Against States of Affairs

Against States of Aﬀairs “How thing are”, graduate course, spring term 2011 Philipp Keller, [email protected]

“[A] statement no more needs, in order to be true, to reproduce the ‘multiplicity’, say, or the ‘structure’ or ‘form’ of reality, than a word needs to be echoic or writing pictographic. To suppose that it does, is to fall once again into the error of reading back into the world the features of language.” (Austin 1950: 125) “My own ’states of aﬀairs’ are directly descended from Anderson’s propositional view of reality.” (Armstrong 2001)

States of affairs as thick particulars, universals as gutted states of affairs “I do not think that the recognition of states of affairs involves introducing a new entity.” (Armstrong 1978a: 80) “One’s first response to this is naturally extremely negative: are there two constituents involved or not? If so, how can they fail to be distinct terms? If they are distinct terms, how can they be ‘tied’ together except by a relation? It is no good simply talking about non-relational ties: or, to put it another way,one philosopher’s solution is another philosopher’s problem.” (Campbell 1990: 15) “The universal is a gutted state of affairs; it is everything that is left in the state of affairs after the particular particulars involved in the state of affairs have been abstracted away in thought.” (Armstrong 1997: 29) In response to the criticism of Devitt (1980: 98) that his account renders exemplification obscure, Armstrong (1980: 109–110) claimed that while we can distinguish the bare or ‘thin’ particular from its properties and the unexemplified universal from its exemplifications in ‘thick’ particulars, neither can exist without the other. The thin particular is the “thing taken in abstraction from all its properties” (1978a: 114), the particular “taken apart from its properties” (1989b: 95), it is “the particularity of a particular, abstracted from its properties” (2004: 105).1 The thick particular, on the other hand, is the “particular taken along with all and only the particular’s non-relational properties” (1997: 124). It is the state of affairs of the (thin!) particular’s having all its non-relational properties ‘enfolded within’ it (1989b: 95), the particular “with all [its] (non-relational) properties upon [it]” (1997: 176). It is the thin particulars that stand in internal relations, but only their thick counterparts necessitate them. Armstrong, however, also holds that internal relations are necessitated by the existence of their relata:

I mean by calling a relation internal that, given just the terms of the relation, the relation between them is necessitated. (Armstrong 2004: 9, but cf. also p. 116)2

1Armstrong (1997: 109) says it is “the particular abstracted in thought from its non-relational properties”, but then later makes it clear that he means all properties (1997: 123). Armstrong (1989b: 95) and Armstrong (1989a: 52) say that the thin particular still has some properties: though thin, it is still clothed and not bare. It is not clear, however, what these properties might be. They are not the essential properties, for the thin particular ‘taken together with’ its essential properties is interme- diate between the thin and the thick particular (1997: 124). Presumably, the thin particular has just its formal properties, like being a particular . If we arrive at our concepts of thin particulars by ‘partial consideration’ (1997: 109), then their properties would be those we cannot subtract even in thought – which makes their nature dependent on our powers of abstraction. 2David (2005: 144), in spite of the many quotes given above, only ﬁnds this notion of “internal relation” in Armstrong and calls it “a bit non-standard”.

1 This, I think, is a mistake, because it turns truthmaker internalism into the claim that truthmak- 3 ers, being ‘thick’, have all their intrinsic properties essentially. The individual horses are minimal truthmakers for the truth that at least one horse exists (2004: 55) only if every horse is essentially a horse.4 This applies quite generally: the ‘non-relational tie’ of exemplification between a particular and its intrinsic properties, for example, has to hold “given just the terms of the relation”, i.e. given the particular and the property.5 “Anon-relational tie between distinct things is pretty mysterious. Seemingly, if the things are distinct then the tie is a relation. If the tie is not a relation then they are not distinct. So a non-relational tie could hold between distinct things only if they are not distinct. That’s how it seems at first. Still, we need the tie if we want universals and particulars.” (Baxter 2001: 449) This means that states of affairs do not explain the relation of exemplification, contra, e.g., Linsky: “The notion of a fact is introduced precisely to provide an explanation where others just provide truth conditions. Facts are deemed necessary in order to show what it is for an object to have a property.” (Linsky 1994: 193) Armstrong is much more cautious: Armstrong (1997: 114–115) says that we need states of affairs because something “is needed to weld [universals and particulars] together” and Armstrong (2002: 33) holds that the acceptance of states of affairs helps us avoiding the problem of explaining exemplification. States of affairs rather presuppose that we can already make sense of particulars and universals combining into entities that exist if and only if a corresponding proposition is true. They do not, contra Armstrong (2004: 24) provide the “ontological connection between subjects and predicates” but presuppose that such a connection has already been made.

Non-mereological composition States of affairs render exemplification otiose Armstrong (1997: 118). At the same time, however, they make it mysterious by turning it into a form of non-mereological composition. By truthmaker necessitarianism, a’s being F must exist if and only if a is F. If “F a” is a contingent predication and F a genuine “one over many”, then a and F could both exist without the other. More importantly, they could both exist without being related by the relation of exemplification. Accepting unrestricted composition, their fusion would then also exist, but not the state of affairs. So the state of affairs cannot be the fusion. Because he thinks exemplification is not a relation (more on this later) and because there is nothing else than a and F that a’s being F could plausibly contain, Armstrong concludes that states of affairs are built out of their components in a non-mereological way, a method of constitution which is such that different things can be constituted by the same components.

3It also means that Armstrong (2004: 23) is wrong to claim that “for every truthmaker T , the truth has T as its unique minimal truthmaker”. Only ‘thin’-T is minimal with respect to this “simplest of all truthmaking relations” (Armstrong 2004: 6). ‘Thin’-T , however, is a mere abstraction from states of affairs, not itself a state of affairs: if the world is a world of states of affairs, ‘thin’-T does not exist. 4Cf. Fox (1987: 194), Restall (1996: 332) and Lewis (1998). This essentialism about intrinsic properties has to be extended to merely possible entities: If the minimal truthmaker for “there are no unicorns” is the totality state of affairs that all ‘horse- like creatures’ lack ‘unicorn-making characteristics’ (Armstrong 2004: 36,76), then merely possible unicorns are essentially horse-like and essentially have the ‘unicorn-making characteristics’ (the horn, presumably). 5Of exemplification, Armstrong said in 1978 that “it is interesting, but somewhat saddening, to notice that the great modern defenders of transcendent universals, Moore and Russell, do not even consider this problem of the nature of the relation between particulars and Forms to which Plato gave such close attention.” (1978a: 67) It is interesting, but somewhat saddening, that the same can be said of the great contemporary defender of universals: if we distinguish, with Sider (1995: 368), the relation of ‘thick instantiation’ (the relation ‘thick’-a has to F iff “F a” is true) and ‘thin instantiation’, neither of them can play the role of a contingent tie between a and F. The first holds necessarily if it holds at all, i.e. it does not allow for contingently true “F a”. The second is a “cross-categorial unity”, “the most puzzling unity of all” (Armstrong 2004: 267), which makes for a unity in diversity which is “literally inexplicable” (Armstrong 1978a: 109).

2 Armstrong (1989b: 84) maintains that it is possible that the conjunction of some properties has, when exemplified, more causal powers than the sum of the causal powers of each property when exemplified alone. Therefore not properties alone, but properties taken together with the particulars that exemplify them, account for causal powers. Armstrong (1989a: 89) thus concludes that states of affairs are the ‘natural’ candidates for the terms of causal relations. (Cf. Armstrong 1989a: ix): The conjunction of a’s being F and b’s being G is different from the conjunction of b’s being F and a’s being G, whereas both states of affairs have the same constituents.The example is from Lewis (1986: 108–109) and designed to show that the problem arises not only (as Armstrong seems to have originally thought) with non-symmetrical relations.

Structured universals Armstrong (1978b: 69): a universal w is a structural universal if every x that has w has a proper part y that has some universal z, where z ≠ w and y’s having z is, at least in part, constitutive of x’s having w. (cf. Friesen 2006: 288) Armstrong (1997: 35) identifies the state of affairs of a particular exemplifying a structural property with the fusion of the states of affairs of its parts exemplifying the relevant component properties. The problem with that line, however, is that the complex state of affairs, supervening on its conjuncts, is an ontological free lunch, even though it contains as one of its (non-mereological) parts a complex universal which is not the mereological fusion of universals contained in one of its parts. This seems truly a generation of something out of nothing. The complex universal is not only not a fusion of its components, but it also contains other parts:

It may be necessary,in order to give the correct structure of a particular complex universal, to specify whether the particulars involved are identical, wholly distinct or standing in part/whole or overlap relations. (Armstrong 1997: 37)

If extension is a structural universal, then simples extended for more than the minimal instantiated length are impossible (Friesen 2006: 289).

References Armstrong, David M., 1978a. Nominalism & Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism,Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Armstrong, David M., 1978b. A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific Realism,Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Armstrong, David M., 1980. “Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 440–449. Reprinted in Mellor and Oliver (1997: 101–111) Armstrong, David M., 1989a. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Armstrong, David M., 1989b. Universals: An Opiniated Introduction. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Armstrong, David M., 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Armstrong, David M., 2001. “Black Swans: the formative influences in Australian philosophy”. In Broogard, Berit and Smith, Barry, editors, Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and Irrationality, number 29 in Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, pp. 11–17. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky Armstrong, David M., 2002. “Truth and Truthmakers”. In Schantz, Richard, editor, What Is Truth?, pp. 27–37. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter

3 Armstrong, David M., 2004. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Austin, John Langshaw, 1950. “Truth”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Supplementary Volume 24: 111–128. Reprinted in Austin (1961: 85–101) and in Austin (1979: 117–133) Austin, John Langshaw, editor, 1961. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock Austin, John Langshaw, editor, 1979. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3 edition. Edited by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock Baxter, Donald L.M., 2001. “Instantiation as Partial Identity”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 449–464 Campbell, Keith, 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers David, Marian A., 2005. “Armstrong on Truthmaking”. In Beebee, Helen and Dodd, Julian, editors, Truthmakers, pp. 141–159. Oxford: Oxford University Press Devitt, Michael, 1980. “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’”. Paciﬁc Philosophical Quarterly 61: 433–439. Reprinted in Mellor and Oliver (1997: 93—100) Fox, John F., 1987. “Truthmaker”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 188–207 Friesen, Lowell, 2006. “Natural Classes of Universals: Why Armstrong’s Analysis Fails”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84: 285–296 Lewis, David K., 1986. Philosophical Papers, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press Lewis, David K., 1998. “The truthmakers (review of Armstrong (1997))”. Times Literary Supplement,13.02.98 4950: 30. Reprinted as “Aworld of truthmakers?” in Lewis (1999: 215–229) Lewis, David K., 1999. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Linsky, Bernard, 1994. “Truth Makers for Modal Propositions”. The Monist 77: 192–206 Lowe, Edward Jonathan and Rami, Adolf, 2009. Truth and Truth-Making. Stocksﬁeld: Acumen Mellor, David Hugh and Oliver, Alex, editors, 1997. Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press Restall, Greg, 1996. “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 331–340. Reprinted in Lowe and Rami (2009: 87–96) Sider, Theodore, 1995. “Sparseness, Immanence, and Naturalness”. Noûs 29: 360–377