2015 PSA Annual International Conference, Sheffield, 30Th March

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2015 PSA Annual International Conference, Sheffield, 30th March

Party personalization: A comparative analysis of a traditional political party, the Democratic Party, with an insurgent populist party – the Five Star Movement.

Maria Elisabetta Lanzone (University of Pavia; Université de Nice - ERMES) and Dwayne Woods (Purdue University)

Introduction: «personalization of party leadership» in contemporary Western Democracies

There is a growing body of literature focusing on a purportedly new phenomenon: the personalized party. The rise and spread of populist parties across Europe is largely responsible for the attention that the personalized party is attracting. Populist parties and movements are generally viewed as containing prominent personalized elements. From the North American experience, Ross

Perot immediately comes to mind. In Italy, the rise of the Northern League appeared to confirm the intricate link between populism and personalization. As Pasquino (2013) noted, in the case of the

Northern League, its slogan reveals much about the role of its leader «the League is Bossi and

Bossi is the League». As Mény and Surel’s point out, a strong personal leadership appears to be the sine qua non of populist parties. Also, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia is often pointed to as an illustration of the phenomenon.

What is now attracting the attention of scholars is the personalization of non-populist parties. In other words, more traditional parties are apparently undergoing personalization process akin to populist parties with an individual become the center of attention at the expense of the party organization and ideology. This supposed personalization of non-populist parties is leading many to conclude that the personalized party is a new emergent party type. Pasquino (2013) states, for example, that «after the collapse of the post-war party system in the early 1990s, Italy has emerged as a quasi-experimental ground of personalized leadership of political parties». Not only have Forza

Italia and the Northern League been illustrative of a personal party: also the less know ‘Italy of

Values’, the more recent ‘Left, Ecology and Freedom’ and the reorganized ‘Union of the Centre’ have been manifested also these characteristics. More strikingly, the personalized style of party leadership is evident with the ascendency of Matteo Renzi and his takeover of the leadership of the

Democratic Party.

We argue that the growing focus on the rise of a new personalized party type is a trompe l’oeil. Our contention is the political parties have always had personalized elements determined by competition for power within and outside of the traditional party system. First, even the most institutionalized political party is identified with a leader whose leadership position is, to some extent, due to how effectively he has personalized his authority in the party. In an established and institutionalized party, the party does not become fully personalized because selection and succession rules have been worked out. When these rules break down, are contested by a faction in the party, or the party system is upended by an endogenous or exogenous shock, then a high degree of personalization of the party is likely to ensue. Second, the degree and extent of personalization of a political party is determined by the nature of the challenge to the status quo. If the challenge is from within the party, then political entrepreneurs seek to personalize the party through a close identification with its ideology - if it has a well-articulated ideology - or as a challenge to the dominant elites in the party. If the challenge to the status quo is against the dominant political parties, then a newly created or reformatted party is likely to become the personalized vehicle to mount such a challenge to the system. Since populist parties present themselves as outsiders and a challenge to the status quo, the personalized element that is inherent to all forms of competition for power within and outside of established parties is more evident. It, however, is not unique to populism.

Our analysis of the personalization of parties and party politics is grounded in Riker’s

‘heresthetic’ model of politics (1984). Riker defined heresthetic «as the art of political manipulation». He noted that politics was about “structuring the world so you can win.” Essentially, political actors seek to frame outcomes in order to improve the chances of the ones they most desire. By rhetorical and other devices, they set out to alter other agents’ preferences and the institutional status quo. Thus, from a heresthetical perspective, all politics is personal since you have individuals engaged in political competition with others to win power or control of a political institution – such as a political party. Riker’s heresthetic relate to political parties in two important

– albeit distinct – analytical ways. First, within already established parties that have established well-defined institutional rules, the personalization dynamic is about winning the leadership of the party or consolidating a dominant position within some faction in the party with the objective of altering future outcomes in one’s favour.

The second heresthetic element is the creation or taking over a political party as a means to gain power or disrupt the status quo. In this respect, the competition and by consequent the party becomes personalized because the challenger engages in «the art of manipulation» to win control of the party or its leadership position. Bordignon (2014: 3) identifies six post-modern leadership elements that he believes are reflection of the transformations the traditional party system and accounts for the rise of personalized party. Within the framework of a heresthetic model, none of these factors are new and thus do not constitute a post-modern leadership style. Instead these elements reflect the panoply of strategies that are employed by a political entrepreneur to become leader, gain control over a party, or use a party as vehicle to winning power more broadly.

Essentially, we are arguing that the personalization of party politics and the emergence of personalized parties are epiphenomenal to strategies that political entrepreneurs use to win power.

The type of personalization that is manifest in strategies to gain power is context contingent. By context contingent, we mean that the opportunity structure will largely determine the kind of personalization that arises in a stratagem for power. In this respect, we adopt, for the most part, Doug McAdam’s (2001) dynamic components of the political opportunity structure:

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system;

2. The stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments that typically

undergird a polity;

3. The presence or absence of elite allies

McAdam’s dynamic components scale nicely across different levels of analysis that are needed in understanding the context contingent nature of personalization of party politics. At the micro-level, components two and three are likely to be the most important mechanisms driving personalization of party politics since a political entrepreneur is engaging in a heresthetics within an established party system.

The objective is to win over party elites and reshape elite alliances (factions) within the party. McAdam’s first dynamic component is useful in understanding macro-level developments to the extent that personalized parties are more likely to arise against the party system itself.

Interestingly, the entrepreneurial challenge against the party system status quo is likely to occur when party systems are permissive. That is there are few barriers of entry. In this context, political entrepreneurs view the establishment of a political party as a convenient vehicle to win power.

When party systems are closed personalized parties emerge to challenge to challenge the barriers of entry to power. The relative success of personalized party will vary with the ability of the closed system to stay closed. If the party system is faced with a crisis, brought on by either endogenous or exogenous shocks, then political entrepreneurs will seize the opportunity to alter the status quo.

Thus, one of the reasons that there is an uptick in personalized parties in Western Europe is due to the general crisis of European party system.

From the heresthetic model and the dynamic components outlined above, two predictors can be specified. First, personalization of party politics is likely to take place within well-established political parties when a challenge to the leadership status quo is mounted. This challenge could be along generational, factional or and/or ideological lines. Secondly, personalized parties, instead of personalized strategies to win over the leadership within a party, are most likely to arise when there is an outline challenge to the status quo. In this article, we explore these two predictors in a contrasting analysis of the rise of Bepe Grillo’s Five Star movement and Matteo Renzi successful bid to win over the leadership post in the Democratic Party. The central aim of our paper is to analyze the general characteristics of the two most influent Italian parties: the Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party. What are the differences between their strategies? In particular, what is the impact of a personal leadership on the organization of a neo-populist party – created by a populist leader – compared to a traditional party rebuilt around a new and strong leader? We utilize web survey results, carried out among party members and party representatives between 2012 and

2014, as a way to assess the appeal and effect of personalized leadership.

The article is divided into four sections. First, we describe the characteristics of national Italian party system and its transformation between First and Second Republic. Second, we explore the link between personalization and party of the Five Star Movement that we argue is inherent to all outsider challenges to the status quo. In particular, we look empirically at the personalized It also relationship between the leader and the party’s members. Then we turn our analysis to the

Democratic Party, focusing especially on now Renzi utilized the personalization of politics to out manoeuvre Bersani for the leadership of the party. In the concluding fourth section of the article we highlight similarities and differences of the two cases in light of the two analytical predictors we elicited form the Rikerian model.1

1 Our data source is largely web survey results, carried out among party members, and some deep interviews to party representatives realized between 2012 and 2014, as a way to assess the appeal and effect of personalized leadership on party membership and party organization, in general. In particular, about twenty interview have been conducted by Maria Elisabetta Lanzone in Piedmont and Sicily between the months of October and November 2013, thanks to a project funded by the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo of Bologna.

The Italian case: parties and leaders from the First to the Second Republic… and beyond

After the Second World War the Italian party system can be divided into two different phases. The watershed in-between these is the so-called ‘Tangentopoli’ corruption scandal culminated with the judicial investigation named ‘Clean Hands’. However, in the 90s, Italy was permeated by a systemic crisis generated – on an external level – by the collapse of international communism (symbolically coincidental with the Berlin wall cave-in in 1989) and – only on an internal side – by the Tangentopoli scandal. For a long time Italy was considered as a country with a stable party system (McCarthy and Pasquino 1992; Gilbert 1995; Bufacchi and Burgess 1998,

2001), so several factors have been identified as detonators of this political rupture: the Clean

Hands investigation was only the climax, which uncovered high-level corruption in all major parties. In fact, it is also possible to consider other elements such as successive rounds of electoral reforms adopted by referendum and the integration of the European Union. In any case, the decline of the national party system caused a completely reorganization of existent parties, an abrupt disappearing of the most important parties and the rise of new parties characterized by inedited traits/structures.

The strength of parties in the ‘First Republic’ period did not negate the possibility of strong, even dominant party leaders emerging. Throughout this first phase (1948-1992) of the Italian

Republic, most party leaders exhibited extraordinary longevity at the helms of their parties. There were only five secretaries of the Italian Communist Party2. The Socialists had two dominant figures: Pietro Nenni, true leader in the period between 1946 and the early 1970s, but not always officially the secretary of the party; and Bettino Craxi, secretary from 1976 until 1992. Three minor secular parties each had their own dominant personality: Giovanni Malagodi for the PLI, Ugo La

Malfa for the PRI and Giuseppe Saragat for the PSDI. And Giorgio Almirante was the long-time leader of the neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano.

2 Togliatti 1943-1964, the year of his death; Longo 1964-1972; Berlinguer 1972-1984, the year of his death; Natta 1984-1988; Occhetto 1988-1994.

More complicated was the situation of the Christian Democracy (DC), a party made of competitive oligarchical factions: as Pasquino (2013) argues, «DC was never a personalized party, and was in fact ideologically opposed to the personalization of politics. Yet all of DC’s internal factions (with the exception of the largest one, the Dorotei) were fundamentally ‘personalized’: that is, their founder and leader was always a major, visible, powerful political protagonist. And these factions, even small ones, could launch their leaders to the heights of power». Factional leader

Giulio Andreotti, for example, was never secretary of the DC party as a whole, but was seven times

Prime Minister. On the other hand, since the days of De Gasperi (Prime Minister from December

1945 to March 1953), the role of DC party secretary was frequently a steppingstone to the office of

Prime Minister. This was the case for Amintore Fanfani in the 1950s; for Aldo Moro in the 1960s; and for Ciriaco De Mita in the 1980s. What is more, most of the DC’s top leadership started their political careers in party-affiliated associations and then ran for internal party offices before aiming at a seat in the legislature or a position in government. In sum, the existence leaders representing different social bases and competing, but never entirely divergent, points of view meant that the

Christian Democrats would never rely on just one figurehead.

Summarizing, almost all the parties characterized the First Republic were never personal parties with one figure (leader and/or founder) but they were parties with a plurality (and rotation) of strong figure that give an important power in the hands of parties: this phase was often know as

‘partitocrazia’. The great change took place in the 90s when all the traditional mass parties were blown away by the Tangentopoli scandal and new organizations appeared. The Italian Second

Republic began and party personalization came to overflow in various forms (Calise, 2005).

In the context of reorganization, traditional party decline and social mutations, voters identified themselves more and more with a leader, a face, and, as a result, they would vote for a person and not always for a party (Lanzone, 2014). They would vote for a man that uses clever slogans that mobilize masses rather than political programs. This is what happened to all the new political subjects that became popular at the beginning of the Second Republic: their development, their success and often their declined was bound to one only political figure, whether leader or founder, around which the party’s organization was built. In addition to the most famous and mentioned Forza Italia (created and leaded by Silvio Berlusconi), one of the Italian most relevant examples of this parties’ personalization are the Umberto Bossi’s Northern League. Also the reorganization of old factions of Christian Democracy resurrected single new parties built around one figure: the most relevant example of this situation are the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani

(UDC) and the Unione Democratici per l’Europa (UDEUR). UDC was promoted by Pierferdinando

Casini and UDEUR by Clemente Mastella. Another case of party personalization confined to small organization was that of Italy of Values (IDV), a moderate center-left party created by Antonio Di

Pietro, a magistrate who leaded the Tangentopoli investigation.

The 1994 general elections opened the era of the Second Republic and the party that mainly

characterized this new phase is Forza Italia (FI), an organization created by Silvio Berlusconi, just

at the elections’ eve. The example of FI can be used as the prototype of the «company party»

(Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999), not only confined to Italian case. FI is the first party with an owner

abled to build a political subject around his personality. This new personal party (Calise, 2000) has

been introduced some important changes and innovations in party strategies and communication

methods. In the meantime of Forza Italia’s development, others parties (new and reorganized)

faced to important transformations and «metamorphosis» (Bordignon, 2014: 78), following the

successfully ‘Berlusconian revolution’. In the center-left area, between 1994 and 1996, it remains a

confused felling. The decision concerns the new organizational models to adopt, respect of the

change of course proposed by Berlusconi’s party. The adaptation process – probably never

completed – of the center-left parties, during the Second Republic, can be divided into four phases:

the first characterized by a reorganization inside ex Christian Democrats and post-Communists and

the opposition against new Berlusconi’s strategies (1994-1996)3; a second season (1996-2001) can

3 During this phase, some leaders (such as Mariotto Segni) decided to undertake the personalization’s path, taking advantage of their personal popularity and also including their names inside party symbols.

be start with the experience of the coalition called the ‘Ulivo’ that was able to win the 1996

general elections under the leadership of Romano Prodi; a third phase (2001-2007) was

characterized by the center-left coalition defeat and by the return of Berlusconi. During this period,

the center-left political forces tempted to reorganized their activities under the choice to use a new

methods to select their leaders: primary elections. In this context, Prodi leaded again the coalition

under the label of ‘The Unione’, but this project remained very vulnerable and it forced the parties

to think at the creation of a ‘one-party’. In 2007 with a party-leadership’s primaries was born the

project of the Democratic Party. The last stage (2007-2011), the fourth, was marked by the new

elections (2008) and by two new small coalitions on the both political side (center-left and center-

right).

In 2009 arrived the resignation of Veltroni inside the PD and a new era of primaries affected

the party. However, is 2011 the key-year for Italian politics, with the resignation of Berlusconi as

Prime Minister and with the establishment of the «caretaker government», leaded by professor

Mario Monti. During all these phases, also other small parties (the so-called ‘different left’ and the

extreme-right parties, too) rebuilt their structures around new leader that took advantage of their

personal characteristics and popularity. These are the cases of the Italian Greens (with Alfonso

Pecoraro Scanio); of the Communist Re-foundation Party (with Fausto Bertinotti); the already

mentioned Italy of Values (with Antonio Di Pietro). Inside the left the most important case of

leadership development is that of Gianfranco Fini: he was able to guide the post-fascist right from

the Italian Social Movement (MSI) to the experience of the National Alliance (AN).

A hypothetical fifth phase is started between 2011 and 2012 and it still remains open. Just in

2011 party politics faced with new mutations, with probably still new characteristics compared to the parties of the Second Republic. In 2013 general elections was the populist vote for the Five Star

Movement to appear as the contemporary answer of the renewal’s request of the political class and also an effective answer to party personalization. The creation of this new political organization represents a new example of personal parties (the party mark’s owner is only the founder Beppe Grillo, as it will be possible to analyze in the follow paragraph) and also an expression of ‘media populism’ (Capelli 2008). At the same time, the party’s characteristics show some contradictories elements that diversify the Five Star Movement from other previous cases and that lead us to consider this case an undiscovered political organization.

The previously described situation, about Second Republic context, is clearly summarized by Venturino (2010: 175): «To sum up, it should be acknowledged that after some rare experiments in a long first phase – mastered by traditional mass parties – personalization has affected most

Italian parties since the 1990s. Party personalization may assume different forms. The Italian landscape includes completely new parties supporting prominent personalities (Forza Italia, IDV), a deeply reshuffled party supporting a strong leader (AN), another completely reorganize party supporting alternative leaders (PD), a regional party with a charismatic leader (LN), and several local parties based on clientelism and patronage (UDC, UDEUR, MPA). Personalization is also affecting left-wing parties, although in such a case this is probably an unintended consequence of the modernization and ‘mediatization’ of the political and electoral scenes rather than a deliberate strategy».

With these requirements, in the following sections of this paper we will analyze the characteristics of the two contemporary most important cases of party personalization in Italy: these of the Five Star Movement and of the Democratic Party. These two very different parties, with an already different history, arrived to organize their strategies around a strong leader. We will understand how these two leaderships are developed their strategies between 2012 and 2014.

The Five Star Movement: Grillo’s party?

The Five Star Movement has been represented the great novelty in the 2013 Italian general elections that were an unprecedented case in the national political history. In that situation, for the first time, a new party obtained more of the 25 per cent of the electoral approvals and globally become the second most voted list (the first was the Democratic Party’s list). Nor Forza Italia, in the 1994 earned similar results: in that occasion, the Berlusconi’s party stopped at 21 per cent.

The 2013 Italian general elections have been generate another unexampled case in the

Country’s history: according to Diamanti (2013) over one of ten elector maintained his hesitance until the election day about if and for whom vote. Besides, more of the 40 per cent of the electors has been vote in a different way compared to the 2008 general elections. The non-participation level arrived to the record value of the 26 per cent (about 5 percentage points above previous elections): a strong refusal of politics by a very large part of citizen, they no longer appeared not wanting to be represented by old parties. In this framework, all of the political organizations of the Second

Republic lost votes in some of their strongest electoral districts and a new political party emerged, the Five Star Movement, that obtained 25.6 per cent of votes for Chamber of Deputies and become the largest single party in the lower house, but without sufficient seats to govern alone.

Also in the 1990s the political vacuum was filled by a new party – Forza Italia – that was created very quickly and that was able to intercept the electors’ needs directly with its first national electoral appointment. Present crisis has been characterized by the arrival of a new party – the Five

Star Movement – that in 2013 participated for the fist time at a national electoral appointment.

However this subject was born in 2005 as local civil lists and officially founded in 2009, when it decided to maintain its locally intents until the same 2013 general elections. So this project was constructed gradually, on the ground (Katz and Mair 1993) and it was able to take advantage of the crisis. Then this new political organization was also capable of catching the citizens’ dissatisfaction towards the existent parties step by step and it managed to trade on the protest vote. In fact, the

2013 protest vote is the result of a gradually disintegration process of the national party system: a sort of explosion of a previous situation that obligated the political actors to face up with their irreversible crisis, started exactly with the 90s’ fragmentation (Lanzone 2014: 57). Additionally, it is fundamental to remark another argument that diversifies 90s crisis with present context: the already breakable political framework, that was previously described, has been increased by a socio-economical crisis that enhanced the citizens’ un-satisfaction towards the political institutions.

Consequently, all these causes added the rebirth of a strong wave of populism that it materialized exactly with the Five Star Movement project.

According to the scheme proposed by Meny and Surel (2001: 85) there are three conditions that historically would be advantaged the emergence of populism: the progressive weakening of the traditional mediation apparatuses (the political parties) around which the representative democracy was structured; the continuous growth of power’s personalization (predominance of personal parties); the development of media’s influence: that of Giovanni Sartori (1999) called «video- politics». So the Five Star Movement’s successfully electoral result in the 2013 general elections should be interpreted inside these three elements: first of all the general crisis of old parties, but also (and specially) the personalization of political power (a strong people’s spokesman was a crucial condition for the populist rooting) and the media’s influence increase.

A strong leadership presence represents a crucial characteristic in the Five Star Movement’s structuring. In addition to its media effect and its personal popularity, Beppe Grillo isn’t only the founder and the leaders of the Five Star Movement, but he is also the only owner of the party’s brand, as the so-called «non-statute» regulation established:

«The Five Star Movement’s name is match with a mark, registered behalf of Beppe Grillo, only holder of the same symbol’s rights of usage» (non-statute, art. 3)4.

So the Five Star Movement leadership is only identified with the personality of Beppe Grillo

(Giuseppe Pietro Grillo as certified by the register of births) and in his name has been registered the

M5S’ mark. Yes, because the ‘logo’ that characterized the Five Star Movement isn’t only a party symbol, but it must be considered a real trademark with also an official registration at proper housing5. These rules imply a large power kept in the hands of the party founder: to him only

4 “Non statute” available at this link: https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/materiali-bg/Regolamento-Movimento-5- Stelle.pdf (last seen: 16th March 2015).

5 The so-called “Ufficio Italiano Brevetti e Marchi”. deserves decisions about the symbol using by party members and party representatives. Upon written request, the trademark can be granted to list of candidates they want to show up for local and/or regional elections. Into the hands of Grillo remains the possibility to withdraw the authorization of lent the same trademark6.

Now, after a description of the normative framework in which Grillo’s role (inside party organization) has been formalized, we can proceed with an analysis of leader’s role under the militants (better named ‘Activists’) point of view. After a preliminary analysis, Grillo’s topic role is legitimate also by the party’s members and by the chairmen, at least in its first electoral and national phase:

The Grillo’s arrival in Sicily had a ‘devastating’ effect. He is a very massive communicator and so [during the regional electoral campaign in 2012] was able to heat squares. He arrived in a very difficult period: we were permeated by a strong crisis, in which people survived hardly and in which the middle-class became its decline. […] So Grillo arrived and it was append something of incredible. I have just in mind the evening meeting in Messina. I might imagine everything, except to see the Cathedral Square, in Messina, so congested: a frightening feeling. There, we understood that something was changing» (Sicilian Regional Deputies, Palermo, November 2013).

In Sicily, the party has been known its first important electoral success, before 2013 general elections. The entry into Sicilian Regional Parliament (named ‘Ars’) probably marked a crucial watershed for party development and organization, especially in term of relationship between leadership and membership. After the Sicilian electoral appointment, some activists recognized

Grillo as an effective «bullhorn» able to mobilize a large number of citizens during electoral speeches. However, still in Sicily, where the Five Star Movement became the most-voted for party in October 2012, there was also who tried to propose a change in national leadership:

«Here in Sicily it was happened something that even Grillo planned. Here the Five Star Movement became something different. It’s in Sicily that it became a big political force and, from scratch, it arrived to the 15 per cent. Never, in the

6 To remark the strong linkage between the party and its leader we have to consider another important document: the notarial deed which established a formal registration of the subject. This I probably the only official act stipulated and able to underline formal rules inside the party that it has been registered as ‘Five Star Movement Association’.

political history, it was happened that a newborn party come to an important voting percentage, especially in Sicilian ground. That is why I said to Giancarlo [Cancelleri] he should have to explain to Grillo the possibility to rethink his role: he could continue to be our spokesman, but as political leader we needed to have a Secretary or chairman […]». (Regional Deputy, Palermo, November 2013)

Therefore some M5S’ representatives – subsequently in opposition with the national leadership – had attempted to underline the changed role inside the party, also requesting an organizational turning point:

Before Sicilian regional elections, the Five Star Movement was only a blog phenomenon, with its ‘Vaffa Day’ and with a showman that asks real things, but using his communication strategies comparable to theatrical and/or comedy performances. In Sicily, the Five Star Movement became an effective political force. We would need to a person able to understand the changes. On the contrary, the situation management remained in Grillo’s hands». (Regional Deputy, Palermo, November 2013)

To open a large debate about party leadership inside the Five Star Movement was precisely the previous described successfully result during Sicilian regional elections. With this episode also began a turbulent and unexpected phase of adaptation. However, during 2013 national electoral campaign the party returned to organize its activities around its leader. The attention (specially media attention) remained focused on Grillo’s electoral tour (called ‘Tsunami Tour’), but when the

Five Star Movement makes is entry in national Parliament, a strong debate about Grillo’s role inside party organization started again. Not only, first cases of expulsion inside MPs groups arrived:

I haven’t any problems to admit that my election as Senator arrived thanks to Beppe Grillo’s effort. He was able, with his charisma, to excited a lot of Italian people decided to vote the Five Star Movement. However, with the same sincerity, I must say that the attitudes kept in the last few months are dangerous and they risk to bring-down the many years of work, leaving disenchantment only. This is a commitment that I didn’t want to share. Not anymore. So I decided – with a deeply regret – to separate myself from the senate group». (Senator, Rome, June 2014)

As we can see from previous analysis, Grillo’s formal role inside the party he has created is clearly formalized by official documents: the filing of the trademark, the association constituent act and the related statute. To remain controversial is the development of the relationships between the same leader/founder/owner Beppe Grillo and the party members. These volatile balances cause important consequences to the three organizational faces (Katz and Mair, 1993) on which the Five

Star Movement is structured.

So, the description we link to contradictory propensity, typical of populist expressions, that they are based on two organizational elements of cohesiveness: a very strong and charismatic leadership and the consideration of a main topic/issue (specially the immigration problems). Then, the power’s personalization continues to be the peculiar structural aspects of the populist parties and in media hype, this personalization become even more important than in previous contexts. About this aspect Paul Taggart said (1995: 41): «For neo-populists, the leadership isn’t a simple structural element. It is the mainstay of their messages and of their party». So the charismatic shape constitutes the cement of the entire project and is also the main mobilization vehicle, able to keep their electors. Another amalgamation element is, still, their focus on a topic argument, as that of the immigration and this argument, in the past, was very important for the populist parties’ institutionalization process and for their ideological rooting7.

The analysis about Five Star Movement organization is based on some variable elements, remains the effectiveness of its leader-founder, who in a few cases was compared to other Italian contemporary leaders: the media using conduced to the comparison with the 90s strategies of Silvio

Berlusconi. At the contrary, its personal style and some of his actions/demonstrations remind to the starting rise of Umberto Bossi. A parallel, that between Grillo and Bossi, that nor the Five Star

Movement’s leader doesn’t refuse:

If I am resembled to Bossi, I not aggrieve myself, because Bossi was a street fighter with his undershirt. At that time, he screamed Berlusconi you are a Mafioso. He said surprising thinks. Then, he became part of the system and the same system is addled. And so he entered in the Banks, in the milk quotas, in the dream of this Padania that it borders to Duck-burg. Bossi lost the sense of the thinks». (Beppe Grillo, 15th April 2012)

7 This aspect, in the case of the M5S, has never been declared or shown among the party’s purposes. In order to have more information about this topic it is possible to compare in Lanzone, 2014.

In particular, in this message, Grillo emphasized his opposition against the current political system, but he also casual remarked the destiny of some populist expressions, that to become connived with the power, the political elites and betraying their people8.

The case of the Five Star Movement appears a controversial example of populism with a labile destiny, especially considering future role of party leadership. Specifically to monitor a hypothetical new phase inside the party and in order to evaluate the evolving of the relationships between leadership and membership, we have planned a national web survey addressed to activists9. In particular, the survey would to consider two problems: one related to Grillo’s role inside the party and one about a possible rise of other party leader. Table one shows the dimensions used in one of survey’s question:

Table 1. Dimensions leadership/members

Question Dimension Beppe Grillo represents the M5S and without Identification leadership/membership Grillo the M5S doesn’t exist The M5S should be managed directly by Centralization/decentralization (decision- representatives inside the institutions making procedure) Present national ‘spokesman’ prevents the rise Party democracy inside the party (dialectic) of other figures Internet is the most effective means to Communication strategies effectiveness communicate M5S’ national political approach The M5S should use primary elections to Inclusiveness/exclusiveness level inside the chose its national leader party The M5S should use open primaries to select Inclusiveness/exclusiveness level outside the all its candidates party (democratization process)

These six dimensions we will allow to monitoring the evolution of leadership role inside the party that represents an example of contemporary populist subjects. But what happen when a more traditional party – in the life of its large number of adaptations – reorganizes its political activities

8 See Mény and Surel (2001: 12).

9 The survey will be made possible thanks to the SISP’s Standing Group Candidate & Leader Selection (C&LS). In order to have more information about its research activities see the link: http:// www.candidateandleaderselection.eu (last seen: 20th March 2015). around a new a strong leader? In the next paragraph we will analyze another important example of contemporary expression of party personalization.

Reorganization inside the Democratic Party: the «PD» according to Matteo

Inside the Democratic Party history it is possible to retrace three phases, corresponding to different leaders and as many changes. In 2007 the PD’s project started under the political direction of Walter Veltroni. At that moment, the new – or better the reorganized – political subject took aware to be a party more and more constituted by electors and less by card-carry members

(Bordignon, 2013: 153). After a short transition’s period under the guidance of Dario Franceschini, the second season of the party has been characterized by the leadership of Pierluigi Bersani (2009).

Under Bersani’s direction the Democratic Party returned to the past, to party’s founding fathers and to a vague idea of traditional values. This phase has been marked by some controversial aspects: first of all, between 2009 and 2012, the party has been faced with important electoral appointments.

In this context, 2012 represented a very crucial year in the party development. The center-left coalition named ‘Italia Bene Comune’ organized (in November) an open primary election (preceded by a large debate about the rules).

Matteo Renzi has come on to the national political scene for the first time as the frontrunner of Pierluigi Bersani, operating a very strong challenge inside the PD with his self-candidature.

Probably, during the 2012 electoral campaign for primaries, Renzi appeared as the author of the most important changing effort (and break-up, too) inside the PD (Bordignon, 2014: 158). Also, with Renzi’s candidature the third party phase started. Renzi’s defeat in the same 2012 national open primaries (he obtained the 40% of selectors’ consensus during the electoral second round) becomes an important starting point for his challenges. In fact, Renzi (surnamed the ‘Scrapper’ or ‘Demolition Man’) in December 2013 has been presented his candidature for primaries to choose the national party secretary10.

According to a national exit poll (8th December 2013), addressed to selectors that participated in the same direct election of the Democratic Party’s Secretary, it is possible to retrace some important characteristics of current party leadership11. From this case of primary elections

Matteo Renzi (the future national party leader and also the Italian prime minister) received a great legitimacy. A first datum able to underline the strong linkage between the party and the nature of its leadership is related to selectors’ voting intentions in the run-up to the following general elections.

About 59 per cent only declared its willingness to vote PD regardless of party leader and the 31.7 per cent has subjected its choice to future leadership (about 8 per cent declared that will not vote

PD). The same primary elections also represented an important test useful to consider the PD a

‘party of electors’ and no more a ‘party of members’. In fact, at the time of the primaries, the vast majority of the selectors were not party members (72.4%). Because this is a case of open primaries, it is crucial to consider another aspect, related to a possible future party membership. Only 24 per cent of the sample declared its intention to become member of the PD; 48 per cent underlined its sure non-intention to a possible registration. The party hope in a possible membership increase is confined to a 23 per cent of unsure selectors and to a 13 per cent of participants that subordinated their adherence to the future leadership. So there isn’t data able to encourage the party to a positive attitude toward new adhesions.

Considering more in details the selectors’ opinions about party leadership, we underline an aspect about the communication strategies. From data it emerges that Matteo Renzi is «the man of

TV», Giuseppe Civati that of the Web and Gianni Cuperlo the most traditional candidate. Among

10 Frontrunners: Giuseppe Civati and Gianni Cuperlo.

11 The survey was carry out by the same research group C&LS throughout a national exit poll (8th December 2013) initially diffused by the report «La scelta del leader Matteo Renzi e l’elezione del Segretario del Partito Democratico. Report basato sui risultati della survey nazionale», edited by De Luca, Fiorini, Marchianò, Rombi and Serricchio. The same data have been included in the book Il Partito Democratico secondo Matteo, edit by Pasquino and Venturino, Bononia University Press (2014). Maria Elisabetta Lanzone participated, as counter, in the data collection.

Renzi’s selectors, a 46 per cent received the information about primaries from television channels

(the 41 per cent considering the entire sample). According to the current party statute, during 2013 primary elections, the selectors has been also chosen the premier candidate and not only the party secretary. So this case of primaries had a direct impact to PD competitiveness in view of the following general elections. For this reason, we consider selectors’ opinions about candidates. In particular, what was the candidate with better chance to win primaries? And who, among candidates, had greater possibilities to lead the center-left coalition to win general elections?

As table two shows12, vote in primaries was especially a ‘prospective choice’. More than a third of the selectors have been chosen their candidate because they share his same vision of the future and, again under a prospective dimension, 20.2 per cent of the selectors have been based their preferential voting based on candidate’s abilities to lead the PD to win general election.

Table 2. Reasons par voted candidate (percentage values)

Cuperlo Renzi Civati Total I share his same vision of the 21.4 37.9 30.1 33.8 future He better represents my values 36.7 16.1 44.1 23.8 I want someone able to win the 5.4 27.7 2.9 20.2 following general elections I prefer the candidate for his 13.0 14.1 10.0 13.3 personal characteristics He better able to represent 23.4 4.2 12.9 8.9 party ideas N. 607 2274 481 3362

At this point we retrace an important difference between Renzi’s selectors and the other participants. Among supporters of Cuperlo and Civati, there were a very few cases believed in a future successfully result of their candidate. On the contrary, a little less than one of three selector of Renzi has been persuaded about a possible winning. Just over 30 per cent of the global selectors have been expressed an ‘identity vote’, basing their choice on the linkage between their values and candidate ones (23.8 per cent) or on candidates’ abilities to represent party ideas (8.9 per cent). A

12 A similar table is included in the previously cited report. few selectors (about 13 per cent) have been declared their propensity to chose the candidate for his personal traits.

A last aspect helping to clarify the party role that Renzi has been able to gain by primaries is related to level of competitiveness perceived by the selectors. According again to survey data, we can point out that, in 2013, primary selectors had clearly in mind the name of the winner: the same

Matteo Renzi. A great 90.3 per cent has been correctly provided for the winner of the Florence’s

Major. Also Cuperlo’s and Civati’s supporters were conscious of Renzi’s exceptional power inside and outside the party. The 94 per cent has been considered Renzi the candidates with better chances to lead the PD to a successfully electoral result. Finally, we can underline that three out of ten selectors have been linked their vote (in a general election) to the name of the new party secretary.

Precisely these aspects take us to interpret data inside a context of politics personalization, where leadership’s traits perform a crucial role in party developments and changes.

From the previous analysis it is possible to retrace two elements related to party personalization inside the Democratic Party. First of all, the effective phase of leadership personalization in the PD has been completely developed as a result of primary elections, able to make an important reorganization inside the party and able to launch a period of strong competition among different leaders. So we interpret primaries as double mean: on one side, they have a democratization effect and give a lot of power to militants. On the other side, they are an attempt to respond to the party crisis (especially to the decline of party membership). The challenge of open primaries represents a possibility to create some ‘parties of electors’ in order to compensate the decline of the ‘parties of militants’. In this context the political attention moves from party to candidates that tempt to carve out their personal role inside the organization and by primary completion. A second aspect is directly related to the leadership of Matteo Renzi: 2013 primary elections gave him a great legitimacy received from selectors. After a well-known government crisis (started with the extraordinary results of the M5S in February), in the same 2013, Renzi obtained the possibility to became the Italian Prime Minister, without new electoral completion. So he became the leader of the PD, but also the Prime Minister. These new roles also caused a strong reorganization inside the same party.

According to Pasquino and Venturino (2014: 12): «The election of Matteo Renzi as

Secretary of the PD has been able to change the party’s history. The same primary elections should be able to change the Italian politics’ dynamics, too. The PD became the ‘PD according to Matteo’.

The Secretary is able to manage the party structure and to change again its role with a lot of reforms. The ‘PD according to Matteo’ obtained a great power but also a great responsibility in

Italian politics». So the strong power of the ex Florence’s Major is clear, but what are the conditions that made possible the rise of his leadership? From its question is possible to start in order to analyze – in a finally paragraph – also the more general effects to party personalization in the Italian case.

Conclusion: Italian parties, crisis of representation and different forms of personalization

In the previous sections we considered the characteristics of leadership inside the two most influent political parties in the current Italian context. Probably, regarding their two histories, the

Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party are one another very different parties, for many reasons. First of all, the M5S is a totally new party with non-ideological traits. At the contrary, the

PD represents a clear example of a reorganized party, a descendent of the First Republic’s parties that built its structure in the middle of the Second Republic. Secondly, the PD is a party with a leadership rotation; the M5S is a recent party with an owner and with a still unclear destiny.

However, in an era of party personalization, it became very interesting to make a comparison between leaders and not between parties, in general. Certainly, different structures produce also different consequences on leadership development. For this reason the point is at the leadership level and the question concerns the effects that different leaders produced inside the party and not the contrary. In addition, a crucial problem of this study is related to causes and conditions that allowed to strong personal leaders to emerge in different parties, but in a same context, as it was previously described. In others words, why different parties are able to adopt the same strategies in terms of party personalization? There are some characteristics that bring together the two leaders considered in this analysis?

First of all, it is possible to retrace two aspects able to closely link the rise of Matteo Renzi inside the PD between the successful of Beppe Grillo’s populist wave. Both are related to the new crisis of representation that pervades Italy, after the volatile framework culminated with 2013 general elections. The first concerns just the electoral results in 2013. In particular, the situation of deadlock generated from the important result obtained by the M5S, forced the PD to reorganize again themself and to rethink the role of its leadership. Even more, Renzi was able to take advantage of this situation and to propose their candidature for leadership primaries in 2013. The other is related to communication strategies and the themes placed at the heart of the political agenda of the two leaders. Renzi and Grillo result from the same citizens’ requirement of political renewal and critique against the political caste and political elites. So in a different way they are able to take advantage of the same situation, often using the same rhetoric. In this context they produce the satisfaction of a large part of militants and electors (also supporting by the previous data) and they became «catchall» (Kirchheimer, 1966) leaders. In particular, in some Renzi’s political speech we can retrace themes fundamental also for the construction of the Beppe Grillo’s project: according to Bordignon (2014: 159) we can remember a general anti-caste sentiment; the political costs reduction and the removal of the public funding of parties.

In general, we consider the Five Star Movement exactly a result (and a creation) of the contemporary irreversible party crisis and the «PD of Matteo Renzi» an attempt to a traditional party to answer at this crisis, proposing a new leader able to take advantage of his personal characteristics. So, as results of the same party crisis, the two leaders maintain an uncertain destiny.

This time, the different structures that Grillo and Renzi have behind them can be able to change their destiny. In the case of the M5S, party’s destiny remains more linked with the decisions of the owner Grillo and to the populist traits of the party. Nevertheless, in the recent Italian history there is a case of populist party that was able to face up to a leadership change: this is the example of the

Northern League in the transitions’ path from Umberto Bossi to Matteo Salvini leadership13. The case of the M5S is different for many reasons to the experience of the LN (especially according to its different people-calling)14. However an important precedent case has been created by the Forza

Italia’s process: in this case we can consider a party with an only leader/founder/owner and a party destiny (survival or decline) strongly related to the same party’s creator Berlusconi.

In the case of the PD, Renzi’s leadership certainly produced important change inside the party (with unprecedented situations) but the future debate about leadership should be managed inside the long-lived party structures and within the boundaries of the internal party rules (for example the party statute). It is however possible that Renzi’s era is able to open a new and still more controversial phase inside the Democratic Party. The same era might be able to manage the

PD to other strong changes, also at the level of party rules. So, under different conditions, the evolution of the two leaderships is currently opened. Overall, we confirm that party personalization is now able to pervade all Italian parties under different ways and expressions. In particular, we can underline – in the two considered cases – the post-ideological and the anti-political leadership better in the case of the M5S and a leadership from outside and an innovative leadership in the case of the

PD. However, it possible to retrace, in our analysis, all the aspects remembered in the six typology of leadership (Bordignon, 2014). A final aspect, as Lauri Karvonen (2010) underlined, concerns the future of party personalization that also depends of systemic conditions inside different Country contest: for example recent reforms have altered some of the most candidate-centered systems in the opposite direction. So the external factors (and not only internal party rules) such as the current electoral system can be able to influence the evolution of party personalization and leaders’ role.

13 In order to have more details about this case it is possible to see Rombi and Porcellato (2014). The cited paper is available at this link: http://www.candidateandleaderselection.eu/sites/default/files/files/natascia-porcellato-stefano- rombi-1834.pdf (last seen: 20th March 2015).

14 About the M5S’ people-call, it is possible to compare in Lanzone (2014: 62-64). In concluding, it is important to note this article represents the first empirical attempt to compare different expressions of party personalization in Italy: a general analysis of the rise of the current leaders of the PD and the M5S is the first step to a future comparison (by a national web survey). In particular, we would measure – on the same variables – different dimensions of leadership and the relation between leadership and membership inside the most important Italian parties. This general work is first of all useful to underline the common trend of party personalization in different parties, able to pervade equally different party, with different history.

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