What the First Coordinated Annual Review on Defence Reveals Cards on the Table
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EN Council Conclusions on EU Relations with EFTA Countries
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EN Council conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries 3060th GENERAL AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 14 December 2010 The Council adopted the following conclusions: "1. The Council has assessed the development of relations between the EU and the four Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) since the adoption of its last conclusions on the subject in December 2008. Generally, EU relations with the EFTA countries, which were already considered to be very good and close in 2008, have further intensified in the past two years (details on developments are set out below in country- specific paragraphs). The Council is looking forward to continue the positive relationship with the EFTA countries and to deepen it in the future. It will reassess the state of relations between the EU and the EFTA countries in two years. 2. The Council appreciates the financial contributions of the EFTA countries to the economic and social cohesion in the European Economic Area (EEA). Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland (the "EEA EFTA States") recently committed themselves to a substantial increase of their continued contributions. The EU is looking forward to a constructive dialogue with Switzerland on the review of the current mechanism, expiring in June 2012. The Council hopes that a mutually acceptable solution will be found with the aim of reducing economic and social disparities in the EU. 3. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are integrated in the internal market through the EEA Agreement of 1994. This Agreement functions properly so long as all Contracting Parties incorporate the full body of the relevant EU acquis relating to the internal market into their national law. -
EU Defence: the White Book Implementation Process
STUDY Requested by the SEDE Subcommittee EU Defence: The White Book implementation process Policy Department for External Relations Directorate General for External Policies of the Union PE 603.871 - December 2018 EN DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT STUDY EU Defence: The White Book implementation process ABSTRACT The question of a defence White Book at European level has been under discussion for some time. Many voices, particularly in the European Parliament, are pushing for such an initiative, while others consider that it is not only unnecessary, but could even dangerously divide Europeans. Concretely, the question cannot be tackled separately from that of defence planning and processes which underpin the development of military capabilities, as White Books are often the starting point for these. Within the European Union, however, there is not just one, but three types defence planning: the national planning of each of the Member States; planning within the framework of NATO (the NATO Defence Planning Process) and, finally, the European Union’s planning, which has developed in stages since the Helsinki summit of 1999 and comprises many elements. Its best-known component - but by no means not the only one - is the capability development plan established by the European Defence Agency. How do all these different planning systems coexist? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Answering these preliminary questions is essential in mapping the path to a White Book. This is what this study sets out to do. EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/Lot6/23 EN December 2018 - PE 603.871 © European Union, 2018 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies This document was requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) on 7 July 2018 Manuscript was completed on 12 December 2018. -
EU Defence Cooperation Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
EU Defence Cooperation Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (article 42.6, 46 and Protocol 10), the PESCO is a framework and process to deepen defence cooperation between those EU Member States, who are capable and willing to do so. 25 EU Member States have joined PESCO and subscribed to more binding commitments to invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities more together, within the Union framework. The objective is to jointly arrive at a coherent full spectrum of defence capabilities available to Member States for national and multinational (EU, NATO, UN, ... ) missions and operations. This will enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of the EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending. The key difference between PESCO and other forms of cooperation is the legally binding nature of the commitments undertaken by the 25 Member States which participate in PESCO. The list of ambitious and more binding common commitments undertaken by each of the participating PESCO contains 20 individual commitments, split into the five key areas set out by art.2 of Protocol N°10 on PESCO annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. PESCO projects An initial list of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 6 March 2018. A second batch of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 19 November 2018. And finally, a third batch of 13 additional projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 12 November 2019. -
Nato and Eu: Towards a Constructive Relationship?
between the two organisations on the ground. The question that has to be asked, therefore, is if it is really the case that the establishment of a constructive relationship between NATO and the COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY EU is in effect being held hostage to the long-standing disagreements about Cyprus. NATO and EU: Two planets in the same city Towards a Constructive Relationship? Trine Flockhart Senior Researcher, DIIS The relationship between NATO and the EU has never been a close one as the two organisa- tions have historically tended to focus on different agendas and different policy areas, roughly divided between a focus on economic and development issues and a focus on military and security issues. However, after a rather unconstructive and competitive relationship during most of the 1990s, the first decade of the 21st century has witnessed convergence between the two organisations. Through the successful establishment of the European Security and he security challenges of the 21st century are likely to be both multifaceted, highly complex Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU has taken on a much greater role as a security actor, and of an increasingly interdependent and global nature. The international community whereas NATO’s experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan has clearly revealed that military T is therefore faced with problems that cannot easily fit into traditional boxes and which solutions alone cannot bring peace and prosperity to post-conflict societies. require a so-called comprehensive approach, with emphasis on cooperation between different international actors and between different agencies across the traditional divides that separate Convergence between the two organisations in policy areas has been accompanied by geo- civilian and military approaches. -
EURODRONES Inc
EURODRONES Inc. A report by Ben Hayes, Chris Jones & Eric Töpfer PUBLICATION INFO Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to the input of Mathias Monroy, Stefanie Sifft, Mathias Vermeulen and Wim Zwijnenburg for their suggestions regarding aspects of the report. Copyright and publication details This report is published by the Transnational Institute and Statewatch under ISSN 1756-851X. Personal usage as pri- vate individuals/”fair dealing” is allowed. Usage by those working for organisations is allowed provided the organi- sation holds an appropriate licence from the relevant repro- graphic rights organisation (eg. Copyright Licensing Agen- cy in the UK), with such usage being subject to the terms and conditions of that licence and to local copyright law. Authors Ben Hayes, Chris Jones & Eric Toepfer Design Hans Roor at Jubels, Amsterdam Contact Transnational Institute (TNI) PO Box 14656, 1001 LD, Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel: +31-20-6626608 Email: [email protected] www.tni.org Statewatch PO Box 1516, London, N16 0EW England Tel: +44-207 697 4202 Email: [email protected] www.statewatch.org Amsterdam, February 2014 EURODRONES Inc. A report by Ben Hayes, Chris Jones & Eric Töpfer EURODRONES Inc. Contents 1. Introduction 7 2. Drones and the European Union: a lobbyist’s paradise 10 2.1. Summary 10 2.2. Reaching for the stars 11 2.3. The road to drone-ware 12 2.4. Establishing a favourable regulatory environment 14 2.5. Towards an EU drone policy 18 2.6. Going global: EU + USA = ICAO drone standards? 21 2.7. “Drone-washing”: the battle for hearts and minds 23 3. -
Permanent Sovereign Cooperation (PESCO) to Underpin the EU Global Strategy Jo Coelmont
No. 80 December 2016 Permanent Sovereign COoperation (PESCO) to Underpin the EU Global Strategy Jo Coelmont The EU now has a full-fledged Global in point. Clearly Member States are not averse Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy – to the principle of PESCO as such nor to the and defence. Just in time. The EUGS permanent mutual commitment that it entails. includes a clear political level of ambition Then why are they reluctant to launch PESCO as well as a call to define the in the EU framework? corresponding military level of ambition and the required capabilities. The list of SOVEREIGNTY? strategic military shortfalls, first identified The answer is simple: PESCO‟s historic in 2000 at the start of the then European baggage. PESCO cannot be dissociated from Security and Defence Policy, will obviously how its initiators envisaged it during the grow still longer. For new tasks have to be European Convention back in 2003. At that integrated, while in the last fifteen years, in time the aim was not for PESCO to be as spite of all the good intentions about inclusive as possible, but rather to assemble “pooling and sharing”, not a single the happy few: “Those Member States whose existing strategic shortfall has been solved. military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and Because a shortfall cannot be pooled – one which have made more binding commitments can only share one’s frustration at that. No to one another in this area with a view to the wonder therefore that Permanent most demanding missions”, who would agree Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is once on “objectives concerning the level of again on the agenda as a potential game investment expenditure on defence changer. -
Nato Hq Office of the Gender Advisor International Military Staff 7 March 2016
NATO HQ OFFICE OF THE GENDER ADVISOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF 7 MARCH 2016 Table of Contents Chapter Page Introduction . 5 Executive Summary . 7 1. Representation of Men and Women in the Armed Forces in 2014 . 8 2. Applications and Successful Recruitments in 2014 . 11 3. Retention Statistics in 2014 . 13 4. Services and Ranks in 2014 . .14 5. Integration of Gender Perspectives in 2014 . 16 6. Conclusion . 19 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Table of Contents Chapter Page 7. 2014 National Reports from NATO Nations 21 Albania . 22 Belgium . 25 Bulgaria . 28 Canada . 31 Croatia . 35 Czech Republic . 38 Denmark . 41 Estonia . 44 France . 45 Germany . 48 Greece . 51 Hungary . 54 Iceland . 56 Italy . 57 Latvia . 60 Lithuania . 62 Luxembourg . 65 Netherlands . 67 Norway . 71 Poland . 75 Portugal . 77 Romania . 81 Slovakia . 85 Slovenia . 87 Spain . 91 Turkey . 94 United Kingdom . 96 United States . 100 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents Chapter Page 8. 2014 National Reports from NATO Partner Nations 105 Australia . 106 Austria . 116 Finland . 119 Georgia . 122 Ireland . 124 Japan . 127 Montenegro . 129 New Zealand . 132 Sweden . 135 Switzerland . 136 Ukraine . .. -
Death of an Institution: the End for Western European Union, a Future
DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION The end for Western European Union, a future for European defence? EGMONT PAPER 46 DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION The end for Western European Union, a future for European defence? ALYSON JK BAILES AND GRAHAM MESSERVY-WHITING May 2011 The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an independent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont’s ambition – through its publications, seminars and recommendations – is to make a useful contribution to the decision- making process. *** President: Viscount Etienne DAVIGNON Director-General: Marc TRENTESEAU Series Editor: Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP *** Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations Address Naamsestraat / Rue de Namur 69, 1000 Brussels, Belgium Phone 00-32-(0)2.223.41.14 Fax 00-32-(0)2.223.41.16 E-mail [email protected] Website: www.egmontinstitute.be © Academia Press Eekhout 2 9000 Gent Tel. 09/233 80 88 Fax 09/233 14 09 [email protected] www.academiapress.be J. Story-Scientia NV Wetenschappelijke Boekhandel Sint-Kwintensberg 87 B-9000 Gent Tel. 09/225 57 57 Fax 09/233 14 09 [email protected] www.story.be All authors write in a personal capacity. Lay-out: proxess.be ISBN 978 90 382 1785 7 D/2011/4804/136 U 1612 NUR1 754 All rights reserved. -
Security Aspect of Turkey – EU Relations
CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DE FORMATION EUROPEENE INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES DIPLOME DES HAUTES ETUDES EUROPEENNES ET INTERNATIONALES Trilingual Branch Security Aspect of Turkey – EU Relations Ceyhun Emre DOĞRU Research Directors: Claude Nigoul Dr. Matthias Waechter Nice, May 2009 TABLEOFCONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 DEVELOPMENTOFSECURITYRELATIONSINHISTORICALCONTEXT 3 A.TurkishForeignPolicyandItsFoundingPrinciples 3 B.ColdWar:APragmaticRapprochement 5 C.ThePost-ColdWarPeriod 7 I.TransformationoftheTurkishSecurityPolicy 7 II.Re-EmergenceofEuropeandtheESS 10 a.ImplicationsoftheMaastrichtTreaty 10 b.AnAppraisaloftheESS:TheContextandNature 11 D.AssessmentoftheHistory:ChangingFormofthePermanentInterdependence 20 SECURITYPOLICIESANDMUTUALCONTRIBUTIONS 22 A.ComparisonofSecurityUnderstandingsoftheEUandTurkey 22 I.Europe:HumanSecurity 22 II.Turkey:TraditionalStateSecurity 25 B.CommonForeignandSecurityPolicyoftheEU 27 I.HowtoAnalysetheCFSP 27 II.CFSP:InSearchofPolitisation 28 III.Efficiency–Consistency 31 C.TurkeyandCFSP:AnInteractioninProgress 32 I.EuropeanizationoftheTurkishSecurityPolicy 32 II.Turkey’sContributiontoCFSP 33 MUDDLINGTHROUGHINDEFENCEANDMILITARYASPECT 36 A.TurkeyinNATO 36 I.TransformationofNATOandTurkey 36 II.TurkeyandDifferentNATOPolicies 39 B.NATO–EURelations 41 I.EUinNATO:ESDIandESDP 41 a.EstablishmentofESDP:WhatAutonomyvis-à-visNATO? 41 b.EuropeanPillarwithinNATO:theBuildingofESDI 43 II.LegalBasisofCurrentRelationshipanditsOutcomes 43 a.FromWEUAgreementstoBerlinPlus 43 b.BerlinPlusinPractice -
ISDS Analyses 2020/15
Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies ISDS Analyses 2020/15. 23 04 2020 Anna Nádudvari – Alex Etl – Nikolett Bereczky:1 Quo vadis, PESCO? An analysis of cooperative networks and capability development priorities Executive Summary • Out of the 47 running PESCO projects, only 1/5 have more than 7 members, while almost half of the projects have only 3 or less participants. Based on coordination and membership accounts, France (31) Italy (26) Spain (24) Germany (16), as the Big Four, are the most involved participating Member States. Subsequently, with regards to Member States’ involvement in capability areas, the Big Four’s involvement is the most diverse, while Poland, the Czech Republic, Netherlands, and Greece are also involved in at least 5 key project areas out of 7. • Most PESCO projects contribute to general objectives of creating Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within EU’s Level of Ambition (LoA), while high-end capability contributions are fewer, partly because PESCO projects contribute to Capability Development Priorities through complementing other activities and projects coordinated by EDA. Therefore, in some cases, the lack of PESCO projects aiming at these missing capability priorities can be explained by parallel EDA projects addressing those capability shortfalls. • Member states are rather aligning their PESCO capability developments with the Big Four than with anyone else. This makes the overall PESCO network fundamentally centralized, in which everyone is tied to the core, while the relations among the peripheral nodes are rather limited. • Central and Eastern European intra-regional PESCO relations are rather weak, since the participation in PESCO did not lead to the emergence of a strong and visible regional sub-cluster. -
Norwegian Defence and Security Industries Association SECURE BORDERS
1/2021 NORWEGIAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION SECURE BORDERS. SAVE LIVES. The Ranger® HDC MS provides exceptional long range performance with a variety of daylight sensors and options to help assess threats. Operators can discern between nuisance alarms and those requiring interdiction for border, coastal surveillance, and force protection surveillance. FLIR.COM/MTRANGERHDCMS CONTENTS CONTENTS: Editor-in-Chief: LEOPARD 2 MAIN BATTLE TANK M.Sc. Bjørn Domaas Josefsen A cornerstone in Europe’s land defence 2 APS TOTAL WAR Trophy active protection system on German Leopard 2 tanks 6 IN THE CYBER DOMAIN NORWEGIAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION (FSI) 7 The entire civilised world, with the possible exception of a mr. DonAs the number of lives lost in war has been reduced during recent years, CYFOR the war in cyberspace is raging at full strength, and spreading to ever The Storting wants to increase the defensive capability new areas. In recent years, the cyber war has spread to include the of CYFOR 14 exertion of influence by foreign states on large population sections, to promote both commercial and political interests. PATRIOT The Swedish Patriot project enters a new phase 16 In the middle of all this, the cyber war continues to target critical infrastructure and how this infrastructure can be destroyed, or even BULLETIN BOARD FOR DEFENCE, INDUSTRY worse, controlled by a foreign power. AND TRADE Upgrading 3D radars of Germany Navy 19 Not least, the traditional cyber battle continues over information content, Patria AMVXP 8x8 test vehicles to Japan 20 such as insight into political and business processes, private and public European Patrol Corvette 22 databases, and perhaps most of all, access to sensitive technology. -
Commission on the Defence Forces Submission by Commander Cathal Power, Irish Naval Service
Commission on the Defence Forces Submission by Commander Cathal Power, Irish Naval Service “What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more of no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own”. Sir John Hackett The Profession of Arms The 1962 Les Knowles Lectures, Trinity College I wish to open this submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces (CoDF) with a quotation from the son of an Irish emigrant to Australia, who served in the British Military through World War II. Are the Defence Forces therefore a reflection of an apathy in Ireland to the military obligations of a State, utilised to underpin a rules-based society? Ireland has, historically, not considered that it is essential to have a robust and capable military force, especially a maritime force. The lack of coherent maritime policies and a capable naval force is a function (or mistake, depending on your viewpoint) of our history. However, it is not something that was underestimated by the British Empire when they established our Dominion status in 1921. The UK ensured that they held on to the right to use and control our waters, thus reinforcing an inward-looking mindset on the island of Ireland. This quote, I hope sets the tone for what is laid out before the Commission and the onerous task ahead of it.