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Brusilov Offensive 4 June 1916—20 September 1916

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Brusilov Offensive 4 June 1916—20 September 1916 Volume VIII, Issue 8 15 May 2018 THE ASC HISTORY NEWSLETTER 100th Anniversary of World War I: Brusilov Offensive 4 June 1916—20 September 1916 This MONTH in military history 1778 Battle of Crooked B illet 1780 Battle of Waxhaws 1813 Americans capture Fort George, Canada 1863 B a t t le o f Chancellorsville 1898 U.S. Navy destroys Spanish Pacific fleet 1918 Third German offensive on western Fr o nt 1942 Battle of Midway 1944 D - D a y 1969 Battle of Hamburger H ill World War I saw many new way towards the Austrian front, Brusilov Brusilov was largely successful, but on all 1995 NATO air strikes on technological advances on the and his armies were prepared to launch other fronts it faltered significantly. Bosnian Serb HQ battlefield. Widespread use of the the largest Russian show of force in the The offensive took its toll of roughly submarine made open waters unsafe for entirety of World War I. His goal was two million casualties over the course of civilians and navies, steel coffin tanks effectively to launch a surprise attack four months. The losses on the side of As A Matter of Fact littered fields where crops used to grow, across the entirety of his southwestern the Russians amounted upwards of half a On multiple occasions, and eyes in the sky could see your every front towards the town of Lutsk, and to million. It is contended today that this the government placed move. War was fought in the trenches, knock the Austrian-Hungarian Army out offensive contributed to the collapse of the acreage that now and once the lines were dug in, there of the war entirely while siphoning off the Russian Army due to the short houses Rock Island was little movement and few gains. German forces from the French front. Arsenal up for auction. amount of time that the losses were Each time it was placed To break this stalemate, Russia’s high The offensive launched on 4 June 1916 built. The majority of Central casualties up for public auction, command (Stavka) was tasked with with an artillery barrage against the were suffered by the Austro-Hungarian the sale was pulled the relieving stress on the Entente powers in Austrians, breaking through the lines forces, which was the goal of the Russian day of or the day France by increasing stress on Germany’s swiftly, the Russians continued onward. Army. They also succeeded in forcing the before. eastern front. The hope was to draw This was attributed to Brusilov’s accurate Germans to cease the attack on Verdun Central forces away from Verdun to assessment of weak points in the on the western front. By these points, allow for reinforcements and Austrian line. Keeping momentum, the the Brusilov Offensive was successful. fortification. Two generals established Russians continued onward to recapture Germany, however, remained a viable plans for the Russian army: the first was Lutsk by 8 June. The tremendous speed enemy, and the fighting that was still to GEN Alexei Evert, who proposed a at which the Russians were making come between the last half of 1916 thru May Trivia! defensive plan; the second was GEN headway had staggered the Austrians, 1918 would still prove to be fierce. The USS Lexington was Aleksei Brusilov, who proposed a full out but Evert — still unsure of the success of Historian John Keegan described the sunk during which WW2 offensive strike against the Austrian- the operation — did not advance. This offensive in his 2000 book The First naval battle? Hungarian army. caused flaws to open in the Russian World War as: “the greatest victory seen In what year was a U-2 advance, and allowed the Germans a The Stavka opted to go with Brusilov’s on any front since the trench lines had Spy plane shot down over chance to fill in the Austrian lines. plan, which included four separate been dug.” Indeed, Keegan’s description Russia? armies comprised of smaller and more By 20 September 1916, Brusilov’s seems to accurately peg the brilliance of In what year did Clara specialized units that would focus on forces had pushed to the doorstep of the Brusilov’s plan, as the methods of Barton found the weak points within the enemy lines. He Carpathians. Noting the success of combat used would set the stage for American Red Cross? faced a narrowly smaller Austrian force Brusilov’s front, the Stavka continued to German tactics in their blitzkrieg battles that was reinforced later by German feed more men into Brusilov’s ranks and during World War II. The same tactics forces. Brusilov, however, would not siphoning them off from Evert. This that were devised by Brusilov would be have any reinforcements, putting all of came long after Evert’s attacks had used to stop the Axis Powers less than his reserves on the front lines with the stalled earlier in the year and progress thirty years later as World War II came to For answers, go to the announcement section on the ASC main attacking force. With the massive had slowed on his front. The sector of a close. History SharePoint site . entrenchments dug out and making their combat that was commanded by Brought to you by your friendly ASC History Office. For more copies or any history related needs call Kevin Braafladt or George Eaton (1450), or stop by for a visit at Building 390 BSMT SW. For answers to trivia visit: https://asc.aep.army.mil/sites/Historian/SitePages/Home.aspx .
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