Policy Making Paper Policies & Institutions: a Matter of Survival for the Sustainable Development Goals (Sdgs) in Africa. Ex

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Policy Making Paper

Policies & Institutions: A Matter of Survival for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Africa. Explaining the Cape Verde Experience

Cristina Duarte 1

Abstract

This paper examines the role of policies and institutions as a survival question for the SDGs in Africa and the need for African policy makers to pay increasing attention to this intangible dimension of the development process. It will argue that policies, institutions and enlightened leadership are a must from an African policy-making standpoint and that effective governance is not an abstract concept. On the contrary, effective governance is grounded in policies and institutions (decisions, processes, systems, methods, techniques, standards) and is critical to the achievement of the SDGs on the continent. As a supporting case, the paper presents Cape Verde as an example of a country where well‐functioning institutions delivered by consistent policies have promoted social and economic development by providing a conducive environment for implementing sustainable development programmes with a clear focus on human capital. The result was a two-thirds decline in extreme poverty between 2001 and 2015. Most of the literature on institutions and development have a handful of examples of how the lack of institutions have prevented development. The Cape Verde story in Africa might be a unique one in the sense that it is just the opposite. It is an example of how policies and institutions have fuelled development in a context of adversity, vulnerability and lack of natural resources.

1. Introduction

The United Nations and the global community in general have taken institutions as crucial to the development effort2. Agenda 2030 strongly recognizes the role played by institutions in promoting sustainable and inclusive development3. SDG 164 is a game-changing feature of the SDGs in as much as it prominently features institutions, both as a cross-cutting issue in many of the goals and as a standalone goal, not as an afterthought or as part of an “enabling environment” for the goals. 5

The place reserved for institutions in the overall SDG framework is linked, among others, to the high level of interdependence among the 17 goals, acknowledging the existence of strong synergies as well

1 Former Minister of Finance and Planning, Cabo Verde, Visiting Research Fellow at WITS University, School of Governance, UN High Level Advisory Board Member to the General Secretary on Economic & Social Affairs, UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration Member, African Leadership Institute Board Member and AU Advisory Reform Committee Member. 2 The paper expands author’s contribution during the 17th UN CEPA (2018) session 3 From the 23 to 27 of April of 2018, in New York, the United Nations Committee of Experts on Public Administration (UN CEPA) hosted its 17th Session. The theme of this session was “Readying institutions and policies for implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. 4 SDG 16 “Promote Peace, Security and Strong Institutions”. 5 World Public Sector Report 2018, “Working Together: Integration, Institutions and the Sustainable Development Goals”, pag. 5, United Nations, New York 2018. 1

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as trade-offs. Only consistent and persistent capacity building can make institutions work for the implementation of the SDGs. The message is clear. It is about time, even a must, for African policy makers to pay a considerable amount of attention to these intangible assets (institutions) in the development process.

Along these lines, a research project6 at the WITS School of Governance titled “Institutions, Policies and Development: The Case of Cape Verde”, intends to present the experience of a country where the last 40 years are living proof of how institutions can impact the development process. Cape Verde is a clear example of where development has been possible despite its high vulnerability and lack of natural resources. At the time of its independence in 1975, Cape Verde’s per capita GDP was around US$ 190. In 2008, Cape Verde graduated to a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of US$3,6927.

The graduation from a Least Developed Country to a Middle-Income Country has been essentially a policy driven process in which enlightened leadership, effective governance and strong attention to institutional capacity building have played a central role (see Box 1). It is an example of a country where the leadership understood, from as early as 1975, that to overcome adversity and vulnerability priority had to be given to the intangible dimension (institutions) in the effort to ensure social development. Essentially, “institutional infrastructure” was placed at a higher level of strategic importance than “physical infrastructure”.

Before proceeding any further, let us quickly analyze the concept of “institution” so that we build a common ground around this paper. Johnstone 8 presents the term institution as “… an organization- based network of rules, laws, norms, administrative systems and social functions”9. According to him, “Institution thus means something more than just “an organization” or even “a public organization”, even though institutions are organization-based”. He argues that “… the most important characteristic of an institution is its strong and evident culture. An organization therefore becomes merely an institution when it has developed a set of values that hold it together, and whose strategic vision is guided by such culture.”10 So, institution and organization are different concepts, even though they are often used interchangeably.

The remainder of this paper is presented in five sections. The second section presents the role of public policies and institutions in promoting inclusive and sustainable development. Section 3 covers the role of leadership in promoting policy driven sustainable development. Section 4 presents the challenge of effective governance with a focus on Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Evaluation Systems (PPBES), a cluster approach and results based management; while Section 5 looks at the challenge of policy-making efficiency, including information systems and big data. Section 6 presents the conclusions.

6 The research project submitted by the author of this paper as a Visiting Research Fellow at School of Governance at WITS University, Johannesburg, South Africa 7 International Monetary Fund 8 “On Developing Institutions in Africa”, Johnstone, A. in “Institution Building and Leadership in Africa”, Edited by Wohlgemuth L., Carlsson J., Kifle H., NAI, 1998. 9 Ibid, pag. 45. 10 Ibid, pag. 6. 2

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2. The Role of Public Policies and Institutions in Promoting Inclusive and Sustainable Development.

“The conventional African story of the last 15 to 20 years has been a very optimistic one as a result of high economic growth, despite the slowdown in the international economy since the global financial crisis. However, the “African Rising Narrative”11 is mostly a story of economic growth based on gross domestic product (GDP), which is overly one-dimensional. It is clear from development experience that high economic growth is not enough to end the vicious cycle of poverty or to ensure inclusive prosperity. Continuous emphasis on the same one-dimensional framework will prevent Africa from tackling its developmental challenges and seizing emerging opportunities. 12

Since the early post-independence period of the 1960s, African countries have faced a paradox: Africa is a resource-rich continent and yet it is unable to provide for its own people. According to UN projections13, by 2050 a quarter of the world`s population will be African and by the end of the century half of the young people on the planet will live in Africa. This demographic dividend could, potentially, place Africa at the center of the global economy. Where the strategic use of African natural resources is concerned: “a third of the mineral wealth of the planet, nearly two thirds of its remaining arable land, a fifth of the global land mass and about 15% of its forests could be the engine of a new growth path”. 14

Africa is a rich continent that is deeply trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. Despite the encouraging results during the first 15 to 20 years of this century, Africa´s total GDP accounts for only 3% of the global GDP despite the fact that the continent represents about 17 % of the World’s population. The 37 ADF15 countries, excluding Nigeria, account for less than 1% of global GDP. Even in a high economic growth scenario (around 6-7%), the number of people in absolute poverty in Africa will only slightly decrease from 417 million in 2015 to 406 million by 2030 16.

Something is wrong. What is missing? Or better, what have we, Africans, been missing?

African policy-making needs a reboot. Since the 1970s, right after the “death” of the independence vision, policy-making in Africa has equated the business of managing poverty with development. In a paper about Domestic Resource Mobilization, Duarte and Adesida argued that: “It is now time to end equating the business of managing poverty to development. Africa must now shift its focus to retaining and creating wealth, better managing its own resources and fostering inclusiveness. This is a significant challenge. How can the continent undertake this switch? African policy makers over the years have become comfortable with managing poverty with the support of their development partners. The result is that the focus on poverty management has not left space for public policy to focus on growing and retaining Africa’s wealth. The continent will achieve a sustainable “Africa Rising

11 “Africa Rising”, denomination adopted by international media regarding the period of Africa’s robust growth from 2000 -2015. 12 “Making the African Development Bank the Engine for Africa’s Transformation”, Cristina Duarte, March 2015. 13 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. New York: United Nations. 14 Africa Rising? Whose Africa?, Naidoo J., Nordic Africa Institute, November 2013. 15 African Development Fund. 16 “Future Development Finance Requirements for Countries of the Africa Region”, Cheetham R.J., 2017. 3

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Narrative” only by focusing relentlessly on socioeconomic transformation and by breaking the “business as usual” cycle in terms of public policies in Africa, particularly those related to development financing”. 17

In this respect, the role of public policies and institutions in promoting socioeconomic transformation towards a sustainable and inclusive development is a particular concern. Without putting in place the right policies and institutions, a number of obstacles will not be overcome. Among these are the challenge of: (i) sustainable infrastructure (a binding constraint to Africa’s competitiveness), (ii) demographic transition, now that the population of Africa has surpassed 1 billion people, (iii) building high-productive labor-intensive African economies; and iv) investing in skills and human development to be able to absorb the growing labor force. Let us take road construction as an example. If we build a road but do not create the institutional and policy framework (this does not mean only public organizations) to own and manage the road, Africa will not get there. That same road will be built 100 times making the infrastructure process in Africa just a huge market opportunity for big construction companies and related financial institutions, while impacting negatively on the quality of public debt that is sustaining such investments. “The reality is that institutions, …. continue to be critical constraints for Africa’s transformation, with deep implications for governance, competitiveness and control of value chains, natural resource management and infrastructure management”18.

“Africa is at the cross-roads. The waning of the Africa rising scenario seems to be prompting a new sense of soul-searching about the future of the continent. The rapid growth of the first 15 years of the 21St century led to renewed optimism about future prospects. Growth was high and the continent was hailed as a last frontier, overflowing with opportunitiey. Despite the exuberance, the quality of the growth was doubtful. Today, it is hard to point to many African countries that have successfully transformed their economies and that are on the path of sustained growth and development.”19

What have we Africans been missing?

It is imperative to provide policy-making with an institutional dimension in order to ensure that economic growth delivers development. It is time for African policy makers to focus on the intangible assets of development, despite the fact that from an electoral standpoint these intangible outcomes are not duly processed as political achievements in young African democracies.

It seems that we have reached a point where African policy makers have no alternative but to give institutional capacity building its rightful place in policy-making in Africa. Average economic growth still lags behind that required to achieve the SDGs. Between 2014 and 2016 growth slowed, declining from 3.7% in 2014 to about 3.5% in 2015 and then to 1.5% in 2016. In 2017, growth increased slightly to 3.6% before falling back to 3.5% in 2018 (below the projected 4.1 percent). Projected growth for 2019 and 2020 is around 4%.20 However, it might signal an inflexion (albeit insufficient) in the trend. This level of growth is far below the 7% rate needed to limit the number of people in absolute poverty to around 400 million by 203021. The youth population in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase

17 “Domestic Resource Mobilization: The Two-Sided Approach”, Duarte, C. & Adesida, O., 2017. 18 “Making the African Development Bank the Engine for Africa’s Transformation”, Cristina Duarte, March 2015. 19 “Exploring the Future of ADF”, Duarte, C. & Adesida, O. 2018. 20 African Economic Outlook 2018, African Development Bank Group 21 “Future Development Finance Requirements for Countries of the Africa Region”, Cheetham R.J., 2017. 4

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by 60 percent while for Africa as a whole the growth is projected to be 42 percent between 2015 and 2030 (UN, 2013)22. “With the lower economic growth rates of recent years, the expected demographic boom could turn to a burst, as African countries will not be able to create jobs at a faster rate than the number of entrants into the labor force, while the rate of urbanization continues unabated. The consequences will be far more severe than today’s problems and they will not be contained within the African continent. In short, the effects, no matter what they are, will be felt around the world.”23

African policy makers have no alternative: In the next 15 years, economic growth has to deliver sustainable and inclusive development. For this to occur, it is mandatory to promote a skilled and assertive civil society able to put in place its own institutions in partnership with citizen-centered and outward-looking state institutions. A socially responsible private sector must also become part of the solution and should be incorporated as one of the pillars of the national institutional capacity building programs. A sustainable and inclusive development process requires participation as the most effective mechanism to deliver checks and balances. For that, “formal” democracy is a pre-condition but not a sufficient one. Another important requirement are skilled and assertive civil societies. However, building skilled and assertive societies demands time that is longer than electoral cycles. By their intrinsic nature these are medium to long-term dynamics where education for all is the main “take off” component.

SDG 16, “Peace, Security and Strong Institutions” is crucial for all countries but it is especially so for African countries for reasons well known to all. SDG 16 is a goal that should be smartly managed by African policy makers from an international cooperation standpoint. In fact, the debate around development assistance and development theory during the 90’s should be recalled now that African countries are aligning national strategies with SGDs. In 1998, Johnston, noted: “In development assistance and development theory, the term institution has to a large extent come to be synonymous with state organization or state agency. This simplification (and creeping nationalization) of the term is unfortunate. Through terminological misuse one begins to ignore important aspects of the process of institution building: the necessary dimensions of culture and of legality and the need for non-state institutions to evolve. The risk arises that aid agencies, under the title institution building, go about building up new public sector organizations with very little foundation in society, rather than supporting the development of institutions in the real sense”24. Learning from past experience in the field of international cooperation, SDG 16 for Africa cannot be a justification for intensifying traditional international technical assistance. The solution to the institutional challenge in Africa requires a deeper understanding of the leadership necessary to deliver as per Agenda 2063.

As Wohlgemuth, Carlsson and Kifle acknowledged at the end of 1990s, “The failure of institutions in Africa, encompassing those of the state and civil society, has been an important theme in much of the debate on African Development in recent years. In a fundamental sense, the crisis of African development can be said to be a crisis of its institutions. It needs to be recalled, in this connection, however, that most African countries inherited a model of a strong and centralized state that was essentially created to fulfil two functions: upholding law and order, and collecting taxes. The

22 UN (2013). 23 “Exploring the Future of ADF”, Duarte, C. & Adesida, O., 2017. 24 “On Developing Institutions in Africa”, Johnston, A. in “Institution Building and Leadership in Africa”, Edited by Wohlgemuth L., Carlsson J., Kifle H., pag. 47, Nordic Africa Institute, 1998 5

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experience of a large number of countries has shown the inadequacy of this model from both political and economic perspectives. It has proved incapable of providing political stability and protecting the welfare of citizens, and it has also failed to promote economic development and growth. Clearly, African countries will need to develop and nurture - as some have already started to do - new institutions of government. They will also need to create the necessary space for the evolution and development of the institutions of civil society as these are essential for both social and economic development”25. Approaching the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, and despite the positive results achieved in the last 15 to 20 years in terms of political and social stability, democratic regimes and good governance, the challenge remains, in substance, the same: the reconfiguration of African States beyond imported western democracies, so that Africa can play its legitimate global role.

It is becoming increasingly clear that sustainable and inclusive development is essentially policy- institution driven. And as already mentioned, the past 40 years of the Cape Verde development process is an archetype of that (Box1).

25“Institution Building and Leadership in Africa”, Edited by Wohlgemuth L., Carlsson J., Kifle H., pag. 7, NAI, 1998. 6

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Box 1: Policies, Institutions and Development: The Case of Cape Verde26 Cape Verde is a highly vulnerable country, particularly from an ecological and agricultural standpoint. It has a limited natural resource endowment, low rainfall and high risk of erosion and accelerated desertification. Only 10% of the land is suitable for agriculture and it produces only about 20% of food needs. In addition, it is highly dependent on AID flows, around 75% of the public investment program, and on emigrant remittances, which represent on average over 10% of GDP. Being an archipelago, Cape Verde faces geographic discontinuity, making the development of an internal market difficult, and requiring the multiplication of infrastructures with high costs of transportation. Additionally, as a microstate, Cape Verde lacks economies of scale. Cape Verde faces a unique set of development constraints. Against these odds, Cape Verde is an example where development was possible without traditional natural resources and commodities, and where “institutional infrastructure” was treated on an equal footing with “physical infrastructure”. Despite its high vulnerability, Cape Verde has built a nation based on: • Focused investment in human capital, with emphasis on education and health, • Effective governance and sound economic management, • Efficient use of AID flows, • An essentially corruption free society, • High level of remittances by its Diaspora. • Democratic governance, with a strong press, an active civil society, multi-party system, free elections and respect for the rule of law, Cape Verde’s experience is an example where: 1) The quality and consistency of public policies were a decisive factor for inclusive and sustainable development, despite the very low starting point in 1975. 2) The building of institutional capacity is one of the most pertinent indicators in assessing the quality of long-term public policies and their capacity to produce sustainability, thus defying traditional indicators of more “economicist” nature. 3) Policy making must necessarily result in the building of institutions focused on development (“developmental institutions”) and consequently on citizens as a prerequisite for structural transformation. 4) The role of leadership in the structuring of consistent and coherent public policies and in the building of institutions as a prerequisite to the exercise of ownership over systems, processes. Particularly the management of natural resources, which is a crucial factor for development. 5) 45 years investing in human capital (education and health) has delivered an assertive civil society not only ready to partner with citizen-centered public institutions but also conscience of the strategic importance of strong domestic institutions in exercising ownership for development.

At independence, in 1975, the main challenge was to build Cape Verdean society’s confidence in the state-building process, its institutions and leadership, as well as in the future. The history of Cape Verde cannot be told without reference to major famines caused by severe droughts. According to Patterson (1988), the worst killed about 40% of the population in the 1860s. The last famines occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, causing the death of about 15% and 18% of the population respectively.27 Confidence was low for centuries. To rebuild it, education, health and fighting poverty have been the primary tool (Table 1). In 1975, Cape Verde embarked on an agenda of democratization of education and learning. To achieve the results shown on Table 1, 22% of the budget, approximately 5% of GDP (see Chart 1), was invested in education in the first 40 years, towards universal access to primary school education, secondary-level schooling and vocational training, which were above the levels of peer countries (Chart 1).28

26 Author’s Research Project at Wits University, School of Governance, South Africa 27 Government of Cape Verde, 1981 28 The Cape Verde Systematic Country Diagnostic features a systematic benchmarking exercise using a pre-identified list of structural and aspirational peer countries.(SCD, WB, 2018, Appendix A) 7

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Table 1: Cape Verde’s Socio Indicators

1975 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 Cape Verde % Population in Poverty (1) > 70 h) 50 39 26,6 b) 21,0 25 d) % Population in Extreme Poverty > 30 h) n/a 20,50 n/a 12 d) n/a Literacy Rate 15-24 years (%) < 60 h) 88,2 88 94 95,0 98,1 Literacy Rate > 15 yrs (%) 36 a) 62,8 75 81 c) 85,3 e) 86,7 Life Expectancy at Birth (Years) 57,8 64,8 69,7 70.45 71,9 72,6 Mortality Rate, < 5yrs (per 1,000 live 115,4 62,7 35,5 26,3 25,1 19,7 birth) Literacy rate > 15 yrs (%) 43,41 Low Income Countries f) 46,37 50,67 53,26 54,76 59,75 Low Middle Income Countries 49,85 57,8 66,68 69,41 72,71 75,84 Middle Income Countries 60,75 70,86 79,31 81,38 83,59 85,35 48,73 Sub Saharan Countries g) 52,03 56,01 58,65 59,36 63,83 Source: World Bank, Unesco, Unicef, Education Statistics-Knoema.com (assessed 9/2/19), Indexmundi.com (assessed 9/2/19), nationencyclopedia.com (assessed 9/2/19) a) 1970, b) 2007, c) 2004, d) 2011, e) 2012, f) 1980, g) 1984, h) author's estimates (1) > $US 1.25

Adult literacy rates increased from 62.8% in 1990 to 88.47 % in 2015 growing at an average annual rate of 12.58%. Despite a lower starting point in 1975, n 1990, it was already much above the Low Income Countries’ rate of 46.37%. As regards poverty the results are similar (Table 1). Based on the monetary-poverty indicator of the World Bank (below US$1.25/day) the percentage of the population living in poverty decreased from 50% in 1990 to 21% in 2010. The increase in 2015 to 25% reflects the negative impact of the international crisis.

Chart 1: Government Expenditure on Education (% of GDP)

Source: SCD, WB, 201829

29 “Systematic Country Diagnostic”, World Bank, 2018. 8

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In the most recent Systematic Country Diagnosis (2018), the World Bank acknowledges the development achievements of Cape Verde in a very clear way: Cape Verde’s “… gross national income (GNI) per capita has grown six-fold from around US$500 in 1986 to more than US$ 3,000 in 2008 (Chart 2b). In 2007 it advanced to lower- middle-income status, becoming the only non-extractive economy in sub-Saharan Africa to do so in such a relatively short time. This fast economic growth has translated into substantial welfare improvements for its population. Using a national poverty benchmark of PPP US$5.60 per day, the incidence of poverty fell from 58 percent in 2001 … to 35 percent in 2015, while extreme poverty, using the national food poverty line of PPP US$2.90 per day, dropped by two-thirds to 10 percent during this period (Chart 2a). Inequality fell, and the consumption-based Gini index dropped from 53 to 42. Human capital achievements have been equally impressive. At 73, life expectancy is the second highest in Africa after Mauritius. In the global gender gap index, Cape Verde ranks among the world’s best in terms of health and survival and school enrolment. It is among the 30 best performing countries in terms of achievement of the Millennium Development Goals”30,31.

30 Ibid. 31 Charts 2a, 2b, 3 and 4, have been taken from Sistematic Country Diagnostic, World Bank, 2018. 9

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The explanation for Cape Verde’s growth (see Chart 4) achievements comes from several factors: (i) strong investment in education and health (non-monetary poverty) on a consistent basis since independence (Chart 3); (ii) the process of opening up the economy that began in the late 1980s; (iii) market reforms and privatizations in the 1990s; and iv) fundamental institutional reforms that were implemented in the first decade of the 21st century. These reforms include the state reform agenda, focus on maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment, promoting transparency and accountability, consolidating international credibility, promoting an assertive civil society and a favourable business environment. In fact, a study32 commissioned by the African Development Bank pointed out four major reasons for Cape Verde's success since independence in 1975. These are consistent investment in human capital; effective governance and sound economic management; political and social stability, and efficient aid and remittance management. And according to theWorld Bank33, Cape Verde’s impressive achievements were grounded in political stability, sound economic policies, and strong institutions that maintained the rule of law, underpinned its open democracy, and kept corruption under control.

In 2010, Donald Kaberuka, the President of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) made the following statement: “Never has a country in the continent taken up the many challenges facing Cape Verde. Natural resource- poor, with an arid Sahelian climate and little arable land, the country is poised to achieve most of the Millennium Development Goals'”.34 As a result of its sound economic and social performance, Cape Verde has gained the status of a Middle-Income Country (MIC). In doing so, it has overcome severe geographic, economic, and social challenges to become an African success story. In spite of its difficult beginnings, Cape Verde now ranks fifth in terms of the UNDP Human Development index (HDI) in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has been labeled a “fast achiever” of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in which it outperformed much of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Universal access to primary and secondary education has been achieved, a strong social safety net has been set up, and the benefits of growth have been distributed through an inclusive approach to policy- making and nation-building.35

In the past decade, African benchmarking of good governance has risen, signaling the emergence of a trend where leadership is becoming conscious of the need to exercise ownership. As well as “the importance of domestic resource mobilization, as a key element in addressing the challenge of financing development. This is, essentially, the mobilization of Africa’s own resources to finance Africa’s development. Domestic resources mobilization must entail much-improved management of natural resources, enhanced capacity to capture and manage fiscal resources, and better deployment and management of financial resources’’. 36.

32 African Development Bank (2012). Cape Verde: A Success Story. Tunis, Tunisia. 33 World Bank (2018), “Systematic Country Diagnostic – The Republic of Cabo Verde, Adjusting the Development Model to Revive Growth and Strengthen Social Inclusion”. 34African Development Bank (2012). Cape Verde: A Success Story. Tunis, Tunisia,, pag. 2 35 Ibid,, pag. ix 36 “Mobilizing Domestic Resources for Africa’s Transformation”, Remarks by H.E. Cristina Duarte, Minister of Finance and Planning, Cabo Verde At the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 13 – 16 July 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

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3. The Role of Leadership in Promoting Policy-Institution Driven Sustainable Development: Credibility vs Organic Legitimacy.

Secondly, this paper stresses the crucial role of leadership in promoting policy and institution-driven sustainable development.

Africa’s challenge of development finance, particularly the challenge of domestic resource mobilization as opposed to illicit flows, is, again, a good example of how “good” leadership has become an indispensable ingredient of structural transformation in Africa.

The best way to approach this highly debated but not well-understood subject, is to take Williams’ straightforward view of what leadership is. “Leadership … is very much about doing what is right for the situation and the people involved in it. Underlying such flexibility and differentiation of response, however, must be a consistency of values and ground rules, if the leader’s professional credibility is to remain the crucial source of influence".37 In other words, if a leader wants to effectively lead under democratic rules, his/her credibility remains a crucial source of authority.

Such a definition suggests credibility as an important aspect of leadership. In fact, Williams adds, “credibility, in turn, in the role of a leader, goes beyond professional consistency and competence. Increasingly, in today’s world, personal integrity, too, is coming to be regarded as a critical factor, as the triple bottom line of profitability, concern for the environment and, thirdly, social responsibility, becomes an established business imperative.”38

It is through credibility that leadership acquires the legitimacy it needs to mobilize civil society for the development process, making trustworthiness an indispensable element. It is time for African political leadership to understand that the vote is not a permanent source of legitimacy. The vote provides simply what we can call “electoral” legitimacy based on the legal framework. It does not provide “organic” legitimacy. Organic legitimacy, once in power, needs to be built by doing what is right “for the situation and the people involved in it” based on “consistency of values and ground rules”39. Professor John Adair (cited by Williams, 2005) phrased this same idea in a very simple way, “Our position of a manager is confirmed by the organization, but the role as a leader is ratified in the hearts and minds of those whom we lead.” 40This brings us to how strict and narrow imported political democracy models are, where civil society participation has been reduced to the vote, so providing only “electoral” legitimacy. As Dutra (2014) noted, there is an increasing “occasional and incidental citizenship, restricted to the act of voting and that the elected, instead of representing, replacing the voter.”41

To build organic legitimacy, the economic dimension of democracy needs to be redeemed. Without the economic dimension of democracy, the system fails to provide organic legitimacy to elected leadership. And this is not only a feature of the younger democracies in Africa nut also a characteristic

37 “Leadership for Leaders”, Michael Williams, Thorogood, London. pag. 1, 2005. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid 41 Dutra, O.O. Hope for Democracy– 25 Years of Participatory Budgeting Worldwide. Ed. by Dias, N. et al., Portugal: Loco Association, April 2014: p.10. 11

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of the most mature western democracies that have been increasingly unable to combine political freedom with civil society economic empowerment based on fair and transparent income distribution mechanisms. In fact, one of the most “disturbing” outcomes of the post 2008-international crisis is the erosion of European families’ disposable incomes combined with a higher concentration of wealth. It is difficult, not to say impossible, to gain credibility within a narrow political democracy context without delivering “endogenous” economic democracy. To bridge the gap between the need to build credibility and legitimacy and the lack of economic democracy is a highly profitable area of business and has led to the emergence of political marketing. In the case of the SDGs, the nexus “economic democracy-credibility-leadership-legitimacy” is crucial to get on board all the SDG stakeholders. In fact, SDG 17: “Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development” involves the entire society and their institutions, making policy and institutional integration an enormous challenge.

At this stage comes the role that a national and shared strategic vision should play to bridge leadership and policy driven sustainable development. The link between leadership and policy driven sustainable development is through a long- term vision. The exercise of leadership requires a shared and long- term vision that provides the “tuning fork” to anchor all stakeholders as well as the platform needed to achieve policy and institutional coherence, two key factors for policy-driven sustainable development. On the other hand, without credible and legitimate leadership there can be no long- term vision.

After 5 years of intense debate on development finance (Addis Ababa Declaration), leadership associated with a shared vision can today be considered to be the most significant “ingredient” in Africa’s economic development, particularly as regards domestic resource mobilization. As such, African policy makers should understand that development cannot be outsourced and must act accordingly. African leadership must lead effectively and in order to do so, African leaders must exercise ownership to set up the necessary and indispensable institutions and policies for domestic resource mobilization. Domestic resource mobilization is a challenge that requires strong institutions, accountability and transparency all delivered by strong leadership. The building of a vision requires well-conceived and structured Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Evaluation Systems (PPBES). Ad-hoc planning-budgeting exercises do not support the emergence of leadership and visions. (Cristina Duarte, 2017)

The exercise of leadership must permeate all Public Administration, civil society organizations and the private sector, and it is a plural exercise. The equation “1 leader+ 1 organization = delivery” has never been appropriate, particularly for a hierarchical organization, where each leader along the chain is supposed to be empowered as per her/his function and duties. Therefore, centralization and leadership exclude each other. A good leader incubates leaders. And SGD implementation needs myriad leaders.

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4. The Challenge of Effective Governance: Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Evaluation Systems, Cluster Approach and Results Based Management

"In probabilistic terms, planning can succeed less than 100%, but in the absence of it, the probability of failure approaches dangerously close to that limit" (Accarini, J.H).

As previously analyzed, leadership needs credibility to feed legitimacy. But from an effective governance standpoint, leadership also needs systems, processes, procedures, so institutions (public, private, and civil society) that can function consistently on a permanent basis. As such, leadership cannot be exercised in an “empty framework”. Leadership should be aware that effective governance is grounded rather in policies and institutions. It requires a properly structured public intervention system based on a logical chain that promotes stakeholder participation along the planning – budgeting value chain: vision, policies, programs, subprograms, projects and activities. Like a maestro and his orchestra, they must follow, in a very integrated and coherent manner, the same music sheet.

A Planning–Programming-Budgeting-Evaluation System (PPBES) derives its crucial role from the fact that, once in place, it determines the country’s development path, through resource mobilization and resource allocation, in terms of amount (quantitative side, e.g. expansionist budget) and in terms of how to do it (qualitative side, e.g. freezing current expenditure versus expansionist public investment programs). They decide on proper education, adequate health, the crowding in or crowding out of the private sector, more or less public debt, proper institutional capacity building, more or less energy, etc. At the end of the day, they decide the entire life of a nation. At this stage, it is clear that leadership, in order to deliver effective governance, must be “operated” through concrete PPBES (systems, processes, procedures,...)

In some African countries with a certain degree of “dysfunctionality” where the democratic change of power carries institutional instability, it is advisable to make it a rule of the system, not an option and not changeable every time a government comes into power. In such circumstances, it is advisable for the PPBES to be approved by the parliament, and in very specific situations in great detail. This is particularly the case at the beginning of the reform implementation process until it permeates the DNA of the Public Administration, which thus becomes an institution of the democratic system. It must have checks and balances where data is captured and used for the noble purpose of development, feeding both dimensions of democracy, the political and the economic.

The implementation of SDG targets 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7 and the 16.842 requires the setting up of strong PPBE Systems. These systems can help ensure the transversal and cross-cutting nature of SGD 16. However, its transversal and cross cutting nature can only be leveraged if: i) information is gathered, processed, classified, organized, analyzed, and distributed to facilitate policy integration and policy coherence; and ii) access to such information becomes an institution where all the stakeholders are duly trained and empowered to understand their social and moral responsibilities of being part of such systems. However, this cannot be a “facebook approach”.

42 16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime. 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms. 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels. 16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance

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PPBE Systems were first developed to serve private organizations in the early 60’s, when the seaarch for profitability was paramount and id not leave room for “waiting until tomorrow” thinking. In 1969, Don Vito described a PPBS as follows: “ … a management tool to provide a better analytical basis for decision making and for putting decisions into operation. A PPBS is constituted, basically, of five elements: (1) a program structure — a classification of the courses of action open to an organization for attaining its objectives; (2) an approved program document that includes precise, quantitative data on needs, resource inputs, and program outputs extending a number of years into the future; (3) a decision-making process that establishes the functions, rules, and timetables for the actions required by the PPBS; (4) an analysis process for measuring effectiveness and for weighing up alternatives; and (5) an information system that supplies the data required to implement the system.”43

After almost 50 years, the USA, most European countries and some Asian Countries have adopted such an approach in the public governance field in an irreversible way. In fact, for these countries PPBE Systems have become an indispensable system for driving strategic planning, program development and resource allocation that require a regulated environment and a commitment to accountability and transparency. In the case of Africa, the ultimate challenge in terms of effective governance is ensuring consistency between policy objectives and fiscal and public investment policies. In much simpler words, it is about ensuring consistency between decisions and resource allocation. As everybody is aware, there has been very little linkage between resource allocation in the budgeting process and policy objectives as they are laid down in government programs and national plans. As a by-product once PPBE systems are in place, they positively pressure organizations to undertake reforms towards new institutions (in the sense presented above). And if well conducted, they might give birth, in the medium to long-term, and to forge a new organizational culture through an intense and consistent “re-engineering” process (procedures and processes) for delivering efficiency. In this context, PPBE Systems can support the emergence of a new governance model associated with a new management culture focused on “developmental” results.

PPBE Systems can be optimized if combined with a cluster-based approach44 as well as with a results- based management approach, both very well known.

PPBE Systems and a Cluster Based Approach. In the public policy-making field, a common denominator needs to be clearly identified in order to structure a cluster. The cluster’s framework constitutes an aggregation factor of public and private entities carrying a competitive and/or a comparative advantage through which complementary interests associated with different stakeholders (public and private), can be aggregated. A cluster links activities and integrates processes in order to explore synergies, creating a fertile ground not only for permanent innovation but also for promoting competitiveness.

As Theus and Zeng (2012) argued, a “cluster-based approach helps to identify policy and institutional impediments to competitiveness and innovation. Through dialogues at the cluster level, new partnerships can be forged between cluster leaders and various public organizations (such as those

43 “The Essentials of a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System”, DonVito P.A., 1969, Rand Corporation 44 Porters’ s concept of cluster: “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, services providers, firms in related industries, training institutions and support organizations linked around technologies or end product within a local area or region”44, has evolved and has been utilized by different knowledge fields, including the planning-programming-budgeting-evaluation field 14

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working on industrial development, infrastructure development, research, innovation, and training) to formulate and expedite policy reforms. Given that developing countries have very limited financial resources, selectivity and efficacy are important guiding principles of competitiveness strategies. Focusing on a cluster approach mirrors these principles, helps in scaling up to the industry level, and fosters regional innovation systems. A government may choose to pursue cluster initiatives along with simultaneous policy reforms, because the two approaches may create positive externalities and help government develop a compelling case for policy reform.”45

It is advisable to adopt a cluster-based approach at the first stage of a new planning-programming- budgeting cycle, for instance when establishing or updating the analysis of constraints to economic growth and the associated strategic vision. By doing so, policy makers create the necessary conditions to ensure that all stakeholders linked to a “cluster- aggregation factor” will be duly involved not only in the constraint analysis of economic growth but also in the policy making process, creating ground for participatory budgeting.

The identification of a common denominator/aggregation factor for stakeholders with complementary interests from different sectors plays a crucial role in creating participatory dynamics that have a major significance for policy coherence. This constitutes a pre-condition to well calibrated and efficient public investment programs. Otherwise, the opportunity cost associated with these same investment programs might be huge. The efficiency of public investment programs, particularly infrastructure development, and related public debt is today’s hot item on the African policy-making agenda. Three questions have surfaced in the debate: i) the “physical” infrastructure selection process in a “planning–absent” environment that makes the overall process a fertile ground for vested interests and consequently creating unbalanced-infrastructure situations (at a national and local level): over-infrastructured sectors (e.g. urban highways) versus low-infrastructured sectors (e.g. rural energy or farm-to-market roads); ii) the public investment financing process and domestic resource mobilization versus international capital markets as the main factor of public debt and consequently to macroeconomic (un)sustainability; and iii) the relatively low level of public investment resources dedicated to institutional capacity building. A cluster approach does not survive under these conditions, meaning unbalanced infrastructure investment policies from a physical and financial standpoint.

In the 2011 planning exercise in Cape Verde, the integration of the long-term planning-programming process, the strategic vision, with the medium to short term programming-planning-budgeting process was done by crossing the long-term vision based on a Cluster Approach with a Programming- budgeting structure46 (Box 2). And since the adopted Cluster Approach aggregated different stakeholders from public and private entities, such “crossing” brought to the “table” civil society and the private sector, making the PPBE System a powerful tool in building participatory, transparent and accountable decision making processes.

45 Agricultural Clusters, Theus F. and Zeng D., 2012, World Bank 46 National Planning System Law approved by Parliament 15

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BOX 2: Cabo Verde’s Strategic Cluster Approach, the “Sea Cluster”

In the 2011 planning exercise in Cape Verde, the medium/long term development strategy was structured in clusters: Sea, Aero-business, ICT, Tourism, Renewable Energy, Financial Services, Agri-business, and Creative Industries. All clusters shared, as their backbone, Cape Verde’s geostrategic position in the center of the Atlantic Ocean. In the case of the Sea Cluster, the aggregation factor was the extensive Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) which is 200 times bigger than the land component of the territory. In this case, the EEZ was the aggregation factor/common denominator which generates competitive and comparative advantages. During the 2011 planning-programming exercise, the “sea cluster” functioned as a platform involving all stakeholders in policy making and consequently contributing to policy coherence. The following hubs within the sea cluster have been identified by the stakeholders: • Fisheries: shipyards, sea food processing & packaging, support services • Transport: trans-shipment, ship registry, shipyard • Tourism: cruise ships [stopovers], duty free shopping, ocean sports, fishing, boating, etc • Security: regional security architecture and infrastructure • Economic Infrastructure: ports, roads, cooling systems, freezing plants • Knowledge Base: meteorology, marine life, sea Farming, energy, Key Strategic Questions discussed by all stakeholders of the “Sea Cluster”: • How do we meet the massive gaps in financing? • How do we entice partners: • Shipping lines to shift their operations to the city of Mindelo, • Cruise ships to add Cape Verde to their route, • Research centers to partner with University of Cabo Verde or set up centers in Cape Verde? • How do we build capacity – both human and institutional for the Sea Cluster? • How do we nurture local Cape Verdean firms to participate in the sector? • How do we build the Cape Verdean brand, that is beyond tourism, to attract firms? • How do we ensure coordination of national efforts that are strategic in orientation? As a result, stakeholders decided to create a “Sea Cluster Network” in order to: • Coordinate the actions among all stakeholders and implementation of the strategy (policy integration and coherence) • Facilitate the resolution of problems/constraints, especially for investors • Monitor progress & undertake reporting

PPBE System, Result Based Management and Democracy Consolidation. Government delivery has become the critical issue in Africa’s policy-making field particularly with an increasing and assertive middle class. The adoption of democratic regimes by most African countries, the huge deficit in social and basic public goods, the emergence of a middle class with increasing demands, the high proportion of youth unemployment, the rise in consumption expectations, the imperative of building a diversified production base, as well as the need to mobilize African private investment, all make government effectiveness in Africa the most important issue from both the Africa 2063 Agenda and the SDGs standpoint. If we add financial constraints to the implementation challenge, the efficacy of governance delivery is necessarily linked to the quality of the way in which taxes are spent. And the middle class is increasingly aware of these issues, namely the importance to paying attention to budget resource allocation, thus making this awareness a great contributor to the consolidation of political democracy in Africa.

The Results Based Management (RBM) approach, duly anchored by a PPBE System, as an integrated and unified information system platform where the public sector as well as civil society organizations are linked and connected, is one of the solutions to the challenge of defining and implementing the highest-priority objectives with the greatest impact. For this reason, it provides the basis for a higher

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quality decision-making process and for policy and institutional coherence both of which are anchored in an efficient mechanism of resource allocation (planning- programming – budgeting as one integrated exercise).

The traditional budgeting systems are “silo-based” approaches, not linked to national planning exercises and consequently simply “number crunching” exercises. In these cases, the financial, economic and social opportunity costs are huge. To overcome the inefficiencies of the traditional budgeting exercises, many African countries have been trying to apply the concept of “Result Based Management” by incorporating Monitoring & Evaluation procedures into budgeting systems, which pushed for the adoption of “Programming-Budgeting” processes to undermine the “silo-based” approach. This is one of the best paths to policy integration. The adoption of the “Programming – Budgeting” concept has been instrumental in the integration of the planning exercises with the budgeting processes. As a result of this integration, planning is slowly leaving behind the “shopping- list approach” and by being combined with the budgeting exercise, it takes financial constraints and fiscal space availability as the two major parts of the equation.

With respect to planning as a crucial institution for “endogenous and owned” development, Cape Verde is again a good example. As the title says, the UNECA study 47 “Cape Verde: Four Decades of Development Planning” analyses Cape Verde’s planning experience since independence in 1975. The study “identifies three key epochs for planning: (i) Planning under a state-led economy - the first epoch 1975 to 1990; (ii) Planning in a market led economy - the second epoch 1991 to 2000; and (iii) Planning for Transformation - the third epoch 2001 until the present. The study examines the three periods, identifies key challenges and distills some key lessons from the Cape Verdean experience. The case study shows that economic development planning in post-colonial African countries can work, especially with an enabling socio-political environment. In all three phases, planning in Cape Verde has broadly delivered a shared vision and entailed mobilizing resources (ODA, FDI, and remittances) to finance growth and development. With the decline in aid and remittances, planning in Cape Verde today faces new challenges. In all three phases, planning was guided by a desire to devote maximum investment resources to human and infrastructure development, and to do so in an institutional context that minimized waste and diversion.”48

The program of a duly elected Government is a contract with civil society. Contracts are supposed to be honored or in other words, governments’ delivery, particularly in democratic African regimes, has become an inescapable issue. In this context, this paper argues that RBM combined with PPBE Systems are essential mechanisms for consolidating democracy in as much as they allow a shift from targeting inputs to targeting outcomes for citizens, which, at the end of the day, are the final source of credibility and consequently political legitimacy. It is therefore important to be able to measure not only the inputs but also the outcomes and for some, the measuring is not simple or obvious. African society is moving beyond basic needs claims, which means beyond short-term measurable claims, resilience being one of them. For instance, measuring the effects of climate change or youth behavior towards entrepreneurship have become standard government goals, particularly after the institutionalization of the SDGs.

47 “Cape Verde: Four Decades of Development Planning”, Adesida O., 2014, UNECA 48 Ibid, page 5 17

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One practical attempt in addressing government pressure to deliver results in public services while ensuring that citizens’ taxes are spent wisely and effectively, has been the implementation of “Deliverology” (Box 3), the “science” of delivering results, created by Michael Barber 49, during Tony Blair’s second term as Prime Minister. As Barber argued during the Harvard Health Ministerial Leadership Program (2014), the adoption of “Deliverology” based on a centralized Delivery Unit (Prime Minister’s Office) faces an institutionalization challenge, raising consequently a sustainability issue under this approach. Such a challenge can be overcome by combining “Deliverology” with strong and well-structured PPBE Systems, allowing public administration and civil society to be connected to the delivery unit, thus making “Deliverology” a “permanent feature of a government’s culture”50.

BOX 3: The Emergence of “Deliverology”51

1) One starting point of this movement took place in the UK at the turn of the Millennium. In Tony Blair’s second term as Prime Minister, he prioritized 20 public service targets. They covered a range of outcomes – literacy for 11-year-olds, reduced road traffic congestion, and lower street crime rates, for example – that captured citizens’ expectations of what effective government should accomplish for them. He established a new entity, the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU), headed by Sir Michael Barber, which reported directly to him and was responsible for ensuring the delivery of these targets.

The PMDU was used to create routines and problem-solving techniques that would help the administration deliver on its campaign promise to increase the effectiveness of public services. Within four years, the unit had helped the government to achieve over 80% of the aforementioned targets and had made significant progress on the others. This attracted attention and interest in the work of the delivery unit, especially after a book detailing the original experience was published. Without realizing it at the time, Sir Michael and his team had discovered a transferable methodology for achieving real impact in government. They had invented a missing discipline: ‘deliverology’, the science of delivering results, which has since spread to other countries and international institutions.

In 2010, for example, deliverology spread to the field of education with the creation of the U.S. Education Delivery Institute (EDI), which helped educational leaders (often at the state level, as in Alabama, Michigan, New York and Texas, to name a few) implement their priority strategies for reaching ambitious student outcome goals.

Source: Centre for Public Impact, “Deliverology – The Science of Delivering Results”, Breifing Bulletin, April 6, 2016 and (Mckay, S., Carnegie Foundation, March 2, 2017)

5. The Challenge of Policy-Making Efficiency: Information Systems, Big Data and Data- Driven Development.

Effective governance requires policy-making efficiency. And policy-making efficiency requires data. This nexus has become unavoidable under the SDGs.

As the Rt. Hon. Tony Benn52 rightly states, “information is the one natural resource that is growing at an exponential rate when every other natural resource is decreasing: fossil fuels, coal

49 “Deliverology – A Field Guide for Educational Leaders”, Michael Barber, 2010 50 Ibid 51 “Deliverology – The Science of Delivering Results”, Briefing Bulletin, Centre for Public Impact, 2016 (assessed September 2018) 52 Rt. Hon. Tony Benn, former UK Technology Minister, at The UKOLUG Annual Lecture at Online Information 94 18

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and oil. Information is growing and what has happened, is happening and will happen will completely transform the world and the lives of everyone who lives in it.”

The world has become highly complex. On a daily basis, we have millions of people producing tons of information in public administration, civil society and the private sector at an incredibly fast pace. This is “energy” that cannot be ignored and wasted: on the contrary, it should be captured, processed and distributed.

In the 21st century, societies have become essentially “information societies” in the sense that on a daily basis, billions of bytes are produced by a multitude of sources, private and public, and captured by a multitude of platforms, most of them independent and not linked. This reality has been challenging the “organization-based” concept of information systems and calls for the adoption of new systems where: i) the waste of information within these old management systems is addressed; ii) the challenge to create systems that capture the billions of bytes of information for the “good” in order to serve the SDGs, where environment, economic and social issues are the pillars; iii) the narrow “organization-based” approach is challenged giving space to new information systems that are configured to serve institutional building (private, public and civil society), as a crucial dimension of development.

In the past 10 years, traditional information systems have been challenged by the Big Data concept. The evolution of the Big Data concept reflects the dynamic pace of the information world, where yesterday is quite remote. Big Data has become an important piece of society’s digital transformation. According to SAS Institute Inc.,53 “the importance of big data doesn’t revolve around how much data you have, but what you do with it …”54. In the context of this paper, how can policy-making efficiency be addressed by bringing in Big Data, which is, already, becoming a cutting-edge in the business world? Can Big Data reset Policy Making in Africa towards higher efficiency with a particular focus on the main functions of the state?55 In a recent report about this subject56, where the World Bank recognizes data as the fuel of the future, it notes that “in the first generations of “e-government,” much of the emphasis was on channels—using web browsers, and more recently, mobile devices, to access government information and services and to perform transactions. In this period, data was often seen as just the payload of the transaction— information supplied by the citizen or the business to support the request for service and the information supplied by the government in return. However as “e- government” has evolved into “digital government,” data is seen increasingly as a strategic asset with value lasting beyond a particular transaction and able to strategically transform the efficiency and effectiveness of government.”57

One can legitimately ask what data has to do with leadership and consequently policy-making ownership? It is as simple as that, Africa’s leapfrog requires an increasing control of the value chains originated in the continent. And without controlling and mastering data such strategic goals will not

53 According to SAS Institute Inc., “The concept gained momentum in the early 2000s when industry analyst Doug Laney articulated the now-mainstream definition of big data as the three Vs: i) Volume, the amount of data that’s being created and stored on a global level is almost inconceivable, and it just keeps growing; ii) Velocity, data streams in at an unprecedented speed and must be dealt with in a timely manner; and iii) Variety, data comes in all types of formats”, website (assessed September 2018) 54 Ibid 55 Main functions of the State: environment, education, health, regulation, justice, security 56 “Information and Communications for Development – Data-Driven Development”, World Bank, 2018 57 Ibid, pag. 5 19

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be attained. Economic leadership within the value chains will continue to be exercised by non-African multinationals. Policy making should be aware of that.

One of the most recent issues in policy-making, for instance, is how to address the measurement of qualitative policy targets, which have been gaining momentum on the effective governance scorecard. The existing governance monitoring systems are designed to measure traditional outcomes but not prepared to measure, for example, the entrepreneurship of the youth population, something that, nowadays, every government promises to deliver. Can Big Data play a role in this matter?

The idea here is a quite straightforward one, to highlight the increasing availability of data and the challenge this poses to African policy-makers without the necessary instruments to collect, analyze and convert to inputs for decision making. The new generation of policy makers in Africa will have to tap into new and “exotic” sources of data to be able to structure Africa’s need to leapfrog.

6. Summary

It is becoming increasingly accepted that policies and institutions are a survival question for the SDGs in Africa. There is also, from African policy makers a clear sense that the time is now. The following issues need to be emphasized:

• Africa is a rich continent that is deeply trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. Policy-making in Africa has been equating the business of managing poverty to development. Today, it is hard to point to African countries that have successfully transformed their economies and that are on the path of sustained growth and development. The imperative remains to provide policy-making with an institutional dimension to make economic growth deliver development. It is time for African policy makers to be attentive to the intangible assets of development. • In this context, African policy-making needs a reboot where leadership has a role to play in promoting policy-institution driven sustainable development. Africa’s challenge of development finance, particularly the challenge of illicit flows, is a good example of how “effective leadership” has become an indispensable ingredient of structural transformation in Africa. Where the link between leadership, exercised on a consistent and permanent basis, and policy-driven sustainable development is through a nationally shared long-term vision. • Leadership cannot be exercised in an “empty framework”. In addition to credibility and legitimacy as “leadership ingredients”, the delivery of leadership requires systems, processes, procedures, and thus requires institutions (public, private, and civil society). A properly structured public intervention system based on a logical chain that articulates vision, policies, programs, subprograms, projects and activities, through well-structured PPBE systems can be a game changer. • Effective Governance has become the critical issue in Africa’s policy-making field, particularly with an increasing and assertive middle class with rising consumption expectations. The adoption of democratic regimes by most African countries, the huge deficit in social and basic public goods, the high levels of youth unemployment, the need to build a diversified production base, and the need to mobilize African private investment make governance effectiveness in Africa an issue that can no longer be avoided.

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• Looking for pragmatic solutions to address this challenge, this paper promotes the idea of adopting a cluster-based approach within a PPBE system as an efficiency enhancer of the overall process, particularly if associated with the concept of Results Based Management. Such governance approach might contribute to democracy consolidation because it enables a shift from targeting inputs to targeting outcomes for citizens, which at the end of the day are the final source of political legitimacy. • African policy making efficiency faces a challenge but also a great opportunity. Societies have become essentially “information societies”. The increasing availability of data and the challenge this poses to policy makers without the necessary instruments to collect, analyze and convert to inputs for decision-making is one of the central questions for the future. Can Big Data play a role in addressing policy-making efficiency with a focus on the main functions of the State: environment, education, health, regulation, justice, and security?

As Andrews et. al. (2017) noted “One of the great paradoxes of contemporary development is that this wondrous project—to bring a measure of prosperity and peace to the whole world—has both succeeded spectacularly and failed miserably. It has succeeded spectacularly because, by many measures, the world has never been in better shape. Despite what one might infer from the daily headlines, on average we live longer, have higher incomes, are better educated, enjoy more political freedoms, and are physically safer than at any point in human history. Most developing countries have met most of the Millennium Development Goals—the eight targets set by the community of nations in 2000—on schedule (i.e. by 2015), a good many even earlier. Large-scale famines, pestilence, and plagues, long the scourge of human existence, have mostly been consigned to the history books. Even wars are smaller scale, resulting in vastly fewer deaths than those of the first half of the twentieth century (and before). But we have also failed miserably, because we have done the easy part, and because the key to taking the next vital steps—building institutions able to implement increasingly complex and contentious tasks, under pressure and at scale—is not only not improving but in most developing countries steadily declining”. 58

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