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The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better?

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The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better? The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better? Colonel Robert O. Work, USMC (ret) 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 912 Washington, DC 20036 The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better? by Colonel Robert O. Work, USMC (ret) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2002 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent public policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century. CSBA’s analytic-based research makes clear the inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering a more effective and efficient defense, and the need to transform the US military in light of the emerging military revolution. Robert Work was commissioned by CSBA in Spring of 2001 to write The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better?. As the reader will discern, Colonel Work offers an expert perspective on this issue. During a distinguished 27-year career, Work held a range of key command, leadership, and management positions. He also holds advanced degrees from the US Naval Postgraduate School, the University of Southern California, and The Johns Hopkins University. This paper offers a well-reasoned, extensively documented case for maritime transformation, one that is worthy of discussion and debate. CSBA is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich and funded by foundation, corporate and individual grants and contributions, and government contracts. 1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW Suite 912 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-7990 http://www.csbaonline.org CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... I Organizing For Combat: The Networked Littoral Battle Fleet...................... iii Recommended Changes to Navy and Marine Organizations and Programs . v Time for a Change ......................................................................................... vi I. NUMBERS COUNT, BUT CAPABILITIES MATTER: RETHINKING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 1 A Dwindling Fleet—A Nation at Risk?.................................................................. 1 Of Revolutions and Transformations................................................................... 7 The 300-Ship Fleet: Poised for Transformation................................................... 8 Ground Rules...................................................................................................... 11 II. THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OUTLOOK FOR 21ST CENTURY NAVAL OPERATIONS.. 13 Past as Prologue: What Previous Strategic Eras Might Tell Us about the Future ........................................................................................................................... 13 Strategic Outlook: A Second Expeditionary Era ............................................... 16 Operational Outlook: A Time-Based Network-versus-Network Competition.... 20 The 300-Ship Fleet: On Course for the 21st Century?....................................... 30 Developing New Metrics for 21st Naval Power Projection ............................... 35 III. THE QUIET (R)EVOLUTION IN THE SURFACE COMBATANT FLEET ................................... 39 The Striking (R)evolution in the Capital Fleet................................................... 39 The Striking (R)evolution in the Battle Force Capable Combatant Fleet ......... 50 The Birth of the Littoral Strike Group................................................................ 60 Thinking about Fourth-Phase Littoral Battle Combatants ................................ 63 The (R)evolutionary 21st Century Littoral Strike Fleet..................................... 69 IV. THE STRIKING TRANSFORMATION OF THE ATTACK SUBMARINE FLEET ........................... 73 The (R)evolution of Covert Littoral Battle Combatants .................................... 73 Right-Sizing the 21st Century Covert Littoral Battle Fleet ............................... 79 The Combined Littoral Strike Fleet ................................................................... 82 V. FROM AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TO OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA: CHARTING THE ONGOING (R)EVOLUTION IN LITTORAL MANEUVER ................................................................. 85 A Naval Maneuver Force in Readiness.............................................................. 85 The (R)evolution of Operational Maneuver from the Sea.................................. 86 The (R)evolution of Littoral Maneuver (Supported) from the Sea..................... 99 The (R)evolutionary 21st Century Marine Corps ............................................. 102 VI. FROM AFTERTHOUGHT TO ENABLING FORCE: CHARTING THE ONGOING (R)EVOLUTION IN FLEET MINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES................................................................................. 105 Cold War Mine Warfare Forces in the Second Expeditionary Era ................... 105 An Organic Revolution: Integrating Mine Warfare Capabilities into the Littoral Battle Fleet ...................................................................................................... 108 (R)evolutionary Mine Warfare in the 21st Century Networked Littoral Battle Fleet ................................................................................................................. 112 VII. FLEET AUXILIARY AND LITTORAL WARFARE SUPPORT: ACHILLES HEEL FOR 21ST CENTURY NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS?............................................................................... 115 The Neglected Component .............................................................................. 115 Inshore Warfare Squadrons ............................................................................. 115 The Combat Logistics Force............................................................................ 120 The Mobile Logistics Force ............................................................................. 124 The Fleet Salvage Arm .................................................................................... 125 Fleet Support: Missing the Boat ...................................................................... 126 VIII. TRANSFORMING THE 21ST CENTURY NETWORKED LITTORAL BATTLE FLEET ................ 127 Time for a Change............................................................................................ 127 Expeditionary Littoral Warfare and Counter-Network Operations.................. 130 Rationalizing The 300-Ship Networked Littoral Battle Fleet .......................... 131 Next Steps: The Navy ...................................................................................... 134 Next Steps: The Marine Corps......................................................................... 139 Next Steps: The Naval Air Arm........................................................................ 143 IX. NUMBERS COUNT, BUT CAPABILITIES MATTER: PREPARING THE 300-SHIP NETWORKED LITTORAL BATTLE FLEET FOR THE 21ST CENTURY .............................................................. 147 X. GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................... 151 ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The once mighty U.S. Navy is in precipitous decline. At least, that is what a vocal group of naval officers, defense analysts and Congressional leaders strongly believe. They support their judgment by comparing the number of ships in the Navy’s “Total Ship Battle Force” with those of past U.S. fleets. Their most common standard for comparison is the “600-ship” fleet championed by John Lehman, President Ronald Reagan’s first, most aggressive and politically savvy, Secretary of the Navy. When compared to that number, the 316 ships of the Fiscal Year 2001 Total Ship Battle Force seem at first glance to provide alarming evidence in support of the “large fleet” faction’s dire conclusion. Totally lost in a narrow focus on fleet ship counts is an appreciation for the fleet’s dramatically improved combat capabilities. Consider a comparison between the surface combatant fleet that existed at the end of the Cold War with that of the 316-ship fleet in service on September 30, 2001. On December 31, 1989, the fleet counted 104 large surface combatants, 15 deployable carriers, and four battleships, for an escort-to-capital ship ratio of 5.5:1. In 2001, there were 80 combatants and 11 carriers, for a 7.27:1 escort-to-capital ship ratio. Moreover, the 24 fewer combatants carried 784 more missiles than their 1989 counterparts. The smaller fleet is thus much more efficient in delivering combat power. Since 1989 the average displacement (in tons) and average number of Sailors per missile carried in fleet missile magazines have fallen by 19 percent and 38 percent, respectively. More tellingly, of the 123 capital ships and large surface combatants in the 1989 fleet, only 48 (39 percent) were capable of delivering either long-range air or missile strikes against targets ashore. In operational terms, this meant the strike power of the 1989 fleet was heavily concentrated in its carrier force. Of the 108 non-carrier platforms, only 33 battleships and surface combatants could contribute to long-range fleet strike power, for a non-carrier strike platform-to- carrier ratio of 2.2:1. Compare these figures with the 2001 fleet. Of its 91 capital ships and large surface combatants, 86 (95 percent) are strike capable, and the non-carrier strike platform to carrier ratio is over three times
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