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Home , Hezbollah, Majdal Anjar

november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Al-Qa`ida’s Presence and in financing and arming these terrorist current events, support the following groups.3 conclusions, each of which will be Influence in examined in detail: It is critical for Lebanese from all sides By Bilal Y. Saab of the political spectrum to come to a - Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership, based in clear understanding of the nature of the the tribal areas of Pakistan-, there is no official consensus in threat. While terrorism may has no franchise or coordinated group Lebanon on whether al-Qa`ida has not be an existential threat to Lebanon, in Lebanon.5 a presence in the country. Since the it has hit hard in various regions and assassination of former Prime Minister in multiple directions. The past three - The Salafi-jihadi movement has neither Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, all years alone have registered more than a local insurgent presence in Lebanon politics in Lebanon has been polarized. 18 terrorist attacks that have taken the nor a unifying leader of the stature of It is on the threat of terrorism where the lives of innocent civilians, high-profile Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the presumed 1 gap is arguably most pronounced. On officials and politicians, prominent leader of al-Qa`ida in . the one hand, the anti-Syrian political journalists and commentators, coalition, led by Prime Minister Fuad military personnel, and international - The Salafi-jihadi movement in Siniora and parliament majority leader peacekeepers. Furthermore, the two Lebanon is neither fictional nor a , believes that al-Qa`ida theories about al-Qa`ida in Lebanon mechanical creation of the Syrian does not have an indigenous presence in as proposed by the anti-Syrian and intelligence services. It also has an Lebanon. What the country faces instead pro-Syrian coalitions are not mutually important Lebanese constituency and is is a fabricated threat by and exclusive. Their common denominator not exclusively Palestinian. its intelligence services that is intended is the Lebanonization process of the to destabilize Lebanon and restore Salafi-jihadi movement in the country. - The current Salafi-jihadi threat is 2 Syrian hegemony. On the other hand, Five years after the start of the war caused by a network of capable terrorist the pro-Syrian alliance, spearheaded by in Iraq, Islamic radicalization is still cells scattered across the country, Hizb (also spelled ) and on the rise in the Middle East. The mostly in northern Lebanon. The most the Free Patriotic Party of , spillover effects of the war in Iraq, the dangerous terrorist axis is the one that judges that al-Qa`ida exists in Lebanon resurfacing of political and sectarian links, by land and sea, regions in the and poses a real threat to national tensions in Lebanon following the May north—such as Tripoli, al-Koura and security. For them, the rise of al-Qa`ida 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops, the Akkar—to the Palestinian refugee camp in the country is largely attributed 2006 war between and Hizb of `Ayn al-Hilwa in . Pockets in to a devilish pact between Lebanese Allah, and the Sunni perception of the Bekaa Valley are also increasingly Sunni politicians and extremist Islamic ascending Shi`a and Iranian power in witnessing Salafi-jihadi activity. factions in the north, the purpose of the region gave new life and meaning to which is to counter-balance the perceived the Salafi-jihadi movement in Lebanon. - Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership values the ascending power of Shi`a Hizb Allah. target of the international peacekeeping The Lebanese Internal Security Forces During the course of a six year period force in the south6 and has a profound (ISF), an institution that is perceived to starting in 2002, the author conducted interest in attacking Israel, but it be fairly loyal to Siniora—in addition to both practical and theoretical research also understands the limitations and and , the two most on the subject of Salafi- in difficulties of waging on Lebanese influential regional patrons of the anti- Lebanon.4 The findings, updated by soil. Syrian coalition—are also accused by the pro-Syrian alliance of having a hand 3 Leading the campaign of warning against the rise of The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Lebanon Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon are the leftist-leaning news- Lebanese government attention on and 1 Many would dispute this assumption and argue that paper al-Safir, the pro-Hizb Allah newspaper al-Akhbar, local media coverage of Sunni Islamic the issue of Hizb Allah’s weapons is the most divisive is- and the pro-Syrian newspaper al-Diyar. militancy has always been episodic and sue among Lebanese politicians. 4 This research was conducted around the country from tangential, focusing exclusively on a 2 Media coverage by outlets sympathetic to or associ- south to north including the regions of Akkar, Majdar limited geographical area—the refugee ated with the anti-Syrian coalition, such as the Lebanese Anjar, Tripoli, Qarun, Arqoub, Sidon, and others, where camp of `Ayn al-Hilwa—and scrutinizing Broadcasting Corporation and Future Television, have the phenomenon of Salafi-jihadism in its concrete and a specific ethnic population—the largely reported that the threat posed by al-Qa`ida is spiritual manifestations was investigated. This article re- Palestinian refugees. `Ayn al-Hilwa more imaginary than real, more Syrian-orchestrated lies on interviews of leaders from the mainstream Sunni is located on the southeastern part of than driven by domestic factors, and as a result less Islamist community in Lebanon, who volun- the port of Sidon in worthy of thorough coverage or investigative journal- tarily associate themselves with the Salafi-jihadi move- and has been historically known to ism. Anti-Syrian newspapers, such as al-Nahar and al- ment, academics who specialize in , report- Mustaqbal, either totally dismiss the thesis that al-Qa`ida ers who are experienced in covering terrorism, Salafist 5 This is in contrast to, for example, al-Qa`ida in the Is- exists in Lebanon or argue that the threat is exaggerated. preachers, Lebanese politicians, leading intelligence lamic Maghreb or al-Qa`ida in Iraq. Most of their editorials and opinion pieces argue that the officers in the ISF, and senior officers in the Military 6 Bilal Y. Saab and , “Al Qaeda’s Ter- majority of the political murders that have taken place Intelligence Directorate. For more, see Bilal Y. Saab and rorist Threat to UNIFIL,” Saban Center for Middle East in Lebanon during the past two decades have been com- Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Policy at The Brookings Institution and the Center for mitted by the Syrian intelligence services, not by an al- Salafist Jihadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National De- Qa`ida-affiliated group. (2007): pp. 825-855. fence College, June 2007.

5 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 have served as a hotbed for Sunni both based in `Ayn al-Hilwa. These against “infidels.” Some are also divided Islamic militancy. A number of high- two groups, whose relationship often along political lines. Importantly, these profile terrorist attacks with Salafi- fluctuates between cooperation and groups have faced constant recruitment jihadi imprints emanated from the hostility, share a challenges within the Lebanese Sunni camp, including the bombing of the and politically motivated violence community, whose solid majority is Lebanese Customs Directorate and the against the Lebanese state and society. In opposed to Salafi-jihadi ideology. In killing of four Lebanese judges in the addition, the two groups have sent many fact, this acute lack of support to al- Justice Palace in Sidon in 1999,7 and the young men to the Iraqi battlefield.10 Of Qa`ida’s ideology and agenda explains attack against the Russian Embassy in the two groups, Usbat al-Ansar is the why the two most ambitious attempts senior partner and arguably the most by the Salafi-jihadi movement to create “Salafi-jihadi factions in capable Salafi-jihadi group in `Ayn a durable and potent insurgent force in al-Hilwa with an estimated strength the country have failed miserably. Lebanon are not united between 200-300 members, according under a single umbrella to estimates by the Lebanese Military The first attempt happened on Intelligence Directorate (MID). Jund December 31, 1999 in al-Dinniyeh, or organization. They al-Sham, on the other hand, can be which is approximately 30 miles away have dissimilar agendas described as a relatively small group from the northeastern part of Tripoli. of 25-50 freelance jihadists that has A group of Lebanese Sunni Islamic and are relatively small no coherent organizational structure militants, led by Afghanistan returnee and clandestine semi- or important terrorist potential. Jund Bassam Kanj, launched an attack on al-Sham militants have been accused, the Lebanese Army and fought it for autonomous entities with however, of murdering Hizb Allah six days. The army eventually defeated informal organizational senior official Ghaleb Awali in July the insurgents and foiled their alleged 2004 and of attempting to assassinate plot of establishing an Islamic state structures.” Hizb Allah Secretary General Hassan in Tripoli. The second more deadly Nasrallah in April 2006. Other Salafi- attempt was in the summer of 2007 jihadi entities—such as the Qarun group when a group called al-Islam13 and the group—have also attacked a Lebanese Army outpost near with rocket-propelled grenades been involved in building networks of Tripoli and slaughtered several soldiers in 2000.8 For too long, however, vast local fighters in their villages to join during their sleep,14 an action that swathes of territory throughout the the jihad in Iraq. The village of Majdal triggered an army counter-offensive. country that are fertile for terrorism Anjar, for example, became a focal point The three-month battle between the have evaded the public eye. after five of its residents were killed in army and Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al- Iraq in 2005 fighting coalition forces.11 Bared Palestinian refugee camp ended Investigating the complex root causes of In September 2004, half a dozen men on September 2, 2007 when most of the Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon is not easy.9 from there were arrested on various surviving few dozen militants punched Since its awakening in the early 1980s, terrorism charges including attempting through army lines in a desperate bid Salafist militancy in Lebanon was largely to blow up the Italian Embassy in to escape. Several were rounded up in defensive and reflected the perceived Beirut.12 Lebanon’s interior minister subsequent sweeps of the hills to the severity of local crisis conditions. at the time, Elias Murr, stated that the east, but an unknown number, including Systematic security crackdowns by group was planning to pack a car with their leader Shakir al-Abssi, have so far the Lebanese authorities, large-scale 300 kilograms of explosives and ram it evaded the dragnet. Even though the foreign (particularly Israeli) aggression into the Italian Embassy in addition to army crushed Fatah al-Islam in Nahr against Lebanon, and violent clashes plotting a sophisticated attack against al-Bared, the organization still exists with rival Islamist groups tended to the Ukrainian Embassy. in an unknown number of cells, mainly awaken and mobilize the Salafi-jihadi in Tripoli, including in the Badawi movement as a whole in defense of an Although sympathetic to one another, camp, but also in `Ayn al-Hilwa. More Islamic order. Still, Salafist militancy Salafi-jihadi factions in Lebanon are recently, Fatah al-Islam seems to have remained grounded in local realities and not united under a single umbrella or established a presence in the Bourj al- only marginally (if ever) connected to organization. They have dissimilar Shemali and camps, where it al-Qa`ida’s global Islamic insurgency. agendas and are relatively small and appears to have amalgamated with Jund clandestine semi-autonomous entities al-Sham. Scattered in the north, these The two Salafi-jihadi groups that are with informal organizational structures. cells (some of which are remnants of closest to al-Qa`ida ideologically are Each is more concerned about its own Fatah al-Islam) that have proven links Usbat al-Ansar and Jund al-Sham, survival than waging an offensive jihad 13 For a detailed account of the story of Fatah al-Islam, 7 Agence -Presse, June 9, 1999. 10 Usbat al-Ansar frequently issues statements from the see Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: 8 For more information on the history of terrorism and camp confirming that its members became “martyrs” in How an Ambitious Jihadist Enterprise Went Awry,” The politically motivated violence in Lebanon, see Saab and Iraq after facing the “crusaders.” Brookings Institution and the Swedish National Defense Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the threat of Salafist 11 Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, Inside Muslim College, November 2007. Jihadism.” Jihadism (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 2006), pp. 273-277. 14 This information is based on the account provided to 9 Ibid. 12 Agence France-Presse, September 27, 2004. the author by the MID.

6 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 with jihadists in `Ayn al-Hilwa have the public statements of several U.S. particular), Lebanon is not a priority. been responsible for a number of recent officials—including Deputy Secretary terrorist acts including the twin attacks of State John Negroponte—confirming Recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri released on the Lebanese Army buses on August that al-Qa`ida does have a presence in yet another long message22 urging 13, 2008 and September 29, 2008, which northern Lebanon,19 and by the visits Muslims worldwide to join insurgencies, killed 15 soldiers and six civilians.15 of a handful of high level intelligence mainly in Iraq.23 Reserving a few words officers to Lebanon, including CIA for Lebanon, which he called a “Muslim The story of Fatah al-Islam is Director Michael Hayden.20 front-line fort,” he said that the country important because it underscores the will play a “pivotal role in future battles transformation of the Salafi-jihadi The argument that did not create with the Crusaders and the .” movement in Lebanon and sheds light Fatah al-Islam or is not responsible While Lebanon is not a “Muslim front- on its future trajectory. That story, for causing the recent wave of Salafist line fort,” al-Zawahiri was correct in his however, is anything but conclusive. militancy in Lebanon does not exonerate assessment that the country may play Damascus from the terrorism threat an important role in al-Qa`ida’s global “Al-Qa`ida’s senior and leaves a number of important Islamic insurgency. The events of Nahr leadership has yet to questions unanswered. For example, it al-Bared last summer were indicative of is concerning that there is no reliable the relative ease with which al-Qa`ida unequivocally declare information or explanation as to why in Iraq was able to transfer fighters— Fatah al-Islam leader Shakir al-Abssi via Syrian territories and with Syrian Lebanon a theater for was released from Syrian prison in the acquiescence—to Lebanon to cause major operations.” fall of 2002. While Syria may not have terror and havoc. given birth to the Salafi-jihadi movement in Lebanon, it surely has aided it and Al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders recognize the aggravated its threat by allowing the big challenges their organization would The author’s analysis of Fatah al- transfer of al-Qa`ida fighters and face in waging jihad on Lebanese soil. Islam’s statements and behavior prior, terrorist finances and equipment from This is why they may have settled for during, and after the battle, coupled Iraq and Syria into Lebanon. The Syrian using Lebanon as a staging ground to with intelligence assessments by senior regime understands the dangers of the the Palestinian and European theaters officers in the MID and European game it is allegedly playing,21 given the intelligence agencies worried about strong ideological enmities between the safety of their troops in southern secular Damascus and Islamist “It is naïve to assume that Lebanon, support the following account: movements and the bloody history they removing the grievances of Fatah al-Islam is not merely a Syrian have shared since the 1970s. Damascus, , but an actual jihadist group whose however, has shown it is willing to Salafi-jihadists in Lebanon goals are inimical to Syrian interests accept the risks given the relative will prevent terrorism and whose creation was greatly benefits such policies have earned it facilitated by spillover from Iraq.16 The over the years. from occurring, for the conclusion reached by senior members nature or root causes of of the Swedish, Danish, German and Lebanon as Viewed by al-Qa`ida’s Senior Italian intelligence agencies is that Leadership these grievances are not al-Qa`ida has a real presence in the Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership has clear.” country and is determined to strike hard yet to unequivocally declare Lebanon against their interests in Lebanon and a theater for major operations. their troops in the south.17 It appears For al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership, that this appraisal is now shared by notwithstanding the many advantages and not so much as a jihadist battlefield. most intelligence agencies in the U.S. the Lebanese battlefield offers to the Still, terrorist operations against government.18 This is evidenced by Islamic insurgency in the Middle the international force in the south Eastern corridor (most importantly the would be praised and welcomed, as al- 15 Al-Safir, October 13, 2008; al-Hayat, October 14, geographical proximity to the Israeli- Zawahiri has repeatedly reminded his 2008. Palestinian theater in general and the followers. The reality is that Lebanon 16 While local actors may have sharp disagreements spiritual significance of Jerusalem in has turned into a place where jihadist over the nature of the threat of terrorism in Lebanon, travelers can quietly meet, train, and 24 all foreign governments and intelligence agencies that ment on the issue of al-Qa`ida in Lebanon during confer- plan operations against Israel. This are concerned about the rise of terrorism speak with one ences and briefings in which he presented. voice on this matter and state that al-Qa`ida has a pres- 19 Andrew Wander, “UNIFIL Says Attack Plot May Not 22 Al-Zawahiri released two messages on December ence in the northern part of the country. Have Been Aimed at Peacekeepers,” Daily Star, October 20, 2006 and February 13, 2007 in which he briefly ad- 17 These conclusions were privately communicated to 22, 2008. dressed Lebanon and Security Council Resolution 1701. the author during several meetings in Stockholm, Ber- 20 It is worth noting that Hayden’s visit was never pub- 23 For an analysis of the letter, see Bilal Y. Saab and Mag- lin, Copenhagen and Beirut in the summer and winter licly confirmed or commented on. nus Ranstorp, “What Zawahiri’s Really Mean for Leba- of 2007. 21 It is also accused of playing this game more explicitly non and the ,” al-Hayat, May 5, 2008. 18 For the past year, the author received a sense of the in Iraq by providing a range of support to Iraqi insur- 24 This is the most recent terrorism threat assessment thinking of most intelligence agencies in the U.S. govern- gents. reached by several European intelligence agencies on the

7 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 happens mostly along the axis that links - The MID claimed it produced a Conclusion by land and sea regions in the north to clear map that shows the location and The most reassuring aspect of the history the troublesome Palestinian camp of distribution of these cells, whether in of Salafi-jihadi terrorism in Lebanon is `Ayn al-Hilwa in Sidon. Given how the rural or urban areas in the north. that it is not widespread and has few al-Qa`ida views Lebanon, the country The MID also said it possessed reliable followers. Yet, in a small country such might be spared the fate of Iraq. The intelligence on the means with which as Lebanon, even a small number of cells international community, however, still these cells communicate and secure can cause havoc and terror. It is naïve to needs to work closely with the Lebanese weapons and funding. assume that removing the grievances of government to prevent al-Qa`ida from Salafi-jihadists in Lebanon will prevent setting up operations. - The MID, with the authorization of the terrorism from occurring, for the nature Lebanese cabinet, has sent out letters or root causes of these grievances are Combating Terrorism: The Lebanese MID Role to the , Arab embassies, not clear. This is not to recommend The MID is pursuing a number of and Arab intelligence agencies asking an exclusive reliance by the Lebanese initiatives to combat terrorism in for old and new information about the government on military approaches to Lebanon,25 some of which are listed terrorist cells in the north. The MID did solve the problem. Balanced economic below.26 not hide the fact that it was seeking the and political development policies in cooperation of elements in the Syrian the deprived north may deny the Salafi- - Inside the MID (unlike other intelligence services and coordinating jihadi movement additional recruits. It government institutions), there is with U.S. covert agencies. should be emphasized, however, that overall agreement that these local cells heavy-handed approaches by the MID are inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology - The MID’s offensive plan to eradicate are essential at this relatively nascent and have extremist ambitions, but the threat of terrorism in the north is stage of the post-Iraq Salafi-jihadi have no verifiable connections with al- divided into four fronts: one, the army’s movement because they help contain Qa`ida in Pakistan-Afghanistan. They 10th Brigade constantly monitors and the threat and prevent it from inflating. are self-starters who are trying hard tracks the cells to keep them on the to earn the endorsement of Usama bin run and in a state of disarray; two, Bilal Y. Saab is Research Analyst at the Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They lure the cells to closed areas and break Saban Center for Middle East Policy at hope to catch their attention by staging them one by one; three, deny the cells The Brookings Institution in Washington, terrorist attacks across the country any kind of support or sympathy from D.C., where he specializes in Middle East and planning spectacular operations the few disenfranchised members of security and global terrorism. Previously, against high-value targets such as the the northern populace; four, avoid he served as Chief Officer and Editor of headquarters in Beirut confrontation with all the cells at once the Middle East desk at the Center for the and the international force in southern and avert a repeat of the Nahr al- Study of Terrorism and Political Violence Lebanon. While most of these cells are Bared incident which resulted in heavy (CSPTV) in the . Mr. Saab active, some of them are dormant. Their loss of lives on both sides.27 Instead, is frequently consulted by European and connection to al-Qa`ida’s franchise in apply a gradual approach and expand U.S. intelligence agencies on the topics of Iraq is traceable. the network of informants (be they Hizb Allah and al-Qa`ida in Lebanon. This agents or citizens) to procure the best article is inspired by a speech delivered - The estimated number of members intelligence. at a Lebanon conference in winter 2007 of these terrorist cells, according to organized by the U.S. National Intelligence military intelligence, is 3,700. Their - The MID confirms that its plan, Council. nationalities range from Lebanese, which it coordinates with the ISF, is Palestinian, Saudi Arabian, Algerian, working, as evidenced in the recent Egyptian, Iraqi, and a small minority of breaking of three cells in the north non-. Experts in explosives occupy that perpetrated or planned terrorist the biggest chunk of these members. attacks against Lebanese Army posts and vehicles. The military intelligence service, however, is badly funded, situation in Lebanon. It was privately shared with the au- lacks sophisticated equipment and is thor during meetings in European capitals. overstretched. It claims it cannot do the 25 Due to the prevalent bickering and divisiveness in the job alone and needs the help of regional Lebanese political sphere, the Lebanese Military Intel- and international intelligence agencies ligence Directorate (MID), the leading public counter- who have an interest in neutralizing the terrorism institution, operates in a challenging environ- terrorism threat in Lebanon. ment. To effectively analyze and combat the terrorism threat, the MID has had to virtually insulate itself from politics. 26 This information is based on several meetings the au- thor had during the past five years with senior members 27 For more on that battle and the lessons learned by of the MID. For more on the counter-terrorism effort in the army, see Bilal Y. Saab and Bruce Riedel, “Lessons Lebanon, see Bilal Y. Saab, “Lebanon on the Counterter- for Lebanon from Nahr al Bared,” The Brookings Institu- rorism Front,” Middle East Times, March 19, 2008. tion, October 4, 2007.

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