COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ALONG the BELT and ROAD: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ALONG THE BELT AND ROAD: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan

SUMMARY REPORT The Asia Foundation is a nonprofit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia. Informed by six decades of experience and deep local expertise, our work across the region addresses five overarching goals—strengthen governance, empower women, expand economic opportunity, increase environmental resilience, and promote international cooperation.

For more information on our work visit www.asiafoundation.org.

This report was funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and implemented by The Asia Foundation. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Government.

Cover image: Sihanoukville City, Cambodia by slyellow / Shutterstock.com Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

Introduction In the context of a rising Asia, South-South Cooperation (SSC) is now a critical modality for achieving the SDGs. As much of Asia has achieved middle-income status, OECD-DAC donors are reducing their Official Development Assistance (ODA) while channeling more of their assistance through aid-for- trade or foreign policy-oriented modalities. As western/northern donors step back, China is filling the gap and quickly becoming one of the most important development actors in the region.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), deemed by one analyst to be the most important diplomatic initiative of the 21st century,1 is not only reshaping the geopolitical realities of contemporary development cooperation, but is also having an immediate impact on communities, environments, and local governments across South and Southeast Asia. The BRI is an economic and infrastructure corridor designed and launched by China in 2013 to promote development, trade and connectivity, and to at least partially fill the infrastructure gap in Asia (estimated by ADB in 2017 to be $459 billion/year2). As of 2018, there were over 72 states participating in the BRI initiative,3 and most of the projects underway were massive infrastructure projects such as the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $1.1 billion port project in Sri Lanka, and an industrial park in Cambodia, among others. Given the enormity of the scale of the BRI undertaking, there has been considerable analysis and research into its approaches and the impact of its infrastructure projects. However, most of this research is macro-level work that has been conducted by investment firms4, multilateral banks,5 or policy think-tanks for foreign policy purposes.6 There is a gap in research at the community level, with almost no research that we are aware of providing a first-hand assessment from those communities most impacted by BRI projects.

This is a significant gap, not only from an end-user development perspective, but also because preliminary evidence indicates a prevailing pattern across BRI investments of a lack of stakeholder consultation.7 Experience tells us that the success of large infrastructure development projects requires stakeholder accountability and engagement, particularly with local communities8. This is a pressing issue for the Chinese government, enterprises, and policy specialists, all of whom wish to see Chinese investments achieve higher levels of sustainability and acceptability in partner countries. Chinese enterprises, while accustomed to implementing infrastructure projects, are not familiar with direct community engagement.9 Infrastructure project implementation in China involves close coordination between enterprises and local government bodies, but not local communities. As such, understanding the demands and needs of local communities and navigating the community engagement process in partner countries is unfamiliar territory for Chinese enterprises. Partner governments also contribute to poor community accountability, often negotiating loans and projects without local stakeholder consultation.

1 Parag Khanna, 2018. The Future is Asian. New York; Simon & Schuster. 2 https://www.adb.org/publications/closing-financing-gap-asian-infrastructure 3 https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance- landscape.pdf 4 https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html 5 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative 6 https://www.merics.org/en/merics_tracker 7 This conclusion is indicated in the research summarized by this report, as well as separate Asia Foundation- commissioned studies on BRI in Nepal and Cambodia. It is also indicated in numerous journalistic and policy reports, such as the Asia Society’s ‘Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative,’ 2018, or CSIS’ ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Problems and Prospects.’ 8 See for example: The, 2019. Published by AECOM 9 “A Civil Perspective on China’s Aid to Cambodia,” 2015. Published by Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China Agriculture University, East China Normal University, and Asia Foundation China.

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

This study aims to close this sustainability and accountability gap. It provides insights into community and local stakeholder knowledge, impacts, and expectations surrounding BRI projects, which may be useful to policy makers, companies, and officials in China and partner countries as they design and plan and implement future BRI projects.

Research design and outline of report This is a pilot study, initiated in response to interest from a range of Chinese stakeholders (government, academic, think-tank, CSO) to better engage communities and improve sustainability of BRI (or other) projects. The Foundation’s intent was to produce an empirical snapshot of community experiences and see if this snapshot revealed useful information to warrant further research. We chose two countries, Cambodia and Pakistan (one in Southeast Asia and one in South Asia), where Chinese investments are significant and ongoing. Given the pilot nature of the project, we chose a context-driven approach to project selection, choice of stakeholders, and research methods.

This summary report starts with a description of Chinese BRI engagement in Cambodia and Pakistan, followed by an explanation of the research methodology used in each country, the findings from the research in each country10, and recommendations for further research and action. We conclude with a brief overview of The Asia Foundation and our research consultants for this undertaking, Kimchoeun Pak (Cambodia) and Shirin Gul and Jamal Janjua (Pakistan). BRI in Cambodia China has been the number one source of FDI into Cambodia since 2011, averaging investment capital of about USD 1 billion a year through 2017, which then jumped up to USD 3.5 billion in 2018.11 Primary sectors for investment are garments, construction, electricity, rice milling, agribusiness, mining and energy, coal and tourism. According to Cambodian ODA data, the Chinese provided over USD five hundred million in bilateral assistance in 2019, making it not only the largest source of FDI, but also the largest bilateral donor.12 This amount was allocated largely for Roads & Transport ($214M), with the remainder divided almost equally ($115M each) between Agriculture and Power & Energy. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and Cambodia, signed in 2013, was bolstered in 2018 by a new $250 million concessional loan to build a ring road in Phnom Penh.

According to a 2018 report by London School of Economic (LSE) and CIMB ASEAN Research Institute,13 the total value of BRI investment in Cambodia was USD 104 billion, which was the third highest BRI investment in the region after Indonesia and Vietnam. Further, the Koh Kong Railway project, started in 2013, is ranked number 2 among the top 10 largest BRI projects in ASEAN. Some of this data is disputed, as there is disagreement among analysts about what constitutes a BRI project – that said, most scholars agree that China does not designate projects as BRI or not BRI – rather, BRI is a framework for all Chinese investment.14

The Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) – one of China’s flagship BRI investments in Cambodia - alone has created 20,000 jobs for Cambodians to date, and as it enters phase three of development, projects another 100,000 to be created.15

10 This summary is drawn from more detailed country reports. 11 https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/china-still-no1-source-fdi 12 Source: http://odacambodia.com/DCR_Report 13 LSE and CIMB. 2018. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Southeast Asia, CIMB ASEAN Research Institute. 14 Sebastian Strangio, 23 Nov 2019, interview. 15 https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-belt-and-road-in-cambodia-successes-and-challenges/

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

BRI in Pakistan The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is another one of BRI’s flagship projects, through which it has invested $40 billion in Pakistan over five years (2015-2020) on multiple infrastructure projects which include roads, airports, seaports, power plants, and pipelines, amongst others. In the longer run, the investment is expected to go up to $75 billion after the completion of early harvest projects.16

According to the Pakistan-China Institute, CPEC projects have contributed to an increase in the country’s GDP growth rate by addressing its infrastructure and energy needs.17 From 2015 and 2016, the GDP growth rate has increased from 4.7% to 5.4%. The Government has added around 12,000 MW to the national grid in the last five years, of which major power plants have been set up under CPEC initiatives. Similarly, it was estimated by the Government that 30,000 direct jobs have been created under early harvest projects of CPEC. And it further estimates that 800,000 more jobs will be created over the next 15 years under the CPEC projects.18

BRI in Cambodia – overview of research methodology, findings, and recommendations The research site for the Cambodia study on BRI was the area around the Steung Trang-Krouch Chhmar Bridge. The Steung Trang-Krouch Chhmar Bridge is also known as the 8th China-Cambodia friendship bridge, indicating a history of similar infrastructure investment partnership between China and Cambodia. The project includes a bridge which runs 1,131 meters long and 13.5 meters wide and crosses the Mekong River from the Krouch Chhmar district of Tbong Khmum province into the Steung Trang district of Kampong Cham Province. It includes 8,323 meters of connecting roads. The project is funded by a USD 57 million concessional loan from China and is being implemented over 42-months by the Shanghai Construction Group. The bridge expects to open by 2021.

Methodology There were two main methodological components to this study – firstly, a literature review and Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted at the national level, and secondly two quantitative surveys and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted among communities directly affected by the construction of the bridge. The literature review and KIIs took place in two rounds – firstly in September 2018, and then again in October 2019.

KIIs took place with key officials from: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), The Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT), Ministry of Interior (MoI), and Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS). Key informants from development partner agencies, NGOs and the research community working on related issues were also interviewed.

Two rounds of field surveys and FGDs were conducted. The first survey was conducted in October 2018 and the second one in late August 2019. The two surveys were conducted in two districts on both sides of the bridge. In each district, three communes were selected. The first survey randomly selected 485 respondents to ensure representativeness of the sample. The second survey was conducted with 303 respondents, described as ‘better informed’ citizens, including businesspeople, fishermen, and youth. The reason for the second survey was a large proportion of ‘don’t know’ answers among the first survey respondents. In order to fill this knowledge gap, the second survey was conducted.

16 Shirin Gul and Jamal Janjua. 2019. “Rashakai Special Economic Zone: Community and Stakeholders’ Perspective”, report commissioned by The Asia Foundation. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

Surveyors initially interviewed 485 respondents across 42 villages in the 5 communes on both sides of the Mekong river, using e-tablets (CAPI – Computer Aided Personal Interviews). Data collection took place from October 25-28, 2018. Interviewees were chief decision-makers of households (adult male or female member who takes household decisions), and the unit of analysis was the household.

The respondents of the first survey were overwhelmingly female (72%) and married (75%)19. The largest proportion of respondents (39%) were between 46-60 years old, while 27% were over 60 and 38% were between 18 and 45 years old. The respondents of the second survey were more evenly divided in terms of gender (54% were female) and were younger (38% were between 18-30 years old). 95% of the respondents had been living in the districts for more than 5 years.

Findings The primary finding of the national-level literature review and KIIs, was that while improvements in transparency of project management have been undertaken by both the Royal Government of Cambodia and Chinese counterparts, significant challenges remain regarding transparency. Specifically, the Cambodian government in 2012 adopted a Standard Operations Procedure (SOP) for Externally Funded Projects, which includes project management best practices such as defining roles and responsibilities, conducting feasibility studies, conducting environment and social impact analyses, monitoring, auditing etc. To date, this SOP has not been used for Chinese funded projects, though a pilot was conducted in 2017 to trial its use on a Chinese project. Interviewees confirmed that authority over design, approval, and implementation of Chinese-funded projects sits high up in government. Furthermore, cost-benefit analyses or feasibility studies are usually not conducted.

The findings of the first survey indicate that many families in these districts are headed by women, as the men are employed outside the district; almost half of the respondents had family members working away from home and of those 73% relied on remittances for their income. Almost 60% of the households had farming lands. With regards to the bridge in question, the survey revealed that the local communities firstly had very little awareness about the bridge project itself – only 24% of them knew that the Chinese were building the bridge. They overwhelmingly do not view the bridge project as having adverse effects on them, and there were little to no concerns about land issues. 26% believe that the bridge construction would provide employment opportunities, and only 4 percent reported any negative impact.

The findings of the second survey were also generally positive -- more people reported knowing different aspects of the bridge project (20% knew it was funded by Chinese; 24% knew when it would be completed). Most respondents (78%) had positive opinion about the project itself, including its quality and speed. Virtually no respondents reported knowing of any complaints that were raised about the Chinese workers working on the bridge construction site. Only 9% of respondents reported land being taken without compensation, while 45% reported land being taken but compensation given, and 16% reported no land problems at all. The primary general observations were that the area has become busy (33%), and that land has become more expensive (32%).

Generally, from the KIIs and FGDs, the expected benefits and impacts from the bridge have to do with expanded markets, i.e. more demand and more supplies of goods and services, especially for farming produce. It was also observed that for some households that cannot generate sufficient income in their own communes/districts, having the bridge can increase the likelihood of their out-migration

19 There is high percentage of female headed households in the communities, where male members are away, working as migrant labor in other countries.

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020 because it will facilitate easier transportation for them to travel to Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and possibly Thailand (i.e. stronger pull factor). However, for those who can manage to generate more income (due to more trading activities, better access to markets), the bridge will help reduce the push-factors that propel them to migrate for jobs elsewhere.

Recommendations Taking the Steung Trang-Krouch Chhmar Bridge as its case, this study found that awareness and engagement of local people and authorities in the project is very limited, except for what they can see with their eyes. A majority of people are positive about the impact of the bridge on their daily life, especially in terms of business, transportation and access to education. They also believe that the benefits of the bridge go beyond just their own districts to impact the whole country, especially for those involved in transportation. The locals interviewed however have difficulty figuring how to better prepare themselves and their livelihood activities to harness the potential of the bridge once it is opened for traffic.

In terms of potential impact on local people’s livelihood, the case of Steung Trang-Krouch Chhmar Bridge illustrates the common feature of Chinese funded projects in which hardware (i.e., infrastructure) is given sole focus, while consideration for software support (i.e. help in finding jobs for people, facilitating safer migration, promoting local business) is almost entirely ignored. It is hypothesized here that only when a better mix between hardware and software is achieved will the project impact be maximized.

Table 1: Specific recommendations for different stakeholders

Actors/ issues Image and information Governance of BRI projects Support to local sharing communities Royal -Update and share of -Adopt the SOP for Chinese -Consider giving more Government of information on Chinese investment projects mandate to sub-national Cambodia investment, debts, and aid in -Include Chinese investment authority in matters of local Cambodia projects in the Public economic development; -When necessary, provide Investment Management -Consider piloting the above official clarification on (PIM) database (when it is set ideas in areas where there are Chinese investment issues up) Chinese investment projects that are of high concern to -Explicitly show Chinese loans (or other investment projects) the public (as observed in in the national debt calculation social media) -Use the CDC and ODA database as the central hub to keep all information relating to Chinese aid and investment Chinese -Make available the Chinese -Adopt the SOP for all relevant -Make MoU with sub-national counterpart embassy website all the aid Chinese aid and investment authority to recruit and train and investment projects in projects local people to work in Cambodia -Consider attaching support on Chinese-funded projects -When necessary, make soft skills especially on -Consider conducting baseline official clarification on employment and SMEs (which and endline surveys to better Chinese investment issues are mostly women-led) in understand people’s that are of high concerns to addition to hardware support perception and the project the public (as observed in from the initial stage of project impacts social media) development Sub-national -Post (online and off-line) -Include and analyze the -Make MoU with Chinese administrations information about Chinese potential impact of Chinese aid company to recruit and train (and other) external projects and investment projects into local people to work in going in their localities their development plan (5 Chinese-funded projects

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

years) and investment plan (3- -Seek support to initiate more year rolling) local economic development projects for local people -Ensure regular dissemination to and feedback from local people on matters relating to Chinese aid and investment Non-state -Contribute to gathering of -Advocate for the adoption of -Work with sub-national actors non-biased information SOP for Chinese aid and administrations in bringing about issues relating to investment projects. feedback from the local Chinese aid and investment -Advocate for more people in Cambodia dissemination by the RGC and -Disseminate the collected/ Chinese embassy on Chinese analyzed information to aid and investment minimize misunderstanding

BRI in Pakistan – overview of research methodology, findings, and recommendations There are nine proposed priority special economic zones (SEZs) in Pakistan, of which the Rashakai Economic Zone (REZ) is the flagship project of the Government of Pakistan. Located in Nowshera and bordering Mardan, Swabi, Bunner, Malakand and Charsadah, it links to the CPEC route through the Burhan interchange. REZ is under two hours driving distance (140 km) from the capital, Islamabad. Due to its central position and proximity to the Afghan border, REZ has the potential to be a trading hub for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

KPEZDMC is the state-owned enterprise that is developing the REZ. KPEZDMC was established as a not-for-profit organization under Section 42 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, which is exclusively owned by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The objective of the company is to bring rapid industrialization and create employment opportunities for the people of this region.

Methodology In this study we examined the plan for the Rashakai SEZ based on the rationale of economics of agglomeration in general, and collaborative governance and stakeholder engagement in particular. It was argued that traditional planning and implementation approaches need to be paired with innovations in governance to develop SEZs as economic cities, creating conducive conditions for stakeholder engagement and responsible investment. The analysis presented in the paper is based on fieldwork in Rashakai, and we utilize a mixed methods approach. Qualitative data was collected by conducting FGDs with more than 100 participants. A quality assurance survey was also added as a spontaneous survey to verify and triangulate findings from the FGDs. KIIs with bureaucrats, developers, and Chambers of Commerce in adjacent areas, including women’s chambers were also conducted. FGDs were conducted in four villages falling within the catchment area of the SEZ, and two villages on the periphery. These included: Nandrak, Usmanabad, Kabarian, Mughaliki, Meeshak, Mian Essa. In all, 12 FGDs were conducted. Each FGD had 10-15 participants, for a total of 150 people participating in the FGDs across these 6 villages. Additionally, FGDs were conducted in Hattar, where another SEZ is already notified. This was to help with comparison, given the different stages of the development of the SEZs. A spontaneous lot quality assurance group survey was incorporated in the research in order to include more respondents, given the low levels of information and to help triangulate the level and type of information collected. A total of 85 questionnaires were administered to respondents from the same six villages where FGDs were conducted.

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

The survey was administered to groups of up to 14 individuals. While tabulating results from the survey and relating it to the qualitative data, the following points were kept in mind: • Data from FGDs was considered verified if more than 55% of the survey respondents corroborated the information. • The information streams not responded to in the FGDs were collected in the survey to present a more holistic picture. • Owing to the small size of villages, findings from the survey were also considered a dipstick measure into the perceptions.

Findings This section reports triangulated findings across the various methods mentioned above. The first finding is that an overwhelming majority (92%) of the respondents were aware of the REZ project, and a majority of those (over 75%) got their information from public meetings or public officials; no respondents cited social media or TV/radio as the source of their information.

The most striking finding was a broad consensus among respondents that the consultation process for the REZ was lacking. Specifically, there were expectations especially amongst the chambers of commerce that the KPEZDMC would proactively reach out to them and systematically integrate their feedback into the KPEZDMC’s policies, strategies, and projects. Several of the chambers mentioned their view that they should be sitting on the board of the KPEZDMC. The picture on this is fragmented – community members did report some consultations, and KIIs with government reported that consultations were held – but there was no evidence of public hearings advertised through any broad communications strategy (through media, mosque announcements, etc.) and the chambers of commerce in particular felt that there was no meaningful stakeholder engagement.

Particularly striking was the absence of women in the consultation process. The women’s chamber of commerce reported zero notification of the REZ plans, and in the survey and FGDs only 75% of women (compared to the 92% of general public) knew of the plans, and 95% of those who knew about it were informed by relatives.

Regarding expectations of the REZ, 86% wanted to see job creation resulting from the project, and a second expectation was for improvement in health and education services. However, possibly due to lack of information about the REZ, a majority (between 53-72%) of respondents feared a negative impact of the project would be the outcome, rather than improvements in jobs or services.

A second set of expectations related to the REZ came from local industry in that area. Local traders hoped that technology for advancing the marble and fruit industries in the region would be an important benefit of the REZ. Training in design for local woodworkers was also mentioned, as was policy inputs such as requiring the replenishing of wood lots.

Finally, a predominant issue raised by the communities was the issue of land acquisition. The villages falling within the REZ filed a case for enhancement of compensation for their land – the government was offering them Rs. 11,000/kanal, which was well under market value. A court appointed commission recommended that the price per kanal should be between Rs 40-80,000. This decision is still in the appeals process, but it has left a negative sentiment amongst many community respondents, who don’t trust the government and feel that the project will have a negative impact on their communities.

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

Recommendations Overall, the conclusions of the survey, FGDs, and KIIs relate to increased consultation and participation in the planning and implementation of the REZ.

The first recommendation is for the developer to arrange a series of multi-stakeholder dialogues through the KPEZDMC. These should include joint-business forums, REZ community fora, and direct meetings at the village level. This would allow for the planning to be participatory – it is hoped that Rashakai “can be a pilot for involving the local population in urban design, planning and provision of services.” In particular, it is recommended that the absence of women in the engagement and consultation process be remedied. Women’s chambers of commerce should be made aware of the incentives for setting up industrial units in Rashakai.

A second recommendation is rationalization of cost. The current price of the plots in Rahsakai is double the price of similar plots in Hattar. The stakeholders were of the view that unless the cost is rationalized the project has little hope of success.

Respondents also recommended that the GoP should tap into a large landlocked consumer market in the Central Asian Republics. They recommend that CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) is a platform where the SEZs within Pakistan and the potential markets in CARs can be linked.

Finally, the respondents emphasized that communities should be shareholders. Incentive management should be put in place, which will allow revenue sharing from the SEZ with different tiers of government. It was recommended that experts study the precise model of revenue sharing that will be optimal for the REZ, but “it is imperative that the local tier of government receives revenue generated from the REZ from day one.”

Conclusion

This brief report summary provides a snapshot view of two different BRI-funded projects in two different countries. In both cases, the intention was to gain access to community-level views of the projects, and to explore views of local stakeholders regarding the process and impact of these projects on their communities. The details of the two cases are extremely different, as are the conclusions and recommendations. However, in both cases it was found that local stakeholders felt that the consultation and engagement process was lacking, and that outcomes would be improved with stronger community awareness and participation in the planning and implementation of these projects. In particular, in both cases it was deemed vital that sub-national government officials be more involved.

We do not seek to draw sweeping conclusions about the efficacy, sustainability, or value of BRI projects as a whole from these two snapshot cases, because clearly there is a great deal of variation across projects, countries, and Chinese implementing enterprises. Rather, we hope through this report to provide some empirical data on community-level perspectives, which we hope will stimulate further research, and which may contribute to future planning and implementation of BRI projects.

About The Asia Foundation: The Asia Foundation is a non-profit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia. Informed by six decades of experience and deep local expertise, our work across the region addresses five overarching goals—strengthen governance,

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020 empower women, expand economic opportunity, increase environmental resilience, and promote international cooperation.

Headquartered in San Francisco, The Asia Foundation works through a network of offices in 18 Asian countries and in Washington, DC. Working with public and private partners, the Foundation receives funding from a diverse group of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, foundations, corporations, and individuals. In 2019, we provided $84.9 million in direct program support and distributed textbooks and other educational materials valued at $7.3 million. About the research consultants:

Dr. PAK Kimchoeun is a Cambodian researcher. He has a master’s degree in Public Finance from Syracuse University, New York in 2002 under a Fulbright Scholarship and a PhD in Public Policy and Governance from the Australian National University (ANU) in 2010 under the Australian Leadership Awards (ALA) program. Since 2003, he has conducted many research and consultancy projects on governance and public sector reforms, especially in the areas of decentralization and public financial management. More recently, he has expanded his research interest to the labor sector, youth development, and the implications of regional economic integration and geopolitics on domestic issues. Through his work, he has developed a deep understanding of policy formulation and implementation in Cambodia and built professional networks with government agencies and development partner organizations at both the national and regional level.

Shirin Gul is a Founding Director and lead on Research and Policy at Verso Consulting in Pakistan. She is a governance specialist with extensive experience in reviewing, analyzing and strengthening management practices and governance processes in institutions, both in the public and private sector. She is a certified project management specialist with extensive programme management experience in financial management, governance, community engagement, and gender, including managing multi-donor basket funds and projects. She has engaged with a wide range of stakeholders on development policy and programming issues. She has worked and published both nationally and internationally. Previously, Shirin has taught culture and research at the undergraduate and graduate level. She continues to dabble with narrative analysis and discourse, in her work and research. Currently, she is working on a research on cross border communities along the Pak-Afghan border.

Muhammad Jamal Janjua is Director Operations at Verso Consulting in Pakistan. He has diverse work experience spanning almost 10 years, beginning with banking and financial services, and moving on to research institutions, the public sector, and finally, consulting. He has strong skills in data collection and analysis, both qualitative and quantitative. His areas of expertise include financial inclusion, governance, conflict analysis, and minority rights. Jamal holds a degree in Economics and Finance from the University of Bristol and an LLB from University of London. Acknowledgements

This research was produced with generous support from The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as part of DFAT’s strategic partnership program with The Asia Foundation. The project was led by Anthea Mulakala, The Asia Foundation’s Senior Director for International Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Foundation’s offices in China, Cambodia, and Pakistan. Robin Bush, consultant, prepared the summary report.

Community Engagement Along the Belt and Road: Findings from Cambodia and Pakistan Summary Report | May 2020

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