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THE UNIVERSITY of HULL Policing Internet Fraud In THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL Policing Internet Fraud in Saudi Arabia: The Mediation of Risk in a Theocratic Society Being a Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Hull By Abdullah Faze Algarni Bachelor in Security Sciences (1st in Cohort with 1st Class Honours), King Fahad Security College, 1995 Bachelor in Fundamentals of Religion (1st in Cohort with 1st Class Honours), Imam Mohammed Bin Saud Islamic University, 2000 MA Criminology, The University of Hull, 2005 Postgraduate Diploma in Research Training, The University of Hull, 2011 June 2012 Abstract This thesis aims to contribute to current debates on the policing of Internet fraud by introducing the Saudi Arabian experience. Drawing on the findings of field research focusing on the capital city of Riyadh, this study assesses the extent to which the Saudi state response to Internet fraud fits in with contemporary debates on cybercrime control within a late-modern penal framework as theorised in Western literature. At the same time, the study provides a detailed micro-sociological account of how the policing of Internet fraud is carried out in different police units within the city in which the case study was conducted. This involves an in-depth investigation into both the organisational and operational dimensions of the Saudi police response to such criminal activity. In this respect, the thesis explores and analyses how this new aspect of policing activity fits in with not only the existing organisational practices, but also the occupational and individual concerns of frontline officers (McCahill, 2002). Moreover, the study considers the implications of the Arab, Islamic and specifically Saudi culture, social norms, values and political environment for police responses to Internet fraud. An interpretive approach was adopted, employing a single case study strategy, which utilised two methods, i.e. participant observation and semi-structured interviews, to collect the required data. The observational data was generated from seven police departments that are directly involved in the policing of Internet fraud in Riyadh. Interviews were conducted with 41 participants, including representatives of both the managerial and operational levels at the units targeted in the observational work, officers from supporting departments and officers with key roles in planning, controlling and supervising the implementation of police policies and strategies in relation to Internet fraud, at both national and local levels. The findings revealed that the only way in which Saudi control strategies in response to cybercrime can be aligned with those followed by Western authorities is in relation to the state’s ‘expressive gestures’ (Garland, 1996, 2001). In this regard, evidence demonstrated that the legal and organisational innovations introduced by the Saudi state, ostensibly to address informational crimes, had serious limitations in achieving their declared purposes and were perceived by police participants as intended only to create and sustain a favourable global image. In contrast, the study failed to find a clear and wide application of plural policing of Internet fraud, which is characterised i by networks of calculation through deploying instrumental ordering practices and risk management technologies. In addition to the limited relevance in an autocratic society such as Saudi Arabia of the ideological, socio-economic and political conditions that facilitated the emergence of the notion of plural policing in Western societies, the Saudi police organisation also appeared unready to engage in networked policing of Internet fraud. Moreover, it was shown how the policing response to Internet fraud was shaped by specific moral principles and cultural values. The findings of this thesis emphasise not only the persistent influence of ‘old’ cultural traditions and moral principles on officers’ perception of risk in Internet fraud and, consequently, their decision to respond to incidents brought to their attention, but also how police commitment to these cultural and religious values can place limits on the ability of technological systems to facilitate preventive policing of online fraudulent activities. Based on these findings, it is argued that policing of Internet fraud in Saudi Arabia, and the extent to which it aligns with the principles of crime control in late modernity, can only be understood by examining and analysing how new policing modes and cultural traditions merge and integrate to shape police response to such a novel criminal phenomenon as Internet fraud. ii Acknowledgements As this chapter of my life comes to an end I praise Allah the Almighty for giving me the strength and perseverance I needed to accomplish this project. Thank you Lord for all the blessings you have bestowed upon me. Initially, I would like to thank Professor David Wall and Professor Majid Yar for their kind acceptance to examine this thesis. There are a number of people whose guidance, motivation, expertise and love made the completion of this research possible, and therefore expression of gratitude is due to each and every one of them. First, I am deeply grateful to my parents for their support and prayers, which enlightened my way throughout this work. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Michael McCahill, for his enthusiastic supervision, insightful guidance and constructive criticism. His intellectual and practical support during all phases of this research, as well as his sincere endeavour to help me improve the quality of my work, are all highly appreciated. A good share of any strengths in my thesis can be traced to his influence. I should also acknowledge the support of Dr. Adam Calverley, who was my second supervisor during the last two years of my course. My thanks extend to the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Hull for a truly friendly learning experience. I am especially grateful to the Head of the department, Professor Peter Young, and the secretaries for the excellent help I received throughout my PhD. The Graduate School’s members of staff are also owed thanks for being handy and cooperative whenever they were needed. A big thank you goes to all the many relatives, friends and colleagues who phoned me constantly to check on my well-being and to offer their support and best wishes. Their encouragement and caring words toward me and my family sustained me more than they know. These acknowledgements would be incomplete without recognising the favour of King Fahad Security College in giving me the opportunity to continue my higher education, and also expressing a special note of gratitude to all the individuals who assisted with the fieldwork in Riyadh and were kind enough to share with me their experience and attitudes, which formed the core of this study. Last but not least, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my beloved wife, Um Fahad, for her unwavering love, tireless caring, positive attitude and continuing encouragement. To her and to my lovely sons, Fahad, Naif and Nwaf, I say: thank you very much for picking me up when I was disheartened and for helping me to end my PhD journey successfully. I will eternally be thankful for the sacrifices each of you has made to make my dreams come true, and I will cherish the memories I had with you in the UK forever. iii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................. i Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... iv List of Tables .................................................................................................................. ix List of Figures .................................................................................................................. x List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... xi Chapter One: Background and Overview of the Thesis ............................................. 2 1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 2 1.2 What is Internet Fraud? ................................................................................... 4 1.3 The Research Problem .................................................................................... 6 1.4 The Research Motivation and Objectives ....................................................... 8 1.5 The Research Questions ................................................................................ 10 1.6 The Significance of the Study ....................................................................... 10 1.7 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................. 11 1.8 Outline of Methodology ................................................................................ 12 1.9 The Research Context ................................................................................... 14 1.9.1 The Saudi Policing System ................................................................. 16 1.10 Structure of the Thesis ................................................................................. 20 Chapter Two: Crime Control in Late Modernity and the Policing of
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