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Terrorism's Operational Code

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Terrorism's Operational Code TERRORISM’S OPERATIONAL CODE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BELIEF SYSTEMS OF AL–QAEDA AND HAMAS By Copyright 2008 Peter Michael Picucci Submitted to the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Kansas In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ___________________________ Chairperson ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ Date defended March 6, 2008 The Dissertation Committee for P.M. Picucci certifies That this is the approved version of the following dissertation: TERRORISM’S OPERATIONAL CODE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BELIEF SYSTEMS OF AL–QAEDA AND HAMAS Committee: ___________________________ Chairperson ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ Date approved ____________________ ii Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to my loving partner, Samantha Star Straf, my mother Fredericka Picucci, and the loving memory of my father Pete Picucci. Acknowledgments This dissertation would not have been possible without the efforts of my mentors/advisors: Professors Juliet Kaarbo, Phillip Schrodt, and Deborah Gerner. Their support and assistance have been beyond value to me. By laying open the black box of political psychology to me, Professor Kaarbo provided me with the foundation for the research that would be the focus of this dissertation. Her insight and critiques have been crucial and her influence has been instrumental in the drive to complete this project. Likewise, Professor Schrodt’s unwavering confidence in my strengths and his willingness to share his considerable knowledge of international conflict and research methods has made me far better at my chosen field than I might otherwise have been. In 1986, Deborah “Misty” Gerner taught a course that was my introduction to the academic study of political science. Many years later I had the privilege of working with her at the graduate level and knowing her as friend, advisor, and teacher. Her passing was a loss to all who knew her and I shall always consider this dissertation incomplete without her signature on its approval page. So many others have also been influential upon my progress as both researcher and teacher, including Professors Mark T. Clark, Ralph Salmi, Catherine Weaver, Paul D’Anieri, Leo Villalòn, Paul “PJ” Johnson, and Ronald Francisco. Many thanks go to Professors Michael Young and Mark Schafer for their technical assistance, also highly appreciated were the insights of Professor Stephen Walker. Additionally I would like to thank Social Science Automation (www.socialscienceautomation.com) for providing the use of Profiler Plus in support of this dissertation. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the contributions of several others who made it possible to complete this long journey: the Dissertation Support Group at the University of Kansas; John Cardosa, friend of more than twenty years without whom I would never have had the courage to be the person I am today; my parents, who engrained in me the belief that I was good enough and strong enough to do whatever I set my heart upon; and my friends who believed in and encouraged me. Most of all, my thanks go to my constant companion on this road, my dearest Samantha. Without her patience, understanding, and willingness to sacrifice, this journey could not have happened. iii Table of Contents Page Chapter 1 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 1 Terrorism Studies Literature Review .................................................................. 6 Definitional Research............................................................................. 9 Terrorist Motivations ........................................................................... 15 Terrorist Behaviors............................................................................... 31 Impacts and Costs of Terrorism........................................................... 58 Counter-Terrorism Research................................................................ 62 The “New” Terrorism .......................................................................... 71 2 Al–Qaeda and Hamas ........................................................................................ 75 Overview of al-Qaeda........................................................................................ 75 Overview of Hamas ........................................................................................... 91 The al-Qaeda and Hamas Cases ...................................................................... 108 3 Operational Code Analysis.............................................................................. 117 Application of the Operational Code Approach ............................................. 127 Terrorist Belief Systems .................................................................................. 131 The VICS Coding Process............................................................................... 136 Philosophical Indices ......................................................................... 140 Instrumental Indices........................................................................... 145 Coding Procedures ............................................................................. 149 Coding al-Qaeda and Hamas........................................................................... 154 4 The Operational Codes of al-Qaeda and Hamas............................................. 173 Philosophical Indices ......................................................................... 177 Instrumental Indices........................................................................... 202 Comparison to State Leaders ............................................................. 232 Comparison of al-Qaeda and Hamas................................................. 235 5 Internal and Chronologic Operational Code Divisions .................................. 243 Operational Code Divisions within al-Qaeda.................................... 244 Chronologic Analysis of al-Qaeda’s Operational Code.................... 259 Organizational Evolution of al-Qaeda............................................... 267 Operational Code Divisions within Hamas....................................... 278 Chronologic Analysis of Hamas’ Operational Code......................... 288 Organizational Evolution of Hamas .................................................. 293 6 Conclusion........................................................................................................ 304 REFERENCES............................................................................................................................ 321 APPENDICES 1 Alternative Formulation of al–Qaeda’s Operational Code............................. 356 2 Statement Groupings for al–Qaeda ................................................................. 358 3 Statement Groupings for Hamas ..................................................................... 361 4 Hamas Subgroup Cluster Analysis Results..................................................... 376 iv Chapter One: Introduction In 1951 Nathan Leites embarked on an extensive examination of what was then commonly seen as the preeminent threat to the international system: the USSR. In particular Leites emphasized the unique role of the Soviet belief system and its influence upon the decision making processes of the Politburo, identifying this belief system as an “operational code” that could help ‘bound’ the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action. Knowledge of the actor’s beliefs helps the investigator to clarify the general criteria, requirements, and norms the subject attempts to meet in assessing opportunities that arise to make desirable gains, in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in making utility calculations. (George 1969, p. 200). Nearly two decades later his work would be distilled by George (1969) into a series of philosophical and instrumental questions regarding beliefs about the nature of the international system. These questions provide researchers with a means of generating comparable measures of the belief systems of international actors and have come into prominence within the foreign policy decision making field as a measurement tool for the belief systems of state leaders. Just as the USSR served in Leites time as a unique challenge to the status quo of the international system so too does modern, non–state terrorism pose a threat to the functioning of today’s international system. It is appropriate therefore to harness the approach pioneered by Leites and George in the efforts to understand these new threats. This is the approach taken in this research project: the application of a systematic study of the operational codes of terrorist actors to assist in accurately describing, understanding, and potentially predicting 1 their actions.1 Contending that the operational code approach is not only an appropriate but also a potentially powerful tool in researching terrorist entities, this project also expands the parameters of operational code research by utilizing it to ask fundamental questions regarding a class of political actors as yet unexplored by this type
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