Commission on the Submission by Cathal Power,

“What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more of no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own”. Sir John Hackett The Profession of Arms The 1962 Les Knowles Lectures, Trinity College

I wish to open this submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces (CoDF) with a quotation from the son of an Irish emigrant to Australia, who served in the British Military through World War II. Are the Defence Forces therefore a reflection of an apathy in Ireland to the military obligations of a State, utilised to underpin a rules-based society?

Ireland has, historically, not considered that it is essential to have a robust and capable military force, especially a maritime force. The lack of coherent maritime policies and a capable naval force is a function (or mistake, depending on your viewpoint) of our history. However, it is not something that was underestimated by the British Empire when they established our Dominion status in 1921. The UK ensured that they held on to the right to use and control our waters, thus reinforcing an inward-looking mindset on the island of Ireland. This quote, I hope sets the tone for what is laid out before the Commission and the onerous task ahead of it.

Context – Threats to Ireland in the Maritime Domain In order to ascertain the capabilities required of a , it is essential to identify the threats that such a navy will have to face in its future operating environment. The fact that Ireland lacks a National Security Strategy, or a National Maritime Security Strategy must be seen as a gap at a national policy level. Without such national documents, one must look to Europe to corroborate or ground-truth the current and future threats that Ireland, as an island faces.

The EU Maritime Security Strategy identifies several threats that the EU will face into the future. This was further elaborated or updated by the Council revision of the EU MSS Action Plan, which reinforces the requirement for EU nations to have a capability to “contribute to the EU aim for a rules-based, cooperative and cross sectoral approach to ocean governance”1. The original EU Maritime Security Strategy lists nine (9) threats and risks to the EU2. Therefore, it behoves the Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF) to consider the EU MSS and all its associated documents and updates as the key policy guidance, in the absence of such national strategy. The White Paper on Defence 2015 does not identify threats, appearing to err on the side of caution by discussing trends; lest the Defence Forces may require specific capabilities to deal with specific threats identified. The maritime domain is central to European security today and it is certain to remain so in the years ahead3. I will focus predominantly on the threats facing Ireland in the maritime domain. The following are a list of the many threats elaborated by the EU MSS and intimate in the White Paper on Defence.

1 Council of the . 2018. Conclusions on the revision of EU MSS Action Plan. Brussels: Council of the European Union. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2011205%202014%20INIT/EN/pdf pg5-6. Accessed 27 Feb 2021. 3 McCabe, Robert, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller. 2020. Europe, Small and Maritime Security. Abingdon: Routledge.

a. Threats or use of force against Member States’ rights and jurisdiction over their maritime zones; b. Threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to Member States’ sovereign rights or armed conflicts; c. Cross-border and organized crime, including maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of human beings and smuggling of migrants, organised criminal networks facilitating illegal migration, trafficking of arms and narcotics, smuggling of goods and contraband; d. Terrorism and other intentional unlawful acts at sea and in ports against ships, cargo, crew and passengers, ports and port facilities and critical maritime and energy infrastructure, including cyber- attacks; e. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats; f. Threats to freedom of navigation, such as the denial of access to the sea and straits and the obstruction of sea lanes; g. Environmental risks, including unsustainable and unauthorized exploitation of natural and marine resources, threats to biodiversity, IUU fishing, environmental degradation due to illegal or accidental discharge, chemical, biological and nuclear pollution, in particular sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance; h. Potential security impact of natural or man-made disasters, extreme events and climate change on the maritime transport system and in particular on maritime infrastructure; i. Illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological objects.

To meet such a diverse range of threats in the maritime environment, the Defence Forces must have a maritime component that can respond to and counter such threats. The Irish Navy can be classed as a Constabulary Role Navy4, this being the second lowest category in his ‘typology’. Considering that Ireland is an island nation, now annexed from the remainder of the EU, on its western frontier is a cause of concern.

Ireland must have a capability to respond to such future trends (as per WP2015) and threats as per EU MSS. Considering that the scale of the sea area that Ireland has rights over is approximately ten times the size of the landmass of the island of Ireland (Government of Ireland 2012), there must be a requirement to have a maritime component of the Defence Forces that is capable of upholding these rights. As a Coastal State and signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)5, Ireland not only has rights but also obligations and must have the capability to uphold same.

Evolving Hybrid Threats6 The White Paper on Defence in 2015 identified that the future uncertainty over hybrid threats remains a concern. Such concerns over hybrid threats are not confined to the traditional domains that may concern people (such as the land domain). There are current and emerging hybrid threats in the maritime security environment that Ireland must be prepared for and willing to have a capability to respond to. The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Services, in their 2019 report7, identified the use of the Russian merchant fleet acting as state intelligence assets. Without divulging operational information, similar patterns of life have been observed in Irish waters by foreign flagged vessels for the past three years.

Along with such evidence, what should concern us in the Irish maritime domain, that may be of interest to other State actors (or non-state actors also). For example, approximately two thirds of all subsea cables connecting Europe to the USA pass through Irish Waters. Ireland is highly reliant of foreign investment for our functioning economy and as such, highly reliant on internet connectivity. What most people do not realise, is

4 Grove, Eric. 1990. The Future of Sea Power. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 5 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm Accessed 27 Feb 2021. 6 Government Of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland, pg 17. 7 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Services. 2019. International Security and Estonia. Tallinn: Government of Estonia, 12-14. Accessed March 10, 2021. https://valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport-2019-ENG-web.pdf that 97% of all internet traffic is transmitted via subsea cables8. Therefore, we must be aware of the risks to such cables, as they should fall under the aegis of critical national infrastructure.

Being an island nation, our Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are key to a vibrant and stable economy, with seaborne trade accounting for 99% of the total volume (45 million tonnes) and 95% of the total value (€128 billion) of the goods traded (imports/exports) in Ireland in 20109. We cannot underestimate how reliant we, as a nation, are on such trade. What should be readily apparent to the public is the shift in trade to the southern facing ports of the Republic since Brexit. The increase in ferry traffic from Cork, Rosslare and Dublin highlight the importance of these sea routes. We should not underestimate the potential hybrid or asymmetric threat to our SLOCs. During the troubles, the IRA recognised the weakness of SLOCs and the ability to disrupt the economy by blocking Lough Foyle on two occasions10. During the recent Ukrainian conflict, the Russian military blocked Ukrainian commercial and naval access to the Sea of Azov11.

The use of the sea by terrorist organisations should never be underestimated. On the island of Ireland, history has shown how the sea has been used to support uprisings and insurrections, for example the Ulster Volunteers in Larne in 1913, the Irish Volunteers, Howth in 1916 and the IRA throughout the Troubles (Claudia 1971, Marita Ann 1984, Eksund 1984). The sea has been key to the success of terrorist organisations. As such interdictions at sea, can pay huge dividend in saving lives, by the sheer volume of arms that can be seized in one operation12.

The nature of conflict will continue to evolve and present new challenges13. Therefore, the future force of the DF must be agile and responsive to these emerging threats and challenges. This can only happen, when there is flexibility in the management systems to allow the Defence Organisation to respond expeditiously and effectively to new threats or tasks.

The oceans are the last great global commons, amounting to two and a half times the land surface of the planet.14 Transnational criminal networks are increasingly capitalizing on this freedom, which poses significant challenges to coastal States.15 From a trafficking perspective, these transnational criminal networks using the sea to ship illicit narcotics to Europe (and Ireland), thereby undermining society. While the predominant trade in heroin originates from Afghanistan, the world’s supply chain of cocaine begins in the northern latitudes of South America and production is on the rise; during the last two decades, the global manufacture of cocaine has more than doubled16. It is estimated that 90 to 110 tonnes, worth €4.5Bn - €7Bn profit, is shipped illegally to Europe every year.17

8 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. 2019. Strategic importance of, and dependence on, subsea cables. Tallinn: NATO. Accessed March 01, 2021. https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/11/Undersea-cables-Final-NOV- 2019.pdf 9 Government of Ireland. 2012. Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 15. 10 New York Times. 1982. I.R.A. Guerrillas Destroy A British Cargo Ship. February 24. Accessed March 01, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/24/world/around-the-world-ira-guerrillas-destroy-a-british-cargo-ship.html#prof 11 Roth, Andrew. 2018. Kerch Strait confrontation: what happened and why does it matter? November 27. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/27/kerch-strait-confrontation-what-happened- ukrainian-russia-crimea 12 Flynn, Dr Brendan. 2017. ""The Dog that's not Barked?" Understanding the Maritime Logistics of Insurgencies and Terrorist Campaigns." In Defence Forces Review, by Defence Forces, 33-39. Dublin: Defence Forces. 13 White Paper on Defence, 2015, Page 11 and White Paper on Defence Update, 2019, Page 12. 14 Murphy, M., 2010. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. 2nd ed. London: Hurst & Co. Love, P., 2010. Fisheries; While Stocks Last. s.l.: OECD. 15 Lombardi, B., 2016. The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power, s.l.: Defence Research & Development Canada. 16 UNODC, 2019. World Drug Report 2019, Vienna: UNODC. 17 EMCDDA, 2020. Cocaine Trafficking to Europe. [Online], Available at: https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/cocaine- trafficking-europe_en

1. Capabilities – In this regard, you may wish to consider future integrated capability development and the planning and delivery requirements to support a joint force approach in terms of new equipment, professional military education and training, maintenance and development of infrastructure, developments in military doctrine, and transformative concepts, including specialist capabilities, that prepare and support the Defence Forces for future operations.

Firstly, the maritime component must have the ability to develop and maintain Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). This is a necessary step to ensure the effective and efficient use of assets such as warships, MPAs and unmanned systems to conduct Maritime Security taskings. In order to develop MDA, the maritime component must have active and passive sensing capability on, over and under the sea, in order to identify threats and unusual patterns of life as far from the coast of our State as possible.

The maritime component must have the capability to sustain a decisive maritime presence in its area of operations. Considering Ireland has a constabulary role navy, it must have an ability to deploy such a presence for extended periods. Such a presence in the North Atlantic must have the ability to self-sustain for upwards of thirty days, along with an ability to survive the worst North Atlantic conditions (Force 12) and then continue on mission. Considering the multifaceted nature of the future threats, the Navy must have a capability to conduct surveillance on the surface, in the air, and subsurface. It must also have a capability to monitor and react across the whole electro magnetic spectrum, to ensure that it can defend itself and provide force protection.

The following are a list of capabilities that the NS should have to be able to counter such threats described in the EU MSS, to conduct Maritime Security taskings and defend Ireland, her citizens and her interests at home and overseas: there are a range of tasks that the NS should be capable of fulfilling and therefore have the capability to do so. The following is a list of capabilities that the NS should have, so as to meet all current and future threats: a. Active air and surface surveillance capability, through the provision of 3D Air Surveillance radars on their warships. b. Ability to defend / protect assets from all expected threats, whether they are surface, subsurface or air threats. Force Protection is one of the key goals of the NATO PARP process, which the DF is undertaking18. c. Ability to support Humanitarian Aid & Disaster Relief (HADR) and Non-Combatant Evacuation operations (NEO). d. Subsea surveillance and search capability, through the provision of such systems as towed array passive sonars, multi beam echo sounders and remote systems for dive teams (Remotely Operated Vehicles and Unmanned Underwater Systems). e. Ability to support air operations, through manned and unmanned systems. f. Ability to launch and recover Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) that can deliver armed boarding teams (which is a minimum of ten personnel) to other vessels. g. Command and control systems that will be future proofed to allow the NS adopt new capabilities as they develop, to embrace reduced manning and unmanned systems. Such systems should be capable of supporting the element of an At Sea Force HQ for CSDP missions, such as and Irini, or UN missions such as UNIFIL MTF. h. Ability to support civil authorities in Ireland in Major Emergency Management (MEM), not the HADR and NEO capability can be re-purposed for use in the national environment.

18 NATO. 2014. Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process. November 05. Accessed March 01, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68277.htm#:~:text=The%20PfP%20Planning%20and%20Review%20Proces s%20%28PARP%29%20aims,and%20other%20activities%20to%20promote%20security%20and%20stability The conduct the tasks, in order to counter the threats as envisaged in the EU MSS, I would proffer that the NS should have the following fleet of warships: a. Two (2) x Multirole vessels (MRV) b. Six (6) x Offshore Patrol Vessels c. Two (2) x Inshore Patrol Vessels d. Two (2) x Maritime Counter Mine / Counter IED vessels Such a balanced fleet is a minimum requirement to meet the range of tasks that the Maritime Component will have to undertake. As per Annex A of this document, I include a Food For Thought (FFT) Paper, that covers the potential outlay of government funds to deliver such a capability over the next ten years.

2. Structures – In this regard, you may wish to consider the most effective high-level Command and Control (C2) structures within the Defence Forces to ensure an agile and balanced approach that can function across all domains at home and overseas.

As partners of NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme, we recognise NATO as the standard setting organisation for modern military forces training and equipping to NATO standards19. With this in mind, the CoDF should consider what best practice with respect to C2 structures in other western militaries (aligned, non-aligned, EU & NATO). The current C2 structures within the DF do not meet with what is considered best practice in western militaries. As such the Commanding Naval Service should be considered as the Maritime Component Commander (MCC). He should have Service Parity with the Land and Air Component Commander. They should all have access to the Strategic Management Committee, to ensure that the views of all components are acknowledged in all the strategic decision-making processes of the Defence Organisation.

The DF should move towards a truly Joint Structure. The current C2 refer to Joint Directorates, but they are just that in name. To say that the NS representation of five OF-3 ranks is sufficient representation in a DFHQ establishment of over 300 is incorrect. The figure below is an illustration of one example of what a future force C2 structure could look like, to ensure that the DF Future Force is structured to NATO standard models:

There should also be service parity in access to appointments in EUMS, to ensure that the NS can continue to learn and develop from exposure to the EU civ/mil systems.

A development of an overseas establishment for components, with representation at OHQ and FHQ level in appropriate missions, such as UNIFIL MTF, Operation ATALANTA and IRINI and MAOC(N). Again, such exposure will develop the NS as the Maritime Component of the Defence Forces.

To best meet the requirement for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), it is recommended that the State should consider the establishment of a National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), where all sensitive information and data in the maritime domain can be shared securely between all State Agencies with an interest in the maritime domain. There are numerous examples of this system operating effectively throughout Europe and the USA, such as MAOC(N)20, the UK NMIC (now renamed UK JMSC21) and JIATF(S)22 in the USA.

19 White Paper on Defence, 2015, page 65. 20 https://maoc.eu/who-we-are/ Accessed 01 March 2021. 21 HM Government. 2020. Joint Maritime Security Centre. Accessed March 01, 2021. https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-maritime-security-centre 22 US Government. 2020. Joint Inter Agency Task Force South. Accessed March 01, 2021. https://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/About-Us/

3. Staffing – In this regard you may wish to consider the HR policies that support the requirement for an agile and adaptive modern military force. You may wish to consider issues such as recruitment and retention, organisational culture and values, gender and diversity, career progression, and industrial relations machinery.

Since the efficiency audits conducted in the late 1990s23, the Defence Forces and specifically the Naval Service have been based around an extremely lean manning model. This model has been built around a two year in two year out rotation policy to sea for Naval Service personnel for a seven-ship navy. This policy has meant that the Naval Service has endured a churn rate (exit rate) of greater than normal business norms for the past fifteen to twenty years.

Over the past three years the Naval Service has suffered a churn rate close to 15% (reduced to just under 11% during COVID19). This churn rate is not sustainable. Along with such a high churn rate, the NS has endeavoured to recruit into the organisation via General Service Recruitment and multiple Direct Entry Schemes. The numbers being achieved from all these induction streams is not meeting the current loss rate.

The consequence of this exceedingly high churn rate has been the removal of two ships from service and placing into operational reserve, essentially mothballing both ships. The continued reduction in head count is having a detrimental effect on the NS ability to conduct operational patrols and to regenerate itself (train new inductees) without support from the remainder of the Defence Forces.

Such issues are indicative of the core problem with the NS, which is, my opinion, an Establishment that is not fit for purpose. To consider, the current establishment (maximum strength) of the NS is 1094. The current organisational strength as of March 2021 is approximately 900. Considering that the NS has approximately 170 – 200 personnel in full time training at any one time, means that the organisation struggling to maintain sufficient manning levels on nine ships, with a lean manning establishment designed for seven ships.

The key outcome from the CoDF process from staffing perspective must be an Establishment for the Naval Service that is fit for purpose and resilient enough to support the number of ships in service. As a minimum, using the benchmark / datum of an Establishment of 1144 personnel for seven ships, as specified in the EAG and VFM reports of the late 1990s, the following could be taken as a minimum organisational manning level, depending on hull numbers: a. Seven hulls equate to: 1144 personnel. b. Eight hulls equate to: 1307 personnel. c. Nine hulls equate to: 1471 personnel. d. Ten hulls equate to: 1634 personnel. e. Eleven hulls equate to: 1798 personnel. f. Twelve hulls equate to: 1961 personnel.

These indicative figures do not consider numbers for additional Joint appointments if the organisational structures at a higher level are to be modified to consider a Joint Force in line with NATO thinking and standards. It also does not consider the potential for overseas appointments in areas such as CSDP missions (Operation ATALANTA & IRINI), UNIFIL MTF and MAOC(N).

23 Price Waterhouse. 1998. Efficiency Audit Group Review of the Naval Service and Air Corps. Dublin: Dept of Taoiseach.

4. Any other comments you may wish to make in relation to the Defence Forces having regard to the Commission’s Terms of Reference

“Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If we ever again should be involved in war, we will fight with all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort”.24

This is a quotation from just after World War II, highlighting the interdependencies of all arms of the military on each other. Jointness must be embraced in order to develop an effective future Defence Forces that can be best placed to defend and protect Ireland and her citizens.

I am more than happy to meet with the Commission to discuss my submission, if they so wish.

24 General Dwight D Eisenhower, ‘Memorandum to Admiral Chester W Nimitz’, 17 April 1946. Quoted in Griffin, Stuart. Joint Operations: a short History, Produced by Training Specialist Services, HQ, p.7. Annex A to Cdr Cathal Power’s submission to CoDF

Food for Thought Paper National Shipbuilding and Ship Maintenance & Repair Strategy An Irish Perspective

Executive Summary This FFT paper endeavours to lay out a process by which a twelve-ship navy can be achieved over the next fifteen (15) years through consistent annual capital investment with the potential to incorporate EU funding. This FFT will also highlight the potential for creating additional benefits to the Irish economy, specifically the Irish maritime shipbuilding, maintenance and repair operations (MRO). Through the utilisation of the Defence Vote capital spend, sub vented by EU funding, a twelve-ship navy supported by an on island infrastructural investment is readily achievable.

Introduction The Naval Service currently has a fleet of nine (9) patrol vessels at various stages of hull life. With a Commission on the Defence Forces tasked with reviewing the appropriate size and structure of the DF (Term Of Reference No. 2), it is prudent to consider whether a whole of government approach to revitalising the maritime sector could be feasible, through the expansion and support of a Naval Fleet of a minimum of twelve (12) ships, as briefed by FOCNS to the Commission on the DF on 26 Jan 2021. At a national level, the Integrated Maritime Plan (IMP), Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth (2012) details the whole of government approach to an integrated marine plan which provides the following vision: “Our ocean wealth will be a key element of our economic recovery and sustainable growth, generating benefits for all our citizens, supported by coherent policy, planning and regulation, and managed in an integrated manner.”

This will be achieved through three high level goals, all of equal importance, which are: a. Goal 1: Thriving Maritime Economy b. Goal 2: Healthy Ecosystems c. Goal 3: Engagement with the Sea

Under the aegis of HOOW, infrastructure has been identified as a key enabler under this in the marine sector, to facilitate the achievement of such goals. Under Goal 1, the endeavour is to develop and enable an infrastructure that will support the growth, development and long-term viability of the maritime industrial base that can support and enable the whole of government approach to the maritime. Its aim is to put in place clear integrated policies and strategies for the development of new key strategic infrastructures to support job creation and economic growth (e.g., the grid and port infrastructure to support renewable energy and export potential).

Current Fleet The Naval Service currently has a fleet of nine offshore patrol vessels, with the following commissioning and expected end of service dates:

Ship Pennant No. Built Out of Service Date L.E. EITHNE P31 1984 2014 L.E. ORLA P41 1984 2014 L.E. CIARA P42 1985 2015 L.E. ROISIN P51 1999 2029 L.E. NIAMH P52 2001 2031 L.E. SAMUEL BECKETT P61 2014 2044 L.E. JAMES JOYCE P62 2015 2045 L.E. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS P63 2016 2046 L.E. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW P64 2018 2048 Table 1: Out of Service Dates for current NS Fleet

As part of the White Paper 2015, the NS is set to continue its Fleet Replacement Programme with the procurement of an MRV and CPV replacements with a Maritime Counter IED / EOD capability. The NS has made a submission to the Commission of the DF, stating a Level Of Ambition (LOA) of twelve (12) ships.

Design Life The P30 Class (L.E. EITHNE) is now nearing forty years’ service. Although both CPVs entered service with the NS in 1988, they were built in 1984 and 1985. The VARD designed P50 and P60 class have been designed for an expected hull life of thirty years, which gives out of service for circa 2030 for the P50 class and early 2040’s for the P60 class.

Future Fleet The NS LOA details a minimum of twelve ships, broken down as follows: a. Multirole Vessel (MRV): Two (2) of b. Offshore Patrol vessel (OPV): Eight (8) of c. Maritime /Counter IED EOD Hull (M C/IED EOD): Two (2) of25 Appendix A details a chart showing the expected out of service dates and proposed introduction into service of new build replacement warships. Capital costs for the projected fleet replacement are based upon a number of sources. a. MRV costings are based upon €200m project costs assigned by the Department of Defence and allotted in Vote 36 over three years (2022 – 2024), as approved in the National Development Plan (pg 96)26. b. OPV replacement costs are based upon potential inflation of previous OPV build costs of €73m for the P60 class and the EDA assessment of €100m for the European Patrol (OPV version)27. c. Maritime C/IED costs are based upon EDA assessment of €100m for Belgian / Dutch MCM replacement programme28. d. It should be noted that other options with respect to the M/CIED replacement are potentially available. The RNZN procured a second user hull to undertake the role of hydrographic and dive support for approximately €62m ($103m NZD)29.

25 Often referred to Multi Role Auxiliary Vessel (MRAV) by the European shipbuilding industry. 26 https://www.gov.ie/en/policy-information/07e507-national-development-plan-2018-2027/?referrer=/en/national- development-plan-2018-2027/ 27 https://pesco.europa.eu/project/european-patrol-corvette-epc/ 28 https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/06/belgian-dutch-mine-counter-measure-mcm-program-achieves- new-milestone/ 29 https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/navy/capability/hmnzs-manawanui-a09/ https://www.navaltoday.com/2019/05/16/future- hmnzs-manawanui-arrives-in-new-zealand-after-46-day-voyage-from-norway/ e. It should also be noted that there is potentially up to 30% EDF funding for EDA projects such as the European Patrol Corvette30.

Capital costs for a twelve-ship navy amount to €940m over fifteen years. This includes the following: a. MRV x 2: €400m in total b. IPV x 2: €20m + €60m (for replacements in 2030 timeframe) in total c. OPV x 2: €200m in total d. M/CIED x 2: €200m in total e. OPV LEP x 4: €60m in total (This could be considered a current rather than a capital expenditure) f. Total: €940m

NS Maintenance and Repair Operations (MRO) Subhead A11 covers all the devolved spend on MRO in the NS, excluding NDY personnel costs. The following table provides the annual A11 outturn since 201731: Year A11 Spend MGO MRO 2017 €13.8m €3.0m €10.8m 2018 €17.0m €7.1m €9.9m 2019 €13.5m €3.5m €10.0m 2020 €11.7m €2.5m €9.2m Total €55.3m €16.1m €39.9m Annual Average €13.825m €4.025m €9.975m

Therefore, a conservative estimate of projected MRO spend over the next fifteen years would equate to €150m. This does not consider a fleet expansion plan, rather just maintenance of nine (9) hulls. An estimate of a €1.1Bn projected spend on naval build and MRO would be an accurate assessment, if a twelve ship navy was to be the aspiration.

Constraints with current MRO Due to the lack of an established maritime industry (excluding a very small support element in Killybegs for the Irish Pelagic Fleet), the majority of subject matter experts (SMEs) are based in the UK and Europe. Any major MRO undertaken by the NS normally requires the support of OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) SMEs. This became readily apparent over the past year with the COVID19 pandemic and the necessary restrictions that were enforced on travelling. The L.E. ROISIN Life Extension Programme (LEP) has suffered delays and overruns due to the unavailability of SMEs because of these restrictions. A LEP which was expected to be completed within one (1) year is now expected to suffer up to a 50% overrun, extending to one and a half years. While the NS encountered delays with the LEP, the RNLN were able to complete a similar Life Extension Programme of HMNLS Pelikaan from Nov 2019 until Sep 2020. Despite the COVID19 pandemic issues, the geographic access of SMEs to assist with the LEP ensured it was completed on time within the NL government restrictions32. The scale and nature of the work undertaken on this vessel is similar to the nature of the work being undertaken in the P50 Class LEP.

30 https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2021/01/04/eda-to-support-european-patrol-corvette-pesco-project# 31 Data provided by Subhead A11 Manager. 32 https://www.damen.com/en/news/2020/10/hnlms_pelikaan_back_in_curacao_after_midlife_upgrade_by_damen Whole of Government Approach The NMCI was opened in 2004, under the aegis of a public private partnership. Overall, this academic institution has been highly successful for the NS and Munster Technological University (formerly CIT) who both recognised that they would not have been able to build such a facility without mutual support. Consideration should now be given to a whole of government approach to the support and enhancement of the maritime industry. Is it now time for the Government to consider a PPP for shipbuilding and MRO capability in Ireland? One possible solution for Ireland, would be to utilise any planned investment and fleet expansion to allow for the reinvigoration of the maritime industry in Ireland. One potential avenue that could be considered would be the acquisition of a site suitable for shipbuilding and MRO by the State. Stemming from the HOOW intent and the overarching EU strategic aim, the State could proceed to the market to seek a PPP to enhance and develop an industrial base in Ireland to provide a guarantee of access to such capabilities in Ireland, with the long-term benefit of the return of a share of such funds (€1.1Bn) back into the State, via the basing of capabilities in Ireland and the consequential direct and indirect employment potential. A number of multinational shipbuilding companies have now increased their portfolio to incorporate technology transfer capabilities. Companies such as Vard, Babcock and Damen have all indicated their ability to utilise the capabilities inherent in their companies and transfer such skills to other yards and or countries. Examples are the Aircraft Carrier Alliance (ACA)33 reinstatement of shipbuilding capability in Rosyth (UK) or Damen reinstatement of shipbuilding in Mexico34.

Funding Streams Within the EU an Action Plan35 to improve across all member states has been initiated, as part of the EU Global Security Strategy. From a maritime and military mobility perspective the aim of the EU Global Security Strategy is to ensure that the “EU can contribute from a security and defence perspective to strengthening the protection and resilience of its networks and critical infrastructure; the security of its external borders as well as building partners' capacity to manage their borders; civil protection and disaster response; ensuring stable access to and use of the global commons, including the high seas and space”36. To support the EU Global Security Strategy and EU Military Mobility Action Plan, the Connecting Europe Fund (CEF) contains funding to support dual use transport infrastructure projects37, potentially providing EU funding of up to 85% to dual use infrastructural projects. The CEF could provide an avenue for EU funding to support such a PPP, that could re-establish such infrastructure in Ireland. This PPP could then be utilised for the support of a fleet expansion programme and NS MRO and also mitigate against such constraints being experienced during the ongoing COVID19 pandemic. Spare capacity in such a dual use infrastructure could then be used to support the civilian maritime industry, in particular the growing marine renewable industry in Irish waters. Note: spare capacity in the NMCI PPP not utilised by the partner institutions, allows NMCI Services Ltd to use the facilities for the provision of private commercial maritime education and training.

Conclusion The projected costs to achieve a twelve-ship navy are achievable through singular or multiple avenues such as government and EU funding. The potential projected spend on a Fleet Replacement and Expansion plan can provide an opportunity to a whole of Government approach to revitalise the maritime industry in Ireland, to provide a workforce, skillset and capability that could be used to support naval shipbuilding and MRO. This revitalised industrial base could also be utilised to provide support to maritime industries, such as the offshore renewable industry that is commencing to grow with multinational investment. Such an investment would be in keeping with EU strategies to strengthen and reinforce Ireland’s position, as a frontier nation on the western approaches of the EU.

33 https://www.baesystems.com/en/blog/the-aircraft-carrier-alliance--taking-our-relationships-to-the-next-level 34 https://www.damen.com/en/news/2020/02/damen_delivers_long_range_ocean_patrol_vessel_to_the_mexican_navy 35 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/news/2018-03-28-action-plan-military-mobility_en 36 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions-st14149en16.pdf (pg 5). 37 https://ec.europa.eu/inea/connecting-europe-facility/cef-transport

Appendix A Projected Capital Expenditure

Ship Number Pennant No. Type Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 1 P31 / P71 MRV P31 Decom €50 €100 €50 2 P72 MRV €50 €100 €50 3 P41 / P91 M/CIED P41 Decom €50 €50 4 P42 / P92 M/CIED P42 decom €50 €50 5 P51 OPV €25 €50 €25 6 P52 OPV €25 €50 €25 7 P61 OPV €15 8 P62 OPV €15 9 P63 OPV €15 10 P64 OPV €15 11 P81 IPV €10 €10 €10 €10 12 P82 IPV €10 €10 €10 €10

Capital Cost (€m) €20 €0 €50 €100 €100 €100 €100 €100 €90 €90 €90 €35 €20 €35 €10

Hull numbers 9 8 8 8 9 9 10 11 11 10 11 12 12 12 12

Total Cost €940 million Current Hull Avg per year €62.67 million New Hull