MASTER'S THESIS - M-1688

SCHMIDT, Walter E. THE UNITED STATES, ARGENTINA, AND THE DRACO DOCTRINE: A POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL EXAMINATION.

The American University, M.A., 1968 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE UNITED STATES, ARGENTINA, AND THE DRAGO DOCTRINE; A POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL EXAMINATION

by

Walter E, Schmidt

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of __

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Signature of the Committee:

Chairmantr

Dean of the Schoo^of International Service

Date: ^ ______

uVlERiCAN UNiubiw., l i b r a r y 1968 SEP 171968 The American University Washington, D.C. WASHINGTON. O. C TABLE OP CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 II. THE DRAGO DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSIVE REACTION. . . . 8 The Historical Peeling of Dependence...... 8 The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity...... 11 Latin American legal philosophy...... 12 American international law...... 13 Pear of Colonization and Conquest...... 13 Argentine historical experience ...... 15 Renewed ties with England...... l8 Pear of Economic Domination...... 19 The financial crisis of 188O-I890 ...... 19 Aftermath of the crisis...... 22 First reactions to the Venezuela blockade . . 24 III. AS A DEFENSE OF FUTURE INTERESTS...... 27 Argentina's Increasing National Power ..... 28 Economic expansion ...... 28 Qualitative changes in Argentine economic l i f e ...... 31 Indications of changing political outlook...... 32 Proposals for Joint issuance of the Drago note...... 34 Ill CHAPTER PAGE Influence of the Monroe Doctrine...... 36 The Venezuela-Great Britain border controversy...... 37 The United States invokes the Monroe Doctrine...... 39 Favorable reactions and multi­ lateralization proposals...... 4l The Drago Doctrine and the Monroe Doctrine. . . 43 An unequal partnership...... 45 Association of the two doctrines...... 48 A delayed reply ...... 50 IV. AS A RECOGNITION OP CHANGING POWER RELATIONSHIPS ...... 54 Growing United States Influence ...... 55 Beginnings of an Anglo-American entente . . . 58 The rise of German imperialism...... 6l The United States Power Position in Venezuela in.19O2 ...... 64 Preparations and deployment of American F o r c e s ...... 67 Roosevelt's alleged ultimatum ...... 69 V. AS A UNIQUE INSTANCE OP ARGENTINE INTERNATIONALISM...... 72 A Burst of Acclaim...... 73 A mixed official blessing ...... 75 iv

CHAPTER p a g e A damning association...... 76 The Transformation of the Drago Doctrine.. . . 8 l The role of Saenz Pena...... 82 The Third Inter-American Conference...... 84 VI. AS A DOCTRINE OP INTERNATIONAL LAW...... 91 The Hague Peace Conference of 1907...... 92 The Drago Doctrine and the Porter Proposition...... 95 Relationship to the Calvo Doctrine...... 97 Reservations and Reactions...... 100 New public acclaim and a strained comparison...... 101 VII. SUMMARY CONCLUSION...... 105 APPENDIX A ...... 112 APPENDIX B ...... 123 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 131 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On December 29, 1902, Dr. Lula Marla Drago, then Argentine Foreign Minister, sent a lengthy note to the Argen­ tine Minister, Martin Garcia Merou, in Washington, for trans­ mission to the United States Department of State. The des­ patch took note of the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela, an armed action later joined by Italy. After a recital of various reasons why this action was unjust, contrary to reason and to the legal and moral sensibilities of the North American government and people, and in flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine, "a doctrine to which the Argentine Republic has, heretofore, solemnly adhered," he said the principle his nation would like to see recognized was: "That the public debt can not occasion armed Intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power.This latter phrase Is the heart of what has come to be known as the Drago Doctrine. The Drago Doctrine held a brief place on the world stage. It was "too relevant and timely to languish as one p half of an exchange of diplomatic opinion." But certain

^The complete text of the Drago note Is given in Appendix A . -"inc&as r. ncuann, argentine, tne united atates and and the Inter-American System. iodO-19Î4 (CambridgeÜtarvard 2 aspects of Drago's note bore such controversial implications that the diplomats of both the United States, and presently, Argentina herself, found It necessary to retreat from what was tacitly recognized as too advanced a foreign policy po­ sition. Conceived as a political doctrine, Drago's original injunction followed a tortuous course through a period of five years, finally emerging as a minor tenet of public international law. In retrospect the Drago Doctrine has been appraised in various ways. In his Western Hemisphere Idea. . . , Arthur Whitaker calls it "an unprecedented and unrepeated Argentine foreign policy excursion into the realm of internationalism on a regional plane." Harold Peterson terms it part of a Latin American "doctrine of sovereign Immunity, " whose Immediate purpose was to "safeguard national control of their colonial economies and revolution-ridden governments against 4 Invasion of European capital." Thomas Mo Gann views It as "another Argentine bid for a leading part in a slowly de­ veloping hemispheric drama in which the United States, with

University Press, 1957), P* 219* “^Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea; Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, kew York: Cornell University Press, 19^4), p. 124. 4 Harold P. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (Antioch, New York: State University of New Ÿork, T952F), p. 258. 3

Its power and Its Monroe Doctrine, had long preempted all the Important roles. Others see the Drago Doctrine as not at all a doctrine In its own right but as a corollary to the doctrines of Monroe, or of Calvo, or even, "since Imprison­ ment for debt has been abolished by law. . . ," as a simple extension of municipal law Into the International plane.^ In fact, the Drago Doctrine Is all of these things and not exclusively any one of them. The Intent of this paper is to cover all these complex and interrelated motives in order to gain a broad understanding of all aspects of the Drago Doctrine in its contemporary political and historical setting. It is convenient to divide such a broad study into five parts, each representing a distinct thought which re­ lates directly to the Drago Doctrine. These parts, which correspond to chapters II through VI, consider the Doctrine as (l) a defensive reactionj (2 ) as a defense of future Interests; (3) as a recognition of changing power relation­ ships; (4) as a unique Instance of Argentine Internationalism; and (5 ) as a tenet, or doctrine of International law. These divisions are hardly perfect since many of the actions.

^McQann, 0£. clt.. p. 218. ^Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina, trans. and ed. by William Spence RoFertson {cRapel H1Ï1, North Carolina: University Press, 1937), p. 241; Peterson, loo. cit.; Edwin M. Borohard, "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," Encyclopaedia of the Soclal Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193^), ïfî, pp. l53-l5 6 . 4 statements and events which form the whole episode cannot be definitively assigned to one such category or another. This organization, nonetheless, seems the best available and avoids the opposite error of attempting to assign meanings and motives, without an overall plan, within a purely chronological framework. In fact, such a chronological framework need not be abandoned, but is loosely superimposed on this flve-polnt breakdown. Thus, the general circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Drago note, which began the whole affair, are treated as part of the second chapter, . . A Defensive Reaction," while the 1907 Hague Conference Is covered In the sixth chapter. The reader will gain a more objective under­ standing and perhaps be more tolerant of the real ambiguities that arise. If he will bear In mind the organizational needs that call forth this chapter arrangement. Luis Marla Drago was born May 6 , 1859, and christened with the.same name as his father, a prominent La Plata medical doctor and politician, several times member of the 7 provincial legislature of Buenos Aires. His maternal grand­ father was the renowned general and statesman, Bartoleme Mitre,

^For biographical Information, I am chiefly Indebted to the following: Ricardo Ploclrllll, Francisco L. Romay, and Leone10 Glanello, Dlcclonarlo hlstérlco argentine (Buenos Aires: Eldlelones Historicos Argentines^ 1954), I, pp. 213-217; William B. Parker, Argentines of Today (New York: Kraus Reprint Corp., 1920), I, pp. 11-14; ET~tJdaonaa, 5 who In the year of his grandson's birth led porteno troops north to meet Urqulza In the battle of Cepeda and would soon be elected and Installed as the first constitutional presl- 8 dent of a united Argentina'. In 1882, Luis Marla Drago graduated from the National University of La Plata with a law degree and commenced a diverse career. Already, a year before his graduation, he had tried his hand as a junior editor of the newly founded newspaper, El Pa£s. The year of his graduation, he was elected a deputy In the provincial legislature of Buenos 9 Aires. A year after his election to the legislature, Luis Marla Drago began his career as a criminal lawyer and Judge when he was appointed Secretary of the Chamber of Appeals In Mercedes, one of the major cities of the province. His rank was soon advanced to that of civil judge, a post he held for

Dlcclonarlo blograflco argentlno (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editors Conl, 1938); and "Drago, Luis Marla," Enclclopedla Universal Ilustrada Europeo-j^erlcana (Madrid y Barcelona: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 19^3), XVIII, segunda parte, pp. 2152-2153. Q Mitre lost at Cepeda, but It was a temporary setback. See Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America. from Its Beginnings to the Present (second edition, revised; New York: Alfred a T Knopf, Inc., 1965), p. 646. % 1 Pais was Carlos Pellegrini's paper. Drago's own famous grandfather. In 1870, had founded La Naclon, then and now one of the finest dallies In South America. 6 almost three years. He took an Increasing Interest In criminal psychology and penal theory, and In 1886, became a criminal judge. In 1868 he published a fine book on crimi­ nology, Los hombres de presa, soon considered a model of advanced liberal thinking and published In both Italy and Spain. In 1890, a year of severe civil disorder, Drago became District Attorney of the Province of Buenos Aires, the highest post he would hold until his appointment as Foreign Minister In August, 1902. It was In this former post and In this troubled era that Drago became the confident of Julio A. Roca, took an Interest In railroad legislation, 11 and began his association with higher affairs of state. There Is a school of thought that looks to Drago's earlier career for clues to the origin of his later cele­ brated Doctrine. Some comparisons are undoubtedly useful, all are Interesting, but none Is adequate If carried too far In an effort to explain all. In this category falls the theory of José Nicolas Matlenzo. While District Attorney of Buenos Aires, Drago answered a demand for the collection of certain revenues allegedly due the Federal Capital. His argument, carried to the Supreme Court of the nation, was

^^Clted In Enclclopedla Universal.. . , p. 2152. ^^See infra., p. 33. 7 that the provinces were sovereign entitles not subject to the forcible collection of such revenues at the whim of the IS executive power. In thé same vein, much has been made of an article by Drago In 1896, "Antecedentes Instltucionales, " a biblio­ graphical commentary about a book by Juan A. Garc£a, Introducclon al estudio del derecho argentine. Drago, trying to show that In the era of the Magna Carta, Spain was 13 In the vanguard of liberal reform wrote: Almost at the same time as did that monarch— referring to landless King John— King Alfonso III gave Identical privileges to the provinces of Aragon, authorizing, moreover, the right to bear arms, which was a far broader, more convincing recognition than for that matter, ever passed the minds of the first, perfidious English sovereigns. The implication Is that Drago was preoccupied with questions of sovereignty in the abstract. This explanation, however. Is not adequate although it can give another useful insight. As revealing as may appear certain facets In Luis Marla Drago's core of experience as an individual, a complete understanding of the Drago Doctrine requires a far broader 14 viewpoint.

^^Plcclrilll, 0£. clt., p. 214. l^Luls Marla Drago, "Antecedentes Instltucionales, " La Blblloteca, II (1896), p. 301. ^^Some scholars take quite the opposite view. An example is the opinion of Thomas Me Gann, o£. cit., p. 220, who attributes the Drago Doctrine not to Drago Eut to Julio A. Roca. Me Gann Is most probably incorrect for reasons that will become clear as this study progresses. CHAPTER II

THE m A G O DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSIVE REACTION

The Drago Doctrine was largely a defensive reaction. It was defensive In the sense that part of the motive for Its creation was a feeling of insecurity and fear. This feeling sprang. In part, from a keen sensitivity to coercion arising from public Indebtedness. The events of the decade of 1880-1890 are particularly Important In assessing the Argentine reaction in 1902. While It Is Impossible to assign an exact weight to the defensive motive, a critical review of the often neglected events of the several preceding decades shows that the Initial impetus for the 1902 note was linked with the concern born of earlier events. Under­ standing this defensive aspect of the Drago Doctrine Is so Important as to meric a full discussion commencing with mention of the philosophical bases of Latin American Insecurity.

I. THE HISTORICAL FEELING OF DEPENDENCE

After even a brief direct exposure to Latin American Intellectual life, one cannot help but be struck by the pre­ dominance of the twin themes of Independence and sovereignty which seem to permeate into every nook and cranny of lit­ erature, history and politics. It Is Impossible to fully I 9 understand the significance of the Drago Doctrine as a defensive device without some feeling for, some awareness of this aura of Latin American self-consciousness tliat over­ shadows the entire Intellectual landscape. Nor Is simple concern for lack of physical means to repel an Invader sufficient to account for the depth and strength of this phenomenon. It Is perhaps an underlying feeling of spiritual Inadequacy that, as much as anything else, unites Spanish America and binds even the unique and consciously aloof La Plata region so effectively to the whole. Barbara Ward speaks of the revolution of equality as one of the great political forces of our time: "The belief that souls are equal before God and that, therefore, their equality Is Innate, metaphysical, and independent of the varieties of class, race, or culture. She says, "the equality of nations one with each other, the quality of esteem and prestige which comes from not being run by other 2 nations. . . is one of the great drives of our world." However, recognizing this Ideal has never been a satisfactory substitute for achieving equality In fact. The acceptance of the concept of equality as a right is one of the bases of Latin American preoccupation with independence and

^Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1^62), p. iW. ^Ibld.. p. 1 5 . 10 sovereignty. The painful fact that Latin America Is not one among equals keeps the Issue alive as an ever-present subject of argument and speculation. Leopoldo Zea comes very directly to this Issue In The Latin American Mind. A section of his Introduction entitled, "The Feeling of Dependence," casts Spain In the role of a grotesque Idol, a model, the symbol of that which Is to be attained, and hints at an almost Freudian love-hate relatlon- 3 ship. Zea refers to Andres Bello's remark, "We snatched the scepter from the monarch, but we did not rid ourselves of the Spanish spirit. . . the predcxnlnance of the Ideas of the same Spain whose banner they ^5ur soldlei^ had trampled. Zea further quotes an Argentine, Juan Bautista Aiberdl, who expands this vision to include Europe, saying Hlspano- Amérlcans were taught ". . .to hate as foreign anything that was not Spanish. . . . The liberators of I810, regarding Spain as a part of Europe, taught us to hate as an enemy of C America everything that was European." In this broader

^Leopold© Zea, The i^tln American Mind, trans. James H. Abbot, et aJ. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 19^7, PP- 3-7. ^Jose Gaos (comp.) Antologia del pensamlento de lengua espanola en la edad contempordnea TMexlco. l945). cl^ng Andres Bello, Investlgacldn sobre la influencla social de la conqulsta y del slstema colonial de los espafiol'es en dhlle (Santiago, 1842). Ibid., p. 37. ^Quoted In Zea, o£. clt., p. 46. 11 sense, Zea's own comments are most relevant :^ The colonial reality was the first of which the Hispanic American was aware— that Is, his reality as a dependency, his knowledge of being an entity dependent upon a reality which he does not yet consider his own, his dependency upon something which he considered foreign to him. The Hispanic American of the twentieth century continues discussing passionately, affirming or denying, this reality. The colonization and con­ quest remain alive In his mind, and about them revolve, after all Is said and done, all of his discussions. The fear of new colonization and conquest gave rise to a doctrine of sovereign Immunity which emphasized Latin American Independence and the Immutable nature of Its sovereignty.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY^

This legal and philosophical doctrine was among the earliest Intellectual creations of the new Latin American states and has an important relationship to the Monroe Doctrine that can help place the events of the Drago era In better perspective. Whereas the United States originated a political doctrine, the Monroe Doctrine, In 1823, the disunited states of Latin America, responding to the threat of the same Holy Alliance, were unable to come to an

Glbld., p. 5 . ^The phrase Is that of Harold Peterson. 12 g agreement at the Congress of Panama In 1826. From that point forward, the North American and Latin American concepts 9 of defensive doctrine diverged. The Latin American doctrine subsequently found expression in law and legal philosophy. In 1848, the Political Congress held at Lima, Peru, made an attempt to define non-intervention as an "American rule. By 1865, the latest reunion of Latin American states, again at Lima, 11 was officially termed a Juridical Congress. By then, the Idea of non-intervention was generally accepted as a prin­ ciple of emerging American International law.

Latin American legal philosophy. There Is an Impres­ sive body of doctrine which appeals to higher principles of Justice and Is so consistently repeated by successive generations. In diverse circumstances, as to merit the title.

^Bolivar's Congress considered a resolution against the Holy Alliance and In favor of the Monroe Doctrine. See J. B. Scott (ed.). The International Conference of American States, 1889-1920 (Fiw York: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. xxl-xxlv. ^Cf. the aggressive aspects of the Drago Doctrine vis a vis the Monroe Doctrine, Infra., pp. 65 ejb seqq. l^Ann Van Wynen et ^ . , The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Rethodlst University Press, 1963), p. l5bj Enrique V. Coromlnas, Hlstorla de las conferenclas Interamerlcanas (Buenos Aires : Editorial Propulsion, 1959). ^^The United States was Invited to participate In the Juridical Congresses of I872 and I879 but declined because of (1 ) "fundamental differences" In legal structure, and (2 ) the 13 "legal philosophy." Such doctrine, nevertheless, falls well 12 Short of International law. Based on moral principles, however commendable, this doctrine Is often wholly Intolerant of conflicting legal doctrine, based on fact and experience. An example Is Valle's famous and often-quoted Injunction con­ cerning the use of force. This phrase also reflects typical 13 Latin American sensitivity about cultural development: America did not have the degree of knowledge which Spain possessed. But neither was there In Spain the degree of knowledge which Is admired In Paris. Yet when Paris wished to regenerate Spain, t'he Spaniards arose against France, the people rebelled against such an unjust aggression, and the Cortes said : "Force gives no right."

American International law. One of the strongest supports for the doctrine of sovereign Immunity Is the Latin American concept of American International law. Thx^ughout a century of Intervention and continued dependency, it Is hardly surprising that lacking the means to mount a stronger defense, several generations of cultured and eloquent Latin dual nature of the United States legal system. W. Manger, Historical Evolution of Inter-American Cooperation (Washington": Pan American" Union, 1942), I, p. 19* ^^An interesting work on this subject Is that of H. B. Jaeoblnl, A Study of the Philosophy of International Law as Seen In the Works of Latin Amerlcan1?riters (The tkgue: Martïnus Wljhoff, 1954). T Q José Ceclllo del Valle, quoted by Harold E. Davis who calls this an early expression of a principle of American International law, ^ t l n American Social Thought (Washington: University Press, l96l), p. 79. 14

American leaders employed their mind a and pens to the best effect. But it would be unfair and Inaccurate to assert that American International law. exists only In the Greek Sophist role of 'à conspiracy of the weak against the l4 strong." There are other Important factors that make such 15 a regional offshoot a logical and useful development. Nonetheless, most of the principal tenets that Latin American publicists point to as the chief distinguishing features of American international law are conspicuously 16 defensive In character. Also, the era In which the subject was most actively debated within the new Pan American system coincided exactly with the years of United 17 States expansion in the Caribbean.

1 ^William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (New York; New American Library, 1965), p. 289. 1C Walter E. Schmidt, "A Theoretical Survey of the Development of Inter-Amerloan Law" (unpublished research paper, American University, Washington, 1966). ^ ^ g . , the Calvo Doctrine and the Drago Doctrine, Itself; Latin American denial of right of territorial aggrandizement by conquest, and even some aspects of such Innocuous Issues as the right to political asylum. See the classic work by Alejandro Alvarez, Chilean Jurist of International stature. Le droit International américain, cited In Jaeoblnl, 0£. cit., pp. 17-21. ^^Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, The Inter-American System (Dobb's Perry, New York: Oceana Publications, ïnc., 1906), pp. 25-38; Schmidt, 0£. clt.. pp. 10-12. However, this defensive attitude appeared even before the concept of American regional law had crystallized, e.g., Andres Bello, while recognizing that prominent publi­ cists made certain exceptions, stressed the intent, the 15 III. PEAR OP COLONIZATION AND CONQUEST

There Is no doubt that both public agitation and official Argentine concern with events In Venezuela In 1902 were a response to what was perceived as an actual threat. Drago*8 concluding remarks at the Hague, in a speech given on June l8, 1907, Illustrate typical Latin American 18 feelings: Par be It from my spirit to suppose that any of the powers here represented have plans of conquest or Imperialist expansion to the detriment of the weak nations of America who have no defense save the law and Immutable Justice. But nature has been generous with our countries, whose mild climate and fertile soil lend themselves to all sorts of pro­ ductivity and cultivation. Vast, with a small, very disseminated population, these were In another time, and can be again, the object of avarice. The history of all Latin America and of Argentina, In particular, reveals many precedents similar to the Venezuela Incident of 1902 in that they taught fear of European encroachment.

Argentine historical experience. Even before Argentina had achieved a distinct nationality apart from Spain, new European pressure was felt. In June, l806, a difference between the word and deed of Intervention, Principles de derecho Internaclonal (third edition; Valparalso,”Uhile: Snprenta de la Fatrla, 1864), pp. 24-30 ^®Drago, quoted In Republics Argentina, W politics Internaclonal de la nacldn argentine, ed. Carlos A. Silva (Buenos Aires : Imprenta del estado, 1946), pp. 504-505. See also Drago's remarks In his famous note. 16 1700 man English "army" led by a Colonel Beresford occupied Buenos Aires— and was quickly expelled. While this early gambit had been undertaken on the personal Initiative of Sir Home Popham, commander of the squadron who was soon recalled for reprimand, the British Foreign Office soon 19 warmed to the Idea of "liberating" Buenos Aires. The following year, 1807, another British invasion force appeared off Buenos Aires. Unwilling to be liberated, the porteno mil It la successfully repelled this augmented force, as well. Argentine horsemen even galloped out, attacked and boarded one unlucky British vessel which missed the tide and became stuck In the mud of the shallow Rio de la 20 Plata. In 1838, ostensibly In reprisal for brusque treatment of a consular agent, a French fleet captured and occupied the Island of Martin Garcia which controls the entrance to the Parana River. Protection of French commerce had probably weighed heavily as a motive for this action. However, with La Plata trade reduced by the blockade, French profits

^^Jose Luis Busanlche, Hlstorla argentina (in Colecclon "El pasado argentlno," ed. Gregorio Weinberg. Buenos Aires: Ediclones Solar, 1965), pp. 285-288. ^Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America. from its Beginnings to the Present “(second edTtlon, revised; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965), P* 271 • For a detailed account see John F. Cady, Foreign Intervention In the Rio de la Plata. 1838-1850 (Philadelphia, 1929). 17 declined even more than would have been the case had the disturbed affairs of Rosas' government been left to run their course. The French withdrew In 1840 and agreed to arbitrate 21 their claims. Again in 1845, when Argentina and Uruguay were at war, the French returned, this time also occupying the Uruguayan town of Colonla, opposite Buenos Aires. The British, this time unwilling to let the French take Inde­ pendent action against Argentina, joined the French almost op at once. By 1850, both England and France had withdrawn 23 and signed agreements with Rosas ' government. As the La Plata region eventually settled down and prospered under the progressive Argentine Constitution of 1853, the locus of direct forceful European Intervention 24 moved northward. But Argentina's financial ties with Europe were Increased and strengthened. Thus, political

^^Herrlng, o£. cit., p. 637. ^^Cf., Infra., p. 66. This set a direct precedent for British participation with Germany In the Venezuelan blockade of 1902. -^There Is also some basis for believing Rosas' repeated claims of Spanish designs for reconquest. See E. Ravlgnanl, Inferenclas sobre Juan M. de Rosas y otras ensay OB (Buenos Aires: Editorial Huarpes, S.A., 1 9 4 5 ) , pp. 91 et seqq. ^Ramon Lopez Jimenez' first chapter Is a brief review of European Interventions, El orIncIplo de no Intervenclon en America 2 iS. nota uru^aya 1 Buenos Aires : Editorial Depalma, 1947)• Even poor Spain seemed a threat to those In whose living memories her power had once been a fact. 18 crises growing from financial disputes between new and old world continued to strike a responsive chord.

Renewed ties with England. The basis for a sudden upsurge of European, and especially English, Interest and investment In Argentina was due to an enormous Increase In Argentina's ability to supply Europe with foodstuffs. The well springs of this sharp Increase were a combination of new technological developments and a fruition of Sarmlento's immigration policies. In I856, the Bessemer converter was 25 Invented, allowing mass production of steel. In 1857, the tide of Immigration to Argentina began to rise. By I876, the first refrigerated ship, the Frigorifique, Initiated frozen meat shipments to Europe. Soon the increased power of superior numbers and superior machines created a furious upsurge in the hitherto backward Argentine economy. Within fourteen years, the number of refrigerator vessels plying the Atlantic between 26 England and the Rio de la Plata had risen from one to 278i Within the same period, the Argentine economy experienced a boom that brought vast sums of English capltal--and a bust

25McNelll, 0£. clt.. p. 804. ^^Herrlng, 0£. clt., pp. 658-659* An authoritative text Is that of Simon 6 . Hanson, Argentine Meat and the British Market (London, 1938). 19 that renewed Argentine fears of intervention on behalf of that capital.

IV, PEAR OP ECONOMIC DOMINATION

As Argentina grew, so did European economic Influence, bringing not only new wealth, but a new and more Insidious kind of colonization and conquest as well as new motives for traditional, more physical forms of encroachment. The clas­ sical Argentine dilemma of how to be European without submitting to European hegemony seemed not at all to diminish with increased prosperity but merely to become especially acute In this new dimension. The financial crisis of 1880- 1890 and the attitudes and apprehensions It left In Its wake had a profound Influence on later events, and particularly, on both public and official reactions during the Venezuela blockade of 1902.

The financial crisis of 188O-189O . The financial crisis that reached its peak In I890 was but the lowest point in a widely oscillating economic curve. The bouyant optimism born of the rising productivity of the rich pampa. the insatiable greed of both Argentine and foreign spec­ ulators, and the unbridled corruption of the Argentine administration, especially that of Julio A. Roca 's brother- in-law and successor In I886, Miguel Juarez Celman, all conspired to create financial anarchy. 20

The financial crash and revolution of 1890 had Its origin a full decade earlier In the changes begun In 1880. In that year. General Roca, the "Conqueror of the Desert," assumed the presidency and abandoned the cautious policies , 27 of his predecessor, Nicolas Avellaneda. In his I88O Inaugural address, Roca made It clear that one of his chief concerns would be to extend the railroad network: "Rich and fertile provinces await only the arrival of the railroad to multiply their productivity one hundredfold by the easy means offered to them to carry to the markets and the ports of the Littoral, their varied and excellent products, which Include 28 all that nature affords." The rail network and numerous other public works, telegraph lines, bridges, public buildings and the enlargement of the port of Buenos Aires all helped underpin a boom whose dimensions are reflected In 20 Impressive statistics. ^ As has too often been the case, both borrowers and lenders tried to make too much of a good thing. English capital rushed Into Argentina as never before, profits soared.

^^Avellaneda, by a combination of salary, personnel cuts, and other economies, had actually succeeded In balancing the disrupted, post-Paraguayan War budget In 1878. See Herring, 0£. cit., p. 651• 2®Quoted by José Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought (trans. Thomas P. MeGann; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 172. 29See Infra., pp. 28-31 21 and the network of railroads— and of foreign debts— sprang into being. The solid achievements of the men of the Generation of I88O obscured their equally real abuses of power. Irresponsible traffic In public lands made a few 30 millionaires while small farmers were overlooked entirely. The abuse of easy credit soon reversed the favorable balance of trade despite constantly Increasing volume of exports. Pressed to meet both usurious Interest payments and domestic expenses, Argentina resorted to what has bee «ne her characteristic method of extracting tribute from the public: 31 printing press money. In l884, the peso began a downward spiral and by 1889 was only worth a third of Its former 32 33 value. By I89O the government was bankrupt. The demand for political housecleanlng led to widespread uprisings, in

^^During the last months of Juarez Caiman's admin­ istration, no less than 134 new land corporations were chartered. % e belatedly established Ministry of Agriculture (1898) found that although the government had given away more than 150 million acres— a little less than the combined area of Prance, Belgium, and the Netherlands— it had "no idea what lands were left, where they were, or what they were worth." Y. Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945)190. Sllbid., p. 176. 32see the discussion and figures In Romero, clt.. "The Economic Era," pp. 166-173; Thomas P. Me Gann, Argent ina, the United States and the Inter-American System. 1886-19X4 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), PP. 112-117* ^^By 1892, also bankrupt was the Baring Bros, fi­ nancial empire which had made loans to Argentina since the era of Rlvadavia. See Ysabel Rennie, og. clt., p. I8 I. 22 some cases, supported by units of the armed forces. The cabinet resigned in April, I89O, and shortly thereafter, Juarez Celraan resigned in favor of Vice-President Carlos 34 Pellegrini.

Aftermath of the crisis. The financial crash was accompanied by widespread fear of foreign Intervention. In fact, such fears might have been justified except that through a massive effort, which forced the Argentine oligarchy to reach even more deeply into the public coffers, 35 the Interest payments on the foreign loans were met. 36 Carlos Pellegrini later said: When I became President of the Republic, I was certain that with the resources which the country possessed at that moment, and as long as no new sources of income were obtained or developed, it would not be possible to service the foreign debt. But I believed that the credit of the nation was worth any sacrifice. Many people criticized me then for what I did. In the midst of the financial anguish, when there was not even money to pay government salaries, I sent the last peso to Europe.

While the immediate crisis was past, and the growth of the economy continued to be based on the firm foundations

3^Carlos Pellegrini, Pellegrini. 1846-1906. Obras (Buenos Aires, 1941), IV, pp. 76-77* 35McOann cites a letter from Miguel Cane to Roque Saenz Pena from Paris in October, 1891, immediately turned over to Foreign Minister Zeballos, warning that the British government was considering the formation of a commission to take charge of Argentina's revenues. See og. clt.. p. 166. S^Pellegrinl, loc. cit. 23 of meat, wheat, and frlgorlfloos, worked by the hands of willing Immigrants, the experience of the crash had made a profound impression on all Argentines and perhaps planted the seeds for the peculiar Argentine brand of economic xenophobia whose harvest the United States was one day so richly destined to reap. Argentina remained a debtor nation In 1896, Juan Bautista Justo, founder of the Argentine * 37 Socialist Party, wrote in ^ Wacion: English capital has done what their armies could not do. Today our country Is tribute to England. Every year many millions of gold pesos leave here and go to the stockholders of English enterprises that are established in Argentina. . . . We ought not to regard as a favor the establish­ ment in the country of additional foreign capital. It is this capital that largely prevents us from having sound money. . . . The growing depth of public feeling against foreign economic control is further shown by a political incident which took place in 1901, barely more than a year before Drago's note was sent. Pellegrini, In 1890, had persuaded Argentina's creditors of his nation's good faith and had gained a three year moratorium whose new bonds were secured 38 by a lien on Argentine customs revenues. But in 1901, a similar proposal for a new loan and a new lien, advanced

37ouoted in Romero, 0£. clt.. p. 193.

^^McQann, loc. clt. 24

Jointly in high government circles by Pellegrini and Roca, met with an unprecedented outcry when the news later leaked out. Roca skillfully disavowed the plan, albeit at the cost of his personal friendship with the aging Pellegrini. Clearly, the power and temper of the public and Its reactions was changing, a factor which would weigh heavily first in the acceptance, then In the rejection of the forthcoming 39 Drago Doctrine.

First reactions to the Venezuela blockade. Compared to the relatively slight interest generated throughout the rest of Latin America by the first reports of the Anglo- German blockade of Venezuela, the reaction In Argentina was striking. The press took up the cry against foreign inter­ vention on December 12, 1902, and maintained front page coverage of the Incident even through the Christmas holi­ days.Buenos Aires was In a "state of hysteria.One of the first manifestations of official concern came in the

^^Ibid., pp. 225-226; Jose A. Terry, Contribueion a la histpria finanelera de la Republica Argentina. . . (Buenos Sires, 1^40), p. 33. Also useful In the question of guar­ antees in the period after I890 Is John H. Williams, Argentina's International Trade under Inconvertible Paper Money (Cambridge; Harvard University Pfess7 40on December 23 and 24, La Nacion printed a lengthy interview with the British Minister, Sir Landsdowne, in which he reiterated traditional Anglo-Argentine friendship and denied any improper British intentions in Venezuela. ^^Republica Argentina, la politics Internacional. . . , p. 506. 25 form of a letter to Drago's office from ex-Presldent Carlos Pellegrini, whose recent experiences had made him eapecially 42 sensitive to issues involving foreign debt. He was suf­ ficiently concerned to suggest the use of Argentine funds. 43 His letter read in part: Why don't we, together with Brazil and Chile, request Venezuela's concurrence In making the fol­ lowing offer: Venezuela would deposit In a bank In London, Berlin or Rome, money or credits equal to the amount sought, and immediately, the matter would be submitted to the Hague, or whatever other tri­ bunal. We would not have to offer mediation, which perhaps, so as not to give the appearance of exclu­ ding the United States, they might not accept. It would place the issue on a basis that would be nard to reject; if Venezuela is not in condition to make the deposit, we could help— and the sum is not of importance; it would be an act of true American solidarity and would submit to judgement this "right by might" of bombing to collect what they feel is theirs. Thus, in seeming response to events far removed from

4p In fact, Drago was no stranger to gentle coercion via the public debt despite his short time In the Foreign Ministry. For months, Britain had been using the debt as a lever to induce Argentina and Chile to de-escalate a renewed arms race. See Ibid. ^3printed in Ernesto Quesada, "La doctrina Drago; su esencla y eoncepto amplio y claro," Revista de la Unlversidad de Buenos Aires. XVL, l43 (December, 19i9), pp."357-358. Drago later stated the suggestion was rejected because of the relatively large sums claimed by the Intervening powers for personal losses suffered by their citizens. Drago's note explicitly addresses Itself to forcible collection of public debt and specifically avoids discussion of tort claims. The precedent for this offer set forty-one years earlier is striking. After some historical research,^Drago offered this example: When In l86l, England, Spain and France resolved to Intervene In Mexico as a consequence of the 26 Argentina, Luis Marla Drago wrote his celebrated note of 44 December 29, 1902. He later said: 1 don't know where it had Its origin— whether In this principle or that ; I can only affirm that I wrote the note in a moment of great agitation, under the pressure of events, without consulting a library or even looking through the Indexes. I only wanted to vigorously express my thoughts and wrote, "Public debts should not be collected by force," and I added, "in the nations of America."

suspension of the payments on the foreign debt decreed by President Juarez, Secretary Seward, fearing violation of American soil by parties to the expedition, conceived the Idea of the nego­ tiation of a treaty with the debtor republic by which the United States was to assume the debt of that country for a period of five years and thus dissipate every Incentive to foreign Intervention. The American Senate disapproved this proceeding. . . . Prom "State Loans In their Relation to International Policy, " American Journal of International Law, I (1907), p. 695» ^^Drago to the Chamber of Deputies, June 24, 1914, quoted by Quesada, op. clt., p. 372. The original Drago note la printed In Its entirety in Appendix A, p. 112. Official versions, both Spanish and English, are found In United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905 (Waslhlngfon : Government Printing Office, 1&Ù4), pp. 1-6. CHAPTER III

AS A DEFENSE OP FUTURE INTERESTS

Also present as an underlying motive for the formu­ lation of the Drago Doctrine was the defense of the future interests of the Argentine Republic. With Increased pros­ perity, there occurred a certain turning outward of state interests— as. Indeed, befit an offspring of Europe. This turning outward was manifested here by a proposal for joint international action, there by a faint Imperialistic rumbling from an intellectual or business leader. Argen­ tina's Impressive growth Is reflected In the almost In­ credible statistics whose assiduous collection. Itself a good Indicator, began In earnest shortly before the turn of ^ e century. It was at this time, partially as a defensive doctrine, partly as a claim against future Interests, that the Drago Doctrine bore its purest and closest relationship to the Monroe Doctrine. The change in that relationship as the United States lost Its moral superiority under the Monroe Doctrine, especially with the advent of the Roosevelt Corol­ lary In 1904, often tends to obscure the nature of the original relationship. It is worthwhile to trace. In detail, both the means and manifestations of budding Argentine Inter­ nationalism and the parallel development of the Drago and Monroe Doctrines. 28

I. ARGENTINA'S INCREASING NATIONAL POWER

The most solid and impressive measures of Increasing Argentine economic power are the statistics showing increases In numbers of people and the quantity of their output. Examples of commercial opportunity, such as the success of the Rosario Port Company are most convincing. However, even more important are the accompanying pressures to change older patterns of thinking, especially at the popular level; that is, changes in the national character. While it may not be possible to measure these changes directly, some statistics are useful, especially those which_ show changes in the quality of human occupations. Examples of new cultural achievements and activity In the arts can enhance our understanding of these more subtle changes. New attitudes toward events abroad, toward Spain and toward North American activities in the Caribbean all showed the presence of a new outlook that viewed the Drago Doctrine as a defense of Argentina's own political and commercial Interests.

Economic expansion. The most fundamental basis of Argentine growth In the decades around the turn of the century was her Increasing population. The flood of Immigrants raised the working population literally by the millions. In l869, at the time of the first national census, the population of Argentina numbered 29 1,737,076} By 1895, this figure had risen to 3,954,911, and by 1914, the total population was 7,855,237. During the same period, the population of Buenos Aires grew even more rapidly, from 284,909 to 1 ,575,818, so that in 1914, half the residents of the capital city were Argentine citizens and half were legal aliens. The speed and ease of communications and trans­ portation increased accordingly. Railroad track mileage, even after the crash of 1890, Increased from 9,432 kilometers in that year to 33,510 kilometers In 1914.^ Telegraph offices more than doubled in numbers and the movement of mail increased from 142 million pieces moved in 1895 to over 3 a billion pieces In 1914. Industry, which had been neglected until the l890's began to expand at a phenomenal rate, not only In the national capital, but In the provinces as well. Table I shows growth In the capital province and three other

^Por these population figures (pp. 1-3) as well as for all the numerical statistics, I rely heavily on,Ernesto Tornqulst e^ al., El desarrollo economlco de la Republica Argentina en los ultlmos clncuenta aftos TBuenos Aires: Ernesto Tornqulst y Cla., ttda., Ï920). ^Ibid., p. Ill 3Ibid.,pp. 119, 124. 30 4 selected provinces in gold pesos worth of industry. TABLE I INCREASING NET WORTH OP INDUSTRY IN POUR SELECTED PROVINCES

Provinces 1895 1913 Increase

Buenos Aires $117,985,951 $547,652,248 3 0 $ San Luis 490,682 6,684,743 1260$ Cordoba 7 ,947,838 75,064,368 845$ Mendoza 14,004,455 171,786,441 1125$

The biggest industry of all, meat export, in the period 1894- 1914, rose from a value of $11,755,368 gold pesos to $96,924,253, or an Increase of 741$.^ The example of the Rosario Port Company, one of the two or three (including the Panama Canal) most monetarily successful enterprises in history. Illustrates the vigor of the Argentine economic boom In the Drago era. In 1902, the National Congress made a contract with Hersent et Plis, Schneider et Cle., a French firm, to build a modern harbor and docks at the city of Rosario, some 150 miles up the Parana River from Buenos Aires. The terms of the contract, which granted rights to exploit the new facilities for the next forty years, anticipated that maximum traffic would reach 2.5 million tons per year by 1930. This figure was

^Ibld., pp. 28-2 9 .

^Ibld., p. 100. 31 not only reached, but exceeded by 1905, less than three years after the port opened, making Rosario overnight the second major city of Argentina and the largest grain port In the world. Shares that originally sold for 500 francs reached a price of 35,000 francs

Qualitative changes In Argentine economic life. During this same era, not only the quantity, but the quality of human endeavor changed. Note, in Table II, the modest gains in the numbers of persons employed in agriculture versus the relatively larger increases in Industry and commerce. The decline In absolute numbers employed in personal services and In the military reflects what was, in fact, a mild labor shortage. The figures on education and 7 the arts virtually speak for themselves. TABLE II CHANGES IN NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN SELECTED PROFESSIONS

Profession 1895 1914 5^ Change Agriculture and ranching 393,953 529,866 34$ increase Industry 366,087 841,237 130jé increase Commerce 143,358 293,646 105$ increase Personal services 222,774 218,619 ^ decrease Military 13,102 9,641 26^ decrease Civil service 23,934 108,852 3555^ increase Education 18,358 83,184 3539^ increase Pine arts 2,698 14,192 4 2 ^ increase Letters and sciences 2,479 8,809 25^ increase

Ysabel Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 201-202. ^Tornqulst, ojo. clt., pp. 7-8. 32 Many of Argentina's finest civic and cultural achieve­ ments date from this period. The wide avenue of "9 de Julio," the earlier, elegant and tree-lined "25 de mayo," the Colon theater, the National Congress and many other fine govern-

— 8 ment buildings changed and improved the capital. The tango, born In Argentine slums. Joined some of Its nations wealthiest sons in the slums of Paris, where in the era of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, Argentina was known as the "mother of playboys."

Indications of changing political outlook. As Argen­ tina 's national wealth and power Increased, a more outward- looking, restless— if not actually aggressive— point of view began to reveal itself in important sectors. Starting with widely differing premises, a new generation of Argentine writers concluded by advocating imperialism as a partial solution to her various problems with surprising frequency. Not all were as direct as the Argentine Army officer who urged the conquest and annexation of a neighboring state, or another well known writer who advocated an even more general reordering of territory as part of "the great

o I am indebted to Thomas McCann for many of the fine examples cited in this section. See his description of Argentina in the centennial year, 1910, In Argentina, the United States and the Inter-American System, ldBO-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard^University ï*ress, 1957), pp. 270-275. 33 9 political solutions that are needed Toy humanity." The Manuel Galvez school of thought urged a return to the shining patriotic principles of the past; Ricardo Rojas pleaded for a more nationalistic-orlented educational system; yet. Inevitably, the theme of Imperialism as part of Argentina's glorious future kept popping up.^^ Even such a prominent figure as Jose Ingenieros could not avoid envisioning a kind of "pacific imperialism" in the future of a land so richly endowed with such superior racial and economic types as was Argentina. Even the usually reliable and level-headed daily, la Prensa, occasionally took up the cry of the "lost viceregal lands, cast away by Argentine pacifism and „11 tolerance. Some prominent business leaders and industrialists, notably one Francisco Seeber, owner of a large department store chain, had an eye on outside markets and often felt a special kinship with their capitalist cousins in North

^Ibid. cites, "Marreucos, la Tripolitana y una republica sudamericana," Re vista de Derecho, Historla % Letras, XIV, 4l (January, 1912), pp. 66-72; A. Pallejâ, "La hora actual de la polftlca argentIna, " Revista de Derecho, Hlstoria g Letras, XIV, 41 (January, 1912), pp. 4i- 51. ^^Raul A. Orgaz, "La orlentaclon amerlcanista en la ensehanza de la historla," Revlsta Argentina de Cienclas Polltlcas, I (1910), pp. 783-792. ^^La Prensa, April 27, 1914; Me Gann, op», cit.. p. 295. 34 America* Seeber, In a book published during the thick of discussion of the new Drago Doctrine, viewed United States "conquests" In the Caribbean as an Inevitable development 12 under the laws of twentieth century progress. In fact, the later coup In Panama provoked surprisingly little 13 unfavorable response. In a similar vain, the same mature spirit, quite uncharacteristic of the rest of Latin America, Is shown in the 1900 change In the Argentine national 14 anthem to remove phrases which might be offensive to Spain. Argentina's neighbors were instinctively aware of the dangers Inherent in her new disposition toward inter­ nationalism. Their attitude was shown when Argentina pro­ posed to send the Drago note as a joint declaration.

Proposals for joint issuance of the Drago note. The short-lived proposal to send the Drago note as an ABC (Argen­ tina -Brazil-Chlle) statement Illustrates the wariness of the latter states of Argentina, in particular, and Monroe-like pronouncements, in general. After "much mediation" drafting

Francisco Seeber, Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Uruguay. Peru, Bolivia y; Paraguay. Ëstudïos comparaiivos. . . (ÎBuénos Aires, 1910)7 pp. 233-239, 241-245. ^^La Prensa endorsed the Hay Herran treaty as a logical extension of United States interests in an editorial of January 28, 1903; MeGann, o£. clt., pp. 224-225* ^^McGann, 0£. cit., p. 229. 35 the note, Drago sent It to President Roca for his approval. Roca "accepted the arguments and conclusions of the note, but had his doubts whether or not to send it for fear that the other nations of South America would believe that Argentina 15 was seeking a certain hegemony." Roca suggested, as did the letter from Carlos Pellegrini advocating the commitment of Argentine funds, that Brazil and Chile be consulted and 16 given the opportunity to co-sign the Drago note. In the Interval while the Ministers of Brazil and Chile were being consulted, Roca, still uncertain, sent Drago to see the # 17 aging Bartolome' Mitre, Drago's own grandfather. After reading the note. Mitre told Drago the note should be sent at once, adding, "it will do honor to you and to our govern- ment.„18 The decision to send the Drago note, with or without the participation of Brazil and Chile, was apparently made even before those states formally declined to accept the

^Ernesto Quesada, "La doctrina Drago; su esencla y concepto amplio y claro," Revlsta de la Unlversidad de Buenos Aires, XVL, l43 (December, 1919), PP* 358-359. ^^Also see the editorial in Pellegrini's paper, El Pafs, December 20, 1902. The first documented evidence of such proposals is Drago's note to Jose A. Terry, Argentine Minister to Chile, January 20, 1903, cited in Mariano J. Drago, Luis Drago, dlscursos ^ escrltos (Buenos Aires, 1938), pp. 68-6 9 . However, it is likely that this was a reitera­ tion of an earlier proposal, made possible by the long delay In the United States reply. Quesada, loc. clt. ^^Ibld. 36 Argentine Invitation. Ernesto Quesada, whose later article, Drago, In a postscript, praises highly, attributed the fol­ lowing attitude to Brazil's Foreign Minister, Rio Branco: (l) Brazil always pays her debts, (2 ) multilateral endorse­ ment of the Drago Doctrine could Involve Brazil In a war with a European power, and (3) the only American nation strong enough to repel a European power, the United States, 19 did not support the "Drago thesis." In a later book, the 1902 Brazilian Minister, Gyro de Acevedo— perhaps with 20 tongue In cheek--wrote: This most commendable Initiative of the Argen­ tine jain later had won, as cruel circumstance always dictates, the resentment of the timid, the easy contempt of the overcautious, the general distrust and apathy toward every new, bold act; It the Doctrine also had to surmount the greatest obstacle, the prejudice and gullabllity of the other South American nations. It was viewed by them with suspicion as an attempt to assert Argentine hegemony over the interests of the continent.

II. INFLUENCE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

There seems little doubt that part of the motive for the rejection of the ABC proposal and much of the motive for the ultimate Argentine reappraisal of the Drago Doctrine stemmed from its relationship to the-Monroe Doctrine. What

^^Quesada, o£. cit., p. 374. ^^razilian Minister Cyro de Acevedo, Chemin faisant, quoted in Ibid., pp. 358-3 59* 37 Is less well known, is that there was a strong Argentine element, as In fact, throughout Latin America, that heartily endorsed the principles of Monroe. The interpretation of the Drago Doctrine as "a financial corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," although a relationship not explicitly defined by Its author until he left the office of Foreign Minister, 21 found much popular support. The last "formal application" of the Monroe Doctrine had been, significantly. In Venezuela some seven years earlier and was directed against the very European nation with which Argentina was most concerned; Great Britain.

The Venezuela-Great Britain border controversy. The degree to which Drago's note appeals to the Monroe Doctrine was Influenced by his knowledge of the general circumstances of the 1895 incident; that Is, the site of the dispute: Venezuela; the protagonists: Venezuela, Great Britain and the United States; and most significantly, the unquestion­ able success, from the standpoint of most Latin American public opinion, of that Intervention. Viewed from the North American standpoint, the events of 1902 struck a familiar chord In no small wise due to the 1895 precedent. North American public opinion was sensitive to the new

Ibid., p. 372; Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea : Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 97* 38 "British aggression" In Venezuela In 1902 and predisposed to regard and receive the Argentine note with favor and fanfare. The boundary dispute in question was hardly a recent Invention of either side; the controversy had flickered since 1840 when the British government had commissioned a Sir Robert Schomburgk to survey the true boundary. Venezuela had refused to accept the "Schomburgk Line" and both aides, "with true horse-trading Instinct," had sub- 22 sequently advanced extreme claims. Part of the area In question had strategic value, particularly the land com­ manding the mouth of the Orinoco River, and the discovery of gold In other parts made the matter still more Interesting to all concerned. In l88?, Venezuela defiantly broke diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Venezuela kept up a continual din of protest and oo appeal In Washington to the name of the "Immortal Monroe." Such appeals were not new. Nor was European Intervention In 24 Venezuela. From 183O-1865, the United States had failed

^^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (fifth edition; New Yorkl Appleton-Century- Crofts, Inc., 1955), Ch. XXIX is entirely devoted to "Cleveland and the Venezuela Crisis with Britain." ^^Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907 (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1937), pp. 50 et seqq. H. Gray, "American Diplomacy in Venezuela, 1835-1865," Hlspanlc-Amerlcan Historical Review, XX (1940), pp. 551-553* 39 to Invoke the Monroe Doctrine In five cases of European

Intervention In Venezuela. In 1876, 1880, 1881, l884, and on three occasions In I887, Venezuela had appealed, more or less explicitly, to the Monroe Doctrine, in each case with- 25 out notable success. Between 1888 and 1894, "the Vene­ zuelan Minister at Washington continued to indite laborious notes In which the principles of 1823 figured prominently.^

In 1894, Venezuela's chief Jurist, Rafael Seljas pleaded:

"In this grave moment, Venezuela has appealed to her sisters on this continent, and particularly, to the United States of

America.The Venezuelan government and press whipped up massive demonstrations In favor of the United States. Great 28 Britain was not the least concerned.

The United States invokes the Monroe Doctrine. In early 1895, the United States became directly Involved,

^^Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1955), p. iTTI The 1871 case, however, was a noteworthy exception. See infra., P* ^^Ibld., p. 173. ^^Rafael Seijas, quoted by William S. Robertson, "Hispanic American Appreciations of the Monroe Doctrine," Hispanlc-American Historical Review, III (192O), pp. 1-2. ^^Balley, In a caption below his chapter title, loc. cit., quotes Secretary of State Olney in 1912: "In English eyes the United States was then so completely negligible a quantity that It was believed only words the equivalent of blows would be really effective." 40 largely due to the efforts of William L. Scruggs, Republican ex-Minister to Venezuela, recently ousted since the Demo­ cratic victory of I8 9 2 . Now employed as a lobbyist by the Caracas government, Scruggs published a pamphlet In October, 1894, entitled, "British Aggressions In Venezuela, or the 29 Monroe Doctrine on Trial. " This pamphlet was distributed to congressmen, sold on newsstands, and quickly ran through four printings. Scruggs also persuaded his congressman, Livingston, of Georgia, to introduce a resolution urging the speedy arbitration of the dispute. The Cleveland admin­ istration, noting the signs of popular interest, reacted with a firm. If crude and inaccurate note to Great Britain denouncing her violation of the Monroe Doctrine and demanding to know whether she Intended to submit to arbitration. Lord Salisbury's delayed and somewhat condescending reply made Cleveland "mad clear through" and prompted him to challenge Great Britain in no uncertain terms. President Cleveland, in a ringing message to Congress, asked for funds to send an American Investigating commission to Venezuela to fix the boundary and stated that, there­ after, the United States "must resist by every means In Its power, " any attempt by Britain to exercise Jurisdiction over land which "we have determined of right belongs to

29Ibid., p. 48lj Perkins, A History. . . , pp. 173-184 describes the entire Scruggs Incident. 4l

Venezuela. Both houses of Congress were moved to ap­ plause, the Jingo press had a field day and public reaction gave a general preview of the Spanlsh-Amerlcan War fever that would sweep the country a few years hence. Happily, In this case, Britain yielded to the United States demands with few hard feelings due to a fortuitlous combination of circumstances as well as real changes In 31 great power relationships. More significant vfs a v£s the later Venezuelan crisis and the Drago declaration was the Latin American response to this latest intervention.

Favorable reactions and multilateralization proposals. The popular reaction in Latin America ranged from cautious approval to unrestrained Joy, especially in the Caribbean, and Inspired a wave of multilateralization proposals. The Venezuelans were ecstatic. The Simon Bolivar Club planned monster demonstrations. Thousands wearing rosette badges with the North American and Venezuelan colors Joined In a Christmas Day procession to Washington's statue In Caracas

3^^11ey, 0£. clt.. p. 485. ^^See Infra., pp. . An arbitration committee, on October 3, 1899, arrived at a settlement substantially in accord with the Schomburgk Line. It Is worthwhile to also note that a long-standing Franco-BrazIlian border dispute was settled by voluntary arbitration in 1900. The example of 1895 as well as the spirit of the Hague was not lost on Prance. See 1895 European press reactions, mainly hostile. In Perkins, A History. . . , pp. 186-I8 9 . 42 which was soon "completely covered" with flowers, crosses 32 and flags. The largest Caracas da.dally, the Dlarlo de 33 Caracas, editorialized as follows: In the Old World, the Hispanic American countries are generally considered as seml-barbarous, without sufficient strength to assure the Inviolability of their rights or to make themselves respected In any emergency. European states have viewed those countries as an easy prize— a prey In which powerful nations might with Impunity fasten their teeth, by extending their conquests and by advocating unjust demands and claims. Experience has demonstrated that It Is necessary to terminate these abuses. It has shown the need for a union of the forces of the continent to guarantee mutually the rights and prerogatives of each one of the confederated nations.

President Monroe furnished a formula In the celebrated message that bears his name; Cleveland and the United States Congress have amplified It In connection with our dispute with England; and eventually, there Is spreading from the Hudson River to Cape Horn the conception of n grand American alliance as the most expeditious and Im­ perative measure for the salvation of the rights and sovereignty of our young Republics. In Bogota, Colombia, popular demonstrations and the press echoed the reactions In Venezuela. On January 10, 1896, la Epoca published a poem, dedicated to the United States, read by Its author, Diego Uribe at a Bogota banquet given in honor of the North American and Venezuelan 34 Ministers. It Is entitled La llbertad:

32])iario de Caracas, December 27, 1895. 33Editorial in ibid., January 10, 1896; Also see El Progoncro /G^araca^, December 19, 1895; January 6 , 1896. ^^La ipoca ^ o g o t ^ , January 10, 1896. 43

Salud por ese pueblo soberano, Slempre en nobleza y en honor fecundo. Que a traves de las olas del Oceano, Tlende hacla el Sol su poderosa mano Para aflanzar la llbertad de un mundo. Mexico's President Diaz, in an address to the opening session of the Mexican Congress on April 10, 1896, barely stopped short of proposing a collective security pact like that adopted In Rio de Janeiro a half century later. Speak­ ing of the Monroe declaration, he said, "Mexico cannot do less than show Itself the partisan of a Doctrine that condemns as contrary to the established order any attack of monarchla1

Europe upon the republics of America." He went on to suggest 35 that these American republics:

. . . By means of a declaration similar to that of President Monroe, should proclaim that an attack by any foreign power which aims to impair the ter­ ritory, or the independence, or to alter the institutions of one of the American republics would be considered, by each nation making the declaration, as an offense against herself. . . . In this manner, the Doctrine which Is today designated the Monroe Doctrine would become a truly American Doctrine in the most ample sense.. . .

III. THE DRAGO DOCTRINE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Argentine reactions to the 1895 incident were, in general, favorable if more reserved. La Prensa Interviewed Acting President Roca who warned that the alternative to action under the Monroe Doctrine was to accept that "the

35Quoted in Ibid., June 2, I8 9 6 , p. 11. 44 time may come when the European nations seek to treat South America as they are treating Africa.Estanislaus S. Zeballos, then Acting Minister to Washington, considered the United States stand on Venezuela "friendly and reasonable, 37 without tending toward a protectorate." Ex-President Pellegrini, alone among the most influential Argentine statesmen, responded In a disgruntled, negative tone, charg­ ing that the Monroe Doctrine was "an anachronism"— It had "no longer a raison d'etre," since; "There is not today a European Power that could or would attempt to conquer ter­ ritories belonging to nations whose Independence all have recognized. There were other negative opinions, mostly from strongly pro-European sources, which as might be expected, opposed any strengthening of United States Influence In Latin America. Thus, Paul Groussac, at once an Argentine and a Frenchman, logically found harsh things to say in his review. La Biblioteca, about both England and the United 39 States. Similarly, La Prensa, in the same issue in which /

Prensa /Buenos Aires/, December l8 , I895. 37Republlca Argentina, Ministerlo de Relaciones Exterlores y Culto, Memoria de relaciones exterlores presentada al Congresb Nacional, 1895 (Buenos Aires; Imprenta del estado, 1896)7 pp. 84-d7; MeGann, o£. cit., pp. 184-185.

38ei Diario /Buenos Aires/, December 22, 1895* Dexter Perkins most aptly labels Pellegrini's comments as "less profound than Jealous," A History. . . , p. 189.

39McGann, 0£. clt., p. l84. 45 it called for popular support of the Venezuelan action, warned against the dangers of Pan Americanism and American commercial reciprocity treaties, saying : "Europe respects us because our relations with her are based on fundamental, 40 reciprocal Interests. This division of opinion, of like and dislike, admiration and Jealousy of the United States and the Monroe Doctrine, with a strong admixture of European Influence, deepened and intensified In the interlude between the two Venezuela Incidents.

An unequal partnership. Even without the Spanish- Amerlcan War and the election of Theodore Roosevelt to the Presidency, the Drago Doctrine would have met with a mixed reaction in its native land. However, these two events were like two strikes against Drago insofar as the new pronounce­ ment related to the Doctrine of Monroe. During the Spanish-Amerlean War, the strong Spanish immigrant element In Argentina assured a loud and vehement public outcry. The ruling oligarchy remained neutral in its statements, if not in its sentiments, with two prominent exceptions: Paul Groussac and Roque Saenz Pena. At a Spanish rally in the capital, they pulled out all the stops of Latin American oratory, vilifying the "gross and greedy

^ L a Prensa, loc. clt. Nonetheless, Argentina during this time sent more official propaganda publications to the Pan American Union than any other nation. See Me Gann, op. clt., p. 227* 46 screech of Monroe." The United States was pictured as alcoholic and materialistic, Spain as noble and lyric. Furthermore, a third speaker claimed, Americans have ice water in their veins, while Spaniards— to them "love lifted 4l the toast of beautiful women, brunette and passionate." Despite such popular manifestations, there remained a strong element that, if not pro-Monroe or pro-American, was at least attuned to the harsh realities of international life, understood the history of the United States and its Monroe Doctrine, and even admired Roosevelt as a strong and 42 capable leader. This group did not place Argentina in the category of "one of those South American places" and was less alarmed by President Roosevelt's annual message of 1901. However, of the three paragraphs in that message which are all vitally significant in explaining the changing sentiments of that era, one sentence in the last tended to alienate even 43 these hardy souls : The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of

^^McGann, o£. clt., pp. I85, 229. S. Zeballos frequently pictured Roosevelt as "a model of civic and economic leadership" in his influential Revista de Derecho, Historia, 2 Letras. See ibid.. p. 225, n . 14. ^3james D. Richardson fed.), A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington: Bureau of Rational Literature,“T 91l), ÜC, pp. 6662-6663• 47 the two Americas as it is of the United States. Just seventy-eight years have passed since President Monroe in his annual message announced that "the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future col­ onization by any European power." In other words, the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non- American Power at the expense of any American Power on American soil. It is in no sense intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World Power at the expense of any other. It is simply a step, and a long step toward assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere. During the last century, other influences have established the permanence and independence of the smaller states of Europe. Through the Monroe Doctrine, we hope to be able to safeguard like independence and secure like permanence for the lesser among the New World nations. This Doctrine has nothing to do with commercial relations of any American Power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. In other words, it is really a guarantee of the commercial independence of the Americas. We do not ask under this Doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it mis­ conducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American Power. . . . All of this address related directly or indirectly to the Drago Doctrine. The opening statement seemed to be a gesture to open the door to a multilateralization of the Monroe Doctrine. But the condescending, paternal tone of the whole, with its implications of United States hegemony, as quickly closed that door. The pious reassurances to Europe only served to make it still more clear that only the 48 most unequal partnexshlp with Latin America could result from any Joint acceptance of the North American doctrine.

Association of the two doctrines. The relationship of the Drago Doctrine and the Monroe Doctrine is explicitly set by certain paragraphs of the December 29, 1902 note. The approach to the Monroe Doctrine is made by means of a 44 sentence that serves as a "bridge :" The collection of loans by military means Implies territorial occupation to make them effective, and territorial occupation signifies the suppression or subordination of the governments of the countries on which it is imposed. The note then goes on to point out that the Venezuelan situation is in violation of the Monroe Doctrine (which it repeats for the elucidation of the American Secretary of 45 State), and affirms Argentine acceptance of that Doctrine: Such a situation seems obviously at variance with the principles many times proclaimed by the nations of America, and particularly with the Monroe Doctrine, sustained and defended with so much zeal on all occasions by the United States, a doctrine to which the Argentine Republic has heretofore solemnly adhered. After a digression of one and a half long paragraphs, the Drago note specifically asks for United States "adoption" of the Argentine "principle" which is then restated in what has become the operative phrase, the heart of the message.

4 4 T " - Appendix A, p. 116, 1.13 et seqq. ^^Ibid.. p. 116, 1.19 et seqq. 49 46 the "Drago Doctrine": . . . The only principle which the Argentine Republic maintains and which it would, with great satisfaction, see adopted, in view of the events in Venezuela, by a nation that enjoys such great authority and prestige as does the United States, is the principle already accepted, that there can be no territorial expansion in America on the part of Europe, nor any oppression of the peoples of this continent, because an unfortunate financial situ­ ation may compel some one of them to postpone the fulfillment of its promises. In a word, the prin­ ciple which she would like to aee recognized is: That the public debt can not occasion armed inter­ vention nor even the actual occupation of the ter­ ritory of American nations by a European power. The phrase in the above paragraph, "the principle already accepted," tends to make the Drago Doctrine a "corollary" or the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. a logical deduction whose particular validity derives from the validity of the more general case. Drago eventually acknowledged that his Doctrine came to be "like a financial corollary of the 47 Monroe Doctrine." The content of the note seems to indicate that Drago intended to make a strong association with the Monroe 48 Doctrine from the start. But in the interval between the

^^Ibld., p. Il8, 1.22et seqq. ^?Drago to the Chamber of Deputies, June 24, 1914, quoted in Republics Argentina, La politica internacional de la naclon argentins, ed. Carlos”ff. Silva (Buenos Aires: IHiprenta del estado, 1946)^-p. 372. 48 Dexter Perkins disagrees. He believes the Drago Doctrine is by no means inevitably corollary to Monroe and emphasizes simple Argentine self-interest in making the proposal. Actually, his views are not inconsistent with 50 time the Argentine note was sent, December 29, 1902, and the United States reply, February 17, 1903, Drago may well have had second thoughts.

A delayed reply. The Drago note was apparently, at first, given scant attention by the State Department. It is possible that President Roosevelt was not even aware of the existence of the Argentine despatch until February when a 49 reply was drafted. The role of formulating a reply fell to Assistant Secretary Alvey A. Adee. His recommendation to Secretary John Hay urged that the United States emphasize its approval of arbitration without commenting on the essence of the Drago proposal. Records of the advice he received pointedly Ignore this main issue, stressing instead, why the 50 United States should keep a free hand. Solicitor W. L. Penfield warned, "If the United States should definitely abandon all right of forcible intervention, there are some communities, subject to the licentious sway of ephemeral

those of the author if the complex mixture of motives is born in mind. See The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, pp. 352-353 ^^No mention of the Drago proposition appears in Roosevelt's voluminous correspondence during this period. See Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters, ed. El ting E. Morison (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), III. 5^Cf. the 1899 United States Hague Reservation seeking to bar any international agency from consideration of the Monroe Doctrine in Perkins, A History. . . , pp. 203-205* This resembles Drago 's refusal in his July 18 , 1907 Hague speech (see Infra., p. 99) to submit certain of his prin­ ciples to debate. 51 rulers. In which Americans might henceforth be completely and repeatedly despoiled with impunity to the wrongdoers. Secretary Hay's reply quoted the portion of Roosevelt's annual message of 1901 which guaranteed Latin American territory but reiterated that the United States would not sanction nor protect them from "repression" for "misconduct."5^ When Drago read the reply, his first thought was that there may have been an error in translating 53 his original note. The reply did not seem to make sense as an answer to his friendly appeal. Meanwhile, unguided by any official government state­ ment, the Argentine press had engaged in some interesting polemics in which public distrust of the Monroe Doctrine figured prominently. Drago certainly had ample opportunity to review the December press reaction as January and February wore on and the air of crisis wore off. Such ruminations, capped by the cold North American reply, certainly must have damped Drago's enthusiasm for further identification of his principle with the increasingly

Memoranda dated February 5 and 6, 1903, United States National Archives, Department of State, Notes from the Argentine Legation (Washington, 1904), Vol. V. 5^Richardson, o£. cit., IX, p. 6758. ^^Mariano J. Drago, op.cit., pp. 56-5 8 . Cf. the popular confusion of the DragolSoctrine and the Calvo Doctrine, their interchangeable use in conversation, cited in Infra., p. 86. 52 ominous principles of Monroe. Mitre's La Nacion, on December 13, 1902, had denounced both European intervention and the Roosevelt speech which sanctioned it. Subsequent issues hesitently asserted the necessity of United States action. Iæ Prensa's editorial of the same date expressed an equally mixed reaction, calling for North American help while "hastening to add that the Latin American states had won their independence without tne United States and knew how to retain it without the nation's C assistance." El Pa£s, controlled by Carlos Pellegrini "hailed the Monroe Doctrine on December 3, called it a fiction on December 16, on December 20 called for Argentine, Brazilian aud Chilean action, and on December 26, when It was apparent that the United States was successfully em­ ploying its influence in the dispute, charged that country with the intention of setting up a protectorate in Latin America. With the publication of the Drago exchange and the overwhelmingly favorable public reaction in the United States and elsewhere, Drago and the Roca administration, for a time, successfully defended the new doctrine on its own very considerable merits. The United States role in bringing

^^McGann, o£. cit., p. 221 et seqq. gives a complete resume of Argentine press reaction. ^5Ibid., p. 221. 53 the Intervening powers to arbitrate could not be ignored, but by now, the association of the Drago Doctrine with that of Monroe had become an unwelcome one. CHAPTER IV

AS A RECOGNITION OP CHANGING POWER RELATIONSHIPS

Although the Drago Doctrine did not contribute to the resolution of the Venezuela incident, a study of that in­ cident, and especially of the changing power relationships involved, can materially contribute to better understanding the Drago Doctrine. The fact that Drago's appeal was directed to the United States was, per se, an Argentine acknowledgment of a change in the balance of power of out­ side interests in Latin America. In the case of the Venezuela incident, the interests of three states and their respective roles are of particular significance: the United States, and two of the blockading powers. Great Britain and Germany. The third blockading nation, Italy, first arrived on the scene six weeks after the crisis had begun and never played anything but a marginal role. While the Venezuela Incident, in itself, is not deserving of more than a footnote in history, the Drago note and the confrontation of the United States with Germany and Great Britain, which that incident provoked, are certainly significant.^ Venezuela served as a stage on which a

Dexter Perkins terms the 1902-1903 Venezuelan inter­ vention "routine," The Monroe Doctrine. 1867-1907 (Gloucester, Massachusetts : Peter Èmith, 193t), p. 354. 55 preview of great power relationships, an emerging pattern 2 that would endure through two world wars was glimpsed. A brief sketch of what were the interests of these three players with regard to Latin America and to each other will provide a background against which the Drago Doctrine may fall into sharper focus.

I. GROWING UNITED STATES INFLUENCE

United States interest in Latin America on a serious scale was, at the turn of the century, of fairly recent origin, but solidly based on geographic and historical facts and vigorously pursued by growing commercial interests. After a shaky start under Secretary James Blaine, Pan Americanism first found mutually satisfactory expression beginning with the first Conference in 1889-I8 9 0 . At first. North American interest was not so much strategic as commercial and the proposals advanced by the

2 The Venezuela incident is a convenient reference point for diverse studies. Thus, Perkins says: "The Venezuela blockade, then marks still another stage in the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine; it marks a great change from the position assumed by Seward in 1866. That great Secretary of State had held that the use of force by European nations, pro­ vided no territorial ambitions or anti-republican aims were Involved, was entirely licit. . . . But in 1902-1903 American opinion, if not the American administration, tended to take a very different view; the State Department was obliged to set its machinery into motion and promote a peaceful settle­ ment of the dispute almost as soon as 56

United States reflected unabashed capitalistic self-interest.

Naturally, European nations "feared for their trade," and

"took steps, particularly in those Latin American countries where their stake was large, to create a backfire of opposi- o tion. . . The stake was certainly large in Argentina, and much of the groundwork for traditional Argentine luke- warmedness toward Pan Americanism was laid during this era.

Argentine representatives Roque Saenz Pena and Manuel Quintana boycotted the opening session of the First Conference and declined to join the other delegates on the marathon 6,000 4 mile complimentary tour of the United States. United States strategic interest soon came to rival commercial interest in Latin America. In the same year as the First Pan American Conference adjourned, I890, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan published his book entitled. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, which became a classic even before the extremely weak American position in the 1895

it began." See A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown and Uo., 1955), p. 22F! ^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (fifth edition: New York: Appleton-Oentûry-Ùrofts, Inc., 1955), p. 444; See all of Edward Perry's article, "Anti- American Propaganda in Hispanic America," Hispanic American Historical Review. Ill (192O), pp. 17-40.

^Thomas MeGann gives a detailed account in chapters 10 and 11, Argentina, the United States and the Inter-American System, l88o-19l4 (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. i5o-T54T 57 Venezuela crisis was pointed out. At that time, had England opted to fight instead of yield, she could have devastated the large American coastal cities with impunity. The need for a powerful fleet was soon felt and Congress ordered an ambitious shipbuilding program to commence.

The Spanish-American War intensified United States strategic interest in Latin America and made continental

European opposition to growing American power still more firm.

Austria-Hungary and Germany, conditionally supported by France, hatched a fantastic plot to Intervene in Spain's 6 favor— a plot squelched by Great Britain. Although in this case, European opposition ultimately culminated in a note which was a model of propriety, the attitude of the 7 continental powers was perfectly clear. Also clear was the need for still more naval power, and as the battleship Oregon * a we11-publicized race around South America from

^Italy, whose armored ships outnumbered those of the United States nineteen to one could undoubtedly have done the same at the time of the "Mafia Affair" in 1891. See Bailey, o£. cit., pp. 449-452, 487-488. ^For a description of the plan to Intervene on Spain's behalf, see Orestes Ferrara, The Last Spanish War (New York, 1937), pp. 21 et seqq., and all ot Ôh. iX. ^Despite official neutrality, the newspapers of Russia, Italy and France were all outspoken in their anti-American sentiments. The German press was especially caustic. See Bailey, o£. cit., p. 512, n. 4. 58

Puget Sound to Cuban waters had pointed up, for an 8 isthmian canal. The latter project would be facilitated by the friendly stance of Great Britain, whose attitude was unique among the European powers.

Beginnings of an Anglo-American entente. The un­ reserved British retreat in the face of United States opposi­ tion to the 1902-1903 blockade was part and parcel of an emerging British policy of cultivating the good will of the United States. In the short run, at least, the United States profited the most from this policy and consciously or instinctively exploited this relationship to the limit. In fact, "entente" is hardly the word to describe such a one-sided display of international affection as the British submission to the United States ultimatum on Venezuela in 1895. The faction that would have gone to war with the insolent Yankees was not insignificant. "No dog of a Republican, " growled one incensed Tory, "can open its mouth 9 to bark without our good leave. ..." Furthermore, the past decade had witnessed a number of clashes between British and North American interests. Since 1885, at least half a dozen notable issues had marred Anglo-American relations— not to mention the vocal

®Ibld., p. 53 3. ^Bailey, o£. cit., p. 488. 59 presence In the former colonies of large numbers of half­ assimilated Irishmen. In that year, the defeat of the Freylinghuysen Treaty with Nicaragua and the beginning of the Canadian fishing grounds dispute highlighted United States conflicts of interest with Great Britain from the Caribbean to the Arctic. The Bering Seas fisheries dispute broke in 1886 and was still unresolved when the Sackville- West incident of 1838 (which may have cost Grover Cleveland the Presidency in that year) stirred up mutual hard feelings in both capitals. The silver-gold controversy and the tariff problem, like the Irish, also remained perennial irri­ tants . Yet despite these negative issues, there remained a solid and growing reservoir of good will, especially at the popular level. The Samoan Hurricane, Incident of IÔ89 had demonstrated Anglo-American affinity— to the exclunlon of the German.In 1895, the great majority of Englishmer regarded war with the United States as "unthinkable."^^

^ The warships of the three nations were present to reinforce their nations' respective claims in Samoa when on March 16, 1889, a terrific hurricane destroyed or beached all vessels except one British cruiser. Bailey recalls how "with straining boilers, the British Calliope headed out to sea, and as she crept to safety, a cheer arose from the Americans on the doomed Trenton— and it was returned with a will." See ibid., pp. 462-4b3. ^^Jennie A. Sloan, "Anglo-American Relations and the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XVIII (1938), pp. 4 9 5 - ? ^ 60 Some 354 Members of the House of Commons sent Grover Cleveland a resolution pledging arbitration of all future disputes, and English workingmen petitioned their government to avoid a war which would be "a crime against the laws of God and man and which would cause unspeakable misery to the people of 12 both countries." Nor were practical diplomatic motives lacking, on the British side, for closer trans-Atlantic accord. The most important of these was the need to strike a more favorable balance of power. England, then as now, was on the fringes of Europe and the friendship of a powerful United States was 13 well worth her while. The rise of a technically potent new Germany was by far the chief element of British concern. The most notable gesture toward formalizing an Anglo-American accord came during the Spanish-American War crisis, while the German government and press was plotting and raging against Yankee imperialism, when the influential Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, openly solicited an alliance, l4 venturing:

Bayard to Olney, December 31, 1895 (enclosure), Departmentlent of State, DgDespatches, Great Britain, CLXXXI, quoted in Bailey, op. cit., p, ^ A fine reference which examines this motive and others is that of L.M. Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship (London, 1938). ^^A public address by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain printed in the London Times, March 29, I89 8 , 12:3, cited in Bailey, op. cit., p . 488. 61 . . . I would even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great ana poble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together ^ o u d and prolonged cheers/ over an Anglo- Saxon alliance. United States ambitions thus came to be approved and seconded by British statesmen, public, and even her poets who urged America to "take up the White Man's burden" around 15 the world. Such ambitions, however, clashed with those of another rising star: Germany.

The rise of German imperialism. The role of Germany with her lively new interest in acquiring overseas possessions and growing rivalry with England was to challenge the United States in the Caribbean, as elsewhere. The race to gobble up remote insular territories for use as naval coaling stations had brought the United States and Germany into direct confron­ tation on a number of occasions before the I902 Venezuela 16 incident. In such distant places as Samoa and Manila Bay, German battle cruisers were ever present to press Imperial claims at the slightest hint of slackening interest on the

^^Rudyard Kipling's famous poem was published during the thick of the debate over the fate of America's diverse new^^ossessions, in McClure's Magazine, XII, 291 (February,

^^Perkins discusses the momentous consequences of the agitation of the German Navy League, especially after 1895, in A History. . . , pp. 151, 16I. 62 part of her American opposites. The cession of Cuba and growing American interests in construction of a trans-isthmian canal brought German interests in Latin America to the attention of the United 17 States. With ominous portent, German authors wereten soon to 18 write such gems as the following by Klaus Wagner: Slowly, not hastily, we people of Germanic blood must proceed in the settlement of the lands that are to be ours in the future. By right of war the non- Germanic population of America and Great Australia must be settled in Africa. . . . By right of war we can send back the useless South American Romance peoples, and the half-breeds to North America. . . . The lands will be settled upon by people of Germanic blood, the non-German inhabitants driven into reser­ vations, or at best, to Africa. It is doubtful that Luis Drago was acquainted with the half-baked plans for the La Plata region circulating in some German extremist circles, but he certainly would not have been comforted by the later declarations of one 19 Tannenburg: The German settlements of South Brazil and Uruguay are the only rays of light In this dismal

^7Elihu Root wrote in 1934, "You cannot understand the Platt Amendment unless you know something about the character of Kaiser Wilhelm II." Quoted in Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Shoe String Press, Inc., 1938), I, pr3T41 i8 Klaus Wagner in 1906, quoted by Perry, op. cit., p. 18. ^^Ibid. Bemis, nonetheless, calls German immigrants - 6 3 picture of South American civilization. Here dwell 500,000 Qerraans, and it is to be hoped that in a reorganization of South American conditions after the peoples of Latin and Indian mixture are quite ruined by bad management the immense plains of the Plate, with the coast in the west, the east, and the south, will fall into the hands of the German people. . . . It is truly a miracle that the German people did not long ago resolve on seizing that country. But aside from these extreme pretensions, the United States viewed German presence in the Caribbean with con­ siderable alarm. Despite continued German assurances that she had no territorial designs, her interest in the Danish West Indies, Galapagos and Curacao was unmistakable at the 20 turn of the century. Nor was German interest in Venezuela without precedent In 1871, Germany had proposed "a Joint and concerted move­ ment to urge on Venezuela a more orderly government. . . Secretary Fish, while not referring directly to the Monroe Doctrine, had replied that "the United States could not look with indifference upon any combination of European 21 powers against an American state. In 1902, John Hay

"exasperatingly lukewarm toward Peutschturn." See Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the~ïïnited States (third edition; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1950), p. 523* ^^C.C. Tanslll, The Purchase of the Danish West Indies (Baltimore; 1932),pp. 4$6-4537 ^^Dexter Perkins, A History. . . , p. 171, quoting John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Washington, 1906), VI, p. 5 3 1 . 64 regarded Germany'a "ostentatious propaganda" with distrust. He would "rejoice at Roosevelt's master handling of the op Venezuelan crisis."

II. THE UNITED STATES POWER POSITION IN VENEZUELA IN 1902

United States opinion, if not leave, was sought both before and during the armed phase of the Venezuelan Incident and the United States power position, for a change, was strong and well planned. The armed phase of the incident was, in fact, announced a full year in advance and it was evident even earlier that an intervention was likely. The bases for intervention were claims against the Venezuelan government for damages suffered by foreign citizens during the civil disorder that had brought the latest dictator, Cipriano Castro, to power. Interest pay­ ments on foreign loans had also gone unpaid for some months

^Quotes from Louis Martin Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations (second edition; New ŸorïcT Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1^55), p. 456; Also see W.R. Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay (Boston, 1915), II, p. 262. For a complete discussion of German interest in Caribbean naval bases, see Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Velopoiitik (Wew Ÿork, 1955), II et passim^ 65 and constituted a secondary claim. 2 3 President Castro, an Illiterate caudillo, formerly a cowhand, had captured Caracas in May, 1899, with an "army" of bandits and opportunists whom he had recruited in Colombia. His internal rule was "more corrupt and dissolute than any the country had known"— no mean feat, even in those 24 early days. His foreign policy was well expressed by remarks attributed to him to the effect, "I laugh at the Kaiser! I spit on the Union Jack!" Germany had offered to submit her claims to arbitration in 1901 and had been refused. It seems too great a coincidence that on December 13, 1901, barely a week after Roosevelt had said, "we do not guarantee any state against punishment If it misconducts itself. . . ," that the German foreign office first announced its intention to blockade Venezuela."If this

^^There Is some doubt about Drago's interpretation of the casus belli. See Edwin Borchard, "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York; The Macmillan Co., 1930/, ÏTl, p. 155. oil ^Hubert A. Herring, A History of Latin ^erica, from Its Beginnings to the Present (second edition, revised; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965), pp. 485-487. ^%ailey, op. cit., p 551. Castro offered to form an all-Venezuelan commission to consider the claims. 26it is this casuallty that earned the United States 66 measure does not seem sufficient," the announcement con­ tinued, "we would have to consider the temporary occupation, on our part, of different Venezuelan harbor places and the 27 levying of duty in those places." Whether there was prior correspondence between Germany and Great Britain is uncertain but seems doubtful. The truth seems to be that Britain later decided to Join Germany for her own reasons. Bemis guesses "... that the British government, feeling that the United States was not going to object to, and would not Join, a non-American intervention, was loath to see Germany take steps alone and perhaps set up a regime similar to that of Egypt. What Is certain Is such comments as that of even Drago himself, who stated, albeit erroneously: "In 1902, Germany, England and Italy bombarded the ports of Venezuela with the complicity /anuencla7 and express consent of the United States." See E. Quesada, "La doctrina Drago; su esencia y concepto amplio y claro, " Re vista de la Unlversldad de Buenos Aires, XVL, 143 (December, 19l9), P* 337* ^^H.C. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), P* 112; Chester L. Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1936), p . 220. By 1906, the Monroe Doctrine was "fair game*' and Drago linked it with the 1902 incident through Roosevelt's 1901 speech, although he did not yet accuse the United States of "complicity," "State Loans in their Relation to International Policy, " American Journal of International Law, I (1907), p. 698. ; 2®Bemis, op. cit., p. 522; Bailey disagrees, loc. cit., as do some other American scholars. The German chronicler, Alfred Vagts, at any rate, says German Ambassador Holleben received United States "reassurance" before the blockade so long as no "lasting occupation" took place, o£. cit., II, p. 1540. Some fancy diplomatic footwork certainly took place 67 that the United States took immediate steps to strengthen its own power position in the Caribbean during the coming months.

Preparations and deployment of American forces. The American navy was put into excellent position to effect pressure against German or other forces in the Caribbean. 29 In January, 1902, the House Committee on Naval Affairs was

asked by the Executive to Include $120 thousand In the next appropriation bill for fleet mobilization In the Caribbean 30 at the end of the year. In June Admiral Dewey assumed command of a combined naval force on exercises in the Caribbean— the first four-star Admiral to take personal command of a fighting force at sea. In July, plans were drawn In secrecy for the defense 31 of the Venezuelan coast. These plans involved both fleet maneuvers and amphibious landing practice and commenced well before the December, 1902, armed phase of the Venezuelan 32 crisis began. Livermore writes:

by all parties concerned. 29 ^Throughout this section, the author relies heavily on the well-researched article by S. W. Livermore, "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903," American Historical Review, LI (1946). pp. 452- 471. ^^Ibld., p. 458. Cf., the accusations of Vagts, infra, p. 6$, n. 3 7 . 31Ibid., p. 460. ^^Ibld., p. 462. 68

The search problem was completed on December 9, and during the second phase of the maneuvers all the squadrons were combined Into one grand fleet for extensive exercises and drills In the waters about Culebra. Part of the time was devoted to practice in landing fully armed and equipped expeditions from the warships along the wilder parts of the Puerto Rican coast in anticipation of what might be required in Venezuela under similar circumstances.

Meanwhile, bits of intelligence tended to confirm not only an intervention was in the offing, but also that

Germany migÿht have designs to establish a Venezuelan coaling station. A German cruiser, the Vineta, put into Newport

News for repairs from the Caribbean in May, 1902, and her crew apparently leaked information about future Imperial plans.Even earlier, an American agent. Commander John E.

Pillsbury, sent to investigate the Venezuelan situation, had reported encountering a group of six German military 34 officers traveling as tourists.

On December 8, 1902, both Germany and Great Britain broke diplomatic relations with Venezuela, and the next day, announced that they had dispatched warships to Venezuelan waters to initiate a blockade. While neither power admitted a formal state of belligerency, a German cruiser promptly 35 sank two Venezuelan gunboats. Several weeks later, on

25ibid., p. 464. Z^Ibid. ^^To have admitted at state of war would have deprived Germany of the use of the neutral port of Willemstad, Curacao, as a coaling station. 69 January 17, 1903, Germany would wantonly bombard Port San Carlos and the adjoining village. It was these acts that did much to offend public sensibility and keep interest in the situation at a high pitch.

Roosevelt's alleged ultimatum. It was United States initiative that led both Great Britain, and after a very brief delay, Germany, to accept limited arbitration in principle, but all of the circumstances are not clear. According to a statement by Roosevelt in 1916, he sent an ultimatum to the Kaiser on December 10, 1902, which ulti­ mately resulted in the withdrawal of the Powers. While there is no direct evidence that such an ultimatum was really given, it is certainly evident that part of the Rough Rider’s recollection may have been true, especially where in his celebrated letter to Thayer be says, "I assembled our battle fleet under Admiral Dewey near Porto Rico, for 'maneuvers' with instructions that the fleet 37 Should be kept ready to sail at an hour's notice.’ In

^%ailey cites public reactions in op. cit., pp. 552- 553. ^^Willlara B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time as Shown in His Letters (New York; Ï9&0), ÏI,p. ’22ff. What­ ever the îFuth, the Rough Rider, as often, stirred up a hornet's nest— in this case, an academic one. Livermore lists conflicting opinions by various authors. The German Vagts, claimed that Roosevelt connived with Navy authorities to raise appropriations— a comment that perhaps teaches more about German than American politics— o£. cit., pp. 1555- TO fact, the large United States fleet conducted maneuvers the following week in sight of German and English vessels. 38 Livermore continues: The Navy Department had planned to send the battle­ ship squadron to Trinidad, close to Venezuelan terri­ torial waters and the scene of Anglo-German naval operations. In view of the delicacy of the inter­ national situation. Rear Admiral Taylor telegraphed to Washington on December l4 asking further confir­ mation of the plan.

The reply to go ahead as planned was returned on December 18, 1902, and the American battleship squadron fairly 39 steamed through the assembled English and German forces. When the press announced movement of the United States fleet on December 18, the German charge d'affaires asked to see Secretary Hay at once. Hay, despite the customary assurances, "warned the envoy that unless Germany quickly reached an agreement on arbitration. Congress might adopt a resolution directing the President to look to the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine. Hay's remarks were as close as possible to a direct threat as diplomatic parlance would allow. Meanwhile, the obstreperous Castro, thoroughly subdued by the vigorous action of the blockading powers.

1568, e^ passim. Cf., however, Perkins picture of Admiral von Tlrpitz as a villain, A History. . . , p. 210. ^^Livermore, 0£. cit., p. 464. ^^Ibid. ^Olbid. Von Quadt, thereafter, made several calls 71 had decided to accept the offer to arbitrate he had once rejected. The next day, December 12, the United States had transmitted his acceptance to Germany and Great Britain Within a week, both nations concurred. In principle, but kept their forces In Venezuelan waters until February 17, 1905, until the signing of a protocol was accomplished. The United States maintained a strong force in the Caribbean through the first months of 1905. In late January; Italian vessels Joined the blockade and there was again a brief crisis. A small United States cutter, the Marietta, cruised throughout the blockaded waters and telegraphed dally reports from La Gualra to Washington. The blockade ended on February 17, 1903> and all ships withdrew except the American fleet which remained In the Caribbean until April 30, when it too dispersed north. Whatever the whole truth, there Is no doubt the United States played Its considerable role from a position of strength. The Drago note was Just a sequel, but too rele­ vant a sequel, to remain half a fruitless diplomatic ex­ change .

on Hay for "additional assurances." See Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, pp. 346-347.

^^Balley, o£. clt., p. 55 1 . CHAPTER V

AS A UNIQUE INSTANCE OP ARGENTINE INTERNATIONALISM

The Drago Doctrine, as a political doctrine of an out­ ward- looking, growing Argentina was tentative, and despite a brief flurry of acceptance was unable to take root in the troubled Argentine soil. The insistence of later Argentine administrations on the universal nature of the Doctrine and its subsequent transformation into a tenet of International law was a rejection of the essence of what Foreign Minister

Luis Marla Drago originally had to say.

The reasons for this rejection are as diverse as the wonderful, enigmatic Argentines themselves. The appeal to

Monroe and the Implications of acceptance of the Pan Ameri­ can framework with all its likelihood of North American hegemony turned out to be an Increasingly unpopular associa­ tion. The grumbling opposition of Europe was, as always, a factor. But most Importantly of all, Argentina, torn by

Internal political strife, seems with regard to the Drago

Doctrine in this era, to have simply bitten off more than

she could chew. In the coming decades of Big Stick and

Dollar Diplomacy, the Drago Doctrine could easily have evolved Into as dynamic and militant a foreign policy

doctrine as that of Monroe— bad Argentina been ready to apply 75 and defend It— which she obviously was not.^ The story of the rejection of the policy aspects of the Drago Doctrine is thus, the story of the beginning of Argentina's return to an intensely Inward-oriented political life. Even while the flood of Italian immigrants, English capital, and odds and ends of French, and European culture. In general, poured into Buenos Aires, the gates were closing. Argentina was already showing signs of entering another period of internal consolidation in which she would try to digest this heady stuff ....

I. A BURST OP ACCLAIM

Whatever Drago's Initial misgivings when he read the delayed United States reply to his note In February, 1903, they must have been dispelled In the first wave of favorable press reaction both at home and abroad. With few exceptions, the United States press was extremely laudatory. The Argentine Minister In Washington, Garcia Merou, soon sent thick portfolios of newspaper clippings. Harper's

Cf., Argentina's "continental policy," which more limited In Its scope, continues to be vigorously called on now and then. It is this policy that somehow— perhaps through the precedent of San Martfn— endows Argentina with the right to be concerned with what goes on across the Andes. 74

Weekly said Drago's proposal marked "the beginning of an 2 epoch." The North American Review recommended: "Our State

Department must refrain, hereafter, from assisting our native creditors In the collection of ordinary debts from the governments of Latin American Commonwealths."^ North

American newspapers in all parts of the country seem to have taken up the issue. Near the end of the year, Drago would publish a book In which a number of such clippings 4 are reproduced in translation.

Argentine public opinion, finally Informed of Its government's official stance, soon registered Its cautious approval, then Its pride In the role Argentina had played and the favorable press reaction in North America. The

United States charge In Buenos Aires reported the public was 5 ✓ becoming "friendlier." Both La Nacion and La Prensa

^Vol. XLVII (March 28, I903, p. 521, quoted In Harold P. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (Antioch, New York: State University of New York, l9b4), p . 261. ^ol. 176 (1903), pp. 321-325, also cited In Ibid. ^Luls Marla Drago, La Republica Argentina el caso de Venezuela (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Case Edltora“^e Conl Hermanns, I9 0 3 )• ^Ames to Hay, May 5, 1903, National Archives, Depart­ ment of State, American States, Diplomatic Despatches, United States Legation, Argentina, Vol. 41, No. 255, quoted in McGann, Argentfna, che United States and the Inter-American System, iaoô-lgi4^ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, l957), p.nTBl---- 75 enthusiastically endorsed the message and denied, as did Drago himself, that there was any "subordination" to the Monroe Doctrine The Implications of the United States reply, how­ ever, remained very disquieting as did the earlier Argentine press polemics. The Roca administration, for the time being, made the most of the warm public response. But Dr. Luis Marla Drago would quietly resign his post as Foreign Minister In July, 1903, and remain out of public life for 7 most of the next three years.

A mixed official blessing. In his May, 1903, message to the Argentine nation. President Roca defended the Argentine note while minimizing its significance as a political doctrine. The trend toward "legalization" is 8 already evident :

Ibid., pp. 222-223, Interprets Argentine press re­ action. Drago's views of the Monroe Doctrine In 1903 are given In the Introduction to his book, op. clt., pp. vlii, Ix. At this point, Drago seems to havehad mixed feelings. ^Ricardo Plcclrllll et al., Dlcclonarlo hlstorico argentino (Buenos Aires : Edîc'lones Hlstdricos Argentines, 1954), I, p. 214. Cf., the resignation of the Argentine delegate to the Customs Congress In New York, La Prensa, January 23 and 24, 1903, cited in McGann, op. cTt., p. 227. ^Republica Argentina, 1^ polftlca Internacional de la nacion argentine, ed. Carlos A. Silva iBuenos Aires ; Imprenta del estado, 1946), p. 497. 7 6

The Argentine note confines Itself, In reality, to a statement of elementary principles which comprise the Inalienable rights of these nations to grow and emerge under the protection on Inter­ national law. This doctrine does not exclude any of the obligations that the Law of Nations Imposes on civilized countries, nor does it deny the rights of recognized colonies [nl reconoce prlmlolas] nor the obligations thereof, limiting Itself to reaffirm the sovereignty of the nations, expressing at the same time, the tumult and alarm that any act of colonization or conquest in this region of the continent would cause.

Stretching the facts. President Roca smoothed over the

United States rebuff by continuing; "The United States answer essentially concurs with these declarations and recommends international arbitration for the settlement of such questions." He went on, overlooking Drago's explicit appeal and, while not specifically mentioning the Monroe 9 Doctrine, nodded charily toward Europe as follows;

It has been finally understood that the Republic has not gone in search of favors or alliances, having merely expounded Its ideas, plainly and simply, on the occasion of European intervention In a part of this continent, having been called on more than one occasion to hear the opinion of its nations, thereby Joining in the establishment of the bases of our common rights.

A damning association. The proximate causes between 1903 and 1906 for modification of Drago'a proposals stemmed

^Ibld. 77 from a combination of European opposition to United States commercial incursions Into Argentina and Argentine alarm at the new and menacing attitude of the United States. These were set against a background of serious internal problems which was, itself, a root cause for retreat from Drago's advanced position.

The previous December had witnessed minor factions

In the Argentine Congress concerned with the Venezuela crisis divided into two views; "those who desired a declara­ tion of South American solidarity and those who feared to do anything that might strain Argentina's ties with

Europe. January, 1903, had seen the recall of the

Argentine consul-general in New York for the offense of having encouraged reciprocal trade agreements with the

United States.Later statistics bore out that total trade with the United States was, indeed, destined to grow rapidly, and as Table III shows, that 1902 was the last year in which Argentina enjoyed a favorable balance of

^^McQann, o£. clt., p. 220, cites Republics Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Dlario de seslones de 1^ Câmara de Dlputados, December 15, 19^, pp. 531-552.

^^Supra, p. 75, n. 7. 7 8 12 trade with the United States:

TABLE III DOLLAR VALUE OP ARGENTINE TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES: l880-19l4

Argentine ArgentIne Year Imports Exports Total

1880 $ 1,882,841 $ 6,214,575 $ 8,097,416 1885 4 ,676,501 4 ,328,510 9 ,005,002 1895 4 ,456,163 7 ,675,270 12,131,433 1900 11,558,237 8,114,304 19,672,541 1901 11,537,668 8 ,065,318 19,602,986 1902 9 ,801,804 11,120,721 2 0 ,922,525 1903 11,437,570 9 ,430,278 20,867,848 1904 16,902,017 9 ,835,161 2 6 ,737,178 1905 25,564,056 15,354,901 40,918,957 1906 32,673,359 18,379,063 5 1 ,052,422

The next year saw several disquieting events in the north. In late 1903, Panama, with North American support, declared its Independence from Colombia; then in December, 1904, President Roosevelt announced his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, also a financial corollary

l^MoGann, op. cit., p. 226, citing Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1906, p. 217. ^^nlted States Congress, Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 3 sess,, p. 1 9 . Dexter Perkins says Latin American reaction was remarkably calm. The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, pp. 350, 453. Ellhu Root may have formulated the Roosevelt Corollary according to Ruhl Bartlett et al.. The Record of American Diplomacy (New York: Alfred XT ICnbpf, ïnc., I938T, p. 539. Also see Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Shoe String Press, Inc., 1938), I, p. 470. 79 Chronic wrongdoing . . . may in America, as else­ where, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. Although Argentines reassured themselves their country was not among those uncivilized places referred to by President Roosevelt, they were not slow to note that the new Monroe l4 Doctrine left no room for a "Drago Corollary." In 1905, the United States established a "customs receivership" in 15 the Dominican Republic. The fresh laurels the Drago note had brought to Argentina could not be denied but its fate was, nonetheless, tied to the image of the United States, Pan Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine. Paradoxically, and perhaps propheti­ cally, Argentina's struggle toward a more democratic system, in fact, as well as in theory, coincided with a tarnishing of the North American image.

^^McGann, o£. cit., p. 223, gives selected press commentary. ^^A statement in 1942 by William Manger strikes a curious note: "Other instances of encroachment on the sovereignty of Latin American states were. . . . the Spanish occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1860-1865 which, although acquiesed in by the existing government, was by no means undertaken with the approval of all the Dominican people." See Historical Evolution of Inter-American Cooper­ ation, ed. William Manger (Washington: Pan American Union, 194è), p. 11. 80 A rash of new books and articles attacked the United States with a vengeance. Author Martjfn Garcia Merou, who had been the Argentine Minister in Washington during the Venezuela affair wrote a diplomatic history of the United States in which he referred to Secretary Blaine's muddling in the Chile-Peruvian conflict in 1883 as North America's "first intervention."^^ Later, Ernesto Quesada would characterize the Monroe Doctrine as "unilateral and Anglo- Saxon, " and the Drago Doctrine as multilateral and Hispano- IT American." Roque Saenz Pena, always a leader, chose the Yankee menace as a theme for a major speech in Lima in 1905. It is also paradoxical that this "most formidable antagonist of the United States" was later to be his own 19 country's democratic reformer.

Martin Garcia Merou, Historia de la diplomacia amerlcanaj polltlca internacional de los EsTados tfnldos (Buenos Aires: P^lix Lajoune y Cia., 1904), II, p. 2$3. ^^Ernesto Quesada, "La doctrlna Drago; su esencla y concepto amplio y claro, " Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, XVL, l4j (December, 1$19), p. 35^5. T Q McGann, o£. cit., p. 230. 19 Ibid. 81 II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DRAGO DOCTRINE

Problems In Buenos Aires came to overshadow Issues of foreign policy as strikes and mass demonstrations under­ lined the serious political division of the Argentine nation. Roca's 1903 message had been mainly concerned with internal matters. During the weeks of the crisis in 20 Venezuela, Argentina had been in a "state of siege." Roca referred to strikes, interventions in the provinces, rebellions, and to the new Law of Residency under which 21 anarchists and other troublemakers would be deported. The experience of 1890 had taught little. Joaqufn Gonzalez' bitter words reflect the depth of the dichotomy between Argentina's again burgeoning, if mortgaged, economy and its political backwardness. To be a great citizen, patriot, meant to be capable of marching "with fixed bayonets to the polls, of beginning with a secret volley upon the group of Inspectors, and of ending by the elimination of all

^Psetween 1902 and 1910 there were to be five states of siege: (l) Nov. 1902-Jan. 1903, (2) Feb.-May, 1905, (3) Oct. 1905-Jan. 1906, (4) Nov. 1909-Jan. 1910, and (5 ) May- Sept. 1910. See ibid., p. 257. 21 ^Republics Argentina, Los mensajes. . . . ed. H. Mabragana (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del estado, 1911), VI, pp. 45-5 1 . Doubt and inferiority feelings reasserted themselves as when a lengthy debate took place between Carlos Pellegrini, author-statesman Miguel Can^, and future president Figueroa Alcorta, as to whether or not Argentine products were good enough to represent Argentina at the St. Louis Exposition, 32 obstacles and the complete possession of polls, ballot boxes pp and registers." In 1905, another revolution shook the Argentine nation.

The role of Roque Saenz Pena. While Roque Saenz Peîîa was not responsible for official rejection of the Drago proposal, his association is worth examining because his career so well marks the times. By chance, within the space of little more than the year 1905, the Generation of l88o lost some of its most prominent members. Bartolomé Mitre,

Bernardo de Irogoyen, Miguel Cané, and President Manuel

Quintana all passed from the scene. Carlos Pellegrini, recently returned from the United States, a convert to the cause of popular government, also died— perhaps prematurely 23 for Argentine“American relations. Roque Saenz Pena, already an ex-Poreign Minister and statesman when he served as delegate to the First Pan American Conference may have had special cause to oppose the Drago proposition. The circumstances of his 1889 visit to the United States had been somewhat negative— albeit.

ibid., citing Republics Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Dlario de seslones de la Cémara de Senadores, October 24, 1903, PP. 5 % : : 5 5 I : ------

^^Joaqufn V. Gonzalez, Juicio del siglo o cien anos de historia argentine (Buenos Aires, 1913), p. 193. ^^McGann, o£. cit., pp. 47, 232-234. 83 self-imposed. Drago at that time was already an ardent 24 admirer of United States culture and law. Drago was also the protege of his distinguished grandfather, Bartoleme Mitre In 1892, Mitre and Julio A. Roca, again to be presi­ dent when Drago drafted his note, Joined forces in an ingenious plot to keep Roque Saenz Pena out of the presi­ dency.^^ Mitre, already 80 years old on his return in 1891 from a trip to Europe had received a hero's welcome from the Union clvica• He was expected to break the opposition of the Partido Autonomista Nacional and its candidate, Roca. When Mitre and Roca were discovered to have made a deal, it proved fatal to Mitre's candidacy and Roque Saenz Pena's name arose. To keep Saenz Pena, who looked far too strong to both Roca and Mitre, out of the presidency, they devised a foolproof scheme: they used their influence to nominate Roque's father and filial respect would dictate that the son withdraw.* This is exactly what took place and the term of the

^^Drago repeatedly cited United States precedent in preparing railroad legislation. See ibid., p. 194, which cites Drago'8 later article, "Los ferrocarriles," Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras, I, 2 (November, I898), PP • 79-8 7 . 25Details of this story appear in Ysabel F. Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945), pp. 190-192, 202. 84 elder Saenz Pena, no longer strong enough to keep a firm rein against Mitre and Roca's opposition in the uncertain 1890's was a humiliating failure, setting a new record of some 23 Ministerial crises in one nine month period,In 1895, the elder Saenz Pena resigned in favor of Vice-Presi­ dent Julio A, Roca. In the light of these facts, Roque Saenz Pena's 27 opposition to Drago and his note is more clear. Neverthe­ less, it was not the opposition of Saenz Pena but a complex combination of circumstances that was the real cause for retreat from Drago's stand. At the Second Hague Conference in 1907, Luis Maria Drago and Roque Saenz Pena would repre­ sent their country together and the 1902 Argentine note, as a political doctrine, would finally be laid to rest. A year earlier, the Third Inter-American Conference decided to defer the discussion of forcible collection of debts to that later world meeting.

The Third Inter-American Conference. The decision, supported by both Argentina and the United States, to defer

Joaquin Gonzalez, o£. cit., pp. 493-494. Another thorn in Saenz Pena's side must have been when, during the Venezuela blockade. La Prensa mocked his cherished slogan, "America for Humanl^, " in a December 21, 1902 editorial entitled "South America for the South Americans." 85 discussion of the Drago issue to the coming Hague Conference, showed a willingness to cooperate only to weaken the bonds of inter-American solidarity. Each nation, to be sure, had its own reasons; Argentina was happy to put aside the embarrassment of a doctrine that courted the interventionist principles of Monroe ; the United States, for its part, wanted to "lie low," emphasize the more harmonious aspects of Pan Americanism and not further stir up the nervous Latin Americans, already showing signs of feeling trapped in the same organization as the Yankee Colossus. United States Secretary of State Elihu Root made it clear to his delegation that the business of the Rio Conference would be "to deal with matters of common interest which are not really subjects of controversy." He added that this Conference was "not expected to accomplish any striking or spectacular final results," and instructed the delegates to 28 resist any attempts to change the agenda. To this end, the ground-work for the avoidance of any serious conflict was carefully laid in the pre =Conference agenda planning

United States Department of State, Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Third International Conference of American SWtes (ffastain'gtoh; Government Printing Office, 19o7T, p p . 39-40. 86 sessions. Argentina was given a successful out from its Drago dilemma by Secretary Root. At the first, December, 1905, planning session, each country aired its general views and made broad suggestions of topics it should like to see Included on the program. Argentina, with studied half­ heartedness, sent a note saying it was not yet certain she would attend the Conference, but perhaps significantly, closed by expressing a desire that obligatory arbitration be included 29 on the agenda. The United States offered an alternative in the form of Root's suggestion to the Program Commission on March 22, 1906:^° It is, consequently, my honor to propose to the Commission, that there be Included in the program of discussion, something more or less along the following lines: Instructions to the delegates to the next Hague Conference. Under this heading I will give instructions to discuss separately, the following: (a) Instructions relative to neutrals in time of war, (b) Instructions relative to the deprival of immuni­ ties on the high seas in time of war, and (c) Instruc­ tions relative to measures to reduce the possibility of war, and under this heading, I Believe that the acceptance of the principle that contracts between a nation and an individual should not be collected by

Argentina was at this time nursing supposed grievances against Pan Americanism, in general, and was soon to be further annoyed by new cordiality between the United States and Brazil. See McGann, op. cit., pp. 235- 238 for discussion and references. Argentina did not authorize funds for its Rio delegation until nine days before their departure. ^ ^ e pub lie a Argentina, politics internacional. . . , p. 510. 87 force, relative to which point. His Excellency, Dr. Drago, the distinguished Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, in 1902, directed an able note to the Argentine Minister in Washington. If the acceptance of this principle, I repeat, can be assured at the Hague, I believe we will have taken an important step forward in the sense of the re­ duction of the causes of war. The offer was promptly accepted. A second Argentine note practically repeated Root's proposal word for word.^^ A major concern of both nations was thus resolved and a possible crisis at the Conference averted. The Program Commission, consisting of the ABC Powers, Cuba, Costa Rico and Mexico ultimately approved an agenda, which as one of fourteen items, included, "IV. The Consideration by the Hague of the Calvo and Drago Doctrines with Respect to Collection of Public Debts. Lula Maria Drago refused Foreign Minister Manuel Montes de Oca's invitation to represent Argentina at the 33 Rio meeting.^ The Foreign Minister's letter had made it

5^Pan American Union, Extracto de las ideas de los dlstintos paises de ^érica con relaci3n al programa de la Teroera ConferenclX 'Fanamericana“~! i Ü rWisbington : Pan American Union, 1900), pp. 50-52; A. Curtis Wilgus, "The Third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, 1906," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XII (November, 1932), pp. 42Ù-4È2. 52wilgus, loc. clt. At this point the public was using the terms "Drago Doctrine" and "Calvo Doctrine" inter­ changeably. 53president Figueroa Corta's original intention had been to send both Luis Drago and Roque Saenz Peria to the 88 clear that Drago would be expected to uphold the official line, namely, that friendship with the United States must "not impede the Argentine tendency to tighten the bonds with European nations to which we owe the labor and the capital . . . that is our pride and the astonishment of the world. Drago's reply reaffirmed his position that his Doc­ trine was "before and above all a doctrine of American inter­ national policy.The ex-Poreign Minister then went on to declare his friendship in the strongest terms ever used by a high ranking Argentine statesman, before or since. His reply, moreover, is important because it sets forth the Intended relationship of the Drago Doctrine to the Monroe Doctrine and to international law. At Rio, with few exceptions, the Conference followed

Rio conference. The latter also declined in order to attend the wedding in Spain of Alfonso VIII. See Peterson, op. cit, p. 289. ^^McGann, o£. cit., pp. 235-236, quoting Montes de Oca to Luis M. Drago, May 1906, Revista de Derecho, Historia 2. Letras, XV, 43 (November 1912), pp. 313-324. 35lnfra., p. 124. The complete text of Drago's reply to Montes de Oca is given in Appendix B. Prom an unpublished "Collection of Documents Pertaining to Intervention and the Forcible Collection of Public Debts," Milwaukee Public Library, File No. 341-D75, dated 1928. 89 a predictable course. The meeting was held in the glittering Monroe Palace--one of the only monuments in Latin America to that much maligned American president— which was originally built at the St. Louis Exposition and moved piece by piece to Rio de Janeiro. Conference President, Brazilian diplomat Joaquim Nabuco, ably set the tone in an opening speech when he urged moderation and counseled the assembly that the "great object of these conferences," should not be to thrash out solutions to problems, but merely to "express collectively what is already understood to be unanimous. Argentina was perverse as usual and nearly abandoned the Conference over the wording of Honorary President Root's reference to public debts, deemed to be permissive of forcible Interven- 37 tion, a phrase which Root obligingly altered. The European press was in fine Yankee-baiting form. A German newspaper in Brazil echoed Berlin's line that the United States T t Q "Intends to make Brazil a Yankee colony." British reaction was mixed, but the London South American Journal said Secretary Root's "honeyed words" were unsuccessful in

^^Report of the Delegates . . . , pp. 55-58. McGann, o^. cit., p. 248. ^^Wilgus, o£. clt., p. 424. 90 39 allaying Latin American distrust of North America. As determined beforehand, the decision to move dis­ cussion of the Drago issue to the Hague was quickly approved 40 and transmitted to that Conference. A harmless Resolution on Public Debts was passed before adjournment but was empty 4l , . of essential content. La Prensa (correctly) called it 42 "essentially evasive." Diarlc on August 24, 1906, with perhaps the most apt comment, said the Conference "had succeeded only in consigning arbitration and the Drago 43 Doctrine to the Hague as 'cadavers.'"

^^Ibld., Secretary Root's opening speech at Rio can be found in Robert Bacon e^ al., Latin America and the United States ; Addresses by Elihu Root (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1917), pp. 6-11. ^^James B. Scott (ed.). The International Conference of American States, 1889-1928 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 124-T23. ^^Ibld., p. 135. ^^El Dlario [Buenos Aires], August 24, 1906, quoted in McGann, o£. clt., p. 252. ^^Ibid., p. 253. In addition to the excellent article already cited by A. Curtis Wilgus, two of the American delegates. Dr. Leo S. Rowe, and Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, and one of the Argentine delegates, Eduardo L. Bidau wrote articles about the Conference which are listed in the bibliography. CHAPTER VI

AS A DOCTRINE OP INTERNATIONAL LAW

It Is in this final and most widely accepted role as a tenet of international law, that the Drago Doctrine is remembered today. Luis Maria Drago accepted appointment as a delegate, together with Roque Saenz Pe'Ka, to the 1907 Hague Peace Conference.^ Although Drago was not bound by any such rigid instructions as he would have been at Rio, the nature of the Hague meeting effectively circumscribed his actions. Discussion of forcible collection of debts fit in very well with the Hague purposes. This was the end of the "golden age of arbitration," an era in the development of international law so prolonged and successful that it led to universal acceptance of most of the ground rules we still recognize today. German and Italian nationalism was upsetting the balance of power and Europe could feel war coming after more than half a century of comparative peace. The 1899 Hague Conference had left much undone and the 1907 meeting was a last melancholy attempt to reduce the causes

^The other Argentine members were Carlos Larreta and R&mulo S. Naon, later to become his country's first Ambassador to the United States. All weçe ex-Poreign Ministers, Republics Argentina, Delegacion a la Segunda Conferencia de 92 of war. The Venezuelan incident had hinted how forcible in­ tervention on behalf of financial interests could lead to confrontation between major powers. The Drago formula, however unsatisfactory to the creditor nations in its pristine form, had at least provided a basis for discussion. The Hague would now embody a part of the spirit of the Argentine note in a resolution adopting the Porter Conven­ tion, a useful and realistic reflection of the collective will, although certainly not all Drago had hoped for.

I. THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OP 1907

Dr. Luis Maria Drago was given the honor of being the Argentine spokesman on the subject of forcible debt collection, and by virtue of the recent publicity his note had attracted, remained the figure on whom public Interest in this topic was centered. It was, perhaps, a strong pride of authorship that led Drago to cling to the continen­ tal and narrow political aspects of his 1902 note. Saenz Pena took the opposite stand in a pre-Conference meeting of the Argentine delegation. "If the principle is first,"

la Paz, La Republics Argentina en Segunda Conferencia de la Paz (Buenos Aires: Imprenta ctel estado, 1907). 93 Insisted Saenz Pena, "it should be sustained and applied for all the nations that issue bonds on the public debt, for the 2 strong as well as the weak, for America and for Europe." He argued that the universalization of the 1902 doctrine actually strengthened it. It is true that Argentina was now on a world stage, and her presence at the Hague dictated her arguments be gauged accordingly. But if Drago's interpretation tended to be too restricted, Saenz Pena's reasoning also revealed a certain naivete, albeit tinged with the skilled politician's pious hypocrisy, as he went on:^ To introduce apprehensive distinctions, to point up our own sovereignty, is to remove the trust that should characterize our relations with Europe; plus it would not be good politics _£no Juzgaba politics^ to create defensive measures against that group of nations at the precise moment we have been called to reason to­ gether in the very cradle of her civilization. . . . In abort, the doctrine and note of 1902 should be, not a guarantee in favor of South America against Europe, but rather a universal protection of the weak against the strong. . . .

p ^ ^Republics Argentina, ^ polltlca international de la nacion argentina, ed. Carlos A. Silva (Buenos Aires, Imprentadel estado, 1946), p. 500. ^Ibid. Saenz Pena evidently gave little credit to the United States for getting the Latin American states invited to "reason together" in the first place, not to mention using its influence to secure the delay of the Hague reunion so as not to conflict with the Rio meeting, a delay opposed by some European powers. 94 Such faith in the process of law seems all the more illusory in view of what had been the final outcome of the Venezuela dispute. The three blockading powers had not been the only claimants. Venezuela had also received claims from citizens of the United States, Mexico, Spain, France, 4 Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The claims of all the creditor nations had been adjudicated by a group of mixed commissions sitting at Caracas, except for certain reserved claims of Great Britain and Germany which the 5 United States had settled by good offices. Finally, the question had arisen as to whether the claims of the blockading powers deserved preferential treatment. This question had been treated by the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration which on February 22, 1904, had decided in favor of the blockading powers. While discussion among the members of the Argentine delegation solved nothing, the United States representative. General Horace Porter, took the initiative in bringing the issue of forcible collection of foreign debts before the

See "The Venezuelan Preferential Case. . . Ann Van Wynen Thomas et al., The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern"Tfe6Hbdist University Fress, 19t>3), pp. 53-76. ^Samuel Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (third edition;“New York: Henry Holt and fco7, l95o), p. 524. Bemis correctly states that the 1904 Hague Court decision "put a premium on intervention." 95 assembly.

The Drago Doctrine and the Porter Proposition. The Porter proposal became the discussion base of the topic of forcible collection and, in a version very close to the initial form, was ultimately incorporated in the final Con­ ference agreements. The Porter Proposition differed from the Drago Doctrine in several important respects. The Porter formula said, in essence, that the use of armed force be conditional upon (l) a refusal of the debtor state to consent to arbitration; or (2 ) obstruction by the debtor state of the formulation of the compromis d'arbitrage after acceptance of arbitration, or (3 ) failure to abide by the decision of 6 the tribunal. Significantly, the Porter proposal merely stated "contract debts," thus making it wider in scope than the Drago Doctrine which addressed itself exclusively to public debts. But the main difference was that the Porter Proposition did not contain the absolute prohibition against the use of force which was the essence of the Drago Doctrine. In his major speech of June l8 , 1907, Drago appealed to the assembly to make the prohibition against the use of

^The Porter Proposition is found in Carnegie Endow­ ment for International Peace, Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, 1899 and 1907, ed. James B. Scott (New York: Oxford Univers ity Press, 1915), pp. 91-95. The report of the United States group is in Carnegie Endowment for Inter­ national Peace, Instructions to the American Delegates to 96 armed force more restrictive. His arguments ably represented the Latin American bloc and shed light on typical objections which would lead this group to make a number of reservations 7 to the final resolution. Drago first defined three types of situations: (l) damages to foreigners as a result of illegal acts of a government or its citizenry; (2) private loans to officials of a government acting in its behalf; and (3) public bonds négociable in the world market. He then addressed himself exclusively to the third situation: the public debt arising from bond issue. As in his 1902 note, the theme of sovereignty lay at the heart of his argument. "The issuance of public bonds or funds," said Drago, "as money, is in effect, a positive manifestation of sovereignty. It is by an act of sovereignty that the state order^ payment of the coupons at maturity, and by an act of the same character, determines in exceptional Q cases, that service of the debt be suspended." He stated the Hague Peace Conferences and Their Official Reports, ed. JSmes 5. Scott (New York: Oxford^nlversity Press, I9 I0 ), pp, 100-101. 7Luis Maria Drago*s speech before the main assembly at the Hague, June 18, I907, is printed in politics internacional . . . , pp. 501-505- ^Ibid., p. 502. 97 that the investor in foreign public bonds has an advantage in that a private company may go permanently bankrupt, whereas a state's insolvency is temporary. Besides, since bonds change hands freely, who is to say at any given moment in time where the real interest lies? Fraud and conspiracy are even possible, he reasoned, to intentionally attract foreign intervention. His comparisons about use of force were most per­ suasive. Armed intervention represents an unwarranted degree of force such as is not sanctioned even in personal self defense. If a man who owes you money refuses to pay, you cannot go to his home and shoot him! Finally, "accepting the part of the United States proposal that resorts to Q force establishes yet another case of just war."

Relationship to the Calvo Doctrine. Throughout his speech, Drago paid due respect to the Calvo Doctrine, property of another distinguished Argentine jurist barely a generation 10 before: Carlos Calvos. The Porter Proposition cut across

9 Ibid., p. 503. ^^Calvo, who died a year before the Second Hague Conference convened, had earlier sent Drago a letter in which he said: "If I can claim any personal merit, it is that of having placed in relief your own fame which is today worldwide." Ibid., p. 509. 98 the Calvo Doctrine as well as the Drago Doctrine. Calvo had 11 written: Aside from political motives, these interventions have nearly always had as apparent pretexts, injuries to private interests, claims and demands for pecuniary indemnities in behalf of subjects or even foreigners, the protection of whom was for the most part in no wise Justified in strict law. According to strict inter­ national right, the recovery of debts and the pursuit of private claims does not justify ^ piano the armed intervention of governments and, since European states invariably follow this rule in their reciprocal relations, there is no reason vAy they should not also impose it upon themselves in their relations with nations in the new world. The Calvo Doctrine maintains the state is not liable to foreigners for damages incurred during time of civil war and gave rise to its somewhat more explicit corollary, the Calvo Clause. Often written into Latin American contracts with aliens, this clause says, in effect, that the alien must agree that any dispute arising out of the terms of the contract be settled in the national courts of the contracting state in accordance with the letter's national laws and is not to cause the lodgement of any international claim by 12 the alien's government. It was with respect to this tenet, already a firmly entrenched Latin American legal doctrine, that Drago had so

. l^Carlos Calvo, Le droit international théorique et pratique (fifth edition; Paris, ltS9bJ, Sec. 6o31 ^^Gerhard Von Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), pp. 220-22*. 99 carefully delineated three specific situations and addressed himself only to the last. However, it was virtually impos­ sible for Drago to avoid treading on some of Calvo's ground. Thus, he criticized the Porter proposal for resorting too soon to arbitration. Arguing somewhat in a circle, he said arbitration should not be necessary unless there is a "denial of Justice," and since "no nation permits Judgement of its public policies in its own courts, no denial of 15 Justice can occur in the first place." Everyone was also aware that the occasion for the formulation of the Drago note had been the Venezuelan incident of 1902, and that Castro's persistent refusal to settle tort claims— clearly the realm of Calvo— had been the cause of the tri-power blockade. Therefore, inevitably, the fates of the Calvo Doctrine and the Drago Doctrine were linked at the Hague and the old criticisms of the Calvo l4 Doctrine came to be leveled against Drago as well. Actually the Drago Doctrine is considerably the narrower since it relates only to public bonds and decries only armed intervention, not diplomatic interposition.

^^epilblica Argentina, La polltica internacional . . ., pp. 501-5 0 2 . l4 For a thorough comparative discussion of the Calvo and Drago Doctrines in relation to the Porter Proposition, see Edwin M. Borchard, "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan 100

II. RESERVATIONS AND REACTIONS

The Porter Proposition, with a few minor amendments, became final as Convention II, a resolution voted by thirty- nine of the states present on July 27, 1907. Argentina made two reservations to the resolution which became the basis of similair reservations by all the other American 15 states present except Brazil and Chile: (1) With respect to debts arising from ordinary contracts between the national of a state and a foreign government, arbitration should not be sought except in the specific case of denial of justice by the courts of the contracting state, whose remedies should be previously exhausted. (2) Public loans with bond issues constituting the national debt can not in any case give rise to military aggression nor to the occupation of the soil of American states. If Argentina was officially satisfied with the results Drago, understandably, was not. He had concluded his July l8 speech by saying:

Co., 1930), III, pp. 15^5-156. Also see Crammond Kennedy, "The Drago Doctrine," North American Review, VII (1907). "5,Republica . Argentina, _ . La polltica______internacional______pp. 504-505; McCann, Argentina, tke Unite'd States and'The Inter-American System, ldüO-19T4^Cambridge : Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1957% p. curiously, some Argentines, such as Richard Levene, call the Drago Doctrine a corollary to the Calvo Doctrine— perhaps feeling that if necessarily corollary to something, better Calvo than Monroe. l^Ibid. Ernesto ftuesada discusses differences 101 In a memorable moment, Argentina proclaimed the doctrine that excludes from the Americas those military operations and occupations of territory which result from state loans. Even when such actions are based on the most serious and fundamen­ tal considerations, they deal with a political principle, a militant policy, that can not and which we will not, discuss nor vote in this assembly. Drago's only success in preserving that principle, a "passing victory over Saenz Pena," was in specifying "American" 17 states in the second Argentine reservation. Even so, neither Argentina nor any other of the Latin American 18 states ever ratified the convention.

New public acclaim and a^ strained comparison. Public reaction to the adoption of the Drago Doctrine in the form 19 of the Porter Proposition was universally favorable. An Oxford law professor saw "little difference" between the between the Drago Doctrine and the Hague Convention II in "La doctrina Drago; su esencia amplio y claro," Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, XVL, 143 (December 19!$), p. 397; Samuel Semis, nonetheless, views United States actions in 1907 as essentially concurring with Drago's proposals. The Latin American Policy of the United States ; An Historical Interpretat ion (New ŸorîcT Harcourt, Srace and World, Inc., 1943),p. 14?. Cf., the United States reserva­ tion on behalf of the Monroe Doctrine at the 1899 Hague meeting, supra, p. 50, n. 50, and discussion in Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1937), P. 292. l^Harold P. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (Antioch, New York; State University of New Ÿork, 1964)7 "p.■ 264. l^Ibid. ^^Republica Argentina, La polltica internacional . . . 102 20 Porter and Drago proposals. A French writer effusively hailed the passing into law of "Drago's great principle," and linked it to the "principles" set forth by France in 1792 and followed by the United States in 1823 and Italy in 21 1848Î The only case of international sour grapes seems to have been on the part of the British community in Buenos Aires— and they managed to blame the North Americans. 22 The tale bears repeating. It seems that the rumor began that the Drago Doctrine had actually originated with the reckless English statesman. Third Viscount, Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston. Lord Palmerston had certainly addressed himself to the subject of foreign bonds when in his "Circular of l848," he wrote for an audience of Spanish debtors as follows If the government of a nation has the right to exact reparations in favor of any one of its subjects, individually considered, who has a Just claim pp. 514-516, cites numerous articles in the European press, all praising Argentina, Drago, peace, and even General Horace Porter. 20 Ibid., p. 512, cites Westlake, "The Hague Conference," Quarterly Review, London (January I9 0 8 ). ^^Pauchille, "The Drago Doctrine," Revue G^n^rale de Droit International Public (June 1907), is quoted extensively in ibiïï., pp. 513-514. pp The germ of this story is contained in ibid., p. 512 et seqq. By comparing the dates given by Carlos Silva and tFe other references cited, the probable sequence of events becomes apparent. ^^Ibid., p. 504. 103 unsatisfied against the government of another country, the right to demand such reparations can­ not be considered diminished only because the magni­ tude of damage is increased and because rather than dealing with the individual demand of a relatively small sum, there be a large number of persons to whom a considerable sum is due. It is, therefore, a simple question of discretion for the British government of whether or not to take up the issue by diplomatic means /emphasis adde^, and that decision must . . . be based on purely British and domestic considerations. What was not circulated as part of that rumor was the rest of what Lord Palmerston said on that occasion. True, force against Spain was never employed. But as the dis­ tinguished American authority John Bassett Moore pointed out, 24 Palmerston also warned: . . . that foreign nations not delude themselves with the false impression that the British nation nor the British Parliament will always be quick to tolerate offense, nor that if the British government is called upon to defend the rights of the English people, it will not have at its disposition . . . the most ample facilities and means necessary to obtain justice. For good measure, the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in an article repudiating the Drago Doctrine, affirms that "in certain instances the Government might be prepared to go to the length of using force," and quotes none other than 25 Lord Palmerston in l848.

2^John Bassett Moore, "American International Law," International Law Digest, VI, cited in ibid. ^^The article also points out that Lord Salisbury endorsed the use of force to back up bondholders' claims in exceptional circumstances as early as l880, "Drago Doctrine," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1966 edition; Chicago; 104

At any rate, the rumor seems to have passed to the United States when Mr. William T. Stead, an Englishman, wrote into the introduction to Perez Triana'a book the lines 26 which Carlos Silva so eagerly quoted: Even the most perverse of these polemicists has abstained from proclaiming as one of the founders of Christianity. In this they are more prudent than those Americans of the North, who in their jealousy to prove that the Drago Doctrine existed before Drago, have managed to convince themselves that Lord Palmerston— Lord help us— was one of the original fathers of the doctrine that force should never be used for the collection of foreign bonds. The truth of these things is that Lord Palmerston not only thought in an opposed manner, but acted according to his opinions, as well; and when for reasons of con­ venience he acted otherwise, he took special pains to explain that if he did not appeal to force, it was not for reasons of principle. He took the opportunity to use force against both Portugal, and against Latin American states that failed to pay interest due to English bondholders.. . . Thus the Drago Doctrine became part of international law.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1947), VII, p. 622. il 11am T. Stead in his introduction to Santiago Pérez Triana, la doctrina Drago : colleccion de documentes (London, 1908), quoted in Republica Argentina, La politTca internacional . . . , pp. 509-510. CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY CONCLUSION

Through the years 1902 through his 1907 appearance at the Hague, Luis Maria Drago had become a statesman of international renown. He was one of the few Argentines of any stature who remained friendly to the United States during this era.^ In 1909, the United States nominated him to serve as one of the members of the Venezuelan Pecuniary CisTitns Commission, a post he resigned shortly thereafter in order to accept appointment as an arbiter in the important North Atlantic Fisheries Case between the United States and 2 Great Britain. For his service in the cause of peace, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1912 recognized him as "the highest exponent of the intellectual culture of South America," and Columbia University conferred 3 on him an honorary doctorate of laws. In 1911, Drago was elected a deputy in the national legislature but shortly after the beginning of his term.

When in his 1906 State of the Union message. Presi­ dent Roosevelt had quoted Drago's views, the former Foreign Minister called in person at the American Legation to ask that his thanks be transmitted to the President. ^William B. Parker, Argentines of Today (New York; Kraus Reprint Corp., 1920), 1, pp7 l^-ITT. ^Ibid., p. 14. 106 his health began to fall and he took an extended vacation In 4 Europe. On his return, he again took up his post as a deputy, where In June, 1914, he was verbally attacked by another distinguished deputy from the Province of Buenos Aires, Estanislao S. Zeballos. The argument soon came to resolve about the Drago Doctrine. During the course of the discussion, Drago pronounced what may well be considered an epitaph for the Doctrine as he had conceived it. Speaking 5 of the December 29, 1902 note, he said; It had been sent at an opportune moment. It was an action /emphasis in the originaj/', not an academic legal doctrine that is born and dies in a book, but a dynamic principle; it was the voice of the nations of America raised up against the rule of force, against the oppression of the weak. . . . In 1917, President Hipolito Irigoyen, who kept

Argentina steadfastly neutral in World War I, but at the same time, chipped away at the bases of Pan Americanism, offered Drago a post in the Argentine Legation in London— f perhaps an act designed to show friendship to North America.

^Ricardo Piccirilli et al., Diccionario histdrico argentine (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Historicas Argentinas, l 9 W h I, p. 21 7 . ^The polemics of June 24 and 26, 1914, are quoted extensively in Republica Argentina, polltica internacional de la naoion argentine, ed. Carlos A. Silva (Buenos Aires; Imprenta del estado, 1946), pp. 372 et_ seqq. ^Harold P. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (Antioch, New York; State University of New York, 1954), pp. 332-33 9 . Of., Wilson's startling suggestions for 107 Drago refused. His feelings were far from neutral. His view of the war was "almost word for word that of the United 7 States." In 1920, Luis Maria Drago, appointed his country's representative at the newly formed League of Nations was Invited to join the Permanent Court of International Justice. His poor health would not permit him to accept. On June 9, 1921, Dr. Luis Maria Drago died at the age of sixty-two 8 years. By the time of its author's death, the Drago 9 Doctrine was also a dead issue. Since the era of the Second Hague Peace Conference the Drago Doctrine has, with few exceptions, been mentioned 10 only in its role as a legal doctrine. A typical exception

Pan American Pact in Samuel Flagg Bemls, The Latin American Policy of the United States ; An Historical In^rpretafaion (New Yorlc: Harcourt, Brace anHHtforld, Inc., l943). Ch. XI: Arthur Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea : Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University PresF, 1954), pp. IÔO-131. T^Ysabel Fisk Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945), P. 209. Q One notable book, a two volume collection of works with, however, little critical content, was written after Drago's death by his nephew, Mariano J. Drago, Luis Drago, discursos 2. esoritos (Buenos Aires, 1938). ^Cf., Samuel P. Bemis statement that the Drago Doctrine foreshadowed the 1928 Pact of Paris which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, ^ Diplomatic History of the United States (third edition; New York: Henry Holt anE Co., 1950), p. $6 5 . ^^unlike the Calvo Doctrine, which has figured in a 108 occurred in Montevideo In 1933 when Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Argentine delegate to the Seventh International Conference 11 of American States said perfunctorily and Inaccurately: Can there be no legitimate solution without force? We have it, Mr. President, because there is an Argentine doctrine, that of Dr. Luis Maria Drago, that has been accepted by the United States and by the majority of the nations of Europe, that excludes forcible recovery. By virtue of Its acceptance at that Conference of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States which proscribed all intervention, the United States technically subscribed to the Drago Doctrine. The same can be said when three years later at Buenos Aires, the United States signed an Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, and when after World War II, the United States reaffirmed its ad­ herence to the principle of non-intervention at the 1948 number of cases and has even been written Into some Latin American constitutions, the Drago Doctrine has never been used before an international tribunal. See Edwin Borchard, "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York; The Macmillan Co., 1930^, IÏT, pp. 154, 15b; Ann Van Wynen Thomas et al., The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, l9b3), p. 15B. ^^Ramdn Ldpez Jimenez quoting Saavedra Lamas in El principio de no interveneion en America y la nota uruguaya (Buenos Airesf^dltorial DepalSa, Ï947;, p. 1Ô4. Saavedra Lamas, who was Saenz PeSa's son-in-law, later wrote Luis Maria Drago ; su obra, proyecciones transcedencla (Buenos 109 12 Bogoté Charter Conference, But these were backhanded endorsements, at best, no more explicit than had ever been Argentina's acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine. The Drago note of December, 1902, was fivefold in its significance. As a defensive doctrine, it had mirrored the reaction of Argentina to an isolated event haIf-a-continent away. This reaction had been the product of deep-rooted fears, conditioned by a hundred years of Insecurity whose final decade of boom and bust had moved Argentina to the threshold of the twentieth century with a rude Jolt. At the same time, Argentina had begun to assume some of the attitudes and airs of a modern western nation and the Drago note had provided the basis for a political doctrine like the United States Monroe Doctrine which it imitated. But it had failed as a political doctrine in its own right because Argentina, already suffering from an acute case of cultural and political indigestion, could not and would not have defended it. It had failed as a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine because the United States was Just then emerging as an imperialistic world power and soon no one, not even Drago himself, had been willing to admit this role. As a recognition of the changing power relationships between Argentina, the rest of Latin America, Europe and

12Thomas,, 0£. cit., p. 174. 110 the United States, the Drago Doctrine had squarely hit Its mark. But the very strength. Interest and energy of the

United States to which the Argentine despatch appealed had helped assure the speedy disavowal of this singular and un­ repeated foreign policy gesture.

The Drago note had, thus, been a unique instance of

Argentine internationalism. After the first blush of pride in the success of her walk-on role on the stage of world power politics had passed; the Argentine government became as cool toward the too-advanced Drago proposal as had been the delayed United States reply.

An embarrassment to both governments, the Drago

Doctrine had been hurried along the only path open to it, past the 1906 Rio Conference and on to the Hague where in

1907, it was safely relegated to law.

It is doubtful, even had the North American government's

response to the Drago note been warmer, that any new pass

in Argentine-American relations would have opened. The

Drago proposal simply ran counter to too many prevailing

currents. However, for that very reason, because it gave

a unique insight into the political and historical character

of its time, it remains a rewarding study. APPENDICES APPENDIX A

LETTER OP DR. LUIS M. DRAGO, MINISTER OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, TO DR. GARCIA MEROU, ARGENTINE MINISTER TO THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 29, 1902

BUENOS AIRES, December 29, 1902

MR. MINISTER; - I have received your excellency's telegram of the 20th Instant concerning the events that have lately taken place between the Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Governments of Great Britain and Germany. According to your excellency's information the origin of the disagreement is, in part, the damages suffered by subjects of the claimant nations during the revolutions and wars that have recently occurred within the borders of the Republic mentioned, and in part also the fact that certain payments on the external debt of the nation have not been met at the proper time. Leaving out the consideration of the first class of claims, the adequate adjustment of which it would be necessary to consult the laws of the several countries, this Govern­ ment has deemed it expedient to transmit to your excellency some considerations with reference to the forcible collec­ tion of the public debt suggested by the events that have taken place. At the outset, it is to be noted that the capitalist 113 who lends his money to a foreign state always takes into account the resources of the country and the probability, greater or less, that the obligations contracted will be fulfilled without delay. All governments thus enjoy different credit according to their degree of civilization and culture and their conduct in business transactions; and these conditions are measured and weighed before making any loan, the terms being made more or less onerous in accordance with the precise data concerning them which bankers always have on record. In the first place the lender knows that he is entering into a contract with a sovereign entity, and that it is an inherent qualification of all sovereignty that no proceedings for the execution of a Judgement may be insti­ tuted or carried out against it, since this manner of collection would compromise its very existence and cause the independence and freedom of action of the respective governments to disappear. Among the fundamental principles of public inter­ national law which humanity has consecrated, one of the most precious is that which decrees that all states, what­ ever be the force at their disposal, are entities in law, perfectly equal to one another, and mutually entitled by virtue thereof to the same consideration and respect. The acknowledgement of the debt, the payment of it 114

In its entirety, can and must be made by the nation without diminution of its inherent rights as a sovereign entity, but the summary^and immediate collection at a given moment, by means of force, would occasion nothing less than the ruin of the weakest nations, and the absorption of their govern­ ments, together with all the functions inherent in them, by the mighty of the earth. The principles proclaimed on this continent of America are otherwise. "Contracts between a nation and private individuals are obligatory according to the conscience of the sovereign, and may not be the object of compelling force," said the illustrious Hamilton.

"They confer on right of action contrary to the sovereign will."

The United States has gone very far in this direction. The eleventh amendment to its Constitution provided in effect, with the unanimous consent of the people, that the Judicial power of the nation should not be extended to any suit in law or equity prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. The

Argentine Government has made its provinces Indictable, and has even adopted the principle that the nation itself may be brought to trial before the supreme court on contracts which it enters into with individuals.

What has not been established, what could in no 115 wise be admitted, is that, once the amount for which it may be indebted has been determined by legal Judgement, it should be deprived of the right to choose the manner and the time of payment, in which it has as much interest as the creditor himself, or more, since its credit and its national honor are involved therein. This is in no wise a defense for bad faith, disorder, and deliberate and voluntary insolvency. It is intended merely to preserve the dignity of the public international entity which may not thus be dragged into war with detriment to those high ends which determine the existence and liberty of nations. The fact that collection can not be accomplished by means of violence does not, on the other hand, render value­ less the acknowledgement of the public debt, the definite obligation of paying it. The state continues to exist in its capacity as such, and sooner or later the gloomy situations are cleared up, resources increase, common aspirations of equity and Justice prevail, and the most neglected promises are kept. The decision, then, which declares the obligation to pay a debt, whether it be given by the tribunals of the country or by those of international arbitration, which manifest the abiding zeal for Justice as the basis of the political relations of nations, constitutes an indisputable title which cannot be compared to the uncertain right of Il6 one whose claims are not recognized and who sees himself driven to appeal to force in order that they may he satisfied. As these are the sentiments of Justice, loyalty, and honor which animate the Argentine people and have always inspired its policy, your excellency will understand that it has felt alarmed at the knowledge that the failure of Venezuela to meet the payments of its public debt is given as one of the determining causes of the capture of its fleet, the bombardment of one of its ports, and the establishment of a rigorous blockade along its shores. If such proceedings were to be definitely adopted they would establish a dan­ gerous precedent to the security and the peace of the nations of this part of America. The collection of loans by military means implies territorial occupation to make them effective, and terri­ torial occupation signifies the suppression or subordina­ tion of the governments of the countries on which it is imposed. Such a situation seems obviously at variance with the principles many times proclaimed by the nations of America, and particularly with the Monroe Doctrine, sustained and defended with so much zeal on all occasions by the United States, a doctrine to which the Argentine Republic has heretofore solemnly adhered. Among the principles which the memorable message of 117 December 2, 1823, enunciates, there are two declarations which particularly refer to these republics, viz., "The American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European powers," and "... with the governments . . . whose independence we have . . . acknowledged, we could not view any interposi­ tion for the purpose of suppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." The right to forbid new colonial dominions within the limits of this continent had been many times admitted by the public men of England. To her sympathy is due, it may be said, the great success which the Monroe Doctrine achieved immediately on its publication. But in very recent times, there has been observed a marked tendency among the publicists and in the various expressions of European opinion to call attention to these countries as a suitable field for future territorial expansion. Thinkers of the highest order have pointed out the desirability of turning in this direction the great efforts which the principal powers of Europe have exerted for the conquest of the sterile regions with trying climates and in remote regions of the earth. The European writers are already many who point to the territory of South America, with its 118 great riches, its sunny sky, and its climate propitious for all products, as, of necessity, the stage on which the great powers, who have their arms and implements of conquest already prepared, are to struggle for the supremacy in the course of this century. The human tendency to expansion, thus inflamed by the suggestions of public opinion and the press, may, at any moment, take an aggressive direction, even against the will of the present governing classes. And it will not be denied that the simplest way to the setting aside and the easy ejectment of the rightful authorities by European governments is Just this way of financial interventions— as might be shown by many examples. We in no wise pretend that the South American nations are, from any point of view, exempt from the responsibilities of all sorts which violations of international law impose on all countries and on all civilized peoples. We do not, nor can we pretend, that these countries occupy an exceptional position in their relations with European powers, which have the indubitable right to protect their subjects as completely as in any other part of the world against the persecutions and injustices of which they may be the victims. The only principle which the Argentine Republic maintains and which it would, with great satisfaction, see adopted, in view of the events in Venezuela, by a nation that enjoys such great 119 authority and prestige as does the United States, is the principle, already accepted, that there can be no territorial expansion in America on the part of Europe, nor any oppres­ sion of the peoples of this continent, because an unfor­ tunate financial situation may compel any one of them to postpone the fulfillment of its promises. In a word, the principle which she would like to see recognized is: That the public debt can not occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power. The loss of prestige and credit experienced by States which fail to satisfy the rightful claims of their lawful creditors brings with it difficulties of such magnitude as to render it unnecessary for foreign intervention to ag­ gravate with its oppression the temporary misfortunes of insolvency. The Argentine Government could cite its own example to demonstrate the needlessness of armed intervention in these cases. The payment of the English debt of 1824 was spontaneously resumed by her after an intermission of thirty years, occassioned by the anarchy and the disturbances which seriously affected the country during this period, and all the back payments and all the interest payments were scrupulously made without any steps to this end having been 120 taken by the creditors. Later on a series of financial happenings and reverses completely beyond the control of her authorities compelled her for the moment to suspend the payment of the foreign debt. She had, however, the firm and fixed intention of resuming the payments as soon as circumstances should permit, and she did so actually some time afterwards, at the cost of great sacrifices, but of her own free will and without the interference or the threats of any foreign power. And it has been because of her perfectly scrupulous, regular, and honest proceedings, because of her high sentiment of equity and justice so fully demonstrated, that the difficulties undergone, instead of diminishing, have increased her credits in the markets of Europe. It may be affirmed with entire certainty that so flattering a result would not have been obtained had the creditors deemed it expedient to intervene with violence at the critical financial period, which was thus passed through successfully. We do not nor can we fear that such circumstances will be repeated. At this time, then, no selfish feeling animates us, nor do we seek our own advantage in manifesting our desire that the public debt of States should not serve as a reason for an armed attack on such States. Quite as little do we harbor any sentiment of hostility with regard to the nations of Europe. On the contrary, we have maintained with all of 121 them since our emancipation the most friendly relations, especially with England, to whom we have recently given the best proof of the confidence which her Justice and equanimity inspire in us by entrusting to her decision the most important of our international questions, which she has Just decided, fixing our limits with Chile after a contro­ versy of more than seventy-five years. We know that where England goes civilization ac­ companies her, and the benefits of- political and civil liberty are extended. Therefore we esteem her, but this does not mean that we should adhere with equal sympathy to her policy in the improbable case of her attempting to oppress the nationalities of this continent which are struggling for their own progress, which have already over­ come the greatest difficulties and will surely triumph— to the honor of democratic institutions. Long, perhaps, is the road that the South American nations still have to travel. But they have faith enough and energy and worth sufficient to bring them to their final development with mutual support. And it is because of this sentiment of continental brotherhood and because of the force which is always derived from the moral support of a whole people that I address you, in pursuance of the instructions from His Excellency the President of the Republic, that you may communicate to the Government of the United States our point of view regarding 122 the events in the further development of which that Govern­ ment is to take so important a part, in order that it may have in mind as the sincere expression of the sentiments of a nation that has faith in its destiny and in that of this whole continent, at whose head march the United States, realizing our ideals and affording us examples. Please accept, etc., LUIS M. DR AGO APPENDIX B

LETTER OP DR. DRAGO TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, MAY 9, 1906

BUENOS AIRES, May 9, 1906

DEAR MR. MINISTER; The doctrine maintained by the Argentine Republic with respect to the forced collection of public debts is contained in the following words taken from the note of December 29, 1902 : The principle that she would like to see recognized is: That the public debt can not occasion armed inter­ vention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power. The same document adds that : . . . in very recent times there has been observed a marked tendency among the publicists and in the various expressions of European opinion to call atten­ tion to these countries as a suitable field for future territorial expansion. Thinkers of the highest order have pointed out the desirability of turning in this direction the great efforts which the principal powers of Europe have exerted for the conquest of sterile regions with trying climates and in remote regions of the earth. . . . The human tendency to expansion, thus inflamed by the suggestions of public opinion and the press, may, at any moment, take an aggressive direction. . . . And it will not be denied that the simplest way to the setting aside and easy ejectment of the rightful authorities by European governments is Just this way of financial interventions— as might be shown by many examples. The note terminates to the effect that in spite of the sympathy which England inspires in us, we would not adhere 124 to her policy "in the Improbable case of her attempting to oppress the nationalities of this continent which are struggling for their own progress, which have already over­ come the greatest difficulties and will surely triumph— to the honor of democratic Institutions." We maintained, therefore, an American thesis, by solidarity with the nations of this continent, with scope and purposes purely American. We anunciated it as a result of the Venezuelan conflict, because Venezuela is a sister republic. We would not have spoken had the country com­ pelled by force to pay its debts been Turkey or Greece. Meanwhile, as I have had the honor of hearing from your own lips, your Excellency thinks that the Argentine doctrine should not be limited to America, but that, on the contrary, it shoiild be sustained as a universal Juridical principle applicable to all civilized nations of the old and new continents. This establishes a fundamental dif­ ference between your Excellency's point of view and mine. The doctrine of the note of December 29, 1902, is not a Juridical doctrine properly speaking, although It Invokes in its support very solid reasons of law. It is before and above all a doctrine of American international policy, which we have been able to formulate only as a political doctrine, and which we can hope to make triumph only on 125 political grounds. This is, in truth, one of the typical cases of the proverb that the better is the enemy of the good. At first sight it undoubtedly appears more noble, more-exalted, more conformable to reason and law to condemn forced collection of public debts in all the civilized world, but we ourselves are not Interested politically in the recognition of this principle as a rule of universal conduct. What interests us is to abolish in the present state of international relations the only method or pretext by which the Powers of the earth might stop the progress of the nationalities of this hemis­ phere, which are growing bold in the protection of their Institutions. Conquest, as such, having been eliminated in principle, we wish to eliminate it likewise under the guise of financial interventions. When the United States pro­ claimed that they would view "any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny," by any Power as an unfriendly act, they deliberately circumscribed their actions to what really concerned them. It would have been more generous and conformable to reason and the humanitarian ideal, perhaps, to generalize that declaration by protesting against the oppression of civilized races throughout the world, but the result would have been infinitely less practical. 126 England has today officially accepted the Monroe Doctrine, probably because its scope is limited to America. Everything leads to the supposition that it would continue to withold its recognition if it embodied a standard of action which would prevent colonization in other regions of the globe. In like manner, the forced collection of public debts might perhaps be abolished with respect to the American nations, for political and diplomatic reasons, provided that the European Powers were not put in the position of making declarations of a general character to this effect. Thus for example, it would perhaps not be impossible for England to accept the Argentine doctrine with respect to the South American States, as it has admitted the Monroe Doctrine with respect to them, but it is a mistake to supf-)se that it would ever declare its intervention in Egypt illegal, any more than that France would acknowledge as irregular its procedure in constituting the commission of dual control in that country. As a thesis of American policy, we can maintain the doctrine of the note of December 29 with some hope of more or less remote success, and it is likewise in this conception, and by treating of interests that directly concern us, that we have the legal capacity to initiate, as we have done for the first time, a principle which comes in this way to be ours, constituting, in its limited scope, an Argentine 127 diplomatic document, not a postulate of universal law. I believe, moreover, in view of the fact that the Drago Doctrine, as such American doctrine, has gained much favorable support, it would not be wise to change it or extend it, thereby drawing upon ourselves the hostility or displeasure of the European chancelleries. We would thus compromise our American contention, already difficult in itself, for the sake of the far interests of nations completely foreign to us, when we can in no way be affected by the form in which they fulfill their obligations or are compelled to pay their debts. One more fundamental reason prevents me from accepting the honorable commission for which the Government proposed to designate me. I believe that the Monroe Doctrine has been accepted by our country, first by Sarmiento in his mission to the United States, then, in 1885, officially by Minister Quesada, and lastly, in 1902, by the undersigned, in referring in the note of December 29 to the previous declarations. Your Excellency informs me that notwith*? standing these antecedents you do not believe that the Monroe Doctrine can be accepted, even in its original form, without involving a kind of diminution of, or interference with, our national sovereignty, I believe that the Monroe Doctrine guarantees our independence, and is today our best safeguard against the colonizing Powers, without the 128 slightest detriment to our sovereignty or to our self-respect. It does not represent in any manner a protectorate, either in reality or as a recourse of rhetorical argument, for neither do the United States contract any obligation relative to us, nor do we on our part pledge ourselves to do more than exclude European Jurisdiction, by our own means and without foreign assistance, within the limits of our terri­ tory. Moreover, we do not feel nor have we ever felt the weight of the influence or the patronage of North America in our internal or external policy, and it is my opinion that we can well be close and sincere friends of this great democratic nation, whose institutions we have adopted and whose great example we should follow. Meanwhile, it is not certain that the Monroe Doctrine will not be discussed in the Pan American Congress. Although it is not included as a subject on the program of delibera­ tions it may unexpectedly arise apropos of some incidental debate. And it is well to bear in mind in this respect that our note holds in high esteem the American declarations relative to the impression that will be produced by any act on the part of a European Power for the purpose of oppressing the independent nationalities of this hemisphere or of "controlling in any manner their destiny." We have held that financial interventions are acts of oppression and represent at the same time an inadmissible control; they are. 1 2 9 therefore, logically comprised In the proposition of Monroe, to which our doctrine gives an "extensive conception," to use the words of a distinguished French internationalist who has studied the question very fully. Perhaps for this reason our note is included in the American official publica­ tion of documents relating to the international relations of the United States under the heading; "Monroe Doctrine and Diplomatic Claims of European Powers." In view of these antecedents what would be my attitude if the representatives of other nations should refer in any way to the Monroe Doctrine, knowing as I do the present opinion of the Govern­ ment? I could not retract my former declarations, and would plainly fail to support your Excellency's policy If I did not do so, with detriment to ray convictions and personal circumspection. These reasons and others which I have explained verbally to your Excellency Justify my attitude in not accepting the pleasing and honorable offer to attend as Argentine delegate the Pan American Conference at Rio de Janeiro. I shall remain ever grateful to his Excellency, the President of the Republic, and to your Excellency for the high distinction implied by your consideration of ray humble person for the discharge of such a high and difficult mission. Please accept, etc., LUIS M. DRAGO. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1?1 A. BOOKS Alvarez, Alejandro. The Monroe Doctrine. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924. Arnault, Jacques. Historla del coloniallsmo. Buenos Aires : Puturo, i960. Bacon, Robert and James B. Scott (eds.). Latin America and the United States; Addresses by Elihu Root. Cambridge : Harvard University Éress, I917T Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. Fifth edition. Rew York:Appleton-Century- Ôroïts, Inc., 1955. Bartlett, Ruhl J. (ed.). 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C. PERIODICALS Abasolo, J. "Cdmo oonfederar la America Latina— como resistir al extranjero," Reviata Nacional, XXI, 4l (April, May 1906), pp. 97-102. Bidau, Eduardo. "Las doctrinas de Monroe y Drago," Reviata de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, V (1906), pp. 9d-llô. Bowen, Herbert V. "The Monroe, Calvo and Drago Doctrines," The Independent, LXII. "President Roosevelt's Report to the Senate on Venezuela," The Independent, LXIV, pp. 911-913. Bustamante, A.S. "La doctrina Drago ante la conferencia de la Haya," El Figaro ^lavana7, 29, XII (1907). "Drago and His Doctrine," Literary Digest, 6, VII (1907). Drago, Luis Maria. "Antecedentes institucionales," La Biblioteca, II (1896), pp. 299-308. ______. "Los ferrocarriles," Revista de Derecho, Historla y Letras, I, 2 (November l898;, pp."79-87. ______. "State Loans in Their Relation to International Policy," ^erlcan Journal of International Law, I (1907), pp. 692-7 26; supplement, p. l"^ Fauchille. "The Drago Doctrine," Revue Generale de Droit International Public (June 1907% Garcia, Juan A. "Estudio bibliografico sobre E^ caso de Venezuela. . . por Luis Maria Drago," Anales de la Faculta3~de Derecho, 1903.

Gay de Montent, R. "La doctrina de Drago y el arbitraje internacional," Mercurio /Barcelona?, XII (1910). Gray, W.H. "American Diplomacy in Venezuela, 1835-1865," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XX (19^0), pp. 551- 574 «

Harper's Weekly, XLVII (March 28, 1903), p. 521. Herschey, Amos S. "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," American Journal of International Law, I (1907), pp. 26-4% l4o

Kennedy, Crammond. "The Drago Doctrine," North American Review, VII (1907). Kipling, Rudyard. "An Address to the United States," McClure's Magazine, XII (February 1899), p. 291. Livermore, S.W. "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903," American Historical Review, LI (1946), pp. 452-471. "Marreucos, la Tripolitana y una republica sudamericana," Revista de Derecho, Historla y Letras, XIV, 4l (January T3ifyrpp7 ------Mendoza, Diego. "La doctrina Calvo y la doctrina Drago," Revista de Derecho, Historla 2 Letras,XXVIIl, 5 . Moore, John Bassett. "American International Law," Inter­ national Law Digest, VI. Nelson, E. "Posiciones respectivas de los Estados Unidos y de Europa en el comercio de la Republica Argentina," Revista de Derecho, Historla y Letras, VI, 17 (December 1903),'PPT 284-233. ------North American Review, 176 (March 1903), pp. 321-325. Orgaz, Raâl A. "La orientacion americanista en la ensenanza de la historla," Revista Argentina de Cienclas Politicas, I (191O), pp. 783-792. Pallejtf, A. "La hora actual de la polftica argentine," Revista de Derecho, Historla y Letras, XIV, 4l (January T 3 I 5T r p p 7 4T : % r ------Patterson, John. "Latin American Reactions to the Panama Revolution of 1903," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XXIV (1944), pp. 342-35% Perry, Edward. "Anti-American Propaganda in Hispanic America," Hispanic-American Historical Review, III (1920), pp. 17-4Ô. Quesada, Ernesto. "La doctrina Drago; su esencia y concepto amplio y olaro," Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, XVL, 143 (December 1919’), pp. 355-4l2T l4l

Relnsch, Paul S. "The Third International Conference of American States," The American Political Science Review, I (February 1907). Rippy, J. Fred. "Antecedents of the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine," Pacific Historical Review, IX (1940) pp. 267-279. "The British Investment Boom of the l880's in Latin America," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XXIX (1949), pp. 2dï-èd5. "The Initiâtion-of^ the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XVII (1937), pp. 419-4577 Rivarola, Rodolfo. "El Présidente Roca y la consolidacion del poder nacional," Revista Argentina de Ciencias Politicas, IV, 9, N? ^O, pp. 110 et aeqq. Robertson, William Spence. "Hispanic-American Appreciations of the Monroe Doctrine," Hispanic-American Historical Review, III (1920), pp. 1-lb. Root, Elihu. "Reasons Why the United States in Particular Should Encourage the Pan-American Conference," National Geographic Magazine, August, 1906, pp. 479-480. Rowe, Leo S. "The Significance of the Third Pan American Conference," The Independent, LXI (November 8 , 1906).

Schoenrich, Otto. "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute," American Journal of International Law, XLIII (1949), pp. ■■553-550:------Scott, George Winfield. "Hague Conference Restricting the Use of Force to Recover on Contract Claims," ^erlcan Journal of International Law, II (1908), pp. 78-94; Supplement, pp. bl-8 5 . ______. "International Law and the Drago Doctrine," North American Review, X (1906), pp. 602-610. Shippee, L.B. "Germany and the Spanish-American War," American Historical Review, XXX (1925)# PP. 754-777. 142 Sloan, Jennie A. "Anglo-American Relations and the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute, " Hispanic-American Historical Review. XVIII (1938), PP- 495-4557 Taylor, H. "International Conference at Rio de Janeiro, " American Law Review, December, 1906, pp. 896-907* Urena y Sanz, R. "Neuvas orientaslones del principio de la intervencioh, " Revista del Derecho Internacional Politico y Exterior /%dri^, VI (I9l0) . Vagts, Alfred. "Hopes and Pears of an American-German War," I870-1915," Political Science Quarterly, LIV (1939), pp. 514-535; LV (194Ô), pp. 53-76. Westlake . "The Hague Conference , " Quarterly Review /London/ January, 19O8 . Wilgus, A. Curtis. "James G. Blaine and the Pan-American Movement," Hispanic-American Historical Review, V (1922), pp. 662-708. "The Third International Conference of American States at Rio de Janeiro, 19O6 , " Hispanic-American Historical Review. XII (l932), pp. 420-456! Young, Q.B. "Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: the Olney Corollary, " Political Science Quarterly, LVII (1942), pp. 247-280.

C . ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES

Borchard, Edwin M. "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, III, pp. 153-156. Rew YéÆT'TKë FETcmïTlan G6:, — "Drago Doctrine, " Encyclopaedia Britannica, I966 edition, VII, pp. 622-623. Chicago: "Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1947. "Drago, Luis Maria," Enc ici oped ia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Ayricana, XVIIÏ, segunda parte, pp. 21$2-2153• ^drlcl y^fiarcelona: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1933.

D. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

"Collection of Documents Pertaining to Intervention and the 143 Forcible Collection of Public Debts," Milwaukee /Wisconsin/ Public Library, File No. 341-D75, 1928.

Schmidt, Walter E. "A Theoretical Survey of the Development of Inter-American Law," Unpublished research paper, American University, Washington, 1966.

E. NEWSPAPERS

Diario de Caracas, December, 1895-January, I896.

El Diario /Buenos Aires/, December 22, I895; August 24, 1905.

El Pafa /Buenos Aires/, December 20, 1902.

El Progonero /Caracas/, December 19, 1895; January 10, 1896. La Epoca /Bogot^, January 10, 1896; June 2, 1896. La Nacion ^uenos Aires/, December 13, 1902.

La Frensa /Buenos Aires/, December 18, 1895; December, 1902- August, 1903; April 27, 1914. London Times, March 29, I89 8 .