WHEN the COLD WAR DID NOT END: the SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE of 1953 and the AMERICAN RESPONSE1 by Jef Frey Brooks

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OP #278: WHEN THE COLD WAR DID NOT END: THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE OF 1953 AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE1 by Jef frey Brooks

The world devoted enormous was nonetheless conciliatory, He sums in human energy, lives, and invoked the wartime alliance and economic resources to the military- challenged Soviet leaders to match strategic competition that was the cold their wor ds with deeds. 2 “What is the w a r. Each side invested billions in Soviet Union Ready to Do?” armaments that could have been spent Eisenhower asked rhetorically. “What- otherwise, fought wars, and for ced ever the answer be, let it be plainly much of the developing world to spoken.” choose between a client capitalism of Scholars disagr ee about oligar chs and dictators and some Eisenhower ’s options. 3 John Lewis variant of a Soviet style one-party Gaddis cites a missed “opportunity to system. Neither side was willing to reunify Germany.”4 Walter Lafeber shift the conflict to the terrain of notes American hesitation under economics and culture, for neither pr essur e of McCarthyism, and could imagine a future in which the Vladislav Zubok and Konstantin other system existed. Ther e wer e Pleshakov see a lost chance “for those moments, however, when the r eigning in the Soviet leadership pr epared to Manicheanism seemed in doubt. move away from the universalist Among them, none was more plau- ideology of communism and the sible than the weeks after Stalin’s practice of global confr ontation.” 5 death, when the shock of his absence Contrarily, Richar d H . Immerman and led Soviet leaders as well as some in Robert R. Bowie str ess Soviet intransi- the West to eschew the familiar dis- gence, as does Vojtech Mastny, who course of diametric opposition. As they finds the Soviet desir e for change pr obed a possibly dif fer ent r elation- “strictly limited.” 6 In the discussion of ship, they ultimately failed to commu- the motives and intentions of the two nicate and ended up on the r oad states, the issue of communication traveled over the next thr ee decades. remains unexplored. How well did the Soviet concessions between rivals understand each other ’s mes- Stalin’s death on Mar ch 5, 1953 and the sages? Did the new Soviet leadership June 17 uprising in East Berlin ar e well fail to convey a desir e for detente documented. In the first weeks of the simply because they lacked a language new era, Soviet for eign policy de- that American policymakers and pended chiefly on Georgy Malenkov, American journalists could under- the Chairman of the Council of Minis- stand? Alternatively, if their objective ters, and Lavr enty Beria, minister of was simply propagandistic, did they the newly merged Ministry of Internal blunder for the same r eason in an Af fairs (MVD) and State Security ef fort to split the emer ging western (MGB). Neither leader had a savory alliance and pr event West German reputation, and Beria was a very rearmament? In either case, as unlikely r eformer. Y et jointly or singly Eisenhower observed, Stalin’s succes- they made statements and launched sors needed the skill of “plain speech.” initiatives that led the newly elected W inston Churchill wr ote to Eisenhower to respond in his speech, Eisenhower of a similar concern on “The Chance for Peace,” on April 16. April 11: “We do not know what these The President made no concessions but men mean. We do not want to deter 1 them fr om saying what they mean.” 7 back to Teddy Roosevelt. The resort to W e have no equivalent statement of arms in for eign r elations also suited linguistic puzzlement fr om the Soviet Lenin and Stalin’s thinking. The side, but it is not unr easonable to military-strategic character of the cold assume that they found the language war was not predetermined, however. of American politics equally tr ouble- On the American side, George F. some. The long hiatus in close r ela- Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, and others tions, br oken only by the brief and sought a competition more r eflective of guarded wartime cooperation, left each the Jef fersonian and Wilsonian tradi- side nearly ber eft of skilled interpr eters tions, accor ding to which the United of the other ’s cultur e and political States could peacefully radiate fr ee- language. dom to all peoples. Eisenhower was The strategic balance after Stalin’s also wary of enlar ging the military’s death can be considered favorable to role in American life. On the Soviet mutual agreement. It was a moment of side, Stalin’s first successors, eager to per ceived parity, if only in the sense of raise living standar ds and satisfy the mutual anxiety. The United States rising expectations of Soviet citizens, worried over the Chinese Communist likewise sought to diminish military victory and the imminent Fr ench expenditures. In exploring this option, defeat in Indochina, but took comfort they inadvertently fell back on ap- in Western Eur ope. Soviet leaders proaches to the West developed con- faced a crisis in Eastern Eur ope but curr ently and contradictorily after the success in Asia, as well as in their Soviet Civil War by diplomats Georgy peace propaganda. 8 Both nations had Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov, and to acquir ed thermonuclear weapons, and a lesser extent by Nikolai Bukharin although the American superiority in and his rival Leon Trotsky. Bukharin bombers was considerable, the Soviet and Trotsky, although far fr om gentle side could take consolation fr om its by character, stressed economics and successful networks of spies. Citizens cultur e because they genuinely be- in each country yearned for peace and lieved in the superiority of the socialist a better material life. Soviet wartime system. Chicherin and Litvinov valued memories were heartr ending, and the benefits derived fr om diplomatic victory led some to question the and economic relations with capitalist Stalinist system. 9 Nearly thirty million powers without giving up the revolu- people had died, and Soviet poverty tionary pr oject. Stalin saw the world was galling to those who had seen life otherwise, but with his passing, the abr oad. Stalin’s death was less of an pattern of implacable military and opening in America, where anger over political confr ontation he established the takeover of Eastern Eur ope and the appeared to float fr ee of its moorings. Korean War had spurr ed Dwight D. On March 15 Malenkov launched Eisenhower ’s landslide victory in 1952. his “peace of fensive,” announcing, Nevertheless, ther e wer e signs of a with r efer ence to the United States, possible opening ther e too and also “ther e is no dispute or unr esolved among America’s closest allies. question that cannot be settled peace- Belliger ency in for eign af fairs was fully by mutual agr eement of the intrinsic to each nation. Militarism inter ested countries.” 10 Y et he and his accor ded with an American willing- colleagues could not deal with the ness to advance America’s special r ole American democracy as Stalin had in the world by for ce that harkened with Hitler or even the western de- 2 mocracies during World War II. The the leader, the party, and the state took informational world in which they cr edit for all achievements and in operated had changed thanks in part which Soviet citizens wer e beholden to to the Voice of America and the British their leaders for everything allotted to Broadcasting Company. To convince them. I have elsewhere called this Eisenhower and his militantly anti- relationship between state and citizen Communist advisors, they had to the economy of the gift. 13 Its ef fect on make a case that would resonate with for eign af fairs was to encourage a the American public. To do this they perspective in which the Soviet Union needed to modify the language of appeared larger than life and the Soviet public life. Khr ushchev accom- surr ounding world smaller. Thus the plished something of the sort with the story the pr ess told after May 9, 1945 thaw and so clear ed the way for was that Stalin had for eseen the war, agreements by himself and his succes- saved the country, and also the world. sor. Gorbachev and his advisors did By str essing the world’s obligation, considerably more, but at a point when journalists appealed to Soviet pride it was alr eady too late to pr olong the and enlar ged the economy of the gift. Soviet system. The notion of Stalin as benefactor was The political language available to epitomized by his portrayal as Grand- Soviet leaders in the spring of 1953 father Fr ost, the Russian Santa. He had reflected a longstanding censorship appeared in this r ole on the fr ont page and monopoly of public expression. of Labor , the of ficial trade union news- Lenin instituted this hegemonic lin- paper, on December 30, 1936, smiling guistic or der, and Stalin extended it by at a tr ee decorated with schools, buses, adopting rituals of theater to rally planes, and other such “gifts” and support for his br utal pr ograms. Public ringed with happy children. utterances acquir ed a bombastic and The Soviet pr ess fit the Truman self-r eflexive character, mor e appr opri- Doctrine and Marshall Plan into this ate for giving or ders than making narrative by portraying the U.S. as a arguments, and the government false benefactor, beneath whose secur ed conformity thr ough terr or. “‘charitable’ mask shows a policy of Varlam Shalamov summed up the imperialistic expansion,” Pravda power of this performative cultur e in editorialized on Mar ch 14, 1947. On his Kolyma Tales, when he r ecor ded a New Year’s Day, 1949, the paper cynical camp saying, “If you don’t showed Uncle Sam as Santa, handing believe it, take it as a fairy tale.” 11 But, Europeans a pie marked “credit,” in fact, Soviet people could not take beside a tr ee decorated with “crisis,” the of ficial public narrative as a fairy “unemployment,” and “atom.” The tale because it infiltrated every aspect caption was “The Marshallization of of life. Ther efor e the “plain speech” the Christmas Tree.” 14 C. D. Jackson, a Eisenhower urged was neither acces- har d-line advisor to Eisenhower sible nor familiar to the new leaders, observed in late 1955 that “So long as who were not fluent in any language the Soviets had a monopoly on covert other than the linguistic conventions of subversion and threats of military Stalinist public life. 12 aggression, and we had a monopoly on The content of “the fairy tale,” as Santa Claus, some kind of seesaw well as its lexicon, also pr esented game could be played. But now the dif ficulties. For emost was the legacy of Soviets ar e muscling in on Santa Claus Stalin’s cult, a cultural system in which as well, which puts us in a terribly 3 dangerous position.” 15 The lasting cumbersome requir ement on Soviet power of this cultural constr uction was journalists and spokesmen for they still evident on December 31, 1999, had to downplay the country’s most when Boris Yeltsin pr esented Vladimir militant activities. Thus Soviet editors Putin to Russian voters with a New lar gely ignor ed the Chinese Civil War, Y ear ’s tr ee in the backgr ound. the Berlin blockade, and even the The Soviet “Santa’s” pr offer ed gift Cominform’s expulsion of Yugoslavia to the postwar world in 1948 and 1949 in late June 1948. The Soviet pr ess was peace. Nothing complicated the allowed American and British radio six Soviet-American dialogue following weeks to shape the telling of events in Stalin’s death so much as the Soviet Yugoslavia befor e denouncing Tito as peace propaganda of the previous five an archenemy. Similarly, it was Truman years. Soviet publicists had debased and not Stalin who on September 23, the word and the concept to such an 1949 announced the successful Soviet extent that it became virtually useless explosion of the atomic bomb a month in communication with the after the test. Soviet journalists could Eisenhower administration and Ameri- have celebrated Soviet possession as a can society. The Soviet sponsored national achievement or as a victory “peace movement” was launched in for the international pr oletariat but early August 1948 at the World Con- neither pr esentation fit the story of gr ess of Cultural Activists in Defense Soviet benevolent leadership of the of Peace in Br otslav (Wroclaw), West- peace camp, and hence the successful ern Poland. 16 In January 1949 Stalin test went unr eported. 20 pr oposed a Soviet American “peace The adulation of Stalin as world pact,” and moved the peace campaign benefactor r eached its zenith in the to the center of the Soviet public cul- of ficial celebration of his seventieth tur e.17 A World Congress of Peace birthday in December 1949. Soon Advocates convened in Paris in April, afterwards, on January 30, 1950, in the and Pravda reported on the Stockholm wake of the successful bomb test and Petition to ban nuclear weapons, which the victory of the Chinese communists, had allegedly been signed by 500 he secr etly authorized the North million people. “Who are you with— Korean attack on South Korea and the 500 million . . . or the handful of pr ovided Soviet assistance. 21 The imperialists and their hir ed agents?” invasion began on June 25 when the asked Iurii Zhukov, Pravda’s Paris North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) corr espondent. 18 At issue was the moral enter ed South Korea. Seoul, less than merit of the rival Santas. The writer and fifty miles fr om the border, fell on June chief Soviet delegate, A. Fadeev, re- 28. Concealing Soviet involvement and buf fed the claim that “people of the so- denouncing that of America, Soviet called Atlantic community possess a publicists br ought the Manichean ‘monopoly’ on culture and humanism, theme of peace and war to a cr escendo and we, Soviet people, heirs to Pushkin and Soviet public life was chor eo- and Tolstoy, Mendeleev and Pavlov, graphed to suit this purpose. As the who have created the first country of N K PA advanced in late June and July, socialism in the world with our hands, the Soviet pr ess dwelled on several are some how the enemies of “west- pre-arranged domestic events that ern,” “Atlantic” cultur e.”19 highlighted the peacefulness of the The division of the world into country and its leader. The first was “camps” of peace and war placed a the “fr ee discussion” of the ideas of 4 deceased linguist Nikolai Marr, which advocate of peace. Ignoring Soviet began in Pravda on May 9, 1950 with military involvement, Soviet publicists an announcement of shortcomings in praised the North Koreans’ bravery Soviet linguistics, and filled two of and charged the U.S. with atr ocities. In Pravda’s six pages every Tuesday until late August, Pravda’s corr espondent, V. July 4. Stalin intervened thr ee times in Kornilov char ged MacArthur with the “discussion” about Marr, begin- carrying out “germ warfare,” an ning on June 20, six days befor e the accusation that figur ed in later pr opa- North Korean attack, so that when the ganda campaigns. 24 The Soviet pr opa- fighting began he appeared to be ganda weekly New Times was vocifer - engaged in a high-minded intellectual ous in contrasting the two superpow- dispute about linguistics. 22 Meetings of ers. The issue for July 5, 1950, the first the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the war, devoted its fr ont page to beginning on June 12, and of the pictur es of the Stockholm Appeal and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Repub- its lead article to “American Aggres- lic on July 5 to consider “a budget of sion in Asia.” 25 A cartoon on July 19 peace,” served a similar purpose. showed one hand holding a dove with These were followed by the opening of a petition titled “peace signatur e s — a Soviet campaign to sign the hundreds of millions in favor”—and Stockholm Appeal on June 30, and another showing “the Voice of meetings of peace advocates in Mos- America,” spewing out “Atom bomb! cow in October and in Warsaw in Cold war! Shooting War! Hydrogen November. Lastly, from June 28 Bomb,” labeled “one against.” 26 The thr ough July 9 a Joint Session of the Second World Peace Congress, held in Academy of Sciences and Academy of W arsaw fr om November 16 to 20, Medical Science of the USSR met to issued an “Address to the United consider Pavlov’s legacy. Nations” urging the withdrawal of Kor ea was a milestone in the for eign armies fr om Kor ea and an official self-r epr esentation of the international commission to investi- country. By pretending to act peace- gate crimes and “in particular, the fully, while secr etly aiding North question of the r esponsibility of Gen- K o r ea militarily, Soviet leaders, pr opa- eral MacArthur.”27 Speaking at the gandists, and rank-and-file partici- congress, the Soviet writer, Alexander pants in the of ficial cultur e validated Fadeyev, accused the U.S. of “All the the Manichean division of the world horr ors of the fascist atr ocities that on the basis of peace and war. Hence came up at the Nuremberg trial.”28 The in the r ealm of images Stalin loftily Soviet government continued its peace discussed the natur e of language, campaign throughout the Korean War. while Truman, “leader of the fr ee Bohlen, ambassador to the Soviet world,” met with generals about Union soon after Stalin’s death, r e- tr oops, bombs, and casualties. called inef fective “meetings at which Ehrenburg recalled how incongr uous the CIA discussed ways to counter the Stalin’s public stance seemed at a time Hate America campaign.” 29 when many feared war: “Stalin busied The Korean War also changed himself with issues of linguistics, but America’s self-image. Until the inva- or dinary citizens bought salt and sion, the United States had competed soap.” 23 with the Soviet Union for the r ole of The r esult was to fr eeze the peaceful benefactor, and President of ficial Soviet national identity as the Truman had rebuffed those in his 5 administration eager for r earmament. the r earmament plan sketched out in As the war approached, the pr ess was the April 14 r eport to the National indecisive; the tone of The New York Security Council known as NSC-68, T imes in May and early June, 1950 was now opted for military containment, to defensive, with many refer ences to the chagrin of Kennan and Bohlen. Soviet militarism and the gr owth of Bohlen later noted, appar ently r egr et- Soviet power.30 A cartoon on Sunday, fully, with r efer ence to the pr oliferation May 21, showed a giant “Powder Keg” of U.S. military bases, “It was the looming over Berlin and a small man Korean war and not World War II that with the globe for a head covering his made us a world military-political ears. 31 A week later the paper pub- power.33 The moderate voices that had lished a pictur e showing a confident survived Joe McCarthy’s campaign Uncle Sam fencing a surprised bear out against domestic subversion disap- of Western Eur ope with barbed wire peared from the press, which adopted labeled “Arms Aid Program.” 32 The a uniformly combative tone. On June T imes summed up the U.S. position in 28, 1950, thr ee days after the invasion, the lead article of the News of the W eek the New York T imes hailed Truman’s in Review for June 1 1 with a statement decision to intervene with a lead by Secr etary of State Dean Acheson: editorial “Democracy Takes its Stand,” All during the week in statements and the columnist Hanson W. Baldwin by other top-ranking officials—and suggested that the United States might by President Truman himself—the have blocked “a communist program same theme was reiterated. The of conquest during the summer theme is that American policy is months in which Korea was to have peace policy—to strengthen the been merely the first step.” On July 17, West in order to discourage Soviet Time featur ed Stalin’s menacing face on aggression and thus prevent war. its cover. The editors asked, This was a kind of “peace offen- Where is the Korean War leading sive”—the West’s offensive. Hereto- the World? Will the fierce forest fire fore the Americans have more or less in the mountainous land below the assumed that the world knows that 38th parallel be confined to the the United States is not an aggressor Korean peninsula? Will it spread nation. At the same time the Russians around the globe, to sear the capi- have sought to “monopolize” the tals of the world with atomic fire? dove of peace—which they have Or is 1950 the beginning of a series made the symbol of the Communist of slow limited wars that will keep peace drives—and the propaganda the U.S. and its allies committed in has had considerable effect.” battle for generations?” The war ended the effort to wr est A map in the new section, “War in the dove fr om the Soviets. The experi- Asia,” showed lines fr om Moscow to ence led many Americans to conclude Kor ea, Formosa, Indochina, Iran, that the country could not set the Turkey, Yugoslavia, and West Germany. world right simply by virtuous ex- “NEXT?” was the caption. British ample. National pride now became cartoonist David Low expressed the entangled with the impulse to extend consensus in the New York T imes on American military power. Reacting to July 2. While tanks r oll acr oss the the North Korean invasion, the Korean border, Stalin and his advisors Truman administration, which had stand arm in arm holding a sign defended a peacetime budget against reading “Next step to shove America 6 out of the Pacific.” The caption r eads, 1953, the Austrian State tr eaty on May “Honest Mister, there’s nobody here 15, 1955, and the arms agr eements of but us Koreans.” subsequent decades represented no Throughout the war, American m o r e than temporary interr uptions. and Soviet policymakers clung to their In the aftermath of Stalin’s death, initial stances. Thus when Stalin died these two rigid national identities wer e on Mar ch 5, 1953, the superpowers momentarily shaken. Stalin’s heirs confr onted each other with sharply launched their peace initiative to gain contrasting public faces. The Soviet legitimacy by incr easing the state’s gift Union professed peaceful intentions. to society. Better r elations with the The United States in the person of the United States could mean trade and new secretary of state, John Foster decreased military expenditures. Dulles, bluster ed. It can be ar gued that Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov the Soviet stance was hypocritical broached the issue on March 9, but in a since they pr ofessed peace and made manner likely to confirm American war, wher eas America’s aggressive skepticism about the gap between rhetoric appr oximated the leaders’ w o r ds and deeds in Soviet behavior.34 intention to defend the per ceived Molotov gave the premier address. national inter est militarily. Hence, fr o m After r eaf firming that “Stalin’s cause the Soviet view it may have appeared will live for ages,” he stated simply, that American policymakers meant “In for eign policy our chief concern is what they said; whereas their Ameri- not to permit a new war, to live in can counterparts could conclude that peace with all peoples.” Beria, while the Soviets did not. hailing Stalin’s legacy with equal This mutual perception had fervor, went further in str essing the possibly serious consequences, since importance of peace and the American leaders were soon to dismiss government’s “policy of international Soviet initiatives as mer e pr opaganda, cooperation and the development of ar guing that the bear was again crying business-like ties with all countries on wolf. Soviet analysts r ead Dulles’ the basis of r ecipr ocity.” Each af firmed tough r hetoric rather than the continuity of Soviet for eign policy. Eisenhower ’s more moderate state- In ef fect, they br oached the issue of ments as indicative of American peace while insisting that nothing had intentions. Each side stumbled over changed. Beria, for example, described the content of the other ’s propaganda the government’s foreign policy as as well as its institutional foundation. “the Leninist-Stalinist policy of the Soviet leaders wer e confounded by a pr eservation and str engthening of multiplicity of voices, while Americans peace,” inadvertently invoking with passed over nuance in an ideological his American audience the hypocritical system that they believed to be mono- peace campaigns of the Korean War. lithic. Tragically, this was pr obably the Molotov’s statement may have equally moment when these two contrasting baf fled outsiders. After denying that national identities wer e set in stone. the Soviet Union had any “aggressive Ahead lay the arms race, the wars in aims,” he announced: Indochina and Afghanistan, the ideo- Our foreign policy, which is known logical polarization of Africa and Latin to the whole world as the stalinist America, as well as myriad smaller peace-loving foreign policy, is a conflicts fought lar gely by pr oxies. The policy of the political defense of tr oubled ceasefir e in Kor ea on July 27, peace between peoples, of the 7 unwavering defense and strength- published “Peace Bids: A Calendar of ening of peace, of the struggle Communist Offers,” and the against the preparation and un- magazine’s list was also impr essive. leashing of new wars, a policy of Soviet leaders made other accommo- international cooperation and the dating decisions or overtur es. These development of business-like ties included the fr eeing of ten British with all countries who also strive civilians held for thr ee years in North for this. Korea (NYT, Mar ch 21); the amnesty on The Eisenhower administration M a r ch 27 of all Soviet prisoners serv- and the American press initially ing sentences of less than five years, discounted these overtures. Y et ges- which resulted in fr eeing r oughly one tur es and pr oposed actions accompa- million, a thir d of the camp popula- nied Soviet r hetoric. On April 1, Carton tion;36 the granting of permission for Savage of the State Department’s the Russian wives of some non-Rus- Policy Planning Staf f noted to the sians to leave the country, and an Dir ector of the Staf f (Paul Nitze), agreement to trade ill and wounded “Since the death of Stalin on Mar ch 5, prisoners in Kor ea (NYT, Mar ch 29). 1953 ther e have been more Soviet North Korea agreed on April 11 to the gestur es toward the West than at any exchange of prisoners. Another sign of other similar period.” 35 He of fer ed a change observed at the time was the “check list of Soviet gestur es” that repudiation of the Doctors’ Plot on included the following: 1. A g r eement April 4. The Char ge’ in the Soviet to exchange sick and wounded prison- Union (Beam) wrote on the evening of ers of war; 2. Pr oposal for the r esump- April 4: “This startling event, per haps tion of armistice talks in Kor ea on m o r e than any other, provides most what appears to be a r easonable basis; concrete evidence thus far of the 3. Pr oposal for British-Soviet talks in pr esent r egime’s br eak with Stalinism Berlin to r educe air incidents in Ger - since it must be accepted that Stalin many (a British plane had been shot himself either engineer ed the doctors down).; 4. Statement by General plot, or gave his appr oval to one Chuikov that a conference “called to initiating bloc.” 37 Winston Churchill prepare a peace tr eaty with Germany agreed. He informed Eisenhower on and the r eunification of the country April 11, “Nothing impressed me so corr esponds fully and wholly to the much as the doctor story. This must cut Soviet Union’s attitude; 5. Soviet very deeply into communist discipline admission in propaganda that the and str uctur e. I would not like it to be United States and Britain had a hand thought that a sudden American in the defeat of Germany in 1945; 6. declaration [pr esumably a refer ence to Soviet permission for a gr oup of Eisenhower ’s upcoming speech] has American correspondents to enter pr evented this natural gr owth of Russia; 7. Soviet appr oach to a Norwe- events.” 38 On April 24, the new Ameri- gian r epr esentative at the UN, discuss- can ambassador to the Soviet Union, ing a possible meeting between Presi- “Chip” Bohlen noted “the cessation of dent Eisenhower and Malenkov to the hate-America campaign,” but consider subjects of tension including warned that little of substance had atomic energy contr ol and disarma- changed. 39 Materials fr om Soviet ment. archives suggest that Beria may have The press was privy to most of consider ed proposing a neutral capital- this activity, and on April 13 Newsweek, ist Germany and that Malenkov sup- 8 ported him, possibly because he was first two years of the Kor ean War. worried about nuclear weapons. 40 In Whereas the aging Churchill thought fact, Soviet r elations with the West of his place in history when he consid- warmed somewhat. Later, in addition ered western policy toward the post- to ending the Kor ean War and signing Stalin r egime, Eisenhower recalled past the Austrian State tr eaty, the Soviet slights in the war of wor ds. Churchill Union annulled the ban on marriages w rote to Eisenhower on March 11, “I with for eigners; r epatriated German have the feeling that we might both of prisoners of war; established r elations us together or separately be called to with Greece, Israel, and Y ugoslavia, account if no attempt wer e made to and r enounced claims to Turkish turn over a new leaf.” 42 Eisenhower territory. replied, however, the same day: “Even In view of the events in the weeks now I tend to doubt the wisdom of a after Stalin’s death it seems surprising formal multilateral meeting since this that the Eisenhower administration would give our opponent the same did not r espond more favorably to the kind of opportunity he has so often initial Soviet gestur es. The dif ference had to use such a meeting simulta- between Eisenhower ’s and Churchill’s neously to balk every r easonable ef fort per ceptions is striking, even given the of ourselves and to make of the whole language of the Republican Party occurr ence [ sic] another pr opaganda platform on which he was elected, the mill for the Soviet.” 43 paranoia of America’s new cold war Thr ee weeks later, on April 5, cultur e, and the American concern to Churchill wr ote again with the same promote Western Eur opean military purpose, noting “the apparent change integration. 41 Eisenhower repeatedly for the better in the Soviet mood,” dismissed as pr opagandistic the Soviet suggesting “that we ought to lose no initiatives Chur chill wished to explor e. chance of finding out how far the The American press lar gely accepted Malenkov regime is pr epared to go in the Eisenhower administration’s easing things up all ar ound.” 44 reading of events. Thus on April 29, Eisenhower replied on April 6 that he the New York T imes ran a fr ont-page was considering a speech but again article on Dulles’ r ejection of Soviet warned of propaganda: “This whole overtures with the caption, “U. S., In field is strewn with very difficult Ef fect, Bars Molotov Peace Bid.” The obstacles, as we all know; but I do fact that the Eisenhower administra- think it extr emely important that the tion r ejected Soviet overtur es and great masses of the world understand convinced the American public that it that, on our side, we ar e deadly serious was proper to do so pr obably owed in our sear ch for peace and ar e ready something to previous Soviet peace to pr ove this with acts and deeds and propaganda and to the competing not merely assert it in glittering national postur es of the two countries phraseology.”45 In fact, the Eisenhower as world-wide benefactors, as well as administration had been preoccupied to Soviet policies thr oughout the with pr opaganda and “psychological world. In r efusing to engage with the warfare” from the moment of Stalin’s Soviets and to accept the Soviet peace illness. 46 initiative as genuine, the Eisenhower Eisenhower sought to counter administration chose to r eplay the Soviet pr oposals, and on April 16 he propaganda match that the United gave the speech he had been consider- States was per ceived to have lost in the ing, despite Dulles’ opposition. 47 He 9 recalled the hopes of 1945 and con- will and inter ests of the br oadest trasted Soviet for ce and subversion masses of the people,” to the bour geois with American efforts for “tr ue peace” state, “which by its very natur e is alien based on cooperation and on each and hostile to the masses of the nation’s right to choose its form of people.” 50 This pr esentation was government and economic system. 48 unlikely to generate a positive r e- He str essed the cost of the arms race sponse fr om either the Eisenhower and the new Soviet leaders’ “pr ecious administration or the American press. opportunity . . . to help turn the tide of The Times first emphasized the nega- history.” He pointed to conflicts in tive featur es of TASS’ commentary, and Kor ea, Indochina, Malaya, Austria, and then questioned its meaning. 51 Germany, proposed a fund for world On the very day of the Soviet aid and r econstr uction, and challenged response, Dulles described the Soviet government to provide Eisenhower ’s speech as a “peace “concrete evidence” of its desir e for of fensive” based on America’s rebuf f peace. He of fer ed a five point pr oposal of Soviet aggr ession.” 52 He derided for arms r eduction, including limita- Soviet initiatives as a “peace defen- tions on the numbers of armed forces, sive,” a r etr eat befor e American power limits on the pr oportion of all pr oduc- and “a tactical move of the kind which tion devoted to military purposes, Soviet communism has often prac- international contr ol of atomic ener gy, ticed.” By Sunday, April 19, Dulles had limitations on other weapons “of gr eat gained sway, and American journalists destr uctiveness,” and enfor cement began to tr eat Soviet initiatives as a through inspection by the United continuation of the ongoing pr opa- Nations. The New York T imes praised ganda str uggle between the two the speech. “Eisenhower Asks Soviet sides. 53 On April 20, Newsweek caught Deeds: Peace in Asia and Disarma- the flavor of the moment with the ment; Would Use Savings to Aid caption, “Western Cold Peace Strategy: W orld,” r ead the headline. 49 Check the Gift Horse’s Teeth.” 54 A On April 17, Pravda published a week later the magazine’s headline short summary of Eisenhower ’s was sharper: “Ike Demands Deeds, not address in the middle of page four, Words as Reds Talk Peace, Wage criticizing him for defending the arms War.”55 A cartoon showed a small race and “the North Atlantic bloc,” for dumpy Malenkov threatened by a ignoring China’s national rights, and towering wave labeled “Ike’s 5 Points for failing to support the unification of for Peace.” 56 Germany according to the Potsdam On April 22, the Soviet pr ess A g r eement. The authors listed the five again signaled inter est in negotiations, points on nuclear disarmament. To but per haps too subtly to attract notice. confuse the issue, however, the Soviet The second among the familiar May pr ess otherwise r etained its usual day slogans that appeared on the fr ont format, again sending the inadvertent pages of the central newspapers was message that nothing had changed. “Long Live Peace between Peoples!” Pravda’s lead editorial on April 17 was Following the slogan was an “Daily Attention to Communal Live- unattributed quote fr om Malenkov’s stock Pr oduction,” and Izvestiia, which speech of March 15: “Ther e is no also published TASS’s r eport, invoked dispute or unr esolved question that the old stalinist jar gon by comparing cannot be settled peacefully by mutual the Soviet state, “which expr esses the agr eement of the inter ested countries.” 10 On April 25, Pravda and Izvestiia anxiety” that “the American newspa- responded directly to Eisenhower ’s pers were hailing it [the commentary speech by printing a translation and in Pravda ] as a great and concr ete identical fr ont-page commentaries. The concession by the Soviet Union,” even editors welcomed Eisenhower ’s appeal, though “they had offered no compro- but defended previous Soviet policies mises.” 62 Jackson worried for naught. and criticized those of America. They The New York T imes welcomed the too ur ged action not words. They Soviet r esponse on April 25, but soon expressed puzzlement at the contrast sour ed on Soviet motives. 63 “Observers between Eisenhower and Dulles’ thought the White House caution was speeches. “It is dif ficult to judge what well taken,” the paper r eported on comprises the external policy of the Sunday April 26. The editorialist USA,” they wrote. Soviet analysts wer e concluded: “This new statement... divided on the meaning of dashes humanity’s hopes that the Eisenhower ’s speech, but after Dulles’ Soviet leaders’ declamations about address they concluded that ther e was peace since Stalin’s death would be little chance of improving r elations. 57 followed by a r eal change of policy.” The American response to the An accompanying cartoon showed a Soviet commentary and translation was highflying peace dove carrying lar gely negative. Again propaganda “Eisenhower ’s Peace Pr ogram,” was the issue. On April 25 Bohlen cited followed by a huffing Malenkov with a the editorial and “accurate and full dove on a leash labeled “Soviet Peace translation” of Eisenhower ’s addr ess as Of fensive.” 64 Newsweek on May 4 also “unprecedented,” but the intention, he justified the administration’s caution: observed, was to defend the Soviet “Until it is satisfied that ther e’s no position and to “avoid the appearance hook in the lur e, the Eisenhower of throwing cold water on any pros- Administration won’t bite [‘at the pects of peaceful solution and im- Soviet peace bait’].” U.S. News and pr oved r elations initiated by the Pr esi- W orld Report printed Dulles’ warning dent.” 58 Similarly, a high level “inter de- that “The fr ee peoples ar e susceptible partmental r eport” dated April 24 noted to Soviet guile because they so pas- that “ther e is no basis for concluding sionately want peace that they can that the fundamental hostility of the readily be attracted by illusions of Kremlin toward the West has abated, peace.” 65 Its cover story was “Africa that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Next Goal of Communists.” rulers have changed, or that the menace The Soviet initiative suf fer ed fr o m of Communism to the free world has the opacity of Soviet politics, which diminished.” 59 Another inter depart- kept outside analysts and journalists mental r eport dated April 30, conveyed guessing about who was in charge. a similar judgment that “the r ulers of “The great question confr onting the USSR envisage a prolonged political intelligence of ficers was to determine warfare campaign exploiting the ‘peace ’ whether this new set-up in Russia theme.” 60 Dulles likewise warned the constituted personal dictatorship by N AT O council in Paris in late April Malenkov or some sort of committee against Malenkov’s “phony peace contr ol,” observed Allen Dulles at the campaign.” 61 National Security Council on March At the 141st meeting of the Na- 11.66 Six weeks later, Bohlen wr ote: tional Security Council on April 28, C. “The great question for the futur e D. Jackson, expr essed “surprise and which only time will answer is 11 whether or not the Soviet system can “when the Soviet peace offensive is be run by a committee or whether it raising doubts in people’s minds.” requir es the arbitrary power of final Despite a str oke on June 5, Churchill decision by one man.” 67 The pr ess was persisted, but was r eportedly losing also at sea. On Mar ch 11 The New York patience with his ally. His private T imes printed an article by its Soviet secr etary, Sir John Coville, noted in his specialist Harry Schwartz comparing diary after they had lunched on July the new leaders’ speeches with that of 24: “Very disappointed in Eisenhower Stalin on Lenin’s death thirty years whom he thinks both weak and stu- earlier . On Mar ch 14, Schwartz pr o- pid.” 72 vided an expose of a doctor ed pictur e In Moscow, on April 24, Bohlen of Molotov with Stalin and Mao began to question his initial appraisal captioned “ Pravda Edits Pictur e Made suggesting that although Soviet r heto- in ’50, Moving New Premier Up.” Such ric sounded familiar it might have a apparent r eadiness of the part of Soviet different meaning because the leader- leaders to distort factual r ecor ds did ship could not “disr egar d as cynically little to r eassur e the American public as he [Stalin] did the contradiction and the administration r egar ding the between word and deed.” 73 The Berlin veracity of Soviet of ficial statements. 68 uprising intervened, however. Speak- Churchill pr essed on in vain for a ing at the National Security Council on summit, anticipating developments June 18, the day after the event, that would only come much later in Eisenhower reiterated his determina- the wake of detente. His objective, he tion to “lend no semblance of moral told Eisenhower on March 27, was “to support for Soviet imperialism,” encourage and aid any development of stating that “he had made it crystal Russian life which leads to a wider clear that if ther e wer e to be a four - enjoyment by the Russian masses of power conference he himself would the consumer goods of which you certainly not be pr esent.” 74 At the same speak, and modern popular amenities meeting C. D. Jackson voiced the and diversions which play so lar ge a opinion that “the East Berliners had part in British and American life.” 69 On pulled the r ug fr om under the Krem- April 11 Churchill wr ote that “gr eat lin.” As he put it: “The Russians can hope has arisen in the world that ther e scar cely come, in the cir cumstances, to is a change of heart in the vast, mighty any four-power conference posing as masses of Russia and this can carry spokesmen for a contented democratic them far and fast and per haps into Germany which only seeks to be re- revolution.” 70 On May 4, he had even united.” 75 On July 7, nearly thr ee weeks sent Eisenhower a draft letter to after the clash in Berlin, Bohlen r e- Molotov, suggesting a meeting, but ported to the State Department: Eisenhower replied negatively. “Far I believe that we can no longer from there having been any Commu- without detriment to our purposes nist actions which we could accept as continue to dismiss the present indications of such seriousness of phase of Soviet policy both internal purpose, the Pravda editorial [about his and external as simply another speech] r epeats all the pr evious Soviet “peace campaign” designed solely positions and we are now faced with or even primarily to bemuse and new aggression in Laos.” 71 He also divide the West. The events that warned against “any action which have occurred here cumulatively could be misinterpr eted” at a time add up, in my opinion, to some- 12 thing considerably more important, death, as r evealed in the transcript of offering on the one hand more the speeches at the secret Plenum of opportunities and on the other the Central Committee of the CPSU considerably more dangers than the fr om July 2 thr ough July 7, 1953 at standard propaganda gestures which Beria was denounced. 81 which we have seen since the end of To engage ef fectively with the the war.” 76 United States in the spring of 1953 He concluded, “In its for eign Soviet leaders would have needed to relations most evidence to date would jettison the most fundamental pr ecepts indicate that the Soviet Government of their political speech and formulate desir es a return to diplomacy and a others. They would have had to dis- lessening of world tension for an pense with the Manicheanism on indefinite period of time.” 77 Y ears later which the legitimacy of the r egime had in a June 1964 interview, he looked depended almost without interruption back with some disappointment: “I since the days of Lenin. In 1953 this think it would have been very useful would have meant giving up the to have had a Summit conference in contrast between a peaceful Soviet ’53. We might have gotten a gr eat deal “camp” and the warlike American one. out of it. I must say, I didn’t advise it Discar ding the old basis for discourse then because I didn’t see the situation would also have undercut the as it looks now.”78 The insight came too country’s claim to be humanity’s chief late. Harrison E. Salisbury, who met benefactor. Nor could a more open- often with Bohlen in Moscow, r ecalled speaking r egime have maintained the of Eisenhower and Bohlen: “He cor e value of the political or der that [Eisenhower] seemed to have no citizens had to thank the leader, the inter est in the tales Bohlen wanted to party, and the state for all goods and tell about the new cr owd in Moscow. services. To pursue negotiations with Though not surprised at Dulles, the United States would have r equir ed Bohlen was shocked and bitter at a r hetoric consistent with a dif fer ent Ike.” 79 conception of the Soviet place in the The American reluctance to test world and of the nature of Soviet the sincerity of Malenkov’s and Beria’s society. apparent desir e for normalization of Only a tr emendous crisis or relations owes much to the linguistic trauma could cause Soviet leaders to conventions in which the Soviet dr op the lens thr ough which they saw leaders expr essed their views. Y et the world and the voice they used to Soviet r hetoric was more than of f- describe it. The initial defeats by the putting. Those who used it sharply Nazis and the threat to national sur - restricted their range of actions as well vival in World War II was one such as the extent to which their American trauma, and the rhetoric changed, if counterparts could understand them. temporarily.82 As soon as the tide The historian J. G. A. Pocock has turned favorable, however, the described this dilemma: “Men cannot Stalinist leadership r eturned to the old do what they have no means of saying rules of speech. Stalin’s death was they have done; and what they do another trauma, since he had ef fec- must in part be what they can say and tively center ed the language of politics conceive that it is.” 80 The old political on his person. The fact that the slogan language retained its hold on most “Thank You, Comrade Stalin,” was no Soviet leaders months after Stalin’s longer r elevant pr ovided an opening 13 for new leaders to develop new forms to messages of both sides, but as an of speech, but the pr ocess was slow, American ally he could do no more uneven, and ultimately unsuccessful. than state his views as he did. In the cr ucial months between March 5 Could Soviet leaders have mas- and the East Berlin uprising, Stalin’s ter ed a new political language in the heirs pr oved unable to express them- short time available to them befor e the selves dif ferently enough to win a East German uprising? Such a depar- hearing fr om the skeptical Eisenhower ture would have probably r equir ed a administration and the American phase of pr eparation, such as “the public. The message the new leaders thaw” under Khrushchev or glasnost conveyed was not sufficient to defeat under Gorbachev. Soviet public cultur e the powerful and enemies of normal- and its message, including the cult of ization in the United States. If a the leader, the economy of the gift, and chance to tone down the arms race was of ficial Manicheanism could not have in fact missed in 1953, failur e to com- been discar ded in their entir ety with- municate may explain in part why. out imperiling the system itself, as Soviet ideology, which suf fused the Khrushchev and Gorbachev both language of public life, constrained the found later. new leaders’ ability to expr ess a desir e What might an agreement have for peace and per haps even to imagine looked like in the spring of 1953 had what such a policy would entail. leaders successfully expr essed a desir e Americans in government and in the to forge one? Faced with the prospect media for their part neither accepted of a rearmed West Germany in NATO, Soviet peace overtur es as literal state- Stalin’s successors wer e willing to ments nor as meaningful messages. consider a neutral united and demilita- They were so fully invested in the cold rized alternative, and they did not war r hetoric that they wer e unable or commit themselves to the two-state unwilling to per ceive nuance or option and the pr omotion of a socialist subtlety in Soviet statements. For the East Germany until after the June Eisenhower administration to have uprising in East Berlin. 83 A second ar ea engaged with the new Soviet leader- of accor d might have involved the ship would have requir ed a significant movement of military observers. The br eak with the militant vision of four -power agreements after the war America’s world role set out in the allowed for some such movement in 1952 Republican Party Platform. Germany, and an extension of this Why did Churchill and Eisenhower arrangement might have had a prospect hear the same Soviet r hetoric so dif fer- of success. Later Eisenhower was to ently? Churchill, from his vantage pr opose the open skies pr ogram, which point in war -ravaged Britain, was not the Soviets wer e unwilling to accept. immersed in the almost religious Although neither option would have American cold war culture. Nor did he led to significant arms r eductions, have to contend with the same expec- either would have repr esented a start. tations about his country’s r ole in the Cultural exchange was another area in world. He may have also been less which the possibility for an opening angered by the Soviet peace campaigns may have existed, even though the of the Kor ean War. Per haps in the Soviets wer e suspicious of such activity. twilight of his car eer he had the vision In each case, however, the momentum to move beyond Manicheanism. of the strategic-military str uggle proved Churchill may have been more attuned too gr eat to overcome. 14 The cold war continued as a fr om the high cost of the pr otracted lar gely military and strategic str uggle cold war. If indeed a window of his- for almost another four decades, at toric opportunity opened partially on gr eat cost to Americans, Russians, and Stalin’s death neither of the opponents other peoples ar ound the world. The was able to use it for ef fective commu- 1970s and 1980s were marked not by nication. Rhetorical constraints, lar gely peaceful competition but by bloody of expr ession on the Soviet side and of local wars. The har dships at pr esent per ception on the American, closed the for so many people in the post-Soviet window before anyone had a chance to successor states derive in lar ge part see the view.

15 End Notes 1. I thank Kar en Br ooks, Georgiy Cherniavskiy, Daun van Ee, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Louis Galambos, John Higham, Anna Krylova, Lary May, Yale Richmond, Blair Ruble, Ron Suny, Ruud van Dijk, and Ron Walters for their helpful comments. I pr esented early versions of this essay at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago in January 2000, a joint seminar of the Kennan Institute and the Cold War International History Pr oject at the Woodro w Wilson Center in Washington, D.C, and the Russian Studies Workshop at the University of Chicago. 2. For eign Relations of the United States (her eafter , FRUS), 1952–1954, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, volume 8, 1147–1155. 3. Vladislav Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952–53,” Diplomatic History , Volume 19, number 3 (Summer, 1995), summarizes the western argument, 457. 4. John Lewis Gaddis, W e Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxfor d, 1997), 129. W. W. Rostow shares this view in Eur ope after Stalin: Eisenhower ’s Thr ee Deci- sions of Mar ch 1 1, 1953 (Austin, 1982), 74. See also William L. O’Neil. American High: the Years of Confidence, 1945–1960 (New York, 1986), 208, who cites Eisenhower ’s “baf fling attitude towar d Russia” and Bennett Kovrig, O f W alls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Eur ope (New York, 1991), 53 who writes, “It is dif ficult to avoid the conclusion that the West missed a rar e opportunity in the spring and summer of 1953 to renegotiate the division of Eur ope.” 5. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold W ar 1950–90 (New York, 1991), 148; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kr emlin’ s Cold War: from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996), 139. Pointing to a missed chance by the U.S. ar e Gary A. Donaldson, Abundance and Anxiety: America, 1945– 1960 (Westport, 1997), 95; Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War (New York, 1992), 190–191; and Deborah Welch Larson, who blames “ideology” for mutual distrust, Anatomy of Mistrust , 70. Car oline Kennedy-Pipe in Stalin’ s Cold W ar: Soviet Strategies in Eur ope, 1943 –1956 (Manches- ter, England, 1995), 172–73, likewise takes this view: “The new leadership moved rapidly to try to secur e some form of detente with the Western Powers partly in the hope of pr eventing the incorporation of West Germany into the Western military alliance. Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’ s First Lieutenant (Princeton, 1993), first suggested Beria’s r eformist views. R. G. Pikhoia, Sovetskii soiuz: Istoriia vlasti 1945– 1911 (Moscow, 1998) summarizes new information on Malenkov’s views. 6. Richar d H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety , Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. For eign Policy (Wilmington, Delaware, 1999), 54, ar gues that “Moscow’s reaction [to Eisenhower ’s speech] was lukewarm” and Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, W aging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York, 1998), 121, suggest that it was not surprising that “Eisenhower r efused to follow up his speech with any pr oposals to negotiate;” Vojtech Mastny, The Cold W ar and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York, 1996), 174. 7. Peter G. Boyle ed., The Churchill-Eisenhower Corr espondence, 1953–1955 (Chapel Hill, 1990), 41. 8. On Soviet concerns about discontent in Eastern Europe see Mark Kramer, “The Early Post- Stalin Succession Str uggle and Upheavels in East-Central Europe:

16 Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making, “ parts 1–3, Journal of Cold W ar Studies vol. 1 (Winter , 1999), 3–55, vol 2 (Spring, 1999), 3–38; vol. 3 (Fall, 1999), 3–66. 9. I ar gue this point in Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Cultur e from Revolu- tion to Cold W ar (Princeton, 2000), 195–98; See also E. S. Seniakovskaia, Fr ontovoe pokolenie. Istoriko-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie (Moscow, 1945). 10. Pravda , Mar ch 15, 1953. 11. Varlam Shalamov, Kolyma Tales, trans. John Glad (New Y ork, 1994), 284. 12. The penetration of this language into the secr et counsels of the leadership is evident in the many publications of documents. See, for example, J. Ar ch Getty and Olge V. Naumov, eds., The Road to Terr or: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939 (New Haven, 1999). 13. Jeffr ey Br ooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! , 82–105. 14. See also the article by B. Gribor ’ev, “Novogodnie ‘dary’ g-na garrimana,” in Trud , January 8, 1949. 15. Quoted from the C. D. Jackson papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas in Brands, The Devil W e Knew, 43. 16. Pravda ,August 26, 1948. 17. Pravda and Izvestiia Febr uary 2–5, 1949 also gave for eign comments on Stalin’s remarks. 18. Pravda , April 7, 1949. 19. Pravda , April 27, 1949. 20. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, 1994), 237–50. He cites a pamphlet by Major-General G. I Pokr ovsky published in 1946. 21. The document appears in Katheryn Weathersby, “Kor ea, 1949–50: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Pr elude to War,” in Cold War Interna- tional History Pr oject Bulletin 5 (Spring, 1995), 9. 22. He commented in Pravda on June 20, 1950, July 4, 1950, and August 2, 1950. His comments on August 2, 1950 consisted of thr ee r eplies to letters, which together with his earlier r emarks were r eprinted as a separate booklet. 23. Il’ia Erenburg, Liudy, Gody , Zhizn’: Vospominaniia v tr ekh tomakh (Moscow, 1990), 3:154. 24. Pravda , July 30, 1950, August 11, 1950. 25. New Times , no. 27, (July 5, 1950). 26. New Times , no 29 (July 19, 1950), 4. 27. “Address to the United Nations, New Times , Supplement to no. 48 (November 29, 1950), 2. 28. “Report of the Second World Peace Congress,” New Times , Supplement to no. 48 (Nov. 29, 1950), 9. 29. Charles E. Bohlen, W itness to History , 1929–1969 (New York, 1973), 295. 30. See for example Bess Furman, “President Rejects Y ielding to Russia” May 24, 1950 and C. L. Sulzber ger, “Soviet Pushes East as U.S. Eyes Europe,” New York T imes , May 28, 1950; and “Clayton Sees U. S. Losing ‘Cold War’” New York T imes ,

17 June 3, 1950. 31. By Morris of The Rochester Democrat and Chr onicle . 32. New York T imes , May 28, 1950. The cartoon is by Mer gen fr o m The Atlanta Journal . 33. Bohlen, Witness, 303 34. Izvestiia, Mar ch 10, 1953. 35. FRUS, 1138. 36. Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz , 105. 37. FRUS, 1141. 38. The Churchill-Eisenhower Corr espondence , 41. 39. FRUS, 1158. 40. Vladislav M. Zubok, SPSU Plenums, Leadership Str uggles, and Soviet Cold W ar Politics, CWIHP Bulletin 10 (Mar ch, 1998), 29; See also D. M. Stickle, The Beria Affair . The Secr et Transcripts of the Meetings Signalling the End of Stalinism , tran. Jean Farr ow (New York, 1992); “Delo Veriia. Plenum Ts KPSS Iiul’ 1953 goda, Stenographicheskii otchet, Izvestiia Ts KPSSS 1 (1991), 139-214, 2(1991), 141–208. On Malenkov’s views, Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz , 131–132. 41. See for example, Stephen J. Whitfield, The Cultur e of the Cold W ar (Baltimor e, 1991) and Lary May, The Big Tomorrow: Hollywood and the Politics of the American Way (Chicago, Illinois, 2000), particularly chapter five. 42. The Churchill-Eisenhower Corr espondence , 31. Sic appears in the quoted passage. 43. Ibid., 32. 44. The Churchill-Eisenhower Corr espondence , 36. 45. Ibid., 38. 46. The first discussion of Stalin’s illness at the National Security Council on M a r ch 4 concerned the exploitation of Stalin’s death for pr opaganda. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, V olume VIII, 1091–1095. 47. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower . vol. 2, The Pr esident , 92–93. 48. I cite the text in FRUS, 1 147–55. 49. New York T imes , April 17, 1953. 50. Martin Walker in The Cold War: A History (New York, 1993) suggests that Pravda published a critical commentary whereas Izvestiia, Malenkov’s power base, published the speech in full. He cites G. Arbatov, The System (New York, 1992), 43. In fact, both Pravda and Izvestiia published the critical summary by TASS on the 17 and both also published the speech and a commentary on April 25. 51. New York T imes ,April 17 and April 19 ( New of the W eek in Review ), 1953. 52. I cite the text in the New York T imes , April 19, 1953. 53. New York T imes , April 19, 1953. 54. Newsweek , April 20, 1953, 40. 55. Newsweek , April 27, 1953. 56. Newsweek ,April 27, 1953. The cartoon is by Packer fr om the New York Mirr or.

18 57. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence,” 461. 58. FRUS, 1164-65 59. FRUS, 1163. 60. FRUS, 1163. 61. Private memorandum, late April, 1953, Dulles Papers; cited by Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston, 1973), 173. 62. Eisenhower Mss. Papers as President (Ann Whitman File) NSC Series. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene Kansas. 63. New York T imes , April 26, 1953. 64. New York T imes , April 26, 1953, by White fr om The Akron Beacon-Journal . 65. U.S. News and World Report , May 1, 1953, 94. 66. FRUS, 111. 67. FRUS, 1157–58. 68. “Is Malenkov slipping?,” asked Newsweek on April 20. See also New York T imes , April 26, 1953, New of the W eek in Review , Harry Schwartz, “Who Now Rules Russia? Four Theories Weighed,” and U.S. News and World Report , May 1, 1953, 42. 69. Quoted by Martin Gilbert in Churchill: A Life, (New York, 1991), 923. 70. The Churchill-Eisenhower Corr espondence , 41. 71. FRUS, 1170–71. 72 Gilbert, Chur chill, 915. 73. FRUS, 1158. 74. Discussion at the 150th Meeting of the National Security council, June 18, 1953, 10, Eisenhower Mss. Papers as Pr esident. (Ann Whitman File) NSC Series. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene Kansas. See also Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback,” working paper No. 11, Cold War International History Pr oject (December, 1994). 75. Ibid., 10. 76. FRUS, 1193. 77. FRUS, 1195. 78. Quoted by Rostow in Eur ope after Stalin , 70, fr om the J. F. Dulles Oral History Project in the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 79. Harrison E. Salisbury, A Journey for Our Times: A Memoir (New York, 1983), 456. 80. J. G. A. Pocock, “Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 (Summer, 1972), 122. 81. D. M. Stickle, The Beria Affair . The Secr et Transcripts of the Meetings Signalling the End of Stalinism , tran. Jean Farr o w (New York, 1992); “Delo Veriia. Plenum Ts KPSS Iiul’ 1953 goda, Stenographicheskii otchet, Izvestiia Ts KPSSS 1 (1991), 139–214, 2(1991), 141–208. On Malenkov’s views, Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz , 131–132. 82. Br ooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! , 159–94. 83. Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Str uggle,” Journal of Cold W ar Stud- ies, vol. 1 (Fall, 1999), 12–14.