BMmi : "^ ; ;tl!!tl! sll> 1 i ^^^^^^^^^^H if m nil i iii 11 i im m MONGOLIA ; X)SUKA CHI CHI JIMA N AWA ^ti^?=^"a:PCKNER BAY 'AN ISIUNG 'ING HARBOR ^i^JtlAM \0! PPINE: EQUATO-B- Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from LYRASIS members and Sloan Foundation http://www.archive.org/details/mobilitysupporteOOhoop QXfOP,0(^ MOBILITY, SUPPORT ENDURANCE A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War 1965-1968 by VICE ADMIRAL EDWIN BICKFORD HOOPER, USN (Retired) NAVAL HISTORY DIVISION DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1972 LC Card 76-184047 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1972 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402—Price S4.25 Stock Number 0846-0057 Dedication Dedicated to the logisticians of all Services and in all wars, and in particular, to the dedicated, and often heroic, ofl&cers and men of the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. UNNTED STATES NH-74351 The globe as viewed from over the intersection of the Date Line and Equator. Foreword In narrating the naval history of a war, one approach open to a historian is to record the general story of naval operations, then complement the main history with works dealing with specialized fields. The Naval History Division plans to follow this approach in the case of the Vietnam War, focusing the Division's efforts primarily on an account of naval operations but accompanying the major history with publications in limited fields deserving of treatment beyond that to be given in the main work. This was the practice, as it finally evolved, in World War II. One of the volumes that complemented Samuel Eliot Morison's magnificent multi-volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II was Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil. Valuable insights on the logistic aspects of the war at sea were provided by the author. Rear Admiral W. R. Carter. Not only had he served as Commander Naval Bases, South Pacific, during critical phases of the Solomons campaign of 1942 and 1943, but also later when the United States naval offensive across the Pacific was in full swing, he had organized and commanded Service Squadron Ten, the mobile base organization so essential to sustaining the massive operations of the Third and Fifth Fleets in the violent final phase of the war. Widely used as a reference work, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil did much to impart an under- standing and appreciation of mobile logistic support throughout the Navy, and to keep the basic concepts alive in the post-war years. To Admiral Carter goes a considerable amount of the credit for the continuing emphasis which the Navy placed on the maintenance of its capabilities for mobile logistic support in the active and inactive fleets, on the continuance of a reasonable state of readiness in this important area, and on the refining of some of the techniques involved. Although somewhat broader in scope, Mobility, Support, Endurance is a similar volume intended to complement the planned primary history of United States naval operations in the Vietnam War. Preface "The only good histories are those that have been written by the persons who com- manded in the affairs whereof they write." Michel De Montaigne (1533-1592) Over the years a number of general officers and a few flag officers in positions of responsibility have written their own accounts of what went on during a major war. Quite understandably these have tended to focus mainly on the purely combat features of the war and on overall strategy. The result has often been an unbalanced picture of the total military effort. To complete the picture, it is necessary to place in proper perspective the logistic support actions upon which the combatant forces and the effective- ness of these forces were totally dependent. It is the coupling of combat strength and logistic support that makes victory possible, whether it be action by a small unit, a major battle, a campaign, a war, or the wide variety of peacetime operations to support the national interest. Thus, along with knowledge of combat activities, one must gain an appreciation of logistics, of its relationship to operations, and the nature of operational logistic actions for a full understanding of a war. Hopefully, this recording of the activities of the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, will advance that appreciation, and contribute to a more complete picture of the Vietnam Conflict. Within the military itself, many logisticians in the past have complained of ignorance of others as to the importance of logistics and the nature of logistic activities. I have never endorsed the more extreme complaints, but there are measures of truth in them. In their totality, logistics and related services in a major war are so varied, complex, and extensive that they are not always easy to comprehend. Those receiving the support normally only see the immediate interface with that support. When the support is good, it is natural to take that support for granted—with little concern over why it was good and little thought to do with the portion of the total effort involved other than at the interface with the operating forces. I have too often found even logisticians who, while experts in their own specialities or their own VII locality, were deficient in their knowledge of the scope of the total logistic effort, of the inter-relationships of its parts, of the extent to which systems must be tailored to the nature of the operations and special environments of the various types of combat forces, and of Service and unified command responsibilities to do with logistics. This book will not attempt to fill in all the gaps, but hopefully it may shed a bit more light on some of these mat- ters. It is with such goals in mind that I have set forth a recording of events and of views and experiences gained in thirty-one months as commander of the Navy's foremost operational logistic command. Although concentrating on the period from 20 July 1965 to 17 February 1968, when I commanded the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the stage will be set by a limited discussion of earlier events, and for completeness, some subsequent developments also will be mentioned. While the bulk of the treatment has to do with operational logistics I have not been able to avoid completely the temptation to make a few observations on broader matters. The initial urge to write this book came from the difficulties encountered when, in the summer of 1965, I sought guidance from history as to the solution of the growing problem then being faced. Some useful information was obtained from Rear Admiral Carter's Beans, Bullets and Black Oil. However, that informative book concentrated almost exclusively on the mobile support forces in the Pacific in World War II. It did not extend to meaningful treatment of many other aspects of naval logistics in the Pacific, such as planning, organizing, preparing, establishing, and operating advanced bases. For the latter it was necessary to draw on the files of Rear Admiral Eccles, USN ( Retired ) , who had been in charge of the Advanced Base Section of the Service Force during the final stages of World War II. In the hope that more complete information would aid those faced with the problems of the future, it seemed desirable to provide a more comprehensive record of operational logistics in the case of the Vietnam Conflict. For the naval officer who would go deeper there are in the classified files not only the annual Command Histories, but also a weekly history started soon after I arrived and "Operations of the. Service Force" for Fiscal Year 1966 and subsequent years. The preparation of this book was very nearly completed during evenings and weekends in 1968 while I served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics). At the time of setting down on paper the vast majority of what follows, there was no hint of the fact that a Joint Logistics Review Board would be convened to study logistic support in Vietnam, or VIII that I would be a member of that board. Nor did I have the slightest suspicion that I would later become Director of Naval History. I set aside further work on this book until the Joint Logistics Review Board's efforts had been completed. Special attention has been given to those operations of the Service Force which differed most from those of more normal periods. Particular emphasis is placed on the extensive Navy logistic operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Support of the Fleet itself, which is the primary role of the Service Force, is given less detailed treatment. Since it is the practice of the United States Navy to operate in peace on the same basis as in war, to the extent this is reasonable and practicable, the changes required to meet the needs of the Fleet in the Vietnam Conflict were relatively straightforward. One other purpose to which I hope this book contributes is imparting some feeling of the fact that operational logistics is far from being as dull as many assume it to be. During the period of this conflict, I found command of the Service Force to be extraordinarily challenging and exciting. Not only was the command a vast and diversified one but the responsibilities were heavy. There was never a letup from the seemingly unsolvable prob- lems that had to be solved in timely fashion in the face of the forbiddingly long lead times that are inherent in so much of logistics.