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General Assembly Distr.: General 24 July 2013
United Nations A/AC.109/2013/SR.8 General Assembly Distr.: General 24 July 2013 Original: English Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples Summary record of the 8th meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 20 June 2013, at 10 a.m. Chair: Mr. Morejón ................................................... (Ecuador) later: Mr. León González (Vice-Chair)..................................(Cuba) Contents Adoption of the agenda Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Hearing of petitioners This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent as soon as possible to the Chief of the Documents Control Unit ([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org/). 13-36953 (E) *1336953* A/AC.109/2013/SR.8 The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m. right to determine their own future, in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, article 1 Adoption of the agenda of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 1 of the International Covenant on 1. The agenda was adopted. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 5. Following the referendum, all the elected (A/AC.109/2013/14; A/AC.109/2013/L.7) members of the Legislative Assembly of the Falkland Islands had travelled extensively throughout Latin 2. -
Imperial Nostalgia: Victorian Values, History and Teenage Fiction in Britain
RONALD PAUL Imperial Nostalgia: Victorian Values, History and Teenage Fiction in Britain In his pamphlet, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, on the seizure of French government power in 1851 by Napoleon’s grandson, Louis, Karl Marx makes the following famous comment about the way in which political leaders often dress up their own ideological motives and actions in the guise of the past in order to give them greater historical legitimacy: The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, bat- tle-cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.1 One historically contentious term that has been recycled in recent years in the public debate in Britain is that of “Victorian values”. For most of the 20th century, the word “Victorian” was associated with negative connotations of hypercritical morality, brutal industrial exploitation and colonial oppression. However, it was Mrs Thatcher who first gave the word a more positive political spin in the 1980s with her unabashed celebration of Victorian laissez-faire capitalism and patriotic fervour. This piece of historical obfuscation was aimed at disguising the grim reality of her neoliberal policies of economic privatisation, anti-trade union legislation, cut backs in the so-called “Nanny” Welfare State and the gunboat diplomacy of the Falklands War. -
The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict by Jorge O
Lessons from Failure: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict by Jorge O. Laucirica The dispute between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands1 led to the only major war between two Western countries since World War II. It is an interesting case for the study of preventive diplomacy and conflict management, as it involves a cross-section of international relations. The conflict involved (a) a major power, Great Britain; (b) an active U.S. role, first as a mediator and then as an ally to one of the parties; (c) a subcontinental power, albeit a “minor” player in a broader context, Argentina; (d) a global intergovernmental organization, the United Nations; and (e) a regional intergovernmental organization, the Organization of American States (OAS). The Falklands/Malvinas territory encompasses two large islands, East and West Falkland—or Soledad and Gran Malvina, according to the Argentine denomination— as well as some 200 smaller islands, all of them scattered in a 7,500-mile area situated about 500 miles northeast of Cape Horn and 300 miles east of the Argentine coast- line. The population of the Falklands is 2,221, according to the territorial census of 1996.2 Argentina formally brought the dispute over sovereignty to the attention of the UN, in the context of decolonization, in 1965. A process including resolutions, griev- ances, and bilateral negotiations carried on for seventeen years, culminating in the 1982 South Atlantic war. Eighteen years after the confrontation, and despite the lat- est changes in the status quo (commercial flights between the islands and Argentina were reestablished in 1999), the conflict remains open, with Argentina still clinging to its claims of sovereignty over Malvinas and the South Georgia, South Orcadas, South Shetland, and South Sandwich Islands, all of them located in the South Atlan- tic and administered by the United Kingdom. -
Sir Michael Quinlan on RAF Policy 1962-65
ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 24 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. Copyright 2001: Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 2001 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361-4231 Typeset by Creative Associates 115 Magdalen Road Oxford OX4 1RS Printed by Professional Book Supplies Ltd 8 Station Yard Steventon Nr Abingdon OX13 6RX 3 CONTENTS ‘THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN TRANSITION, 1962- 5 1965’: Address by Sir Michael Quinlan at the AGM held on 28th June 2000. BOSNIA 1992-1995 – A CASE STUDY IN THE 12 DENIAL OF THE ADVANTAGE CONFERRED BY AIR SUPERIORITY. A winning British Two Air Forces Award paper by Sqn Ldr S Harpum RAF. THE INFLUENCE OF SPACE POWER ON HISTORY 21 (1944-1998). A winning American Two Air Forces Award paper by Capt John Shaw USAF. THE DE HAVILLAND VENOM WITH No 8 SQN IN 36 THE MIDDLE EAST by Air Vice-Marshal L W Phipps. SQN LDR G D GRAHAM DSO MBE by Frank Card. 46 THE RAF HERALDRY TRUST. 56 SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE 60 FOURTEENTH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE CLUB ON 28 JUNE 2000. FEEDBACK 64 BOOK REVIEWS. -
In Answer to Carlos F. Brescacin and His Historical Untruths: a Demonstration That Argentina Has No Claim to the Falkland Islands
In answer to Carlos F. Brescacin and his Historical unTruths: a Demonstration that Argentina has no claim to the Falkland Islands. By Roger Lorton In 2008 Peter Pepper and Dr. Graham Pascoe published a paper refuting Argentina's version of Falkland's history as it had been laid laid out at a seminar at the London School of Economics in 2007. Their paper was entitled Getting it Right: the real history of the Falklands/Malvinas. Five years later, and in a supposed reply to Pascoe & Pepper, Carlos F. Brescacin has published an imitation of the 2008 paper called; The historical truth about the sovereign rights of Argentina in the Falkland Islands: Answering the document 'Getting it Right: the real history of the Falklands / Malvinas.'1 Pascoe & Pepper's paper was an early step in the development of their argument countering the version of history promoted by Argentina in many countries of the world. A propaganda exercise that continues today. Pascoe & Pepper drew the world's attention to a different version of the history surrounding the Falkland Islands however; a history that could be proved from archived sources. Moreover, they put forward an argument that disturbed the accepted thinking in Argentina itself. Quite an achievement and an obvious target for ardent Malvinistas. The 2008 work looks a little dated now, as further research has expanded some of their arguments and cast doubt upon other supposed facts accepted at that time. It is not therefore my intention to directly compare the two texts, but rather to address Brescacin's points and identify the flaws in what he believes to be his counter- arguments. -
Numismática De Las Islas Malvinas Argentinas
Numismática de las Islas Malvinas Argentinas | | Presidente Martín Redrado Vicepresidente Miguel Ángel Pesce Superintendente de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias Waldo José María Farías Vicesuperintendente de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias Zenón Alberto Biagosch Directores Zenón Alberto Biagosch Arnaldo Máximo Bocco Gabriela Ciganotto Waldo José María Farías Arturo O’Connell Carlos Antonio Pérez Carlos Domingo Sánchez Síndico Titular Hugo Raúl Medina Síndico Adjunto Jorge Alfonso Donadio Gerente General Hernán Lacunza | Agradecemos al Archivo y Museo Históricos del Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, “Dr. Arturo Jauretche”, por la colaboración de las imágenes de los vales mo- netarios del gobernador Luis Vernet. Investigación presentada en las XXVIII Jornadas Nacionales de Numismática y Medallística, realizadas en la ciudad de Córdoba, los días 16 y 17 de agosto de 2008. Trabajo efectuado por el Museo Histórico y Numismático del Banco Central de- pendiente del Subgerente General de Servicios Centrales, Dr. Norberto Rubén Domínguez. Supervisión de la edición | Alicia B. Osorio Investigación y redacción | Ramiro I. Frutos y Daniel A. Rey Diseño Gráfico | Área de Imagen y Diseño, Gerencia Principal de Comunicaciones y Relaciones Institucionales Impresión | Sector Impresiones, Subgerencia de Gestión de Documentación y Suministros, Gerencia de Servicios Generales © Copyright 2008. Banco Central de la República Argentina. | Dedicamos el presente trabajo a todos los argentinos que desde 1833 reclamaron los derechos de soberanía argentinos sobre las Islas Malvi- nas, a todos los que combatieron heroicamente por su recuperación en 1982 y a todos los que esperamos que se cumplan los justos anhelos de integración de estas islas al territorio argentino. Anverso y reverso de la moneda conmemorativa por los 25 años de la Gesta de las Islas Malvinas. -
Falkland Islands War: Diplomatic Failure in April 1982
The Falkland Islands War: Diplomatic Failure in April 1982 By Joseph Mauro Wake Forest University The fate of over 1,000 souls was decided in April 1982. On April 2, Argentine Special Forces invaded and occupied the British Falkland Islands. For the next month, Britain and Argentina tried to resolve the conflict diplomatically. United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig served as mediator, shuttling multiple times between London and Buenos Aires. Haig and his team tried to develop a document to which both the Argentine military junta, led by President Leopoldo Galtieri, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher could agree. However, despite long hours in negotiations and a genuine desire of both sides to avoid war, agreement was never reached. The British counterattacked on May 1, and the fighting that resulted saw 1,054 soldiers and seamen die.1 Diplomacy in the Falkland Islands failed for a number of reasons. First, the negotiations were flawed, both in Haig’s uneasy position as mediator and the junta’s unreliable decision- making process. In addition, each side misunderstood the other. The Argentines never believed the British would counterattack and the British struggled to believe that Argentina wanted a peaceful solution. The possibility of oil under the islands also may have played a role. However, the most important impediment to diplomatic success was the fact that neither side was able to compromise enough to prevent war. The main reasons for this inflexibility were two-fold: both leaders needed to appear strong to remain in power, and the political climate at the time, especially in terms of diplomatic principles relating to the Cold War, prevented the British from yielding to the minimum Argentine demands. -
War and Media: Constancy and Convulsion
Volume 87 Number 860 December 2005 War and media: Constancy and convulsion Arnaud Mercier* Arnaud Mercier is professor at the university Paul Verlaine, Metz (France) and director of the Laboratory “Communication and Politics” at the French National Center for Scientifi c Research (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifi que, CNRS). Abstract To consider the relationship between war and the media is to look at the way in which the media are involved in conflict, either as targets (war on the media) or as an auxiliary (war thanks to the media). On the basis of this distinction, four major developments may be cited that today combine to make war above all a media spectacle: photography, which opened the door to manipulation through stage-management; live technologies, which raise the question of journalists’ critical distance vis-à-vis the material they broadcast and which can facilitate the process of using them; pressure on the media and media globalization, which have led to a change in the way the political and military authorities go about making propaganda; and, finally, the fact that censorship has increasingly come into disrepute, which has prompted the authorities to think of novel ways of controlling journalists. : : : : : : : The military has long integrated into its operational planning the principles of the information society and of a world wrapped into a tight network of infor- mation media. Controlling the way war is represented has acquired the same strategic importance as the ability to disrupt the enemies’ communications.1 The “rescue” of Private Jessica Lynch, which was filmed by the US Army on 1 April 2003, is a textbook example, even if the lies surrounding Private Lynch’s * This contribution is an adapted version of the article “Guerre et médias: permanences et mutations”, Raisons politiques, N° 13, février 2004, pp. -
Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War
Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War Ken Kotani Introduction This paper focuses on the Thatcher administration’s foreign diplomacy and conduct of war during the Falklands War. Full-fledged research on the history of this war has been facilitated by the publication of a detailed official history of the Falklands War by Professor Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London, along with the release of previously closed documents and other material by the British National Archives in December 2012.1 Leaving the details of the Falklands War to Freedman’s official history, this paper shall examine the Thatcher administration’s conduct of war, specifically: (1) the extent to which the Thatcher administration was aware of the situation before the war; and (2) the Thatcher administration’s foreign diplomacy and conduct of war. 1. Did Prime Minister Thatcher have a grasp of the situation? When unraveling the history of the Falklands War, the issues which always become the focus of debate are whether Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was adequately aware of the situation regarding the Falklands before the war, and if so, the degree to which she did and the reasons why she did not take earlier action. The Thatcher administration’s handling of the Falklands issue is often compared with the policy of deterrence adopted by James Callaghan’s Labour Party administration in 1977. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Cabinet Office estimated in October 1977 that Argentine forces were plotting a landing on the South Sandwich Islands, which was British territory. Prime Minister Callaghan accordingly made the risky decision to prepare for any contingency by sending a British fleet to stand by in the vicinity of the Falklands.2 Compared to the action taken by the Callaghan administration, the Thatcher administration’s actions in 1982 seem to lack a sense of urgency. -
False Falklands History at the United Nations How Argentina Misled the UN in 1964
False Falklands History at the United Nations How Argentina misled the UN in 1964 – and still does © 2010 by Graham Pascoe and Peter Pepper ince the 1960s Falkland Islanders have faced efforts by speech would be hard to beat for sheer concentrated SArgentina to promote its claim to the Falkland Islands – inaccuracy. Among many others, he made the following efforts which led to armed invasion by Argentina in 1982. untrue assertions, some repeatedly – the number in brackets at The current “wave” of intense Argentine pressure began with right indicates how many times he stated each one: the foundation of an official pressure group inside the 1. That Spain made an express reservation of its sovereignty Argentine Congress, “Observatorio Parlamentario – Cuestión in the treaty of 22 January 1771 which ended the crisis Malvinas”, in June 2006. That was three years before the caused by Spain’s peacetime attack on Port Egmont in resumption of oil drilling around the Falklands in 2009, and 1770; (5) long before Argentina repudiated the 1995 Oil Agreement with Britain in March 2007 – the current Argentine activity is 2. That Argentina put a governor in the Falklands in 1823; not a response to Falklands oil exploration. In 2007 the (1) “Observatorio” distributed grossly erroneous historical 3. That Britain expelled the Argentine population in 1833; pamphlets on the Falklands to Argentine schools, containing (5) much of the false history that Argentina had used in 1964 to mislead the United Nations. 4. That the Argentine inhabitants resisted the “invaders”; (2) 5. That Britain replaced the Argentine inhabitants with British subjects; (2) 6. -
Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative
AUSTRALIA JOANNE NICHOLSON, PETER DORTMANS, MARIGOLD BLACK, MARTA KEPE, SARAH GRAND CLEMENT, ERIK SILFVERSTEN, JAMES BLACK, THEODORA OGDEN, LIVIA DEWAELE, PAU ALONSO GARCIA-BODE Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative Study An Examination of Overseas Planning The research described in this RAND Australia report was prepared for Australian Department of Defence and was conducted within RAND Australia under Contract SON2901652. About RAND Australia RAND Australia’s mission is to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. To learn more about RAND Australia, visit www.rand.org/australia Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Australia R® is a registered trademark. For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA1179-1 Preface The Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) has established a small Directorate within Force Design Division in response to significant changes in Australia’s strategic outlook, to ensure a contemporary mobilisation planning framework across Defence. This mobilisation planning process will be conducted over two and a half years and will include several research activities. In June 2020, RAND Australia was engaged by the Australian Department of Defence to undertake a series of material studies and analysis activities. RAND Australia was asked to undertake a comparative study of mobilisation planning in selected countries to discern principles for mobilisation planning. For this a comprehensive international literature review was undertaken spanning the United States, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Singapore. To present the results so that they could be readily compared against each other, a research framework was constructed comprising examination of four areas: Planning Model, Activation, Attributes and Principles, and Forecast Trends. -
Corned Beef Raid on Embassy British Patriotism and the Falkland Conflict
Corned Beef Raid on Embassy British Patriotism and the Falkland Conflict By Adam Haney In 1982, Great Britain went to war over possession of the Falkland Islands. The islands themselves do not appear to be much to fight over. The Falklands, specifically speaking, are the two larger islands immediately off of the eastern coast of Argentina, near the Straits of Magellan. The Falklands War encompassed not only these two islands but the islands as far south and east as the South Sandwich Islands. It is from the two main islands of the group that the name of the conflict originates. Physically, the islands are not much to look at. Ronald Reagan described them as "That little ice-cold bunch of land down there."< 1> They have also been called "An island thrown aside from human use."< 2> Clearly, these islands are not exactly the stuff that legends are made over. However, the Falkland Islands have had a place in the joint history of Britain and Argentina since 1690, when a British ship sighted the islands and gave them the name of the Treasurer of the Royal Navy, Viscount Falkland.< 3> At the time of their discovery, the islands were unsettled. There are no people who can claim them as their homeland.< 4> The islands lay to the west of the Papal line of Demarcation, a line that was drawn to divide the so-called New World between the then powers of the sea, Spain and Portugal. The Pope gave everything to the west of the line to Spain, this included all of South America except for Brazil; everything to the east belonged to Portugal.