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SWP Journal Review NO. 1 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction

The Difficult Normalisation of Relations between Arab Countries and Bashar al-Assad From International Journals, Think Tank Publications and Arab News Media, 2019–2020 Sarah Ch. Henkel

The Syrian seems to have been decided in favour of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the process and the debate about the normalisation of relations between Arab states and , as well as the country’s possible readmis- sion into the (AL), have already begun. A return to normality would help strengthen the legitimacy of the Syrian regime. This, however, would run counter to efforts by , the (EU) and the USA, who seek to force the Syrian regime by means of sanctions and isolation to negotiate a political solution to the conflict. In addition to Syria’s contentious return to the AL, the articles examined here discuss the motives of those Arab countries wishing to normalise relations with , and the influence that external actors and the Covid pandemic exert on this process.

Beyond the military victory brought about the AL in November 2011. coun- by and , the Assad regime cru- tries, and , for example, were cially needs legitimisation, especially from mostly neutral towards the Syrian govern- the , to consolidate its authority ment. Moreover, Russia’s intervention and reconstruct the country. The debate already foreshadowed in 2015 that the about the rapprochement between Arab Assad regime would remain in place. Since states and Damascus is marked by contro- then, various events have accelerated the versy. The majority of these states supported discussion about the normalisation of Assad’s enemies at the start of the conflict. relations between Arab countries and the His uncompromising war also seriously Assad regime: first, the reopening of the destabilised neighbouring countries, above UAE’s and ’s embassies in Damas- all and . Yet at no point cus in December 2018; second the (failed) during the civil war was Syria wholly iso- attempt to have Syria readmitted to the AL lated – not even after its exclusion from in 2019, driven by ,

and presumably ; and third, the that is affiliated with the Arab Center for reinstatement of Oman’s ambassador to Research and Policy Studies in . He writes Damascus on 4 October 2020. that, ironically, it is the differences of This journal review examines this debate opinion between Arab countries that have with a particular focus on Jordan and Leba- prevented them from taking the “foolish non, which are not involved in the Syrian and costly decision” to rashly readmit Syria civil war but have nonetheless been strongly to the AL. In his view, the Arab world has impacted by it. The review will also exam- to “hold on to at least a veneer of respect- ine those countries that have assumed the ability” and make any resumption of rela- role of opinion leaders through their active tions with Assad’s conditional commitment and positioning in favour of on the regime atoning for its crimes and normalising relations: the UAE and Egypt. initiating a political process. However, he It will draw on analyses by Arab, American, adds, most Arab are authori- European and Russian researchers, pub- tarian themselves and meanwhile gladly lished in 2019 and 2020 in Arab and inter- refrain from calling for a democratic tran- national think tanks, journals and Arab sition in Syria. news media. According to the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies – a research, cultural and media institute headquartered in Doha The Trend towards Normalisation and , and affiliated with Doha’s Arab Center – it is unlikely that Arab coun- The dominant debate on the readmission tries will give the Syrian regime, its methods of Syria to the AL often evokes the lack of and hostile posture towards them free rein. regional consensus for such institutional The main Arab actors involved in Syria, it reintegration of Damascus. While some claims, have no interest in Syria’s “victori- articles call on Arab countries not to accom- ous return” to the AL because they have modate Syria, equally there is criticism their own priorities, interests and condi- of the organisation’s current state and the tions, which Assad would have to meet increasingly authoritarian governments before his government could enjoy reinte- of its member states. Other commentators gration into the . Yet, the authors even suspect that Damascus could exploit argue that Arab governments’ normalisa- the dire situation to its advantage. tion of relations with Assad serve them as In an article for Atlantic Council, the the latest evidence of the futility of their analysts Ali Hussein Bakeer own peoples’ uprisings. Ever since the fail- and Giorgio Cafiero argue that despite ure of the AL’s initiative to mediate the a trend among Arab countries towards in 2011, the organisation normalising their relations with Syria the is paralysed and its policies mostly reflect question of Assad’s legitimacy strongly their member states’ divergences. Yet, the polarises the region. The UAE, Bahrain, Iraq organisation has become a means to protect and North African countries have called for Arab rulers and legitimate the suppression and encouraged the resumption of bilateral of their people. relations with Damascus as well as Syria’s Tatyana Shmeleva, a Middle East re- return to the AL. Relations with its neigh- searcher with the Russian International Affairs bour Jordan have been steadily improving Council (RIAC), a think tank close to the Rus- as well. and Egypt have pointed sian government, believes that AL members out the necessity of a UN-led political solu- that voted to expel Syria from the organi- tion to the civil war, and only has sation have no business lecturing Syria on categorically rejected normalising relations and . Syria, she with Syria. writes, does not depend on the AL and could Imad K. Harb is the director of the Arab afford to wait for more favourable con- Center Washington DC, a research institution ditions in the region for its re-accession.

SWP Journal Review 1 November 2020

2 Daniel L. Byman of the Center for Middle political price risks being too high. In East Policy at the , seen Lebanon, he points out, rapprochement as close to the US Democrats, also views with Syria also has a domestic driver: the Damascus as being in a position of strength steady strengthening of , Assad’s towards the Arab world and the West. For ally, has shifted the discourse in Byman, the fear of continued instability, towards resuming relations with its neigh- especially at Syria’s borders, has caused bour. According to El-Halabi, Lebanese neighbouring countries to resume contact politicians’ instrumentalisation of the one with the Assad regime, albeit quietly. The million Syrian refugees in the country – Syrian regime, he suggests, could demand the largest refugee-per-inhabitant ratio any- financial support and structured coopera- where in the world – has turned public tion from its neighbours and the EU for opinion in favour of entering into talks re-admitting Syrian refugees. Further, he with Damascus for the sake of the return of believes that a limited problem, refugees. The repatriation of refugees is also deliberately controlled by Damascus, could a priority for Jordan in its relations with help the Syrian government obtain Euro- Syria. As Jordan’s ailing economy further pean and US support and present itself as suffered from several years of border clo- part of a counterterrorist coalition. To that sures with Iraq and Syria, the reopening of end, Byman writes, Assad may release border crossings, he writes, is another key jihadists of the so-called Islamic State from reason for its exchanges with Damascus. prison, as he did at the outbreak of the civil Mohammed Bani Salameh and Ayman war, to exert pressure on potential coopera- Hayajneh of Yarmouk University in Irbid, tion partners. Jordan, devote an article in the Middle East Quarterly, a journal published by the Middle East Forum headquartered in Philadelphia, Diverging Motives USA, to the situation in Jordan. They em- phasise that the country is becoming ever The debate about what motivates countries more dependent on foreign aid by the US, to strive to normalise relations with Syria the EU and the Gulf states due to its socio- shows a complex mix of issues. For Jordan economic and political problems, which are and Lebanon, commentators write that exacerbated by the . This, they their economic interests and domestic point out, significantly limits ’s politics are decisive, as well as the fact that room for manoeuvre in foreign policy: the Syrian civil war has had a big impact Jordan has to meet its donors’ demands on them. The UAE’s and Egypt’s motives, to position itself against Assad while also however, are according to observers best having to contend with its own concerns accounted for by the countries’ financial about the Syrian uprising and the Syrian and security interests, and geopolitical opposition. They conclude that Amman’s rivalry with Iran and . tightrope act of reconciling complex and In an article for the report “Rebuilding often contradictory domestic, regional and Syria” published by the Istituto per gli Studi international interests in relation to Syria di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) in Milan, in a coherent approach is becoming in- the Lebanese Middle East analyst Bachar creasingly difficult. El-Halabi describes how Lebanon’s and Jor- The French-Lebanese journalist Mona dan’s pressing economic needs are urging Alami writes in her article for the Atlantic these countries to be open towards Damas- Council that Hezbollah and its allies misuse cus. In the medium term, he believes, both Lebanon as a platform for supporting Assad. countries will have to tap the economic This misuse, she claims, significantly con- potential offered by the reconstruction of tributes to the country’s collapse and irre- Syria and use their strategically and logis- versibly ties Lebanon’s fate to that of Syria. tically favourable location, even if the For her, Hezbollah’s military involvement

SWP Journal Review 1 November 2020

3 in the Syrian civil war – which runs coun- seeking a rapprochement with Damascus, ter to the Lebanese government’s decision he writes, the two Gulf states plan to con- from 2012 to disssociate itself from Assad solidate Syria’s place in the Sunni Arab and the conflict – has turned Lebanon into world. However, Cafiero sees no indications a pariah state and distanced it from its Arab that Assad would want to break with Tehran. and Western partners. She points out that Nevertheless, he points out, the two Gulf despite Lebanon’s heavy national debt and could render Damascus two dwindling currency reserves, Hezbollah important services that neither Iran nor along with other pro-Syrian parties con- Russia can provide: the Gulf states could tinues to ensure that Syria is supplied with contribute financially to the reconstruction subsidised food and oil. Due to its coopera- of Syria and promote Syria’s rapproche- tion with Damascus, she states, Beirut not ment with the US and EU. For him, the only exacerbates tensions with the US and legacy of the 2003 , which exposed the Gulf states whose support it relies on the Arab world to Iran’s influence, strongly to overcome the economic and financial motivates Abu Dhabi and Bahrain to reach crisis; it also risks US sanctions as part of out to Damascus. the Caesar Act. Joseph Daher, a Swiss-Syrian Associate Chafic Choucair, a researcher of Leba- Professor at the European University Institute nese origin at the Centre for Studies (EUI) in Florence, takes issue with this in in Doha, comes to the conclusion that his study for the project Wartime and Post- saving Lebanon from collapse will require Conflict in Syria. He argues that it is mislead- not just the implementation of economic ing to assume that the normalisation of reforms and a new social contract, but relations between the UAE and Assad is above all Beirut’s disengagement from Syria based on Abu Dhabi’s efforts to counter and Iran. In his analysis, the explosion in Iran’s and Turkey’s influence in Syria. For the port of Beirut and the possibility that him, the UAE’s rapprochement with Damas- Hezbollah was indirectly or directly in- cus is instead based on regional political volved deepens the social divide between developments, the resulting shift in Abu those who support Hezbollah’s dominant Dhabi’s foreign policy priorities, and eco- role and Beirut’s association with Damas- nomic interests. In 2011 and 2012, the cus, and those who call for disarming the UAE followed its partners from the Gulf militia and establishing closer relations Cooperation Council (GCC) in condemning with Saudi Arabia and the West. The for- Assad and supporting the opposition. How- mation of a Lebanese unity government ever, Daher points out, diplomatic and is crucial, he believes, for overcoming the economic channels to Damascus remained country’s divisions and multiple crises. This informally open, and the UAE sheltered would require a regional and international members of the Syrian regime. He ascribes consensus, including with Iran, on neutral- the UAE’s absence from the Syrian conflict ising Lebanon; which would also mean between 2015 and 2018 to Abu Dhabi’s Hezbollah having to withdraw from Syria competing foreign policy priorities in and retreat into Lebanon’s interior. If this and , and the boycott of Qatar since fails, he fears that Lebanon might get caught 2017. In his view, mutual interests in reviv- up in further regional conflicts alongside ing economic relations were an important Syria. factor in the rapprochement between Syria To decrease Iran’s influence in the and the UAE, with the latter having invest- region, the UAE and Bahrain are gradually ment opportunities in real estate, luxury seeking closer ties with Assad’s govern- products, transport and trade – sectors ment, according to Giorgio Cafiero, the which traditionally benefited significantly founder of Gulf State Analytics, in Inside from Emirati foreign direct investment Arabia, an Arab-American online news before 2011, as the second-largest Arab in- magazine based in Washington D.C. By vestor. According to Daher, the Syrian civil

SWP Journal Review 1 November 2020

4 war has generated a new economic elite Damascus marks a new phase in the Syrian that is loyal to the regime, while the Syrian conflict. In Majid’s view, Washington’s commercial in the UAE which pre- reticent policy towards the Syrian regime, viously acted as middlemen lost its network even when the latter deployed chemical in Damascus. Possible foreign investment weapons, convinced the Arab world that in Syria thus needs to go through business the US had no desire to topple Assad de- networks connected with Assad. spite its initial mobilisation against him. Economic interests, especially those con- Russia subsequently rescued the Syrian cerning the reconstruction of Syria, are regime by intervening from 2015 onwards also a motive for Egypt to seek contact with and created new facts on the ground, inter Damascus, writes the Egyptian journalist alia as part of the Astana process. According Albaraa Abdullah on the Arab-American to Majid, Western and Arab governments news website Al-Monitor. However, he sees tolerated this new status quo, which paved ’s primary focus as being stability: the way for the resumption of contact with Egyptian President al-Sisi, himself a military Damascus by some Arab states, spurred on man, supports the because by the Kremlin. Had it not been for the he considers the integrity of Syria as fun- sanctions imposed by the US and the EU damental for the security and stability of other Arab countries would have been likely Egypt. [The main focus here is the regional to join the UAE’s energetic push towards fight against Islamist groups; editor’s note]. normalisation. The main reasons for most As Egypt is not involved in the war in Syria, Arab countries avoiding further risks in maintains contacts with both the regime seeking rapprochement with Assad, accord- and parts of the opposition, and has brought ing to Majid, are the severity of the sanc- about a between tions, Washington’s unpredictable course factions in the past, Cairo is for Abdullah vis-à-vis Iran, and the unforeseeable conse- best suited to mediate between Syria, the quences of a definitive US withdrawal from region’s countries and the international Syria. community. The afore-mentioned article by Tatyana Shmeleva of the Russian International Affairs Council also represents the Russian perspec- Great Powers and Arab Interests tive, which views the West’s isolation of Syria as powerful, but fundamentally International commentators agree that flawed. The author explains that the West Russia has become the dominant foreign is preventing Syria’s reintegration into the power in the Arab world, but that the region, as the legitimisation of the Syrian threat of US and EU sanctions outweighs government by Arab countries would lay this status, and prevents the Arab world’s bare the failure of the West’s Syria policy relations with the Syrian regime from being while demonstrating the effectiveness of normalised. Non-Western observers criticise Russia’s. that the political and economic isolation Less biased but similarly critical is the of Syria imposed by the US and EU aims to article by Eyal Zisser, vice rector of whitewash their reluctance to intervene in University, in Middle East Quarterly: he con- the Syrian civil war as well as the failure of siders that the Syria policy adopted by the their democratisation policies in the region. West (here, the US) and the resulting isola- Ziyad Majid, a Lebanese Professor in tion of the Assad regime are still guided by Middle East Studies at the American Uni- the “delusion of regional democratisation”. versity in Paris, writes in an article for the For him, Assad’s brutality against his own Al Jazeera Centre for Studies in Doha that people as well as his alliance with the decision of Arab countries to follow up and Tehran have made the attainment of their original rejection of the Syrian regime these ideals more remote, and herald the with the normalisation of relations with end of Pax Americana in the region. In

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5 Zisser’s analysis, Russia emerges as the true tributes to a wider acceptance of Assad’s victor of the conflict, and allows Moscow to rule both regionally and internationally. In regain its long-lost status as the mightiest their view, particularly the posturing of the foreign power in the Middle East. UAE’s Crown Prince Bin Zayid In an article for the English-language could be instrumental for Syria’s regional daily , published in Abu Dhabi, rehabilitation: he has emphasised that the the journalist and essayist Faisal Al Yafai humanitarian challenges presented by the speaks out against the USA and Russia in- pandemic outweigh any political issues fluencing the relations between Arab states between the two countries. The crisis is also and Syria. Russia’s aim in pressing Arab convenient for Moscow, the authors argue, states to re-establish relations with Assad, in its efforts to rehabilitate Assad’s govern- he writes, is to attract funds for Syria’s ment in the region and internationally: costly reconstruction, which Moscow will Putin insists that Damascus serves as the be involved in for the medium to long sole administrator of crisis measures and term. While the US is right to ostracise the aid delivered to Syria. The regime, Al Yafai points out, the sanctions meanwhile have called for sanctions against also punish the civilian population and en- Syria to be relaxed during the pandemic. courage Damascus to destabilise the region Khaled Yacoub Oweis, a Jordanian further. In his view, the US and Arab coun- journalist and Middle East analyst, argues tries take up diametrically opposed posi- in an article for The National that the Syrian tions: the US is convinced that isolating regime is aiming to capitalise politically on Assad will sooner or later force him to re- the crisis to blame the US and EU sanctions linquish his alliance with Iran; from the for the hardship in the country. As the Arab perspective, however, it is precisely Syrian regime seeks to rejoin the AL, Oweis this exclusion of Syria that is driving the writes, it affirms its independence from Iran country into the arms of Russia and Iran. issuing propaganda claiming that the virus Al Yafai therefore concludes that neither was brought into the country by Shiite pil- the US nor Russia can contribute to improv- grims from neighbouring countries rather ing conditions for within or outside than – as is generally assumed – by mili- of Syria, and that it is high time for Arab tias stationed in Syria and commanded by countries to decide what relationship with Tehran. Syria is in their own interest.

Conclusion The Covid-19 Pandemic The debate shows a trend towards the bi- Various articles on the effects of the corona- lateral normalisation of relations between virus pandemic in the Middle East show some Arab countries and the Assad govern- that the crisis seems to favour the normali- ment. The articles reviewed here show how sation of diplomatic relations between Arab the lack of a regional consensus on Syria’s countries and Damascus. readmittance to the AL and its political and An example is an article by Sandy economic isolation by the US and the EU Alkoutami and Khulood Fahim, a Syrian- are hampering the progress of Arab states American and an Egyptian James C. Gaither normalising their relations with Syria. The Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for authors largely welcome this fact, but they International Peace in Washington D.C. They also point out that the implementation of write that countries such as Jordan, the EU and US policy towards Syria has an im- UAE, Egypt and Bahrain have used the ex- pact on the neighbouring countries – since ceptional circumstances of the pandemic it runs counter to their economic, domestic to justify their softening stance vis-à-vis the and security concerns. It also disregards the Syrian regime. This, the authors say, con- hardship in countries such as Jordan and

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6 Lebanon that partly justifies their coopera- Reviewed Publications tion with Damascus. The articles also make clear that the lack Abdullah, Albaraa, “Cairo Keeps Itself of unity among Arab countries and the Front and Center in Syria Negotiations”, paralysis of the AL inhibit the formulation Al-Monitor, 27 2019. and achievement of common Arab interests Alami, Mona, “Lebanon’s Fate Appears regarding Syria. The opinion leaders UAE to Be Irreversibly Tied to Syria”, Blog and Egypt are pursuing their own commer- (Washington, D. C.: The Atlantic Council, cial, security and geopolitical interests in 21 July 2020). their rapprochement with Damascus. Alkoutami, Sandy, and Khulood Fahim, For their Syria policy, Germany and Revived by Disease, Diwan (Washington, the EU should take into account both the D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Inter- debate and the dynamics of the normalisa- national Peace, 11 May 2020). tion process between the Arab world and Al Yafai, Faisal, “Middle Eastern Nations Damascus, including the motives driving Must Decide for Themselves How those involved. Together with the US, the to Engage with Syria”, The National, German and European policy towards Syria 21 March 2019 (Comment). continues to bank on forcing Damascus to Bakeer, Ali Hussein / Giorgio Cafiero, change behaviour through political and “Bashar al-Assad and the Greater Arab economic isolation. However, governments World”, Blog (Washington, D. C.: The should consider, as the authors illustrate, Atlantic Council, 8 February 2019). the political and economic intertwining Bani Salameh, Mohammed and Ayman of Syria and its neighbouring countries, as Hayajneh, “The End of the Syrian Civil well as the destabilising potential of the War. How Jordan Can Cope”, Middle East refugee crisis for the region. The articles’ Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2019). critical perspectives on the incoherence of Bartenev, Vladimir, The Syrian Azimuth of ’s and America’s approach vis-à-vis Gulf Talks: Is the Wind of Change Losing Syria and on the premises underpinning Power?, Expert Opinion (Moscow: Valdai their Middle East policies should be food Discussion Club, 12 March 2019). for thought for Berlin and . Byman, Daniel L., “Can Syria Return to Attention should be drawn to the appeals the Regional Stage?” Order from Chaos by several Arab authors for two things: more (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institu- participation by Arab countries in peace tion, 28 February 2019). negotiations for Syria, and more self-deter- Cafiero, Giorgio, “Can Arab Gulf States mination for Arab countries in shaping Neutralize Iranian Influence in Syria?” their relations with Damascus. The UAE Inside Arabia, 11 March 2019. and Egypt emerge from the debate as the Choucair, Chafic, Lubnan ma ba‘da infijar key Arab actors able to influence the course Bairut: tahadiyyat al-nuhud wa darurat of normalisation between Arab states and al-tawafuq [Lebanon after the Beirut Syria. Germany and the EU need to be aware explosion: challenges of reconstruction that Abu Dhabi and Cairo, backed by Mos- and need for consensus], Report (Doha: cow, are willing to undermine the West’s Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 13 August policy of isolating the Syrian regime – and 2020). yet seek dialogue with them regardless, so Daher, Joseph, The Dynamics and Evolution of as to be constructively involved in shaping UAE–Syria Relations: Between Expectations the process of normalisation. and Obstacles, Research Project Report 2019/14 (Florence: European University Institute [EUI], 25 October 2019). El-Halabi, Bachar, “Syria’s Reconstruction: Risks and Benefits for Lebanon and Jordan”, in Rebuilding Syria. The Middle

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7 East’s New Power Game?, ed. Eugenio Dacrema and Valeria Talbot (Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Inter- nazionale [ISPI], 20 September 2019), 95–116. Harb, Imad K., The Trickiness of Syria’s Return to the Arab League, Policy Analysis (Wash- ington, D. C.: Arab Center Washington DC, 29 March 2019). Harmoon Center for Contemporary © Stiftung Wissenschaft Studies, Al-mahamma al-sa‘ba: I‘adat ta‘hil und Politik, 2020 al-nizam al-suri ‘arabiyyan [A difficult task: All rights reserved the rehabilitation of the Syrian regime in the Arab world], Political Analysis (Doha This Journal Review reflects and Istanbul, 4 March 2019). the author’s views. Majid, Ziyad, Afaq al-tatbi‘ al-‘arabi al-mur- The online version of tabik ma‘a al-nizam al-suri [The prospects this publication contains of the complicated Arab normalisation functioning links to other with the Syrian regime], Report (Doha: SWP texts and other relevant Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 6 February sources. 2019). SWP Journal Reviews are Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, “: subject to internal peer Syrian Regime Sees Pandemic as Blessing review, fact-checking and in Disguise”, The National, 9 April 2020. copy-editing. For further Shmeleva, Tatyana, The Odds of Syria’s Return information on our quality to the Arab League: Opportunities and Threats, control procedures, please visit the SWP website: Article (Moscow: Russian International https://www.swp-berlin.org/ Affairs Council [RIAC], 9 April 2019). en/about-swp/quality- Zisser, Eyal, “The End of the Syrian Civil management-for-swp- War. The Many Implications”, Middle East publications/ Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2019).

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ISSN (Print) 2628-0256 ISSN (Online) 2628-0264 doi: 10.18449/2020JR01

Translation by Tom Genrich

(English version of SWP- Zeitschriftenschau 1/2020) Sarah Charlotte Henkel, M. A., is Programme Manager at the Brussels Office of SWP.

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