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Lejeune and Denby: Forging a Marine Corps Doctrine

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Lejeune and Denby: Forging a Marine Corps Doctrine Lejeune and Denby: Forging a Marine Corps Doctrine Manley R. Irwin Professor Emeritus Peter T. Paul College of Business & Economics University of New Hampshire Durham, New Hampshire 02824 1 Introduction Fate threw two individuals into an endeavor that was to last from 1921 to 1924. Together they redefined the direction and mission of the Marine Corps. The first individual was Marine Corps Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune: the second, Edwin Denby, secretary of the navy, Harding/Coolidge administration. The result of their collaboration would not be apparent at the time. By the end of the Pacific campaign of World War II, however, the doctrine of amphibious assault had reconfigured not only the Marine Corps but the U.S. Navy as well. John A. Lejeune stands as a giant among giants in the corps’ pantheon of preeminent leaders. Lejeune was born, raised and educated in Louisiana. He attended Louisiana State, graduated from Annapolis in 1888 and entered the Corps as a second lieutenant. Alternating between duty and ashore duty, Lejeune won acclaim during and after the Spanish-American War. He later distinguished himself at Belleau Wood, Mont Blanc and the Argonne Forrest. By 1920, Josephus Daniels, Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of the navy, appointed Lejeune to head the Marine Corps. The U.S. Senate refused to confirm Lejeune’s appointment.1 Lejeune anticipated stepping aside as Commandant following Warren Harding’s election in 1920. Edwin Denby, Navy Secretary, approached Lejeune and asked him to remain as Commandant. That afternoon the Senate confirmed Lejeune. He would serve until 1929. 2 Born in Indiana and educated in Michigan Edwin Denby served as a gunner’s mate on the U.S.S. Yosemite during the Spanish-American War. He took a law degree from the University of Michigan. Drawn to politics, Denby represented Michigan’s First District, U.S. House of Representative. Among other committees, he sat on the House Naval Affairs Committee. In his fourth bid for election, Denby was defeated by Frank Doremus in 1910. Thereafter, Denby launched a career in Detroit’s business community. Among others, he founded the Hupp Motor Car Company, the Federal Motor Truck Company, the Denby Trucking Company, the Detroit Bank of Commerce. When the U.S. declared war against Germany, Denby enlisted as a Marine private. He later attained the rank of major. Denby campaigned on behalf of Warren Harding in 1920, and though not the president’s first choice as Navy secretary he accepted the post when offered to him.2 Lejeune and Denby engaged in range of decisions that included naval/marine aviation, amphibious operations, U.S. fleet structure, weapons and supply outsourcing. Consider aviation. Marine, Naval Aviation The First World War witnessed notable strides in aviation technology, tactics and organization. Britain’s Royal Naval Air Service set the pace. The Admiralty introduced the world’s first aircraft carrier. The Army’s Royal Flying Corps supported a ground offensive that assisted a ground troop breakout at Amiens, France, August of 1918. 3 In the last year of the war Britain created the Royal Air Force (RAF), a merger of Army and Navy aviation. A German Zeppelin raid on London’s Victoria station set in motion the RAF. Civilian casualties prompted the Lloyd George Government to broker a consolidation. The result was unforeseen. The Army’s Royal Flying Corps essentially dominated the Navy’s Royal Naval Air Service. Viewed as an appropriate move by the United Kingdom, Brigidair General William Mitchell, U.S. Army Air Service, lobbied for a comparable merger for the U.S. His recommendation was persuasive. By the time the Harding administration had taken office congress had filed eight bills calling for aviation unity in one form or another. Then Mitchell’s bombers sank a captured German battleship in the summer of 1921. The public celebrated Mitchell’s aviation achievement. The sinking put the Navy on the defensive.3 The Harding administration, nevertheless, remained less than receptive toward Mitchell’s proposal. Edwin Denby resisted Mitchell’s plan, insisting that Army and Navy pilots embodied a distinctive aviation mission. Each service, Denby argued, should retain their own aviation arm.4 The Harding administration did establish the Bureau of Aeronautics as an institutional home for naval aviation. Denby assisted in drafting the legislation, testified before naval affairs committees, and secured the appointment of Captain William Moffett, a former battleship commander, as the bureau’s first chief.5 William Moffett would later be known as the father of naval aviation. 4 The Marines vested interest in aviation as well. Committed to ground support, the Marines defined a pilot as a Marine employing a different weapon. Mitchell, by contrast, was dedicated to the bomber and to strategic targets. In aviation doctrine, Lejeune and Mitchell stood at polar extremes. Lejeune requested a training airfield adjacent Quantico to promote close air support. Denby backed the plan. Successful, Lejeune later reported that a Marine aviation unit was now an operating reality.6 Though Britain led the world in carrier introduction, Admiral William Benson, Wilson’s operation chief, resisted converting a navy collier into an experimental carrier. Navy secretary, Josephus Daniels, overrode Benson’s opposition and the USS Langley became the navy’s first carrier. The General Board, a naval advisory group to the secretary, recommended the construction of two carriers from the keel up. Edwin Denby testified on behalf of the carrier funding. In a postwar era congress resisted military spending and questioned the need for new carriers. As Senator, Warren Harding had been perceived as a “big” navy man. Before taking office, however, the president’s party called for a cessation of an armaments race that had erupted between Japan, Britain and the U.S. Once in office, Harding invited former allies to attend an arms limitation conference in Washington. Completed in February 1922, the conferees adopted 5:5:3 battleship tonnage standard applied to the U.S., Britain, and Japan. The conferees permitted the conversion of two battlecruisers into carriers. Theodore Roosevelt Jr., assistant Navy Secretary, convinced congress that recycled battlecruisers into 5 carriers constituted an exercise in cost savings and economy. The Senate backed the proposal. Amphibious Assault Though the Marines received acclaim in their Belleau Woods performance the fame was not long lasting. Congress, in fact, questioned the notion of an independent Marine Corps. Some legislators, wanted to consolidate the Corps into the U.S. Army, regarding Marines as “soldiers,” who simply spoke a peculiar navy “lingo.” Lejeune was obviously concerned by the possibility of legislative “death.” Nor was this the first time. President Theodore Roosevelt had ordered Marines off battleship duty during his tenure.7 Accordingly, Lejeune’s first move was to differentiate the Corps from the Navy. He convinced Denby to set up separate Marine recruiting stations. Denby advised Lejeune to clear the move with Charles Dawes, head of a new agency, the Bureau of the Budget. Lejeune set up a meeting with Dawes. He proposed to use government to save rental expenses. Dawes was so taken by the plan he handed Lejeune a cigar.8 Lejeune’s recruiting move was only the beginning. A real issue was how he could distinguished the Marines from the Army. Lejeune’s colleague, Colonel Earl Ellis, provided one answer. Ellis predicted the next adversary would be the Imperial Japanese navy. The Marine Corps began directing their attention toward the Pacific.9 6 Two issues attended that proposal. First, President Wilson had approved of Japan’s control of the former German Islands of Micronesia, Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas. Straddling a line between Hawaii and the Philippines, the islands posed as a potential military base. Second, to compensate for Japan’s lower tonnage assignment, Britain agreed to transfer its Asian naval base from Hong Kong to Singapore. The U.S., in turn, agreed not to fortify any base west of Hawaii. That U.S. naval planners were confounded by the Washington arms limitation agreement would be an understatement. In their view, U.S. politicians had ceded control of the western Pacific to the Japanese fleet. What appeared an impediment to naval planners was viewed as an opportunity by John Lejeune. Adopting Ellis’s plan, Lejeune proposed to transit the Pacific in a step by step move against enemy held islands. Submitting the proposal to the navy’s General Board, Lejeune informed the board that the Washington naval agreement did not preclude the creation of a U.S. mobile force. The Marines, said Lejeune, would be that force.10 Lejeune’s memo ignited a redefinition of Marine Corps doctrine. The Marines were now wedded to the fleet while at the same time separating their mission from the Army. Designated the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, the mobile force sought to be self-sufficient and semi-autonomous, fielding its own artillery, supplies, landing craft, aviation, and battleship support. The latter proposal was especially audacious. Lejeune had challenged the mission of a major fleet asset. 7 The next step was to secure congressional funding. Bent on liquidating the cost of the Great War, that exercise proved challenging. The Bureau of the Budget embarked on a program of massive spending cuts and the Navy’s budget was an attractive candidate. Denby wrote a letter to President Harding, stating the Bureau threatened the very existence of the Marine’s Expeditionary Force.11 In late 1921, Denby responded to an inquiry from Senator Miles Poindexter, Senate Naval Affairs Committee. Denby outlined the navy’s trans- Pacific strategy. The secretary predicted that a Pacific War would reduce itself to a “contest for bases,” specifically seizing an enemy island, and converting the base into a future launching pad.12 Having studied and evaluated the British experience at Gallipoli, the Marines were convinced they had identified the flaws that beset that controversial operation.
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