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Logistics in the Falklands War Kenneth L Naval War College Review Volume 69 Article 21 Number 2 Spring 2016 Logistics in the Falklands War Kenneth L. Privratsky Cynthia K. Sexton Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Privratsky, Kenneth L. and Sexton, Cynthia K. (2016) "Logistics in the Falklands War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 69 : No. 2 , Article 21. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/21 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 146 NAVAL WAR COLLEGEPrivratsky REVIEW and Sexton: Logistics in the Falklands War one-hundred-year life cycle for global others, Liu continually repeats the theme hegemons, Liu names the champi- that “the first nonhegemonic champion ons: Portugal in the sixteenth century, nation in history will appear, and that Holland in the seventeenth century, nation is China�” However, he also refers Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth on multiple occasions to China as king, centuries, and America in the twentieth and the difference between kingly think- century� Maybe China had a fleeting ing and hegemonic thinking is ironically world championship title in the fifteenth opaque� Liu refers to the United States century—not through colonial conquest, as “one country, two systems,” mean- but through tributary recognition of the ing democracy at home and hegemony center of world power� Liu’s argument is abroad� Since Liu prefers to see China that China is back—to claim the cham- exercise democracy abroad and hege- pion’s title in the twenty-first century� mony at home, we could also refer to The rest of the book elaborates how China as “one country, two systems,” but China can become the world champion with practices inverted from those of the by drawing on lessons from former United States of his characterization� and current champions, especially the For those who like the sporting anal- United States� For instance, Liu notes ogy, the book is an entertaining read that American strategy included an and an enticement to place one’s bets internal strengthening phase of isola- on the grand sporting event of world tionism under President Washington, a politics� On a more sober note, Liu’s century of regional consolidation under world view rings more true to current the Monroe Doctrine, and world power Chinese policies than to those of five generation under FDR’s globalism� He years ago� President Xi Jinping gave his also likes America’s “cheap rise”: in “China Dream” speech in November other words, coming late to both world 2012, apparently somewhat influenced wars, but concluding those wars with by Liu Mingfu’s book of the same title the victor’s share of the spoils� Compar- published two years earlier� Thus, the re- ing China to America, Liu notes that cent translation is food for thought that China underwent domestic consolida- should be chewed on by a wider Western tion under Mao and Deng, and has audience now that it is available� its eye on being king of Asia, with the GRANT RHODE ultimate goal of being king of the world� The first champion’s goal, toward achievement of which China is well on the way, is to become the wealthiest nation—because all world champions Logistics in the Falklands War, by Kenneth L� have been the wealthiest nation� All Privratsky� Barnsley, U�K�: Pen & Sword, 2015� world champions have also been the 248 pages� $34�95� strongest military power—hence the Major General Kenneth Privratsky, focus on martial spirit� In terms of strat- USA (Ret�), highlights the importance egy, Liu prefers Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, of the integration of combat operations pointing out that China will seek to win and logistics in this book about the without fighting� In what may seem like Falklands War of 1982� Logistics in the a non sequitur to Americans and many Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016 1 NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 146 3/8/16 10:29 AM Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 21 BOOK REVIEWS 147 Falklands War is the result of years of Privratsky argues convincingly that research, begun when Privratsky was logistics was the center of gravity of the at the Army’s Command and General campaign� The movement of ammuni- Staff College in the mid-1980s and tion, supplies, and equipment—whether continued while a fellow at Stanford’s by shallow water–capable ships, helicop- Hoover Institution� Most of all, the ters, or backpacks—dictated the pace of author wants the reader to “appreci- the ground war� The author’s thorough ate the extent of the efforts behind the research, including interviews, leads victory” rather than simply present to a comprehensive description of the a logistical view of lessons learned� combat operations and movement of The book begins by examining British supplies and equipment from the am- and Argentine claims on the Falkland phibious landing zone on the west shore Islands before walking through the of East Falkland on D-Day, 21 May 1982, sequence of Argentina’s invasion threat to the surrender on 14 June 1982, at Port and subsequent invasion; Britain’s mobi- Stanley, the capital on the east shore of lization and deployment; combat opera- East Falkland� The British, with their tions; and the aftermath of the conflict� firm resolve and their jointly trained and He highlights the key role of industry professional military forces, tirelessly got during the rapid mobilization� Com- the right supplies to the right place� His mercial ships were quickly modified for vivid description of the harsh conditions the war� For example, the cruise ship on the Falkland Islands reinforces the Uganda was converted to a hospital ship importance of the integration of combat in only sixty-five hours once it reached operations and logistics� Nevertheless, the shipyard� This included modifying although that integration was successful, its interior spaces for a clinic, surgical “[b]y the time the Argentines surren- facilities, and labs; installing a helicop- dered in Stanley, some [British] artillery ter deck; adding equipment to produce batteries were on their last rounds�” fresh water; and applying Red Cross In many ways, Britain embarked on a markings� In total, fifty-four ships were “come as you are, bring what you can” taken up from trade, outnumbering the affair to reclaim the Falkland Islands number of warships involved� Privratsky from Argentina� The remote islands’ aptly describes the outload as rushed formidable terrain and inhospitable and gives readers a sense of being on climate—along with the hostile Argen- the docks during the unchoreographed tine military forces—exacerbated the flurry of activity� Many converted com- difficulty of moving supplies and equip- mercial ships were designed only for ment, which directly impeded combat pier-side off-loading; however, once in operations� As Privratsky writes, “Wars theater, supplies and equipment had sometimes occur at times and in places to be transferred to vessels capable of least expected�” And a lack of bullets, shallow-water operations� Off-loading beans, and fuel can cause unplanned difficulties and concerns over Argentine pauses to a campaign plan or, worse air strikes sent Queen Elizabeth 2 home yet, leave troops alone and exposed� with “seventy percent of 5 Brigade’s 81 Privratsky firmly believes that effective mm mortar and 105 mm gun am- combat operations are enabled by inte- munition � � � buried in lower decks�” grating combat and logistics units and https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/21 2 NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 147 3/8/16 10:29 AM 148 NAVAL WAR COLLEGEPrivratsky REVIEW and Sexton: Logistics in the Falklands War conducting realistic training� Privratsky’s of relations between Korea and Ja- insights could also apply to humanitar- pan� Economic issues, including trade ian affairs operations, especially if a disputes, predominate in this section, natural disaster has destroyed piers or and set the stage for a review of the war off-loading equipment, or occurred in a itself, which is the subject of the next remote location without prepositioned part of the book, simply entitled “War�” stores� Military operational planners and The nine chapters that compose the sec- military history enthusiasts should add tion on the Imjin War present the reader this book to their professional library� with a wealth of information previously CYNTHIA K� SEXTON unavailable to an English-language audience� These chapters rely almost exclusively on either primary-source material in Japanese and Korean or sec- ondary sources from scholars in Korea, The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Re- Japan, and China who have provided lations, Violence, and Memory, ed� James B� Lewis� their own accounts and interpretations London: Routledge, 2015� 418 pages� $178� of this conflict� Each of the belligerents The Japanese invasion of Korea, known gets a thorough review, covering politi- in the West as the Imjin War, has been cal, military, cultural, and social forces largely overlooked by Western schol- that shaped the six-year-long tragedy ars� While Stephen Hawley’s The Imjin that has come to be known as the Imjin War and Kenneth Swopes’s A Dragon’s War� From a military perspective, read- Head and a Serpent’s Tail are excel- ers will find plenty of groundbreaking lent
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