3. the Nordic Countries and the EU–NATO Relationship: Further Comments

3. The Nordic countries and the EU–NATO relationship: further comments Gunilla Herolf I. Introduction The Nordic countries have undergone a number of changes over the past 15 years. Like all other countries in Europe, they have been affected by the fall of the Berlin Wall. A predicament that they share with all other smaller countries is their limited possibilities to influence developments. To a great extent, therefore, their policies have constituted reactions to events and to the policies of larger states. All the Nordic countries retain the same institutional affiliation (in security terms) that they had during the cold war: this might surprise many, given the vast changes since 1989. In her chapter on the Nordic countries and their role in the relationship between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Teija Tiilikainen describes and analyses the way in which Den- mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden relate to the two now dominant Euro- Atlantic organizations. This chapter offers comments on a number of analytical points made by Tiilikainen, but it also cites some additional factors and conclu- sions that may help to explain the past and present positions taken by these four countries. The final section speculates on where future developments in the EU and NATO might take the Nordic countries. An important basis for the analysis in this chapter is the fact that, even after the cold war, the European and world scenes have been characterized by dra- matic events and developments. This has meant that the two organizations in focus here—the EU and NATO—have undergone substantial change. It was hardly to be foreseen in 1991–92, as the Swedish and Finnish applications for membership of the European Community were submitted, that the EU would become such an important actor in the field of security. The events taking place in the former Yugoslavia turned all four countries under study into active players in European crisis management, and this in turn had an immediate influence on their own countries—a new experience for them all. European security thus became, in a totally new way, part of the Nordic countries’ own national security. The attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 had a further, huge impact on the security agenda, affecting all countries regardless of their institutional affiliation. Finally, the USA’s policy towards Iraq—developed outside NATO and the United Nations—has had a strong influence on perceptions of cooperation in Europe. 68 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICS II. The positions of the four Nordic countries In several ways, as pointed out by Tiilikainen, the positions of the four Nordic countries covered here differ from each other. She highlights two particular reasons for this, one being their historical identity and the other their general orientation towards European integration. Others could be mentioned, geography being a prominent factor in explaining both their previous and their more recent choices. External factors are heavily involved, too, as indicated above. For Finland, in particular, the external factor of the Soviet Union was important during the cold war, since the 1948 Finnish–Soviet Treaty of Friend- ship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance explicitly prohibited Finland from pursuing certain policies. For Finland neutrality was therefore the only option, whereas for Denmark, Norway and Sweden there was a real choice to be made. In 1948 a Swedish proposal for a Scandinavian defence union was made and discussed by these three states. Discussions ended, however, after Norway had concluded that strong military assistance, and thus a connection to the major Western powers, was needed for its defence. Norway and then Denmark chose the Atlanticist option, whereas Sweden saw continued non-alignment as its best choice.1 Generally, this author sees more similarities among the Nordic countries than Tiilikainen does. Atlanticism, it can be argued, has been a strong and continu- ous characteristic of all the Nordic countries’ policies, albeit cast in different forms depending on their institutional affiliations. During the cold war a strong US military presence in the northern part of Europe was a reassuring factor, since the region was of vital strategic importance for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For Norway, in particular, geography must be seen as a strong factor here. As Tiilikainen says, quoting Mikael af Malmborg, Swedish non- alignment has relied in practice on the US presence in Europe,2 as did the security of European NATO countries. As she also mentions, Finland and Sweden in their reactions to European security and defence policy proposals have often emphasized Atlanticist viewpoints. This is not unique; all the European countries want the USA to continue to be interested in European security matters, even though their precise interpretations of how far the US involvement should stretch are not identical. Danish policies towards the (pre-2000) Western European Union (WEU) can also be explained in terms of Atlanticism rather than of concerns about sover- eignty. Denmark was the only Nordic country that was involved in European 1 Andrén, N., Maktbalans och Alliansfrihet: Svensk Utrikespolitik under 1900-talet [Balance of power and non-alignment: Swedish foreign policy in the 20th century] (Norstedts Juridik: Stockholm, 1996), pp. 66–81. See also Herolf, G., ‘Sweden: continuity and change’, H. Ojanen with G. Herolf and R. Lin- dahl, Non-Alignment and European Security Policy: Ambiguity at Work, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP no. 6 (Ulkopoliitinen instituutti: Helsinki, 2000). 2 af Malmborg, M., ‘Sweden in the EU’, eds B. Huldt, T. Tiilikainen, T. Vaahtoranta and A. Helkama- Rågård, Finnish and Swedish Security: Comparing National Policies (Försvarshögskolan: Stockholm, 2001), p. 44. THE EU–NATO RELATIONSHIP 69 security discussions from an early stage. Its views on the WEU were thus formed at a time when this organization had different ambitions from those it developed at a later stage. In Denmark, WEU policies were seen as expressing limited European interests, pursued at the expense of those of NATO and therefore a threat to NATO.3 For a small Atlanticist country, not being able to wield much influence on the policies of the WEU and seeing WEU defence guaran- tees as nugatory as compared with those of NATO, Denmark chose the policy of staying outside specifically European defence endeavours.4 This opt-out has recently come to be seen by many Danes as a constraint. III. The meaning of non-alignment and relations with NATO The non-aligned countries also demonstrate much parallelism in their policies: long after the fall of the Berlin Wall, not just Finland and Sweden but also fellow EU members Austria and Ireland have remained non-aligned. However, they have also undergone a number of changes. Austria and Finland have both changed the term used for their security status from ‘neutrality’ to ‘non- alignment’. Sweden, which already used the term ‘non-alignment’, abandoned the term ‘neutrality policy’ (as did Finland).5 All have made policy moves that would have been inconceivable or at least more complicated during the cold war. Sweden and Finland applied for membership of the European Community in 1991 and 1992, respectively, and joined the EU in 1995 along with Austria. (Austria had applied in 1989, while Ireland had been a member since 1973.) All four non-aligned EU members entered partnership with NATO, joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) or its successor from 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and the Partnership for Peace (PFP).6 For all four countries, participation in these bodies meant that they were in partnership with NATO, rather than waiting for future membership. The question is therefore why Finland and Sweden have not exchanged their non-alignment for NATO membership. One reason might lie in the fact that the changes they have made are seen as satisfactory: the two countries are now doing what they want to do in terms of defence activism and see NATO as a valuable partner with which they share their values and can participate in common efforts to promote them. 3 Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, Dansk og europeisk sikkerhed [Danish and Euro- pean security] (Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg: Copenhagen, 1995), p. 291. 4 In effect, Denmark stayed outside the WEU institutional system until 1992 and then opted to become only an observer—a status designed for non-NATO members of the EU—rather than taking the full WEU membership it would have been entitled to as a member of both the EU and NATO. For details of WEU membership arrangements see the WEU website at URL <http://www.weu.int/>. 5 Ireland uses the term ‘military neutrality’. 6 Finland and Sweden joined the PFP in 1994, the year it was established, Austria in 1995 and Ireland only in 1999. Austria, Finland and Sweden had observer status in the NACC; Ireland did not participate in the NACC and did not join the EAPC until 1999. 70 INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICS A second reason surely lies in the views of the general public. Tiilikainen refers to the strong support in Sweden for the policy of non-alignment.7 This is true, and there is little prospect of this changing. Finnish public support for non- alignment is also high.8 Although it is commonly said that Finnish public opin- ion changes more easily when the government takes a lead, it is hard to imagine that a majority of the population would in the near future accept the idea of NATO membership. Tiilikainen refers to two kinds of neutrality, Finnish neutrality being ‘instrumental’ and Swedish neutrality ‘ideological’. Both of these terms could be interpreted in several ways. An ‘instrumental’ approach might be equated with the pursuit of a policy that is in the Finnish interest.

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