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D.C. 13 1 April 1950 NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE COMMITTEE

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NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 D.C. 13 1 April 1950 NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE COMMITTEE DECISION ON D.C. 13 A Report by the Military Committee on NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MEDIUM TERM PLAN Note by the Secretary 1. At their Third Meeting on 1 April 1950, the North Atlantic Defense Committee approved the recommendations in paragraph 6, pages 3 and 4, of D.C. 13 as the goal to be achieved, subject to the constitutional limitations of the Member Nations. 2. The directive in paragraph 6 c was forwarded to the Military Committee and the requests in paragraphs 6 d and e were forwarded to the North Atlantic Council on 10 April 1950. 3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of D.C. 13. C.H. DONNELLY Colonel, U.S.A. Secretary D.C. 13 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 107 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 108 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 D.C. 13 28 March 1950 BECAUSE OF THE SECRECY OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT, IT IS BEING GIVEN A SPECIALLY LIMITED DISTRIBUTION D.C. 13 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 109 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 110 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 D.C. 13 28 March 1950 Pages 1 - 66 REPORT FROM THE MILITARY COMMITTEE to the NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE COMMITTEE on NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MEDIUM TERM PLAN 1. In accordance with the directives of the Defense Committee D.C. 3 and D.C. 6/1, the Military Committee directed the preparation of an over-all North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense plan. This plan was prepared by the Regional Panning Groups in the light of the Strategic Guidance transmitted to the Regions by the Standing Group. The Standing Group specified a planning date of 1 July 1954. This date was selected as one which should provide time to implement a reasonable program for building up the over-all military capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. 2. The Regional Planning Groups submitted their plans to the Standing Group, who in turn integrated these plans into an over-all plan to be used as a basis for the development of military preparedness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Military Committee has approved the 1954 Defense Plan (Appendix “A”), as an initial working basis and expressed the common will of the Chiefs of Staff to build up these forces as quickly as possible. It is considered by the Standing Group that as future realistic analysis of the requirements continues, it might well indicate a need for some revision in the interest of economy of forces, particularly after an assessment of the various threats - 1 - D.C. 13 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 111 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 on the several fronts. It might then be evident that the defensive efforts must be coordinated so as to obtain a maximum efficiency, and that the employment of forces will have to be contemplated with the greatest flexibility. Also, it is possible that force requirements as stated have not been integrated in regard to the potentialities or abilities of the several nations to provide and to support such forces. Review of the plan and of the size, composition and employment of the forces therein, will be required from time to time, but the initiation of increases in our combined military capabilities cannot and should not await such action. 3. In order to assess the increase in armed forces necessary to reach the 1954 objectives as established in the plan, the Regional Planning Groups were requested to submit estimates of major forces which could be made available by 1 July 1951. These statements of force availabilities were, in most instances, the forces already programmed for 1951 by each nation. Although they were not derived directly from the 1954 objectives they are considered a vital first step toward their achievement. They will also provide a standard measure of allied capability which the North Atlantic Treaty organization can then proceed to integrate into an effective, though as yet quantitatively insufficient, defensive force. 4. The degree of expansion which is needed can readily be computed by each Region-based on the difference between its 1951 programmed availability and its 1954 requirements, which requirements are subject to constant revision as stated in paragraph 2 above. However, the Military Committee considers that acceptance by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations of the fact that a major increase in their individual - 2 - D.C. 13 112 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 and collective military establishments will be an essential prerequisite to the achievement of a reasonable degree of security. The Military Committee, therefore, recommends that this fact be brought to the attention of the North Atlantic Council. 5. The Military Committee is of the opinion that special emphasis must now be placed on the determination of the means, rate, and extent by which the armed forces of the treaty nations must be expanded. The achievement of the military requirements necessary for the common defense will require long-range planning to coordinate fiscal, economic, and industrial considerations with those of national and regional defense. To this end, it might be advisable to establish closer liaison between the permanent bodies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization responsible for these activities. In any event, the Military Committee considers that immediate determination should be made as a matter of urgency on the economic and financial capabilities of the treaty nations to increase their current military commitments. RECOMMENDATIONS 6. The Military Committee therefore recommends that the Defense Committee: a. Approve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Defense Plan. b. Approve as a first approximation the forces required to meet the plan (detailed in Appendix “A” to the plan) and accept these as the basis for a progressive build up of North Atlantic Defense forces. c. Direct the Military Committee through the Standing Group to invite the Regions to proceed, as a matter of - 3 - D.C. 13 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 113 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 first urgency, with the study of programs through which they contemplate, for the purpose of stressing their will to defend, to increase their forces in order to reach the objectives set forth in subparagraph b consistent with their capabilities and requirements. d. Request the North Atlantic Council to agree to the immediate need for urgent national and allied action to insure the progressive build-up of forces in accordance with paragraph 6b above, and that an immediate determination should be made as a matter of urgency on the financial and economic potentialities of the Treaty nations, with a view to increasing the value of their present Military commitments, and to consider new adequate economic and financial dispositions, in particular for the implementation of an integrated armament program. e. Request the North Atlantic Council to give instructions in order that a closer liaison be established between the permanent bodies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since a coordinated action of these bodies is an essential prerequisite to the organization efficiency. - 4 - D.C. 13 114 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MEDIUM TERM DEFENSE PLAN 1 July 1954 CONTENTS PART I - Defence Policy and Concept of Operations Section I Introduction ............................ Para 1 Section II Defence Policy ....................... Paras 2-3 Section III Assumptions ............................ Para 4 Section IV Strategic Concept ....................... Para 5 Section V Phased Concept of Operations ......... Paras 6-7 Section VI Basic Undertakings ...................... Para 8 Section VII Tasks ............................... Paras 9-10 PART II - Estimate of Enemy Capabilities and Possible Courses of Action Section I Outbreak of War ......................... Para 1 Section II Political Factors ................... Paras 2-18 Section III Economic Factors ................... Paras 19-27 Section IV Military Factors ................... Paras 28-51 Section V Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union ....................... Paras 52-70 Section VI Soviet Campaigns ................... Paras 71-80 PART III - Consolidated Regional Estimates Section I Regional Estimates of the Situation General.................................. Para 1 Western European Region .............. Paras 2-8 Southern European-Western Mediterranean Region ................ Paras 9-12 Northern European .................. Paras 13-25 North Atlantic Ocean Region ........ Paras 26-38 Canada-United States Region ........ Paras 39-42 Conclusions ............................ Para 43 - 5 - D.C. 13 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 115 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 Section II Outline Plan for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Area General ................................ Para 44 The Defence of Europe .............. Paras 45-48 Operations on Land ..................... Para 49 Operations in the Air .................. Para 50 Operations at Sea ...................... Para 51 Operations in North Africa ............. Para 52 Summary ............................ Paras 53-54 North American Area ................ Paras 55-60 Defense of Essential Sea and Air Lines of Communication Para 61 Ocean Lines of Communication ........... Para 62 Attack at Source ......................
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