NOVEMBER 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 12 Al-Qa`ida’s Presence and in financing and arming these terrorist current events, support the following groups.3 conclusions, each of which will be Influence in Lebanon examined in detail: It is critical for Lebanese from all sides By Bilal Y. Saab of the political spectrum to come to a - Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership, based in clear understanding of the nature of the the tribal areas of Pakistan-Afghanistan, there is no official consensus in terrorism threat. While terrorism may has no franchise or coordinated group Lebanon on whether al-Qa`ida has not be an existential threat to Lebanon, in Lebanon.5 a presence in the country. Since the it has hit hard in various regions and assassination of former Prime Minister in multiple directions. The past three - The Salafi-jihadi movement has neither Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, all years alone have registered more than a local insurgent presence in Lebanon politics in Lebanon has been polarized. 18 terrorist attacks that have taken the nor a unifying leader of the stature of It is on the threat of terrorism where the lives of innocent civilians, high-profile Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the presumed 1 gap is arguably most pronounced. On officials and politicians, prominent leader of al-Qa`ida in Iraq. the one hand, the anti-Syrian political journalists and commentators, coalition, led by Prime Minister Fuad military personnel, and international - The Salafi-jihadi movement in Siniora and parliament majority leader peacekeepers. Furthermore, the two Lebanon is neither fictional nor a Saad Hariri, believes that al-Qa`ida theories about al-Qa`ida in Lebanon mechanical creation of the Syrian does not have an indigenous presence in as proposed by the anti-Syrian and intelligence services. It also has an Lebanon. What the country faces instead pro-Syrian coalitions are not mutually important Lebanese constituency and is is a fabricated threat by Damascus and exclusive. Their common denominator not exclusively Palestinian. its intelligence services that is intended is the Lebanonization process of the to destabilize Lebanon and restore Salafi-jihadi movement in the country. - The current Salafi-jihadi threat is 2 Syrian hegemony. On the other hand, Five years after the start of the war caused by a network of capable terrorist the pro-Syrian alliance, spearheaded by in Iraq, Islamic radicalization is still cells scattered across the country, Hizb Allah (also spelled Hezbollah) and on the rise in the Middle East. The mostly in northern Lebanon. The most the Free Patriotic Party of Michel Aoun, spillover effects of the war in Iraq, the dangerous terrorist axis is the one that judges that al-Qa`ida exists in Lebanon resurfacing of political and sectarian links, by land and sea, regions in the and poses a real threat to national tensions in Lebanon following the May north—such as Tripoli, al-Koura and security. For them, the rise of al-Qa`ida 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops, the Akkar—to the Palestinian refugee camp in the country is largely attributed 2006 war between Israel and Hizb of `Ayn al-Hilwa in Sidon. Pockets in to a devilish pact between Lebanese Allah, and the Sunni perception of the Bekaa Valley are also increasingly Sunni politicians and extremist Islamic ascending Shi`a and Iranian power in witnessing Salafi-jihadi activity. factions in the north, the purpose of the region gave new life and meaning to which is to counter-balance the perceived the Salafi-jihadi movement in Lebanon. - Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership values the ascending power of Shi`a Hizb Allah. target of the international peacekeeping The Lebanese Internal Security Forces During the course of a six year period force in the south6 and has a profound (ISF), an institution that is perceived to starting in 2002, the author conducted interest in attacking Israel, but it be fairly loyal to Siniora—in addition to both practical and theoretical research also understands the limitations and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the two most on the subject of Salafi-jihadism in difficulties of waging jihad on Lebanese influential regional patrons of the anti- Lebanon.4 The findings, updated by soil. Syrian coalition—are also accused by the pro-Syrian alliance of having a hand 3 Leading the campaign of warning against the rise of The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Lebanon Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon are the leftist-leaning news- Lebanese government attention on and 1 Many would dispute this assumption and argue that paper al-Safir, the pro-Hizb Allah newspaper al-Akhbar, local media coverage of Sunni Islamic the issue of Hizb Allah’s weapons is the most divisive is- and the pro-Syrian newspaper al-Diyar. militancy has always been episodic and sue among Lebanese politicians. 4 This research was conducted around the country from tangential, focusing exclusively on a 2 Media coverage by outlets sympathetic to or associ- south to north including the regions of Akkar, Majdar limited geographical area—the refugee ated with the anti-Syrian coalition, such as the Lebanese Anjar, Tripoli, Qarun, Arqoub, Sidon, and others, where camp of `Ayn al-Hilwa—and scrutinizing Broadcasting Corporation and Future Television, have the phenomenon of Salafi-jihadism in its concrete and a specific ethnic population—the largely reported that the threat posed by al-Qa`ida is spiritual manifestations was investigated. This article re- Palestinian refugees. `Ayn al-Hilwa more imaginary than real, more Syrian-orchestrated lies on interviews of leaders from the mainstream Sunni is located on the southeastern part of than driven by domestic factors, and as a result less Islamist community in Lebanon, militants who volun- the port of Sidon in southern Lebanon worthy of thorough coverage or investigative journal- tarily associate themselves with the Salafi-jihadi move- and has been historically known to ism. Anti-Syrian newspapers, such as al-Nahar and al- ment, academics who specialize in political Islam, report- Mustaqbal, either totally dismiss the thesis that al-Qa`ida ers who are experienced in covering terrorism, Salafist 5 This is in contrast to, for example, al-Qa`ida in the Is- exists in Lebanon or argue that the threat is exaggerated. preachers, Lebanese politicians, leading intelligence lamic Maghreb or al-Qa`ida in Iraq. Most of their editorials and opinion pieces argue that the officers in the ISF, and senior officers in the Military 6 Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Al Qaeda’s Ter- majority of the political murders that have taken place Intelligence Directorate. For more, see Bilal Y. Saab and rorist Threat to UNIFIL,” Saban Center for Middle East in Lebanon during the past two decades have been com- Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Policy at The Brookings Institution and the Center for mitted by the Syrian intelligence services, not by an al- Salafist Jihadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National De- Qa`ida-affiliated group. (2007): pp. 825-855. fence College, June 2007. 5 NOVEMBER 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 12 have served as a hotbed for Sunni both based in `Ayn al-Hilwa. These against “infidels.” Some are also divided Islamic militancy. A number of high- two groups, whose relationship often along political lines. Importantly, these profile terrorist attacks with Salafi- fluctuates between cooperation and groups have faced constant recruitment jihadi imprints emanated from the hostility, share a history of terrorism challenges within the Lebanese Sunni camp, including the bombing of the and politically motivated violence community, whose solid majority is Lebanese Customs Directorate and the against the Lebanese state and society. In opposed to Salafi-jihadi ideology. In killing of four Lebanese judges in the addition, the two groups have sent many fact, this acute lack of support to al- Justice Palace in Sidon in 1999,7 and the young men to the Iraqi battlefield.10 Of Qa`ida’s ideology and agenda explains attack against the Russian Embassy in the two groups, Usbat al-Ansar is the why the two most ambitious attempts senior partner and arguably the most by the Salafi-jihadi movement to create “Salafi-jihadi factions in capable Salafi-jihadi group in `Ayn a durable and potent insurgent force in al-Hilwa with an estimated strength the country have failed miserably. Lebanon are not united between 200-300 members, according under a single umbrella to estimates by the Lebanese Military The first attempt happened on Intelligence Directorate (MID). Jund December 31, 1999 in al-Dinniyeh, or organization. They al-Sham, on the other hand, can be which is approximately 30 miles away have dissimilar agendas described as a relatively small group from the northeastern part of Tripoli. of 25-50 freelance jihadists that has A group of Lebanese Sunni Islamic and are relatively small no coherent organizational structure militants, led by Afghanistan returnee and clandestine semi- or important terrorist potential. Jund Bassam Kanj, launched an attack on al-Sham militants have been accused, the Lebanese Army and fought it for autonomous entities with however, of murdering Hizb Allah six days. The army eventually defeated informal organizational senior official Ghaleb Awali in July the insurgents and foiled their alleged 2004 and of attempting to assassinate plot of establishing an Islamic state structures.” Hizb Allah Secretary General Hassan in Tripoli. The second more deadly Nasrallah in April 2006. Other Salafi- attempt was in the summer of 2007 jihadi entities—such as the Qarun group when a group called Fatah al-Islam13 and the Majdal Anjar group—have also attacked a Lebanese Army outpost near Beirut with rocket-propelled grenades been involved in building networks of Tripoli and slaughtered several soldiers in 2000.8 For too long, however, vast local fighters in their villages to join during their sleep,14 an action that swathes of territory throughout the the jihad in Iraq.