Chapter 13 I Love a Sunburnt Environment
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John Anderson's Development of (Situational) Realism And
CHAPTER THREE JOHN ANDERSON’S DEVELOPMENT OF (SITUATIONAL) REALISM AND ITS BEARING ON PSYCHOLOGY TODAY1 Fiona J. Hibberd ABSTRACT. In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. By the late 1930s, the ‘macrostructure’ of his realist system was in place. It includes a theory of process and a substantial meta- physics, one which opposes positivism, linguistic philosophy and all forms of idealism. However, beyond Australia it remains largely un- known, despite its bearing on a number of current issues in psychol- ogy and the social sciences generally. This paper outlines Anderson’s transition from Hegelian idealism to realism, describes aspects of his ontology and epistemology, compares some of Anderson’s ideas with Dewey’s pragmatism and explains their relevance to present-day psychology. In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Marking this event, John Passmore described it as ‘... the greatest single piece of intellectual good fortune our country Australia has ever experienced’ (1977, p. 53). As the university’s prime rebel, Anderson’s political engagement with the university, the church and other institutions, have been well documented (e.g., Franklin, 2003; Kennedy, 1995; Weblin, 2003b). His greatest impact, however, was on the intellectual life of Sydney where generations of students were to meet with a forceful articulation and defense of his realist philosophical system. 1 This chapter is reprinted from Hibberd, F. J. (2009). John Anderson's de- velopment of (situational) realism and its bearing on Psychology today. -
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1947–2016: a Retrospective Using Citation and Social Network Analyses
Global Intellectual History ISSN: 2380-1883 (Print) 2380-1891 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgih20 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1947–2016: a retrospective using citation and social network analyses Martin Davies & Angelito Calma To cite this article: Martin Davies & Angelito Calma (2018): Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1947–2016: a retrospective using citation and social network analyses, Global Intellectual History To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2018.1478233 Published online: 28 May 2018. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rgih20 GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2018.1478233 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1947–2016: a retrospective using citation and social network analyses Martin Davies a and Angelito Calma b aGraduate School of Education, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia; bWilliams Centre for Learning Advancement, Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia ABSTRACT KEYWORDS In anticipation of the journal’s centenary in 2027 this paper provides Citation analysis; bibliometric a citation network analysis of all available citation and publication analysis; social network data of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1923–2017). A total analysis; philosophy; of 2,353 academic articles containing 21,772 references were Australasian Journal of Philosophy; Kumu collated and analyzed. This includes 175 articles that contained author-submitted keywords, 415 publisher-tagged keywords and 519 articles that had abstracts. Results initially focused on finding the most published authors, most cited articles and most cited authors within the journal, followed by most discussed topics and emerging patterns using keywords and abstracts. -
A Life of Thinking the Andersonian Tradition in Australian Philosophy a Chronological Bibliography
own. One of these, of the University Archive collections of Anderson material (2006) owes to the unstinting co-operation of of Archives staff: Julia Mant, Nyree Morrison, Tim Robinson and Anne Picot. I have further added material from other sources: bibliographical A Life of Thinking notes (most especially, James Franklin’s 2003 Corrupting the The Andersonian Tradition in Australian Philosophy Youth), internet searches, and compilations of Andersonian material such as may be found in Heraclitus, the pre-Heraclitus a chronological bibliography Libertarian Broadsheet, the post-Heraclitus Sydney Realist, and Mark Weblin’s JA and The Northern Line. The attempt to chronologically line up Anderson’s own work against the work of James Packer others showing some greater or lesser interest in it, seems to me a necessary move to contextualise not only Anderson himself, but Australian philosophy and politics in the twentieth century and beyond—and perhaps, more broadly still, a realist tradition that Australia now exports to the world. Introductory Note What are the origins and substance of this “realist tradition”? Perhaps the best summary of it is to be found in Anderson’s own The first comprehensive Anderson bibliography was the one reading, currently represented in the books in Anderson’s library constructed for Studies in Empirical Philosophy (1962). It listed as bequeathed to the University of Sydney. I supply an edited but Anderson’s published philsophical work and a fair representation unabridged version of the list of these books that appears on the of his published social criticism. In 1984 Geraldine Suter published John Anderson SETIS website, to follow the bibliography proper. -
Discrete and Continuous: a Fundamental Dichotomy in Mathematics
Journal of Humanistic Mathematics Volume 7 | Issue 2 July 2017 Discrete and Continuous: A Fundamental Dichotomy in Mathematics James Franklin University of New South Wales Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm Part of the Other Mathematics Commons Recommended Citation Franklin, J. "Discrete and Continuous: A Fundamental Dichotomy in Mathematics," Journal of Humanistic Mathematics, Volume 7 Issue 2 (July 2017), pages 355-378. DOI: 10.5642/jhummath.201702.18 . Available at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/vol7/iss2/18 ©2017 by the authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License. JHM is an open access bi-annual journal sponsored by the Claremont Center for the Mathematical Sciences and published by the Claremont Colleges Library | ISSN 2159-8118 | http://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/ The editorial staff of JHM works hard to make sure the scholarship disseminated in JHM is accurate and upholds professional ethical guidelines. However the views and opinions expressed in each published manuscript belong exclusively to the individual contributor(s). The publisher and the editors do not endorse or accept responsibility for them. See https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/policies.html for more information. Discrete and Continuous: A Fundamental Dichotomy in Mathematics James Franklin1 School of Mathematics & Statistics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, AUSTRALIA [email protected] Synopsis The distinction between the discrete and the continuous lies at the heart of mathematics. Discrete mathematics (arithmetic, algebra, combinatorics, graph theory, cryptography, logic) has a set of concepts, techniques, and application ar- eas largely distinct from continuous mathematics (traditional geometry, calculus, most of functional analysis, differential equations, topology). -
Papers in History and Methodology of Analytic Philosophy
Papers in History and Methodology of Analytic Philosophy Brian Weatherson March 5, 2014 Contents 1 What Good are Counterexamples? 1 2 Morality, Fiction and Possibility 20 3 David Lewis 46 4 Humean Supervenience 81 5 Lewis, Naturalness and Meaning 96 6 Centrality and Marginalisation 114 7 Keynes and Wittgenstein 128 8 Doing Philosophy With Words 144 9 In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma 152 Co-authored with Jonathan Ichikawa and Ishani Maitra Bibliography 161 What Good are Counterexamples? e following kind of scenario is familiar throughout analytic philosophy. A bold philosopher proposes that all Fs are Gs. Another philosopher proposes a particular case that is, intuitively, an F but not a G. If intuition is right, then the bold philosopher is mistaken. Alternatively, if the bold philosopher is right, then intuition is mistaken, and we have learned something from philosophy. Can this alternative ever be realised, and if so, is there a way to tell when it is? In this paper, I will argue that the answer to the rst question is yes, and that recognising the right answer to the second question should lead to a change in some of our philosophical practices. e problem is pressing because there is no agreement across the sub-disciplines of phi- losophy about what to do when theory and intuition clash. In epistemology, particularly in the theory of knowledge, and in parts of metaphysics, particularly in the theory of causation, it is almost universally assumed that intuition trumps theory. Shope’s e Analysis of Knowl- edge contains literally dozens of cases where an interesting account of knowledge was jettisoned because it clashed with intuition about a particular case. -
Curriculum Vitae GEOFFREY SAYRE-Mccord October 2020
Curriculum Vitae GEOFFREY SAYRE-McCORD October 2020 3301 West Cornwallis Road Department of Philosophy Durham, NC 27705 University of North Carolina (919) 627-1403 Chapel Hill, NC 27599 [email protected] PERSONAL: Born December 10, 1956; Boston MA. Married; two children. EDUCATION: University of Pittsburgh (1979-1986): Ph.D., April 1986; M.A., 1981. Dissertation: “Realism and Moral Epistemology” Oberlin College (1975-1979): B.A. with Honors in Philosophy, 1979. POSITIONS: University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill, Morehead-Cain Alumni Distinguished Professor, July 2008- present; Professor, July 1995-June 2008; Associate Professor, July 1990-June 1995; Assistant Professor, January 1986-June 1990; Instructor, July 1985-December 1985. (Interim Director, Parr Center for Ethics, October 2014-June 2015 and July 2016-August 2018; Director, Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Program, 2005-present; Philosophy Department Chair, July 2001-June 2011.) Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society, Founder and Director, 2015-present Marc Sanders Foundation, Executive Director, 2019-present Princeton University, Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Professor for Distinguished Teaching, 2015- 2016. University of Edinburgh, Professorial Fellow, 2013-2016, Regular Distinguished Visiting Professor, 2016-present University of California, Irvine, Distinguished Visiting Professor, Spring 2000, Spring 2001 University of Auckland, Visiting Professor, July 1997-August 1997. University of Pittsburgh, Teaching Fellow, 1980-1983. FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS: Philip Quinn Prize for “service to philosophy and philosophers,” the American Philosophical Association, January 2020. Visiting Fellowship at the Australian National University, Canberra, for 2019. Rajkumar Faculty Fellowship, Carolina Asia Center, University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill 2017. Regular Visiting Distinguished Professor at the University of Edinburgh, 2016-present. -
[email protected] 5 Washington Place New York, NY 10003
July, 2020 CURRICULUM VITAE Samuel Scheffler Telephone: (212) 998-3643 NYU Department of Philosophy E-mail: [email protected] 5 Washington Place New York, NY 10003 Education: Harvard University, A.B. 1973 Princeton University, Ph.D. 1977 Employment: University of California, Berkeley Assistant Professor of Philosophy (1977-79) Associate Professor of Philosophy (1979-85) Professor of Philosophy (1985-97) Professor of Philosophy and Law (1997-98) Class of 1941 WW II Memorial Professor of Philosophy and Law (1998-2008) New York University University Professor (2008- ) Professor of Philosophy and Law (2008- ) Fellowships and Awards: Phi Beta Kappa, 1972 Sheldon Travelling Fellowship, 1973-74 Danforth Graduate Fellowship, 1973-77 UC Berkeley Humanities Research Fellowship, Winter Quarter 1981, 2006-2007 Franklin J. Matchette Prize of the American Philosophical Association (for The Rejection of Consequentialism), 1983 Guggenheim Fellowship, 1984-85 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, 1989-90 University of California President’s Research Fellowship in the Humanities, 1989-90 All Souls College (Oxford) Visiting Fellowship, Hilary and Trinity Terms, 1990 Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2004) 2 Lectureships: Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1994 John Dewey Lecture, University of Vermont, 1995 Sir Malcolm Knox Memorial Lecture, University of St. Andrews, 2002 Winston Distinguished Fellow, University of North Carolina, 2003 Annual Law and Philosophy Lecture, Columbia Law School, 2005 Mala Kamm Memorial Lecture in Value Theory, NYU, 2007 Ethics, Politics, and Society Lecture, Rice University, 2007 Everett W. Hall Lecture, University of Iowa, 2008 Richard and Dorothy Sikora Lecture, University of British Columbia, 2009 Ruth Evelyn Parcells Memorial Lecture, University of Connecticut, 2009 John Passmore Lecture, Australian National University, 2011 Tanner Lectures on Human Values, UC Berkeley, 2012 H.L.A. -
The Melbourne Spectrum
Chapter 7 The Melbourne Spectrum T IS an old saying that philosophy begins with a sense of wonder. That is a source of philosophy, but there is another one, the sense Ithat ‘that’s all bullshit (and I can explain why)’. Different philoso- phers draw on these sources in differing proportions. An uncritical sense of wonder leads one out of philosophy altogether, into the land of the fairies, to start angels from under stones, find morals at every turn and hug the rainforest. A philosopher near the other extreme — or one, like David Stove, actually occupying the extreme — will at least still be doing philosophy, but it will consist entirely of criticism of others. In the Australian intellectual tradition, the wonder/criticism mix varies not only according to individuals but according to cities. At least, it has since 1927, when John Anderson arrived in Australia and Sydney and Melbourne set off on different paths. Various writers, mainly from Melbourne, have discoursed at some length on the con- trasts between the two cities in their styles of thought, and with all due allowance made for the hot air factor, there is undoubtedly some distinct difference to be identified. Where Sydney intellectuals, fol- lowing Anderson, tend to be critical, pessimistic, classical and opposed to ‘meliorist’ schemes to improve society, Melbourne’s unctuous bien pensants are eager to ‘serve society’, meaning, to instruct the great and powerful how they ought to go about achieving Progress and the perfection of mankind.1 Manning Clark — and it is characteristic of 1 J. Docker, Australian Cultural Elites: Intellectual Traditions in Sydney and Melbourne (Sydney, 1974); V. -
Ji Richapd'sylvan WHAT IS WRONG with APPLIED ETHICS Richard
197d /> << Ji p. I Richapd'Sylvan WHAT IS WRONG WITH APPLIED ETHICS Richard Sylvan There is much that is wrong with and in applied ethics. Specifically, there are three comprehensive counts where things are wrong with the commodity concerned, applied ethics, that is with applied ethics so economically viewed.1 Namely on the following three counts: • extraneous, with the supply, delivery, consumption, and the like of applied ethics, AE. The category prominently includes the delivery of applied ethics: what is done, taught and learnt, by whom, and how qualified (e.g. whether taught by professionals, professional ethicists or philosophers in particular). That has tended to presume that the commodity itself is more or less in order, though the presumption lacks good pedigree, delivery of defective goods being almost as ubiquitous as business enterprise. The present focus is not however upon the delivery, or other features of the production and consumption, packaging and marketing of the goods, but on features of the commodity itself, applied ethics itself. Thus • intraneous counts, concerning the commodity itself, where a further two things are wrong: •• the applied idea, and ••• what the application is presumed to be made to, established - or, should it be, establishment - ethics. Because an implicit premiss in organising the Philosophy and Applied Ethics Re-examined1 Conference seems to have been that the issues to be addressed are predominantly extraneous, and because most of the papers actually relevant to the Conference topic appear to focus on extraneous issues, the present exercise, by contrast, concentrates upon intraneous problems, especially the third: radical deficiencies in what is supposed to be applied, prevailing ethics, and some extensive repairs thereto. -
Australian Indigenous Philosophy
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture ISSN 1481-4374 Purdue University Press ©Purdue University Volume 13 (2011) Issue 2 Article 3 Australian Indigenous Philosophy Stephen Muecke University of New South Wales Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, and the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons Dedicated to the dissemination of scholarly and professional information, Purdue University Press selects, develops, and distributes quality resources in several key subject areas for which its parent university is famous, including business, technology, health, veterinary medicine, and other selected disciplines in the humanities and sciences. CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index (Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies. Contact: <[email protected]> Recommended Citation Muecke, Stephen. "Australian Indigenous Philosophy." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 13.2 (2011): <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1741> This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field. The above text, published by Purdue University Press ©Purdue University, has been downloaded 3753 times as of 11/ 07/19. -
A History of Physical Education, School Sport, and Health Education in New South Wales Public Schools from 1880 to 2012
The three-legged race: A history of Physical Education, School Sport, and Health Education in New South Wales public schools from 1880 to 2012. Michelle Gorzanelli Faculty of Arts and Social Science University of Sydney 2018 A thesis submitted to fulfil requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. Michelle Gorzanelli Acknowledgements Completion of this doctoral thesis was possible with the support of several people. Most significantly, this feat was possible because of the unconditional support provided by David Baxter, who always made himself available to clarify my thought process and offer guidance that extended this PhD into my professional development and career progression. My manager Associate Professor Kathie Ardzejewska was also very supportive in terms of my personal welfare, and development as an academic. Ben Kooyman was kind enough to undertake the editing work and I acknowledge his meticulous work and attention to detail. I am very much grateful to Mum, Dad, my sister Bec, and my husband Sean for encouraging and believing in me every step of the way. Without their support I would not have been able to manage study along with my everyday life. Sean was understanding and patient during the tough times and stayed by my side. To my little and beautiful soul, Kaden, you have been on this journey without even knowing it and my love for you kept me motivated and dedicated to making sure this achievement came true. -
Chapter 6 Idealism and Empire
Chapter 6 Idealism and Empire When the hysterical vision strikes The facade of an era it manifests Its insidious relations. 1 — Ern Malley OW far can philosophy diverge from common sense? This is a question, of course, for philosophy, and one that has pro- Hduced a range of divergent opinions.2 Some regard the deliverances of common sense as data that philosophy can explain, but not deny. Others dismiss common sense as so much Stone Age metaphysics, incorporating the confusions of the Cave Man in the street in much the same way that ordinary language includes antique science like ‘The sun rises in the east.’ Now, if departures from common sense are allowed, how far can you go? Surely there is a limit. David Armstrong’s first year lectures on Descartes included this joke: A philosophy lecturer noticed one of his students looking more and more worried as the course progressed. The student was absent for a while, then staggered in unkempt, dirty, obviously unslept. ‘Professor, Professor,’ he said, ‘You’ve got to help me. Do I really exist?’ The Professor looked around and said, ‘Who wants to know?’ 1 Ern Malley, Collected Poems (Sydney, 1993), p. 36. 2 K. Campbell, ‘Philosophy and common sense’, Philosophy 63 (1988): pp. 161–74; cf. P. James, ‘Questioning the evidence of commonsense’, Melbourne Journal of Politics 14 (1982/3): pp. 46–57; J. Kennett & M. Smith, ‘Philosophy and common sense: The case of weakness of will’, in M. Michael & J. O’Leary-Hawthorne, eds, Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind (Dordrecht, 1994), pp.