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How Successful Was Joseph Stalin in Establishing the Soviet Union As a Superpower?

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How Successful Was Joseph Stalin in Establishing the Soviet Union As a Superpower? doi: 10.15503/jecs20171.23.31 -RXUQDORI(GXFDWLRQ&XOWXUHDQG6RFLHW\1RB How successful was Joseph Stalin in establishing the Soviet Union as a superpower? Jakub Majkowski )DFXOW\RI/HWWHUV8QLYHUVLW\RI:URFãDZ SO8QLZHUV\WHFNL:URFãDZ E-mail address: [email protected] Abstract 7KLVHVVD\ZLOOÀUVWO\DGGUHVVWKHH[WHQWRI-RVHSK6WDOLQ·VDFKLHYHPHQWVLQOHDGLQJ WKHFRXUVHIRUGRPHVWLFSROLF\RIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQDQGLWVFRQWULEXWLRQWRZDUGVPDLQ- WDLQLQJWKHFRXQWU\·VVXSUHPDF\LQWKHZRUOGIRUH[DPSOHWKHUDSLGSRVWZDUUHFRYHU\ RILQGXVWU\DQGDJULFXOWXUHDQGVHFRQGO\WKHIRUHLJQSROLF\LQFOXGLQJDPELJXRXVUHOD- WLRQVZLWK&RPPXQLVWJRYHUQPHQWVRIFRXQWULHVIRUPLQJWKH(DVWHUQ%ORFPDLQWDLQLQJ IUDLODOOLDQFHVDQGJURZLQJDQWDJRQLVPWRZDUGVZHVWHUQSRZHUVHVSHFLDOO\WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHVRI$PHULFD 7KHDFWLRQVDQGLQÁXHQFHRI-6WDOLQ·VFORVHVWDVVRFLDWHVLQWKH&RPPXQLVW3DUW\DQG WKHHIIHFWRI6RYLHWSURSDJDQGDRQWKHVRFLHW\DUHDOVRUHYLHZHG7KLVLQYHVWLJDWLRQZLOO FRYHUWKHSHULRGIURPWR$GGLWLRQDOO\RWKHUIDFWRUVVXFKDVWKHLPSDFWRID SRVWZDUZRUOGZLGHHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQDQGDWWLWXGHRIWKHVRFLHW\RIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ ZLOOEHGLVFXVVHG Key words6RYLHW8QLRQ&RPPXQLVP6WDOLQ:RUOG:DUVXSHUSRZHU Introduction 7KHUHLJQRI-RVHSK6WDOLQUHPDLQVDFRQWURYHUVLDOWRSLFLQ5XVVLD$OWKRXJK 1LNLWD .UXVKFKHY·V GH6WDOLQL]DWLRQ RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ UHYHDOHG WKH H[WHQW RIDWURFLWLHVLQÁLFWHGE\WKHGHFHDVHGOHDGHURQWKHVRFLHW\VXFKDVWKH*UHDW 3XUJHRIWKH&RPPXQLVW3DUW\DQGUHQRZQHGPLOLWDU\RIÀFLDOVQDWLRQZLGH *XODJFDPSVIRUFHGUHVHWWOHPHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQRUQXPHURXVPDVVDFUHV RIFLYLOLDQVWKHIDFWWKDWXQGHU-6WDOLQ·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