David Mansfield, 8 April 2014

Our Friends in the North: Contrasting Images of Power and Poppy in the ii Provinces of Balkh and Badakhshani

As 2013 ended and 2014 began the rural population in the provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan were subject to quite contrasting experiences of the state and state power. In Balkh, the governor Atta Mohammad Noor had further strengthened his hand and was reasserting his position in parts of the province where only two years ago his hold had been more tenuous. At the same time in Badakhshan the state was on the backfoot, concerned about growing insurgent presence and how the actions of those in positions of power might be seen by a rural population that showed increasing signs of unrest.

'The Cock of the North'iii: Governor Atta's concentration of coercive power in Balkh

As 2013 came to a close, farmers in the province of Balkh, in the districts of Chimtal, Chahar Bolak, Dehdadi and Sholgara, talked of the Governor, Atta Mohammed Noor consolidating his power and successfully marginalising his political and military opponents. Indeed, while there were the ubiquitous complaints from the rural population about corruption by government officials and a lack of development assistance there were few who doubted Governor Atta's fortitude and resilience, even in districts such as Chahar Bolak and Chimtal where only two years prior there had been a growing insurgent presence. Locally, Atta's long term rivals in Balkh, uzbek warlord of Jumbish, and the pashtun commander Juma Khan Hamdard, who had previously fought on the side of Hezbi Islami (Hekmatyar) before becoming the Governor of Paktya,iv were viewed as weak and unable to challenge Atta's primacy. The were also said to have lost territory to Governor Atta and his supporters who he had successfully armed under the Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative.

Illustrative of the extent of Atta's coercive power was the campaign to stamp out opium poppy cultivation in the districts of Chimtal and Chahar Bolak which the Governor had launched in the last few weeks of 2013. This campaign followed the crops resurgence in the area in the 2012/2013 growing season and the province officially losing its 'poppy free' status for the first time since 2007.v While some farmers claimed cultivation had been on the rise since 2009 due to the growing insecurity that had accompanied the last presidential campaign and the decision by regional leaders supporting both Karzai and Abdullah to arm their supporters,vi the United Nations estimated that opium production had reached only 410 hectare in 2013 - still considerably less than the 7, 233 hectares reported in 2006 when cultivation had last been officially reported in the province.vii

By late 2013 farmers were of the view that further cultivation would not be tolerated; and this was not a province where farmers simply heard the same old counternarcotics messages on the radio year-in- year-out. In the deputy provincial security commander Razzaq Qaderi had already taken personal responsibility for efforts to deter planting as of late 2013 and had travelled to a number of districts in person to instruct farmers not to cultivate opium. Units of the ALP in Chimtal and Chahar Bolak had also informed those that had planted the crop that they faced arrest and that their crop would be destroyed. In Chimtal it was said that the ALP 'walked the fields' looking for opium poppy. Some farmers were said to have elected to destroy their own crop fearful of arrest, choosing to plough it over at night so as to attract less attention from the authorities. By early January only a few poppy fields remained; a few solitary farmers with land 'far from the road' who hoped that their crop might go unnoticed, or that come spring, those running the eradication campaign would not bother to traipse across the fields of others just to destroy a few jeribs of opium poppy.

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The resolute actions by the provincial and district authorities in Balkh so early in the 2013/14 growing season stood in contrast to many provinces, and followed on from what many farmers considered a robust eradication campaign in the districts of Chimtal and Chahar Bolak the previous growing season. In both districts farmers complained that there had been few opportunities to avoid the destruction of their crop in the spring of 2013. They argued that the presence of multiple and competing agencies - the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) - resulted in a campaign where there was 'more soldiers than poppy' and that it was almost impossible to bribe members of the eradication team with so many onlookers. The result was a campaign that destroyed all the cropviii that it came across; not the kind of negotiated effort that could be seen elsewhere, such as in the provinces of Badakhshan (see below) and Nangarhar. Some farmers even complained that the loss of their opium crop in the spring of 2013 was followed by a further campaign of crop destruction in the summer when their cannabis plants were also destroyed.

For many it remains a mystery why the Governor has been so pro-active in his desire to maintain a poppy free province. He has often said that he has gained little from the international community in terms of promised development assistance for his counternarcotics efforts.ix Moreover, while he has received some political acclaim for his efforts it has often been short-lived. For example, even at the point that cultivation was brought down from 7,233 hectares in 2006 to 'poppy-free' the following year, ‘success’ quickly turned to skepticism when the international media and commentators claimed those that had abandoned opium poppy had simply replaced it with cannabis,x despite the considerable doubts over the methodology and the veracity of UNODC’s estimate as to the extent of cannabis cultivation - not just in Balkh but nationally.xi

By 2012 it had become almost the norm that Balkh was ‘poppy free’ – there was no song and dance about it; no acclaim even though there had been six consecutive years with negligible levels of cultivation - unprecedented for a province that was once considered a major producer and where cultivation once topped 10,000 hectares. Neither did the return to cultivation in 2013 attract much opprobrium from the international community, particularly given that in the run up to transition in 2014 and the end of the combat mission for international military forces most donors wish to avoid talking about the scale of opium poppy cultivation in and what it might mean for the viability of the Afghan state.

Instead, the real motivation for Balkh to continue as a 'poppy free' province appears to come from Governor Atta himself. It seems to be genuinely important to him, not because others care and that he might be rewarded for his efforts, but because he cares and he has the power to do something about it. Perhaps the real reason why the governor remains so proactive in his pursuit of low levels of drug crop cultivation is less one of projecting the appearance of state power on an international stage - as most efforts to prohibit opium poppy in Afghanistan are designed to do - and more an attempt to concentrate real power by limiting the funding of Atta's political and military competitors within the province. After all, drugs crops are what Snyder and Bhavnani (2005)xii views as a good example of 'lootable resources' - 'high value goods with low economic barriers to entry' - that are notoriously difficult for both private and public actors to establish monopoly control over. Moreover, as an illegal good, state actors find it even more challenging to appropriate the revenues from opium and cannabis without facing sanction from the international community. On this basis it is possible that the ban on opium in Balkh is not simply an example of Governor Atta's concentration of power but part of his strategy for achieving it.

It is also possible to see how many farmers in the province of Balkh can currently refrain from opium poppy cultivation - or at least not pursue violent resistance as a response to the state's eradication

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efforts. With larger irrigated landholdings than are found amongst those cultivating opium poppy in provinces like Nangarhar and Badakhshan, and a growing level of crop diversification it is easier for farmers to maintain food security in districts like Chahar Bolak and Chimtal without recourse to opium poppy cultivation.xiii As the example below shows, with twenty jeribs of land and two crops per year an average household can earn more than USD 1 per person per day, even without access to non farm income and despite the destruction of their opium crop.xiv This is not an option available to many farmers in other provinces where much smaller landholdings and high population densities have made non farm income a critical component of the coping strategy of households compelled to abandon opium production by the state.

The real question, however, is what will happen to the local economy should there be a significant fall in public and private investment in the province after transition in 2014? There are already signs of a fewer wage labour opportunities in Mazar and daily wage labour opportunities have fallen over the last year amidst signs of a general economic downturn in Afghanistan.xv Were security in other parts of the country to worsen, and the markets of Kabul and beyond be blocked to the farmers of Balkh, the pressure to return to opium poppy cultivation would increase significantly. In such a depressed economic environment Governor Atta might reconsider his zero tolerance position on opium production and deem it too risky to use the coercive power of the state on a rural population with few viable alternatives. As the Governor knows all too well, while banning opium

poppy cultivation in areas where farmers have other economic opportunities might reduce the opportunities for rent extraction for rival politico-military actors and support state formation, pursuing the same policy in areas where farmers cannot meet their basic needs often runs the risk of provoking rural rebellion.xvi

Of course the recent presidential election raises a further question; that of the tenure of the current governor. There was an unsuccessful attempt to remove Governor Atta in 2009 following his support for Abdullah in the previous presidential election.xvii Regardless of which candidate ultimately prevails and who becomes Afghan president in 2014, it is likely that an attempt to unseat governor Atta on anything other than terms to which he agrees to will lead to conflict. Since 2004 Atta Mohammed Noor has successfully positioned himself at the controls of the political, economic and security infrastructure of the province of Balkh - no other governor in Afghanistan has managed to dominate in such a way over the last decade. Were Atta to be removed unceremoniously the likely return of opium poppy cultivation to the province would be one of only a number of challenges a future governor would have to deal with.

Burning Bridges in Badakhshan: Projecting the appearance of state power while in retreat

In rural Badakhshan, there was little evidence of the kind of coercive power that Governor Atta was bringing to bear in the province of Balkh. Indeed, in the district of Jurm in Badakhshan the government was already in retreat having lost the territory to the east of the Jurm river from the valley of Khustak in

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the south, a Taliban stronghold, to as far north as Fargha Munj bordering Baharak. The valleys of Kip and Ketip located in between were also dominated by anti government elements, who had successfully deterred government efforts to penetrate the area, including a recent incursion by the Afghan National Police (ANP), whose commander had experienced the indignity of having to negotiate for the release of his men following an attempted raid on a heroin laboratory.xviii

In each of these valleys the Taliban were said to have bedded down, and were described by the local population as understanding local priorities. Indeed, it was commonly understood on both sides of the Jurm river that the Taliban had prevented government forces from destroying any of the opium crop in the areas under its influence - a populist stance that gained them favour with the local population - as one farmer in Kip argued 'it is because of poppy my life has improved and it is because of the Taliban that my crop was not eradicated'.xix

Yet to simply attribute the rise of the Taliban on the eastern bank to the government's counternarcotics efforts would be to misunderstand the complex political terrain in rural Badakhshan, particularly in the district of Jurm. Primarily, it was far from clear whether the rural population of Jurm was opposed to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) per se, or just Zalmei Khan the local strongman who had come to be seen as the government's man in the district, and in the neighbouring districts of Yangan and Kuran wa Munjan. It was certainly the case that Zalmei Khan's desire to dominate the area was a source of considerable contention and a driver of anti government feeling across Jurm. He and his brother Asadullah Khan - a commander of an ANP unit responsible for the security of Mines - were alleged to be appropriating revenues from the Lapis mine in Kuran wa Munjan,xx as well as a more recent mineral exploitations in Dew o Dara on the borders of the districts of Jurm and Khash. It was claimed that they took commission from those with rights to work the mines as well as charged for both transport and security.

It was also Zalmei Khan's people that dominated the Jurm district authorities and the recently formed Afghan Local Police (ALP) in Jurm, Kip, and Khostak. The fact that the ALP units for both Kip and Khustak were found in the centre of Jurm, unable to travel to the valleys for which they were appointed because of insecurity, raised questions amongst the local population as to what their real purpose was and whether this was just another way for Zalmei Khan to re-arm his men. Of course like many of those in positions of formal power in Afghanistan, particularly those who appear to have absorbed the security agencies, there were also allegations of drug smuggling leveled against the brothers - after all they had the vehicles and the mobility with which to transport goods unchecked to the borders. The fact that opium poppy cultivation was visible in close proximity to Zalmei Khan's house in Qala Gumbas was often cited as further evidence of his culpability.

The view that Zalmei Khan's behaviour was driven by his own financial and political interests, and that those interests were diametrically opposed to some local sense of what government should look like in the district was further reinforced by the rumour that Asadullah Khan's business partner in the mine at Dew o Dara was Abdul Wahid, the brother of a local Taliban commander. This kind of political hybridity - where the lines between state and non state, public and private institutions and actors are blurred - prevails in much of rural Afghanistan and particularly at the village level. For example, in the Kip valley farmers reported having family members in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), employed as teachers in public schools or by NGOs, while at the same time making contributions in-kind - in the form of either wheat, opium or both - to what appeared to be a wide range of anti state elements described as 'Taliban'.xxixxii Moreover, the same local elders could be found representing political party, Jamiat Islami; the government's flag ship development programme, the National Solidarity Programme; and anti government elements, in the form of the Taliban. Maintaining a foothold in each institution was

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good practice and a well honoured tradition, as in this kind of contested space who knows who might come to the village on which day of the week.

Given how fluid the political terrain had become in Badakhshan the authorities had already adopted a more cautious position on counter narcotics by the spring of 2013. In fact, the eradication campaign in Badakhshan, would appear to have been more lackluster than official statistics suggest. The results of research in situ, stand in contrast to the 2,798 ha reported by UNODC and the MCNxxiii; figures that suggest the destruction of more than half of the standing cropxxiv and a sixty per cent rise in the amount of eradication compared to 2012, when it was reported that only 1,784 hectares of opium poppy were destroyed.xxv Indeed, far from threatening the population with complete crop destruction - or even half the crop - the authorities appear to have pursued a compromise across most of Badakhshanxxvi in which only a proportion of the farmer's crop was destroyed.

Of course the degree of compromise differed according to the location. Where the government authorities believed it had less to fear from armed opposition groups such as in parts of Argo, Darayem and Baharak, eradication was more resolute Tickling at the Edges: Crop destruction in Jurm, Badakhshan, 2013 destroying perhaps as much as a jerib - or in isolated cases two jeribs - of a household plot of up to four jeribs. In part the authorities looked to see off the potential for violence by threatening a more aggressive eradication effort were communities to resist. In a few isolated cases farmers claimed to have lost the entire crop but on the whole the government's campaign was careful not to overstep the mark with the local population and eradicate too much. According to farmers by eradicating the crop with sticks in the early flower stage there was also a good chance that some of the secondary capsules would escape eradication and they could still get some yield from their opium .xxvii

On the western bank of the district of Jurm - where the government was more fearful of the population turning to the Taliban due to the loss of the eastern bank to the insurgency - it was only a few biswaxxviii destroyed from a household crop of perhaps as much as five jeribs that was destroyed.xxix Here the campaign was carefully managed by the local authorities and the village elders.xxx The district governor and security commander are said to have warned the provincial and national authorities that to press hard on eradication would fuel local resentment and garner support for the Taliban who were after all only across the river. Such was the fear of the influence of anti government elements in the valleys on the eastern bank of the Jurm river that to halt their advance the government destroyed the footbridges that crossed the river connecting the valleys of Kip and Ketip to the centre of the district. It was claimed that the suspension bridges were not just cut and left, but actually set ablaze - a literal example of scorched earth policy designed to isolate these side valleys and their populations from the main population in Jurm centre.

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On the whole crop destruction in Badakhshan was a risk that farmers could manage; more compromise than coercion, designed to cater to the wishes of a rural population that showed a growing potential to shift sides, while at the same time projecting the appearance of state power to officials in Kabul and in western embassies. Even better the authorities seemed less inclined to press forward with an aggressive campaign in the 2013/14 growing season. As far as farmers Now you see it, now you don't!: The destruction of the bridge crossing the Jurm were concerned they had river at Kip in November 2013. heard the usual statements on the radio prior during the fall and early winter but the local authorities had not announced their position with regard to prohibition and there were none of the written proclamations that could be found in the mosques or distributed by the elders that they had seen in previous seasons. Furthermore, while the trade in opium was far from open, many farmers reported that they could still sell their crop in the district centre showing a level of toleration by the authorities, or an inability to enforce the letter of the law, even in the areas in which they were reputed to have greatest control.xxxi

For those that had cultivated opium in 2012/13 the crop had brought reasonable returns. They had obtained yields of between six to ten kilogrammes per jerib in the irrigated areas, and two to four kilogrammes in the rainfed areas of places like Argo. Prices had also been relatively high and farmers had received up to 4600 Afghanis for each kilogramme (the equivalent of USD 82 per kg) that they had sold in 2013. On top of this, those farmers that worked on the land of others during the weeding season had received 200 Afghanis per day, while harvesters had been paid as much as four to five tuli of opium.xxxii Furthermore, as has become the tradition in Badakhshan the women and children were also paid for their work on the family opium crop.xxxiii For example, one farmer in Nawa Jurm reported paying his wife, his two older daughters and his five small children five kilogrammes of opium for their work on the family plot of seven jeribs of opium poppy, one fourteenth of the final yield.

For those with a good crop, opium poppy had allowed them to buy meat and fruit at least once a week, or in some cases, 'as they wanted', and to see a private doctor instead of visit the health centre - where the quality of care was often viewed as substandard. A few households with other forms of non-farm income, such as a member of the family in the ANSF, a teacher, perhaps working in the mines of Kuran wa Munjanxxxiv or Dew o Dara, or in trade, had purchased livestock, carpets,xxxv televisionsxxxvi, satellite dishesxxxvii, solar panelsxxxviii or lap topsxxxix - but these really were few and far between. For most farmers in Badakhshan opium appeared to be far more an important supplement to household income and a source of food security and a way to pay off debts, than the means for rampant consumerism. xl

Of course, as with any other agricultural commodity with expanding cultivation comes the risk of falling prices. In this regard opium is no different from any other crop and by the fall planting season prices

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were as low as 1,000 to 1,200 Afghanis per paw (the equivalent of USD 40 to USD 48 per kilogramme), which along with low yields, had deterred many from planting as much as they had in 2013 and some from growing altogether.xli Even in Kip, on the eastern bank of the Jurm river, where they had nothing to fear from eradication due to the Taliban's presence, most farmers were either maintaining the same level of cultivation or growing less opium poppy in the 2013/14 growing season than they had the year before.xlii Indeed, one farmer in Kip, so pleased with the 15,000 Afghanis per month income his son was earning from the car they had bought and rented out as a taxi travelling the Jurm-Baharak road, had abandoned opium poppy cultivation altogether in 2014 complaining about the low price, the low yield and 'the hard work' required. He like many others farmers in Badakhshan saw much greater potential for higher income from employment elsewhere rather than farming - even opium poppy farming.

Conclusion

There is often a danger of overstating the importance of opium production in the political economy of Afghanistan. It is after all, only one of many crops grown in Afghanistan, and it is rarely monocropped even in those areas where cultivation is concentrated. At the same time opium production is an issue that cannot be ignored. While the 209,000 hectares of opium poppy cultivated in 2013 might represent less than 3 per cent of the total agricultural land in Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation would have generated the equivalent of 376,200 jobsxliii of Full Time Equivalent (FTE). This is around the same number of jobs generated by the cultivation of wheat on irrigated land,xliv despite the fact that wheat is typically grown on over one million hectares of irrigated land each year; and it is greater than the number employed in the Afghan National Security Forces - a focus of the international community's investment. With further jobs in the trading, transportation and processing of opium and its derivatives, as well as the multiplier effect of the USD 2 billion to USD 3.7 billionxlv that UNODC estimates that opiates are worth to the Afghan economy, opium is clearly an integral part of the national economy.

As we move beyond the macro-economic and examine the contribution opium production makes to the political economy of different provinces or even localities we see a varied picture. In the case of Badakhshan and Balkh it is possible to see quite divergent experiences of opium poppy cultivation and attempts to control it. In part this is a function of the different resource endowments that can be found in the two provinces. For instance, in general farmers in Balkh have better access to irrigated land, show greater signs of crop diversification and can access wage labour opportunities in a more vibrant provincial centre - Mazar e Sharif - than their compatriots in Badakhshan. Balkh is also more integrated into the national economy with better access to markets in Kabul than the more mountainous and isolated rural areas of Badakhshan. These attributes make it much easier to supplant the opium economy with other productive enterprises.

But it is also important to recognise that Balkh has seen a growing concentration of political power in recent years. Since being made Governor of Balkh in 2004, Atta Mohammed Noor has proven adept at eliminating his competition, even taking on what many see as a foreign agenda - the banning of opium poppy - as way of reducing rent extraction by his rivals. He now stands as a paramount leader, having succeeded in marginalising his political opponents, pushing back the Taliban and absorbing his supporters into the ALP. In the context of Balkh both political and economic factors have contributed to creating the conditions under which opium poppy can be effectively prohibited, even though there has been none of the kind of proactive counternarcotics effort that has been seen in provinces like Nangarhar and Helmand.

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The same cannot be said of Badakhshan where rivalries between state actors, competition between local politico-military groups, a growing insurgent presence and limited economic opportunities for farmers conspire against the elimination of the crop. Here those in state power tread carefully, fearful of provoking a rural population by pursuing counter narcotics efforts that will undermine farmers' capacity to meet their basic needs and lead to rural rebellion. In this kind of contested space, crop destruction represents a negotiated settlement that draws on a mix of persuasion, patronage and a large amount of bluff, particularly when it comes to the degree of coercive power that state actors are willing or able to expend. The irony is that to Kabul and the international community, eradication is to be celebrated and seen as evidence of a capacity and a will - paraphrasing Scott (1998) – to ‘act like a state’; the rural population often sees quite the opposite.

i This paper is based on research in December 2013 and January 2014 in the provinces of Badakhshan and Balkh. It consists of 238 interviews with farmers in 16 research sites in the districts of Argo, Baharak, Darayem, Jurm, Khash and Tishkan in the province of Badakhshan and 165 interviews in 11 research sites in Balkh, in the districts of Balkh, Chahar Bolak, Chimtal, Sholgara and Dehdahdi. Research sites in both provinces were chosen using Alcis GeoExplorer and based on areas that had a high probability of opium poppy cultivation over the last ten years and that had experienced eradication in the 2012/13 growing season. This means there was a bias towards those area that have a history of opium poppy cultivation. ii Thanks go to Paul Fishstein, Jonathan Goodhand, Dipali Mukhopadhyay for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper and both Alcis and OSDR for the imagery. iii The 'cock of the north' is a term that is used to describe a person with significant power and influence. It was originally used to describe the 4th Duke of Gordon, Alexander Gordon, reflecting his power in north east Scotland but has subsequently been used to describe all chiefs of the Gordon clan. The cock of the north is also a pipe tune and the regimental march of the Gordon Highlanders, a Scottish regiment in the British Army who served in Afghanistan in the 1890s. iv Atta also accuses Hamdard of arming Pashtun commanders in the run up to the 2009 presidential election, allegedly working on behalf of the Ministry of Interior and to counter Atta's support to Abdullah Abdullah candidature. v UNODC consider a province 'poppy free' when less than 100 ha of opium poppy are grown. vi The Guardian,' US embassy cables: Cables reveal Karzai family panic after Afghan elections', 2 December 2010. vii US Government figures concur with farmers views in these areas that levels of opium poppy cultivation were in fact higher in 2012 compared to 2013. US estimates report cultivation reached 640 hectares in 2012 falling to 190 hectares in 2013. viii Of the 37 farmers interviewed that cultivated opium poppy during the 2012/13 growing season 31 experienced eradication. All of these farmers lost their entire crop. ix Adam Pain, 'Let them eat promises: Closing the opium fields in Balkh and its consequences', Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Case Study Series, AREU: Kabul, December 2008, page 1-2. x Kirk Semple, 'Cannabis replacing opium poppies in Afghanistan', New York Times, 4 November 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/world/asia/04iht-cannabis.1.8176149.html?_r=0 xi Initially UNODC estimated levels of cannabis cultivation as part of the opium poppy survey using household interviews. This approach led to national estimates of 50,000 ha of cannabis in 2006 rising to 70,000 ha in 2007 (UNODC/MCN, Annual opium poppy survey, 2007, page 58). It also led to concerns over the efficacy of the methodology, in part due to concerns over the veracity of earlier estimates of the Afghan opium poppy survey prior to the introduction of remote sensing imagery (1994-2002) but also due to the fact that as cannabis is largely a summer crop in Afghanistan and the ground survey for the opium poppy survey takes place during the spring there was no opportunity to view the cannabis crop in situ. The first dedicated UNODC cannabis survey was produced in 2009 and used both household interviews and remote sensing imagery, producing an estimate of

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between 10,000 ha and 24,000 ha. A follow up survey was conducted in 2010 which reported similar levels of cultivation, ranging from 9,000 ha to 29,000 ha of cannabis nationally. The wide range in the estimates reported was due to the challenges of marrying the results of the ground survey with the estimates from imagery, with the higher figure in the range representing the results of the ground survey and the lower figure a product of the analysis of satellite imagery. As opposed to opium poppy where the flowers make the crop relatively easy to identify using remote sensing imagery, both the foliage of the plant and the number of 'confusion crops' grown in the summer months make it much more difficult to identify cannabis, hence the lower figure. However, estimates of the level of crop cultivation based on a visual assessment on the ground have also proven problematic and difficult to verify. The fourth cannabis survey produced by UNODC only used remote sensing and estimated that between 7,000 and 14,000 ha of cannabis was cultivated, with a 'point estimate' of 10,000 ha (UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan: Survey of commercial cannabis cultivation and production 2012, UNODC/MCN: Kabul, September 2013, page 6). Given the methodological challenges and the quite different ways that national figures have been estimated it would be a mistake to say that cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan has fallen from 70,000 ha in 2007 to only 10,000 ha in 2012. xii See Snyder, R., Bhavnani. (2005, August).Diamonds, Blood and Taxes: A Revenue Centred Framework for Explaining Political Order, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 563-597. xiii Amongst those interviewed in Balkh (n165) the average landholdings were 20.6 jeribs, of which 17.3 jeribs were irrigated and 4.8 jeribs were rainfed. While this was not much larger than the average landholding of those interviewed in Badakhshan (n238) at 17. 3 jeribs the amount of irrigated land was considerably smaller at only 4.4 jeribs, compared to rainfed land which was on average 13.2 jeribs per household. In Nangarhar the average landholding amongst those interviewed (n389) was only 5.1 jeribs, all of it irrigated. xiv see Paul Fishstein, 'Evolving Terrain: Opium poppy cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan provinces in 2013', Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, February 2014. His review of households budgets in Chimtal and Balkh suggested that 25 out of the 30 farmers interviewed in 2013 earned more than USD 1 per person per day from on- farm income. xv See World food Programme, Vulnerability Analysis Marketing - Afghanistan, Initial Market Price Bulletin for the month of February 2014, http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp263434.pdf xvi See David Mansfield "'From Bad they Made it Worse': The concentration of opium poppy in areas of conflict", Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, (forthcoming). xvii Paul Fishstein, 'Winning Hearts and Minds: Examining the Relationship between aid and security in Afghanistan's Balkh Province', Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, Boston, 2010, page 17. xviii It was claimed that the police commander had sent forces to the area to investigate reports of a heroin factory and were seized, along with their vehicles by 'the young men in the area'. xix Kip was the only research site where farmers had cultivated opium poppy in the 2012/13 growing season where none of those interviewed had experienced eradication in the spring of 2013. The only others research site where farmers did not report losing their crop in 2013 was in Malangab in the district of Baharak where none had grown the crop. xx Paul Fishstein, 'A little bit poppy free and a little bit eradicated: Opium poppy cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan provinces in 2011/12', AREU, Kabul, 2013; Philipp Munch 'Local Afghan power structure and the international intervention: A review of developments in Badakhshan and Kunduz provinces', Afghan Analysts Network, Kabul, March 2013. xxi Paul Fishstein, 'Evolving terrain', 2014 describes the Taliban in Badakhshan as a 'vague term, used to cover a range of actors, including criminals, “local Taliban,” and insurgents who might have a connection with a Taliban hierarchy'. xxii All of those interviewed in Kip reported cultivating opium in 2012/13 on anything from half a jerib to six jeribs. Of these five farmers reported giving an amount of their opium crop to the Taliban, ranging from 0.432 kg to 1.5 kg, but claimed there was 'no rule' applied to how much should be paid. Fourteen of these farmers claimed to have given some of their wheat crop to the Taliban, ranging from 15 to 30 seers of wheat, on average less than nine per cent of their crop. xxiii UNODC/MCN Afghanistan, Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2013, UNODC/MCN, Kabul, December 2013.

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xxiv UNODC/MCN estimated that there were 2374 ha of opium poppy left after the eradication campaign had finished (UNODC/MCN, 2013, page 98). xxv UNODC/MCN, 2013, page 32. xxvi Of the 148 that cultivated opium poppy in the 2012/13 growing season, 132 (89%) had lost some of their crop to the eradication campaign. Of these only 32 (24%) reported that half of their crop or more was destroyed. The average amount of crop destroyed was only 24% of the standing crop. xxvii It is claimed that this method often only destroyed the main capsule leaving the secondary capsules intact. xxviii One biswa is the equivalent of 100 square meters, therefore one jerib consists of 20 biswa. xxix In Jurm the levels of eradication reported by farmers rarely exceeded ten per cent of the crop cultivated in 2012/13 growing season. xxx It is said that in Jurm the elders were first asked to come to the district centre and meet with the authorities to discuss the eradication plan. Once an agreement was reached between the authorities and elders a day was agreed when the eradication team would come to the village where they would be escorted to the fields by the elders themselves. xxxi Of the 118 that reported selling their crop in 2013, 51 farmers, including those from Jurm, Tishkan, Darayem, and Khash, claimed that they had sold their opium in the district centre or in Faizabad bazaar. xxxii One tuli is the equivalent of 18 grams. There are 24 tuli to one Kabuli paw. xxxiii David Mansfield, 'Governance, Security and Economic Growth: The Determinants of Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Districts of Jurm and Baharak in Badakhshan'. A Report for the Aga Khan Development Network, 2007. xxxiv One respondent in Nawa Jurm had a son who was working in Dew o Dara mine on the Khash-Jurm border and a father working in the mines of Kuran wa Munjan. His father sent 5,000 Afghanis per month to the family in 2013, down from 10,000 Afghanis/month in 2012. Meanwhile his son had worked in Dew o Dara for 8 months and not yet earned anything. In 2013 this family had worked as sharecroppers on 3 jeribs of land in Nawa Jurm, cultivating 1 jerib of wheat and 2 jeribs of opium poppy in the winter months. The 8 kilogrammes of opium that the farmer received as his half share of the opium crop was sold for 2,000 Afghanis per paw ( the equivalent of 4629 Afghanis/kg), bringing in less cash income than his father sent from Kuran wa Munjan in 2013. xxxv Prices from 6,000 to 8,000 Afghanis. xxxvi Prices from 4000 to 6,000 Afghanis. xxxvii Price of 6,000 Afghanis. xxxviii Price 8,000 Afghanis. xxxix Price of 15,000 Afghanis. xl Monthly salaries in the ANA were around 13,500 Afghanis per month, a total of 162,000 Afghanis per year; the equivalent of a total yield of 35 kg of opium sold at 4,600 Afghanis/kg requiring 4.4 jeribs of irrigated land allocated to opium poppy and 11.6 jeribs of rainfed land. Only 25 of the 148 respondents cultivating opium poppy in 2013 cultivated enough poppy to produce the same or more gross income as having a family member in the ANSF. xli Of the eighty four respondents that said they would reduce the amount of land that they would allocated to opium poppy in the 2013/14 seventy seven (92%)had experienced eradication the spring of 2013, losing on average 29% of their crop. When asked whether they had experienced a significant change in their livelihood (this could be positive or negative) over the last twelve months, only seventeen of those respondents who had reduced the amount of land that they were cultivating with opium poppy in the 2013/14 growing season reported that eradication was the cause. Of the sixty six farmers who were maintaining the same level of cultivation or increasing the amount of land they dedicated to opium poppy in the 2013/14 growing season compared to the previous year, fifty three (80%) had lost on average one fifth of their crop to eradication in 2013. Eight of these farmers identified eradication was the cause of the significant change in their livelihood. xlii In Kip eight farmers were cultivating the same amount of opium poppy that they had in 2013; four had reduced the amount of land that they had grown with poppy; two had increased the amount of land they had dedicated to opium poppy and one had not cultivated opium poppy in either 2013 or 2014. xliii Opium poppy cultivation requires 360 person days per hectare from the point that land is ploughed and tilled for planting to the stage where the crop is finally cleared. With an estimated 209,000 ha grown in 2013, opium poppy would have required 75,240,000 labour days. Were this converted to Full Time Equivalent using a rate of 200 work days per year, opium poppy cultivation would have generated 376,200 FTE.

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David Mansfield, 8 April 2014

xliv According to Hector Maletta (2004: 24) wheat production on irrigated land requires 65 person days per hectare from the point that land is ploughed and tilled for planting to the stage where the crop is finally cleared. With MAIL estimating that 1,155,000 ha of wheat were grown in 2013 wheat would have required 75,075,000 labour days. Were this converted to Full Time Equivalent using a rate of 200 work days per year, wheat production would have generated 375,375 FTE (See Hector Maletta, 'The Grain and the Chaff: Crop residues and the cost of production of wheat in Afghanistan in a farming system perspective', July 2004. xlv UNODC/MCN Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, December 2013, page 10.

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