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The Eu-Ukraine Security Partnership: Status and Prospects

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The Eu-Ukraine Security Partnership: Status and Prospects THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: STATUS AND PROSPECTS The project was implemented with the support of Representative Office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine Kyiv 2021 CONTENTS 3 THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: STATUS AND PROSPECTS 4 1. POTENTIAL OF THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP 7 1.1. The EU and Ukraine’s security policies 8 1.2. Formation and development of EU security formats 19 2. RESULTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP 20 2.1. Ins titutional framework of the Association Agreement implementation 21 2.2. Assessments of the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy 34 2.3. Assessments of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement implementation in the civilian security seсtor 41 3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47 Annex 1. PESCO’s projects 55 Annex 2. Ukraine's cooperations with EU members under CSDP in 2019-2021 58 Annex 3. The Ministry of Internal Affairs cooperation with EU agencies 61 Annex 4. Technical assistance projects (programmes) of EU and Member States implemented in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2019-2021 64 EXPERT ASSESSMENTS AND FORECASTS OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE’S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EU IN THE SECURITY SPHERE The Razumkov Centre would like to express its gratitude to all experts, who took part in the expert survey, for their contribution to one of the project goals, which is to establish and promote a competent dialogue between Europe and Ukraine, as well as between government and civil society at the national, regional and European level. The report was prepared by the Razumkov Centre team, including: Project Manager Oleksiy MELNYK, Co-Director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes, Coordinator of International Projects; Mykhailo PASHKOV, Co-Director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes; Leonid POLYAKOV, Visiting Senior Fellow; and Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI, Director of Military Programmes. 2 RAZUMKOV CENTRE THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: STATUS AND PROSPECTS For Ukraine, European integration means a process of convergence with the European community, its principles and values, standards of protection of human rights and freedoms. The state’s course towards Europe is supported by most of Ukrainian society, while implementation of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine looms large in Ukraine’s political agenda. Partnership with Ukraine becomes increasingly important for the EU. According to Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, «the partnership with Ukraine is one of the most strategically important that we have in the world», and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is the most comprehensive among all EU agreements. There is an increasing understanding in the EU that rapprochement with Ukraine must occur not only for the sake of political association and economic integration, which are the main focuses of the Association Agreement, but also for creation of a common security space. Despite having a few serious questions for official Kyiv concerning implementation of some Agreement clauses, the EU understands Ukraine’s difficult situation and given the security interests of the entire European region, intends to continue broad financial, technical and expert support to Ukraine. Periodic assessments of the Association Agreement implementation consistently emphasise the document’s significant potential that is not being fully and effectively realised. European partners call the Ukrainian authorities’ attention to the importance of full implementation of the Agreement and remind about the close link between EU’s assistance and the need for Ukraine to show its commitment to reform and adherence to the Union’s principles. At the same time, they recall the necessity to take due account of the evolutionary changes that have taken place since the signing of the Agreement, to strengthen monitoring mechanisms and to examine the possibility of updating its individual provisions. The goals of this study include independent expert assessment of the situation in the field of Ukraine-EU security partnership in the context of the Association Agreement implementation, identification of success and failure factors, and analysis of how current formats, priorities and mechanisms of cooperation keep with reality and projected changes in the medium term. The analytical report consists of three sections: SECTION ONE reviews the evolution of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the development of the EU-Ukraine security partnership. SECTION TWO considers results of the realisation security commitments by Ukraine within Titles II and III of the Association Agreement. SECTION THREE assesses achieved results and offers conclusions and recommendations on further development of the EU-Ukraine security partnership. Annexes include background information about PESCO projects, Ukraine’s bilateral cooperation with individual EU Member States within the CSDP, cooperation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine with EU agencies and missions, EU and Member States’ programmes and projects in Ukraine in the field of civilian security, as well as results of a survey of Ukrainian and foreign experts on the EU-Ukraine security partnership. RAZUMKOV CENTRE 3 1. POTENTIAL OF THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP Ukraine’s partnership with the European Union in the security sрhere is one of the key principles of Ukraine’s national security. Along with NATO partnership, the country’s partnership with the EU outlines the external s trategic security framework in which Ukraine expeсts to maintain and develop its s tatehood today and es pecially in the future. Current legislation sрecifies that «Ukraine’s integration in the European political, economic, security, legal s pace» meets the 1 fundamental national interes ts . Ukraine rightly expects that cooperation with (2) the occupation of Crimea and Russian the EU and NATO — within partnership today aggression on the territory of the Donetsk and within full membership in the future — will and Luhansk oblasts continue since 2014; make it much easier for the country to confront existing and potential security threats. Current (3) despite the constant tension along the threats to the national security of Ukraine, ways contact line with territories temporality to counter them, as well as necessary measures occupied by the Russian Federation, and resources have been fairly adequately there is a danger of scale-up of Russia’s reflected in the National Security Strategy of «hybrid war» against Ukraine, including Ukraine 2020. Consistent with the provisions of the escalation of armed aggression2. the Strategy, the most relevant issues of national security are as follows: (1) in view of recent years’ events, the 1 Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine «On the National Security of Russian Federation, as expected, has Ukraine». 2 been identified as a «source of long-term Article 39 of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine «Secu rity of an individual — security of the country», approved by systemic threats to the national security of the De cree of the President of Ukraine No. 392 of 14 September Ukraine»; 2020. 4 RAZUMKOV CENTRE POTENTIAL OF THE EU-UKRAINE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP Accordingly, the National Security Strategy party. There already exist several fundamental of Ukraine provides guidance for key areas of factors that comprise a real potential for further countering Russia’s aggressive policy. Article deepening of the security partnership. Such 40 of the Strategy states that priorities for factors include: preventing the escalation of conflict with Russia are «strengthening defence and security (a) proximity of the EU and Ukraine’s interests capabilities, strengthening international support in the security sphere; of Ukraine and effective use of international assistance, as well as maintaining consolidated (b) shared assessments of the security international political, economic and legal threats to Europe and Ukraine’s national pressure on the aggressor»3. security threats; Therefore, the overriding need to «strengthen (c) compatibility of values and readiness to defence and security capabilities» is directly defend them; linked to the need to «strengthen international support of Ukraine and effectively use the (d) gradual building of Ukraine’s capacity to international assistance». Given the country’s become not just a consumer but a real goal to become a member of the EU as en- contributor to European security. shrined in the Constitution of Ukraine, the potential of security partnership with the EU However, one must acknowledge some is viewed as one of the options for attracting substantial differences between Ukraine international support along with cooperation and individual EU Member States in specific with other key partners, namely NATO and security interests and threat assessments. This theUnited States (Box «“Weight” of the particularly concerns the vision of relevance partnership»). of the Russian threat and the perception of Ukraine as a contributor to European security. «WEIGHT» OF THE PARTNERSHIP In general, Ukraine’s partnership with the EU When assessing the «weight» of Ukraine’s partnership with in the security sphere today is not systemic the EU, NATO and the United States in specific security enough, focusing mainly on civilian security and defence areas, the national experts highly appreciated aspects,
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