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Working Paper Series 2018/22/EFE Working Paper Series 2018/22/EFE Trump: A Tragi-Comedy Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries INSEAD, [email protected] This article explores the concept of tragi-comedy in which both forms of artistic endeavor are combined. An example of the genre, the film “The Death of Stalin”, is reviewed, portraying the consequences of dictatorial leadership. However, it is not only in the Russian mindscape where tragi-comedy can turn into a cautionary tale about flawed leadership. Looking at the state of the world, “great men” are once more on the rise and disturbing socio-political developments are occurring even in the “land of the free”. Given President Trump’s determination to “Make America Great Again”, this article explores the question of how he is recasting leadership. What’s very disturbing in these dynamics is the obsequiousness of his inner circle. Drawing parallels with scenes from the firm in the aftermath of Stalin’s death, I explore how exposure to flattery prevents leaders from recognizing the hidden agendas behind such behavior. Flattery has an insidious way of moving into the collective unconscious, often with devastating results. Observations are made about the interface between flattery and groupthink, as well as how it gives rise to social defenses. Ultimately, the question becomes, will Trump’s presidency be a comedy or tragedy? Keywords: Dysfunctional Leadership; “Great Man”; Obsequiousness; Flattery; Social Defenses; Groupthink; Faulty Decision-Making Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3193844 A Working Paper is the author’s intellectual property. It is intended as a means to promote research to interested readers. Its content should not be copied or hosted on any server without written permission from [email protected] Find more INSEAD papers at https://www.insead.edu/faculty-research/research Nothing in this world is harder than speaking the truth, nothing easier than flattery. —Fyodor Dostoevsky Flattery is all right if you don’t inhale. —Adlai Stevenson My IQ is one of the highest — and you all know it! Please don’t feel so stupid or insecure; it’s not your fault. —Donald Trump Tragedy or comedy A thin line separates joy and pain, hurt and humor, and for that matter, tragedy and comedy (Williams, 1966; Kerr, 1985; Walton, 2015; Day, 2016). Both depict human foibles but there are differences in the way in which they are dealt with, as well as in their outcomes. A simple distinction is to describe tragedy as a serious story with a sad ending, while comedy is a humorous story with a happy ending. Generally speaking, tragedy teaches important lessons of life by arousing a sense of pity or terror. In such instances, the dramatization of the “tragic flaw” of the protagonist leads to his or her downfall. In contrast, comedies take the perspective that life is ridiculous and absurd; faults and weaknesses are depicted as foolish. And like tragedy, comedy casts light on human shortcomings. Unlike tragedy, however, it makes fun of conceit and self-delusion, yet 1 allows for personal improvement and self-renewal in the end, whereas tragedy usually ends in the protagonist’s demise—physically or spiritually. Tragi-comedy is the arena where comedy and tragedy meet, where tragedy contains enough comic elements to lighten the serious mood with a happy ending, intertwining conflicting emotions (Foster, 2004). After all, to know happiness, we must know sadness; experiencing sadness creates a greater appreciation for happiness. As is so often the case in theatre, the glue that connects the two art forms turns out to be humor, which is a highly effective way to cope with devastating situations. This interconnectedness is masterfully portrayed in the film “The Death of Stalin”, a tragi- comedy directed by the Scottish satirist, Armando Iannucci (Nuru, 2017), which depicts the aftermath of the passing one of the greatest monsters of the 20th century: Joseph Stalin. Following his sudden demise, the capital Moscow is plunged into disarray. The state of chaos portrayed demonstrates what years of dictatorship have done to a society. Its tragi-comic nature led to the decision by Russia’s Ministry of Culture’s to ban the film, labeling it “offensive” and “extremist” (Telegraph, January 23, 2018). Most likely, it cut too close to the bone of the Putin era élite. To be reminded of a terrifying past is one thing, but to mock a serious and horrific event must have been—at least to the censors—one step too far. Stalin’s reign was not only terrifying, it was also terrifying in its ridiculousness. For example, the film shows how in the short episode before Stalin’s death his entourage behaved in an extremely obsequious, farcical way—a way of acting that may have been 2 unacceptable to senior government officials. The mocking of the Communist top brass held up a mirror that the censors refused to look into. It may have been too much of a reminder mof what’s happen ing in the present. The death of Stalin After Stalin’s death, the film shows how his cronies embark on a frantic power struggle. Among the prime contenders are the dimwitted Georgy Malenkov, the shrewd Nikita Khrushchev, and the sadistic chief of the Soviet security and secret police apparatus, Lavrentiy Beria. Combining Machiavellian-like intrigue with riotous farce, the film becomes a caricature of bureaucratic dysfunction. Given its similarity to present-day Russia—a resemblance that must have been obvious to Putin’s government officials—it offers insights on what can go wrong when a country is under dictatorial leadership. The depiction of what may happen when “great men” die is uncanny. Like other tragicomedies, it is not only a comment on the societal ills that are hard to express in a more direct way, but also an attempt to master the fear and anxiety that such leaders propagate. The rise of “great men” It is not only Russia to which this tragi-comedy offers a cautionary tale about flawed leadership. Looking at the state of the world, it is worrisome to see how many “great men” are once more on the rise. Even in the “land of the free” we are faced with disturbing developments. In seeking to “Make America Great Again”, Trump has taken a dangerous way to redefine what leadership is all about. Given his flawed leadership style, it begs the question what his presidency will do to America. The way he is running the country offers 3 many similarities with the imagery presented in the film “The death of Stalin”. Should we look at his presidency as a tragedy or comedy? Looking at Trump’s daily reality show, is he making us cry or laugh, or both? Trump’s presidential arc provides many insights about human fallibility. Will his antics lead to a dramatic reversal of fortune? Will he go from hero to zero? Will Trump—like most tragic heroes—finally (albeit too late) realize his errors? Will hubris and vindictiveness contribute to his downfall? But taking another angle, will Trump transform into a comic hero? Could he simply be holding up a mirror to society to reflect its follies and vices in the hope that they will be mended? Admittedlyj, people who have to deal with “great men” like Trum need to be obsequious in order to survive. To speak truth to power can only be done at their own risk. In that context, Trump has been compared to a Mafia boss, an observation made by former FBI Director James Comey (2018). In his book A higher loyalty, Comey observes the dynamics at play in Trump’s inner court: “The silent circle of assent. The boss in complete control. Loyalty oaths. The us-versus-them world view. The lying about all things, large and small, in service to some code of loyalty.” However, the Mafia boss analogy may not be entirely appropriate. Looking at the developments in Washington, the White House seems more like a medieval court, with its cliques and coerced displays of fealty, all taking place under the somewhat paranoid eye of Trump and his close family. Given what they are up against, his courtiers have 4 figured out that the only way to survive his peculiar “reign” is through flattery taken to the extreme. The dangers of obsequiousness Given Trump’s narcissistic needs, members of his Cabinet are expected to break out spontaneously in lavish praise of the “great man” at a moment’s notice (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1985; Millon, 1995; Kets de Vries, 2017). Due to his psychological insecurities, Trump’s main management objective seems to be to keep the people that work for him off balance, while at the same time expecting conspicuous acts of loyalty. No wonder, that members of Congress—even past critics—have figured out that dramatic shows of subservience are a precondition for getting anything done. People in Trump’s inner circle surpass each other in expressing their subservience at an unmatched, highly creative level. Some examples: the outgoing Speaker of the House Paul Ryan praised Trump’s “exquisite leadership.” Senator Orrin Hatch declared that “one of the great privileges of my life [is] to stand here on the White House lawn with the president of the United States who I love and appreciate so much.” Stephen Miller, a favorate Trump aide, “sees a man who [is] a political genius.” Nobody, however, has attained the heights of obsequiousness of Vice President Mike Pence, “thanking him for fulfilling miracles,” and crediting him with “restoring American credibility on the world stage, spurring record-setting optimism.” As a final accolade, Pence in his role as “flatterer-in-chief” added that “serving the president is the greatest privilege of my life.” 5 All leaders have blind spots.
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