Martin McCauley. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007. xxix + 522 pp. $38.00, paper, ISBN 978-0-582-78465-9.
Vladislav Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 488 S. $39.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8078-3098-7.
Reviewed by Andreas Hilger
Published on H-HistGeog (April, 2008)
Almost ffteen years after the dissolution of terpreters of Soviet international behavior during the Soviet Union, there is still no real consensus the Cold War era, combines his reading of Soviet concerning the reasons for its demise. This is due foreign policy with a challenging discussion of partly to the continued lack of access to important profound shifts in the perceptions, thinking, and archival materials, and partly to the complexity of reformist enthusiasm of Moscow's ruling circles international and internal developments and and élite, while McCauley seems to prefer a pre‐ pressures that contributed to the Soviet implo‐ dominantly economic, long-term diagnosis. Both sion. Vladislav Zubok's insightful study and Mar‐ accounts are based not only on a vast collection of tin McCauley's comprehensive textbook obviously primary and secondary sources--with Zubok the serve diferent purposes (and cover periods of dif‐ more successful hunter--but also, almost unavoid‐ ferent lengths), but both--McCauley's work more ably in current Soviet studies, on a huge stock of or less implicitly--have to address this fundamen‐ personal experiences. Again, it is Zubok who tal question. The approaches and fndings of these translates more successfully individual encoun‐ well-written works refect the enormous range of ters and former impressions into historical ques‐ possible explanations for the Soviet Union's unex‐ tioning. On the other hand, McCauley's personal pected end. Zubok, one of the most prominent in‐ recollections underline contemporary possibilities H-Net Reviews for detecting cracks behind Soviet façades as well led to the accumulation of power. Nevertheless, as the dangers of focusing on earlier certainties. the meaning of "security," "competition," and the Analogous to this methodological problem, his use stage of being satisfed were defned not only by of jokes illuminates not only "one's understanding state interest, but by ideological perceptions and and add[s] to the pleasure of studying other cul‐ convictions as well. Indeed, this fundamental of tures" (p. xxii), but shows a certain neglect for Soviet international behavior helps to explain the specifc cultural underpinnings. It is subject to de‐ contradictory zigzag of Stalin's international un‐ bate whether "many of the best Russian jokes are dertakings, and it contributes to the analysis of either Jewish or Armenian," (p. xxii) or whether Nikita Khrushchev's worldwide adventurism that several Russian jokes are simply anti-Semitic and culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Those days anti-Caucasian, respectively. McCauley's descrip‐ revealed the pernicious mixture of ideological tion of Chechens as "specialists in black market over-optimism and half-cooked strategic consider‐ dealings and violence" and his nonchalant--and ations; incidentally, the deep gap between today's pointless--revelation of the Jewish orgins of some relatively positive assessments of Khrushchev's Russian politicians are noteworthy in this context, courageous rejection of Stalin and newer research too (pp. 388, 465-466). (including Zubok's) concerning Khrushchev's for‐ As mentioned earlier, Zubok concentrates on eign policy is remarkable. That research again the foreign policy aspects of the Soviet empire-- its points to the enormous importance of Soviet lead‐ diplomatic history and those who occupied the in‐ ers' personalities in the USSR's concrete imple‐ ner circles of policy formulation and implementa‐ mentation of "proletarian internationalism." Be‐ tion. As a result, the impact of, for instance, inter‐ sides, a state system like the Soviet Union's, orga‐ nal nationalisms on external positions--noticeable nized around personal networks and hierarchies, as early as the Iran crisis--remains vague;[1] added infuential ingredients to international pol‐ equally, the weight of economic developments-- icy-making. Zubok skilfully demonstrates the inti‐ the USSR's special challenge"or strategic military mate, direct relationship between power struggles options await more detailed explanations.[2] and foreign policy maneuvers in the post-Stalinist Above all, these omissions refect the uneven years: the new openness toward Yugoslavia and stage of research. Austria put an end to Vyacheslav Molotov's do‐ mestic career as well. This Soviet intertwining of Zubok explains in detail the impact of Soviet domestic and international policy-making contin‐ economic and psychological exhaustion on the ued until the end of the empire. At the same time, emergence of the Cold War. Iran and Turkey the new (semi-)collective leadership and its poli‐ proved to be the frst serious tests of Western pa‐ tics of limited de-Stalinization gave way to the tience, although the main frontline ran through emergence of a new generation, the "men and Germany--rightfully, Zubok links the Korean War women of the sixties." The social, and, more im‐ to the global antagonistic developments in Asia portant, the mental and cultural transformations and Europe. Some unnecessary inaccuracies not‐ of the post-Stalinist years appear as Zubok's cru‐ withstanding (pp. 64, 70), these frst chapters rep‐ cial point on the way to the Union's fall. According resent a successful overview of Josef Stalin's con‐ to Zubok, those years saw, among others, the birth tribution to the Cold War. For his classical ap‐ of new, "enlightened" apparatchiks whose fond‐ proach to diplomatic history, Zubok relies once ness for reforms and liberalization eforts made more on his classical conceptual framework, that Gorbachev's new designs conceivable and possi‐ is, the "revolutionary-imperial paradigm": The de‐ ble. fensive quest for security in a competitive world
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In this longue durée, the Brezhnev reign ap‐ Cold War, a somehow static comparison of Hitler, pears as a dragging demonstration of systemic pe‐ Stalin, and Mao, considerations of "Bolshevik culiarities as well as shortcomings of the Soviet speak," Chernobyl, and a fnal chapter "Russia Re‐ system, of the inertia of ideological conceptions born." In striking contrast to Zubok, discussion of, and Cold Warriors' convictions, and of the depen‐ for instance, "RYAN" or social post-Stalinist trans‐ dence of international solutions on the big "oth‐ formations are missing. McCauley's work com‐ er," with its problems, failures, and erroneous bines vivid text passages, several informative conclusions. Against this background, it took background materials, and telling illustrations. "Brezhnev's personal and increasingly emotional Unfortunately, his maps show a clear bias in favor involvement and his talents as a domestic consen‐ of the Stalin era; the biographies are selective sus builder" (p. 223) to reach a deténte that lasted (with Georgy Malenkov and Nikolai Bucharin from 1968 until 1972; the aforementioned factors missing); the reader simply has to know the origi‐ led to its limited duration. Zubok sees the bipolar nal sources and arguments; and McCauley's fur‐ ideology of the Soviet Union, with its belief in ther readings and (helpful) sample questions do "peace through strength," combined with the (of‐ not always refect the chapter's narrative. In gen‐ ten realized) "potential for an anti-deténte back‐ eral, McCauley claims to tell a "tale of the Russian lash in the United States" (p. 231) and specifc and other Soviet peoples overthrowing their mas‐ overvaluations of Soviet strategic skills in Africa ters and their world view" (p. xxi)--instead, and (Angola), Europe (Poland), and Asia (Afghanistan), this is the main weakness, his central theme is the as main obstacles to a lasting reconciliation. alleged total incompetence of communist systems Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the majority of in all spheres of life and politics (p. xxi). Thus his those ingredients of a self-perpetuating Cold War textbook turns into a timeline of events, colored became obsolete. He based his foreign policy on by a Cold War victor's perspective and suggestions his conviction in the world's interdependence, de‐ of ideological superiority (pp. 405, 427, 438-439). veloped a profound afnity for the West, and was Stimulating refections alternate with too-easy able to elicit, after the U.S. government's long hesi‐ conclusions (pp. 229, 390-391), and outdated or in‐ tation, the cooperation of Western politicians. Ex‐ correct statements (pp. 335-336, 355-356, 402-403) planations for the end of the Cold War that focus overshadow insightful summaries. The discussion exclusively on either the decline of Soviet power on p. 445 of the importance of moral, intellectual, in combination with Reagan's successful accelera‐ cultural as well as economic and technological tion of the arms race, or on domestic structural factors for the collapse of the USSR raises relevant (economic and fnancial) reasons, again neglect questions; unfortunately, it is not really refected the important role of Soviet leaders' personalities, in the previous 444 pages. The above-mentioned worldviews, and attitudes in a system of personal economic argument, developed between the lines, leadership. sufers from this mixture of educated guesses, generalizations of personal experiences, and In contrast to Zubok's multifaceted interpre‐ somewhat unexpected certainties. Nevertheless, tation of the Soviet handling of the Cold War, Mc‐ although unreliable as a guide through Soviet his‐ Cauley aims to present a comprehensive descrip‐ tory, the textbook points to relevant topics which tion of the Soviet years, including, among others, may enrich analyses of the Soviet experiment and the year 1917, the Cheka (linked with the Com‐ its failure. intern under the title "Soviet Power, Terror and Civil War"), the nationality question, women, Notes diplomats and spies, the Gulag, World War II, the
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[1]. Jamil Hasanli, At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941-1946 (Lanham: Rowman & Lit‐ tlefeld, 2006). [2]. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006); for the military input, see for example I. B. Bystrova, Sovetskii voenno-promyshlennyi kom‐ pleks: problemy stanovleniia i razvitiia (1930-1980-e gody) (Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi Is‐ torii, 2006).
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Citation: Andreas Hilger. Review of McCauley, Martin. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. ; Zubok, Vladislav. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. H-HistGeog, H-Net Reviews. April, 2008.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=14425
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
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