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Commission on the Defence Forces Submission by Commander Cathal Power, Irish Naval Service

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Commission on the Defence Forces Submission by Commander Cathal Power, Irish Naval Service Commission on the Defence Forces Submission by Commander Cathal Power, Irish Naval Service “What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more of no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own”. Sir John Hackett The Profession of Arms The 1962 Les Knowles Lectures, Trinity College I wish to open this submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces (CoDF) with a quotation from the son of an Irish emigrant to Australia, who served in the British Military through World War II. Are the Defence Forces therefore a reflection of an apathy in Ireland to the military obligations of a State, utilised to underpin a rules-based society? Ireland has, historically, not considered that it is essential to have a robust and capable military force, especially a maritime force. The lack of coherent maritime policies and a capable naval force is a function (or mistake, depending on your viewpoint) of our history. However, it is not something that was underestimated by the British Empire when they established our Dominion status in 1921. The UK ensured that they held on to the right to use and control our waters, thus reinforcing an inward-looking mindset on the island of Ireland. This quote, I hope sets the tone for what is laid out before the Commission and the onerous task ahead of it. Context – Threats to Ireland in the Maritime Domain In order to ascertain the capabilities required of a Navy, it is essential to identify the threats that such a navy will have to face in its future operating environment. The fact that Ireland lacks a National Security Strategy, or a National Maritime Security Strategy must be seen as a gap at a national policy level. Without such national documents, one must look to Europe to corroborate or ground-truth the current and future threats that Ireland, as an island faces. The EU Maritime Security Strategy identifies several threats that the EU will face into the future. This was further elaborated or updated by the Council revision of the EU MSS Action Plan, which reinforces the requirement for EU nations to have a capability to “contribute to the EU aim for a rules-based, cooperative and cross sectoral approach to ocean governance”1. The original EU Maritime Security Strategy lists nine (9) threats and risks to the EU2. Therefore, it behoves the Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF) to consider the EU MSS and all its associated documents and updates as the key policy guidance, in the absence of such national strategy. The White Paper on Defence 2015 does not identify threats, appearing to err on the side of caution by discussing trends; lest the Defence Forces may require specific capabilities to deal with specific threats identified. The maritime domain is central to European security today and it is certain to remain so in the years ahead3. I will focus predominantly on the threats facing Ireland in the maritime domain. The following are a list of the many threats elaborated by the EU MSS and intimate in the White Paper on Defence. 1 Council of the European Union. 2018. Conclusions on the revision of EU MSS Action Plan. Brussels: Council of the European Union. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2011205%202014%20INIT/EN/pdf pg5-6. Accessed 27 Feb 2021. 3 McCabe, Robert, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller. 2020. Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security. Abingdon: Routledge. a. Threats or use of force against Member States’ rights and jurisdiction over their maritime zones; b. Threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to Member States’ sovereign rights or armed conflicts; c. Cross-border and organized crime, including maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of human beings and smuggling of migrants, organised criminal networks facilitating illegal migration, trafficking of arms and narcotics, smuggling of goods and contraband; d. Terrorism and other intentional unlawful acts at sea and in ports against ships, cargo, crew and passengers, ports and port facilities and critical maritime and energy infrastructure, including cyber- attacks; e. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats; f. Threats to freedom of navigation, such as the denial of access to the sea and straits and the obstruction of sea lanes; g. Environmental risks, including unsustainable and unauthorized exploitation of natural and marine resources, threats to biodiversity, IUU fishing, environmental degradation due to illegal or accidental discharge, chemical, biological and nuclear pollution, in particular sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance; h. Potential security impact of natural or man-made disasters, extreme events and climate change on the maritime transport system and in particular on maritime infrastructure; i. Illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological objects. To meet such a diverse range of threats in the maritime environment, the Defence Forces must have a maritime component that can respond to and counter such threats. The Irish Navy can be classed as a Constabulary Role Navy4, this being the second lowest category in his ‘typology’. Considering that Ireland is an island nation, now annexed from the remainder of the EU, on its western frontier is a cause of concern. Ireland must have a capability to respond to such future trends (as per WP2015) and threats as per EU MSS. Considering that the scale of the sea area that Ireland has rights over is approximately ten times the size of the landmass of the island of Ireland (Government of Ireland 2012), there must be a requirement to have a maritime component of the Defence Forces that is capable of upholding these rights. As a Coastal State and signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)5, Ireland not only has rights but also obligations and must have the capability to uphold same. Evolving Hybrid Threats6 The White Paper on Defence in 2015 identified that the future uncertainty over hybrid threats remains a concern. Such concerns over hybrid threats are not confined to the traditional domains that may concern people (such as the land domain). There are current and emerging hybrid threats in the maritime security environment that Ireland must be prepared for and willing to have a capability to respond to. The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Services, in their 2019 report7, identified the use of the Russian merchant fleet acting as state intelligence assets. Without divulging operational information, similar patterns of life have been observed in Irish waters by foreign flagged vessels for the past three years. Along with such evidence, what should concern us in the Irish maritime domain, that may be of interest to other State actors (or non-state actors also). For example, approximately two thirds of all subsea cables connecting Europe to the USA pass through Irish Waters. Ireland is highly reliant of foreign investment for our functioning economy and as such, highly reliant on internet connectivity. What most people do not realise, is 4 Grove, Eric. 1990. The Future of Sea Power. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 5 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm Accessed 27 Feb 2021. 6 Government Of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland, pg 17. 7 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Services. 2019. International Security and Estonia. Tallinn: Government of Estonia, 12-14. Accessed March 10, 2021. https://valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport-2019-ENG-web.pdf that 97% of all internet traffic is transmitted via subsea cables8. Therefore, we must be aware of the risks to such cables, as they should fall under the aegis of critical national infrastructure. Being an island nation, our Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are key to a vibrant and stable economy, with seaborne trade accounting for 99% of the total volume (45 million tonnes) and 95% of the total value (€128 billion) of the goods traded (imports/exports) in Ireland in 20109. We cannot underestimate how reliant we, as a nation, are on such trade. What should be readily apparent to the public is the shift in trade to the southern facing ports of the Republic since Brexit. The increase in ferry traffic from Cork, Rosslare and Dublin highlight the importance of these sea routes. We should not underestimate the potential hybrid or asymmetric threat to our SLOCs. During the troubles, the IRA recognised the weakness of SLOCs and the ability to disrupt the economy by blocking Lough Foyle on two occasions10. During the recent Ukrainian conflict, the Russian military blocked Ukrainian commercial and naval access to the Sea of Azov11. The use of the sea by terrorist organisations should never be underestimated. On the island of Ireland, history has shown how the sea has been used to support uprisings and insurrections, for example the Ulster Volunteers in Larne in 1913, the Irish Volunteers, Howth in 1916 and the IRA throughout the Troubles (Claudia 1971, Marita Ann 1984, Eksund 1984). The sea has been key to the success of terrorist organisations. As such interdictions at sea, can pay huge dividend in saving lives, by the sheer volume of arms that can be seized in one operation12. The nature of conflict will continue to evolve and present new challenges13. Therefore, the future force of the DF must be agile and responsive to these emerging threats and challenges.
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