DOCSLIB.ORG

NAVAL GAZING? Jul 2021

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
NAVAL GAZING? Jul 2021 BRIEF / 16 NAVAL GAZING? Jul 2021 The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence by Daniel Fiott* Security and Defence Editor, EUISS INTRODUCTION Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime Summary security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily depend- › The EU and its member states will find it ent on maritime trade routes for power projection increasingly difficult to sustain the rules- and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods enter- based order and the Union’s own economic ing Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies prosperity without a sizeable and consist- and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, ent investment in maritime power. China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, › The politics of the EU’s approach to mari- Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile time security is conditioned by questions of maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into geographical priorities and how to balance question the relative freedoms Europeans have en- ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ maritime risks. joyed at sea for decades. › The Strategic Compass should set measur- able targets that lead to a higher and more Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can credible EU naval presence, and it may generate a greater maritime presence in such a con- even instigate a shift in the way the EU thinks text. The Union has accrued experience in deploying about maritime security more broadly. © European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2021. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. DANIEL FIOTT naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard vessel and nuclear attack submarine — to the Pacific functions, performing maritime safety tasks, coun- at the start of 2021 (3). Although many of these initia- tering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance tives have been given impetus because of the grow- assignments. More recently, the EU has even estab- ing importance of the Indo-Pacific, it is important lished new maritime initiatives such as the to note the geographical extent of Europe’s maritime Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which ambitions and the (direct/indirect) proximity of mar- is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile itime threats, risks and challenges. areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have These enhanced European maritime security initia- also invested in national strategies and guidelines for tives have given rise to questions about what role na- maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU val power should play within the Strategic Compass. will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strat- One can understand why, especially given a grow- egy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in ing European recognition that freedom of navigation October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own and the international law of the sea are steadily be- Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on ing eroded. Some EU member states are directly im- maritime issues too. plicated in this challenge, and it is worth recalling that Denmark, France and Portugal At the same time, by March 2022, here is a have some of the largest Exclusive the EU will present a Strategic Economic Zones (EEZs) in the world Compass for security and defence, T security and when calculated in km2. However, which is in part supposed to pro- economic rationale free and secure seas and oceans are vide clearer guidance on what type for enhancing the in the interests of all EU member of maritime actor the Union should Union’s maritime states as they provide the basis for become. This is a challenging task. Europe’s economic prosperity — There is limited political agree- presence. consider that Europe is home to 329 ment on the Union’s maritime se- key seaports (4). There is a security curity role, and there is uncertainty and economic rationale for enhanc- about how far the EU should geographically extend ing the Union’s maritime presence. Even marine in- itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is surers are increasingly taking into consideration se- also the question of limited European naval capabili- curity and geopolitical considerations when insuring ties. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the shipping companies, vessels and ports (5). Regardless Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to of whether a member state is landlocked or not, every the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our EU member state feels the effect of maritime sup- first port of call, however, is to better understand the ply disruptions. For example, Covid-19 led to an im- contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and mediate 4.1 % decrease in global maritime trade in challenges. 2020 in addition to disrupting supply chains, ship- ping networks and ports. (6) Yet it is not just pandemics and canal blockages that threaten maritime trade. Increasingly, climate HARD AND FAST? THE change will transform maritime spaces. For example, if climate adaptation and coastal protection efforts CHANGING NATURE OF fail by 2100 approximately 48 % of the world’s land area, 52 % of the global population and 46 % of global MARITIME SECURITY socio-economic infrastructures and activities are at risk of flooding (7). Coastal areas in the EU and beyond Europe’s navies are increasingly being called upon are the most at risk from climate change. For the EU, to perform maritime security tasks. Violent piracy in this means that critical infrastructure such as ports, the Gulf of Guinea has been met with enhanced na- harbours and naval bases will be vulnerable and there val vigilance in the area, insecurity in the Strait of could be resource depletion because of environmen- Hormuz has resulted in a European maritime aware- tal risks. What is more, climate change could lead to ness initiative (EMASOH) and longstanding crises in the collapse of fishing stocks due to water warming, Libya and the Horn of Africa have required the de- which in turn may lead to conflict between states ployment of EU naval forces in the form of Operations and fishing companies, and new shipping lanes are Irini and Atalanta. On top of this, countries such as likely to open up in the summer season in the Arctic. France, Germany and the Netherlands have deployed Increasingly, climate change could aggravate trans- or plan to deploy naval forces to the Indian Ocean and boundary maritime disputes, especially where ma- the South China Sea. Germany will deploy its frigate rine conservation spaces or resources overlap with Bayern in the second half of 2021 (2) and France initi- contested EEZs. Finally, the increased use of renew- ated ‘Mission Marianne’ — consisting of a support able marine energy installations and connectors may 2 NAVAL GAZinG? | THE StrAteGic COMPAss And THE EU’S MAritiME Presence replicate well-known infrastructure vulnerabili- at the same time. This is why it is difficult to craft ties at sea (8). responses to the construction of artificial islands, il- legal sand dredging and sea mining, the collision of The oceans and seas are not then only conduits for civil and military vessels, civil harassment of naval maritime trade: they are also home to food sources, vessels, submarine threats or the use of fishing ves- vital critical infrastructure and strategic economic sels or coastguards as proxy ‘maritime militias’ (15). inputs. For example, consider that the Sea-Me-We-5 Legal ambiguity and the congestion inherent in the submarine telecommunication cable routes through maritime domain give rise to legal and regulatory six separate maritime zones such as the Mediterranean loopholes that can become security vulnerabilities (16). Sea and the Malacca Strait and has 18 different land- China exploits these vulnerabilities through a tac- ing points including France, Italy, Myanmar, Oman tic of combining military and constabulary forms of and Singapore (9). Subsea energy pipelines and off- maritime coercion (17). shore installations are also vulnerable maritime in- frastructures — the EU imports gas and oil through These hybrid tactics are not used by China alone. the Mediterranean, Baltic and North Seas. Turkey is employing similar methods in the Furthermore, critical raw materials that are essential Mediterranean through its use of survey vessels to for the European economy are located far beyond EU illegally drill in Cyprus’s territorial sea and EEZ. shores and this includes magnesium from China, Maritime security closer to the EU is, therefore, palladium from Russia, ruthenium from South Africa another pressing issue for the Strategic Compass. and niobium from Brazil (10). Criminal networks also Consider that the EU has a coastline of 68 000 km operate across multiple seas and oceans. Safeguarding and over 2 000 inhabited islands (18) and the Baltic, sea lines of communication (SLOC) will therefore be Black, Mediterranean and North Seas are also impli- another key task for the Strategic Compass. cated in security or geopolitical risks. Here, Russia remains a regional concern and the Although not all EU member states hina is a growing modernisation of its submarine fleet see an immediate need for a lurch and long-range precision strike ca- towards the Indo-Pacific, China is a C geopolitical pabilities means that Moscow can growing geopolitical maritime rival maritime rival that threaten Europe via the Atlantic, the that cannot be overlooked.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • EU Defence Cooperation Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
    EU Defence Cooperation Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (article 42.6, 46 and Protocol 10), the PESCO is a framework and process to deepen defence cooperation between those EU Member States, who are capable and willing to do so. 25 EU Member States have joined PESCO and subscribed to more binding commitments to invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities more together, within the Union framework. The objective is to jointly arrive at a coherent full spectrum of defence capabilities available to Member States for national and multinational (EU, NATO, UN, ... ) missions and operations. This will enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of the EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending. The key difference between PESCO and other forms of cooperation is the legally binding nature of the commitments undertaken by the 25 Member States which participate in PESCO. The list of ambitious and more binding common commitments undertaken by each of the participating PESCO contains 20 individual commitments, split into the five key areas set out by art.2 of Protocol N°10 on PESCO annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. PESCO projects An initial list of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 6 March 2018. A second batch of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 19 November 2018. And finally, a third batch of 13 additional projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 12 November 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • ISDS Analyses 2020/15
    Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies ISDS Analyses 2020/15. 23 04 2020 Anna Nádudvari – Alex Etl – Nikolett Bereczky:1 Quo vadis, PESCO? An analysis of cooperative networks and capability development priorities Executive Summary • Out of the 47 running PESCO projects, only 1/5 have more than 7 members, while almost half of the projects have only 3 or less participants. Based on coordination and membership accounts, France (31) Italy (26) Spain (24) Germany (16), as the Big Four, are the most involved participating Member States. Subsequently, with regards to Member States’ involvement in capability areas, the Big Four’s involvement is the most diverse, while Poland, the Czech Republic, Netherlands, and Greece are also involved in at least 5 key project areas out of 7. • Most PESCO projects contribute to general objectives of creating Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within EU’s Level of Ambition (LoA), while high-end capability contributions are fewer, partly because PESCO projects contribute to Capability Development Priorities through complementing other activities and projects coordinated by EDA. Therefore, in some cases, the lack of PESCO projects aiming at these missing capability priorities can be explained by parallel EDA projects addressing those capability shortfalls. • Member states are rather aligning their PESCO capability developments with the Big Four than with anyone else. This makes the overall PESCO network fundamentally centralized, in which everyone is tied to the core, while the relations among the peripheral nodes are rather limited. • Central and Eastern European intra-regional PESCO relations are rather weak, since the participation in PESCO did not lead to the emergence of a strong and visible regional sub-cluster.
    [Show full text]
  • Norwegian Defence and Security Industries Association SECURE BORDERS
    1/2021 NORWEGIAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION SECURE BORDERS. SAVE LIVES. The Ranger® HDC MS provides exceptional long range performance with a variety of daylight sensors and options to help assess threats. Operators can discern between nuisance alarms and those requiring interdiction for border, coastal surveillance, and force protection surveillance. FLIR.COM/MTRANGERHDCMS CONTENTS CONTENTS: Editor-in-Chief: LEOPARD 2 MAIN BATTLE TANK M.Sc. Bjørn Domaas Josefsen A cornerstone in Europe’s land defence 2 APS TOTAL WAR Trophy active protection system on German Leopard 2 tanks 6 IN THE CYBER DOMAIN NORWEGIAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION (FSI) 7 The entire civilised world, with the possible exception of a mr. DonAs the number of lives lost in war has been reduced during recent years, CYFOR the war in cyberspace is raging at full strength, and spreading to ever The Storting wants to increase the defensive capability new areas. In recent years, the cyber war has spread to include the of CYFOR 14 exertion of influence by foreign states on large population sections, to promote both commercial and political interests. PATRIOT The Swedish Patriot project enters a new phase 16 In the middle of all this, the cyber war continues to target critical infrastructure and how this infrastructure can be destroyed, or even BULLETIN BOARD FOR DEFENCE, INDUSTRY worse, controlled by a foreign power. AND TRADE Upgrading 3D radars of Germany Navy 19 Not least, the traditional cyber battle continues over information content, Patria AMVXP 8x8 test vehicles to Japan 20 such as insight into political and business processes, private and public European Patrol Corvette 22 databases, and perhaps most of all, access to sensitive technology.
    [Show full text]
  • Commission on the Defence Forces Submission by Commander Cathal Power, Irish Naval Service
    Commission on the Defence Forces Submission by Commander Cathal Power, Irish Naval Service “What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more of no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own”. Sir John Hackett The Profession of Arms The 1962 Les Knowles Lectures, Trinity College I wish to open this submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces (CoDF) with a quotation from the son of an Irish emigrant to Australia, who served in the British Military through World War II. Are the Defence Forces therefore a reflection of an apathy in Ireland to the military obligations of a State, utilised to underpin a rules-based society? Ireland has, historically, not considered that it is essential to have a robust and capable military force, especially a maritime force. The lack of coherent maritime policies and a capable naval force is a function (or mistake, depending on your viewpoint) of our history. However, it is not something that was underestimated by the British Empire when they established our Dominion status in 1921. The UK ensured that they held on to the right to use and control our waters, thus reinforcing an inward-looking mindset on the island of Ireland. This quote, I hope sets the tone for what is laid out before the Commission and the onerous task ahead of it.
    [Show full text]
  • Europe of Defence in the New World (Dis)Order: Choices for Italy
    Europe of Defence in the New World (Dis)Order: Choices for Italy © 2020 IAI by Ester Sabatino and Alessandro Marrone ISSN 2280-6164 ABSTRACT The 2016 EU Global Strategy delineated the level of ambition of the Union, but four years later the EU still struggles to reach this level in the defence domain. The paper investigates how the current EU initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and European Defence Fund could help defining and reaching such a concept, to eventually realise an appropriate level strategic autonomy. In light of the principle of the “single set of forces”, as well as due to synergies and commonalities between EU and NATO, the paper also inquires whether the old vertical “division of labour” discussed in the early 2000s is still a valid approach, or if the EU quest for a wider and stronger strategic autonomy could ultimately bring to a geographical division of responsibilities. However, such an occurrence implies a strong political willingness and commitment towards EU defence, that is now further shaken by the impact of COVID-19 particularly on military budget and capability development. In such a context, Italy needs to clearly position itself in a post-Brexit EU at 27, where the different stances on the level of strategic autonomy and on transatlantic relations need to be balanced in renewed ways – also in light of the new role played by the European Commission. In the end, a new and more solid “centre of gravity” for EU defence in Europe could be established, should Rome manage to fully enter the Franco-German driver for strategic autonomy.
    [Show full text]
  • NAVIRIS and NAVANTIA SIGN a Mou for the EUROPEAN PATROL CORVETTE PROGRAM
    NAVIRIS AND NAVANTIA SIGN A MoU FOR THE EUROPEAN PATROL CORVETTE PROGRAM Genoa/Madrid, February 11, 2021 – NAVIRIS, the 50/50 joint venture company between Fincantieri and Naval Group in charge of development of cooperation programs, and NAVANTIA have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aimed at enlarging the industrial cooperation for the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) program, the most important naval initiative within the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project. The EPC will be a smart, innovative, affordable, sustainable, interoperable and flexible vessel to meet the future missions in the evolved world context of mid-21st century. EPC will be a fully ready surface combatant to carry-out diversified missions, primarily aimed at enhancing maritime situational awareness, surface superiority and power projection, particularly in the context of governmental peacetime actions, such as those aimed at counteracting piracy and smuggling, as well as those actions dedicated to humanitarian assistance, migration control and aimed at ensuring freedom of navigation. It will be about 100 meters and 3.000 tons, able to replace in the near future (from 2027 onward) several classes of ships, from patrol vessels to light frigates. The design requirements for these vessels, with a clear objective of commonality of solutions and modularity for adaptation to national requirements, are expected from the Navies in 2021. On the industrial side, NAVIRIS and NAVANTIA will act in a fully coordinated way with Fincantieri and Naval Group for the EPC program. The studies could potentially benefit from European Union and national funds and will include a large part of R&D leading to innovative solutions for making easier the co-development and interoperability, the efficiency of the vessels in operations and the digital data management.
    [Show full text]
  • New Opportunities in Common Security and Defence Policy: Joining PESCO
    Copyright @ 2019 Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies https://cesaa.org.au/anzjes/ Vol11 (3) ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) New opportunities in common security and defence policy: Joining PESCO Christian Leuprecht Royal Military College [email protected] Rhianna Hamilton Queen’s University [email protected] Abstract Responding to concerns about burden-sharing and aiming to improve internal defence cooperation, act more quickly and harness resource synergies, the European Union (EU) initiated the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017. PESCO, however, is controversial. On the one hand, the United States (US) wants greater burden-sharing by European allies whilst concerned about greater European military autarky that would undermine US influence over NATO, Europe/EU and EU member states. On the other hand, at least one European NATO ally wants to leverage PESCO precisely as an instrument to shore up European “strategic autonomy”. This tension over competing European defence futures leaves participation by third countries in limbo. Arguably, third-country participation would hinder greater European defence autarky. The article makes the case for the mutual benefits of third-country participation, focusing on Canada. Canada has a major stake in the outcome. NATO is Canada’s most important multilateral institution and Europe is Canada’s second-most important strategic partner, after the US. Canada’s unequivocal strategic interests in Europe have long informed its expeditionary priorities -- from the two world wars, when Canada coming to Europe’s defence long before the US proved existential for both parties, to nowadays. Since the 1970s, Canada and Europe have worked consistently together bilaterally beyond NATO to advance regional stability and mutual security interests.
    [Show full text]
  • Pesco Projects
    PESCO PROJECTS TRAINING, FACILITIES • European Training Certification Centre for European Armies (ETCCEA) • Helicopter Hot and High Training (H3 Training) • Joint EU Intelligence School (JEIS) • EU Test and Evaluation Centres (EUTEC) • Integrated European Joint Training and simulation Centre (EUROSIM) • EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub (EU CAIH) • Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre (SMTC) • CBRN Defence Training Range (CBRNDTR) • European Union Network of Diving Centres (EUNDC) LAND, FORMATIONS, SYSTEMS • Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package (DM-DRCP) • Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle (AIFV/AAV/LAV) • Indirect Fire Support Capability (EuroArtillery) • EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) • Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS) • EU Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) Land Battlefield Missile Systems (EU BLOS) MARITIME • Maritime (semi) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) • Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO) • Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance (UMS) • Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention Capability (DIVEPACK) • Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System (MUSAS) • European Patrol Corvette (EPC) AIR, SYSTEMS • European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – MALE RPAS (Eurodrone) • European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III • Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) • Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) ENABLING, JOINT • European Medical Command (EMC) • Network of Logistic
    [Show full text]
  • Molnár Anna – Szabolcs Laura: Megerõsített Együttmûködés
    BIZTONSÁGPOLITIKA Molnár Anna– Szabolcs Laura Megerõsített együttmûködés, változó geometria, PESCO DOI 10.17047/HADTUD.2020.30.4.77 Az Európai Unió közös biztonság- és védelempolitikája a 2016-os globális stratégia elfogadása óta védelmi együttmûködés terén is mélyül – ennek egyik meghatározó pillére a 2017-ben érvénybe lépett állandó strukturált együttmûködés, a PESCO. A kooperációs forma lehetõséget ad a differenciált vagy rugalmas integrációra – ezért fontosnak tartjuk megvizsgálni, hogy a jelenleg futó projektekben miként alakul az egyes tagállamok együttmûködési hajlandósága, és ezzel összefüggésben a megerõsített együttmûködés vagy változó geometria megvalósulása. A tagállamok csoportosítását különbözõ szempontok szerint meghatározott védelmi (vagy védelempolitikát is érintõ) formációk, szövetségek, egyezmények tagjaitól való eltérések és hasonlóságok alapján végeztük el, illetve elkülönítettük az Unió Tanácsa által meghatározott projektcsoportokat. Az egyes projektkategóriákban részt vevõ államok együttmûködési preferenciáit gráfokkal ábrázoltuk. KULCSSZAVAK: Európai Unió, közös biztonság- és védelempolitika, állandó strukturált együttmûködés, változó geometria Reinforced cooperation, variable geometry, PESCO Since the acceptance of the Global Strategy in 2016, the cooperation between EU members has been constantly deepening in the field of defence. One of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy’s defining segment is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was established in 2017. This type of cooperation
    [Show full text]
  • MARITIME Security &Defence M
    Pilot Issue MARITIME October 2020 Security a7.50 D 14974 E &Defence MSD From the Sea and Beyond ISSN 1617-7983 • European Naval Shipbuilding www.maritime-security-defence.com • • Counter-Mine Capabilities in Europe • Naval Propulsion Options MITTLER • Naval Interceptors October 2020 • European Submarine Builders REPORT MISSIONREADY From o shore patrol vessels to corvettes – Lürssen has more than 140 years of experience in building naval vessels of all types and sizes. We develop tailor-made maritime solutions to meet any of your requirements. Whenever the need arises, our logistic support services and spare parts supply are always there to help you. Anywhere in the world. Across all of the seven seas. Lürssen – The DNA of shipbuilding More information: + or www.luerssen-defence.com Editorial From the Sea and Beyond You are holding a new magazine concept in your hands, and might already be asking: “Security and Defence – again? Maritime? What for?” Photo: author Conrad Waters is a contributor to Mittler Report Verlag publi- Water covers more than 70 per cent of the world’s sur- cations, serves as editor of face – including rivers and lakes of strategic importance. “Navies in the 21st Century” It is the means for defining national boundaries, outlining and is the editor of the “World regions, conducting trade, feeding populations, energising Naval Review” since 2009 when the digital planet and relaxing safely on a beach holiday. it was founded. Yet, there are many aspects about the sea that are ignored or misunderstood by the current – and shrinking pool – of defence titles focused on it. Maritime Security and Defence is dedicated to remedy the broader understanding of “the sea” in a unique way.
    [Show full text]
  • COLLECTIVE COLLAPSE OR RESILIENCE? European Defense Priorities in the Pandemic Era
    Études de l’Ifri Focus stratégique 103 COLLECTIVE COLLAPSE OR RESILIENCE? European Defense Priorities in the Pandemic Era Edited by Corentin BRUSTLEIN February 2021 Security Studies Center The French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the authors alone. ISBN: 979-10-373-0315-8 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2021 Cover: © Rokas Tenys/Shutterstock.com How to cite this publication: Corentin Brustlein (ed.), “Collective Collapse or Resilience? European Defense Priorities in the Pandemic Era”, Focus stratégique, No. 103, Ifri, February 2021. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 – Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Focus stratégique Resolving today’s security problems requires an integrated approach. Analysis must be cross-cutting and consider the regional and global dimensions of problems, their technological and military aspects, as well as their media linkages and broader human consequences. It must also strive to understand the far-reaching and complex dynamics of military transformation, international terrorism and post-conflict stabilization.
    [Show full text]
  • The Eu-Ukraine Security Partnership: Status and Prospects
    THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: STATUS AND PROSPECTS The project was implemented with the support of Representative Office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine Kyiv 2021 CONTENTS 3 THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: STATUS AND PROSPECTS 4 1. POTENTIAL OF THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP 7 1.1. The EU and Ukraine’s security policies 8 1.2. Formation and development of EU security formats 19 2. RESULTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP 20 2.1. Ins titutional framework of the Association Agreement implementation 21 2.2. Assessments of the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy 34 2.3. Assessments of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement implementation in the civilian security seсtor 41 3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47 Annex 1. PESCO’s projects 55 Annex 2. Ukraine's cooperations with EU members under CSDP in 2019-2021 58 Annex 3. The Ministry of Internal Affairs cooperation with EU agencies 61 Annex 4. Technical assistance projects (programmes) of EU and Member States implemented in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2019-2021 64 EXPERT ASSESSMENTS AND FORECASTS OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE’S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EU IN THE SECURITY SPHERE The Razumkov Centre would like to express its gratitude to all experts, who took part in the expert survey, for their contribution to one of the project goals, which is to establish and promote a competent dialogue between Europe and Ukraine, as well as between government and civil society at the national, regional and European level.
    [Show full text]