John Anderson's Development of (Situational) Realism And

CHAPTER THREE

JOHN ANDERSON’S DEVELOPMENT OF (SITUATIONAL) REALISM AND ITS BEARING ON PSYCHOLOGY TODAY1

Fiona J. Hibberd

ABSTRACT. In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. By the late 1930s, the ‘macrostructure’ of his realist system was in place. It includes a theory of process and a substantial meta- physics, one which opposes positivism, linguistic philosophy and all forms of idealism. However, beyond Australia it remains largely unknown, despite its bearing on a number of current issues in psychology and the social sciences generally. This paper outlines Anderson’s transition from Hegelian idealism to realism, describes aspects of his ontology and epistemology, compares some of Anderson’s ideas with Dewey’s pragmatism and explains their relevance to present-day psychology.

In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Marking this event, John Passmore described it as ‘... the greatest single piece of intellectual good fortune our country Australia has ever experienced’ (1977, p. 53). As the university’s prime rebel, Anderson’s political engagement with the university, the church and other institutions, have been well documented (e.g., Franklin, 2003; Kennedy, 1995; Weblin, 2003b). His greatest impact, however, was on the intellectual life of Sydney where generations of students were to meet with a forceful articulation and defense of his realist philosophical system.

1 This chapter is reprinted from Hibberd, F. J. (2009). John Anderson's development of (situational) realism and its bearing on Psychology today. History of the Human Sciences, 22(4), 63-92. 120 FIONA J. HIBBERD

The ‘macrostructure’ of Anderson’s philosophy was in place by the late 1930s. It sustained Passmore’s critical analysis of logical positivism in the 1940s and his 1967 entry on ‘logical positivism’ in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (where he famously pronounced the movement’s death). More recently, Anderson’s influence is evident in the work of Boag (e.g., 2008), Maze (e.g., Henry, 2009), Michell (e.g., 1999), Mackay (e.g., 2003), McMullen (e.g., 1997), Petocz (e.g., 1999), Rantzen (1993) and Sutcliffe (e.g., 1993). It also underpins my analysis of social constructionism and its conceptual union with logical positivism (Hibberd, 2005). Anderson offers an Heraclitean account of causation-as-process, argues against social and physical atomism, provides an objective foundation for qualitative and idio- graphic research, identifies beliefs, concepts, schemas, mental rep- resentations and the like as non-existents, and makes clear the logic of relations, the importance of the categories and the central role of critical inquiry in furthering any science. Yet his philosophy remains unknown to many. My aim, then, is to offer an historical ex- position of Anderson’s realism. In doing so, I point to some impor- tant differences between it and twentieth century positivism, iden- tify similarities and differences with Dewey’s pragmatism, and show how Anderson’s system redresses a number of ill-conceived ap- proaches in present-day psychology.

1. From Glasgow Hegelianism ...

Anderson was born in 1893 into a family of left-wing agnostics living in Stonehouse, a village 22 miles south-east of Glasgow. He entered the University of Glasgow in 1911 and completed his M.A. (Honours) in Philosophy in 1917 with a dissertation on William James. His political activism and literary interests did not prevent him from re- ceiving a number of prizes in mathematics, political science and various subjects in philosophy. A bursary enabled him to work in the Moral Philosophy department at Glasgow until 1918. He then lectured at Cardiff (1918-1919), Glasgow (1919-1922) and Edinburgh (1920-1927) before his departure to Sydney.