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Shifting Strategic Initiative in the Pacific in World War II

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The Turn of the Tide, July 1942-February 1943: Shifting Strategic Initiative in the Pacific in World War II DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Sean M. Judge, M.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: John F. Guilmartin Jr., Advisor Peter R. Mansoor Nicholas B. Breyfogle Copyright by Sean M. Judge 2011 Abstract Military historians and military professionals often refer to strategic initiative and most assume a common understanding of the term. Yet the term has not been carefully defined or closely studied. This dissertation aims to fill the void by crafting a definition for the concept and examining the role and influence of shifting strategic initiative in the Pacific War between mid 1942 and early 1943. Strategic initiative grants the combatant possessing it greater influence over the course of the war and therefore provides the possessor with more options in waging the war. The underlying elements that influence possession of this initiative include resources, intelligence, strategic acumen, combat effectiveness, chance, and political will. The study contains several descriptive chapters. The first examines the organization of the Japanese and the American high commands and their decision- making bodies. These organizations had many similarities, but significant differences as well. The Japanese army and navy did not create joint organizations in the same manner as the Americans, who created the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization based upon a British Imperial General Staff model. The two combatants also differed in their approach to intelligence organizations and emphasis. They both leveraged similar types of intelligence, but the Japanese created a system designed to gather tactical intelligence for battlefield success. The Americans and Allies created and grew more joint and combined organizations that helped better integrate their intelligence and improved their estimates. ii The heart of the study examines the course of the war and shifting strategic initiative in the Pacific War during 1942 and 1943. The Japanese attacked and seized the strategic initiative in December 1941 with advantages in nearly all the underlying elements. Six months later the Americans won an important victory at the Battle of Midway, which altered the naval balance and allowed them to vie for the strategic initiative. Over the following eight months and through two symbiotic campaigns on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands and on Papua, New Guinea, the Allies gained the strategic initiative. The Allies did so predominantly through the exploitation of advantages in intelligence, strategic acumen, and combat effectiveness. The Americans and Allies thus took control of the war before they held the preponderance of resources with which they closed out the last two years of the war. The genesis of this dissertation began with the author‘s thesis titled ―‗Who has the puck?‘: Strategic Initiative in Modern, Conventional War,‖ completed for the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies in 2008. Significant portions of this study borrow from and incorporate portions of that thesis. The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. iii Dedication This document is dedicated to America‘s Gold Star Families. iv Acknowledgments I could never have completed this project without the guidance, understanding, and patience of a multitude of individuals. First I would like to give special thanks to my advisor and fellow airman, Prof. John Guilmartin. His insights and thought provoking discussions greatly enhanced my own understanding of the topic and he has guided this project with a steady hand throughout. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee. Profs. Peter Mansoor and Nicholas Breyfogle provided excellent and timely feedback throughout this process, and pushed me to expand my view and to consider alternative viewpoints. In addition, in a fortuitous turn of events, Prof. Mansoor conducted research at the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland while I too did my research. While there Prof. Mansoor took the opportunity to provide some archival mentorship at the expense of his own time to research. In similar fashion, Prof. Brian Linn, Texas A&M University, also took time out of his own research to assist me while at the National Archives. His recommendations for organizing one‘s research proved invaluable throughout this process. I would like to acknowledge all those who assisted with my archival research as well. Dr. Timothy K. Nenninger and all the archivist at the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland provided excellent support. Similarly, Mr. John Hodges at the Naval History and Heritage Command, Operational Archives Branch, Washington Navy v Yard, assisted immeasurably. Finally, the multitude of archivists at the Air Force Historical Research Agency stood ready to help at a moment‘s notice and offered insightful recommendations to meet my research needs. I would like to thank Dr. Harold Winton, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), who advised the initial thesis that undergirds this entire dissertation. I would also like to thank the entire faculty at SAASS for providing me the opportunity to continue my education at The Ohio State University and for preparing my mind for the vigorous academic study the endeavor would entail. I would also like to thank the many Ohio State faculty members, staff, and graduate students, particularly those affiliated with the Military History program, who have enhanced my learning in a multitude of ways. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Carmen, and my three children, Ryan, Seth, and Amelia, for their incredible patience, understanding, and endurance during this project. Without their support, I could not have done it. vi Vita May 1989 .......................................................Central Catholic High School 1993................................................................B.S. History, U.S. Air Force Academy 2007................................................................M.A. Military Operational Art and Science, Air University 2008................................................................M.A. Airpower Art and Science, Air University 2008 to present ..............................................Graduate Student, Department of History, The Ohio State University Publications 1. Major Sean M. Judge, ―Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising,‖ The Wright Flyer Papers No. 34, May 2008. Fields of Study Major Field: History vii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Dedication .......................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... v Vita .................................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xvi Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 Historiography ................................................................................................................. 6 Chapter Outlines ............................................................................................................ 19 Chapter 2: Strategic Initiative ........................................................................................... 25 Framing Strategic Initiative ........................................................................................... 34 Historical Examples of the Influence of Strategic Initiative ......................................... 39 Supporting Elements of Strategic Initiative .................................................................. 44 Chapter 3: National Command Structures ........................................................................ 52 The Japanese Command Organization .......................................................................... 53 Japanese National Command Structure ..................................................................... 54 Japanese Field Commands in the South Pacific July 1942-November 1943 ............ 65 viii The United States‘ Command Organization ................................................................. 72 United States National Command Structure .............................................................. 76 Allied Field Commands in the South Pacific July 1942-November 1943 ................ 81 A Brief Comparison of the Japanese and U.S. Command Structures ........................... 84 Chapter 4: Japanese Intelligence Organization In World War II ...................................... 88 Elements of Intelligence ................................................................................................ 89 The Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Organizations ....................................... 91 Imperial Japanese Army Intelligence Organization
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