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2005 Exploring Reproductive Roles and Attitudes in Saudi Arabia Azizah Linjawi
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EXPLORING REPRODUCTIVE ROLES AND ATTITUDES IN SAUDI ARABIA
By AZIZAH LINJAWI
A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Degree awarded: Fall semester 2005 The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Azizah Linjawi defended on August 4th 2005:
______Elwood Carlson Professor Directing Dissertation
______Rebecca Miles Outside Committee Member
______Graham Kinloch Committee Member
______Isaac Eberstein Committee Member
Approved:
______Patricia Martin (Chair - Sociology)
______Graham Kinloch (College of Social Sciences)
The office of Graduate studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.
ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Praise be to almighty Allah, the most merciful one, for his blessings to me which enabled me to finish my study at FSU. I write this acknowledgement with special gratitude and thanks to my Professor Elwood Carlson for his great teaching and his unlimited patience. I really appreciate his commitment to teaching me and imparting knowledge and encouragement. I have great respect for him. I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Professor Isaac Eberstein for his tremendous encouragement and advisement. I also wish to convey much thanks to Professor Rebecca Miles for sharing with me her own experience in research related to the Arab world along with always willing to teach. I have learned so much from her. I also would like to express great thanks to Professor Graham Kinloch, Associate Dean of the College of Social Science at FSU, and Professor Kathryn Tillman. These professors served without reservation on my dissertation committee, providing lots of direction and taking extra responsibility. I here would like to thank my editor Mrs. Trisha C. Shaw for all her assistance editing my research work. Finally I express my gratitude to Professor Esmail Gashgary at King Abdulaziz University who provided assistance to me with data collection for surveys. I really appreciate all of you helping me achieve this milestone.
Azizah Linjawi, Tallahassee FL, August 2005
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………… vii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………….. ix Abstract…………………………………………………………………………… x
1. REPRODUCTION AND POPULATION GROWTH IN SAUDI ARABIA A. Introduction…………………………………………………...…...... 1 B. Population Growth Rates………………………………………………. 2 C. Mortality Decline and Population Growth…………………………….. 3 D. The Predominant Role of Fertility in Population Growth…………….. 6 E. Population Distribution………………………………………………… 9 F. Increasing Education for Women………………………………...... 12 G. Changes in Female Labor Force Participation…………………...... 15 H. Tribal Identity in Saudi Culture………………………………………... 16 I. Gender Relations in Saudi Society…………………………………….... 18 J. Demographic Studies in Saudi Arabia………………………………….. 19
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF FERTILITY A. Do Theories Fit the Middle East?……………………………………… 22 B. Special Institutional Factors in Saudi Arabia…………………………… 29
3. THE MOTIVATIONAL CONTEXT OF FERTILITY A. The Rational Actor/Rational Choice Model of Fertility Behavior..…… 31 B. Social and Political Limits on the Rational Actor……………………… 35 C. Social Networks: How Social Context Influences Fertility Decisions… 41 D. The Fertility Decision-Making Process………………………………… 43
4. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS A. Fertility Attitudes and Behavior in Saudi Arabia. ……….…....………. 45 B. Location for Study: City of Jeddah……………………………...... 45
iv C. Variables for Study……………………………………………………... 49 D. Method of Data Collection……………………………………………… 53 E. Analysis of Results……………………………………………………… 60
5. FINDINGS ON ATTITUDES ABOUT REPRODUCTIVE ROLES AND BEHAVIOUR A. Scenario One…………………………………………...………...... 62
1. Timing of the first child ………………………………………… 62 2. Others involved in the birth decision …………………………… 69
3. The ultimate decision-maker ……………………………………. 73
4. Influence of living with the husband’s family ………………….. 78 5. Effect of the wife’s job on the birth decision ………………….. 83 6. Knowledge and use of contraceptives ………………………….. 87 B. Scenario Two…………………………………………………………… 90 1. The average number of children ……………………………….. 90 2. Influences to Have Fewer Children …………………………….. 93 3. Influences to Have More Children ……………………………... 98 C. Scenario Three…………………………………………………………. 101 1. If the first child is a boy ……………………………………….. 102 2. If the first child is a girl ………………………………………... 106 3. If she has three boys …………………………………………… 110 4. If she has three girls ……………………………………………. 114
6. COMPARISONS OF ATTITUDE TO ACTUAL LIFE HISTORIES A. Length of the First Birth Interval…….…………………………………. 120 B. Number of Children Ever Born………………………………………… 124 C. Sex Preferences for Children and Sex Ratios…………………...... 127 D. Attitude Toward Gender Relationship & Actual Fertility Behavior………………………………………………... 130
v 7. CONCLUSION FOR FUTURE SAUDI RESEARCH A. Introduction…………………………………….………………………. 137 B. Methodologies………………………………………………………….. 139 C. Substantive Conclusions……………………….………………………. 141 D. Prospects for Saudi Society……………………………………………. 147
APPENDICES ...... ………………………………………………… 150 REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………. 158 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH………………………………………...... 168
vi LIST OF TABLES
1A. Population in Saudi Arabia………………………….……………………….. 2 1B. Gulf State Populations in 2000……………………...….…………………… 3 1C. Infant and Child Mortality Rates per 1000 Births…………...... 4 1D. Percent Decline in Infant Mortality in Arab Countries 1950-1990…………………………………………...…………………… 5 1E. Percentage Decline in Crude Birth Rates from 1950-1990…………………. 6 1F. Total Fertility Rate of Saudi Women…………………...…………………… 7 1G. Knowledge and Use of Modern Contraceptive Methods…………………… 8 1H. TFR for Urban and Rural Areas……………………………...... 9 1I. Reproductive Status by Urban/Rural Residence……………………………… 9 1J. Percent of Saudi Female Population In-Migrant in Administrative Areas……………………………………..…………………… 12 1K. Educational Attainment for Saudi Females in the Largest Administrative Areas………………………………………………………..... 14 1L. Mean Age of Marriage for Men and Women by Region…...... 14 4A. Saudi Population by Residence, 1999……………………………………….. 47 4B. Research Sample……………………………………………………………… 56 4C. Occupations by Education and Tribal/Non-tribal Identity for Young Ages…. 57 5A. Response Patterns for Timing of First Births…………………………………. 64 5B. Response Patterns Regarding the Ultimate Decision-Maker………...... 74 5C. Response Patterns For the Typical Number of Children a Saudi Might Have………………………………………...………………….. 92 5D. Five Most Frequently Cited Reasons to Have Fewer Children……………… 95 5E. Response Patterns for "If the first child is a boy, will she have another child?"……………………………….…...……………………. 104 5F. Response Patterns for "If the first child is a girl, will she have another child?"……………………………………...………………….. 108 5G. Response Patterns for "If she has three boys, will she have another child?"…………………………………………………………. 113 5H. Response patterns for "If she has three girls, will she have another child?"…………………………………………………………. 117
vii 6A. Actual Intervals from Participants’ Ages at Marriage to Ages at First Birth………………………………………………………….. 121 6B. Actual Mean Ages for Participants at Marriage and First Birth…………………………………...... …………………………….. 123 6C. Actual Mean Number of Children Born to Each Participant……………………………………………………………………. 125 6D. Proportion of Boys and Girls by Sex of Last Child…………………………. 127 6E. Fertility Behavior Following the Consecutive Births of Three Same Sex Children…………………………………………………… 128 6F. Fertility Attitudes Compared to Actual Mean Scores for Total Children Born…………………………………….……………………. 131 6G. Actual Mean Number of Children Born to Participants’ Compared With Participants’ Attitudes Toward Gender Relationships and the Ultimate Decision-Maker……….……………………………………………. 134
viii LIST OF FIGURES
1A. Age-Specific Fertility Rates 1994-1996……………...….…………………. 10 1B. Map of Saudi Arabia's Provinces……………….…………………………… 11 1C. Percent of Female Population in Labor Force by Age Group…………………………………………………………………… 15 1D. Saudi Labor Force by Sex, 2002……………………………………………. 16
4A. Administrative Areas in Saudi Arabia………………………………………. 46
4B. Labor Force (15 Years and Over) by Administrative Area, Nationality, and Sex in 2002………………………………………………… 47 4C. Map of Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………….. 48 4D. Research Design and Content………………………………………………. 51
ix ABSTRACT
My study attempts to provide a picture of the relationship between choices about childbearing in Saudi Arabia, the position of certain women in the social structure of Saudi Arabian society, and their family formation attitudes. The assumption of the study was that a woman’s social position may affect her attitudes about gender relationships and, in consequence, her fertility behavior outcome may be affected as well. This study is important for Saudi society. A study linking fertility transition and social-structural family formation changes could provide important information and clues as to how these two trends interact, explain variations in the fertility transition within Saudi society, and provide a prior study about how women’s social position might serve as a demographic indicator. This study will help in explaining how reproductive roles and attitudes can be explained in more detail, apart from the low status of women in Islam, which many previous studies have focused on. Using the format of focus group interviews as a method, this study gathered qualitative data from married Saudi women in Jeddah, differentiated by level of education, work status, age, and family background. Groups were scheduled for two-hour sessions, 90 minutes for the interview and 30 minutes for the introduction and ending. Interviews were conducted in the places I originally located each group. In general, many members of tribal and non-tribal groups alike still hold a traditional attitude toward having children right away, especially women who are 50 and older. All groups most often indicated that the husband controls the fertility decision, and religious reasons for obeying the husband’s wishes were cited among both tribal and non- tribal participants. Tribal participants appeared more independent than non-tribal women and indicated a greater willingness to use deceptive practices to control fertility. The majority of participants thought that the husband’s family, the husband’s mother in particular, would be involved in fertility decisions. Tribal women were more likely to express a religious rationale for their attitude toward childbearing. Non-tribal women were more likely to fear using contraceptives or to believe that childbearing is the exclusive goal of the marriage. Tribal women were much less likely to say the hypothetical couple would wait a while. Non-tribal women
x more often stated the couple should wait a while, though their actual behavior did not show this. Almost all participants know about contraceptive methods. Older non-tribal women waited longer after marriage to have a first child than did younger non-tribal women. Non-tribal women were twice as likely as tribal women to see work and motherhood as incompatible. Non-tribal participants were more likely to say that living with the husband’s family would result in increased interference from the husband’s family in the birth decision process. The actual mean number of children differed between tribal and non-tribal groups. For tribal the mean was 4.3 with a standard deviation 3.1, and for non-tribal the mean was 3.0 with a standard deviation of 1.8. Non-tribal participants were more concerned than tribal participants about the high cost of children. Tribal participants were more likely to cite a religious belief for having more children than average, whereas non-tribal groups cited a lack of awareness. To satisfy the family, though, both tribal and non-tribal will have more children to have sons. Tribal women were twice as likely as non-tribal women to say the husband will be satisfied with 3 boys and not need more children. Non-tribal women were more likely to say that a man might want a daughter. Among the tribal groups, the older women more often gave the religiously-influenced response “as God wills” in answer to questions about the timing and the number of children, though both young and old want children right away. Younger tribal women limit children to raise them well. Older women were more likely to say no one else is involved in the birth decision, while young women appeared more sensitive to interference from the husband’s family. Among non-tribal groups, health problems and the desire to raise children well were the most cited as reasons for limiting fertility by older women, whereas, the high cost of childrearing was the most cited reason of young non-tribal women. Older participants suggested the hypothetical couple would have more children, and had more children themselves compared to younger participants. Regarding education’s effect, no one from the non-tribal groups of women with more than a high school education said that couples should have children right away but suggested they look first to establishing themselves. The effect was not so clear for tribal women. No women with more than a high school education provided the religious response that God’s will might cause couples to have fewer children. Educated
xi respondents often stated that the desire for children depends on one's situation and financial condition and that a couple today will have 4 to 6 children. The more educated a participant was, the more likely she was to consider herself the one responsible to take care of her child. This finding agrees with the 1992 study by Miles in Jordan. Less educated women said the wife can both work and have children. More educated women were more likely to say a wife should not wait to have another child if she has a girl first. Education did not lessen the preference for sons. Education did not affect actual first birth intervals in tribal groups, but did have a negative effect on the actual mean family size in both tribal or non tribal. Working women, especially among tribal groups, were more likely to state that a newly married couple should wait a while before having children. Younger working women said a wife must choose between work and bearing children. Working women were more likely than non-working women to say a lack of awareness leads couples to have more children. Tribal working women more often mentioned the desire to raise and educate children well and a desire to arrange their own lives as factors limiting childbearing. Non-working tribal women, on the other hand, were more likely to state that only God’s will would limit childbearing. Work status did not affect family size, except slightly among non-tribal groups. Regarding spacing births, tribal women with jobs were more likely than those not working to say that a woman who had a girl as a first child could wait to get pregnant again. Work had no effect on actual family size, preference for sons, or first birth intervals. Among both tribal and non-tribal participants in this study, women who held a view that a woman could control her own fertility had on average fewer children than those who believed the decision to be the husband’s or mutual. This was especially true among tribal educated women and tribal women with jobs. Future research should focus on asking Saudi men about their attitudes and should also give more attention to the importance of the husband’s mother and inquire about her attitudes. Also, researchers should give more attention to work and the various kinds of work and how that affects fertility. Implications of this study indicate that further research should be done regarding gender relationships and their effect on fertility in Saudi Arabia.
xii
CHAPTER ONE REPRODUCTION AND POPULATION GROWTH IN SAUDI ARABIA
Introduction
This study has seven chapters. This first chapter addresses the importance of studying fertility in Saudi Arabia, stressing the predominant role of fertility in population growth and related vital changes (population growth rates, mortality decline). These demographic trends connect with many other changes in social structure, including population distribution, increasing education for women, changes in female labor force participation, tribal identity in Saudi culture, and gender relations in Saudi society. My dissertation research concentrates most on the last five items in this list, but to understand the importance of my work, the whole picture should be considered. Any pattern of fertility is based on the overlapping of economic and cultural factors. Understanding key dimensions of the social structure and values about family size in a transforming Saudi society (determining what is desirable and what is not in terms of family size) are important elements in the analysis and understanding of fertility trends and levels, and of the balance of vital events involved in the natural increase of the Saudi population. Chapters 2 and 3 explain economic change and cultural context as influences on fertility, and examine the special considerations needed to understand these issues in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. Chapter 4 is about methodological considerations in my research. Chapters 5 and 6 present my findings, and Chapter 7 is the conclusion.
A. Population Growth Rates
1
In the last twenty years, Saudi Arabia has experienced changes in total population. The Saudi Arabian Central Department of Statistics concluded from a demographic survey that the population in Saudi Arabia increased 17.4 % from 1992 to 1999. The total population of the country reached 21.4 million in 1999, including 15.7 million Saudis and 5.7 million non –Saudis. In the most recent demographic survey in 2004, population reached 22,673,538 including 16,529,302 Saudis and 6,144,236 non Saudis. (Saudi Central Department of Statistics, 2004). As shown in Table 1A, growth rates have been slowing for both the native Saudi population (the subject of my research) and the rising share of the population composed of immigrants.
Table 1A Population in Saudi Arabia Annual Annual Non Growth Growth Saudi Saudi Rate Rate Year of (non- census (millions) (millions) (Saudi) Saudi) 1974 6.2 0.8 1992 12.3 4.6 3.80% 9.70% 1999 14.9 5.0 2.7% 1.10% 2004 16.5 6.1 2.04% 3.89% Sources: Calculated from demographic surveys of 1999 & 2004.
The World Bank indicated that Saudi Arabia is one of the largest Gulf countries in terms of population.
2 Table 1B Gulf State Populations in 2000 (millions) Bahrain 0.6 Qatar 0.7 Kuwait 2 Oman 2.4 UAE 2.9 Yemen 17.5 Saudi Arabia 20.7 Iraq 23.3 Iran 63.7 Source: World Bank, 2000
In 1999 population estimates showed that the population of Saudi nationals has a very young age structure, similar to that commonly observed in high-fertility societies, with 16 percent of the population aged under 5 years, 41 percent aged under 15 years and only three percent aged 65 and over (UN-ESCWA, 1999). These indications of youth dependency and of future labor force growth do not suggest an easy future for the Saudi population, especially if we know that the young age structure will promote even further increase in the population. Saudi Arabia in the long run may need to reduce its native population growth to ensure an economic reform for the population and for the expansion of education, employment and social services. (Achievement plan 2000-2004). Since I am looking at the native Saudi population, the main factors determining such growth rates are mortality levels and fertility levels.
B. Mortality Decline and Population Growth
1. Crude death rates Rapid socioeconomic development, which has taken place since the early 1960s, has made a visible impact on the health status of the population. During the period from 1960 to 1996, the Saudi crude death rate estimated from health surveys in the country decreased from 23 to 4 deaths per thousand population. The surveys employed a
3 standard technique for estimating vital rates including adult mortality, maternal mortality and life tables, from questions that can be answered with reasonable accuracy; namely questions on number of children ever born, children dead, father alive, mother alive, and death of ever-married sisters who died while pregnant (Graham et al.1995). All these questions help to estimate mortality. The data from a similar survey in 1999 estimated 4.11 deaths per 1000 population in Saudi Arabia.
2. Infant and child mortality A comparison of results from the 1987 Saudi Arabia child health survey with another survey conducted in 1996 indicated that the percentage of all children born to Saudi women that had died by the time of the survey declined from 11 percent in 1987 to 5 percent in 1996. Deaths for infants less than one year of age dropped from 49 deaths per 1000 birth in the period between 1977 and 1981 to 21.6 deaths per thousand in 1999. These results do not look different from other Arab countries, which were characterized by high infant mortality rates between 1980 and 1990. Infant deaths in Arab countries during the period between 1985 and 1990 ranged from 65 per 1000 live births in Egypt and 44 in Jordan to 120 in Yemen. Saudi Arabia's infant death rate was higher than that of other Gulf countries in 1992, such as in Kuwait (18) and Bahrain (16) (Makhlouf, 1992). Further, comparisons of the infant and child death rates for several years showed that the decrease in death rates over time is not stable for infant and early childhood. Mortality is relatively high.
Table 1C Infant and child mortality rates per 1000 births Year Ages 0 to 1 Ages 1 to 4 Ages 0 to 4 1977-1981 48.6 15.7 64.3 1982-1986 30.1 7.1 37.2 1987-1991 18.8 5.1 23.9 1992-1996 21.4 7.7 29.1 1999 38.4 5 43.4 Source: Health survey 1996. Demographic survey 1999
4
Infant mortality has decreased over time except between 1992 and 1999. The health survey in 1996 involved retrospective data, subject to errors of omission and misreporting of date of birth and for age at death, which are common for events further back in time. Also, “…the data are based only on those births reported by women of reproductive age at a given point in time and those are truncated because women past age 49 are not interviewed” (p.181). The increase in infant mortality from 1992 to 1999 in Saudi Arabia may well reflect improvements in infant death registration. The survey of 1996 indicated that "until recently, early childhood mortality in Saudi Arabia was relatively high” (p.180) but the pace of transition to lower mortality differs between regions. Urban infant mortality was 18.3 per thousand, about 36 percent lower than the rural infant mortality of 27.9 per thousand. Urban environments feature more child health care. (Health survey1996). All regions in Saudi Arabia have shared in the decline in infant and child mortality, but the pace of the transition to lower mortality has been much faster for births to urban/educated women. The decline in infant mortality rate in Saudi Arabia from 1950 to 1990 was 65%. This decline was less than Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, which are considered similar to Saudi Arabia. The United Nation in 1991stated trends in infant mortality rates in Arab countries and showed percent in decline 1950-1990.
Table 1D Percent Decline in Infant Mortality in Arab countries 1950-1990 Saudi Arabia 65% Bahrain 91% Kuwait 86% Qatar and Oman 83% Source: United Nations, 1991
The growth rate of a population is a function of the difference between fertility and mortality (and, of course, migration). Mortality is also an important dimension of
5 family planning research since reductions in child mortality often are followed some years later by voluntary decreases in birth rates.
C. The Predominant Role of Fertility in Population Growth
1. Crude birth rates, with comparisons There was no clear decline in fertility up to 1990 in Saudi Arabia, according to the United Nation Report in 1991. This differed from other Gulf countries like Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar.
Table1E Percentage Decline in Crude Birth Rates from 1950-1990 Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Oman Arabia 0 41 46 20 0 Source: United Nations 1991
However, the demographic survey of 1999 indicted that the crude birth rates changed from 43 in 1000 people in 1980 to 34 in 1000 people in 1998 (Demographic survey 1999). The government considers the current level of fertility as satisfactory (United Nations 2000). The crude birth rate is calculating by summing all births and dividing by the whole population as if each person in the society can have a birth. That may be dangerous for interpretation. Women of childbearing ages in society can give birth, so total fertility rates based on only such women in the denominator resolve the danger of depending on crude birth rates.
2. Total fertility rates The Saudi Central Department of Statistics (Ministry of planning 1999) estimated that the total fertility rate of Saudi women has declined since the 1980s, when the total
6 fertility rate was over 6 births per woman. However, the rate was still at 5.4 infants per women in 1996 and at 5.2 in 1999. This is still high compared with a global average of 2.7.
Table 1F Total Fertility Rate of Saudi Women 1987-1991 1992-1996 1994-1996 1996 1999 7.87 6.10 5.74 5.36 5.20 Sources: Health Survey 1996 and Demographic Survey 1999.
The results from the demographic survey in 1999, health surveys in 1991 and the health survey in 1996 showed the total fertility rate and age specific fertility rates in Saudi Arabia declined slightly, but still remained high compared to other Arab and Gulf countries. Results from the 1996 Saudi Arabia family health survey indicated that fertility is strongly influenced by social and economic development including the increase in age at marriage, which reduces the family size that couples desire. The study (p. 126) mentioned “that increasing women’s control over their reproductive lives would clearly have a major impact on the health of mothers and the growth and survival of their children. Individual choices about family size are, however, made effective through fertility regulation." Given the importance of knowledge about contraceptive methods and their uses in spacing births, the Saudi Arabia Family Health Survey of 1996 gathered information about birth spacing and contraceptive uses from ever-married Saudi women. Table 1G shows that knowledge of modern methods was nearly universal at all ages for this national sample, just as indicated by my respondents (see later chapters). Actual use of modern contraceptives includes more than half of Saudi women between ages 25 to 40, suggesting these methods are used for spacing births, rather than for delaying the start of childbearing or stopping childbearing altogether.
7 Table 1G Knowledge and Use of Modern Contraceptive Methods
Ages Knowledge Ever used
15 to 19 87.5 24.8 20 to 24 91.8 45.2 25 to 29 92.7 55.5 30 to 34 91.8 56.3 35 to 39 90.7 57.3 40 to 44 88.4 49.0 45 to 49 86.4 44.0 Source: Saudi Arabia Family Health Survey 1996
In Saudi Arabia, all recent statistical data demonstrate slow and unstable rates of change for vital events (especially fertility) and the rate of growth is still high compared to developed and even other Arab countries. Since the death rate has been declining with the birth rate, we can say that even if the Saudi birth rate declines slowly in future years the growth of population will continue. A demographic shift towards a lower birth rate is appearing in many developing countries. Particularly as urbanization increases, women enter the labor force and economic pressure leads to smaller families. However the impact of those factors has been limited in Saudi Arabia. During the past three decades, the increase in the size of the population for Saudi nationals has been primarily due to natural increase--relatively high fertility and rapidly declining mortality (Health survey 1996). Al-Mazroy and Farid (1993) stated that important changes in reproductive patterns as a response to modernization have occurred in the past few years. It is also expected that the marital status of the population has an influences on population growth. Education and women's participation in the labor force led to a sharp decline in early marriage and a rise in the age of first marriage (Health survey 1996). The key component of population growth is fertility. If Saudi Arabia wants to solve future problems related to the labor force, education, unemployment, housing and the like, the government must give importance to studying fertility. The search for transition patterns from higher to lower fertility rates is considered by many planners and
8 researchers in the field as essential in order to meet developmental plan requirements. Several important aspects of Saudi society determine what the level of fertility will be, and whether we can expect it to change. While I discuss these more fully in Chapters 2 and 3, they are outlined below.
D. Population Distribution
Saudi Arabian fertility is characterized by wide geographical and socio-cultural diversity. “The total fertility rate of 5.7 live births between 1994 and 1996 includes regional variation ranging from 5.1 births per women in the west region, to 6.6 births among women living in the north region. Further, fertility is much lower among the most educated urban couples than in the more traditional rural setting in which levels of literacy are low” (Family Health Survey 1996:182). The Health Survey of 1996 indicated that both total fertility rates and age specific fertility rates differed between urban and rural areas. It was higher for rural respondents in all age groups.
Table 1H TFR for Urban and Rural Areas Urban 5.39 Rural 6.30 Source: Health Survey 1996
There are also some differences in the percentages of urban and rural women at ages 15 to 19 who are mothers or pregnant with their first child, as shown in Table 1I.
Table 1I Reproductive Status by Urban/Rural Residence, Women 15 to 19 % % all Residence mothers pregnant combined women Urban 3.8 0.6 4.4 3,285 Rural 5.1 0.8 5.9 1,643 Source: Health survey 1996
9 Urban and rural age specific fertility rate 1994- 1996
350 300 250 200 Urban 150 Rural women 100 50 0 age specific for 1000 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 age group
Figure 1A - Age-Specific Fertility Rates Source: Health survey 1996
Given these differences, urbanization might affect Saudi birth rates dramatically. Such urbanization is happening. Regionally, the share of the population living in rural areas decreased from 34 percent to 15 percent between 1980 to 1998. Continued urbanization could bring fertility lower, if the differences shown in Table 1I are not just the result of selective migration by people who would have had low fertility anyway. Different parts of the country also show fertility differences. If people move from one part of the country to another, this might change the total fertility rate. According to the demographic survey of 1999, 17.3% of Saudi women living in a province other than where they were born.
10
Figure 1B - Map of Saudi Arabia's Provinces Source: Saudi US Relation Information Service.
Original calculations based on the 1999 demographic survey show that all the administrative areas of Saudi have experienced population movement. The 1999 survey showed that 88 percent of women in Makkah province were born in Mecca. Ten percent were in-migrant from within Saudi Arabia, and the other two percent were Saudi women born abroad. Riyadh has 80.7 percent native-born while 17.3 percent were in-migrant. In the East administrative area 13.5 percent of women were born elsewhere and moved to live there. As a result of such movements, the World Bank indicated that the population in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s largest city, rose from 16% of the country’s population to 19% in 2000. By 2015 the percentage of Saudis living in cities with populations of over one million may reach 30%. Such changes could have powerful effects on fertility if they continue.
11
Table 1J Percent of Saudi Female Population In-Migrant by Administrative Areas Saudi 1999 % In- females % Native % Foreign migrant Riyadh 80.70% 2.00% 17.30% Mecca 88.00% 1.90% 10.00% Jazan 98.00% 0.10% 1.90% Eastern 85.30% 1.20% 13.50% Assyear 92.70% 0.10% 7.10% Kassem 91.60% 0.50% 7.90% Hail 93.10% 1.10% 5.80% Medina 92.10% 1.10% 6.80% Baha 94.40% 0.40% 5.20% Northern 79.20% 3.00% 17.90% Tabuk 81.20% 1.80% 17.00% Najran 84.90% 0.50% 14.60% Joaf 89.60% 2.20% 8.20% TOTAL 87.70% 1.30% 11.00% Source: calculated from the Demographic Survey 1999.
E. Increasing Education for Women
The increase in urbanization has been matched by a major increase in the level of education in the Saudi population, especially for females. Average annual growth rates in the number of students enrolled between 1970 to 2000 was 9.9% for females, but only 5.9% for males (Saudi Achievement Plan, 2001). The Central Intelligence Agency and World Bank statistics indicate that virtually all children now receive an education through the secondary school level. The CIA estimated in 2002 that Saudi Arabia had reached an overall literacy rate of 84.2% for males and 69.5% for females. The World Bank indicates that the illiteracy rate for adult males dropped from 33% in 1980 to 17% in 2000 and from 67% to 33% for adult women (World Bank, 1999). During the same time period, the Saudi government reports that the number of males graduating annually from
12 universities rose from 795 in 1970 to 21,229 in 1999, while the number of female graduates rose from 13 to 21,721, ending in a total that slightly exceeded the number of male graduates (Ministry of Planning,1970-2000). All levels of education, including universities, are sex-segregated in Saudi Arabia. Achievements of the development plans reported average annual growth rates in enrollment for females as increasing over time in all educational levels. The number of women graduating from universities has grown at an average rate of 2.5 times that of male graduates during the last decade; this trend in education may create new values for family size. The distribution of women by educational status is similar in the various large urban administrative areas. A study in 1993 by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health explored reproductive patterns and child survival in Saudi Arabia. It noted that first marriage rates have declined at almost all ages (p.21), and conclude the following: “the analysis has depicted a varied and dynamic picture of marital fertility in Saudi Arabia. Unchanging high fertility, and reductions in fertility associated with limiting and spacing have been identified with specific socio-geographic characteristics. The models do not rule out a reduction, albeit small, in fertility among the majority of urban women, whilst a reduction is ruled out for the majority of rural women. Maternal education and residence in the West are dominant influences in the urban setting, supplemented at the higher end of the range by husband’s illiteracy, and at the lower end of the range by marital migration for women with secondary or higher education. Husband’s occupation, and to a lesser extent a woman’s education appear to be dominant influences in the rural setting.” (p.95).
First, the study concluded that “It may be inferred that increasing educational opportunities for young Saudi women are largely responsible for the recent decline in early marriage and the upward trend in age at marriage particularly in urban areas.” (p.269). The study next concluded that while “fertility remains high in Saudi Arabia, the long-term trends suggests a recent reduction in the level of fertility of nearly two live births per woman, from over 8.5 to about 6.5 children” (p. 270).
13
Table 1K Educational Attainment for Saudi Females in the Largest Administrative Areas Education Riyadh Mecca Eastern High school 215,448 235,945 144,554 15% 14% 16% >high school 171,863 148,516 89,288 12% 9% 10% Total 1,445,373 1,742,702 917,175 100% 100% 100% Source: Saudi Statistical Yearbook 2002. These changes improved women's status in relation to their husbands and their families in Saudi Arabia, and also meant that women were likely to marry later, because they postponed marriage in many cases so long as they were in school. The age of marriage for men differed according to residential background in 1996, but for women there was little regional variation. Table 1L Mean Age of Marriage for Men and Women by Region Region Women Men Central 24.3 28.2 North 23.2 26.7 South 24.3 27.2 East 24.2 27.3 West 24.3 27.9 Source: Health survey 1996 These educational changes all together must have effects on fertility, so any 14 research about fertility and population growth in Saudi Arabia must pay attention to differences and trends in education--and education for women in particular. F. Changes in Female Labor Force Participation Participation in the Saudi labor force in the year 2000 for women reached its peak at ages 20 to 24, and decreased rapidly after age 40. This decline after 40 partly occurs because we don’t have cohort data, and are looking at a cross section of several generations. Women's participation in the labor force especially is a new phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. Percent of Female Population in Labor Force by Age Group 0.3 0.25 0.2 female 1999 0.15 female 2000 female 2001 0.1 0.05 0 19- 24- 29- 34- 39- 44- 49- 54- 59- 64- 65+ 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 age group Figure 1C - Percent of Female Population in Labor Force by Age Group Source: Ministry of Planning and Economy, 1999. Although female labor force participation is increasing (see figure above), it remains weak compared to rates for men as shown in Figure 1D. 15 Saudi Labor Force by sex,2002 600000 500000 400000 Male 300000 Female 200000 100000 0 19-15 24-20 29-25 34-30 39-35 44-40 49-45 54-50 59-55 64-60 65+ Age Group Figure 1D - Saudi Labor Force by Sex, 2002 Source: Ministry of Planning and Economy 2001. G. Tribal Identity in Saudi Culture The Saudi population is characterized by a high degree of cultural homogeneity (all are Muslim, speak the same language, and most of them are Sunni) and by an equally high degree of social stratification. The territory that constitutes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia consisted of four distinct regions and diverse populations. Each region has sustained some measure of nomadic and semi-nomadic population (Smith, 1885). As recently as 1950, at least one-half the total population of the kingdom was estimated to be nomadic. Tribal identities were paramount among the nomadic population and among those in towns and villages who recognized a tribal affiliation (Gellner, 1981). Almost all nomadic people are organized in tribal associations, the exceptions being the khaidere, the tinkers and traders of the desert, and black people. Not all tribal people, however, are Bedouin because urban and agricultural peoples may maintain tribal identities 16 (Abdulaziza Alfahad 2002). The Eastern Province has a substantial Shia population with cultural links to Iran, Bahrain, and other places in the Gulf region. Asir was more closely linked to Yemen than to Saudi Arabia both by population and geography. Najd had town centers that functioned almost as independent city-states until the early twentieth century. The populations of Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah (west region) have been infused for centuries by descendants of foreign Muslims who had come for the pilgrimage and stayed. Jeddah was virtually without peer as the commercial center in the kingdom until the 1960s, and in all the Hijaz towns, mercantile families comprised powerful elite (Alnokhba, 2003). “Tribal affiliation constituted a major status category based on bloodline. At the top of the tribal status category were the qabila, families that could claim purity of descent from one of two eponymous Arab ancestors, Adnan or Qahtan, and could therefore claim to possess asl, the honor that stemmed from nobility of origin. To some extent, tribal status could be correlated to occupation, yet manual labor in general, but particularly tanning hides and metal work, was considered demeaning for individuals of qabila status. Qabila families considered themselves distinct from and distinctly superior to khadira, nontribal families, who could not claim qabila descent. Khadira include most tradesmen, artisans, merchants, and scholars, and constituted the bulk of the urban productive population of pre-oil Arabia. Marriage between individuals of qabila and khadira status was not normally considered. The claim to qabila status was maintained by patrilineal descent; therefore, qabila families were concerned to observe strict rules of endogamy (marriage back into the paternal line) so that status might be maintained and children, who were considered to belong to the family of the father, not the mother, would not suffer the taint of mixed blood” (2001-2003, by MidEastWeb, CIA Factbook, Saudi Arabia). These status categories based on blood have at times in the past and again in the 1990s been transcended by status groups based on religion, commerce, professions, and political power (Koury & Kostiner, 1990). Religious authority, for example, constituted an additional category of status. To some extent, as secular education became more valued and greater economic rewards accrued to those with technical and administrative skills, new status categories based on education and economic advantage began to undermine the importance of tribal affiliation to status and was having a homogenizing effect on this barrier to social integration in contemporary Saudi Arabia. Still, tribal roots 17 remain a crucial part of identity for many Saudi families, so I must consider this part of their lives in my research. H. Gender Relations in Saudi Society In Saudi Arabia, the social system described above has many kinds of influence on gender relations, and so may affect fertility in a way that differs from any other Arab country. Interpretations of the roles, obligations, and rights of men and women have a great effect on the family and reproduction. At the individual decision-making level, Saudi Arabia also has a special system of gender relationships that mediates between the social structure and fertility, making Saudi Arabia unique among Arab-Muslim countries. Saudi women practice different gender relationships, holding a traditional interpretation of the status of men in society and in family. Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country in which women cannot drive, work, go outside their homes, or travel without permission from their husbands. This serves to lessen the autonomy of Saudi women, and they must depend on their husbands to represent them in society. Adding to that, the financial support of married women comes from their husbands. Even whether women work is a religious issue. In Saudi society, the man as the husband should be obeyed and his desires should be satisfied in all matters of family life, including childbearing and family size. The growing literature on economic, cultural, and gender relations in Muslim countries and the role of women in decision-making reflects disappointment with Muslim women’s inability to translate their reproductive goals into reality. This study argues that the issue is not solely religion, but also the status of women in the local culture, and the norms coming from culture. All of these affect fertility decisions. The issue here is how couples make their decisions and how their gender relationship does or does not give the woman autonomy to decide fertility matters. Although societal norms and religious practice have not changed in Saudi Arabia, we begin to see changes in women’s autonomy in decision-making and differences in fertility and the size of families among couples. All this is to say that there is something 18 within the couples’ gender relationships that should be studied and may explain differential fertility in Saudi society today. Most of the results of previous demographic studies of Saudi society indicate that modernization may change the age of marriage and delay the birth of the first child. These results have come from demographic statistical aggregate data. The findings of these previous studies in Saudi Arabia could provide a starting point; however, the explanation for differential fertility in Saudi Arabia should come from studying the couples that created this aggregate data. Despite the volume of work on the role gender relationships play in fertility decisions in Muslim-Arab countries, there have been only rare attempts in Saudi Arabia to derive direct empirical estimates of gender relationships and their effect on men and women’s communication on fertility matters. Yet to be explored is how various categories of women’s status and position may affect attitudes about gender relationships and the process of making decisions about fertility. To understand the situation in Saudi Arabia, it is necessary for us to examine how gender relationships play out in the everyday lives of Saudi men and women. This examination will better enable us to interpret how couples selectively and reflexively as individuals practice their gender relationships and their reproductive process. We must study how women’s autonomy or lack thereof in gender relationships is shaping the reproductive decision. Traditionally, for example, contraceptive use requires the husband’s approval and not the woman’s. Desire for a son depends on the man’s desire, and the size of the family must satisfy the man. Fertility decisions may vary with the different positions of Saudi women. If we understand how women’s autonomy in gender relationships works, we can understand the transformation of values and attitudes in decision-making within the reproductive process. Using gender relationships in local resources based on gender and family different contexts seems effective in changing reproductive behaviors. J. Demographic Studies in Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia has experienced social changes in population growth, urbanization, education, and women’s participation in the labor force in the past twenty years. These 19 changes in turn affect other changes in family formation in Saudi Arabia. A study linking fertility transition and social-structural family formation changes could provide important information and clues as to how these two trends interact. My study attempts to provide a picture of the relationship between choices about childbearing in Saudi Arabia and certain social structures and family formation attitudes. The study assumes that social change in the population has affected gender relationships, which then affect decision- making in the reproductive process by changing values and attitudes about family planning and family size. It is expected that such relationships can help explain the pattern of the ongoing relationships and help us estimate the potential demographic impacts of on-going transformations in the future. This study aims to address how men’s and women’s gender relationships have been practiced to produce their fertility decisions. I study attitudes to learn how couples' gender relationships affect the reproductive process and cause differential fertility. I do not expect that fertility attitudes are the same in all areas and between all groups. I assume that gender relations as well as fertility are different according to positions of women in Saudi Arabia. Both changing women's positions and changing gender relationships can contribute to either high or low fertility. I believe that gender relationships within the family and how these differ according to status of women is the key variable explaining differential fertility in Saudi Arabia. In short, I believe that women's status in Saudi Arabia contributes to differences in gender relationships that are conducive to fertility differences. Understanding key dimensions of women's position which shape their reproductive decisions, and which also shape values regarding family size in a transforming Saudi society, are important elements in the analysis and understanding of fertility differences and achieve several objectives: 1. A study linking differential fertility with gender attitudes of women could provide important information and clues as to how differential fertility and gender relations interact. 2. Description and analysis of demographic indicators of fertility and its relation to cultural and social gender relations among groups can explain variations in the fertility transition. 20 3. This study will help in explaining how values and attitudes towards the reproductive process, like desired family size, timing of births, and son preferences, can be explained in more detail, apart from the low status of women in Islam that many previous study focus on. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it seems that socioeconomic changes to this point have not yet lowered the birth rate as would be expected. Growth rates are not decreasing much over time. Also, the five-year development plans did not include any attempt to promote limiting population growth despite all the changes that happened in other sections of the nation's social life. As indicated above, fertility and family planning are cultural phenomena, and any explanation of them falls within socio-cultural theory. To study Saudi Arabia, aspects of a multilevel theory of social structure may be the key to explaining changes in fertility. The problem in Saudi Arabia is that we are facing population growth in a conservative society which does not actively promote family planning. This is what we can see in the next chapter. 21 CHAPTER 2 THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF FERTILITY A. Do Theories Fit the Middle East? Some studies suggest that countries in the Middle East differ from the West in demographic trends and paths of economic change. An economic model of factors governing fertility decline in the West might be challenged by distinctive paths and different experiences in Arab Muslim countries (Courbage 1995, Fargues 1997). Focusing on Arabic countries, special economic conditions might intervene to introduce different causes for fertility decline. Courbage and Fargues in their studies demonstrated that fertility rates in Arab and Middle Eastern countries are not correlated with modernization variables that many demographers see as fundamental to fertility decline. Some studies even argue that the situation in Arab countries may be in opposition to the modernization model in the West. For example, Egyptian economic growth has been rapid without bringing down fertility, while Morocco’s slow economic growth and a decrease in fertility have gone hand in hand (Courbage, 1995). Fargues (1997) argued that worsening economic conditions (rather than modernization) in some countries like Sudan might delay marriage and decrease fertility (Fargues 1997). Several countries were affected by such harsh economic factors, including Morocco, Egypt, and Syria. In some countries fertility decline seems to be a product of both development and under- development. Harsh economic conditions delay marriage, affecting costs and benefits of children. On the opposite side, Azzam (1979) showed that socioeconomic determinants of fertility and female participation in labor force can be applied in the Arab countries based on the assumption that couples act rationally in their best interests in making fertility and 22 labor force decisions. A high female labor force participation level would tend to lower fertility and promote economic growth. Rashad (1997) also does not agree that Arab regional experience is different than the West as a result of culture. She argued, “Arab regional experiences are quite comparable to what happened in developing countries. Though the fertility decline occurred at a somewhat later date, the pace of decline more than compensates for this delay”(p.1). She believes most research exaggerates the role of cultural specificity. In the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, socioeconomic development and increased education affected timing of women's marriages. Meanwhile the transition in Egypt was slower and less smooth due to concluding the war with Israel, the liberalization of the economy, and mass out-migration. She added that economic explanations work even in the oil-producing Arab countries, which despite high per capita income, continued to retain the highest fertility levels. There, fertility decline came only after the reduction of oil prices in the mid 1980’s and the expense of the Gulf War. Other studies stand in the middle in this debate. In research by Omran and Roudi (1993), for example, Middle Eastern countries are grouped by their responses to socioeconomic change in many different ways: persistent high fertility and declining mortality with low to medium socioeconomic conditions (Jordan, Oman, Syria, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza), declining fertility and mortality in intermediate socioeconomic development (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran), high fertility and declining mortality in high socioeconomic conditions (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and low fertility and mortality in average socioeconomic conditions (Israel). One explanation for these differences in response to socioeconomic development is that Arab fertility is affected by short-term and long-term factors in explaining the fertility transition. In the short term, rising education for girls delays a woman's age at marriage, for example to an average of 25 to 29 years in Lebanon. However, economic development apparently also can raise fertility (Tabbarah 2000), while the depressed economic situation and the conflict between Arab peoples and Israel also can affect fertility negatively (Fargues, 2000). Long-term factors such as the socioeconomic level of the family, its prestige, and the religious context also can affect marriage timing and fertility. These factors can 23 determine the perceived cost of children and, in particular, the cost of the child relative to household income. Distinctions are made in some situations between the costs and benefits of male and female children, but modernization can lessen the importance of a son as wealth flow decreases and then reverses (Caldwell, 1976). Adequacy of income, as measured for example by Tabbarah (2000) as the ratio of income to a person's convention standard, can affect attitudes and decisions about childbearing. Fertility has changed more in some countries than in others. Due to an early age of marriage and a large proportion of married women, Yemen has exceeded TFR values of 7.0 children per woman of reproductive age, while in Sudan the TFR has dropped to 4.6 children per woman, despite slow adoption of contraceptive methods. In Algeria there are 4.4 children per woman; in this case the reduction came from a delay in the timing of childbearing, not from a sizeable proportion of women who limited their childbirth. Morocco has 3.3 children per woman. The reduction in Moroccan fertility came from using contraceptives even before giving birth to a first child. Egypt has 3.8 children per woman, with three out of four women using contraceptives before their first child. The differences between these countries result from age differences of women at first birth, contraceptive use, and the spacing of child bearing (Eltigani 2001). Decline in fertility has been initiated by younger cohorts of women in Oman, while in Yemen it has been women age 35 and above who have led the transition to lower fertility. Factors affecting fertility decline in Oman have been the improvement in levels of education and health status, but Omani government provision of free medical care, social services, and education also encourages families to continue having a large number of children. Socioeconomic development created new attitudes and promoted the diffusion of new ideas about the modern lifestyle. The government providing the method for family control in Oman makes it easy for a young couple to follow the modern lifestyle regarding family size. In Yemen fertility also is expected to continue its downward trend but not rapidly. Tough economic conditions alone helped in the decline. Improvement in women’s status by attending school and participating in work, as well as improved health service leading to continued declines in childhood mortality, have resulted in fertility decline. Also, a decline in couples’ desire for children was observed between 1992 and 1997. 24 Government provision of contraceptive methods is needed in Yemen since a shortage in contraceptives delays Yemen in its fertility decline. (Eltigani 2000) Fargues (1989), like other scholars in the West (Goldberg 1975, Watkins & Pollack 1993) argues that the main challenge for economic theories in fertility depends on how much cultural and social change must be taken into account in fertility explanation. He insists that fertility decline now underway in Arab countries depends on the social context, and focused on two important factors in Arab fertility decline: residency and education status. He mentioned that the urban fertility rate is lower than rural fertility and that women’s education, particularly post-primary education, is a factor of fertility decline. These two variables (education and urbanization) affect fertility through three proximate determinants (Bongaarts, 1978). Two of these encourage lower fertility: contraception and later first marriage. The other favors higher fertility: a reduction in the period of breastfeeding. These variables are important in explaining sub- group differences in both quantum and tempo of births (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998). Similarly, Fargues (1997) emphasized other features of social context as a reason why fertility in Jordan is higher than in Morocco despite more advanced education in Jordan. He concluded that fundamental changes such as those in the age of marriage, education, and the possibility of working outside home, mean the door of the society is open for change and women no longer stay within the boundary of the home. These help a woman to change and accept a new attitude, which is reflected in the diversity of fertility trends. Eltigani (2000) tried to extend the studies of Courbage (1995) and Fargues (1997) by making comparisons between the fertility transitions of Egypt and Morocco and using family structure as a key variable. His study, “Changes in Family Building Patterns in Egypt and Morocco: A Comparative Analysis” found that from the late 1970s to the mid- 1990s, fertility declined 44% in Morocco and 28% in Egypt. Using contraception was not as acceptable for women in Egypt as it was in Morocco, and this accounted for much of the difference. Cultural factors such as women’s social position within families and in the larger economy also can affect fertility change in developing countries. Women’s autonomy, economic dependency and other aspects of their position in relation to men influence fertility in the third world. Regarding the concept of women's status in Islam, Obermeyer 25 (1999) argued for expanding the scope of population research to include how decisions are made and how the concept of gender rights realistically work, as these forces affect reproductive motivations and behavior. Gender inequality is hypothesized to influence fertility and the intermediate determinants of fertility. The extent to which women have autonomy from men’s control in their day-to-day lives or are economically independent from male family members has been argued to affect their age at marriage, their desires for children, the costs of children, and the use of contraception. Relations between the sexes influence fertility in developing countries and is worthy of more consideration, and this influence may vary by social context (Mason, 1987). Islam itself can be used to deter change in gender relations in some Arab Muslim cultures. Yazbeck, Haddad, and Esposito (1998) describe how some Islamic women now use Islamic teachings designed to encourage the “expansion of the people and religion of Islam, as a tool for maintaining power and prestige.” According to these advocates, Islam teaches that the purpose of sexual relations is to increase the community and to fulfill the Prophet’s injunction, “Copulate, procreate, I will be proud of you before the nations on the Day of Resurrection” (p.18). The authors argue that an emphasis on reproduction has given women status in the community, and that many women don’t want population control that reduces fertility because they are afraid it will reduce their status (p.18). Many articles have focused on special features of Arab and Islamic culture to explain continued high fertility. Hasna (2003:181) explores "the doctrine of Islam with respect to family planning, as interpreted by different Islamic authorities in both Sunni and Shia traditions.” She compares Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Jordan, describes the Shari’ah and the doctrine of Islam, explains the idea of family planning in Islam, and explores the controversy about family planning among Muslims. She goes on to discuss men’s and women’s sexuality, marriage, and children in the legacy of Islam. Hasna found that religious authorities have an impact on policy formulation and implementation, and that in most Middle Eastern societies, individuals sacrifice their individual needs for the group, usually the extended family. She concluded that “…fertility is associated with the marital bond, femininity, and power by both men and women. The providers and 26 community members alike use many justifications to advocate the value of children” (Hasna, 2003:190). In most studies of important influences on fertility in Arab and Muslim countries, two mechanisms link gender inequality and fertility. These are the degree of female autonomy (decision-making with regard to personal affairs, including freedom of movement) and preferences for male children. Preference for a son increases fertility in many settings because larger numbers of children are required to produce some minimum number of sons. Greater autonomy, on the other hand, reduces fertility by affecting the desire for more children, increasing contraceptive use, and lowering level of “unmet need” contraception (Morgan 1993). Cultural and policy differences played a role in determining the timing of fertility decline in Arab countries which are quite diverse (Fargues 1997). In Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, for example, cultural factors permitted at least some family planning, and allowed major improvements in gender imbalances. In these countries, cultural forces and religious doctrine have been successfully manipulated to practice family planning. In Tunisia, reforms of legal status and new family laws prohibiting polygyny and tightening divorce reflect a liberal Islamic interpretation. By contrast in the Gulf countries, especially before 1980, the nature of economic change did not invite revision of traditional beliefs, and fertility remained high. Sief El-Dawla (1997) criticized the homogeneity of cultural references in Muslim Arab study, a category which he claims does not exist except as a hypothesis. He believes that culture is colored, formulated and reformulated, and adopted differently in response to people’s need; their selectivity depends on how to make their lives easier. Moral and cultural references are heterogeneous and context-specific. For example, cultural interpretation about contraceptive usage sometimes delays decline in fertility. Some Muslim men believe that Islam opposes family planning and therefore Islam prohibits the use of modern contraceptive methods. They support these beliefs from the Koran, which states: 'You shall not kill your children because you cannot support them. We provide for you and for them' ( The Koran, p. 147). Others accept the idea of family planning; however, their acceptance is often conditional. For example, some believe that Islam approves using family planning for child spacing, but that using family planning to limit 27 the final size of the family is prohibited. Therefore, sterilization is forbidden by religion because it prevents all future births. Other people limit the idea of family planning to the use of natural methods such as rhythm and breast-feeding. This group accepts modern methods of family planning only if natural methods fail. Finally, some believe that Islam does not prohibit family planning if the person has a good reason. However, the definition of a “good reason” differed from one group to another. Some believe that poor health of the mother or the newborn is a good reason, whereas others believed that the inability to provide for children's needs is a good reason. (Farsoun, 1996). These different interpretations contribute to differences in fertility decline among Arab and Muslim populations. Rashad (1997) provided many different explanations for Arab countries’ fertility transition. Decline is not always maintained. Her study of Yemen and Sudan aimed to provide another example of deviation from transition theory. Harsh economic conditions and their depressing effect on marital fertility resulted in a decline in fertility. The decline did not result from the desire for few children or from socioeconomic development. The reduction of labor remittances and a phosphate crisis were the main precipitators of fertility decline in Syria, Egypt, and Morocco. Rashad agreed with Fargues, however, that most of the changes in Arab fertility come from changes in nuptiality. Marriage changes have been the main contributor to the decline in fertility between the early 1980’s and 1990 in the Arab world (p.8). In investigating the reason for the delay of Arab fertility, she concluded that the fertility decline has not been fully maintained by either the diffusion process or the distribution of the benefits of development. And it is not only due to a cultural effect; even for Rashad this does not mean denying the role of culture in shaping decisions. “Culture is a major force in the rational decision model," she declares (1997:6). "It shapes aspirations, determines the values attached to children and other pleasures of life and influences the calculation of relative costs”. However, she stated that culture and interpretations of religion are never stationary. The manifestations are always modified by conditions. 28 B. Special Institutional Factors in Saudi Arabia In Saudi Arabia the situation is in some ways unique. Saudi society stands between two conflicting choices of direction--modernization and conservative cultural traditions. First, economic growth or development did not produce the forces needed to alter the cost and value of children to the same degree in all families. The cost of children is subsidized by the state, including free education and free health services, so rational decisions do not have to count such costs of children. The Saudi version of the "rational decision model" involves a unique calculation. Harsh economic situations that explain some fertility decline in some Arab countries also do not appear in Saudi Arabia. Some scholars have argued that recent changes in fertility of the Gulf countries are probably coming from economic difficulties after reduction of oil prices in 1980 (declines in per capita income, youth unemployment, the Gulf War in 1990) and from female participation in education. In Saudi Arabia this argument seems less useful. The Saudi economic situation has not significantly altered the cost of children yet. Also, in general, women’s role is still at home since female labor force participation is minimal. Rational decisions based on the cost of the children do not much affect the number of children yet. Still, socioeconomic development has created some new attitudes and promoted the diffusion of new ideas about modern lifestyles. Education and residence in the urban setting in particular seems to not only delay marriage but also to change the value placed on early marriage and the basis for women's status among Saudi families. But in the opposite direction, religion and other cultural traditions still shape norms and decision- making regarding fertility in many families in Saudi Arabia. Those religious and cultural influences determine the value attached to having children, despite the level of modernization. Saudi Arabians experience deeply rooted high-fertility desires shaped by religious and cultural values that resist responding to development forces, and that so far have not had to face harsh situations. These two different directions of pressure (modernization and pressure from rooted beliefs and culture pressure) make variations in fertility and number of children 29 among different categories of ethnic groups within Saudi Arabia. For example, Islam and its interpretation have a great effect--cultural, ideological, social and political--on the demographic system. In Saudi Arabia, Islamic influence has been associated with the persistence of high fertility, lack of change in the status of men and women, and low contraceptive use. Interpretation of roles, obligations and rights has a great effect on the family system and so on reproductive choices. Varying interpretations of religious doctrines by local religious leaders also affect behavioral outcomes. To apply any demographic model to Saudi Arabia, we should make a linkage between this demographic model and the ideology of Islam as an important cultural factor. The debate about whether economic or cultural factors offer the best way to explain fertility patterns and trends might not be possible to settle, but it does give one way to show that fertility in the Middle East, and in Saudi Arabia in particular, is important to study. Saudi Arabia offers another case where we can look at this debate and test which explanations from each side best explain what is happening. At the same time, study of Saudi Arabia can help us to decide whether each of these explanations works in the same way in the Middle East as it works in other parts of the world. But all of the theories and explanations considered in this chapter end by telling us that both economic and cultural influences mainly influence fertility by affecting what goes on inside the family between husbands and wives, and between the couples and their other relatives and the larger social networks where they live. So the next chapter changes from looking at the institutional context of fertility, to look at the motivations and behavior of people in these family settings. 30 CHAPTER 3 THE MOTIVATIONAL CONTEXT OF FERTILITY A. The Rational Actor / Rational Choice Model of Fertility Behavior 1. General economic theories of fertility Behavior and motivations about fertility can be affected by economic factors within families. While economic and demographic variables are related, decisions to spend, save, work and have children are actually made at the individual or household level. Becker's economic theory viewed fertility as determined by income and child cost to the individual. Decline in price would increase the demand for children. According to this, rich people should have many children while poor have less (Becker 1960); opportunity costs are needed to explain why that does not happen. Blake (1968) denies that there is any direct evidence that wealthy people desire more children than do poorer ones. When she examined the few instances in which Becker claims an equal use of contraception, she found that the positive relation Becker stresses between family size and income relied on incorrect evidence. She went on to say that “clearly there are cogent reasons for concluding that the consumer durables model is inapplicable to children and hence cannot predict fertility differentials by income” (p.23). To apply the household model, in 1988 Becker and Barro studied the implications of parental altruism toward children, where parental utility depends on their own consumption, their fertility, and the utility of each child. Their model is based on the assumption that parents are altruistic toward their children. “The utility of parents depends not only on their own consumption, but also on the utility of each child and the number of children” (p.2). Later, they added “utility maximization requires equality 31 between the marginal benefit of an additional descendant and the net cost to producing the descendant. Costs depend negatively on lifetime earnings of children and positively on the cost of rearing children and of investing in their human capital” (p.23). Becker and Barro neglected uncertainty, marriage timing, and the spacing of births. Especially important is the idea that parents are linked to children through intergenerational transfers. Nevertheless, even a highly simplified model of the behavior of dynastic families appeared to capture an important aspect of the long – term behavior of fertility and consumption.(p.24). Wanting to introduce the economic idea of maximization in fertility study, in 1981 Harvey Leibenstein found that macro-level results cannot test maximization of utility. Proposing the hypothesis that a “high proportion of the fertility rate is determined by non-decision decisions, that is, passive or inertial decision-making” (p.388), Leibenstein announced without any evidence that “…for most groups routine behavior, which is the expected type of behavior under passive decision-making, predominates” (p.389). He went on to conclude that “while we cannot tell until we try, it seems likely that studies of this kind could lead to the development of fertility theories (including nonmaximizing, maximizing, passive, and active decision processes) that would have greater explanatory and predictive power than the current models.” (p.399). Besides individual and household utility, Butz and Ward (1977) stated that there are three factors that affect timing and fertility decisions: the proportion of women in the labor force, women’s earnings, and men’s earnings. While the demand for children increases with an increase in the husband’s wages, increases in women’s wages decrease fertility. Butz and Ward’s model implies that times of economic wealth are the most expensive times for employed women to have children. Fertility rates move in the opposite direction of those of the business cycle. During recession, family income is lower and therefore couples decide not to have children because of the high costs associated with child bearing. (p. 85). However, with more women working, the business cycle generates cycles for both men and women’s salaries and job opportunities. Therefore, as more women are employed, times of economics success do not imply an increase in fertility. Instead, they will tend to delay childbirth and fertility rates can actually decrease. In short, Butz and 32 Ward explain that fertility rates are positively related to family income, and negatively related with women’s employment and wages. Also, the correlation between women’s wages and fertility is stronger, the larger the proportion of women employed. Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) also proposed to study to see if women either limit their fertility to accommodate their labor force activity, or they adjust their labor force behavior to their fertility. They found that “the impact of childbearing on labor force behavior tends to be relatively short term, ending when the youngest child reaches school age. Over the long run, however, the causal relationship between labor force participation and fertility may be stronger in the opposite direction, with labor force participation and participation plans inhibiting fertility” (p.289). The negative association between fertility and work will diminish if the conflict between the work and family responsibility is reduced. Rindfuss and Brewster describe the various strategies by which women in industrialized settings accommodate their employment patterns to their fertility and their fertility to their labor force participation. Their evidence also suggests that these strategies and the ability to combine motherhood and labor force vary according to nations and countries. 2. Does the rational actor model apply in the Middle East? Arab and Muslim countries may have a different experience in the relation between labor force and child bearing. Where gender relations are generally non- confrontational, autonomy has been shown (Isvan, 1991) to be a stronger conditioning factor in the employment –fertility relationship than measures of power relations. Autonomy depends on cultural context, especially on whether gender relations are confrontational or not. Domestic power and autonomy have been posed as alternative conditioning factors in the relationship between work and fertility. In 1998, Al-Qudsi examined whether lagging fertility trends affect women’s labor force participation in Arab economies. His study demonstrated that age at marriage, women's education, infant mortality, and preference for male offspring are important determinants of fertility. Reduced infant mortality is associated with fertility reduction. A rise in women's wages increases the opportunity cost of having children and therefore leads to a decrease in fertility. As families become well-off, their demand for children is 33 reduced, presumably because demand for 'quality' kicks in and the cost of providing the quality dimension rises. Furthermore, there is a significant degree of dependence between fertility and labor force participation. That is, fertility produces a negative influence on women's labor participation. However, age is positively correlated with labor force participation, up to a certain point, beyond which its effect becomes negative. In all countries, the findings demonstrate a strong association between education and workforce participation. Education is an important pathway to effective engagement of Arab females in market activities. These findings suggest that the general theories of fertility outlined above may work in Middle Eastern societies. These studies do suggest that the "rational actor" model may fit Middle Eastern societies, although the results of economically rational behavior do not always mean low fertility there. 3. Does the rational actor model apply to Saudi Arabia? In Saudi Arabia, for example, economic growth has not produced the forces needed to alter the cost and value of children. The cost of children is subsidized by the state’s help, including free education and free health services. The rational actor model depends on cost calculations which do not predict lower fertility in Saudi Arabia, as well as in many other Gulf countries (Rashad 2000). The model may fit, but it does not predict much fertility decline yet. As seen above, economic factors affecting fertility decisions in Arab countries include women’s participation in the labor force as well as the number of children alive (especially the number of sons). In addition, Saudi women’s role is still at home since female labor force participation is minimal. A Saudi woman cannot work without permission from her husband, meaning the decision to work in Saudi Arabia not only comes from education, but is related to gender relationships and the degree of autonomy in these relationships. Fertility as a social task and responsibility for Saudi women gives her social status. Having children, especially sons, may take prior place in her decision to start or stop working, especially if her husband wants children. Wages and increasing income will not stop her from achieving the goal of having children, especially sons. If she seeks to combine the two, she will be the one to make a balance since the man is not responsible for domestic roles. 34 B. Social and Political Limits on the Rational Actor 1. General theoretical limits on economic theories In 1956, Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake made the distinction between underdeveloped and industrial societies regarding the reproduction process. Davis and Blake found that the two types of society differ in social organization. Consequently, it is significant to consider a comparative sociology of reproduction. They outline intermediate variables through which any social factors influencing fertility must operate. Furthermore, they wanted to show how some types and elements of social organization, acting through these variables, appear to enhance or depress social fertility. Bongaarts (1978) further demonstrated the importance of biological and behavioral factors. These intermediate variables, such as contraceptive use, proportion of women married, induced abortion and frequency of intercourse, stand between the cultural and socioeconomic variables and fertility. For both Bongaarts and Davis & Blake, education changes decision-making by changing the values and attitudes about fertility. Education facilitates rapid spread of new ideas and information, which would help explain another of the important findings from the Princeton European Fertility Project--that the onset of long-term fertility decline tended to be concentrated in a relatively short period (Caldwell 1980). The relation between fertility and education could be divided in two: first, how parental schooling limits fertility, and second, how children's schooling (costs, benefits and other consequences of childbearing and childrearing) affect parents’ decisions about having children (Axinn 1993). Greene and Biddlecom (2000) proposed to show how men should be incorporated into fertility research and, most importantly, in the model of the decision making of childbearing. If fertility is to be understood in specific cultural contexts, then men must be included in demographic research to explain and to predict fertility. Interest in men’s roles has grown through feminist studies. “Feminists and demographers interested in fertility control have identified men as a ‘problem’ in a similar way: for neo-Malthusian demographers men seem to be potential obstacles to women’s exercise of their fertility 35 preferences; and feminists see them as potential obstacles to woman’s exercise of their rights, one of which is, of course, the exercise for their fertility preferences” (p.89). 2. Limits on economic rationality in the Middle East Beliefs, social organization, customs, and attitudes about high birth rates can all be expressed in terms of religion in the United Arab Republic (Rizk 1963). Despite declines in mortality in response to economic development, the birth rate remains high in most Arab countries due to beliefs and attitudes that prevent births from declining. Hanna Rizk pointed out two determinants of fertility among socio-economic and educational groups: the age of the wife at marriage and the length of the childbearing period. The recent rise in the age of marriage due to education did not decrease fertility rates, although new-generation wives preferred smaller families than the older generation did. The desire for having children was strong among females and the family size depended on how many sons they had. Khan (2003) hypothesized that in the squatter settlements in Karachi, Pakistan, “…major obstacles to reducing fertility include lack of consistent government commitment to provision of family planning services, and social and religious objections.” His study found that “…in general, poor Pakistanis hold traditional and religious beliefs in high esteem and consider family planning heretical to Islamic law. Family planning issues are generally not openly discussed within Pakistani families.” He also observed that “…although inter-spousal communication is known to be associated with contraceptive use, it does not always translate to use of contraceptive unless both spouses, specifically males, are convinced and have changed their attitudes” (p. 13). Entwisle & Casterline (1989) indicated that community factors are of potential importance to contraceptive behavior, including characteristics of labor commodity markets, norms concerning roles of women and children, and the density of health and family planning services. “These factors are hypothesized to influence contraceptive behavior by altering the value of children to parents and households, cost of childbearing, and barriers to adopting and containing to use contraceptive method” (p.1020). They demonstrated that contraceptive behaviors in rural Egypt vary systemically with features of the village. 36 Desired fertility and contraceptive use differ not only by norms. In one society sharing the same norms, a variety of backgrounds such as Bedouin roots in Kuwait (Nasra, Mashdoom and Radovanovic 1998) can influence women's fertility along with economic factors like level of education and work status. Kuwaitis believe that the country needs more nationals for political security, since many foreign workers are there, especially after Iraq’s occupation of their country. Kuwait has a small population compared to its neighbors and government policies are pronatalist. Monthly payment is provided for each child, a job is guaranteed for any one who seeks it, and women who give birth have two months leave free (p.134). Even rational economic behavior can mean high fertility when shaped by such a context. As for the women, having children is an important social role for each woman. Some feel that if they do not have children they will lose their femininity, or their husband will marry another woman. Particularly among tribes, having children is a source of social significance and strength. On average, Kuwaiti women considered 5.3 children the ideal number a couple desires. A small proportion, 7%, wanted one to three, while 40% desired 6 or more children (p.135). The number of living children is the most important factor in determining whether Kuwaiti women desire to stop having children and use contraception. Although the women wanted an average of 5.3 children, some started to take contraceptives before having this number, and ethnic background affects that. Significant differences appeared in the average number of desired children between Bedouin and non-Bedouin groups. The husband’s education plays a role in the desire for children while women’s education has no important effect in determining family size or contraceptive use. Women follow their husband’s desire and attitude in family size and contraceptive use (p.137). In general, in Arab-Muslim countries, we see that cultural and religious values still shape decisions about having children. They determine the value attached to children. For example, a common belief is that God should decide family size. It is not allowed to think that a shortage of food comes from having children or an increase in population. The Quran asks Muslims not to kill their children from fear of poverty, as previously people in some cultures before Islam killed their children and even buried 37 girls alive to get rid of them since they were afraid of poverty and responsibility. All these values affect women’s and men’s desire to control family size. As a matter of fact, children, particularly sons, are seen as a source of economic security for parents in their old age (Gadalla et al. 1985). Sons also provide physical security for the extended family as well as political strength and social prestige (Faour 1989). Therefore, there is family pressure on young couples to have children immediately after marriage. Males and elderly female mothers-in-law make decisions on family matters, health care, and major household expenses. Mothers-in-law have an important role as independent decision-makers as well as being involved in decision-making in the family. Young women have no power to make decisions and cannot decide to go out without their mother-in-law’s or husband’s permission. Contraceptive use depends on the husband’s approval (Khan, 2003:48). That cultural and political factors in Islamic countries can determine fertility by determining women’s status implies two basic principles. The first is autonomy, which means that a woman can make decisions in matters of reproduction and that she has access to the information and services that make her choice possible. This autonomy in turn implies a set of other rights for her as an adult individual and as a citizen. The usual economic theories of fertility assume such a context, but it is not always present in the Middle East. The second principle is the notion that reproductive health is an integral part of a woman's life, and hence is shaped not only by medical conditions, but also by social forces and power relationships that range from the level of the family to that of international institutions (Freedman and Isaacs 1993). Gendered power relationships play an important role in explaining fertility decisions in Arab and Muslim countries. Male dominance is supported by religion and political systems and is related to fertility in many points including women's employment and autonomy in the home (Isvan, 1991). The risk and insecurity that patriarchy imposes on women represents a powerful incentive for high fertility. The patriarchal system can increase demand for children because it usually limits unfamiliar opportunities for social status and economic support. Where women outside the house are severely constrained, their activities focus on family and bearing children. Many recent investigations in some developing countries suggest that the role of males contributes to the shortfall in women’s behavior vis a vis their 38 stated preferences (Boungaarts and Burce 1995; Casterline, Perez, and Biddlecom 1996; Dodoo 1993, Terefe and Larson 1993). Gender relations also increase the psychological benefit of children for women in patriarchal societies, given the low status of women and a dependence on children for security in old age. This new value of children for women's status was considered a key variable to explain and understand the relationship between socioeconomic change and the fertility decline in Turkey ( Kagitcibasi and Cigdem 1982). To assess the factors that improve women's role in decisions on fertility, many studies reveal that women who were educated, employed, older, members of credit programs, or with access to media had greater say in decision-making. Those who had greater say in decisions were more likely to desire smaller families and less likely to have additional children. Among those who had a desire for additional children, the women having greater say in decision-making were more likely to wait more to have another child than those who had comparatively little say (Khanum & Tunon 2000). Gender relations also affect use of family planning in Muslim countries. Waszak, Severy, Kefif, and Badawi (2001) studied the influence of gender norms on women’s family experiences. Using cross-sectional survey data from Egyptian women, the study mentioned that traditional gender norms may limit a woman’s ability to use family planning if she perceives herself as being bound to cultural expectations or the will of her husband. Such norms also may reduce her motivation to limit her family size if she does not work outside her roles as a wife or mother. Fear of the anger of her husband or stigmatization by her community influence her (p.197). The authors stated that all previous research found that even the women who have a relatively high level of autonomy and education and live in urban areas were still much more dependent on their spouses for making family decisions than Western women (p.199). Involving men in family planning programs can make them more aware of women’s reproductive needs and rights. In many Arab Muslim countries a woman cannot control her fertility without her husband's cooperation. When men and women are aware of and responsive to each other's health needs, they are more likely to obtain necessary services. Moreover, strengthening communication between partners about reproductive health and involving men in health promotion can lead to better health for the entire 39 family. Attitudes toward birth spacing and contraceptive use were more positive among men with at least a secondary education and among those with a higher income than among their less-educated and less well-off counterparts ( Wasileh Petro-Nustas 1999). However, this involvement also can subvert a woman’s autonomy. Autonomy in gender relation in all Muslim countries must be considered in explaining the relation between gender power and reproductive process. We can see autonomy as another intermediate variable. 3. Limits on economic rationality in Saudi Arabia In Saudi Arabia, religion has a strong influence shaping norms and values about husbands' rights and obligations, the contraceptive behaviors of women, and the value placed on children. All this affects fertility decisions. Islam divides roles within the family and gives men the responsibility for supporting the family. To study Saudi fertility at the household level, we must consider the importance of the man as a supporter of the family and the decision-maker in fertility behaviors, not only in economic terms but also in terms of rights and cultural autonomy. In Saudi Arabia's social and political context, men represent the family in front of society. Pressure on a woman to obey her husband and to have a son affects her decision about fertility in ways deeper than choices about wages and working. In Saudi Arabia, male economic dominance is supported by religion and the political system. What we can say in the micro approach is that Saudi families differ from the West and some Arab countries--in these families, men are the ones who support the whole family even if the women work. This supportive situation gives the right to determine both number of children and son preferences. Saudi Arabia differs from other Arab countries because, as mentioned before, a woman's movements and work are limited by permission from her husband. All women in Saudi Arabia try to satisfy their husbands' desires, especially since husbands are allowed by Islam to marry more than once. Fear of such marriages to additional wives or fear of divorce and losing her one sponsor mean that women always try to satisfy husbands especially in reproductive matters. 40 C. Social Networks: How Social Context Influences Fertility Decisions 1. Integrating economic motives, social norms, conflict/power limits Some scholars including Kohler (1997) focused on social networks, arguing that existing economic theories of fertility do not adequately consider “why fertility rates have fallen significantly in many societies and not in others, and why fertility transitions have been precipitous in some cases, and leisurely in others.” Kohler proposed to overcome these limitations by developing “formal tools for the study of ‘socially embedded’ fertility behavior.” He did so by providing microeconomic foundations for the diffusion of low fertility, and investigating reproductive decisions interdependently with the transformation of social and economic institutions. First, Kohler analyzed the “dynamics of word-of-mouth communication” by evaluating the different methods through conversations with early adopters in their social network. Next, he investigated social influence in a broader perspective. Kohler found that the “onset and speed of a transition do not only depend on historical conditions, but also on social interaction and community cohesion.” Kohler concluded that his analysis provided explanation as to “why the most striking instances of sudden fertility transitions have occurred in comparatively small geographic areas with homogeneous populations” and further pointed to times “when social forerunners in fertility decline constitute a nucleus for diffusion, and when separate demographic regimes across subpopulations are likely to exist.” Diffusion of ideational change might explain some fertility decline. Sociocultural heterogeneity and barriers raised by different ethnicity, cultural values, and religion prevent knowledge and attitudes favoring modern reproductive behavior from diffusing through all sectors of society. (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). In 2004 Laura Bernardi examined different types of social mechanisms affecting the interdependence of couples in making reproductive choices. Bernardi described her article as an “attempt to explore, empirically, the domain of learning and perception formation” (p.530). She collected and analyzed the text transcripts of 54 unstructured interviews collected in the northern Italian region of Lombardy, between November 2000 and April 2001 (p.530). In her study, Bernardi constructed her interview questions so she could get “what,” “where,” “who,” 41 and “when” answers (p.530). This approach comes closest to how I approach similar research questions in Saudi Arabia. Exploring the overall range of relations influential in fertility decision making, Bernardi examined relationships that included “members of the family of origin, friends, work mates or neighbors, special others (priest, doctor), and each woman’s own perception of her social environment” (p.531). She was interested in how these relationships centered on the family shape the interpretation of cost and benefits of reproduction alternatives and defines their appropriateness and convenience (p.532). Bernardi found that social learning, social pressure, subjective obligation, and contagion are important influences in fertility decision-making (p. 535-542). Her study concluded that these influences are “differentially effective [in influencing fertility decisions], depending on the type of relationship and the structure in which relationships are embedded” (p.550). Bernardi then suggested that “differences in education, employment status, or size of the place of residence of the single woman” might have an “effect on her exposure, her reception and her reaction to social influences, and on the kind of social relationships she is embedded in,” and implied that further studies in this area might be helpful and therefore necessary (p.550). 2. Specifics of the Saudi Arabian social networks When we want to study fertility in Saudi Arabia we should take into consideration three specific types of pressure and influence to have children. The first might be called economically rational, because it is based on the long tradition of having children to help work in the field and take care of parents in their old age. These traditional influences diffused through generations. The second kind of pressure comes from family members to have more children, especially boys, to preserve the family name. This pressure has nothing to do with the economic interests of the woman herself, but with the economic interests of a whole kin group or tribe. Finally, religious pressure is based on the belief that Muslims should be fruitful and that God will take care of children, regardless of the economic situation of the parents. This pressure is not in the "rational interest" of an individual or even a tribe, but of a whole country or all Islam. 42 All those pressures should be taken in consideration in studying Saudi Arabia's fertility and Saudi couples' decisions. However these influences may vary over areas and between subgroups. I expect differences in age, education, employment status, and also tribal identity of women to have an effect on their exposure to, their reception of, and their reaction to social influences in Saudi Arabia. D. The Fertility Decision-Making Process Many factors affect timing and spacing of births. In some cases, practice of birth control played a major role in generating fertility decline and birth and delay timing and spacing child bearing (Martine 1996). Eltigani’s “Childbearing in Five Arab Countries” (2004) described the childbearing pattern in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Yemen. The researcher asked, “Are the differences in fertility related to the differences in family-building, that is, to differentials on the onset of reproduction, or in spacing or limiting birth?” (p.17). Eltigani measured the cumulative proportion of women of a given parity having a subsequent birth within 60 months of the previous birth, and the median length of the interval between successive births. Eltigani found great diversity of childbearing patterns among these Arab countries. In the Yemen (where the total fertility rate exceeds seven) women begin childbearing at a relatively early age and a large proportion of married women reach high parity at a relatively fast pace. Morocco and Egypt (with TFR of 3.3 and 3.8 children per women, respectively) are characterized by delaying the onset of childbearing, a slow pace of childbearing, and a smaller proportion of ever-married women reaching high parity. In Algeria and Sudan (with TFR of 4.4 and 4.6 children), delay of the onset of childbearing plays a larger role in fertility reduction than do the tempo or the quantum of childbearing. Also, in Sudan “the relatively long period of postpartum amenorrhea (associated with long intense breastfeeding) slows down the tempo and childbearing (another fertility reducing factor), despite the low prevalence of contraceptive methods” (p. 22). These cases show that later childbearing played an important role in lowering the fertility level (to varying degrees) in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. The rise in the age at marriage will not continue indefinitely, and upward pressure on fertility will, no 43 doubt, ensue. Consequently, countries with the great increase in age at first birth (Algeria, Morocco and Sudan) may experience a stall in their level of fertility decline, unless the decline continues by other means (Eltigani 2004:23). Timing of childbearing, desired family size, and preference for sons among different levels of Saudi families are affected by religious and cultural as well as economic factors. I expect attitudes about these things to differ by education of women. Also, I expect that differences according to ethnic background and in younger generations compared to older people. All of these things are taken into account when I present my research design in the next chapter. 44 CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS A. Fertility Attitudes and Behavior in Saudi Arabia According to chapters 2 and 3, fertility attitudes and decisions vary among economic and cultural subgroups within society. Some of the most important differences are education of women, their participation in work, their generation or age group, and their family background (tribal, i.e., Bedouin or not). These variables can be used in defining social-structural subgroups to explain different fertility attitudes and behavior in Saudi Arabia. Social positions represented by patterns of education, work, age, and tribal roots (family background) influence the roles of women and gender relationships within families, and both changing social positions and changing gender relationships can contribute to either high or low fertility. B. Location for Study: City of Jeddah Jeddah city was chosen for the study because of the diversity of its population and economic base and its development as a modern urban city. According to the demographic survey of 1999, Jeddah is the largest city in Mecca administrative area or mintaqah. Saudi Arabia is divided into 13 such areas (mintaqat, singular - mintaqah). Mecca area (area 11 on the map in Figure 4A) has the largest population in Saudi Arabia with 5,193,149 people, or 26 percent of the Saudi population. Jeddah also has one of the largest proportions of working Saudi females according to reports on the labor force (Demographic Survey 1999). 45 Figure 4A - Administrative Areas (mintaqat, singular - mintaqah) in Saudi Arabia. Source: Source: Wikipedia, online encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. Jeddah also has one of the largest proportions of working Saudi females according to reports on the labor force (Ministry of Planning and Economy, 2002) as shown in Figure 4B. (Note that Mecca administrative area is spelled "Makkah" in some sources.) Due to my own family roles as a Saudi woman, it was impossible for me to go to tribal residences in rural area to ask about their lives, without being known to the family. The study involved interviews with tribal women who live in Jeddah as well as tribal women visiting the city from rural areas, and their attitudes might be affected by Jeddah city life. 46 Table 4A Saudi Population by Residence, 1999 Current Residence TOTAL % Native % Foreign % In-migrant Riyadh(6) 4485028 61.2% 26.3% 12.5% Mecca (11) 5193149 69.5% 23.3% 7.2% Jazan(10) 1071478 91.5% 6.2% 2.3% Eastern(7) 2886661 67.3% 22.0% 10.7% Assyear(8) 1563015 82.4% 10.5% 7.1% Kassem(5) 933146 76.7% 17.1% 6.2% Hail(9) 495769 83.2% 11.5% 5.2% Medina(4) 1310448 76.9% 17.1% 6.0% Baha(1) 459172 86.9% 7.8% 5.3% Northern(2) 237074 73.3% 10.7% 15.9% Tabuk(13) 560212 70.2% 13.6% 16.2% Najran(12) 367672 72.3% 13.2% 14.5% Joaf(3) 332408 76.4% 16.8% 6.9% TOTAL 2E+07 71.3% 19.8% 8.9% Source: Demographic survey 1999. female percent in the labor force 30 25 20 15 % 10 percent 5 0 h n il h a f a kah Asir H ina ah ord. iyad ssim B B abuk - Jou R ak Jaza . Prov. a ad - . T Najran M Q h ste M L rt AL a A o E N adminstrtative area Figure 4B Labor Force (15 Years and Over) by Administrative Area, Nationality, and Sex in 2002. Source: Ministry of Planning and Economy, 2002. 47 The Mecca area (as mentioned in Chapter 1) had the third-highest level of female education in Saudi Arabia, after Riyadh and the Eastern area, but even so 79% of women in Mecca area have completed less than high school education. For the rest, 9% completed more than high school and 12% finished high school as their highest level (Demographic survey 1999). Figure 4C. Map of Saudi Arabia. Source: CIA, World Factbook, 2005. 48 Mecca administrative area includes famous cities such as Jeddah and the holy city of Mecca itself. As discussed in chapter 1, the importance of Jeddah includes its diversity of population. The story of Jeddah is one of rapid expansion, mostly within the past 20 years. A look at the figures is staggering. In 1947, the city encompassed no more than one square kilometer, and its population was about 30,000 (Alnokhba, 2003). Between the boom years of 1974 and 1980, the population of Jeddah doubled. With a population of approximately two and a half million composed of some 50 nationalities, Jeddah occupies an area of 560 square kilometers and stretches for 80 kilometers from north to south along the coastline. Jeddah is the nearest large city to Mecca, a holy place for Muslims, and people move easily between Jeddah and Mecca. Millions of people from different places and cultures all over the world come to visit Mecca for pilgrimage and stay there afterwards. People became citizens of the area even though they do not have local tribal roots originally. At the same time, Jeddah is surrounded by many different tribal and rural cultures whose members immigrate to the city to get jobs. This rural-to-urban migration increases the urban population of Jeddah (Alseryani 1993). Jeddah appears as a melting pot of populations from many subcultures; these groups live in different areas in the city. C. Variables for Study 1. Social position Social position was measured by variations in four characteristics derived from previous research reviewed in chapters 2 and 3: level of education, work status, age, and tribal roots. These characteristics were used to sort women into separate interview groups, to avoid status inequalities that could prevent useful dialogue in the interviews. I assume that social-structural position in society will be related both to fertility and to gender relationships as shown in Figure 4D. a. Tribal roots. This variable has two categories, having tribal roots (Bedouin) or not. In Saudi Arbia there are large tribes with famous known names. People without one of these names are considered non-tribal. The families with original tribal roots consider themselves the real inhabitants of Saudi Arabia, who have lived in the country since long 49 ago. As mentioned in the first chapter, each region in Saudi Arabia has sustained some measure of nomadic and semi-nomadic population: as recently as 1950, at least one-half the total population of the kingdom was estimated to be nomadic. Tribal identities were paramount among the nomadic population and among those in towns and villages who recognized a tribal affiliation. They consider themselves different from other inhabitants such as pilgrims who came to Mecca for religious reasons, stayed, and over time became Saudi citizens. Usually we know tribal roots from family names. Knowing tribal names but not recording given names, I could construct interview groups with or without tribal roots, and still preserve the anonymity of respondents since many people share each tribal name. I assumed that families with tribal roots are more conservative and have a special position for men and sons and that may affect gender relationships and fertility decisions. b. Ages of women. Age includes two categories: over age 50 with childbearing completed (to reflect different generational and social status than younger women); young women under 50 years old. In these two levels of generation I expected to see differences especially regarding values and attitudes towards husbands and fertility. Women under 50 represent different cultural values and attitudes than older women. The post-World War Two period was the start of formal mass education in Saudi Arabia. The ministry of education was instated in 1954 (Ministry of Education, 2003). Television and other media also began about that same time. All these factors separate the old generation from the younger world. The old generation women are mostly not educated and stay home, not working. They have a different status for men, so gender relationships are different between these two generations. In the older generation they need more children since the children, especially sons, are needed to secure women's lives when they are not educated and have no work. Traditional requirements in family life give women in the older generation their social position and status. c. Women's level of education. Education was measured by the level of school the respondent finished. Categories include less than high school, high school, and more than high school. As mentioned in chapter 1, the increase in urbanization has been matched by a major increase in the level of education in the Saudi population, especially for females. d. Work status. Work status divided between working and receiving a regular monthly income, versus not working and depending on husband's income. In Saudi 50 Arabia, most women (including government employees and also service workers such as laborers or maids) work by fixed contract and are paid monthly. Self-employed women usually own their own businesses and there are no official statistics for their private work. Women's experience with work is something new. Education, work, and communication with the world now give some women (but not all) in the young generation a new position in their family and that affects their gender relations, decisions and attitudes toward childbearing. Position Attitudes Behavior Social-structural Gender Fertility history position Relationships (data sheet from (sample design) (scenarios with interviews) focus group) 1. Tribal roots 1-Length of first birth 2. Age groups 1.Timing of 1st birth interval (after marriage) 3. Education 2. Family size 2. Number of children born 4. Work status 3. Son preference 3. Sex ratio of births Figure 4D - Research Design and Content 2. Attitudes about Gender relationships Attitudes about gender relationships, with particular focus on questions about reproduction, were captured through conversations in the intensive group interviews described below. I examine three specific decisions in which gender roles may be important. a. Timing of a first birth. Attitudes may differ by social background on the timing of a first birth. These differences related to the extent to which birth is within the "conscious calculus of choice," and will affect the possibility of contraceptive use or other fertility control. For example, tribal women might consider using contraceptives as 51 preventing God's gift. More educated women may be more likely to know about contraceptive methods. A wife's job may be related to differences in gender relations between husbands and wives, and may also change their incentives about the timing of births. b. Family size. Women who work may have different attitudes than women who do not work, if work makes changes outside the family that affect relations within the family. On the other hand, when some women begin working, the effects may be felt in other families as well and attitudes may not be different after all. Education also may contribute to the promotion of gender equality or to the maintenance of a power relationship based on gender. Age groups should have different values and cultural attitudes toward family size since they are related to different generations. Finally, the tribal population is more conservative than others. They wish to increase the number of the tribe by adding members. c. Son preference. Gender relations may find expression in son preference, the attitude that sons are more essential than daughters. I assume different responses depending on tribal affiliation. Also different age groups reflect different generations' attitudes toward sons and their role in mothers' lives. More educated women may have a different degree of son preference since they know more about changing women's roles in family life. An educated woman may have more power and equality with her husband and that could change her attitude. The same could happen with women who work. 3. Reproductive outcomes Reproductive outcomes also appear in Figure 4D above, in addition to attitudes about family decision-making. These outcomes measure the actual behavior reported by women for the years before the survey. We examine three factors that parallel the attitude questions discussed in (2) above. a. Length of first birth interval. The first birth interval measures the difference between a woman's reported age at marriage and her age at first birth. Three respondents reported no difference between age at marriage and age at first birth. They were coded as having the first child right away. Women whose ages at marriage and first birth differed by only one year also were coded as having a child right away. Those whose age at first 52 birth was two years older than their age at marriage were considered to have briefly waited to have children. Women whose ages at marriage and first birth differed by 3 years or more were coded as having waited a while. b. Number of children ever born. Women reported the number of children they ever had; this reported number was used directly in the analysis. c. Sex ratio of births. For each child born, women were asked whether it was a girl or a boy. The sex ratio of all births is the number of boys divided by the number of girls; this sex ratio can be calculated for all births together, or for each birth order separately. D. Method of Data Collection 1. Surveys versus in-depth interviews To measure attitudes about fertility and gender relationships in Saudi Arabia, a survey instrument could not capture all important dimensions. Saudi women are not used to such surveys and to answer such questions. For example, in recent demographic surveys done by the Ministry of Health, men always are the ones who give all answers. Only in one recent health survey were women the respondents. Women need someone who can explain for them any misunderstandings. On the other hand, as a woman I could not interview men on these sensitive subjects, so this study has only female subjects. My research needs answers to sensitive questions about gender relations and decision-making regarding desired number of children and contraceptive uses. Questions about family attitude and hopes, wishes regarding children and choices of contraception and other such questions may receive little in the way of response from a survey. Therefore collecting data about gender relationships and attitudes in my study was accomplished by using intensive discussion groups. Talking in a group comes naturally for Saudi women. Any comments from one of the group encourage others to talk more about the subject, especially in regard to different attitudes and experiences regarding fertility. 2. Interview methods 53 Intensive interviews can be used especially where qualitative data is important. The strength of the methodology is in depth of detail. A moderator can probe when information provided is shallow or superficial, which is an inherent problem with structured surveys or mail questionnaires. The results from intensive interviews are similar to those from surveys in many studies (Ward,1991) but provide added details not available from the surveys. There is an additional benefit related to the natural affinity for oral communication regarding a sensitive subject. Many countries like Saudi Arabia are conservative culturally. Many people can talk and converse in certain dialects but to read or write in those dialects is far more difficult. People have been conditioned to keep their opinions to themselves, and are more likely to relax and talk honestly in a group of their peers than in an artificial survey interview setting. Further, translating questionnaires often results in changes in the meaning of questions, resulting in misunderstanding and invalid results. The interview setting can reduce a lot of these difficulties. Accordingly, the moderator has to be very skilled at encouraging participation and making participants feel comfortable. This is partly a natural skill, partly trained. I preferred to be the moderator for each focus group. I conducted semi-structured intensive interviews. The format helped me to conduct informal and natural conversations, but allowed me some direction about how and when to ask sensitive questions. Topics and questions are chosen in advance (see Interview Guide below) and flexibility is built through careful probing (Miles 1997). The interview was like a long, flexible conversation, and sought information on gender relations and their effect on fertility outcome. 3. Sample composition Cross-classifying the four social characteristics of work status (two categories labeled "work" and "home"), education (three categories labeled "basic", "secondary" and "university"), age (two categories labeled "younger" and "older") and tribal roots (two categories labeled "tribal" and "non-tribal") gives 24 possible combinations. In practice, so few Saudi women over age 50 have any history of paid jobs that six of these 24 combinations were dropped from the sample design. Women over age 50 also almost never have higher education, eliminating two additional possible combinations. This left 54 sixteen groups, each of which can be identified using the first letter of each of the categories used to define the group (see Table 4B). Table 4B Research Sample Education < high school high school high school + Respondents Tribal Never worked under 50 TYHB TYHS TYHU 12 50 and above TOHB TOHS - 8 Ever worked under 50 TYWB TYWS TYWU 12 Non-Tribal Never worked under 50 NYHB NYHS NYHU 12 50and above NOHB NOHS - 8 Ever worked under 50 NYWB NYWS NYWU 12 (T = tribal Y=young H=home B=basic education) (N= nontribal O=older W=worked S=secondary education) U=university education) To create a comfortable, intimate atmosphere for discussion, and yet to be sure that it would be possible to note down each participant's comments, quota samples of four women in each of these 16 categories were formed for 16 different focus group meetings. Interviews involved small groups of women only so I could hear from each of them with out any pressure from their husbands in answering such sensitive questions. In my sample I controlled for education levels, tribal and non-tribal status, working and non-working, and age group or generation through selection into the groups. Since kinds of work and occupations varied somewhat, I tabulated types of work to see how those jobs differed and if attitudes differed according to the kind of job (See Table 55 4C). The table indicated tribal and non-tribal women experienced similar types of jobs requiring similar levels of expertise. Table 4C Occupations by education and tribal /non-tribal identity for young ages Person 1 Person 2 person 3 person 4 Tribal < high clerical worker school for day care clerical worker clerical worker Custodian High university clerical clerical worker for clerical worker assistant director for school worker charity in school university > high manager in school professor manager in school school Teacher in school Non Tribal < high school clerical worker clerical worker clerical worker clerical worker High clerical worker in director of public school charity relation Secretary Telephone opreator > high University school clerical worker clerical worker Accountant Bank teller I needed to know women's names to know their tribal roots, but I promised them that their names would not be recorded in our records of the groups or mentioned in the research (see Interview Guide below). Also all participants participated voluntarily. I took my participants' oral agreement to do the interview before determining the interview place and time. (See Human Subjects Review approval in the Appendices.) 4. Contacting respondents and securing interviews a. Contacting respondents. Groups of women similar in age, education, work status and tribal roots were chosen from different areas in the city. I found respondents in social centers for women in Jeddah, including mosques, places of work and shopping, schools and universities, coffee shops, places for homeless women, and banks (all sex- 56 segregated settings where women can gather). I tried to meet with each subject first and discuss with them what the interview would be about and the goal of the research. The respondents agreed to do the interview and I informed them that I would report and record their answers if they agreed. The interview time and place was arranged with each group. b. Interview places (and groups located there). -Mosques after Friday prayer: some religious women from all categories of society. (NYHB) - University and school conference rooms: women with higher levels of education and working women are there. (NYWS, TYWU) -Charity women's organizations: both poor and rich working and not working women visit, some to ask and some to receive donations and help. Those women include both tribal and non tribal backgrounds. Some are jobless and some are homeless women. Rich women volunteer at these organizations. Most rich women work without salary and stay in these organizations for a long time to look over the poor cases and distribute donations. (TYHB, NYWB) -Superintendent's office at Ministry of Women's Labor: there are all kinds of women working in many kinds of organization.(NYWU) - Coffee shop: mostly newly married young girls are the visitors of the malls and coffee shops, from all categories of society. (TYHS, NYHS) -Private rooms in the national restaurant: business meetings and chatting areas in the restaurants for middle- and higher-class women. ( TYHU, NYHU) -Private homes: by appointments through some of my friends. Women over 50 prefer to stay home and gathered there instead of meeting in public places. (NOHB, NOHS, TOHS) -Security section in private and governmental schools: most are tribal, uneducated women and working women. (TYWB) -Women's Bank branches: women who are working in banks are educated working women who have given me some of their time after working hours, and also some bank visitors. (TYWS) 57 -Hospital: women's visiting rooms. By arrangement with hospital's management, I had the chance to meet non-working older tribal women visiting relatives in the hospitals. (TOHB) c. Problems with interviews. In general, opposite to what I expected, there was little refusal among most potential interview participants. Refusals included three women with less than high school education. All three were young and had jobs. One other woman refused, with education higher than high school and not working. Most of those I invited immediately accepted participation in the meeting. I was pleased by their cooperation in answering all questions without hesitation, giving their honest ideas regarding the subject of the interview. Still, I faced a few difficulties, including some interviewees' misunderstanding the nature of the group meetings. A few respondents thought that I would question their own personal and private life. For example, two educated women working in the university withdrew from the interview as soon as I told them my topic of the research, before even talking to me. But then when they discussed the interview subject outside the room with their colleagues who had finished the interview with me, they came back, accepting to meet with me and participate in an interview. They were anxious to give their answers, to the extent that many of them asked whether I needed anything else or if there were more questions they could answer. As another example, a woman over age fifty and of non-tribal origins thought about my topic for two days. Then she apologized and refused the interview with her group. I replaced her with another and delayed my appointment with the group for many days. Also, some women apologized that their husband did not allow them to answer such questions. However, most of the participants, even the not educated, were willing to do so. In terms of the interviews, and the groups gathering, one disadvantage was that timing was not respected by some of the participants. I sometimes waited for an hour until they came together. Sometimes I was forced to start with only three participants. In these situations I re-asked the same questions again of late arrivals. The greatest disadvantage of poor timing was in coffee shops and restaurants. I chose people available in the coffee shop or restaurant and asked them if I could meet them in the same place at 58 another time. Even the persons who accepted sometimes could not be in the same place until I tried for several times. Older women often were not interested to go outside their homes. It was difficult for me culturally as a Saudi woman to visit homes and meet non-working women (tribal or non tribal) without being invited. To solve this problem, I used some of my friends to get me an invitation through them. I succeeded in a few invitations but not as many as I wanted. I started to think about hospital visiting rooms where many non-working women visit their sick family members. The social relation office of the hospital helped me to enter these rooms and meet and talk to those people to invite them to my interview. I had to explain the interview subject before I got their acceptance to sit with me as a group. The identification paper from the university helped me a lot to introduce myself to the participants. With the management of the hospital's help, I allowed one hospital employee to attend the interview there as a listener only. 5. Interview Format Groups were scheduled for two-hour sessions, 90 minutes for the interview and 30 minutes for introduction and ending. Meeting times were early evening (preferred by all non-working women) and early afternoon for working women. Interviews were conducted in the places I originally located each group. In some cases it took me a week to meet with the interviewees and do the interview--for example, the mosque gathering for prayer is every Friday. Other interviews I did the next day. For example, at the university and schools or the banks where I could find the working women every day in the same places, I was sure that I could find them. Some interviews I did as soon as they agreed, on the spot (for example, tribal older women). It would have been hard to find them in the same place again since they were visiting their relatives in the hospital. Also some had a specific day of the week for interviews, such as the women visiting the charity organization and asking for donations. They have a specific day for visits and I arranged with the manager to meet them and interview those who agreed to answer my questions. The conference room in the charity organization was the place of these interviews. 59 I kept with my ethical guidelines by discussing the purpose of the research. I encouraged anyone to freely share their own thoughts and ideas. My purpose was to assure them that their voluntary cooperation had no negative effect on their status, especially since they are not used to such research. I asked them to listen carefully to each scenario and then to answer. I followed the direction they wanted the interview to be oriented. I suggested that interaction is acceptable in answering the interview questions. I interviewed four women in each group to control the subject and try to explain any misunderstanding. After reading the scenarios (see sample interview protocol in Appendix) I tried to keep them on task as necessary and manage the time for the interview. I tried to probe into deeper issues, skipping some questions that might already have been discussed. The interview length of 90 minutes was not exceeded. The last step was reporting the answers. Saudi women are not used to such research and needed more explanation and repetition for many questions. I was the moderator. I preferred to record the interview to follow all the details of answers. Also the answers were recorded by reporters who took notes during interviews. The reporters were three paid women. They were the same reporters in each interview. I trained them not to talk or involve themselves in any answers. Not all groups allowed me to record their interview mechanically. They did not want their voice to be recorded. I respected their demand, and only six groups were recorded out of sixteen. For the rest I depended on the reporters' notes. I preferred three reporters to report each conversation to allow comparison between their writing. Regarding the difficulty in reporting the data, I found a little problem in registering true ages. Many older women refused to give their true ages, but they appeared to me to fit in the age range I recorded. Others, especially tribal women, refused to give their names though they were very proud to inform me that they had tribal roots. Knowing their tribal roots was my concern, so I did not insist to take their names. E. Analysis of Results I reviewed the qualitative data gathered from the intensive interviews. I made comparisons between the data collected by the reporters who took notes for me and my 60 own records. We discussed any disagreements between the two information sources, without making assumptions about which source was correct or which should be used as a standard. Because of the lack of information about Saudi gender relationships, I needed all the details of answers. In my analysis, I transcribed the complete discussions. Commentary and verbatim responses can be placed in the context of respondent characteristics from the face pages of the Interview Guide, expressed as general statistical measures. The large-sheet-of-paper approach is the equivalent of electronic cut and paste using a word processor and involves breaking the transcripts down into three scenarios. I divided each scenario into a number of questions and sub-questions. The text answers were allocated under themes and headings identified deductively from the responses. I listed all possible answers given from the responses to each question. Sometimes their answers included more than one response. I gave each answer a number code, trying to find logically coherent groups of answers. That helped me in doing the comparison between my categories. I wrote interpretive thoughts about the data in the margins. The benefits of this approach are that each transcript is considered as a whole rather than as a set of discrete responses. This allows the analyst to re-experience the group, body language and tone of the discussion. Themes and topics I deduced from questions and sub-questions centered on timing of first birth decisions, involvement of different actors in the decision, and discussions of contraceptive use, family size, or preferring a son. In following chapters I explore differences and opposing views on these issues according to differences (work, education, age and tribal roots) in the composition of the focus groups. 61 CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS ON ATTITUDES ABOUT REPRODUCTIVE ROLES AND BEHAVIOR A. Scenario One In the interview process, each of the 16 groups of women shared similar tribal status, work status, education and generation as described in chapter 4. In Scenario One, the researcher posed a series of open-ended questions to each group of four respondents. The respondents were asked to consider a hypothetical couple, Ahmed and Fatma, who reside in their own neighborhood. They were told to imagine that Fatma is a woman close to them, such as a cousin, sister, or friend. These interviews were recorded, translated into English, and transcribed. The information gathered was then coded, compiled, and analyzed with an eye towards revealing variations between tribal and non-tribal groups, younger and older generations, those working and non-working, and educated and uneducated women, while also exploring an overall picture of Saudi women. 1. Timing of the first child To begin the interview, the participants were asked, “Suppose a couple has just gotten married and they live in their own home. Will they have a child right away, or not?" To this open-ended question, the researcher received many answers ranging from, “They will wait,” to “They will have a child right away.” Others answered that the couple would decide by mutual agreement or that it would depend on the couple’s circumstances. Some expressed the religious sentiment of “as God wills.” 62 In reviewing responses for tribal and non-tribal groups, some differences became evident (see Table 5A.) In general, in groups of non-tribal women, participants were more likely than those in tribal groups to respond that a newly married couple should wait a while before having a first child. The table shows counts of individual respondents, even though they actually interacted in groups of four. One also could report "group answers," but sometimes women in the same group did not all agree on answers to a certain question. If we look at each woman's answer, we can consider all women in a certain category (for example, women with tribal roots or women with work experience) from several different interview groups. Table 5A shows that half of non-tribal women stated that the couple should wait a while. Only about one-sixth of tribal women answered in this way. Furthermore, more than one of every five tribal women held a traditional religious belief that the couple should not control their fertility, but should conceive as God wills and gives them the ability. No non-tribal woman provided such a religious response to this particular question, though later in the course of the interview they too mentioned the influence of religious thinking. Regarding the influence of age, over 60 percent of tribal women age 50 and older responded with the answer that the couple should conceive as God wills. The reasoning they offered followed traditional religious beliefs and teachings regarding this matter. As one tribal woman over 50 stated, “She will have children at once. What God gives us is welcome. We never refuse to have children. Nobody can prevent what God wants. I married before having my period and I got pregnant when I had my period.” An additional 25 percent of older tribal women responded that the couple should have children right away, being influenced by the traditional belief that children are the goal of marriage. These women offered traditional but not necessarily religious rationales. One such woman stated, “The first goal of constructing a Saudi family is having children.” 63 Table 5A Response Patterns for Timing of First Births ______(Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: God’s Will Right Away Wait a While If They Agree It Depends Total Tribal Women Under 50 (2) (9 ) (6) (3) (4 ) (24) 8.3% 37.5% 25% 12.5% 16.7% 100% 50 and older (5 ) (2 ) (0) (0) (1) (8) 62.5% 25% 0% 0% 12.5% 100% < High school educated (6) (3) (2) (1) (0) (12) 50% 25% 16.7% 8.3% 0% 100% High school educated (1) (5) (2) (1) (3) (12) 8.3% 41.7% 16.7% 8.3% 25% 100% > High school educated (0) (3) (2) (1) (2) (8) 0% 37.5% 25% 12.5% 25% 100% Working (0) (4) (5) (1) (2) (12) 0% 33.3% 41.7% 8.3% 16.7% 100% Non-working (7) (7) (1) (2) (3) (20) 35% 35% 5% 10% 15% 100% All tribal groups (7) (11) (6) (3) (5) (32) 21.9% 34.4% 18.8% 9.4% 15.6% 100% Non-tribal women Under 50 (0) (7) (15) (0) (2) (24) 0% 29.2% 62.5% 0% 8.3% 100% 50 and older (0) (4) (1) (1) (2) (8) 0% 50% 12.5% 12.5% 25% 100% < High school educated (0) (6) (6) (0) (0) (12) 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 100% High school educated (0) (5) (4) (1) (2) (12) 0% 41.7% 33.3% 8.3% 16.7% 100% > High school educated (0) (0) (6) (0) (2) (8) 0% 0% 75% 0% 25% 100% Working (0) (3) (9) (0) (0) (12) 0% 25% 75% 0% 0% 100% Non-working (0) (8) (7) (1) (4) (20) 0% 40% 35% 5% 20% 100% All non-tribal groups (0) (11) (16) (1) (4) (32) 0% 34.4% 50% 3.1% 12.5% 100% ______ 64 Significantly, no older tribal women stated that the couple should wait a while before conceiving. Only one of eight women in this category responded that the couple’s decision would be determined by the particular circumstances, age and personality of the couple. Even this woman advised her own daughter to have children right away: “I was so careful not to let my daughter use contraceptive pills, and I let her have children at once after she married. But, at the same time I studied my daughter's husband’s personality and noticed he is so calm and independent and an educated person. Also, her husband was older than her by 10 years and had no time to delay having children. According to that, I let her get pregnant at once after marriage.” What is interesting here is that she “let” her daughter get married, and she “let” her get pregnant at once after she was married. We can see that the mother still has influence even after her daughter is married. By comparison, older non-tribal women split evenly between a traditional response that the woman should have a child right away (50 percent) and the less traditional responses that the woman should wait a while, decide by mutual agreement, or decide based upon their individual circumstances. These groups of older non-tribal women did not offer religious rationales as had their tribal counterparts, but were more concerned that the newly wed couple first established their own relationship before bearing children. Those who responded that the couple should have children right away were influenced by the traditional belief that children are the goal of marriage and a fear of the side effects of contraceptive use. For example, one older non-tribal woman said, “They will have children at once, but if she so young they will wait but not use contraceptive pills. It is not good for her. I know a friend who used contraceptive pills to avoid pregnancy for two years. She was in the U.S., and after she came back she cannot have children. She visited many doctors to have children and they told her that it may be from using contraceptive pills.” Those older non-tribal women who said that the couple may wait depending on their mutual agreement and individual situation were influenced by a belief that the couple should make sure their own life situation is established and that they know each other well enough before entering into the responsibilities of parenthood. As one such woman said, 65 “It depends on the situation of the couple. If they are in good financial condition and their life is settled down and if they understand each other, they will have a child. If they are not, they should wait.” And another added, “If they know each other before marriage, they will have children, and it is not so in all marriages, so it is a matter of choice.” Among younger tribal women we see fewer religiously-influenced responses that the couple should have children “as God wills” than among the older women. Only two of these 24 women answered “as God wills,” compared with nearly two-thirds of the older tribal women. Almost half of younger tribal women did, however, maintain a traditional response that women should have children right away, being influenced by a fear of divorce, the cultural understanding that men want children right away, and society’s emphasis on the importance of the first child. For example, one tribal woman in this age group said, “If she does not get pregnant at once, there will be a greater chance of the husband getting married to another woman to satisfy his need for children.” Two other younger tribal women spoke of the importance of the first child and societal pressure saying, “For the first baby, she should have a child right away but for the rest she can wait and arrange herself and her future,” And, “She should get pregnant at once and have a child immediately. In our society, they all will talk about her if she does not get pregnant.” Over half of younger tribal women gave non-traditional opinions, with 26 percent saying a newlywed couple should wait a while before having children and another 26 percent saying they could delay children depending on their circumstances. Some younger tribal women were influenced by a modern belief that the couple should establish their own life circumstances first and get to know each other well before having children. One woman said, “She should wait for a while. In the beginning they should build their life step by step looking forward to a good future.” 66 Another spoke of the importance of knowing one another first saying, “In our society, girls do not know their husband [before marriage], so they should know each other after marriage and not have children at once.” Three-fourths of younger non-tribal women showed the opinion that a couple should wait a while before having children, compared with half of older non-tribal women and also half of younger tribal women. Only one of five younger non-tribal women said that a couple should have children right away. These women often expressed a belief that a couple should first establish themselves, get to know each other, and enjoy life together before having children. Interestingly, only 5 percent of younger non-tribal women expressed fear of contraceptive use, compared with 40 percent of older generation non-tribal women. Several younger non-tribal women themselves commented on this change in attitude from the previous generation. One said, “It used to be that she would get pregnant immediately. They married young and had children immediately. The opposite is true nowadays. They are wise because they finish their education, know their husbands more, learn households, and then have children.” Variations in response depending on the women’s educational background can also be observed. The percentage of tribal women responding that a couple should wait to have a child, possibly based on their circumstances or mutual agreement, included 25 percent of less-than-high-school-educated women, 50 percent of high-school-educated women, and 63 percent of more-than-high-school-educated women. Similarly, among groups of non-tribal women, 50 percent of less-than-high-school-educated women, 58 percent of high-school-educated-women, and every more-than-high-school-educated woman said that a couple should delay having children or may choose to delay depending on their situation. The biggest differences between tribal and non-tribal women therefore came at the lowest and the highest educational levels, while these groups were not as different for women with some schooling but less than a high school diploma. Interestingly, none of the more-than-high-school educated non-tribal women said a couple unequivocally should have children right away, though they may choose to based on their age or some other concern. One more-than-high-school-educated non- tribal woman stated, 67 “No one wants to have children before at least one year. Especially educated persons want to know each other and then have a child.” Finally, variations in the responses were observed based upon the women’s job status. One-third of all tribal women said that a new wife should have a child right away, whether they had worked at paying jobs or not. Many non-working tribal women offered a religious response that the couple should bear children as God wills, but no working tribal women stated this religious rationale. Also, significantly, tribal women who were working were eight times more likely than their non-working tribal counterparts (42 percent to 5 percent) to say a couple should wait a while to have children. Among non-tribal women, 40 percent of those who had not worked said she should have a child right away while only 25 percent of working women said this. One tribal woman working as a manager said this about the influence of a job, “In general, if a woman works, she delays her fertility.” Another tribal woman working as a teacher had this to say of a job’s influence, “If Fatma works, that may let her to delay having children immediately. If Fatma does not work that may allow her to have children immediately. Also, it depends on the kind of work Fatma is doing.” One non-tribal woman working as a manager said, “If she has no job she will have children immediately because she has nothing to do.” However, another non-tribal woman working as a banker said, “I think there is no difference whether Fatma works or not. The most important thing is to have the first child after taking about one year to know each other.” In short, age, education, and job status influenced Saudi women’s attitudes toward childbearing. Many members of tribal and non-tribal groups alike still hold a traditional attitude towards having children right away, especially women who are 50 and older. However, tribal group members expressed a religious rationale for their attitude towards childbearing, and they appeared more likely to believe in God’s will determining whether to have a child. In contrast, no one from a non-tribal group expressed that 68 perspective. This is not to say that non-tribal women are not religious. However, they have other ways of interpreting their religious beliefs. Non-tribal women are less likely to fear using contraceptives or to believe that childbearing is the exclusive goal of the marriage. While “as God wills” is a common rationale among tribal groups, satisfying society and following the social norm was the reason given for maintaining a traditional attitude in non-tribal groups, with non-tribal women following norms to get respect and keep their status. As we also saw above, younger women in both tribal and non-tribal groups were more likely to hold a non-traditional attitude towards timing the first child. This generational divide reflects a difference of experience between the generations regarding childbearing. The older generation (50 and older) gained their status from having and bearing children, especially sons. Also, older women hold different views and practice different gender relationships, having a traditional interpretation of the status of men in society and the family. The financial support they require for themselves and their children makes them more dependent on a husband, and they could not refuse to bear him the number of children he wants. Educated Saudi women often stated that the desire for children depends on one's situation and financial condition. The interesting thing here is that all non-tribal women with more than high school education answered that couples should delay childbearing and look first to establishing themselves. Attitudes towards having children right away differed in both tribal and non-tribal groups when women worked. Respondents seem to consider having a baby to be like another job for a woman. She should get pregnant if she does not have a job, since she has nothing to do. Their answers reflect another important reality in Saudi Arabia, which is that women are the ones responsible for taking care of their children. Men are not helping women in rearing the children, so if a woman’s job will affect childbearing, they prefer to leave the job. 2. Others involved in the birth decision The researcher then asked, “Suppose Fatma and Ahmed talk about whether to have a baby right away, or to wait. Who will be involved in the discussion?” This question, too, was open-ended. Answers ranged from saying that only the couple would 69 be involved to statements that the family members, particularly the husband’s family and his mother, would involve themselves. As the quotes below indicate, when family members are involved in the birth decision, they are most likely to urge the couple to have children right away. One of the most interesting patterns in my research emerges here--non-tribal women actually were more likely than tribal women to say that their families would get involved and encourage a birth right away. Among non-tribal women, three-fourths said that family would encourage them to have a baby right away. Non-tribal women also more often felt that family members may urge the couple to delay having children, with one-fifth saying a family member will urge the couple to wait. Among tribal women, about half responded that family members would tell the couple to have children right away. An additional one-eighth said that family members would more subtly ask questions about their fertility and encourage the woman to see a doctor to encourage them to have children. Hardly any tribal participants said a family member may encourage the couple to wait. Overall, a majority of participants stated that some family members would be involved. Nearly half of both tribal and non-tribal respondents indicating that the husband’s family and the husband’s mother in particular have special influence in this decision. On the other hand, very few women (about one in ten) indicated that the wife’s family or the wife’s mother would influence the decision. Tribal women emphasized the influence of the husband’s mother more, but mentioned the influence of the wife's mother less. One non-tribal woman said of others involved that, “The husband's family, especially the mother-in-law, will criticize the wife if she does not have children. The husband’s family has the power to ask and insist on their having a child since the child will carry the family name.” A tribal woman similarly stated that, “[The husband’s] family dominates everything, and [the husband’s] mother interferes in fertility matters. They have the power in the family. They will demand children immediately.” 70 Another tribal woman relayed a personal story about her mother-in-law’s involvement saying, “My mother-in-law always asks my husband if I am pregnant or not. One time she came to my house and saw some baby clothes I bought as a gift for my friend. She was so happy and asked me if I got pregnant.” One non-tribal woman described a difference in how the wife’s family and the husband’s family influence the decision saying, “The husband’s family--they insist on having a firstborn. On the opposite side, the wife’s family wants to wait a while to secure their daughter’s life and situation.” Another non-tribal woman described the different interest of the family members in this way, “If Fatma and her husband don’t have children, Ahmed’s family will pressure them to have children, but the other relatives only comment. Fatma's family members are not insisting. They always look out for Fatma's happiness and desire.” And another non-tribal woman said of the wife’s family, “I think Fatma's family will tell her to wait until they know each other.” Some further distinctions may be made upon examining the age, educational background, and job status of the respondents. Older tribal women most often said no one else is involved in the birth decision, with about two-thirds of them answering in this way. Their religious beliefs seemed to influence these women’s response, as one said, “Nobody involves themselves in this discussion. It is a matter for the husband only. We get pregnant at once and nobody is involved. How can they refuse what God wills? This is a matter of God.” And another said, “There will be no delay if God wills.” This is very interesting! It might indicate that among the older, more religious tribal women, the customary pressure to have babies is so strong that family members 71 have no need to get involved. The partners themselves are so strongly socialized with pronatal attitudes that no overt social pressure seems to be needed. This interpretation also might explain why women with more than high school education (both tribal and non-tribal) were least likely to say that no one else is involved in the birth decision. Only 13 percent of the most educated women answered in this way, compared with 21 percent of high school educated women and 38 percent of less-than- high-school educated women saying that no one else is involved in the decision. The less- educated women perceive less active influence from relatives, maybe because they rarely delay childbearing and the issue never comes up. Job status also seems to influence the participants’ responses. All working tribal women responded that others get involved with the birth decision, while only half of their non-working counterparts said this. A bit less dramatically, five out of six working non- tribal women answered that someone else is involved with the decision, but only one- fourth of their non-working counterparts answered in this way. It seems that work also increases the woman’s perception that others interfere or are involved in the couple’s birth decision process. This again fits with what the older tribal women were saying, if we are willing to imagine that when relatives—especially the husband’s mother and other family—begin to take an active pronatal role, that might indicate that there are some doubts about how completely the couple themselves have been socialized to have children. In short, non-tribal women predicted more family involvement in birth decisions than did tribal women. Most often participants thought that the husband’s family, the husband’s mother in particular, would be involved. They stated that the husband’s family has the power to insist on their having a child since the child will carry the family name, and the husband’s mother can ask the wife to go to the doctor if she didn’t have a baby. Furthermore, the husband’s mother is often the one to take care of the children, and she can play a very strong role in the family, especially in the tribal families. The situation with the wife’s family is different; they generally look out for their daughter’s happiness and desire. Responses differed, however, according to age, educational background, and job status of the respondents. Older tribal women were most likely to say no one else is 72 involved in the birth decision. Education and work also seemed to mean more expected involvement of the husband’s mother. This could be because education and work increase the woman’s awareness that others interfere or are involved in the couple’s birth decision process, and/or it could mean that women with such experiences are the only people who would think of postponing a birth. Relatives may always be a latent source of pronatalism, but they get "activated" only when a woman actually starts to delay a birth. This feeling also may come from the independence of educated and working women, which lets them refuse any interference or involvement from others, even if it is small. 3. The ultimate decision-maker Next the interviewer asked, "If Ahmed wants a baby right away but Fatma wants to wait for a little while, what should Fatma do?" Responses were divided according to who the women say ultimately will decide: the husband, by mutual agreement, or the wife. Participants at times would contradict themselves in their answers, on the one hand saying that the husband should be obeyed and at the same time saying the wife could secretly control her own fertility. If the husband was said to think the choice was his but the wife controlled her fertility secretly, the wife was chosen as the actual decision- maker. Where the participant simply stated the husband should be obeyed, the husband was selected as the decision maker. When a respondent stated the wife had the power and the ability to convince the husband of her desires, the wife was chosen as the decision- maker. When a participant stated the couple would discuss and agree together, the response was coded as “by mutual agreement.” Tribal and non-tribal participants provided somewhat similar feedback regarding the person who most controls the birth-decision process, with both tribal and non-tribal women indicating most frequently that the husband controls the decision, followed in frequency by the response that the decision is made by mutual agreement, and ending with the woman controlling the birth decision as the least frequent response by both groups. Just under half of both tribal and non-tribal women felt that the husband is the ultimate decision maker and that the woman should obey his wishes in this matter, as shown in Table 5B. 73 Table 5B Response Patterns Regarding the Ultimate Decision-Maker ______(Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: The Husband Mutual Agreement The Wife Total Tribal Women Under 50 (9) (8) (7) (24) 37.5% 33.3% 29.2% 100% 50 and older (6) (1) (1) (8) 75% 12.5% 12.5% 100% < High school educated (7) (4) (1) (12) 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 100% High school educated (5) (2) (5) (12) 41.67% 16.67% 41.67% 100% > High school educated (3) (3) (2) (8) 37.5% 37.5% 25% 100% Working (4) (3) (5) (12) 33.3% 25% 41.7% 100% Non-working (11) (6) (3) (20) 55% 30% 15% 100% All tribal groups (15) (9) (8) (32) 46.9% 28.1% 25% 100% Non-tribal women Under 50 (9) (8) (7) (24) 37.5% 33.3% 29.2% 100% 50 and older (4) (4) (0) (8) 50% 50% 0% 100% < High school educated (5) (4) (3) (12) 41.7% 33.3% 25% 100% High school educated (4) (7) (1) (12) 33.3% 58.3% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (4) (1) (3) (8) 50% 12.5% 37.5% 100% Working (5) (4) (3) (12) 41.7% 33.3% 25% 100% Non-working (8) (8) (4) (20) 40% 40% 20% 100% All non-tribal groups (13) (12) (7) (32) 40.6% 37.5% 21.9% 100% 74 Religious reasons for obeying the husband’s wishes were cited among both tribal and non-tribal participants. As one tribal woman stated, “Do not forget the religious issue here. Women in Islam should obey their husbands especially in these matters of having children soon. If she cannot convince him, she should obey him and not let this matter make a problem between them.” And a non-tribal woman similarly stated, “In religious issues, she has to obey her husband’s desires, especially if their financial condition is permissible to have children.” Among all groups, older women with less than a high school education were the most likely to indicate that the husband was the final decision maker. In fact, every less- educated older tribal woman answered this way, and three-fourths of less-educated older non-tribal women did as well. One tribal woman in this group gave an interesting example from her personal life saying of the husband, “If he wants to wait, he can do anything. My husband stopped my fertility by having an operation without my permission because he had already 10 children and did not want any more.” Non-tribal women in this group cited religious reasons for the husband to be the ultimate decision-maker, as one woman said, “She should obey him. Religion asks the woman to obey her husband and never use contraceptives without his permission.” And another non-tribal woman in this category said, “Fatma should surrender to Ahmed’s desire and get pregnant. It is against religious beliefs if she does anything else.” Only 28 percent of tribal compared to 38 percent of non-tribal participants indicated that the decision could be reached by mutual agreement. Among tribal women, those with a greater than high school education were most likely to say the decision could be reached by mutual agreement. Older non-tribal women with high school education were most likely (75 percent) to say the decision was a mutual one. Finally and least frequently, about one-fourth of both tribal and non-tribal women indicated that the woman had the final control over the birth decision. Interestingly, most 75 of those who indicated that the woman is the final decision-maker said the woman is able to make this decision by secretly controlling her fertility against her husband’s wishes and tricking him. A tribal woman answered, “The husband always wants to wait because of money or financial problems. She can trick him and get pregnant,” One non-tribal woman said of the woman’s ability to control, “Fatma can cheat him and use contraceptive pills with out his permission.” Another non-tribal woman agreed that the woman was able to control but cautioned, “But if he finds out later he might divorce her. I think she should convince him that they should wait for a while, but if Ahmed is not convinced she could cheat him for one month or two but not for a long time because he might think that she cannot get pregnant and marry another one since remarriage is an acceptable phenomenon nowadays.” In fact, because of the fear of divorce and the importance society places on having children, participants who felt that the woman could control the decision often only advocated that she exercise this control when it is she who wants to get pregnant against her husband’s wishes and not when it is her husband who wants a baby. For example, one tribal woman said, “Fatma can trick him and get pregnant because she cannot disobey him, so she can use this tricky way.” It is interesting to note that among tribal participants, perception of a woman’s ability to influence or control the decision increases in direct proportion to level of education. Among those with less than a high school education, 42 percent answered that the decision is either mutual or in the woman’s hands. Among those with a high school education, 58 percent indicated that the decision is mutual or made by the woman. And of those with a greater than high school education, 63 percent said the birth decision is made mutually or by the woman. However, among non-tribal women, this same trend was not observed. Fear of divorce may suppress using this tricky method of fertility control among educated non-tribal women. Two non-tribal women with more than a high school education cited such fear saying, 76 “No, I am not for [secretly controlling fertility]. This way Fatma will lose Ahmed's confidence if he finds out that Fatma is using contraceptive methods. Or Ahmed may think that they cannot have children and go marry another one. So it is not good to use contraceptive methods without informing her husband.” And, “She should obey Ahmed or he will send her back to her family’s house (divorce her).” As with education, having a job seemed to have a positive influence on a tribal woman’s perception of her ability to influence the birth decision. Less than half of tribal women without a job answered that the birth decision was mutual or made by the wife, compared to two-thirds of working tribal women who answered in this way. However, also as for education, having a job had no discernable influence on non-tribal women’s responses. It is here that we can see the influence of religious thinking among some working non-tribal women whose attitudes toward fertility were unaffected by their work situations. For example, one non-tribal working woman stated, “Fatma should obey Ahmed and have her baby right away. This is a religious matter and the wife should obey.” In short, both tribal and non-tribal women indicated most frequently that the husband controls the decision. Religious reasons for obeying the husband’s wishes were cited among both tribal and non-tribal participants. Furthermore, older participants with less education were most likely to indicate that the husband was the final decision maker. However, about a quarter of the participants from tribal groups and slightly fewer non- tribal women indicated that the woman had the final control over the birth decision, secretly controlling her fertility against her husband’s wishes and tricking him. It is interesting that tribal participants appear more independent and tricky than non-tribal women. Tribal women may not want to disobey their husbands but have no way to convince them, so they adopt tricky methods of control more than non-tribal women did. Another possible explanation is that tribal husbands have less information about contraception and do not know if their wife has used it. Working and school did not appear to have empowering effects among non-tribal women, some of whom cited as a 77 factor the influence of religious beliefs such as obeying the husband, especially in matters of fertility. 4. Influence of living with the husband’s family Participants were then asked, "How might their choice be different if they were still living with Ahmed's family?" Categories of responses included statements that there would be no change, that any change would depend on their personalities, that there would be greater interference from his family, that the couple would delay having children, or that living with his family would help them to have children. Interesting differences emerged when comparing tribal and non-tribal groups, the participants’ ages, their job status, and educational background. To begin with, four times as many tribal participants, or one in four, responded that living with the family would make no difference in the decision compared with one in sixteen non-tribal women. These results are consistent with the answers above that show less expected family interference in decisions among tribal women. One tribal woman described her personal experience saying, “I lived with my husband's family and I didn’t get pregnant, and living with them did not affect my fertility. This is especially the case if your husband and the family relationships are good.” Another agreed, “No, it is not different. If living with the husband’s family will affect their life, they should move away.” Also, more than twice as many tribal participants indicated that living with the husband’s family would help them to have children right away, by providing help in the care of the children. Almost one-fourth of tribal participants answered this way compared with only one in ten non-tribal participants. One tribal woman explained her answer by sharing her friend’s story: “Living with Ahmed's family will encourage her to have children since the responsibility of caring for the children is less. Usually the couples will have someone help them in taking care of their children. I know one friend who had eight children because she is living in her husband’s family’s house. There is a 78 cook for all the family, and her mother-in-law helped her in taking care of the children.” Another tribal woman agreed saying, “While my friend was living with her husband's family, she had most of her children there. Fatma will feel more secure if she lives with her husband's family, especially about her children.” The first woman qualified her answer, however, explaining that women today were, unlike her friend, less likely to live with the husband’s family and more likely to face interference from their mothers-in-law. Additionally, a few women among both tribal and non-tribal participants indicated that living with the husband’s family would cause the couple to delay having children. One non-tribal woman explained her reasoning this way, “Nowadays, the husband's family knows that their son is not yet settled down in his life or his financial situation is not perfect to have children immediately. So they insist that he delay having children soon. If Ahmed is living with his family, this is an indicator that he is still not an independent person, and they may interfere to delay having children for a while until the couple’s life is settled down and they have their own house.” Another agreed, “Yes, in this point they prefer to have children when Ahmed has his own house with Fatma.” Respondents from both tribal and non-tribal groups most frequently responded by saying that living with the husband’s family would result in increased interference from the husband’s family in the birth decision process. However, more than half of non-tribal participants answered this way, compared with less than half of tribal participants. Two non-tribal women explained their answers saying, “The fertility decision would be different since the husband's family loves to have grandchildren and it would not depend on the husband's personality. They believe that any child comes with his support from God.” And, 79 “Yes, there will be differences. Ahmed and Fatma will think about it deeply because they are not independent.” Two other non-tribal women described the interference this way: “If his family wants them to have children, they will strongly insist on them to have children,” And, “They will keep on insisting the girl obeys what he wants.” All of these answers by non-tribal women seem to imply that the couple, by themselves, may have different (lower) expectations about children than the husband's family. Some tribal women also expected similar outcomes, as in the case of a woman who said, “Of course there is a difference, the pressure, the interference. They will know the time for her period; they will know everything,” Two other tribal women described the affect of tribal customs in determining the influence of the husband’s family. The first said, “It differs since the mother-in-law will interfere in everything and she has power. They may also force him to remarry to have children. In our tribal group, girls live with their husband’s family in general, and she should get pregnant at once to prove that she does not have a health problem.” And the second added, “Fatma will not feel comfortable in her husband's family house; they will insist on her having a child and God will help. All her decisions will be affected by his family. In our tribe there are many rules that if you do not obey, you did something bad. One of these expectations is satisfying your husband.” Finally, 6 percent of tribal women and 20 percent of non-tribal participants, or more than three times as many, indicated that the influence of living with the husband’s family would depend upon the various personalities involved. Two non-tribal women explained, “It depends on her personality. If Fatma has a strong personality, she will not let anybody interfere in her matters, whether she is living with them or not.” 80 And the second added, “Also on the mother-in-law’s personality.” A tribal participant explained the influence of the wife’s personality this way: “Of course their decision will be affected since they are living with them, unless Fatma's personality is independent and strong.” Another tribal participant described the influence of the husband’s personality this way: “It depends on the husband’s family. The involvement differs from one family to another. Most couples' families practice their power on their children even after they married. The families never leave the couples to decide alone. But I doubt that they interfere in fertility matters. Maybe they interfere in son or daughter matters. I know a woman who did not celebrate the births of her son’s three children because his wife had daughters.” Further interesting differencess are observed when comparing age groups. Among the younger generation of women (under age 50), both tribal and non-tribal included, 59.5 percent indicated that living with the husband’s family would increase family interference in the birth decision. The percentage of those stating interference would increase was lower for the older generation, with only 37.5 percent of those aged 50 and older indicating that the interference would increase. This may be due to cultural shifts between the generations as seen in the 1993 study by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health, which indicated that the younger generation has delayed childbearing longer than the previous generation, the primary causal factor being the time they have dedicated to their schooling. This effect of more education and delayed childbearing in the younger generation of women could be leading to a conflict between the generations where the younger generation wishes to reject the advice of the older generation regarding timing their births. Another possible explanation is that perhaps the older generation women underestimate their own influence while the younger generation women are keenly aware of and sensitive to the pressure the older generation can exert. Another difference observed is that those with less than a high school education were most likely to indicate that there would be no change in the birth decision as a result of living with the husband’s family, with a total of 29 percent among both tribal and non- tribal participants answering this way. The percentage of those indicating there would be 81 no change was lower for those with more education, with only 8 percent of high school educated women and 6 percent of more than high school educated participants answering this way. The majority of these educated women, 56 percent of those more than high school and 58 percent of those high school educated, indicated the change would be more interference from the family in the timing of the first child. This compared with only 33 percent of those with less than a high school education. Once again, this relates to the cultural shift discussed in the 1993 study of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health which observed the trend toward more education for women leading to delayed childbirth. It may be that those with less education may not feel interference as much because they may not be delaying first births as are those women with more education. Job status also appeared to have a strong effect on the participant’s perceptions regarding family influence. One-fourth of both tribal and non-tribal participants without a job indicated that living with the husband’s family would make it easier to have children. Furthermore, a third of women without jobs said that interference would increase when living with the husband’s family. In contrast, 71 percent of working women stated that interference would increase and no working woman, either tribal or non-tribal, indicated that living with the husband’s family would help them have children. As shown above in Chapter 4, there is no important difference in the kind of work tribal and non-tribal women are engaged in. In short, non-tribal groups more frequently responded by saying that living with the husband’s family would result in increased interference from the husband’s family in the birth decision process. However, a majority of all women answered this way. Further interesting contrasts are observed when comparing the responses based on the age groups of the participants. Among both tribal and non tribal older women, only 38 percent said that living with the husband’s family would cause an increase in their interference in the birth decision. By contrast, among tribal and non-tribal younger women under age 50, 52 percent indicated that living with the husband’s family would increase interference in the birth decision. This may be due to real differences between the generations, or perhaps the older generation underestimates their own influence while the younger generation is especially sensitive to the power the older generation has over 82 their lives (an age effect). Repeating this study after a generation would decide which alternative is correct. Those with less than a high school education believe there is no change in birth decisions when living with the husband’s family. This may be because even if they do not live with the husband’s family, they consider it to be the husband’s family’s decision. Yet this belief was less common for women with more education, so women with less education may make decisions on their own that match the wishes of their family more closely. Women without a job more often indicated that living with the husband’s family would make it easier to have children. In contrast, most working women said that interference would increase but they did not usually regard this as "help". This study did not ask detailed questions about involvement by husbands' or wives' mothers or other relatives in helping with child care; future research might explore the importance of this factor. 5. Effect of the wife’s job on the birth decision The researcher then posed the question, "How might their choice be different, depending on whether Fatma had a job or not?" The participants’ responses included the following: working would have no effect, she must stop work to have children or delay children to keep working, she can keep working and have children, she can balance between work and children, she can work with help from family or a maid, she must obey her husband’s wishes, and she will be more confident in whatever her decision because of her work. Each of these responses received a separate code but for purposes of analysis and comparison some similar responses were considered together. One category combined responses indicating that a woman must choose between work and children, or that the two can be combined. The first category included both the response that she must stop work to have children and the response that she must delay children to keep working, as many participants stating the one option also stated the other. The other category of similar responses considered together were those indicating a woman could keep working and have children, those specifying that she could get help from family or a maid, and others stating that she should balance between work and family. 83 Comparing responses regarding the influence of the wife’s job on the birth decision revealed distinctions between tribal and non-tribal perceptions and differences based upon the age, educational status, and job status of the respondents. To begin with, twice as many non-tribal women (44 percent) as tribal women (22 percent) suggested that Fatma should either stop working to have a baby or delay having children to keep working. Their responses seemed to be influenced by the belief that a non-working mother could better raise, educate, and care for her children. They also indicated that if finances are a reason why the wife is working, the couple should delay having children until the financial situation is settled. One non-tribal woman put it this way saying, “She should stop working to have children. Work may stop so she can take care of her children. I prefer having children, and then to work. After her children grow up she would work. I will not let anybody take care of my children. The child bearing is the responsibility of the mother only.” When another non-tribal woman tried to argue that work should not be given up because it is necessary for the woman to help meet her social needs and develop personally, this woman insisted, “But my children need me more…I can socialize myself and educate myself from home if I have children. If mothers with children leave the house to work, it means I would leave my children with maids and that may affect even their language as I have seen in many children. The only excuse for women to work is if her financial condition requires her to work. But for other needs, she can fulfill them while she is at home.” Another non-tribal woman agreed, “If her financial condition is poor, she should delay having children for a while. On the opposite side, if her financial situation is good, there is no need to work.” Women in this category also indicated that having a job could provide a woman with leverage in the argument to delay children. As one non-tribal woman said, 84 “Work will give her an excuse to delay having children, but if her husband or his family insists on having children, Fatma should stop the work.” And another agreed, “Yes, if she works this will help her insist on not having children, but if she does not work it is easier to convince her to have children.” While non-tribal women more often viewed family duties and paid work as incompatible, tribal women were almost twice as likely (56 percent to 31 percent) to indicate that a woman could continue working and have children, perhaps with the aid of family or a maid or perhaps by balancing and arranging both work and caring for the children. One tribal woman said, “She should have the first baby whether she works or not. Saudi families always have maids help them if the women work.” Another agreed saying, “Yes, if Fatma can take a maternity leave from work, she can arrange her time to care of her child and do her work hours while having someone to take care of the child during her absence from home. She can have a baby immediately.” Further distinctions were identified when the respondents’ age, educational background, and job status were compared. For example, participants of the younger generation were more likely to state that a wife should either delay children to work or stop working to have children. A total of 38 percent of younger tribal and non-tribal participants answered this way, compared with 19 percent of those 50 and older. Just as work and family roles more often seemed incompatible to younger women, older women more often thought the two parts of life could be combined. Several older tribal women shared the influence of their personal experience upon their response: “In the past, women did not work and if she works at home no arrangement and planning is required. But our pregnancy was arranged by breastfeeding every two years if God wills.” Another added, 85 “The work never affected us. We farmed, cooked, and took milk from the cows and made our bread at home and carried our water and at the same time we were pregnant and having children.” The more education a respondent had, the more likely they were to state a woman should stop working to have children or else delay children. Over half of more than high school educated women answered this way, compared with one-third of high school educated women and one-sixth of less than high school educated women. Conversely, the less education a respondent had the more likely they were to say a wife can have children and continue working by some means such as arranging childcare or balancing both work and children. Job status also had an interesting effect on participants’ responses. Almost half of those with work experience said a wife should delay children to work or stop work to have children, but only one-fourth of those who had not worked felt that a woman had to make a choice between work and children. Working women in this sample were engaged in jobs outside the home such as in the universities or in banks and offices. Women with these sorts of jobs would have to arrange for someone else to care for their children while they work. Perhaps those who have worked themselves understand more fully the cost in time of doing so and are less likely to think that Fatma can have children and work at the same time. In short, non-tribal women were twice as likely to see work and motherhood as incompatible. They also indicated that if finances are a reason why the wife is working, that the couple should delay having children until the financial situation is settled. Tribal women more often said that Fatma could continue working and have children, perhaps with the aid of family or a maid or perhaps by balancing and arranging both work and caring for the children. Such reactions often came from tribal couples who lived with the husband’s family and benefited from their aid. Younger women and those with more education were more likely to state that Fatma must either delay children to work or stop working to have children. It may be that it is a modern idea that mothers are the best ones to raise their own children, and women with education might especially feel the quality of care they can provide their children is best. Similarly, those women who are working themselves were more likely to state that 86 Fatma would need to choose between work and bearing children and less likely to state that she could do both by getting help from others or by balancing between work and family responsibilities. 6. Knowledge and use of contraceptives Participants were then asked if there was something a couple could do to avoid a birth and what methods were used today. While all combinations of response were coded and recorded separately, those stating two or more methods were considered together as a category of “many methods are known.” Other categories coded and considered separately included the following responses: “no one knew of contraceptive methods in the past but some methods are known today,” “religion prohibits their use,” “a few people still don’t know about contraception,” and those providing no response. The interviews revealed widespread knowledge and use of contraceptive methods available today among Saudi women. This knowledge appeared to exist in every segment the sample, regardless of job-status, education, tribal status, or even age, though some women were careful to say that a number of the methods known and used in Saudi Arabia today were neither known nor used by past generations. Indicating the common knowledge of contraception in Saudi society today, two tribal women stated, “Yes, there are many methods. All people know that. There are many things like using pills, condoms, or an IUD,” And, “Sure, there are many ways. Even unmarried girls know these methods…There are many methods like what I said before. Some are modern and others are traditional, like timing and withdrawal.” Similarly, a non-tribal woman stated, “Nowadays the girls know everything (pills, condoms, IUD’s, creams, injections.)” Regarding the question of knowledge of contraception, seven out of eight participants (both tribal and non-tribal) simply indicated that many methods of 87 contraception are known. Most of the remaining women agreed, but differentiated between the past and today, saying some methods are known and used today but weren’t in the past. Two older tribal participants described this difference between their generation and their daughters’ generation today saying, “We didn’t know about contraceptive methods and we did not avoid pregnancy. [We thought] God will do what is the best for us. Now days, girls know contraceptive methods.” And, “No, we did not know about contraceptive methods and there was not any care before, but now our daughters know about the pills.” One tribal respondent, however, did state that religion prohibits the use of contraception, and another provided no response at all. Among non-tribal participants, a few women having knowledge of contraceptives themselves stated that a few couples today may still have no knowledge of contraception. Only one respondent stated that many don’t know about contraception, and an additional non-tribal participant gave no response. Interestingly, the one participant who stated that many people today still don’t know about contraception was a non-tribal woman who was expressing her stereotypes about tribal women living in the village, a sentiment that no tribal woman herself confirmed. This participant stated, “The tribal women who live in the village are unaware. We can say that 10 percent only are aware and 90 percent do not know anything about contraceptive methods. In some tribal groups, contraceptive methods are prohibited.” Similarly, those non-tribal women who said that a few people may still not know about contraception stated, “Only a little Bedouin does not have any idea about contraceptive methods. But all the others know how to avoid the birth.” Furthermore, when it came to the question of what methods might be used by a Saudi couple to prevent birth, seven of eight participants (both tribal and non-tribal) mentioned at least two different methods. Many responses included modern, medical methods available and used widely today such as pills, IUDs, injections, condoms, and birth control patches, as well as the traditional methods such as withdrawal, monthly 88 timing, or breastfeeding to space children, which were more commonly used in the past. Participants indicated that this widespread knowledge is attributable to the power of the media in spreading the information on contraceptives. A tribal participant stated, “This is because the Internet and the media solve the problem of unawareness of contraceptive methods.” Similarly, a non-tribal woman stated, “Yes, the media, the Internet, the medical information available through the Internet, her friends, the city she lives in, all these help her to know everything about contraceptive methods.” Regarding the question of contraceptive use, a tiny number of women answered that religion prohibits their use, while a few did not specify any particular method of contraception. When examining the breakdown of responses by age, education, job status, and tribal status, older tribal women emerged as the group least likely to state that there is knowledge today of contraception. Even among this group, however, half thought that many methods are known and another one-fourth said that some methods are known today though not in the past. One-eighth of this group indicated religion prohibits contraceptive use and the final one-eighth gave no response. Older tribal women also were least likely to specify particular methods used. Neither education nor work status appeared to have a strong effect upon the percent of participants reporting a knowledge of contraceptive use, with more than 80 percent of participants from every educational and work category reporting specific knowledge of multiple methods of birth control. This matches the nationwide figures for contraceptive knowledge reported in Chapter 1. In short, when examining the breakdown of responses by age, education, job status, and tribal status, older tribal women emerged as slightly less likely to agree that there is knowledge today of contraception, but all groups of respondents expressed a general consensus that Saudi women have widespread information from the media and their physicians. Many responses included both modern medical methods such as pills, IUDs, injections, condoms, and birth control patches, and traditional methods such as withdrawal, monthly timing, or breastfeeding to space children, confirming the survey results reported in Table 1G in the first chapter above. 89 B. Scenario Two In Scenario Two, the researcher posed a series of questions to these same participants, examining the expected number of children born to a Saudi couple like Ahmed and Fatma. The interviews also focused on exploring possible factors that may cause a couple to have fewer or more than the expected number of children. The information gathered was once again analyzed to uncover differences between the various groups identified. 1. The average number of children To begin the second scenario, participants were asked, "Suppose now that Ahmed and Fatma have been married for some years. How many children would they be most likely to have during their whole married life?" Answers were categorized as up to three, four to six, seven to eight, and more than eight. Additionally, a coding was provided for those participants who did not respond to the question. Table 5C presents the distribution of answers for women grouped according to the main explanatory factors considered. When asked how many children Ahmed and Fatma may have over the course of their lives, both tribal and non-tribal participants most frequently responded that the couple would have four to six children, with 44 percent of tribal and 69 percent of non- tribal participants answering this way. However, tribal participants were four times as likely to say that the couple would have seven, eight or more children. Non-tribal women were twice as likely to say that the couple would have less than four children. In providing these responses, some participants differentiated between the past and the Saudi family of today. These Saudi women shared a widespread impression that family size already has begun to decline in the Kingdom. For example, one non-tribal participant said the couple would have “three or four nowadays but in the past they had bigger families.” A tribal woman similarly stated, “From seven to twelve was common, but today five to six only.” In examining the age of respondents, older participants in both tribal and non- tribal groups were more likely to state that a couple would have more than 6 children, 90 though the age distinction was greater among the non-tribal groups. These older women may have been referring to the past when providing their answers. For example, several non-tribal women spoke of the past when answering this question saying, “In the past ten, but they did not count the children.” “Yes, in the past no women or men planned; it was God’s will.” And, “In the past they liked children.” When examining the educational background of participants, some differences were observed among the tribal groups. The more education a tribal woman had, the more likely she was to state that a couple would have four to six children, while the less education a tribal woman had, the more likely she was to say that a couple would have more than eight children. Tribal women with more than high school education cited a number of concerns as reasons for limiting the number of children, including the costs and time required to educate and properly raise a child today. For example, one well- educated tribal woman said, “I think four. In the past they were more secure. Nowadays the future is unsure and the cost of the children is very expensive, and childbearing requires awareness. Women in the past were not so picky about childbearing and the children’s education, like women are now. Because of that, in the past women could have many children but now they cannot.” Among non-tribal women, there was no such discernable difference by level of education. Similar percentages of women in each education group answered that the couple would have less than four, four to six, seven or eight, or more than eight children. 91 Table 5C Response Patterns For the Number of Children Ahmed and Fatma Might Have ______(Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: No Response Up to 3 4 to 6 7 or 8 Above 8 Total Tribal Women Under 50 (0) (0) (13) (6) (5) (24) 0% 0% 54.2% 25% 20.8% 100% 50 and older (1) (2) (1) (2) (2) (8) 12.5% 25% 12.5% 25% 25% 100% < High school educated (0) (0) (2) (4) (6) (12) 0% 0% 16.7% 33.3% 50% 100% High school educated (1) (2) (6) (2) (1) (12) 8.3% 16.67% 50% 16.7% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (0) (0) (6) (2) (0) (8) 0% 0% 75% 25% 0% 100% Working (0) (0) (6) (4) (2) (12) 0% 0% 50% 33.3% 16.7% 100% Non-working (1) (2) (8) (4) (5) (20) 5% 10% 40% 20% 25% 100% All tribal groups (1) (2) (14) (8) (7) (32) 3.1% 6.3% 43.8% 25% 21.9% 100% Non-tribal women Under 50 (0) (4) (18) (1) (1) (24) 0% 16.7% 75% 4.2% 4.2% 100% 50 and older (2) (0) (4) (1) (1) (8) 25% 0% 50% 12.5% 12.5% 100% < High school educated (0) (3) (8) (1) (0) (12) 0% 25% 66.7% 8.3% 0% 100% High school educated (2) (0) (8) (0) (2) (12) 16.7% 0% 66.7% 0% 16.7% 100% > High school educated (0) (1) (6) (1) (0) (8) 0% 12.5% 75% 12.5% 0% 100% Working (0) (0) (11) (1) (0) (12) 0% 0% 91.7% 8.3% 0% 100% Non-working (2) (4) (11) (1) (2) (20) 10% 20% 55% 5% 10% 100% All non-tribal groups (2) (4) (22) (2) (2) (32) 6.3% 12.5% 68.8% 6.3% 6.3% 100% 92 Furthermore, it was difficult to find an influence of job status on answers of women in either tribal or non-tribal groups. Working women were only slightly more likely than their non-working counterparts (in both tribal and non-tribal groups) to say a couple would have more than six children. In this qualitative study with such a small and non-random sample, nothing can be made of such vague differences. Again, type of work could affect this result, but tribal and non-tribal women in this study worked in very similar kinds of jobs so type of work is not producing these differences. In short, tribal women expected Ahmed and Fatma to have more children than did non-tribal women. Differences between generations appeared in this question, in that older women expected more children for the couple than their younger counterparts. This was more evident between the two generations of non-tribal women. Education affects the attitude towards having a large family negatively in tribal groups, but not for non- tribal groups. The cost of children and the desire to raise them well were cited as reasons to have fewer children among some more educated women. Working affected non-tribal women more than tribal women, but the difference was very small. Beliefs about childbearing being more deeply rooted in tribal women so that work does not effect as great of a change in them. Or, perhaps tribal women are living with a large extended family and can have someone help them care for the children when women work. 2. Influences to Have Fewer Children Participants were then posed the open-ended question, “What might cause the couple to have fewer than the average number of children?” For this question, many participants provided more than one possible reason a couple might have fewer children. Every answer was recorded and each factor mentioned was given a separate code so that for those respondents stating more than one factor, each factor was recorded separately so that no data would be excluded. For this reason, for this question there were more possible causes listed than there were participants. The number one answer among tribal participants, and second most frequent among non-tribal women, was that a health problem could result in fewer children. 93 Slightly more than 30 percent of tribal participants and slightly less than 30 percent of non-tribals mentioned this response. By contrast, only one in ten tribal women mentioned the number one response among non-tribal participants (one-third of the non-tribal women), which was the high cost of children and/or poor finances of the parents. However, equal percentages of both tribal and non-tribal respondents (28 percent) stated that a desire to raise and educate the children well would be a limiting factor, with this response being the second most frequent for both groups. While the “raising the children well” response does imply the ability to adequately provide for the children, it extends, as we saw above, beyond the mere financial consideration that the “cost of children/poor finances of parents” response referred to. For example, one tribal participant referred to the moral and social training of the children when she said a couple has fewer: “Maybe to raise them well, since that is an important matter in these days…Now days, I prefer fewer children since raising them is very difficult. Children need care and control.” Also, a non-tribal woman stated this concern saying, “Maybe in their opinion having fewer children will make it easier for them to take care of their children and provide socialization.” In this, we see that both tribal and non-tribal groups are concerned about providing a high quality of care and education for their children, and that concern about quality can trump the desire for many children. Equal numbers of tribal and non-tribal participants also stated that God’s will would be a factor limiting the number of children. One non-tribal woman providing this answer said this alone would be a reason stating, “The will of God and not anything else,” would cause a couple to have fewer than the average number of children. Also, equal numbers of tribal and non-tribal participants stated a desire to arrange their lives could be a limiting factor for a couple with 15.6% of tribal and 15.6% of non-tribal women stating this reason. 94 Table 5D Five Most Frequently Cited Reasons to Have Fewer Children* ______ (Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: To Raise/ Cost Health To Arrange God’s Will Educate Well Problem Their Lives Tribal Women Under 50 (9) (2) (9) (4) (2) 37.5% 8.3% 37.5% 16.7% 8.3% 50 and older (0) (1) (1) (1) (3) 0% 12.5% 12.5% 1.25% 37.5% < High school educated (3) (1) (2) (2) (5) 25% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7% 41.7% High school educated (3) (2) (5) (2) (0) 25% 16.7% 41.7% 16.7% 0% > High school educated (3) (0) (3) (2) (0) 37.5% 0% 37.5% 25% 0% Working (5) (2) (3) (3) (0) 41.7% 16.7% 25% 25% 0% Non-working (4) (1) (7) (2) (5) 20% 5% 35% 10% 25% All tribal groups (9) (3) (10) (5) (5) 28.1% 9.4% 31.25% 15.6% 15.6% Non-tribal women Under 50 (6) (9) (6) (5) (5) 25% 37.5% 25% 20.8% 20.8% 50 and older (3) (2) (3) (0) (0) 37.5% 25% 37.5% 0% 0% < High school educated (6) (3) (5) (0) (3) 50% 25% 41.7% 0% 25% High school educated (2) (4) (3) (3) (2) 16.7% 33.3% 25% 25% 16.7% > High school educated (1) (4) (1) (2) (0) 12.5% 50% 12.5% 25% 0% Working (2) (4) (2) (2) (4) 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% Non-working (7) (7) (7) (3) (1) 35% 35% 35% 15% 5% All non-tribal groups (9) (11) (9) (5) (5) 28.1% 34.4% 28.1% 15.6% 15.6% * Totals of all responses may not equal 100% due to some respondents providing more than one reason to have fewer children or some respondents providing an answer other than these top five. 95 Several non-tribal women providing this answer explained saying, “Some of them also want to enjoy their lives,” And, “They are very organized couples.” Additionally, less than 10 percent of both tribal and non-tribal groups responded that the age of the parents, awareness, work, or the couple not liking large families might be reasons the couple would have fewer than average numbers of children. In these responses, I understood "awareness" or being "organized" to mean something similar to what Ansley Coale called the conscious calculus of choice, not awareness of some specific piece of information like how to use a birth control method. That is, women who are aware or organized can consider their own interests consciously, and can think in terms of making choices about timing and number of children, use of contraceptives and so on, rather than only following traditions and the wishes of others. This kind of awareness is a new and controversial state of mind in Saudi Arabia today. In citing awareness as a factor, one tribal woman described the example of a friend saying, “If Fatma and Ahmed are an aware couple [they will have fewer children]. I know one lady who is 45 years in age and has only 2 children and she is living her life and happy.” In looking at the breakdown of these responses by educational status of the participants, it is interesting to note that the less education a participant had, the more likely she was to state that God’s will would cause a couple to have fewer children. Strikingly, 42 percent of less than high school educated tribal women gave this religious response while no more educated tribal women gave this answer. Similarly, while one- fourth of non-tribal, less than high school educated women gave “God’s will” as an answer, only one-sixth of high school-educated and none of the more than high school educated non-tribal women gave this religious reason. Another interesting pattern in non- tribal groups was a link between higher education levels and more stated concern for finances as a factor limiting fertility, while lower education levels meant more stated concern for raising, socializing, and educating children well. In looking at the breakdown of response by age, “God’s will” was the top response for older tribal women, while health concerns and the desire to raise children 96 well were the most important concerns of younger tribal women. The high cost of children was the most mentioned concern of younger non-tribal women, whereas health problems and the desire to raise children well were most cited by older non-tribal women. Interestingly, one-fifth of younger non-tribal women cited God’s will as a limiting factor, while none of their older counterparts gave this traditional religious response. In looking at the influence of job status among non-tribal groups on these responses, no discernable pattern was observed. About a third of both working and non- working working non-tribal women stated that the high cost of childrearing and poor finances of parents would be a limiting factor, and about one-sixth of both of these groups of women listed the desire to arrange their lives as a limiting factor. Non-working non-tribal women were, however, more likely to mention a desire to raise and educate their children well and were less likely to mention that God’s will might limit the number of children. Among tribal groups, both those working and not working cited a health problem as the number one factor limiting the bearing of children. However, those working were more likely than their non-working counterparts to mention the concerns of cost of childrearing, the desire to raise and educate them well, and a desire to arrange their own lives as factors limiting childbearing. Two working tribal women cited these concerns when they stated, “In these days, the cost of the child is greater and the parents now think about the future. Nowadays men travel and the wife will be responsible for her children,” And, “The reason is their responsibility, not only the money, and I want to do for my children what my parents did not do for me.” Non-working tribal women, on the other hand, were more likely than their working counterparts to state that only God’s will could limit childbearing. One non-working tribal woman explained her belief citing a friend’s experience, “I agree that it is a matter of God and nothing else. I know a friend who had no children from her husband, and after he divorced her and married another woman, he had children. And after she married another man she had children. It is not a health problem; it is a matter of God.” 97 In short, tribal and non-tribal groups are equally concerned with providing a high quality of care and education for their children, and the quality concern can trump the desire for many children. However, 34 percent of non-tribal participants were concerned about the high cost of children. This was not an important reason for having fewer children among tribal groups, with only 9 percent of tribal groups mentioning the cost concern. Those tribal and non-tribal participants concerned that a health problem would be a limiting factor also reflect traditional beliefs that a family should have many children. Education seems to have an effect on both tribal and non-tribal answers, as none of those with a greater than high school education provided the religious reason that God’s will might cause couples to have fewer children. Perhaps this is because education provides participants with rationales besides “as God wills,” which participants often provided as the only reason when they had no other answer. Among non-tribal groups, those with more education were more likely to cite financial reasons to limit childbearing, and among those with less education, the limiting factor was the desire to raise, socialize, and educate their children well. Reflecting generational differences, “God’s will” was the number one response for older tribal women, whereas the desire to raise children well was the number one response for younger tribal women. While health problems and the desire to raise children well were equally most cited as reasons by older non-tribal women, it was the high cost of childrearing that was the most cited concern of younger non-tribal women. This may reflect the rising cost of raising children, of which the younger generation of non-tribal women are more keenly aware. 3. Influences to Have More Children When asked what might cause Ahmed and Fatma to have more than the typical number of children, participants provided a variety of explanations and reasons, with some women providing multiple rationales. The most frequent response given by tribal participants (about one in three) was that a religious belief would encourage a couple to have more than the average number of children. One-fifth of non-tribal women also stated that religious beliefs might influence a couple to have more children; the religious 98 factor ranked third in frequency among their lists of reasons. However, the number one answer non-tribal groups gave for having more children was a lack of awareness, with almost half answering in this way. Several non-tribal women discussed amongst themselves how a lack of awareness could cause a couple to have more children than average, the first saying, “The issue is not the money or financial, education and socialization are the issues. Maybe the cause is lack of awareness or maybe her husband wants children. Maybe she did not count how much they will cost them.” A second agreeing said, “Their vision is limited.” And a third added, “Or her education is limited or her social life is limited since interaction with other people makes the women more aware.” Among tribal groups, lack of awareness was listed as the second most frequent reason that a couple may have more than the average number of children, with 25 percent listing this as a factor. One such tribal woman explained her answer this way, “I think Fatma and Ahmed in this situation are like an instrument for fertility. They do not feel what is the meaning of themselves. Poor people are the most likely to have children because of lack of awareness of responsibility toward this child and this child is not a toy in their hand but they have needs that should be fulfilled.” Another important answer given by both tribal and non-tribal groups was that a love of children and large families would influence the couple to have more children than average, though non-tribal women (31 percent) were twice as likely as tribal women (16 percent) to provide this answer. Two non-tribal women stated, “Lack of awareness is not the reason. Many families love having big families,” and “It is a traditional thing that men love children.” Another reason given by participants was that having many children would make the parents proud and provide them with support in their old age, although only a few tribal or non-tribal participants provided this response. One tribal participant explained her reasoning this way, 99 “Maybe the most important thing is having children no matter what their financial condition or health is like. Maybe Fatma believes that they will support her when she becomes older. In the case that one of them dies, she will not get depressed as she will have another one to stay with her.” Additionally, a few tribal and non-tribal participants said that good health and fecundity might lead a couple to have more children than average. One non-tribal woman stated, “I think it depends on Fatma’s fecundity, even if she tried to avoid having a child.” Also two tribal women stated, “We all have many children if we are healthy and eat natural food.” and “The reason is good health and God’s will.” Good finances were identified by more non-tribal than tribal women as a reason a couple might have more children than average. Consistent with many other observations above, tribal women seem less willing to reduce childbearing to financial motives. One non-tribal woman explained how good finances could lead to this decision when she listed as reasons: “A lack of awareness, their desire, or their financial ability. If they have maids and servants. It is not love that produces having more children since that will prevent her from satisfying her husband.” And another non-tribal woman said the couple might have more, “If they have a good financial situation and they can support many children.” But a tribal woman discounted the influence of finances saying, “The financial condition does not play a role in that situation since all the poor people have more children than the educated couples. The cause is lack of awareness about contraceptive methods.” Equal numbers of tribal and non-tribal participants provided additional answers that a desire to secure the marriage, the sex of the children, the couple's early marriage, or an ability to raise the children well would cause the couple to have more children than average. 100 In looking at the breakdown of these responses by age, education, and job status, some interesting trends can be observed. For example, older tribal respondents were more likely than their younger counterparts to say religion would influence a couple to have more children. Among both tribal and non-tribal groups, the more education a participant had, the more likely they were to cite lack of awareness as a reason that a couple would have more children than average. Furthermore, among both tribal and non- tribal participants, those with jobs were more likely than their non-working counterparts to cite a lack of awareness as a factor leading to having more children. On the other hand, non-working tribal and non-tribal participants were more than twice as likely as their working counterparts to cite a love of children as a reason why a couple would have more than the typical number of children. In short, the difference between tribal and non-tribal groups was that tribal participants were more likely to cite a religious belief for having more children, while the number one answer given by non-tribal groups was a lack of awareness. These differences between tribal and non-tribal groups reflect a more traditional attitude towards having many children among the tribal groups who, as we saw above, were also more likely to state a couple would have a larger number of children. However, tribal and non-tribal groups were similar in the frequency with which they mentioned factors like a desire to secure the marriage and the sex of the children, two factors that could also refer to the societal need for the woman to bear sons. Older tribal respondents were more likely than their younger counterparts to say religion would influence a couple to have more children. Among both tribal and non-tribal groups, the more education a participant had, the more likely they were to cite lack of awareness as a reason that a couple would have more children than average, and those with jobs were more likely than their non-working counterparts to cite a lack of awareness as a factor leading to having more children. C. Scenario Three The goal of interview questions in the third scenario was to determine if participants value the bearing of sons and daughters differently. The findings were remarkable among both tribal and non-tribal groups. 101 1. If the first child is a boy In the third scenario, participants were asked, "Suppose that Fatma's first baby is a boy. Is she likely to have another child?" Tribal participants were more likely than non-tribal participants to state that having a boy first would satisfy the family and that she could wait to have another. As two tribal women put it, “All family members will be happy. The opposite is true if Fatma has a girl as her first baby.” And another agreed saying, “A man loves to have his first baby be a boy to call himself the father of Mohamed and not the father of Fatma.” Two non-tribal women provided quite a different answer saying, “Yes, because she wants a daughter,” And, “Yes, to have a girl.” Some who suggested that she should wait to have another child suggested this so that the woman could have time to recover and raise her first child well. As one non- tribal woman said, “She should take a break and try to take care for her child before having another one right away. She should wait and not be in rush. Even if she has a girl she should wait and rest then have another child.” More non-tribal than tribal respondents said that having another child after having a boy would depend on the couple’s circumstances or upon God’s will. A few respondents said the sex of the child did not matter or provided no response. When asked what in their experience makes them answer in this way, almost half of all women based their answers on what they observed to be social norms in the culture around them. Smaller percentages based their answers on their own experience, on the experience of their family and friends, or on religious beliefs and values. Interesting variations emerge when the participants’ responses are broken down by age. A much higher percentage (75 percent) of older women said that the couple 102 should have another child if the first child is a boy, compared with only 27 percent of younger women. Two-thirds of those under 50 either indicated that the family would be satisfied or that the couple could wait. This compares with only one in sixteen older women saying they should wait to have another and none saying the family would be satisfied. One older non-tribal woman explained her age group’s thinking in this way, “All the parents do not think that one is enough, and they should have another child be it a boy or girl.” A tribal women in this age group similarly said, “Yes, as a first child she should have the other one without caring if he is a boy or she is girl. We have no problem about the first child. We need the second.” When examining the breakdown of responses by education, no clear trend emerged. However, those participants with more than a high school education were the least likely to say the couple should have another child right away. Their answers seemed to hinge on the societal importance of having a boy, and the feeling that if a woman has a boy she has met her societal obligation. Several non-tribal women with more than a high school education felt this way. One observed, “If Fatma gets a baby boy as a first child, more of her responsibility to have a son is done, and she will be happy and proud of herself. The society lets us prefer a son. It is not a religious issue.” Another confirmed the societal importance of having a boy from her own experience: “The importance of sons or men is something absolute in all of Saudi society. When I went to rent a cabin on the seashore, they refused to rent to me until my husband left his work and came to sign instead of me, though I was holding the ID that proves that he is my husband and agrees to rent. In this society how could we live without a son or husband?” Two tribal women with more than a high school education spoke from their own and their friend’s experience and gave similar responses saying, “No, I think having a girl or boy does not matter for the first baby. After the first one, it may be Fatma's desire. But, getting a boy first will make Fatma feel more 103 Table 5E Response patterns for "If the first child is a boy, will she have another child?" ______(Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: No They Will Wait Have It Child’s Sex Total Response Be Happy Another Depends Unimportant Tribal Women Under 50 (1) (10) (7) (6) (0) (0) (24) 0% 41.7% 29.2% 25% 0% 0% 100% 50 and older (1) (0) (1) (5) (1) (0) (8) 12.5% 0% 12.5% 62.5% 12.5% 0% 100% < High school educated (0) (4) (5) (2) (1) (0) (12) 0% 33.3% 41.7% 16.7% 8.3% 0% 100% High school educated (1) (1) (3) (7) (0) (0) (12) 8.3% 8.3% 25% 58.3% 0% 0% 100% > High school educated (1) (5) (0) (2) (0) 0% (8) 12.5% 62.5% 0% 25% 0% 0% 100% Working (0) (3) (5) (4) (0) (0) (12) 0% 25% 41.7% 33.3% 0% 0% 100% Non-working (2) (7) (3) (7) (1) (0) 20 10% 35% 15% 35% 5% 0% 100% All tribal groups (2) (10) (8) (11) (1) (0) (32) 6.3% 31.3% 25% 34.4% 3.1% 0% 100% Non-tribal women Under 50 (0) (6) (6) (7) (4) (1) (24) 0% 25% 25% 29.2% 16.7% 4.2% 100% 50 and older (0) (0) (0) (7) (1) (0) (8) 0% 0% 0% 87.5% 12.5% 0% 100% < High school educated (0) (0) (4) (6) (2) (0) (12) 0% 0% 33.3% 50% 16.7% 0% 100% High school educated (0) (2) (2) (6) (1) (1) (12) 0% 16.7% 16.7% 50% 8.3% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (0) (4) (0) (2) (2) (0) (8) 0% 50% 0% 25% 25% 0% 100% Working (0) (2) (3) (3) (3) (1) (12) 0% 16.7% 25% 25% 25% 8.3% 100% Non-working (0) (4) (4) (11) (1) (0) (20) 0% 20% 20% 55% 5% 0% 100% All non-tribal groups (0) (6) (6) (14) (5) (1) (32) 0% 18.8% 21.9% 43.8% 12.5% 3.1% 100% 104 comfortable… Maybe she feels comfortable that her mother-in-law will stop asking. My friend said that to me.” And, “Yes, I agree. If she has a son, she will feel comfortable and can wait... [In] my own experience, when I had a boy as the first child I felt comfortable.” In examining the breakdown of responses by job status, tribal participants with a job were more likely than their non-working counterparts to say specifically that the couple should wait before having another child. Among non-tribal participants, those who were not working were more than twice as likely as their working non-tribal counterparts to say a woman having one son should have another child right away. When asked if Fatma would be likely to have another child after having a first child who is a boy, one working non-tribal woman answered, “No, it depends on her education and her work situation.” Another working non-tribal woman said, “She will satisfy Ahmed with this boy, and she will not be in a rush to have the other children. All men love to have boys, there is no need to have another baby soon, and she can wait for years.” In these responses, these working women resembled the more than high school educated participants who based their answers on the societal importance of having a son. In short, tribal participants were more likely than non-tribal participants to state that having a boy first would satisfy the family and that she could wait to have another. Some non-tribal women mentioned that the decision would depend on the couple’s circumstances. Those most likely to state a couple should have another child right away were older. The older generation of women from both tribal and non-tribal groups answered in this manner because one son or one birth alone is not enough for them in general, whether it is a boy or girl. Participants with more than a high school education were least likely to say the couple should have another child right away. The answers of the women with more than a high school education seemed to hinge on the societal importance of having a boy and the feeling that if a woman has a boy, she has met her societal obligation. 105 2. If the first child is a girl Participants were then asked, "Suppose that Fatma has had a girl first. Is she likely to have another child?" Major differences were revealed and much different responses were given when participants were asked what the couple would do if the woman has a girl first. When asked this question, three-fourths of all participants either said the couple should have another child (25 percent) or specifically stated that she should try to have a son right away (52 percent). This figure compares with only 39 percent of participants saying a couple should have another child right away if the first child were a boy. A non-tribal woman explained the greater emphasis on having a son in this way: “Fatma must have a baby soon to have a son since he carries the family name. According to my experience, if I had 5 girls I wouldn’t rest until I got the son because of my mother-in-law insisting that I have a son for my husband.” In the belief that having a son is more urgent than having a daughter, about half of both tribal and non-tribal women stressed that the woman should urgently try for a son and another one-fourth stating more simply that she should have another child. As two tribal women said, if the man has a girl first, “All of the tribe will know that he has a girl, and he will be shy that he is the father of a girl.” And, “The man will be sorry to have a girl as a first baby.” Furthermore, no participant indicated that having a girl first would satisfy the family. This is in great contrast to 25 percent of all participants saying that having a boy first would make the family happy. Only 9 percent of tribal and 16 percent of non-tribal women indicated that a woman could wait to have another child if she has a girl first. This is in contrast with half of all women who said either that Fatma may wait if she has a boy first, or that the boy would satisfy the family (also indicating that a woman could wait to have additional children). 106 In evaluating participants’ responses by generation, some distinctions and some similarities emerge. A similar percentage (about 80 percent) of those under 50 and those 50 and over indicated that having a girl first would not satisfy the family and that a couple who had a girl first should have another and/or try for a boy. However, an additional one-sixth of those under 50 indicated that a couple could yet wait to have another child, even if the first is a girl, while no woman age 50 and over indicated that the couple should wait. One non-tribal woman under age 50 explained why she thought the woman should wait saying, “Of course she wants to have a boy. [But] she should wait and rest for a while.” Two other non-tribal women under age 50 responded similarly saying, “It does not make a difference if the baby is a boy or a girl. She has to wait,” And, “No, she should wait until the first kid grows up, and then she has another.” For these respondents, the health and well-being of the woman and proper raising of the first child were more important than proving to the rest of the family that she could have a son right away. In another variation by age, one-eighth of older women stated that having another child would depend upon God’s will. However, no woman under age 50 provided such a response. Interestingly, the more education a participant had, the less likely she was to say a woman could wait to have another child after having a first girl. Two non-tribal women with more than a high school education explain why they believe the woman should not wait to get pregnant again saying, “Of course she must have a son soon. Traditional beliefs still emphasize the importance of a son. The husband’s family also prefers a son as a first child,” And, “Men love sons, and having a son is very important.” 107 Table 5F Response Patterns for "If the first child is a girl, will she have another child?" ______(Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: As God Father Will Try Right Have Wait No Response Total Wills Be Sorry Away For Another Tribal Women A Son Under 50 (0) (4) (13) (4) (3) (0) (24) 0% 16.7% 54.2% 16.7% 12.5% 0% 100% 50 and older (2) (0) (2) (3) (0) (1) (8) 25% 0% 25% 37.5% 0% 12.5% 100% < High school educated (2) (4) (3) (1) (2) (0) (12) 16.7% 33.3% 25% 8.3% 16.7% 0% 100% High school educated (0) (0) (5) (5) (1) (1) (12) 0% 0% 41.7% 41.7% 8.3% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (0) (0) (7) (1) (0) 0% (8) 0% 0% 87.5% 12.5% 0% 0% 100% Working (0) (0) (7) (2) (3) (0) (12) 0% 0% 58.3% 16.7% 25% 0% 100% Non-working (2) (4) (8) (5) (0) (1) 20 10% 20% 40% 25% 0% 5% 100% All tribal groups (2) (4) (15) (7) (3) (1) (32) 6.3% 12.5% 46.9% 21.9% 9.4% 3.1% 100% Non-tribal women Under 50 (0) (0) (13) (6) (5) (0) (24) 0% 0% 54.2% 25% 20.8% 0% 100% 50 and older (0) (0) (5) (3) (0) (0) (8) 0% 0% 62.5% 37.5% 0% 0% 100% < High school educated (0) (0) (2) (6) (4) (0) (12) 0% 0% 16.7% 50% 33.3% 0% 100% High school educated (0) (0) (9) (2) (1) (0) (12) 0% 0% 75% 16.7% 8.3% 0% 100% > High school educated (0) (0) (7) (1) (0) 0% (8) 0% 0% 87.5% 12.5% 0% 0% 100% Working (0) (0) (6) (4) (2) (0) (12) 0% 0% 50% 33.3% 16.7% 0% 100% Non-working (0) (0) (12) (5) (3) (0) 20 0% 0% 60% 25% 15% 0% 100% All non-tribal groups (0) (0) (18) (9) (5) (0) (32) 0% 0% 56.3% 28.1% 15.6% 0% 100% ______ 108 Two other more-than-high-school-educated non-tribal women explained their opinions and personal experiences, the first saying, “A son is responsible for his family and mother. My husband asked me, ‘If I died, what would you do if you do not have son?’” But her friend said, “No, my husband and I are not thinking in this couple’s way and sometimes my husband likes to have girls. I am the one who wants a son to support me in older age.” But the first woman retorted, “No, she wants that to shut the husband’s family’s big mouth because they all like sons. From my real life, when the mother of my friend knew that I had a baby girl, she was so sorry because she is originally from a tribe.” Several well-educated tribal women also explained why the woman should not wait saying, “Yes, Fatma will not wait. She will have a baby right a way. The love of sons continues still today. The man loves to have a son to help him when he becomes older.” And furthermore, “Yes, it differs. Girls do not carry the father’s name like boys do.” For all these reasons, including traditional beliefs, the man’s love of sons, and his family’s preference for sons to carry on their name, these highly educated women said a woman should try at once to have a son. Another distinction in response can be seen in examining the respondents’ job status. Those with jobs were more likely than their non-working counterparts to say that a woman could wait to get pregnant again. One working tribal woman explained why she felt a woman could wait saying, “No, there is no difference between having a girl or boy in these days. Girls do the same duty as the son does and they can support their families.” In short, the majority of the participants said the couple having a girl should have another child right away to try for a son, compared with only 39 percent of participants 109 saying a couple should have another child right away if the first child were a boy. This reflects the societal belief that having a son is more urgent than having a daughter. Emphasis on the birth of sons cut across the generations, with similar percentages of those under 50 and those 50 and over indicating that having a girl first would not satisfy the family. Additionally, some tribal participants stated even more dramatically that the father would be disappointed to have a girl first. Interestingly, the more education a participant had, the less likely she was to say a woman could wait to have another child after having a first girl. Citing traditional beliefs, the man’s love of sons, and his family’s preference for sons to carry on their name, even highly-educated women said a woman should not wait to try to have a son. By contrast, those with jobs were more likely than their non-working counterparts to say that a woman could wait to get pregnant again. Perhaps this can be attributed to the desire of working women to balance career and family obligations and carefully arrange their lives. While distinctions such as these may be made, it is important to note that the majority of women in every category regardless of age, marital status, job status, education, or tribal status provided responses which indicated the importance of having another child and the importance of having a son in particular. The bearing of sons seems to be a value that crosses every segment of Saudi society. 3. If she has three boys Participants were then asked, “"Suppose that Fatma has had three boys. Is she likely to have another child?" Responses to this open-ended question were recorded and divided into the following categories: a religious response, “the man will be satisfied— girls are not necessary,” “yes—try to have a girl,” “if the husband wants a girl,” “the wife may want a girl,” “wait”, and no response. Responses, shown in Table 5G, varied between tribal and non-tribal groups when asked what a woman should do if her first three children are boys. Non-tribal respondents were more than twice as likely as their tribal counterparts to say she should try to have a girl, with a total of 56.3% of non-tribal respondents said she should try to have a girl versus only 25% of tribal respondents saying she should try to have a girl. 110 A number of non-tribal participants provided explanations for their answers. One provided a religious explanation saying, “I think she should have a girl since God blesses those who have many children.” Two others said, “There is a need for a girl.” And, “Yes, because mothers like to have girls.” Another provided a different reason, “Yes, because she wants a daughter to support her in her older age. In our society all women need a daughter to take care of them in their old age.” Yet another shared her brother’s experience saying, “My brother has four boys and he continues to have children to have a daughter.” On the other hand, tribal participants were almost twice as likely to say that the husband would be satisfied with three boys and that having girls was not necessary, with 46.9 percent of tribal participants providing this response versus only 25 percent of non- tribal women. Tribal women’s answers were influenced by a belief that having boys is more important than having girls. These tribal women explained their answers saying, “It is not important to have the girls. The most important thing is to have boys.” “It is not important if Fatma has children or not after that. For Fatma girls are better than sons, but for Ahmed, sons are important.” An additional 18.7 percent of tribal and 12.5 percent of non-tribal participants indicated that a couple with three boys could have another child if either the husband or the wife wished to have a girl but often added that it is not necessary. Tribal woman stated, “It depends if Fatma wants to have a girl, but the society does not care to have a girl.” “Fatma would have another child if her husband would like to have girl. If not she would not have another child.” A non-tribal woman also said, “It is not important to have another child. Some women may want to have another, but it is not necessary.” 111 In looking at the breakdown of responses by age, differences between tribal and non- tribal groups become even more apparent. Almost four times as many young non-tribal women (65 percent) as young tribal women (17 percent) said that a woman with three sons should have another child to try to have a girl. This difference was narrower among participants age 50 and older (50 percent for older tribal and 25 percent for older non- tribal women). Older tribal women also were least likely to say having three boys would satisfy the husband and that girls were not necessary, with only one-eighth of those 50 and older providing this answer versus more than half of those under age 50. Older tribal women believe in God's will in having births more than young women. The more education a non-tribal woman had, the less likely she was to state that the wife should try to have a girl after three sons (66.7 percent of less than high school educated, 66.7 percent of high school educated, and 25 percent of more than high school educated participants). Tribal participants, however, did not show this difference. One- fourth of each of the three educational groups stating the couple should try to have a girl. The desire for a girl, even after three boys, seems to concentrate among the least- educated non-tribal women--women who may depend most on daughters in their own lives. In examining the breakdown by job status, those working were about equally as likely as their non-working counterparts to say having three boys satisfies the man and that girls are not necessary. Also, almost equal shares of those working and not working stated the couple should try for a girl. In short, responses varied between tribal and non-tribal groups when asked what a woman should do if her first three children are boys. Non-tribal respondents were more than twice as likely as their tribal counterparts to say she should try to have a girl, while tribal participants were almost twice as likely to say that the husband would be satisfied with three boys and that having girls was not necessary. Some stated the couple that has three boys could have another child if either the husband or the wife wished to have a girl but often added that it is not necessary. 112 Table 5G Response Patterns for "If she has three boys, will she have another child?" ______(Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: As God Father Will Try for If Man If Wife Wait No Total Wills Be Satisfied a Girl Wants a Wants a Response Tribal Women Girl Girl Under 50 (0) (14) (4) (5) (1) (0) (0) (24) 0% 58.3% 16.7% 20.8% 4.2% 0% 0% 100% 50 and older (2) (1) (4) (0) (0) (0) (1) (8) 25% 12.5% 50% 0% 0% 0% 12.5% 100% < High school educated (2) (7) (3) (0) (0) (0) (0) (12) 16.7% 58.3% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% High school educated (0) (3) (3) (5) (0) (0) (1) (12) 0% 25% 25% 41.7% 0% 0% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (0) (5) (2) (0) (1) (0) (0) (8) 0% 62.5% 25% 0% 12.5% 0% 0% 100% Working (0) (6) (2) (3) (1) (0) (0) (12) 0% 50% 16.7% 25% 8.3% 0% (0) 100% Non-working (2) (9) (6) (2) (0) (0) (1) (20) 10% 45% 30% 10% 0% 0% 5% 100% All tribal groups (2) (15) (8) (5) (1) (0) (1) (32) 6.3% 46.9% 25% 15.6% 3.1% 0% 3.1% 100% Non-tribal women Under 50 (0) (6) (16) (1) (1) (0) (0) (24) 0% 25% 66.7% 4.2% 4.2% 0% 0% 100% 50 and older (0) (2) (2) (2) (0) (2) (0) (8) 0% 25% 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 100% < High school educated (0) (2) (8) (2) (0) (0) (0) (12) 0% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 0% 0% 0% 100% High school educated (0) (2) (8) (0) (0) (2) (0) (12) 0% 16.7% 66.7% 0% 0% 16.7% 0% 100% > High school educated (0) (4) (2) (1) (1) (0) (0) (8) 0% 50% 25% 12.5% 12.5% 0% 0% 100% Working (0) (3) (8) (1) (0) (0) (0) (12) 0% 25% 66.7% 8.3% 0% 0% (0) 100% Non-working (0) (5) (10) (2) (1) (2) (0) (20) 0% 25% 50% 10% 5% 10% 0% 100% All non tribal groups (0) (8) (18) (3) (1) (2) (0) (32) 0% 25% 56.3% 9.4% 3.1% 6.3% 0% 100% ______ 113 Among participants under age 50, non-tribal women were more than three times more likely than their tribal counterparts to say that a woman with three sons should have another child to try to have a girl. However, higher education lessened the desire for another child among all participants. Those with more than a high school education were most likely to state having three boys would satisfy the husband and having a girl is not necessary, with 50% of both tribal and non-tribal participants providing this response. Those with work experience were about equally as likely as their non-working counterparts to say having three boys satisfies the man and that girls are not necessary. 4. If she has three girls Finally participants were asked, “"What difference would it make if all three children were girls?" All responses were recorded and the following categories identified among their remarks: “if she doesn’t have a boy right away the husband will remarry to have a son,” “the husband might be patient and wait to have a son,” “she must try to have a son right away—sons are very important,” “it depends on the husband and his family’s preference,” “she can wait,” “men no longer blame women for not having a son,” and no response. When asked what difference it would make if the three children were girls instead of boys, participants provided responses far different than answers to the previous question, reflecting a much greater value placed of the bearing of boys. While less than half of all participants stated a woman with three boys should try to have a girl, almost twice as many (80 percent) indicated that it would be urgent for the woman with three girls to have a boy. More than one-sixth of all respondents said that if the wife fails to have a son, the husband would remarry to get a boy. One non-tribal woman stated, “They will continue to have children until they have a son. In this situation the fertility will be faster and necessary.” To illustrate her point, one tribal woman shared a personal story saying, 114 “I know one man who had nine girls and he did not stop trying to have son. If Ahmed wants a son, he will force her wife to get pregnant if he does not want to remarry.” Other non-tribal women explained the importance of having a son saying, “Yes, of course, she should have a son since the son carries the name of the family,” And, “And he is responsible after his father is dead. There is a difference in Saudi society,” And, “Yes, a son is important in the inheritance. A son’s right is double a girl’s right and he carries the father’s name.” Yet another non-tribal woman discussed the fear of remarriage saying, “In this situation she should have a son. Men love sons and he will remarry to have a son, so she should have children until she gets the son.” Tribal participants also discussed the importance of having a son right away. When asked what the difference would be if Fatma had three girls, a tribal woman responded, “ Ooooh, there is a big difference. She has to try many times to get the boy.” And another added, “Ahmed will divorce her if she does not have a son.” Other tribal women explained reasons for their answers saying, “They will not wait. She will get pregnant at once to have a son since a son is very important and will support the parents later.” Another said, “Nowadays as well as in the past she should have a son to carry the family name.” And yet another discussed the fear of remarriage saying, “Fatma should not wait to have a son to protect the family. The family in Saudi depends on sons a lot and the husband will remarry if she doesn’t have a son.” One tribal participant described how having a son affected a woman’s inheritance saying, 115 “Yes. It differs. The inheritance is very important to Fatma. If she does not have a boy the inheritance will be divided between the whole family, but if she has a son the money will go only for Fatma and her children. So she should have son.” Almost no respondents said a woman with three daughters could wait to have a son. One women said, “She can wait for a while and then get pregnant so as not to be in a rush. Children need time between them and Fatma should not be afraid that her husband would remarry.” Her fellow tribal participants were quick to disagree with her, however. Interestingly, the tribal respondents who suggested Fatma wait to try again for a son were working women, and their work status could have been a factor in suggesting that Fatma wait to arrange her life. Yet no non-tribal woman, either working or non-working, dared to suggest a woman of her own accord might be able to wait. In fact, only one non-tribal woman suggested that a woman might not try to have another child away, depending upon the husband’s opinion and desire, and her fellow group members were quick to disagree. This woman stated, “If Ahmed is satisfied there is no problem, but if he is not, she should have another child to try to have a son.” By contrast, one-sixth of tribal women stated that a woman might wait depending upon her husband’s desire or pressure from his family. Two suggested that a husband might be patient and wait for a son and not immediately remarry. These women said, “It depends. Some men are patient and others are not. Some women get upset since a son is very important to women for supporting them in their older age,” And, “She must have a son. Men always pretend that they are happy to have three girls but inside they are not, but if he is patient he might wait for a son. If he is patient, God might help him. Having a son is a matter of God.” 116 Table 5H Response Patterns for "If she has three girls, will she have another child?" ______(Count) and Percent of Respondents Saying: Try For a Husband The Man Wait It Depends As God No Total Son Right Will Might Be on Him and Wills Response Tribal Women Away Remarry Patient His Family Under 50 (14) (4) (2) (2) (2) (0) (0) (24) 58.3% 16.7% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 0% 0% 100% 50 and older (3) (1) (0) (0) (1) (2) (1) (8) 37.5% 12.5% 0% 0% 12.5% 25% 12.5% 100% < High school educated (5) (2) (2) (1) (0) (2) (0) (12) 41.7% 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 0% 16.7% 0% 100% High school educated (7) (2) (0) (1) (1) (0) (1) (12) 58.3% 16.7% 0% 8.3% 8.3% 0% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (5) (1) (0) (0) (2) (0) (0) (8) 62.5% 12.5% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 100% Working (7) (2) (0) (2) (1) (0) (0) (12) 58.3% 16.7% 0% 16.7% 8.3% 0% (0) 100% Non-working (10) (3) (2) (0) (2) (2) (1) (20) 50% 15% 10% 0% 10% 10% 5% 100% All tribal groups (17) (5) (2) (2) (3) (2) (1) (32) 53.1% 15.6% 6.25% 6.25% 9.4% 6.25% 3.1% 100% Try For a Husband The Man Wife It Depends As God No Total Son Right Will Might Be Can’t be on Him and Wills Response Non-Tribal Women Away Remarry Patient Blamed His Family Under 50 (20) (2) (0) (1) (0) (0) (1) (24) 83.3% 8.3% 0% 4.2% 0% 0% 4.2% 100% 50 and older (5) (2) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (8) 62.5% 25% 0% 0% 12.5% 0% 0% 100% < High school educated (11) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (12) 91.7% 8.3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% High school educated (7) (3) (0) (1) (1) (0) (0) (12) 58.3% 25% 0% 8.3% 8.3% 0% 0% 100% > High school educated (7) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (8) 87.5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12.5% 100% Working (9) (1) (0) (1) (0) (0) (1) (12) 75% 8.3% 0% 8.3% 0% 0% 8.3% 100% Non-working (16) (3) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (20) 80% 15% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 100% All non-tribal groups (25) (4) (0) (1) (1) (0) (1) (32) 78.1% 12.5% 0% 3.1% 3.1% 0% 3.1% 100% ______ 117 But a fellow group member disagreed that a man would be patient, “I do not think that Saudi, especially Bedouin, men are patient. At once he will marry again to have the son.” Another referred to the influence of those close to the wife saying, “It depends on her small society and husband's family and how they feel about a preference for sons.” To this, her fellow group members stated, “Yes, of course the society and the man will not be satisfied with having three girls.” And, “Of course, Ahmed’s family will not be satisfied until they have a son who carries Ahmed's name. Also, Fatma will not feel comfortable that her husband will not marry another wife until she has a son.” Very few participants stated that having another child right away after having three daughters would depend upon God’s will. These women were 50 or older, had less than a high school education, and did not work. These women explained their religious beliefs this way, “There is no talking about these things. It all depends on God’s willing...We believe in God, and what God wants will happen.” And, “Nobody talks about that. We thank God. Men believe in faith in God. They do not make distinctions. A girl is so kind and a man loves a son to help him in his responsibility.” A very small number of women also indicated that men could no longer blame women for not having a son, or did not provide a response. In short, the value of having a son is seen in every segment and every generation of Saudi society, among both tribal and non-tribal, educated and uneducated, and working and non-working women. In this final scenario, job status, religious belief, or age only appeared to have a very slight effect, and that was apparent only within tribal groups. 118 Two tribal women described well the prevalence and extreme value placed on having sons in Saudi society saying, “In general, all women in Saudi society try many times to get the boy. The society will look at her as a poor woman if she doesn't have a son.” And the other added, “But if she has three boys, they will be proud of her and thank God. And I think that is the case not only in Saudi society but also in the other Arab and non-Arab countries. In general, even though the girls now are working and have a good situation, in our society the boy is valued more since the son is carrying the father's name, and he is the one supporting his family and representing his father in his absence. This is a good thing in our society. The mother wants her son to carry some responsibility and the father also, so they feel proud of having son. So they will try to have children to get the boy.” Through these interviews we see that the vast majority of all Saudi women view the possibility of a wife never giving birth to a son as an unhappy and fearful eventuality to be avoided at all costs. Failure to produce a son puts the Saudi woman at risk of losing her marriage, her inheritance, her security, and her place in society. 119 CHAPTER 6 COMPARISONS OF ATTITUDES TO ACTUAL LIFE HISTORIES This chapter discusses a second group of outcomes in addition to attitudes about family decision-making. These outcomes measure the actual behavior reported by women for the years prior to the interview. We examine three factors that parallel the attitudes discussed in Chapter Five. A. Length of the First Birth Interval The first birth interval measures the difference between a woman's reported age at marriage and her age at first birth. Three respondents reported no difference between age at marriage and age at first birth; they were coded as having the first child right away. Women whose ages at marriage and first birth differed by only one year also were coded as having had a child right away. Those whose age at first birth was two years older than their age at marriage were considered to have briefly waited to have children. Women whose ages at marriage and first birth differed by 3 years or more were coded as having waited a while. It is important to note that data collected regarding participant’s present job status does not necessarily indicate their job status at the time they were married or the time of their first births. Therefore, first birth intervals of working participants cannot be reliably compared with responses to Scenario One’s question regarding the effect of work for purposes of comparing stated attitudes and actual behavior. In general, most of our sample of tribal and non-tribal women either had their first baby right away or waited only briefly to have their first child. Among tribal groups, 59 percent had their first child right away and an additional 19 percent waited only briefly. Among non-tribal participants 50 percent had their first child right away and an additional 31 percent waited only briefly. Similar percentages of tribal and non-tribal participants waited three or more years to have their first child: 22 percent of tribal participants and 19 percent of non-tribal participants waiting a while (see table 6A). 120 Table 6A Actual Intervals from Participants’ Ages at Marriage to Ages at First Birth ______Had a Child Waited Briefly Waited a While Total Right Away To Have a Child To Have a Child Tribal Women Under 50 (14) (4) (6) (24) 58.3% 16.7% 25% 100% 50 and older (5) (2) (1) (8) 62.5% 25% 12.5% 100% < High school educated (6) (2) (4) (12) 50% 16.7% 33.3% 100% High school educated (8) (3) (1) (12) 66.7% 25% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (5) (1) (2) (8) 62.5% 12.5% 25% 100% Working (8) (1) (3) (12) 66.7% 8.3% 25% 100% Non-working (11) (5) (4) (20) 55% 25% 20% 100% All tribal groups (19) (6) (7) (32) 59.4% 18.8% 21.9% 100% Non-tribal women Under 50 (13) (7) (4) (24) 54.2% 29.2% 16.7% 100% 50 and older (3) (3) (2) (8) 37.5% 37.5% 25% 100% < High school educated (7) (3) (2) (12) 58.3% 25% 16.7% 100% High school educated (7) (4) (1) (12) 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 100% > High school educated (2) (3) (3) (8) 25% 37.5% 37.5% 100% Working (6) (3) (3) (12) 50% 25% 25% 100% Non-working (10) (7) (3) (20) 50% 35% 15% 100% All non-tribal groups (16) (10) (6) (32) 50% 31.25% 18.75% 100% ______ 121 It is interesting to compare women's actual first birth intervals with their comments about what Ahmed and Fatma would do in timing the first birth. In this regard, 50 percent of non-tribal women answered that the hypothetical couple would wait a while before having children, but only 19 percent actually waited a while. An additional 31 percent of non-tribal participants waited briefly. By comparison, only 19 percent of tribal women said Ahmed and Fatma would wait a while before having children, but 22 percent actually waited a while and another 19 percent waited briefly. Tribal women were much less likely to say the hypothetical couple would wait a while, but tribal and non-tribal women were quite similar in their actual birth timing. The non-tribal women more often expressed attitudes that did not match their own childbearing experiences. Similarly, among tribal participants 56 percent stated that the hypothetical couple would either have children right away or “as God wills” (without trying to prevent pregnancy), and a very similar 59 percent actually had children right away. Only 34 percent of non-tribal women stated that Ahmed and Fatma would have children right away, but 50 percent of them also had children right away themselves. Attitudes accepting delayed childbearing may be more widespread among non-tribal women, but their behavior so far has not matched such ideas. Regarding differences in first birth intervals between the generations, a slight difference existed between older and younger tribal women. Among younger tribal women, 25 percent waited for three or more years. Among those age 50 and older, only 13 percent waited this long. The shares waiting only briefly (two to three years) were just the opposite--25 percent for older tribal women and 17 percent for younger tribal women. Both generations of tribal women had children right away with more or less the same frequency (58 percent for younger women and 63 percent for older women). Interestingly, according to the mean age at marriage and mean age at first birth for both the tribal and non-tribal groups, older women actually waited longer than younger women between marriage and first birth. This was especially true among the non-tribal groups, as Table 6B shows below. 122 Table 6B Actual Mean Ages for Participants at Marriage and First Birth* Tribal Status Mean Age Mean Age Difference in Mean At Marriage At First Birth Age at Marriage And Birth Under 50 Tribal 18.3 20.2 1.9 Non-tribal 18.6 20.5 1.9 50 and Older Tribal 17.4 19.6 2.2 Non-tribal 18.5 21.4 2.9 *Includes only those women having ever given birth. Among the tribal groups education does not appear to have a strong effect on whether or not a participant had a child right away. For every level of education, tribal participants were most likely to have had a child right away. Among non-tribal participants, however, first birth intervals revealed big differences between women with less than high school and more than high school education. While only 25 percent of more than high school educated non-tribal participants had their baby right away, 58 percent from the less than high school educated non-tribal groups had a child right away. So among these non-tribal participants, education appeared to have a delaying effect on first births, just as it made a difference among these women in attitudes about birth timing. The present job status of the participants did not seem to influence the timing of their first births for either tribal or non-tribal participants. Half of both working and non- working non-tribal participants had a first child right away. Two-thirds of tribal women with jobs had a child right away, while 55 percent of those not working had a child right immediately after they were married. 123 B. Number of Children Ever Born In collecting information for participant profiles, participants reported the number of children they had ever had. Using this data, the researcher made comparisons between groups according to the mean of the number of children women in the group had actually borne, keeping in mind that those younger women in the sample may not have completed bearing children. No data was collected asking women whether or not they considered it likely that they would bear more children. (See Table 6C.) The mean number of children born differed between tribal and non-tribal groups. The mean number of children for tribal participants was 4.3 with a standard deviation 3.1, and for non-tribal the mean was 3.0 with a standard deviation of 1.8. Childbearing behavior of tribal participants agreed with their attitudes, since tribal participants suggested larger numbers of hypothetical children for Ahmed and Fatma. Remember that 47 percent of tribal compared with 13 percent of non-tribal participants suggested that Ahmed and Fatma would have more than 6 children. Both actual family size and stated family size were larger for tribal than for non-tribal participants. Differences between generations in mean family size appear in both tribal and non-tribal groups. Among the tribal groups, the younger generation has a smaller mean number of children (3.7) than did those tribal participants above 50 (6.1). Such a large difference by age was not seen among the non-tribal groups, in large part because the older generation of non-tribal women had a smaller mean number of children than their older generation tribal counterparts. The mean number of children in the younger generation of non-tribal women was 2.7 while among the older generation the mean was 3.9. Of course, we must keep in mind that some of the younger generation of women in both groups may not yet be finished bearing children. 124 Table 6C Actual Mean Number of Children Born to Each Participant ______Mean Number Standard Number of Of Children Deviation Women Tribal Women Under 50 3.71 2.74 24 50 and older 6.13 3.44 8 < High school educated 6.83 3.16 12 High school educated 2.67 1.87 12 > High school educated 3.00 1.69 8 Working 4.08 2.91 12 Non-working 4.45 3.22 20 All tribal groups 4.31 3.06 32 Non-tribal women Under 50 2.67 1.71 24 50 and older 6.13 3.44 8 < High school educated 3.67 2.02 12 High school educated 3.00 1.54 12 > High school educated 1.88 1.13 8 Working 3.17 1.59 12 Non-working 2.85 1.88 20 All non-tribal groups 2.97 1.75 32 Regarding the effect of education on family size, a tremendous distinction emerged among tribal groups between those with or without a high school education. The mean number of children born to those tribal women with less than a high school was 6.8 per women, more than twice the number of other groups with more education. In this, the participants’ actual behavior agreed with the attitudes they expressed in Scenario 3 where similar differences were seen between the tribal education groups (See Table 5C). In 125 response to the question of typical family size for a couple today, the number one answer of tribal participants with less than a high school education was “above 8”, with 50 percent of these women answering this way and an additional 33.3 percent and 16.7 percent saying “7 or 8” and “4 to 6” respectively. By contrast, 50 percent of the high school educated said the couple would have “4 to 6” with only 8.3 percent saying they would have “above 8” and 16.7 percent saying they would have “7 or 8”. Among tribal women with more than a high school education, 75 percent said the typical couple would have “4 to 6”, 25 percent said “7 or 8”, and 0 percent said “above 8”. Although education had no effect on when tribal women began having children, here we can see that education does influence how long they continue to have children. There is also a difference in births by education among non-tribal groups of women. Higher education again meant a smaller number of children born. As for tribal women, educated non-tribal women had only half as many children as women with no high school education. Within each education group, non-tribal women also had fewer children on average than did tribal women. The difference here, however, is that a large majority of each non-tribal education group stated that “4 to 6” would be the typical number of children born to today’s Saudi couple. So while their attitudes were similar, their behaviors differed between the non-tribal education groups. (See Table 5 C.) Present job status did not appear to have much relation to the mean number of children born. Among the tribal groups, those presently working had on average 4.1 children. Those not working had slightly more with a mean number of 4.5. Among non- tribal women, those presently working averaged 3.2 births, and those not working had slightly less with a mean of 2.9. What is interesting here is that non-tribal working women averaged more children than non-working women. This does not reflect their stated attitudes, because non-tribal women were the ones most likely to think that jobs and children were incompatible. 126 C. Sex Preferences for Children and Sex Ratios Participants also reported whether each child they bore was a girl or a boy. First in this section we will take a look at whether or not stated sex preferences for having boys impacts the sex ratio for the last child born to each participant. The purpose of looking at the sex of the last child is the notion that although nature may dictate on average that equal proportions of males and females will be born, a woman who prefers to have a son might stop having children after a last child is a son but keep having children if she has a girl in hopes of having a last son. This pattern, however, was not observed, and roughly equal percentages of males and females were born as last children to our participants, as the chart below indicates. Table 6D Proportion of boys and girls by sex of last child* ______ Sex of Last Child Count Percent Male 30 50.85% Female 29 49.15% Total 59 100.0% ______* (Includes only those having ever born children) A much different result regarding sex preferences could be seen, however, when examining the continued fertility behaviors of those bearing at any point of their fertility three children of the same sex in a row. The researcher examined the fertility records of those bearing three girls or three boys in a row, regardless of if they had had any previous children, and looked to see if such a woman had another child. As seen in Table 6E below, the result seems to indicate a striking sex preference. 127 Table 6E Fertility Behavior Following Consecutive Births of Three Same-Sex Children ______ Tribal Non-Tribal Total Had another child after having three girls in a row 8 5 13 Did not have another child after having three girls in a row 0 2 2 Had another child after having three boys in a row 4 2 6 Did not have another child after having three boys in a row 3 3 6 ______ From the chart above we can see that while women having three boys in a row were evenly split between having another child and not having another child, women having three girls in a row were more than four times more likely to have another child than to not have another child. Furthermore, all eight tribal women who had three girls in a row had another subsequent child, while only half as many, or four, women who had three boys in a row had a subsequent child. Also, among both tribal and non-tribal groups three times as many women, or six women, did not have another child after having three boys in a row compared to only two (both non-tribal) who did not have another child after bearing three girls in a row. All of these statistics seem to indicate a strong preference for sons and are in line with those participants who voiced a preference for son in answers to questions from Scenario 3. These findings also agree with the notion expressed by many that while having a daughter may be desirable, it is optional and not necessary, but having boys is very important. For those having three males or three females in a row, the researcher compared their answers to the interview questions exploring attitudes towards fertility with their actual fertility behaviors. By counting the number of girls or boys a participant bore after 128 having three boys or girls in a row, the researcher made these comparisons to see if there was any conflict between their answers and their actual behaviors. In the group (NYHB) a preference for sons emerged in the behavior of two women. Both of them are above forty and still married. One of them has three male children, and she had the last one when she was 27. This woman is now 42 years old but has not had another child even though she said that Fatma should try to have a baby if she has three boys. Another woman from the same group is now 45. She had a first child a boy when she was 18 and she kept having children until she was 39, all of whom were girls until the last child. When her last child was a boy, she stopped having children, and has not had any more since then. These two stories from this group (NYHB) give the impression that having a son is still the practice in this group and extremely important, even if they say the opposite is true. This story repeated itself in the case of a woman from group (TYWU), participant A. She had continued to have children up to the interview, but had not succeeded in having a son. She is age 32 and has 6 girls. The researcher noticed something else in the tribal and non-tribal groups among all categories of education and work status, especially in the tribal groups. When women have many girls, they keep trying to have a child until they have a son, and after the first son they try to have maybe one more child. If they then get a baby girl, they stop and never try again. This was the case in (NYHB) tribal person B and in (TYHB) tribal person B, and again in person D of (TYWB) and in (NYWS) person B. What can confirm this argument is that when a participant has a male after many girls, she tries for another boy. If she succeeds and has another son, she will try to have more. This was the case in (TYHB) person C and in person B of (TYWU) and again in person B from (NOHB). All of these stories reflect that among Saudi women there remains a son preference among all the groups, tribal and non-tribal, educated and uneducated, working or not working. 129 D. Attitude Toward Gender Relationship & Actual Fertility Behavior As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, participants were asked, “If Ahmed wants a baby right away but Fatma wants to wait for a little while, what should Fatma do?" Participant responses were analyzed to determine who in their opinion was the ultimate decision maker, either the husband, the wife, or by mutual agreement. A very interesting pattern emerged when comparing attitudes toward gender relationships and fertility decisions with actual fertility behavior. Specifically, those participants (both tribal and non-tribal) who viewed Fatma as having the ultimate power to make fertility decisions averaged fewer children themselves, compared to those stating that Ahmed would control the decision. This distinction was even greater for tribal women than it was for non-tribal women as seen below in Table 6F. The difference between tribal women who said Fatma would control choices versus those who said Ahmed would control fertility decisions is on average about two fewer children per woman, while for non-tribal women who think Fatma can control fertility decisions, the result is on average less than one child lower. However, women who viewed the birth decision to be a mutual one had a mean number of children similar to that of participants stating that the husband was the decision-maker. Perhaps this is due to the husband being the more persuasive partner or the one having more control among Saudi couples, even in seemingly mutual decisions. Perhaps we can more clearly see the effect of attitudes about gender relationships by comparing an individual’s response to the question about decision-making with her actual fertility behavior, and then comparing her behavior to that of another woman in her group who had a different attitude. For example, when one tribal woman from the group of younger working tribal women with less than high school education was asked, “If Ahmed wants a baby right away but Fatma wants to wait for a little while, what should Fatma do?” she stated, “I think women are leading in fertility matters and she can convince Ahmed to wait.” This person herself married at age 12 and had 5 children over a 10-year span, spacing each child about two years apart and ending her fertility at age 22. She is now age 35. This compares to the example of another woman from her group who answered, “She should 130 have a baby as Ahmed wants to.” This woman also married at age 12. She began bearing children at age 15 and had a child every year for 10 years, without spacing them apart and having 10 children (or twice as many) in total, stopping her own fertility at age 24. So we see in this group that the woman answering that the husband controls fertility had more children than the woman answering that the wife could make the decision. Table 6F Fertility Attitudes Compared to Actual Mean Scores for Total Children Born ______ Mean Children Means Children Excluding Women for All Women Married less than 2 years, divorced, Or the possibly infertile Tribal Women Answering: The wife controls fertility 3.43 3.43 The husband controls fertility 4.6 5.31 The decision is mutual 4.4 5.57 Non-Tribal Women Answering: The wife controls fertility 2.57 3.0 The husband controls fertility 2.92 3.5 The decision is mutual 3.17 3.4 We can see this pattern again in another group of younger tribal women who are working and have more than a high school education. To the same question, one woman responded that, “Fatma can take the contraceptive pills without informing her husband,” while another disagreed saying, “It is not her choice or decision to make. She should obey him.” The woman answering that the wife could secretly control fertility had only 1 child in the 12 years she has been married, and she had reached age 32. The other answering that the husband controls fertility has had 3 children in the 10 years she has 131 been married and is now age 30. So once again we see that a participant holding the attitude that a wife controls fertility decisions had fewer children than her counterpart with the view that the husband was the decider. Of further interest, we can see an effect of gender relationship attitudes on first birth intervals among non-tribal groups. For example, in the group of younger non- working, non-tribal women with more than a high school education, one woman stated in response to the same question, “Ahmed and Fatma should argue that together. She should let Ahmed agree to wait or she will be tired. Or maybe she could use the contraceptive pills without informing him.” One of her fellow group members disagreed saying, “No, I am not for this. This way Fatma will lose Ahmed's confidence if he finds out that Fatma is using contraceptive methods. Or Ahmed may think that they cannot have children and go marry another one. So it is not a good way to use contraceptive method without informing her husband.” In the case of the first woman, her actual birth behavior indicated that she waited two years before giving birth to a first child. She explained her ability to lead her husband in the decision saying, “From my experience, I convinced my husband to wait because I was studying and then because we want to travel. Also because I will have my first child after I work for 2 months. But in my work, I signed a contract that if I get pregnant, I should leave the work because it was a private job." By contrast, the woman who stated the husband’s desire should be fulfilled for fear of divorce herself had a child within the first year of marriage, both marrying and giving birth at age 22. A similar pattern was observed in a group of non-working, non-tribal women under 50 with a high school education. One woman answered, “She should discuss this matter with her husband, but if he refuses she can use contraceptive pills without his consent.” This woman who indicated that the wife could secretly control fertility waited two years before giving birth to her first child. Another from her group, however, stated, “She should accept his request and have the baby since he will marry another wife if she doesn’t accept that and she cannot convince him.” This woman who said a husband should be obeyed in fertility matters for fear of divorce had her first child right away 132 without waiting. So we see once again that a woman whose attitude toward gender relationships is that a husband should decide fertility matters is less inclined to space births or wait to have children. These examples should not be taken as an indicator that all women who hold the attitude that a woman can decide fertility would also choose to limit her fertility more than her husband would. For example, when asked a second question, “If Ahmed wants to wait for a little while but Fatma wants a baby right away, what should Fatma do?” these tribal women indicated a woman’s power to decide might increase her fertility. One woman said, “Again, she should convince him and explain the reason for her desire to have children.” Another added, “Fatma can trick him and get pregnant because she cannot disobey him, so she can use this tricky way.” And yet another agreed saying, “She should seemingly obey his desire but not use contraceptive pills and trick him until she gets pregnant suddenly, and then he cannot reject that. I think she can get pregnant if she can control her use of the contraceptive pills and does not use them, later on she will get pregnant if God is willing.” However, among both tribal and non-tribal participants in this study, we see in Table 6F above that those women who held a view that a woman could control her own fertility had on average fewer children than those who believed the decision to be the husband’s or mutual. 133 Table 6G Actual Mean Number of Children Compared With Participants’ Attitudes Toward Gender Relationships and the Ultimate Decision-Maker* (Total Births / Number of Women ) ______ Mean Number of Children Born to Participants Answering: The Husband Mutual The Wife Tribal Women Under 50 (28 / 7) (37 / 7) (24 / 7) 4.0 5.28 3.43 50 and older (41 / 6) (3 / 1) (5 / 1) 6.83 3.0 5.0 < High school educated (51 / 7) (26 / 4) (5 / 1) 7.29 6.5 5.0 High school educated (10 / 3) (3 / 1) (19 / 5) 3.33 3.0 3.8 > High school educated (8 / 3) (11 / 3) (5 / 2) 2.67 3.67 2.5 Working (15 / 3) (19 / 3) (15 / 5) 5.0 6.33 3.0 Non-working (54 / 10) (21 / 5) (14 / 3) 5.4 4.2 4.67 All tribal groups (69 / 13) (40 / 8) (29 / 8) 5.31 5.0 3.62 Non-tribal women Under 50 (24 / 9) (22 / 7) (18 / 6) 2.67 3.14 3.0 50 and older (14 / 4) (16 / 4) (0 / 0) 3.5 4.0 N/A < High school educated (21 / 6) (15 / 4) (10 / 2) 3.5 3.75 5.0 High school educated (12 / 4) (22/ 6) (1 / 1) 3.0 3.0 1.0 > High school educated (7 / 4) (1 / 1) (7 / 3) 1.75 1.0 2.3 Working (12 / 5) (12 / 4) (14 / 3) 2.4 3.0 4.67 Non-working (26 / 8) (26 / 7) (4 / 3) 3.25 3.71 1.33 All non-tribal groups (38 / 13) (38 / 11) (18 / 6) 2.92 3.45 3.0 *Includes only those participants having ever born children. In Chapter 5 we saw that among tribal women perception of a woman’s ability to influence or control the decision increases in direct proportion to level of education and with having a job. This is seen in Table 5B where we see that the tribal women’s 134 perception that the husband controls fertility declines when a tribal woman has more education or holds a job. Among non-tribal women, these same trends were not observed (See Table 5B). It is worth repeating a few things from Chapter 5 here, to illustrate attitudes in the context of actual behavior. Among those tribal participants with less than a high school education, 42 percent answered that the decision is either mutual or in the woman’s hands. Among those with a high school education, 58 percent indicated that the decision is mutual or made by the woman. And of those with a greater than high school education, 63 percent said the birth decision is made mutually or by the woman. However, among non-tribal women, this same trend was not observed. Fear of divorce may suppress using this tricky method of fertility control among educated non-tribal women. Two non-tribal women with more than a high school education cited such fear saying, “No, I am not for [secretly controlling fertility]. This way Fatma will lose Ahmed's confidence if he finds out that Fatma is using contraceptive methods. Or Ahmed may think that they cannot have children and go marry another one. So it is not good to use contraceptive methods without informing her husband.” And, “She should obey Ahmed or he will send her back to her family’s house (divorce her).” As with education, having a job seemed to have a positive influence on a tribal woman’s perception of her ability to influence the birth decision. Less than half of tribal women without a job answered that the birth decision was mutual or made by the wife, compared to two-thirds of working tribal women who answered in this way. However, also as for education, having a job had no discernable influence on non-tribal women’s responses. It is here that we can see the influence of religious thinking among some working non-tribal women whose attitudes toward fertility were unaffected by their work situations. For example, one non-tribal working woman stated, “Fatma should obey Ahmed and have her baby right away. This is a religious matter and the wife should obey.” According to these findings, higher education of tribal Saudi women and in their being more likely to work might also lead to a fertility decline among tribal Saudi groups 135 and to tribal women being more likely to make their own fertility decisions. Similar trends may not have the same effect among non-tribal groups, however, unless they are also accompanied by a decreasing fear of divorce or a change in traditionally held interpretations of the gender relationship because, as we saw above, findings indicate some non-tribal women, even those highly educated and working, believe a woman should always obey her husband’s fertility wishes due to a fear of divorce and traditional interpretations of Islam’s teaching on the gender relationship. Non-tribal Saudi women in this study, however, already experience a fertility rate lower than that of their tribal counterparts. 136 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS FOR FUTURE SAUDI RESEARCH A. Introduction While most demographic studies concerned with women’s status in Islam (Obermeyer 1992; Yazbeck, Haddad, and Esposito 1998) have attributed matters involving the position of women in an all-Muslim society to the religion as a cause of this status, my study provides a different rationale. My study centers on a very important factor suggested by a few previous researchers (Isvan 1991, Waszak, Severy, Kefif, and Badawi 2001, Khanum & Tunon 2000)--how women build their status, make decisions, and hold attitudes according to their gender relationships, which affect even reproductive behavior. I hold that sometimes it is not religion alone that the Saudi woman tries to satisfy. If perhaps her husband desires a different outcome than that suggested by Islam, she may even try to interpret Islam differently to satisfy him. Furthermore, this research revealed diversity among Saudi couples in how they interpret religious teachings about fertility and gender relationships, and variations in how gender relationships play out in fertility decisions. Some couples may hold that Islam allows for planning and spacing births while others may believe that according to Islam no precautions should be taken to prevent births. Also, while some women in this study expressed the belief that Islam gives men the authority to exercise control over the woman in every aspect of life including fertility, many others shared that the woman is able to convince her husband of her position through persuasion. Some others also stated 137 that the man may choose not to exercise his authority in matters of fertility, or that the woman may secretly go against his wishes to control her fertility herself. I found that women often interpret Islam in a very conservative way built on the women’s obligations and roles, and these women refuse their husbands nothing. Religious reasons for obeying the husband’s wishes were cited among participants, particularly older participants with less education who were most likely to indicate that the husband was the final decision maker. Others, perhaps influenced by factors such as education, work, or more liberalized thinking, might have a view of their religion that allows the woman more say in gender relationship matters. In general, my respondents held a traditional attitude toward having children. Women indicated most frequently that the husband controls the birth-decision process, followed in frequency by the response that the decision is made by mutual agreement, and ending with the woman controlling the birth decision as the least frequent response by both groups. How each couple interprets the gender relationship affects every aspect of a woman’s life, and influences the reproductive process in particular. Gender relations appear in respondents' attitudes about the issue of whether the husband must give the wife permission to use contraceptives, and whether the wife may be justified in deceiving him if he denies such permission (or if he desires contraception and she does not). Having a baby is like another job for some women, reflecting another important reality in my sample that women are the ones responsible for taking care of their children. Men are not helping women in rearing the children, so if a woman’s job will affect childbearing, they prefer to leave their job. Some non-tribal women see work and motherhood as incompatible. Comparing attitudes toward gender relationships and fertility decisions with actual fertility behavior, those participants who viewed Fatma as having the ultimate power to make fertility decisions averaged fewer children themselves, compared to those stating that Ahmed would control the decision. This distinction was even greater for tribal women than it was for non-tribal women. Women who viewed the birth decision to be a mutual one had a larger mean number of children, similar to that of participants stating that the husband was the decision-maker. Perhaps this is due to the husband being the more persuasive partner or the one having more control among Saudi couples, even in 138 seemingly mutual decisions. These differences should not be taken as an indicator that all women who believe that a woman can decide fertility would also choose to limit fertility more than her husband would, but among participants in this study, we see such a result on average. Concerning the sex composition of the family (sons versus daughters) again the majority of respondents spoke above all about meeting the expectations and desires of husbands and the husbands' families. My findings suggest that the reproductive process is a reflection of gender relations between couples, and that gender relationships are strongly related to timing of fertility, family size and sex composition of children. Below I will discuss the methodologies I used in my research to come to these conclusions. B. Methodologies 1. Issues of access in interviewing women in Saudi culture This research took an approach different from previous demographic studies on the reproductive process in Saudi Arabia. Instead of taking aggregate information as collected in surveys, I listened to women themselves in small groups and examined their attitudes, which they expressed in discussions. Demographic surveys tend to be conducted by men (for example, the Demographic Survey 1999 described all field enumerators using the masculine form of the noun, indicating that they were men) and answered by the men of the house (all results were given for households, not for individual respondents--in particular, not for individual women). Because I (a woman) was the interviewer for this study, female participants felt more free to talk about their use of contraceptives and their fertility attitudes than if they were talking to male strangers. My study also differed from a previous study conducted by the Ministry of Health that interviewed only those women attending clinics. I, on the other hand, interviewed a variety of Saudi women in diverse life circumstances of different age groups, work experience, tribal status, and educational backgrounds. I was pleased that I was able to collect data from a variety of Saudi women on one of the most sensitive topics within the Saudi family. 139 2. Group discussions help express normative values Using the format of focus group interviews instead of the demographic survey of individuals allowed for interaction leading to agreement and disagreement between the respondents. This facilitated the discussion of norms and how participants valued those norms. In this research, the interview process helped the Saudi women to discuss the subject in detail, and I as the interviewer encouraged each to try to clear up any misunderstandings throughout the interview. The participants talked about what religious beliefs allowed them to do and whether or not others agreed or disagreed. A small number of participants (four) per group allowed the interviewer to be sure each answered all questions and were afforded time and opportunity to interact. Participants did not always agree with one another’s opinions; sometimes they rejected the ideas of each other. These disagreements might give us clues about changes happening to normative values in Saudi society, and also to normative differences in different population subgroups. I noticed many examples of both agreement and disagreement, for example the controversy over the clandestine use of contraceptives, and different views on whether or not living with the husband’s family would affect fertility or whether or not a woman would have to quit work to have a baby (See Chapter 5). 3. “Ahmed” and “Fatma”: Attributing personal opinions to proxies Conducting the group interviews through the framework of scenarios allowed the researcher to probe the attitudes of the participants without asking them such questions directly. Participants were asked to use their imagination about a fictional couple and were able to ascribe their own attitudes to the fictional couple when answering questions about what is happening in Fatma and Ahmed’s life. This method of using proxies was very effective in drawing out the attitudes of the Saudi women, since Saudi women normally will not tell anybody about their reproductive and family lives and consider this a private matter. Accordingly, the right approach is not to ask them directly about their attitudes. Using stories about Fatma and Ahmed allowed them to talk freely about these couples and not be shy to share their attitudes indirectly. 140 Sometimes some respondents spoke directly about their own lives while describing their attitudes about Ahmed and Fatma. At times, they would add of their own volition specific and direct comments about their own lives or would share the experiences of their friends or family. For example, one woman shared her story about her mother-in-law desiring a grandchild. Another woman shared the advice she gave to her daughter. Using this approach, participants also reflected some norms and social aggregate attitudes such as religious and social values and were able to discuss what norms are occurring in the society as a whole. In future research, I expect to return to these responses and examine whether certain categories of respondents were more likely than others to add direct comments about their own lives when discussing Ahmed and Fatma. C. Substantive Conclusions 1. Differences between tribal and non-tribal women In addition to my focus on gender relationships as important factors in decisions about having children, my research explores a dimension of Saudi social structure that rarely received attention in previous demographic research. I find that the tribal / non- tribal distinction provides many powerful insights into the social context and the motives of the women in my sample. Tribal identity should be included as an important variable in future research on demographic issues, especially fertility. In general, many members of tribal and non-tribal groups alike still hold a traditional attitude towards having children right away, especially women who are 50 and older. However, tribal group members expressed a religious rationale for their attitude towards childbearing, and they appeared more likely to believe in God’s will determining whether or not to have a child. Non-tribal women are less likely to fear using contraceptives or to believe that childbearing is the exclusive goal of the marriage. Satisfying society and families or following the social norm were the reasons given for maintaining a traditional attitude in non-tribal groups, with non-tribal women following norms to get respect and keep their status. 141 Both tribal and non-tribal women indicated most frequently that the husband controls the fertility decision, and religious reasons for obeying the husband’s wishes were cited among both tribal and non-tribal participants. However, tribal participants appear more independent and mention a willingness to use deceptive practices more often than do non-tribal women. Tribal women may not want to disobey their husbands but have no way to convince them, so they adopt deceptive methods of control more than non-tribal women did. Another possible explanation is that tribal husbands have less awareness about contraception and do not know if their wives have used it. Regarding making fertility decisions, working and education did not appear to have empowering effects among non-tribal women, some of whom cited a fear of divorce or the influence of religious beliefs such as obeying the husband as factors influencing fertility decisions. The majority of participants thought that the husband’s family, the husband’s mother in particular, would be involved. They stated that the husband’s family has the power to insist on their having a child since the child will carry the family name, and the husband’s mother can ask the wife to go to the doctors if she does not have a baby. Furthermore, the husband’s mother often has a strong position in the family, especially in the tribal families. The situation with the wife’s family is different. They generally look out for their daughter’s happiness and desires. However, non-tribal participants were more likely to say that living with the husband’s family would result in increased interference from the husband’s family in the birth decision process, although respondents from both tribal and non-tribal groups frequently responded this way. This could be because family influence largely remains latent in tribal families, since few women regulate or delay fertility. A difference emerged between tribal and non-tribal groups in how they balance work and having children. In general, respondents seemed to consider having a baby like another job for a woman, saying Fatma should get pregnant if she does not have a job, since she has nothing to do. Their answers reflect another important reality in my sample of Saudi women, which is that women are the ones responsible for taking care of their children. Men are not helping women in rearing the children, so if a woman’s job will affect childrearing, they prefer to leave the job. However, non-tribal women were twice as likely to see work and motherhood as incompatible. They also indicated that if 142 finances are a reason why the wife is working, the couple should delay having children until the financial situation is settled. Tribal women more often said that couples could continue working and have children, perhaps with the aid of family or a maid or perhaps by balancing and arranging both work and caring for the children. Such reactions often came from tribal couples living with the husband’s family who benefited from their aid. All groups of respondents expressed a general consensus that Saudi women have widespread contraceptive information from the media and their physicians. Many responses included both modern medical methods such as pills, IUD’s, injections, condoms, and birth control patches, and traditional methods such as withdrawal, monthly timing, or breastfeeding to space children. Tribal women and older women expected to have more children than did non-tribal and younger women. Non-tribal participants were more concerned about the high cost of children, whereas this was not a significant cause for having fewer children among tribal groups. This may be due to more traditional beliefs among tribal groups and the feeling that children are a support to their parents in their old age, negating the financial concern. Among non-tribal groups, as education levels increased, so did the citing of financial reasons to limit childbearing, and as education levels decreased, the limiting factor was the desire to rear, socialize, and educate their children well. Among tribal groups, a generational difference was reflected in women's answers, with “God’s will” being the number one response for older tribal women while the desire to raise children well was the number one response for younger tribal women. Those tribal and non-tribal participants concerned that a health problem could be a limiting factor for fertility also reflect traditional beliefs that a family should have many children. Regarding factors limiting fertility, tribal and non-tribal groups are equally concerned with providing a high quality of care and education for their children, and the quality concern can trump the desire for many children. Regarding reasons to increase fertility, the difference between tribal and non- tribal groups was that tribal participants were more likely to cite a religious belief for having more children, while the number one answer given by non-tribal groups was a lack of awareness. However, both tribal and non-tribal groups said a woman might have more children to have sons. 143 Tribal participants were more likely than non-tribal participants to state that having a boy first would satisfy the family and that the wife could wait to have another. Some non-tribal women mentioned that the decision would depend on the couple’s circumstances. However, a majority of both tribal and non-tribal participants said that a couple having a girl should have another child right away to try for a son. This reflects the societal belief that having a son is more urgent than having a daughter. Emphasis on the birth of sons cut across the generations as well. Additionally, some tribal participants stated even more dramatically that the father would be disappointed to have a girl first. Interestingly, the more education a participant had, the less likely she was to say a woman could wait to have another child after having a first girl. Citing traditional beliefs, the man’s love of sons, and his family’s preference for sons to carry on their name, even highly-educated women said a woman should not wait to try to have a son. The importance of sons appears in response to the question of the difference between having three sons and having three daughters. Here, the value of having a son is seen in every segment and every generation of Saudi society, among both tribal and non- tribal, educated and uneducated, and working and non-working women. In this final scenario, job status, religious belief, or age only appeared to have a very slight effect, and that was apparent only within tribal groups. 2. Generational contrasts or continuity and interaction with other factors Interesting contrasts were observed when comparing the attitudes between the generations, and these were seen among both tribal and non-tribal groups. A generational divide reflects a difference of experience between the generations regarding childbearing. This may be due to cultural shifts revealing a kind of conflict between older versus more modern ideas and opinions, or it might be simply an age effect. Among tribal groups, the older generation more often cited religious rationales regarding the timing of births and the number of children a couple would bear. The older generation of women often stated that “God’s will” would determine these matters. Among younger tribal women we see fewer religiously-influenced responses than among the older women. Almost half of younger tribal women did, however, maintain a traditional response that women should have children right away, being influenced by a 144 fear of divorce, the cultural understanding that men want children right away, and society’s emphasis on the importance of the first child. Also reflecting generational differences, “God’s will” was the number one reason given by older tribal women for having fewer children, whereas the desire to raise children well was the number one reason for limiting fertility given by younger tribal women. Similarly, older tribal respondents were more likely than their younger counterparts to say religion would influence a couple to have more children. Among non-tribal groups, health problems and the desire to raise children well were the most frequently cited reasons for limiting fertility by older women. In contrast, the high cost of childrearing that was the most cited concern of younger non-tribal women. This may reflect the rising cost of raising children, of which the younger generation of non-tribal women are more keenly aware. Another generational difference appearing in my study was that older tribal women were most likely to say no one else is involved in the birth decision. They consider it to be something natural that a couple will have children immediately and nobody interferes or asks questions about the matter since any delay is always from God. Another possible explanation is that the older generation underestimates their own influence while the younger generation is more sensitive to their interference. Furthermore, older participants in both tribal and non-tribal groups were more likely to state that a couple would have more than 6 children, though the age distinction was greater among the non-tribal groups. These older women may have been referring to the past when providing their answers, and some participants differentiated between the past and the Saudi family of today. These Saudi women shared a widespread impression that family size already has begun to decline in the Kingdom. For example, one non-tribal participant said the couple would have “three or four nowadays but in the past they had bigger families.” 3. Effects of education and interaction with other factors Education seems to have an effect on both tribal and non-tribal attitudes toward fertility. One example of this effect is that none of those with a greater than high school education provided the religious response that God’s will might cause couples to have 145 fewer children. Perhaps this is because education provides participants with rationales besides “as God wills,” which participants often provided as the only reason when they had no other answer. Another finding is that educated Saudi women often stated that the desire for children depends on one's situation and financial condition. The interesting thing here is that all non-tribal women with more than high school education answered that couples should delay childbearing and look first to establishing themselves. Those with less than a high school education believe there is no change in birth decisions when living with the husband’s family. This may be because even if they do not live with the husband’s family, they consider it to be the husband’s family’s decision. Or perhaps these uneducated women already agree with attitudes of the in-laws regarding the timing of the first child. Yet this belief was less common for women with more education. The more education a respondent had, the more likely they were to state that a woman should stop working to have children or else delay children. Conversely, the less education a respondent had, the more likely they were to say a wife can have children and continue working by some means such as arranging childcare or balancing both work and children. The more educated a participant was, the more the woman considered herself to be the one responsible to take care of her child and any involvement from others to be interference. It may be a modern idea that mothers are the best ones to raise the children. This result agrees with the study by Miles (1992) in Jordan. 4. Effects of working and interactions with other factors Attitudes towards having children right away differed when women worked. The idea held by many educated women that the mother is the best one to care for her children is also found among many women who hold a job. According to responses discussed in Scenario One, working women were more likely to state that a newly married couple should wait a while before having children. Younger women and those women who are working themselves were more likely to state that a woman should choose between work and bearing children and less likely to state a woman could choose to do both by getting help from others or by balancing between work and family 146 responsibilities. These women hold the attitude that the mother is responsible and the best person to raise her children. Regarding limiting fertility, those with jobs were more likely than their non- working counterparts to cite a lack of awareness as a factor leading to having more children. Those working were also more likely than their non-working counterparts to mention the concerns of cost of childrearing, the desire to raise and educate them well, and a desire to arrange their own lives as factors limiting childbearing. Non-working tribal women, on the other hand, were more likely than their working counterparts to state that only God’s will could limit childbearing. Regarding spacing of births, those with jobs were more likely than their non- working counterparts to say that a woman who had one child who was a girl could wait to get pregnant again. Perhaps this can be attributed to the desire of working women to balance career and family obligations and carefully arrange their lives. While distinctions such as these may be made, it is important to note that the majority of women in every category regardless of age, marital status, job status, education, or tribal status provided responses which indicated the importance of having another child and the importance of having a son in particular. The bearing of sons seems to be a value that crosses every segment of Saudi society. D. Prospects for Saudi Society The most original finding in my research is that tribal versus non-tribal family identities make important differences in both the attitudes and the behavior of Saudi women when it comes to reproduction. This distinction is particularly important in Saudi Arabian society, but might also prove to be a useful consideration in research in neighboring countries. Tribal identity has some socially sensitive aspects, but its importance as revealed in this study suggests that other researchers could benefit from including measures of this concept in their work. In addition to tribal / non-tribal differences, my other considered variables (work, education and age) also reveal that the rational actor model discussed in Chapter 3 is present in some parts of Saudi society more than others. Non-tribal women more often 147 say things that fit this model or concept than do tribal women. More educated women, women with work experience and younger women also more often use language that sounds like the rational actor model. Each of these dimensions of social structure has an independent effect. However, for non-tribal women the difference by education or work or age more often appears for attitudes about what Ahmed and Fatma (the hypothetical couple) would do. The actual behavior of non-tribal women does not seem to be very different by age, education or work status. On the other hand, for tribal women the attitudes seem more uniform, but their actual behavior seems to have been different depending on their education, work experience, and age. If younger tribal women who have been to school and worked outside the home say that Fatma can control her own fertility, such women also have fewer children themselves. In both attitudes and actions, such women give evidence of the rational actor model, but this model is not found everywhere in Saudi society at the present time. Why should non-tribal women show differences more in their attitudes, while tribal women show differences more in their actual behavior? This research only collected information about family formation attitudes and behavior, so I cannot give reliable evidence to answer this question. However, non-tribal women frequently expressed a fear of divorce, and this was given as a reason for never resisting a husband's wishes about children. Such an attitude was less frequent among tribal women, and indeed I think that tribal women have less to fear from divorce. Future research is needed to examine attitudes about divorce, the frequency of actual divorce and remarriage, and how these might affect reproductive roles and decisions differently in tribal and non- tribal subcultures. I would encourage researchers to collect family names of respondents in Saudi research, so that tribal affiliations can be coded and measured. Future research should focus on asking Saudi men about their attitudes about timing of first births, desired number of children, and son preference as I have examined for women, which I think is a very important factor that I did not include in my research. Research should focus on the husband because Saudi women want to satisfy the husband and some even feel they must trick the husband rather than disobey him. Future research also must give more attention to the importance of the husband’s mother, inquire about her attitudes, and examine her power within the family and over 148 her daughter-in-law, with reference particularly to the role of the husband in conferring such power. Given the findings of this research which reveal that the husband’s mother interferes the most in the couples’ fertility decisions, further examination of her role is merited. Many women move from villages to cities, or from cities to other cities in Saudi Arabia today. Retrospective questions are needed in future research, asking about where a woman spent her childhood and where else she may have lived. These different places can have important influences on her life and her attitudes. Researchers should give more attention to women's labor force participation and how various kinds of work affect fertility, especially since having a baby is considered a job and other work is thought by some to be incompatible with having children since raising them is the mother’s responsibility. This study only assessed work at the time of the survey. In retrospect, this was not enough information. More information about work histories, including questions about whether a woman ever worked, when she got her first job, and so on could have been more useful. Connecting the work histories to reproductive histories (a calendar approach) could be especially useful. This study did not ask women about future fertility intentions, except to speculate about what "Fatma" might do. Based on my exploratory research, I think women might answer more direct questions about desired future births and desired family size. Implications of this study indicate that further research should be done regarding gender relationships and their effect on fertility in Saudi Arabia. Further studies should examine the question, “Could changes in gender relationships and how couples make fertility decisions lead to stabilization of fertility in Saudi Arabia?” 149 APPENDIX A Interview Guide The following pages contain the English-language version of the actual interview guide used for field work for this project. The first sheet contains information identifying the type of group involved in each group interview, classified by tribal background, age, educational level and work status. The next four pages are for recording information about each of the four participants in the group, including information about their exact age, their reproductive histories, and so on. The final pages contain the verbatim text of the scenarios presented to the respondents as the basis for conversations and discussions, which were transcribed by note-takers as the primary data for the study. 150 Interview Guide - FACE PAGE Group # _____ Age Group 18 to 24 25 to 49 50 or older (<=CIRCLE ONE) Education Work Status no job working (<=CIRCLE ONE) Families Tribal roots Nontribal roots (<=CIRCLE ONE) Date of meeting: ______ Identification of participants: At the outset of the meeting, the moderator and the note- takers should agree on identifying each participant as Person 1, Person 2, Person 3 and so on. All notes should be taken in terms of these assigned identities, rather than using any actual names. Only information on the participant sheets should be retained for each person; actual names should not be retained for any respondents. Complete one sheet for each participant. Some information should be noted as it comes up in discussion; other information must be obtained from participants in private discussions with the moderator and note-takers before, during or after the meeting. 151 Interview Guide - PARTICIPANT SHEET Person A: Age: _____ Highest level of school completed: ______ Type of job (BLANK if none): ______ Family name (NO FIRST NAMES): ______ Marital Status (CIRCLE ONE): 1st husband divorced remarried polygynous polygynous (monogamy) (monogamy) (1st wife) (later wife) Relation to Husband (CIRCLE ONE): non-relative relative (exact relationship ______) Age First Married: _____ Children Ever Born: _____ Children Surviving: _____ Birth History: BIRTH Age of Woman Sex of Child Child now alive Child w/mother 1st M F Yes No Yes No 2nd M F Yes No Yes No 3rd M F Yes No Yes No 4th M F Yes No Yes No 5th M F Yes No Yes No 6th M F Yes No Yes No 7th M F Yes No Yes No 8th M F Yes No Yes No 9th M F Yes No Yes No 10th M F Yes No Yes No most recent M F Yes No Yes No 152 Interview Guide - PARTICIPANT SHEET Person B: Age: _____ Highest level of school completed: ______ Type of job (BLANK if none): ______ Family name (NO FIRST NAMES): ______ Marital Status (CIRCLE ONE): 1st husband divorced remarried polygynous polygynous (monogamy) (monogamy) (1st wife) (later wife) Relation to Husband (CIRCLE ONE): non-relative relative (exact relationship ______) Age First Married: _____ Children Ever Born: _____ Children Surviving: _____ Birth History: BIRTH Age of Woman Sex of Child Child now alive Child w/mother 1st M F Yes No Yes No 2nd M F Yes No Yes No 3rd M F Yes No Yes No 4th M F Yes No Yes No 5th M F Yes No Yes No 6th M F Yes No Yes No 7th M F Yes No Yes No 8th M F Yes No Yes No 9th M F Yes No Yes No 10th M F Yes No Yes No most recent M F Yes No Yes No 153 Interview Guide - PARTICIPANT SHEET Person C: Age: _____ Highest level of school completed: ______ Type of job (BLANK if none): ______ Family name (NO FIRST NAMES): ______ Marital Status (CIRCLE ONE): 1st husband divorced remarried polygynous polygynous (monogamy) (monogamy) (1st wife) (later wife) Relation to Husband (CIRCLE ONE): non-relative relative (exact relationship ______) Age First Married: _____ Children Ever Born: _____ Children Surviving: _____ Birth History: BIRTH Age of Woman Sex of Child Child now alive Child w/mother 1st M F Yes No Yes No 2nd M F Yes No Yes No 3rd M F Yes No Yes No 4th M F Yes No Yes No 5th M F Yes No Yes No 6th M F Yes No Yes No 7th M F Yes No Yes No 8th M F Yes No Yes No 9th M F Yes No Yes No 10th M F Yes No Yes No most recent M F Yes No Yes No 154 Interview Guide - PARTICIPANT SHEET Person D: Age: _____ Highest level of school completed: ______ Type of job (BLANK if none): ______ Family name (NO FIRST NAMES): ______ Marital Status (CIRCLE ONE): 1st husband divorced remarried polygynous polygynous (monogamy) (monogamy) (1st wife) (later wife) Relation to Husband (CIRCLE ONE): non-relative relative (exact relationship ______) Age First Married: _____ Children Ever Born: _____ Children Surviving: _____ Birth History: BIRTH Age of Woman Sex of Child Child now alive Child w/mother 1st M F Yes No Yes No 2nd M F Yes No Yes No 3rd M F Yes No Yes No 4th M F Yes No Yes No 5th M F Yes No Yes No 6th M F Yes No Yes No 7th M F Yes No Yes No 8th M F Yes No Yes No 9th M F Yes No Yes No 10th M F Yes No Yes No most recent M F Yes No Yes No 155 INTERVIEW GUIDE 1-Introduction from the moderator (READ WORD-FOR-WORD): “Thank you for taking the time for this conversation. I hope you can tell me about how people in Saudi Arabia today make choices about family life, about how men and women think about their own place in the family and about each other. Please try to tell as honestly as you can the way you think people really feel and the way they really act. We are making some notes from the discussion to help us remember what was said, but we will not keep any record of anyone's actual name. At the end of our work, you can look at what we have written. You will see that no one will know who you were or what each person said. Taking part in this discussion must be purely voluntary for you. If you do not want to be here or join in this discussion, you do not have to stay.” 2-Questions: a) Opening question (2-3 minutes per person) "What do you like best about living in Jeddah?" b) First scenario (up to 20 minutes): "Imagine that we are talking about a woman that you know well, named Fatma. She does not really exist, but imagine that she could be your cousin, your sister, or a close friend of yours from school or from your neighborhood. Suppose that Fatma has just gotten married to Ahmed and they live in their own home. Will they have a child right away, or not?" *Follow-ups: "What in your experience makes you say this?" "Does anyone else have a comment?" "Any thing else?" "Do any body has something to add?" "Tell me more about that." *Probe (only if any respondents seem to say there is a decision process): "Suppose they talk about whether to have a baby right away, or to wait. Who will be involved in the discussion?" *Follow-up (if respondents mention relatives or other persons): "What will these people tell Ahmed and Fatma they should do?" *Follow-up: "If Ahmed wants a baby right away but Fatma wants to wait for a little while, what should Fatma do?" *Follow-up: "If Ahmed wants to wait for a little while but Fatma wants a baby right away, what should Fatma do?" *Probe (ask in ALL groups): "How might their choice be different if they were still living with Ahmed's family?" 156 *Probe (ask in ALL groups): "How might their choice be different, depending on whether Fatma had a job or not?" *Probe (ask in ALL groups): "If Ahmed and Fatma want to wait for some time before having a baby, is there any way that they could avoid a birth?" *Follow-up: (only if yes) "What could they do to avoid a birth?" c) Second scenario (up to 15 minutes): "Suppose now that Ahmed and Fatma have been married for some years. How many children would they be most likely to have during their whole married life?" *Follow-up (if respondent has trouble giving a number): "What would be typical for a couple like them?" *Probe (ask in ALL groups): "What might influence Ahmed and Fatma have fewer children than this? Tell me what might cause them to have fewer children." *Follow-up (to other respondents): "What do you think about that? What else might influence them?" *Probe (ask in ALL groups): "What might influence Ahmed and Fatma have more children than this? Tell me what might cause them to have more children." *Follow-up (to other respondents): "What do you think about that? What else might influence them?" d) Third scenario (up to 15 minutes): "Suppose that Fatma's first baby is a boy. Is she likely to have another child?" *Follow-up: "What in your experience makes you say this?" *Follow-up: "What difference would it make if her first child were a girl?" *Probe: "Suppose that Fatma has had three boys. 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Retrieved July 11, 2005 from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:SaudiArabiaNumbered.png. World Bank. (1999). The World Bank Atlas. Washington: World Bank. World Bank. (1997). World Development Indicators, 1997. Washington: World Bank. World Bank. (2000). World Development Indicators, 2000. Washington: World Bank. 167 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Azizah Linjawi is a Saudi national. Born on August 13th , 1956, in the city of Riyadh Saudi Arabia, Ms. Linjawi attended elementary school, secondary school, and university classes in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. She earned her bachelor’s degree from King Sauod University in Riyadh in 1973. After marrying and having her first son, she moved to Jeddah where she earned her master’s degree from King Abdulaziz University in 1990. Ms. Linjawi worked in King Abdulaziz University for 9 years as a teacher the sociology department. In 1999, the university authorized her to further her studies in the United States where she has pursued a doctoral degree in sociology. She spent four years studying the English language and attending the doctoral program at Colorado State University and then moved to Tallahassee, Florida in 2003 to complete her doctoral program and earn her doctoral degree. Ms. Linjawi is married, the mother of six children, and three of her grown children are studying at Colorado State University. 168