January/july 2012 • Issue no. 22 www.jwc.nato.int

The magazine of the joint warfare centre The three sw rds Stavanger – Norway

Schriever Wargame 2012 International

EXCLUSIVE Security Challenges of the Future

Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan

HEADLINE The Royal Visit His Majesty King Harald V of Norway gave NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre a visit during STEADFAST JOIST 12 Information Operations vs. Targeting + Norwegian Reflections on Arctic Issues Joint Warfare Centre 2014 and Beyond

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 1 JWC Public Affairs Office Cover _ Design by PO Box 8080, Eikesetveien Brandon Chhoeun, 4068 Stavanger, Norway Assistant Technician, Tel: +(47) 52 87 9130/9131/9132 Media Simulation Section, Internet: www.jwc.nato.int Joint Exercise Division, Joint Warfare Centre.

January/July 2012 Listed in order of appearance: Will the New Security Challenges be NATO’s Future? • JWC 2014 and Beyond • JWC Observer/Trainers – Helping the Commander’s Staff Succeed • TE 12/01 - UE 12-2 • STEADFAST JOIST 12 • JWC Legal Office and its Operations • A Royal Visit 6 – King Harald V of Norway visits JWC • Organisational Culture – Does it Matter? • Schriever Wargame 2012 International • The Arctic – A Norwegian Perspective • The Special Forces in Afghanistan • Information Operations vs. Targeting • JWC’s New Live Broadcast Studio

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61 48 CONTENTS Photo: Fredrik Refvem, Stavanger Aftenblad

The Three Swords

JWC PAO: CDR (SG) Helene Langeland, RNOR N The Three Swords is the Joint Warfare Thanks Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A Centre’s authorized magazine published three Brigadier General Steven J. Inci Kucukaksoy, NATO Civilian times a year by the Public Affairs Office. It DePalmer, US AF Bente Heill Kleven, NATO Civilian presents a compilation of articles, editorials, opinions, news and general information related Forsvarets Mediesenter Editors to the Centre as well as a variety of key defence Inci Kucukaksoy and security issues. Opinions expressed in this CPO Valerie Guyoton, Bente Heill Kleven magazine are those of the authors and do not FRA N, JFC Lisbon necessarily represent the policies and points of Layout view of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to MSgt Herbert Berger, Inci Kucukaksoy edit or shorten submissions. DEU A, JWC

2 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 FOREWORD

Major General Jean Fred Berger French Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

his new edition of the The upcoming year will keep us on the Three Swords magazine is stage and under the light. Three main events dedicated to NATO and the Joint will sequence our track through 2012-2013: Warfare Centre (JWC) for 2014 and beyond. The intent is to draw • The JWC will co-direct, together with some perspectives on how the JWC shall sup- the JCWC, the ISAF 12-02 exercise to support Tport the Alliance and the Nations on training ISAF and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) pre-de- and concept development by adapting its de- ployment training. liverables and own processes. • Steadfast Juncture, to be held in Reflecting on my first year in charge, I see November in Estonia, will provide the oppor- this new Three Swords delivery as an opportu- tunity to implement the new Skolkan scenario nity to come back to what has been achieved, and to support JFC Naples’ own Joint Task what the strengths of the JWC are and what the Force HQ concept development. vision of its own future is. • Steadfast Jazz 13 will combine First, as the future is always grounded in CPX, CAX and LIVEX in entering its actual the past, I would like to remind everyone what building phase, and will for sure challenge both the JWC has achieved over the last year. ACO and ACT.

• Although not directly involved in Operation Unified Pro- In the longer term, the JWC, while complying with its mission to tector (OUP), the JWC did provide three staff officers to rein- provide support to ACT, will also continue its efforts in other fields force the various headquarters conducting the operation. Moreover in order to prepare and shape the future. This contributes to its cred- and mainly, the JWC contributed to the OUP through the training ibility and ability to deliver high quality training and integrate new provided to key staff three months before the operation started. capacities. The JWC is to support ACT in the transfer of training and Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, who commanded the mission in the design and implementation of a new training concept. This in Libya, acknowledged that he and his staff would have lost energy, will lead us to go back to the basic MC 5-10 and maybe to draw a time and quality in planning had they not been trained by the JWC new delineation of responsibilities between ACT and ACO on the in Stavanger. one hand and between the NCS and the NFS on the other. • The JWC has successfully integrated the Afghan transition is- sues in its deliverables. The exercise conducted in Grafenwoehr last • The JWC will maintain its contribution to the integration of March boosted cooperation and mutual understanding with our U.S. new capacities through exercises and simulation. counterparts and partners of the Joint and Coalition Warfighting • The JWC is also to feed ACT’s effort to develop new concepts Center (JCWC, Suffolk, VA). This can be seen as a major achieve- such as Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative, which ment that sets the conditions for the post-ISAF training deliveries. are the framework of NATO’s transformation. This is a permanent • Finally, the JWC successfully contributed to the ACT and task for the JWC Strategic Advisory Group (SAG). This group has al- NATO transformational effort to implement the new NATO Com- ready identified what could make up the JWC training offer for 2014 mand Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS). and beyond. This continues to develop and will root ACT’s training concept to be defined by the end of this year. I want to pay a tribute to JWC personnel for their dedication, avail- ability and professionalism. They can be legitimately proud of what Together with JWC personnel, I am determined to and will carry the has been achieved. We have no room, however, to sleep on our lau- effort of adapting the JWC’s deliverables, organization and processes rels. A lot is still to be done, and the Programme of Work for 2013, to the new environment in order to meet the challenges of 2014 and 2014 and beyond with the effective transfer of training to ACT will beyond. The forthcoming period will be challenging for the Alliance not lighten the load. I must say I am happy with this, as it shows that and our Nations as we will continue to have a more and more dan- we are more than ever relevant to NATO, useful and appreciated by gerous world. The JWC will adapt to match the NATO Level of Am- our customers. bition now and in the future.

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 3 4 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 Opposite: The glorious landscape of Norway – Brigadier General DePalmer at the Kjerag Boulder in Stavanger where the rocks drop 1,000 metres on both sides. Below: Brigadier General DePalmer with Lieutenant General Stoltz at the special VIP luncheon in honour of His Majesty King Harald V of Norway; the General participating the ISAF pre-deployment training event in Grafenwoehr, Germany; Mrs and Brigadier General DePalmer at a formal reception at JWC; the General playing football with the JWC football team.

A Farewell to JWC and Norway

t is hard to believe my fam- Approach, by leveraging a variety of expert NATO’s focal point for full-spectrum joint ily and I depart the JWC and beauti- organizations. All of this was accomplished operational level training, will contribute to ful Norway at the end of July. It seems while transitioning from 286 billets to 250 the success of all future NATO operations. like only yesterday I was learning the and moving into our world-class training Future changes to the NATO Command Ibasics about ISAF events, STEADFAST ex- facility. As we review our Programme of Structure and the Chicago Summit initia- ercises, and NATO’s operational planning Work over the past two years each of us can tives suggest more challenges ahead. How- processes. I want to thank each JWC mem- truly be proud of these results. ever the JWC’s ability to deliver high quality ber for their contributions to our success All of these accomplishments are due exercises secures our reputation and feeds a over the past two years. to the outstanding talents of our JWC team. growing list of NATO and national HQs re- Under the leadership of Lieutenant Every day I appreciated working with our questing JWC expertise and assistance. General Wolfgang Korte and Major General NATO civilian corps as well as officers and Finally, I want to acknowledge the out- Jean Fred Berger we increased the already enlisted from 20 different Nations. It was standing support from our Host Nation. It is high reputation of the JWC by expanding humbling to lead and partner with JWC here in Norway that our family has soaked the robustness of our STEADFAST exer- professionals who know and enjoy their in the most glorious landscapes, breathed cises and ISAF events. We doubled the ISAF jobs, who believe in their value to NATO, the freshest air and met the most charitable training throughout by forging partnerships and who speak multiple languages. I have people on the planet. We have made lifelong with the Joint and Coalition Warfare Cen- fond memories of finishing our many ISAF friends here in Norway and look forward to ter in the United States and the Joint Force and STEADFAST events knowing we over- returning to the High North and the JWC Training Centre in Poland. We increased came huge challenges to help other NATO community again. Until then best of luck and the intensity for STEADFAST training au- personnel prepare for their future missions. Godspeed. TUSEN TAKK. diences by improving our instruction and And I admit to feeling extreme pride for delivering the new SKOLKAN scenario, the JWC when senior leaders of Operation complete with cyber, space and missile de- UNIFIED PROTECTOR told me, face-to- Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer fence challenges. We continued to define the face, how the JWC’s training and expertise U.S. Air Force leading edge of NATO’s CAX capabilities, directly contributed to their success. we launched NATO’s first large-scale virtual I am convinced NATO will continue to JWC Deputy Commander and network, and we led the way in new NATO play a leading role in Europe, North Amer- Chief of Staff concepts, to include the Comprehensive ica, and the entire world. And the JWC, as 12 August 2010-23 July 2012

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 5 NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

CHICAGO SUMMIT, 20-21 MAY 2012 NATO

«The future belongs to the agile, not to the stolid.»

 EXCLUSIVE Will the new security challenges be NATO’s future?

By Dr Jamie Shea NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General of the Emerging Security Challenges Division

During the past 25 years, those analysts who have special- ized in NATO have had to become experts in far away places that were rarely on NATO’s radar screen during the Cold War: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the Gulf of Aden. This is be- cause out-of-area operations have been the Alliance’s primary, and certainly, most visible activity. Moreover, NATO’s post Cold War transformation has been largely driven by the need to prepare for, carry out and then learn the lessons from large scale and very costly overseas deployments. NATO’s new Strategic Concept largely re- flects this evolution with its emphasis on multinational capabilities, deployable headquarters and command structures, civil-military coordination of effort, and giving global partners more participa- tion in the planning and conduct of operations in exchange for their contribution of forces. When NATO governments look at the relevance and added  BIOGRAPHY: Dr Jamie Shea is Deputy Assistant Secretary GenD- eral for Emerging Security Challenges. His former duties include value of the Alliance today, they think largely in terms of a “force Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public multiplier” (President Barack Obama) or of a multinational com- Diplomacy Division (2003-2005); Director of Information and Press mand structure, which can quickly bring together the mixture of (2000-2003); Spokesman of NATO and Deputy Director of Infor- mation and Press (1993-2000); Deputy Head and Senior Planning multinational and national capabilities to conduct a land, sea or air Officer, Policy Planning Unit and Multilateral Affairs Section of campaign. Operations have certainly not been easy or uncontrover- the Political Directorate (1991-1993). Some of Dr Shea’s academic sial for the Alliance. Just think of the criticism of NATO for its delay titles include, but not limited to, Professor Collège d’Europe, Bru- in intervening in Bosnia, or for not anticipating Milosevic’s ethnic ges; Lecturer, Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent; Associate Professor of International Relations, American cleansing tactics in Kosovo, or for its shifting strategies and uneven University, Washington D.C. He is a regular lecturer and conference burden sharing in Afghanistan. Moreover, operations are different speaker on NATO and European security affairs and on public di- from the Cold War scenarios of the past in that they do not result plomacy and political communication and lobbying. Dr Shea is also in total success or total failure, but rather something in between. the Associate Editor of “Europe’s World”, a Brussels-based journal on international affairs. Jamie Shea was born on 11 September 1953 Even if NATO’s interventions have prevented worst case scenarios, in London. (Photo by NATO – Strategic Concept Conference, 7 July as in Kosovo or Libya, they have equally not produced the lasting 2009, Palais d’Egmont, Brussels.) peace, stability and prosperity that Alliance planners were hoping ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 7 for. Yet, at the same time, operations have failed or failing states at bay. Consequently, easy it is in modern societies for criminals given NATO a mission and sense of purpose if NATO will no longer be primarily defend- or merely disgruntled individuals to access at a time when the prospect of an Article 5 ing its populations abroad in future, it will software programmes free on the internet collective defence mobilization in Europe need to do it increasingly at home, and be to steal our credit cards and personal data, — the traditional mission — has been at an more visible in what the U.S. has termed or to build rudimentary explosives in their all-time low. “Homeland Defence”. home kitchens. In short, if the vulnerabil- This comes too from a recognition that ity of the information technologies, energy As the Alliance approaches 2014, attacks on NATO’s governments and their grids and mass transportation systems on the date for the end of its ISAF operation citizens are more likely these days to come in which we all increasingly depend is now the in Afghanistan, and as it sees its other de- the form of electronic malware through fibre main security threat, NATO has to widen its ployments in Kosovo, Iraq and the Medi- optic cables, or improvised explosive devices remit to bring these new challenges under terranean also wind down, the question is in mass transportation systems, or extreme its traditional notion of collective defence whether this current NATO business model weather conditions disrupting critical energy and solidarity. Otherwise, there is the dan- based largely on military operations under grids and infrastructure than in the form of ger that when NATO’s ISAF mission ends in NATO command and political direction tanks and infantry columns crossing NATO’s 2014, and if no new operation emerges in will still be viable in the future. borders. Interestingly, last year was the high- the near future to take its place, the Alliance In the past, when one operation came est recorded for insurance claims in response will lack a significant transatlantic security to an end, another was there to take over. to natural disasters. According to the Finan- project to maintain its recent high profile, Kosovo followed Bosnia, and Afghanistan cial Times, these disasters cost the global and to mobilize the resources and political followed Kosovo. But Libya is different in economy U.S. $ 570 billion and made com- energy of its Member Nations. Certainly that an initial Allied air campaign has not panies and government officials across the NATO will need to maintain interoperabil- been followed by a long-term stabilisation globe aware of their vulnerabilities to critical ity among its forces and a minimal multi- force on the ground. With declining public supply chains and production facilities often national planning and command structure support for long term nation building com- located in regions prone to earthquakes, tsu- to be able to generate an operation quickly, mitments and rapidly falling NATO defence namis and major flooding. if required. But should this be NATO’s only budgets, governments are increasingly turn- These “weapons of mass disruption” future mission? ing to short term expedients like drones, are not only the most likely threats; they Special Forces Operations and military as- are also the ones that our citizens are most With these considerations in sistance programmes to keep threats from worried about, especially as they see how mind, it was not surprising that NATO’s ►►►

8 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 New and old threats to security

With the exception far expended U.S. $ 3.7 trillions in respond- geographical boundaries or lack of recruits. of ballistic missile ing to the 9/11 attacks. Almost half of this None of these traditional constraints apply and weapons of mass sum has gone on the U.S. deployments in in the cyber realm where a computer is not Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall, this expendi- a weapon per se, but can have multiple uses destruction proliferation, ture represents no less that 25 percent of the for good or bad. So, the new challenges can- the new challenges are U.S. national debt. Clearly, security is not not be confronted through the mathemati- largely civilian. going to be a “budget neutral” activity for cal definition of a set of military forces (such a very long time, if ever again. So preven- as the old 1:3 ratio in Central Europe during tion and using more political instruments the Cold War) or by the threat of military to manage crises, particularly in their early retaliation. Moreover, these challenges may new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lis- stages, will no longer be simply desirable but not engage collective NATO defence and bon Summit in November 2010, also gave essential. solidarity as easily or as automatically as a the new security challenges a central place. This said, in adopting the new security Soviet tank thrust through the Fulda Gap. Terrorism, cyber attacks, the proliferation challenges, NATO was not just adding to its Only one ally may be affected by an energy of weapons of mass destruction, energy vul- shopping list. It was also presenting itself cut-off, or a cyber or terrorist attack. What nerabilities and environmental constraints with a number of cultural, organisational is the threshold for activating NATO’s Ar- were highlighted in particular. This was and conceptual challenges. First and fore- ticle 5 if a country is paralyzed for days but not because they cover all the new threats most, this is because with the exception of (for instance pandemics or organized crime ballistic missile and Weapons of Mass De- Above, clockwise (all photos are by NATO were not mentioned) but because these are struction (WMD) proliferation, the new unless mentioned otherwise) – New and old the areas where NATO’s essentially mili- challenges are largely civilian. Ninety per- security threats: Robots are used by Allied tary capabilities have some value to add to cent of the internet is privately owned and troops to help defeat IEDs in Afghanistan; a Royal Marine boarding team during OUP; broader international efforts. In addition, there are no national jurisdictions or 200 vulnerabilities of the information systems; the Strategic Concept also calls on NATO to mile territorial limits in cyber space. Equally, the alarming reality of homegrown terrorism: monitor and analyze the international en- governments cannot mobilize computers, or 52 people lost their lives in the London vironment in order to anticipate crises as a bandwidth to address a crisis in the way they bombings of 7 July 2005; vulnerabilities of the energy infrastructure; ISAF: NATO´s first step to better preventing them. can mobilize tanks or aircraft; nor can they largest ground and nation-building operation Research by Brown University in the rely on adversaries giving up the fight be- – Spanish and U.S. soldiers prepare to board United States estimates that the U.S. has thus cause of exhaustion, depletion of resources, a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in Afghanistan. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 9 NATO

With declining public support for long term nation building commitments and rapidly falling NATO defence budgets, governments are increasingly turning to short term expedients like drones, Special Forces Operations, and military assistance programmes to keep threats from failed or failing states at bay. Photo by ISAF.

Meeting the new security less successful — and with a higher degree they impact on each other and to identify the challenges will require of ability to attribute the sources of the at- triggers that can turn a local threat into po- NATO to adopt a new tack via forensics and freezing of the evi- tentially a major international headache. dence. So Allies have to develop a real un- business model. derstanding of how cyber space operates (as NATO’s new approach must focus on opposed to the more familiar notions of air, prevention, recovery and overall resilience. sea and land space): they must step up in- Yet this involves a second cultural shift. telligence cooperation on these threats and The NATO of the past was an Alliance that no equipment is permanently damaged and identify the critical infrastructure (whether had, generally speaking, an “all or noth- nobody is physically harmed? In this case, IT pipelines or grids) that need to be pro- ing” approach. Either the Alliance owned would NATO solidarity not apply more to tected, given the impossibility of protecting the issue almost entirely, being by far the helping that affected country to limit the everything. They must also better grasp the principal actor, or it stayed on the sidelines. damage and recover than to going to war on nature of hybrid threats. For instance, envi- Think of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or its behalf? Or, alternatively, would solidarity ronmental decay and illegal industrial waste Libya. NATO’s involvement and contribu- not apply more to trying to prevent these at- dumping off the coast of Somalia leads to tion were significantly greater than for any tacks in the first place, or denying the attack- a decline in fish stocks; Somali fishermen other actor, and for large portions of the er any benefit, than to responding collectively then resort to piracy which in turn drives up campaigns. Missile Defence is another area and with massive force after the event? insurance premiums for international ship- where NATO is totally in the lead in what In sum, meeting the new security chal- ping and leads to an expensive deployment is exclusively a military programme. Yet the lenges will require NATO to adopt a new of counter-piracy warships; the ransoms for great majority of crises today involve a very business model. Rather than rely only on the pirated vessels are taxed by the local ex- broad spectrum of actors and assets (po- deterrence and defence to ward off threats tremist organization, Al Shabab, which uses lice, intelligence services, emergency rescue from actors that will likely be more often the proceeds to buy arms and plan attacks, agencies, the private sector, citizen’s action than not non-state groups or lone individu- including hostage taking in neighbouring groups, Interior Ministries and other inter- als, NATO will have to operate on the prin- Kenya; this leads to hostilities between Ke- national organizations). There are currently ciple that attacks by these non-state actors nya and Somalia and to a Kenyan incursion over 30 different international agreements (many of them are anonymous) will inevita- into Somali territory, provoking regional and codes of conduct in the area of cyber bly happen. Security policy must therefore tensions. NATO has to not only understand security — and many more in the pipeline. be to make them harder to carry out and the threats individually, but also analyze how NATO can add valuable capabilities and ►►►

10 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 Smart Defence: The C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability is a multinational initiative delivering a vital capability to NATO. It allows the ten participating NATO Allies and two Partner Nations to collectively own assets that would be prohibitively expensive to purchase individually. Photo by NATO.

The city of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. NATO airlifted expertise in areas such as cyber, critical food and supplies following the disaster. (Photo: FEMA) infrastructure protection or counter-ter- rorism detection technology but it cannot play the dominant role. It has to accept to be part of the chorus rather than the lead- ing tenor or soprano. That means defining policies that not only support NATO’s own requirements but support the efforts of oth- ers and fit into an established international framework of norms and cooperation (for instance making NATO’s use of cyber de- fence or emerging technologies fit in with international humanitarian law or the laws of armed conflicts.) The Alliance also has to or police counterparts? Will the latter see Indeed, the public often thinks that security decide if it wants to be primarily a technical NATO, with its heavily military culture, as threats only exist in places where NATO has contributor, focussing on equipment, capa- a visible interlocutor? Will NATO be able to troops (and some people even believe that bilities and technology, or whether it wants run successful partnerships with industry in the threats exist because NATO deployed also to be a political actor, helping to define areas such as intelligent software, malware the troops in the first place). But the end of the new rules of the game; for instance con- detection, internet identification smart ISAF in 2014 should reduce the demands on fidence-building measures in cyber space or grids or new counter-terrorism technolo- the North Atlantic Council to direct opera- new forms of agreement to combat nuclear gies so as to steer industry towards NATO’s tions and free up time for more scanning of or other WMD proliferation. Moreover, if needs? In short, a permanent partnership is the horizon. NATO is to develop its niche areas, it will required rather than the occasional meeting More time needs to be spent analyz- need to interact more with the branches of when it is time to negotiate new contracts. ing global trends and harmonizing Allied government that have the main responsibil- Contractor support will increasingly be em- assessments. More time needs to be spent ity; for instance, Interior Ministries, cabinet bedded in NATO’s day-to-day activities and crafting common NATO positions and offices, intelligence services, police and In- in its contingency planning for a surge of locking in partners where possible. The re- terpol and Europol. capability to manage crisis situations. cent common NATO-Russia position at the When NATO HQ organized a meet- But no less important in these times of Biological and Toxin Weapons Review con- ing of the national heads of cyber defence financial constraint will be to analyze the ference in Geneva is an excellent example last year, a large number had never been to new challenges more systematically in order of such a proactive political initiative even NATO before. So, NATO will need to be to determine the most rational and cost-ef- between partners that have their differences able to reach beyond its traditional stake- fective approach to meeting them. This has in other areas. holders in the Foreign and Defence Min- to begin with an upgrade of NATO’s politi- Winston Churchill famously said, “Gen- istries and create a new operational and cal consultations and intelligence sharing. tlemen, we have run out of money. So now consultative network. Will the Foreign and In recent times, those consultations have we must think.” Similarly, NATO will have Defence Ministries agree to share NATO been too narrowly focused on the regions to track potential threats at a much ear- policymaking with their Interior Ministry where the Alliance is leading an operation. lier stage and achieve a more sophisticated ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 11 NATO

understanding of how hybrid threats are Ultimately, NATO’s goal is to develop a missile formed from the interconnection of trends defence capability to protect the Alliance’s such as terrorism, narcotics, or organized European populations, territory and forces. crime. Such an analysis in NATO can also help its Member States to identify the most cost-effective response to a given issue, which may not always be a military deploy- ment. For instance, is piracy best solved at sea or on land? Are private guards on oil tankers more useful than warships in the Gulf of Aden? Is training Somali coastguard and customs personnel a better investment than financing pirate tribunals in Kenya or the Seychelles? Can improved maritime surveillance help to compensate for a small number of available ships? It is by having the capacity to do this kind of assessment and cost-benefit analysis that NATO will 1 achieve better results, especially given that it is very difficult to reverse a military deploy- ment once it has been committed. The cost of military deployments can also outweigh the value of the strategic ob- jective that is being pursued. For instance, in Afghanistan most of the counterinsur- gency is carried out by a very small num- ber of Special Forces rather than the bulk of the stabilization forces. Or take another example. Billions of dollars have been spent by the NATO militaries to deal with the few seconds when an improvised explosive de- vice explodes in Afghanistan and with the resulting shockwaves against NATO troops and vehicles. But a different approach, such as the U.S. Operation Global Shield 2 3 in which the U.S. military works with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the 1: The Arleigh Burke class, guided-missile destroyer USS “The Sullivans” arrives at Marathi Pakistani Coast Guard to interdict the illicit NATO Pier facility for a routine port visit. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist maritime transport of chemicals, including Seaman Chelsy Alamina). 2: NATO Air HQ Ramstein, the operational headquarters for NATO’s ammonium nitrate and hydrogen peroxide, future territorial ballistic missile defence capability, passed a significant technical test on 4-5 only costs hundreds of thousands of dol- April 2012 as it conducted a series of simulated engagements using assets from across the Alliance. Picture shows the Dutch launch crew preparing the Patriot battery for firing. Photo by lars and can be much more effective. This is SHAPE PAO. 3: NATO Chicago Summit Ballistic Missile Display by Sgt John Small. what the military calls “moving to the left of the bang”: identifying the networks of or- ganized crime, technology, middlemen, and The creation of a new division on duplication of effort and to steer them terrorists that produce threats; and using the (Emerging Security Challenges) in the towards NATO’s key priorities rather than military, police, customs, intelligence ser- NATO International Staff in August 2010 as ends in themselves. vices, and scientific laboratories to disrupt has given this new area of NATO’s work a The Partner dimension has also become these networks at their vulnerable points. In distinct focal point. The new Division has increasingly important. Last May, NATO sum, a networked threat requires an equally been able to bring the rather fragmented Foreign Ministers in Berlin offered the Part- networked response; and one which can be strands of NATO’s previous efforts together ners an upgraded relationship based on an adapted as quickly as the threat metamor- in a more coherent whole, and then increas- expanded toolbox of cooperative activities phoses from one element (small arms) to ingly join those efforts up to the work of and more “28+N” consultations with those another (terrorist groups). other bodies such as the UN, OSCE, EU, Partners that have specialist expertise and and Council of Europe. It has also carried resources to contribute. Many Partners out a review of all its activities to cut down share a common vulnerability and interest ►►►

12 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 NATO

The new security challenges will increasingly test NATO’s posture and readiness, whether it is prepared and willing or not.

in dealing with the new challenges along- side the Allies (perhaps more than in con- tributing to out-of-area deployments). Con- sequently, outside interest in working with the Division is high and despite some politi- cal obstacles (such as the sharing of sensitive intelligence on cyber threats and method- ologies); NATO must build new coalitions The needs of Special Forces, especially of course, they dovetail with operational with Partners. It is also a way for Europe in the area of forensics and dedicated airlift, requirements, such as the need to develop and North America to push their norms are becoming more important. NATO’s ap- technology to counter the terrorist use of (for instance on a cyber code of conduct or proach to energy and environmental secu- improvised explosive devices in Afghani- confidence building measures) within the rity is also becoming more systematic, es- stan. Also some Alliance countries have broader international community. pecially in the area of critical infrastructure been sceptical of NATO’s legitimate role Over the past year NATO has chalked protection where we can build on much pre- or added value in dealing with these chal- up some successes in expanding its role on vious work in the field of Civil Emergency lenges believing that the response lies pri- the new security challenges. It has agreed a Planning and established best practices ex- marily with other bodies, such as the UN, new cyber defence policy and related action changes between government and the pri- the EU or Interpol, even though these bod- plan. These will bring NATO’s own networks vate sector. At the same time, the Alliance’s ies are often keen to cooperate with NATO under centralized, 24/7 cyber management, new strategic analysis capability has helped and acknowledge its expertise in key niche while allowing the Alliance to provide more the NATO Ambassadors to consult on cur- areas. Such concerns can only be dispelled immediate and longer-term assistance to its rent or potential crisis areas, to improve if the Allies devote more time to discussing Members in areas such as training, educa- their situational awareness and to iden- the new challenges and to agreeing coherent tion, systems configuration, intrusion de- tify how NATO’s many tools (partnerships, NATO policies that allow the NATO mili- tection and consequence management. Two training programmes, more integrated civil- tary and civilian staff to work more freely rapid response teams are being established ian/military planning, rapid response forc- and productively in areas where NATO’s ex- and the NATO Centre of Excellence on Cy- es) can be better used for crisis prevention pertise and added value are proven. ber Defence in Tallinn, Estonia, is conduct- and management — rather than being mo- Trotsky famously said: “You may not ing exercises, pooling information and ex- bilized only late in the day when the crisis like war, but war likes you”. Similarly the pertise and compiling a “Tallinn Manual” on has turned into a full-blown conflict. new security challenges will increasingly the status of international law in regulating So, the record after a year and a half is test NATO’s posture and readiness, wheth- cyber space. Cyber defence is gradually being a respectable one: but it is not yet fully sat- er it is prepared and willing or not. These incorporated into NATO’s defence planning isfactory. NATO will need to develop the new threats are good at identifying and and NATO exercises are rehearsing the pro- high level political attention and the holis- exploiting vulnerabilities and they adapt cedures and decision making cycles for as- tic approach needed to respond effectively and reorganize very quickly. In the future, sessing and reacting to cyber attacks. NATO to the emerging threats. It must define its no defence will work statically for decades has also conducted an in-depth review of the Level of Ambition in these various areas, on end, as nuclear deterrence and flex- political and military instruments to combat so that the practical work can move ahead ible response worked for NATO during the terrorism that it has employed since 9/11. It without reopening the discussion at every Cold War years. The future belongs to the is also revising its Defence against Terrorism corner. NATO cannot wait for the next en- agile, not to the stolid. So the new emerg- Programme of Work to look at training and ergy crisis or Estonian-type cyber attack to ing threats will force their way onto NATO’s process management as well as at hard core get its act together. These challenges are the agenda. It is better that we be prepared to capabilities such as force protection against future of collective defence. Inevitably, over overcome them before they overcome us.  improvised explosive devices (which kill and the past years dealing with NATO’s opera- maim more NATO soldiers than any other tions has taken up the greater part of the Al- weapon at the moment) and helicopter and liance’s time, at the expense of discussing Above: A NATO E3A Awacs aircraft; NATO’s aircraft survivability. other equally pressing challenges, unless, eyes in the sky. Photo by NATO.

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 13 Photos Valerie Guyoton

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT JWC 2014+

 Cover Story JWC 2014 and BEYOND

By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey, USA A Joint Capability Integration Division, Joint Warfare Centre

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) 2014+ approach. While we based our planning on The second major factor that indicated is our collective effort to adapt traditional military planning processes, we a need for change is the Alliance’s increased what JWC does and how we do it in re- removed or modified some of those steps. interest in operating within the context of sponse to changes in our strategic envi- In the process, we were able to understand Article 4 or Article 5 during joint warfare ronment. Major General Jean Fred Berger, much more about our potential capabilities exercises. This changes the intensity and Commander JWC, has established that our and capacities. Currently, we are developing complexity of the exercise and requires mission for 2014 and beyond is: a transformation campaign plan to allow adaptation of the bulk of our exercise tech- the Centre to meet the Commander’s vision niques. The current series of exercises, both Joint Warfare Centre provides NATO’s train- for JWC 2014+. the Cerasian series used for NRF training ing focal point for full spectrum joint opera- Using 2014 as the time horizon was the and the real-world data driven ISAF mis- tional level warfare. result of several influences. Most impor- sion rehearsal scenario, are set in a context tantly change of mission in Afghanistan will of COIN and Crisis Response. This has led The JWC 2014+ planning effort is intended lead a NATO mission set that will be smaller us to develop and perfect an exercise model to optimize our contribution to the Alliance in scale and different in scope than the cur- that provides accuracy and depth through in terms of providing joint operational train- rent Comprehensive Approach. This may iterative development of scripts. ing and integrating new joint warfare capa- reduce our requirement to support the Af- A shift to an Article 5 scenario will re- bilities into that training. It also recognizes ghan mission and allow us to rebalance the quire dynamic play by a thinking enemy that this needs to be done in an environ- Centre in response to a variety of changes in that seeks to get inside the Observe, Orient, ment of constrained human resources and the NATO environment. There are several Decide, Act (OODA) loop of the NATO finances. JWC 2014+ began as an attempt to internal and external issues that were im- Commander and employ the full arsenal of answer the Commander’s questions about portant in starting us on the road to 2014+. a modern joint force. We realized early on how the JWC should proceed on a number While change of mission in Afghanistan in our analysis of this change that we would of specific issues, such as defining our Pro- was the most visible of those, it also is the need to change the way we plan and run gramme of Work, and reinvigorating efforts source of the biggest variable that still exists exercises and the way we structure our EX- to integrate new joint capabilities, like cyber in our plan because until decisions are made CON. It will also intensify the focus on joint defence, into our exercises. As we did our about NATO operations beyond 2014, it is warfare and on component operations while analysis, we came to the conclusion that the difficult to plan our exercise commitments simultaneously changing the Joint Force’s issues were interrelated and the implications in any detail. To account for this and retain role in the Comprehensive Approach. of them were so profound that our Strategic flexibility, we made reasonable assumptions. The third major factor was that our Advisory Group (SAG) needed to reassess We also analyzed our capacity to respond to training audience changed. The reform of JWC’s strategic direction. a variety of scenarios for our yearly work the NATO Command Structure and the Because this was a question of institu- plan. This will allow us to inform strategic NATO Force Structure (NCS/NFS) reduced tional strategy, we took an interdisciplinary decision making at the appropriate time. the number of Joint Force Commands but ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 15 JWC 2014+

reduced defence resources across the Alli- ance we need to be predictable in what we ask of our host nation. Advance planning and coordination with the Norwegian Min- istry of Defence is an important responsibil- ity for us and for the training audience.

What is JWC 2014+? JWC 2014+ began in January with the con- duct of a mission analysis adapted to reflect the needs of an institutional rather than an operational headquarters. The JWC senior leadership dedicated considerable time to working to better understand our strategic environment, to define our own strengths and weaknesses, and to determine what op- portunities and challenges we would face in the future. We also supported the Com- mander in developing his Vision for JWC. Former Commander of NATO’s Libya Operation Unified Protector, Canadian Air Force In January 2012 we convened several Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard and Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander JWC, dozen JWC members and conducted mis- at the Forward Coordination Element (FCE) Seminar, 1 February 2012, Stavanger, Norway. sion analysis. There were three major out- Read more about FCE on pages 35 through 40. Photo by Lt Col Markus Beck, JWC PAO. comes of the mission analysis. The first was a definition of the JWC key tasks, and the arguably has increased the number of head- also to joint transformation. In order to second was a new mission statement for the quarters that need joint warfare proficiency. meet the pressing requirements of support- JWC in 2014. These allowed us to develop NATO’s Level of Ambition is to be able to ing the Afghan mission and because of the our third major outcome, which was objec- simultaneously conduct two Major Joint Op- PE reductions, it has become very difficult tives for transforming JWC to achieve our erations (MJOs) and six Smaller Joint Op- to pursue transformational efforts such as “2014 and Beyond” mission. We updated erations (SJOs). In theory, this would require integrating new capabilities into exercises, our tasks for 2014 to reflect how we could the ability to generate eight headquarters or conducting experiments, and making a sig- support NATO’s needs within the means a smaller number of headquarters, which nificant contribution to the NATO Lessons and capability of our likely future human, could oversee multiple, simultaneous opera- Learned process. With further manpower physical, and financial resources. tions. The training relationship between the cuts coming to our JCID, we have been JFCs and JWC is largely understood and is looking for ways to prioritize the use of our The updated tasks are: evolving along mutually agreed upon lines remaining resources in order to give NATO • JWC provides operational level but the impact of other commands potential- the highest payoff within the context of the joint training in support of ongoing ly having a joint role is still being determined. JWC mission. NATO’s progress on cyber de- operations; The new requirement for Maritime fence and missile defence drive the urgency • JWC conducts and supports collective Command to lead a naval-heavy SJO and of reestablishing our transformational role. training of joint and combined staffs Air Command to lead an air-heavy SJO, as Fifth, JWC and the government of Nor- of the NATO Command Structure and well as the potential employment of NATO’s way have been pooling and sharing key NATO Force Structure for MJOs and NFS Corps headquarters for an SJO, cre- resources long before the Smart Defence SJOs, integrating NATO Members’ ates a new need for training, and in some initiative focused attention on such coop- national capacities, regional security ways, it is a deeper need as these headquar- eration. Pooling and sharing requires syn- organizations´ initiatives and Partner- ters are not naturally joint in their staffing chronization of the use of shared resources, ship for Peace (PfP); or in their day-to-day operations. It is not such as the lodging facilities at Madla. Dates • JWC provides key leader training yet decided exactly what the exercise rota- for the JWC to use Madla to lodge training capability; tion to support this new structure is, but the audiences must be agreed at least 18 months • JWC supports adherence to joint opera- current planning effort will allow us to in- prior to execution to allow the Norwegian tional warfare doctrine and standards; form this decision with a realistic estimate Ministry of Defence to integrate our needs • JWC assists the developmental and of JWC capacity. into their capacities in an efficient way that experimental work of ACT on new The fourth issue driving JWC transfor- does not compromise their own govern- concepts, technologies, modeling and mation is our need to get back to our full ment’s needs. This is not always conducive simulation; role as a warfare centre, which means that to providing a training headquarters with • JWC performs joint analysis, collects we contribute not just to joint training, but flexibility in scheduling events. At a time of lessons learned and feeds them back ►►►

16 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 JWC 2014+

into the transformational network decreases, JWC can provide a reservoir of The Joint Warfare Centre’s through the JALLC. knowledge that preserves this costly and most visible and important valuable experience and transmits it to fu- Our new tasks required new ways of doing ture generations of leaders. task remains the conduct business. In order to move us in the right Key Leader Training is a task that we of joint exercises. direction, Major General Berger established had given a lot of attention to now that Iraqi an intermediate objective and an objective Key Leader Training (IKLT) has success- for 2014 and beyond. Our intermediate ob- fully completed its mission. Having worked jective for 2012 and 2013 is: myself in NATO Training Mission-Afghan- real-world joint operations every day. They istan (NTM-A), I have looked at options for have the best view of the cutting-edge of joint Adapt from being largely a training centre to Afghan Key Leader Training from a variety operations and best practices. What they are being NATO’s joint warfare centre. of perspectives. As much as I would like to doing today will not be written into doctrine see a JWC directly working with the Afghan for a considerable time. Leveraging their ex- Our long term objective for 2014 is: leadership, our capabilities do not match up pertise through the use of a small number of well with their needs. Our skill set does not trusted agents who develop exercise injects A powerful joint warfare centre efficiently de- align with areas where they would benefit and events, in cooperation with JWC exercise livering a training and transformation capa- from NATO training. Unlike in Iraq, the de- designers, provide the greatest training ben- bility, meeting the NATO Level of Ambition velopment of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) efit. Additionally, NATO headquarters sup- and integrating emerging concepts. and Ministry of Defence (MoD) at the Min- port each other by providing Subject Matter istry level is not a mission that NATO has Experts and EXCON members to make pos- A major change Major General Berger agreed to take on. sible the training of their peers. wanted to see in our tasks was a reinvigo- The Afghans are building a Ground ration of our transformational tasks. As we Forces Command, which is more akin to What can JWC deliver in 2014+? drew down from a Concept Development an enhanced Land Component Command One of the most important and difficult Division to a smaller, concept-integration rather than a fully joint headquarters. At the questions we have addressed in our efforts Division, we lost the capacity to drive the tactical level the Afghans have the Capital is what will JWC’s capacity to conduct exer- development of NATO concepts. This re- Division and five Corps Headquarters, as cises and integrate capabilities be in 2014+? quired a redefinition of our tasks from “de- well as parallel structures for their police Based on our current analysis and our as- veloping concepts” to integrating mature and border forces. The Corps Headquar- sumptions about the future, the answer is: concepts into our exercises, in order to help ters are comparable to the NATO division three exercises and a key leader training drive the evolution of NATO joint warfare. level and are involved in combat operations event each year. The JWC will also be able to This means we need closer partnership with throughout the year. Their training needs integrate two to three mature concepts each those elements of ACT and ACO that are can better be met by partnership with the year into these exercises to maintain our actually developing new joint doctrine on Regional Command Headquarters. The one transformational role in NATO as a warfare everything from Missile Defence to Com- place we have identified where the JWC centre. Obviously, we are looking for ways prehensive Approach. can make a significant Key Leader Training to do more with what we have but until A related task was to support the main- contribution is by becoming Officer Direct- some change occurs this capacity estimate tenance of NATO’s warfare doctrine and ing the Exercise (ODE) for Pyramid and allows us to inform decision making. standards. This is a shift from our past focus Pinnacle. We are currently considering Coming up with a capacity estimate has and is important because NATO seems to be options for becoming the ODE and looking been complex because the greatest volume moving from a period of intense operational into the implications. of work involved in an exercise is conducted involvement across large areas of the globe, The JWC’s most visible and important outside of view of the training audience and to a period of strategic reset and consolida- task remains the conduct of joint exercis- includes highly technical issues that are of- tion. JWC can help preserve the deep pool of es. It is important for decision makers in ten only understood by only a few key per- operational knowledge that currently exists. NATO to understand that JWC was pur- sonnel who provide a service to the larger Today’s officer and senior NCO corps con- posely designed as a facilitator, rather than exercise community. One key take away of tains a group of leaders with broad and deep as a provider of joint exercises. The JWC the process is that the PE was not designed knowledge of how to conduct the kind of requires a collaborative network of exercise to allow the JWC to deliver an exercise, but operations we are involved in Afghanistan, partners. The quality and complexity of the rather to facilitate the delivery of the exer- in counter-piracy, and in other operations exercise is directly related to early and ro- cise by drawing experts from across NATO such as Operation Unified Protector bust involvement by the training audience including from the training audience HQs. (OUP). The pool of leaders with first-hand headquarters in developing their objectives While this structure allows JWC to provide experience in preparing for and conducting in the current exercise construct. This may an exercise larger than its PE could support, high intensity combat operations is much seem counter-intuitive but the expertise on it also creates a bill for other parts of NATO. smaller. As the force structure of NATO operations in Afghanistan is in Kabul, not militaries shrink and the operational tempo in Stavanger, and the JFCs are conducting ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 17 «We contribute not just to joint training, but also to joint transformation.»

With this context we developed a series of shifted manpower from Concept Integra- schedule their military training around our capacity assumptions that are: tion to exercise planning. What we could exercises. JWC depends on access to the not do was provide the scenario support for same facilities that Norway uses to house • Nations will support the JWC PoW four exercises a year within the CAX team’s and support their forces. This provides a sig- with manning and funding; capacity and continue to update scenarios. nificant cost savings versus trying to com- • Sufficient external augmentation is Since losing the ability to adapt the exercis- pete with the oil industry for hotel space available to support Scripting and es to changes in NATO’s needs makes little and contracted services but limits flexibility Phase 3 Exercise Delivery (EXCON); sense, we are limited by manning to three on the timing of events. • Training requirements for a Com- exercises a year within the JED. Finally, we determined that if we went mand and Control HQs in Afghani- The Joint Training Division (JTD) is the much beyond three exercises a year we stan in 2014 and beyond can be sup- part of JWC that is most visible to the training would have to pull manpower from the ported by the equivalent of two SJO audience and is on the road much of the year. JCID to backfill other parts of the HQs. This events/year; They are structured to support one event at a would have the negative consequence of re- • Current JWC manning levels will re- time and also need to have significant prepa- ducing or even eliminating JCID’s ability to main consistent for the foreseeable fu- ration time to deliver the level of training the bring new capabilities into the exercises in ture (80-85 percent manning targets); training audience has a right to expect. This an intelligent and meaningful way. Around • Sufficient funding accompanies as- limits them to about three exercises a year. the margins of the exercises and the integra- signed exercises; The case of our Simulation, Modeling and tion mission we still appear to have the ca- • No substantive changes to the exercise Computer Division was more complex. Their pability to conduct key leader training event planning process outlined in NATO primary limitation is driven by time required that is less manpower and CAX intensive Bi-SC 75-3; planning cycle for SJO ex- to arrange outside CIS support and the sig- than a full exercise if we can very carefully ercises will be defined; nificant reset time needed between events to deconflict the yearly schedule of events. • High demand-low density expertise/ reconfigure computer networks and the exer- Centre of Excellence augmentation is cise CAX system. This led to the conclusion From NDMAA Report: available to support PoW; that again about three exercises a year was «In general, it is understood that JWC • Article 5 scenarios will reduce “cut their capacity. There is a significant unknown and JFTC cannot cover all existing areas and paste” ability and require more factor in that we are only using the new fa- that need to be trained within their PE. deliberate planning early in the exer- cility at Jåttå for the first time now and need The training centres need to be looked at cise cycle; to better understand what it takes to recon- as facilitators for the training and will al- • 50 percent of Phase 3 training occurs figure it between exercises. Additionally, the ways depend on a number of SMEs from at the JWC; 100 percent of MEL/MIL NATO agencies that are an essential part of other NATO HQs, COEs or Nations on at Scripting Conferences at the JWC. the exercise team are undergoing reform. It top of their own expertise.» is not yet clear what impact this will have on Based on these assumptions, we built a their future contribution to exercises. Capability Integration in JWC 2014+ number of models and used them to test Another key component of our capacity Major General Jean Fred Berger was very our capacity in each area of JWC. Within analysis was the Support Division. What we clear in his planning guidance that it is not Joint Exercise Division (JED) we found that found was that because of our dependence sufficient for the JWC to be merely a train- theoretically, with perfectly deconflicted on the Norwegian MoD, a key limitation ing centre, but that it has to reinvigorate its exercise planning and execution events, we is the need to schedule exercises at least 18 transformational role as a warfare centre. could support four exercises a year if we months out to ensure the Norwegian’s can This wider utility will enable us to use our ►►►

18 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 exercises as vehicles that allow operational or campaign will be supported by a detailed us with greater confidence that our exercise HQs to implement and build on new NATO plan that provides a clearly articulated end play is coherent with emerging doctrine and capabilities in a sophisticated, controlled state, and specifies, prioritizes and sequenc- capability, and therefore of greatest value to and low-risk manner. This is a challenge as es the events necessary to achieve this, and the training audience. Furthermore, this ap- ISAF training had subsumed a significant maintains a clear audit trail of our activities. proach is wholly in keeping with the Com- proportion of JCID manpower in exercise The first capability to be dealt with in this mander’s intent to raise our profile and planning roles and the JCID itself continues way is European territorial BMD, which credibility as a warfare centre. to shrink as part of NATO’s move to lower builds on existing work done for Theatre manning levels. BMD. This campaign has two main strands Conclusion To resolve this dilemma JCID spent of activity, which are being developed in JWC 2014+ is an ongoing process and par- several months reviewing its internal pro- parallel. The first and more obvious is the ticipation is sought from throughout the cesses in order to deliver its outputs in the introduction of BMD-related play to the JWC and from our partners in the joint most systematic and streamlined manner. STEADFAST series of exercises, starting exercise community. All are invited to con- This included the production of a Standard with JUNCTURE 12. This is being achieved tribute to work currently getting underway, Operating Procedure (SOP) for the JCID’s with extensive support from experts within which includes: Capability Integration Process, which pro- the wider BMD community of interest, • Refining the exercise life cycle; vides a clear mechanism for the incorpora- who are helping to develop the BMD-spe- • Cooperating with Joint Force Train- tion of new concepts and capabilities into cific elements of our exercise scenarios and ing Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz on the JWC’s training events and exercises. contributing to incident development and the future of exercises; Coupled with this was the introduction of scripting workshops. • Analyzing the sufficiency of exercise a process to analyze emerging concepts and The second and arguably more impor- infrastructure; capabilities and prioritize them within the tant strand of work is the creation and sus- • Developing a written Concept of Op- JCID’s Programme of Work. This objective tainment of an appropriate level of BMD erations (CONOPS) for 2014+; and integrated approach enables us to dif- expertise within the JWC. This involves • Developing new ACT concepts to ac- ferentiate between a wide range of emerging providing specified individuals with BMD count for the transfer of many training and often high profile capabilities, some of training such that they can represent the and exercise roles from ACO to ACT. which have not yet reached a level of ma- JWC’s interests within the BMD commu- turity that justifies their inclusion in our nity and can contribute meaningfully to Working together we will succeed at the exercises, so that the JWC can provide the ongoing work in areas such as doctrine and mission of providing NATO’s training fo- operational-level training audience and training development. This enhanced level cal point for full spectrum joint operational NATO as a whole with the best return from of involvement will bring a wide range of level warfare and maintain leadership in the investment of our limited resources. In benefits. These include making us less de- both training and transforming NATO’s the near term, JCID will focus its capabil- pendent on external assistance, while at the joint headquarters.  ity integration efforts on European territo- same time making us better able to direct rial Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), cyber specific requests for assistance in areas such (Above-from left): CAX operators during SFJT defence and supporting the new Compre- as doctrine, capability and simulation when 12; Colonel Carl Giles, Chief Joint Exercise hensive Crisis and Operations Management required. Greater engagement within the Division, speaking at a SITCEN wrap-up during exercise SFJT 12; JWC Auditorium Centre at SHAPE. BMD community also allows us to main- during SFJT 12; JWC Observer/Trainers’ In line with this more structured ap- tain accurate situational awareness of the meeting with Colonel Timothy Bishop, Chief proach, each capability integration project BMD programme, which in turn provides Joint Training Division (JTD).

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 19 Your role may APPEAR thankless, but if you are willing to give it your all, you just might bring success to those who outlast you.

JWC OBSERVER/TRAINERS helping the commander’s staff succeed

By Colonel Robert Hatcher, USA A Chief Training Support Branch, Joint Training Division, Joint Warfare Centre

he Joint Warfare Cen- we can explain why their “foot soldiers” are NATO’s concept development and experi- tre (JWC) deploys and em- traipsing around Europe and asking for your mentation efforts. TheseS MEs aim to de- ploys dozens of military officers valuable time and resources. liver quality training so that the HQs will around NATO to conduct exer- reach their training objectives. Your success Tcises on behalf of Allied Command Trans- JWC mission is our success. If that is the JWC mission, formation (ACT) and Allied Command The JWC is NATO’s focal point for the full then it must have a strategy to carry it out Operations (ACO). These Subject Matter spectrum of joint operational level warfare. and the means to implement that strategy. Experts (SMEs) come from all corners of It is the Commander’s directed mission to I will state the strategy in its simplest our respective militaries, and the vast ma- deliver both training and transformational terms: JWC will send an SME where you are jority of them are assigned to the JWC. But, capability according to the NATO Level located. Whether you come to the JWC´s what is their exact purpose and how do they of Ambition, including emerging require- state-of the-art training facility or set up a carry it out? What do they offer you, as the ments. To that end, the command must de- DJHQ in a deployed location, that is where Training Audience (TA)? Perhaps it is best liver joint operational training for all types we need to be. The primary focus of this pa- to sort out what JWC intends to do, before of operations and simultaneously support per is the means by which we prepare our- ►►►

20 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 JWC 2014+

selves to be there and what we offer the TA. “Competency Triad” of a JWC staff officer occurring and then communicate in a man- So, who are the SMEs? ner that is helpful. In order to make their final preparations in their assigned role as Subject Matter Expert People are our greatest credential an O/T, the JWC has a defined set of pre-ex- JWC is similar to any other NATO Force ercise preparations outlined in our internal Structure Organization in its Peacetime exercise SOP and reiterated in a JWC pub- Establishment. Our officers are assigned to lished Training Team Handbook. One of the fill a job description written to specify our JWC critical elements for an O/T is a personal duties as members of the team. The pri- JOINT contact with the team and individuals they mary mission of an SME assigned to JWC’s and will be working with in an exercise. This MULTINATIONAL Joint Training Division (JTD) is to deliver OFFICER contact is made in advance of the exercise and support training at the operational and cycle and then enhanced through face-to- component command level. The core com- face contact during the exercise phases. petencies must be joint planning and execu- Observer/Trainer Operational Level tion processes and the provision of training, Training Team composition and advice, and mentoring to headquarters, staff organization teams, and individuals. Additional roles SMEs and O/Ts are not just members of JTD. could include exercise scripting, planning, that are very valuable to the organization JTD only has the capacity to staff roughly support to concept and doctrine develop- and to the TA taking part in NATO exercis- 70 percent of the Training Team (TT) that ment, and identifying lessons learned from es. The JWC therefore makes full use of this will participate in the exercise, so, obvious- these experiences. Preferable experience be- experience arriving in JTD, and across the ly, the O/Ts must come from other places. fore an assignment at JWC includes service entire command. The command employs Internally, we have SMEs assigned to other in some or all of these duties, and better yet, a mix of modular training techniques to portions of the command who can use their while deployed in operations! prepare an SME for an exercise. Individual functional skill such as CBRN, PAO, Theater Obviously, very few officers have all the training is conducted with NATO School Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) to name a above, and more often, we find that the basic Oberammergau (NSO), internally by SME few, and they are tasked to join the team. skills of tactical training, tactical skills, and sections, through self study, and through We also have a strategic partnership with tactical decision making are more prevalent Advanced Distributive Learning (ADL). the NATO Centres of Excellence (COEs) or in someone posted to the JWC than the Collective training is carried out with the other NATO Command Structure organiza- high-end expectations written in our job Observer/Trainers (O/Ts) assigned against tions and we recruit their help. Because the descriptions. So, we must develop this cor- an exercise through lectures and syndicate TTs are a temporary task force of experts as- porate knowledge. work on the same topics we emphasize signed for a specific mission, it is not pos- through STEADFAST series exercises, and sible for the JWC to maintain the depth and SME development then rehearsals and final training in the breadth of all possible requirements. Fortunately, many SMEs posted to the JWC warm-up period prior to an exercise. That Similar to a DJHQ, we must staff our do come with some of these qualifications, series of events is designed to elevate the TTs for the mission at hand. If the exercise including NATO and deployed experiences tactical oriented and experienced officer to became air component heavy, we would a joint and operational level, imbue them employ more air and targeting SMEs, and with NATO doctrine in their particular sub- be able to reduce the size of another less in- ject matter, and give them the O/T skills to volved component TT. Of course, we have a mentor and coach the individuals and teams basic model for our TT and this would be a O/T Pre-Exercise they will be working with and feedback ob- good time to discuss it. Preparation servations to the command for its use. This JTD assigns a Colonel (OF5) as the triad of knowledge forms the JWC SME into Chief of the Training Teams. That Colo- • Know the SOPs someone useful for assisting you. nel is responsible for the preparation and • Know the scenario and STARTEX synchronization of all the TTs assigned • Know your team O/T preparation to the JHQ and subordinate components, • Know your TA — individually The real preparation of an O/T is more de- most often including Air (ACC), Land • Know your Event Manager tailed than what I have already outlined. (LCC), Maritime (MCC), Special Opera- • Know your Grey Cell Support The O/T has to be an expert in the complete tions (SOC), Joint Logistics Support Group • Know your IM/CIS plan • Coordinated travel plans with package of joint and operational processes (JLSG), and Psychological Operations Task the team and TA for planning and decision making, and they Force (POTF). Each of those TTs is led by a • Have academic training ready have to be a NATO SME in a particular sub- Colonel or a Lieutenant Colonel (OF4) and for your TA ject matter. But, in addition to bringing this provided with functional and processes ex- knowledge to you as the TA, they have to be perts; plus, at least one analyst to assist the able to make their own analysis of what is TT Chief gather data from all the SMEs for ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 21 JWC 2014+

«O/Ts have a unique ability to help you see the entire collaborative process from strategic to tactical...»

JWC Observer/Trainers during exercise STEADFAST JOIST 12.

collective observations on the achievement group from JTD and so some face-to-face to the TA. An O/T will never test, examine of training objectives. coordination can begin. During Phase 2B, or evaluate your performance. O/T interac- Additionally, most TTs are assigned Crises Response Planning will begin in tion with the TA is generally more targeted a Senior Mentor (SM) through the NATO earnest. The team will deploy to your loca- and active coaching in the earlier phases of SM programme. This provides support and tion and join up with the staff counterparts. an exercise and evolves to more observation mentorship to the TA Command Group Operational Planning is an area that JWC and the recording of a successful comple- from a similarly experienced retired Flag maintains extensive and detailed knowl- tion of training objectives as we move to Officer. The SM also advises the TT on its edge and the O/Ts are a significant asset to Phase 3B. A staff team is always well served conduct and observations. These retired assist your staff. Many of the observations if they take advantage of the O/Ts at the end Flag Officers are a significant enabler to the are more than technical. O/Ts have a unique of an exercise and they conduct a frank and TT and JWC training program. ability to help you see the entire collabora- open internal After Action Review. tive process from strategic to tactical and Training Team actions their experience with Operational Planning, Other actors in your headquarters So, what does that mean for NATO’s war- several times each year, keeps them fresh on But who are all those other visitors in your riors assigned to NATO Command and the mechanics of planning and the Lessons coffee bar and creating longer ques at the Force Structure organizations? It means that Learned from previous exercises. In Phase dining facility? JWC is not the only entity O/T and TT Chiefs will make contact in ad- 1D Battle Staff Training and Phase 3A Force interested in the success of NATO organiza- vance of an exercise. They will research your Activation and Deployment, we again send tions conducting an exercise. Those COEs specific Staff Operating Instructions (SOI) a small team to assist and observe. Finally, that were mentioned earlier also have their or any stand-alone Staff Operating Proce- in Phase 3B Operations the entire team re- own research objectives in order to complete dures (SOPs) they may not already be fa- turns as the command executes its mission their mandates. There is also an Operations miliar with. During the Phase 1B Academic from a predetermined start point. Preparation Directorate (OPD) whose job is Phase of the exercise JWC will provide just a Most headquarters are receptive to to certify units assuming NATO Response few relevant SMEs for your exercise prepa- these intrusions because the O/Ts are com- Force duty. With so many units on your ration. There will always be a representative mitted to their success and offer assistance doorstep looking for information to insert ►►►

22 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 JWC 2014+

JWC Training Team

Chief TTs

TT JHQ TT LCC TT ACC TT MCC TT SOCC TT JLSG

ANALYST CHIEF TT CHIEF TT CHIEF TT CHIEF TT CHIEF TT

O/Ts O/Ts O/Ts O/Ts O/Ts O/Ts

ANALYST ANALYST ANALYST ANALYST ANALYST

in a NATO report it could appear threaten- ences. The relationship between OPD and ing to a staff. Frankly, we all want to put our JWC is significantly distinctive. OPD works best foot forward when we have a visitor and with JWC in exercise development to en- “An O/T is humble, helpful it is hard to work naturally and be receptive sure the TA will have opportunities to dem- and is continually learning.” when meeting someone new. This is where onstrate the processes and procedures they the early contact and the blue lanyards come must evaluate. During planning and execu- Brigadier General in. JWC wants to ensure they are viewed tion OPD may share insights with JWC to Steven J. DePalmer separately from the other agencies because ensure that the JWC has the opportunity to of the confidence we want to keep with our address a specific training requirement. As TA counterparts. We work hard to join the for all contact between JWC and these other training with you, so we pride ourselves on external agencies, JWC O/Ts vet all of their becoming part of the TA team. So how do professional observations through the Chief cies, many of which are contemporary top- they all work in the same vicinity and not of the Training Team and never allow their ics that our NATO Nations and Partners unnecessarily duplicate effort or become opinion on personal matters make their way would like to know more about. The JWC disruptive to the training? into conversations. JWC observations made SMEs will continue to find themselves in JWC appoints a Chief Analyst for each to external agencies are focused on the high demand, constrained only by time and exercise, and as the Officer Directing the Ex- achievement of the training objective and money considerations. ercise (ODE), the Chief Analyst coordinates not the detailed discussion of how it was ac- these external agencies in planning confer- complished and what we did in concert with The training audience is our the TA to assist them. raison d’être As a guiding rule, our mission sums up our The work never ends activities: the JWC will provide NATO the • The main role is to assist the TA An SME would like to think that he/she training focal point for full spectrum joint to meet their exercise Training could go back to the JWC and put their operational level warfare. In order to do so Objectives. feet up until the next exercise. Besides the we will continue to develop ourselves for fact that the next exercise is just around the service in exercises and transformational corner, JWC SMEs are in high demand for activities to ensure that NATO Command • The specific roles of an O/T include: other employment opportunities in NATO. and Force Structure organizations are certi-  Observation and assessment Because of our vast network and current ex- fied by meeting their training objectives. We  Training and coaching perience, the SMEs are involved in doctrinal will engage ourselves in NATO functional  Providing feedback and concept meetings held by SHAPE and expertise and joint staff processes, with a  Acting as a resource to help ACT, conferences, NSO delivery of train- pin point focus on comprehensive and col- find solutions ing, component level exercise assistance, laborative planning at the operational level.  Contributing to the success experimentation, and staff work to provide The JWC will provide feedback to the force of the TA input to all the above in the development of through training, exercises, conferences  Be available and be the myriad of documents governing NATO and official publications to ensure NATO a resource functional matters. The JWC has maintained remains fit for purpose in addressing 21st an active role in shaping warfare competen- Century security challenges. 

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 23 Training

TE 12 01 UE 12 2

ISAF TRAINING EVENT 12/01 UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 12–2

By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Robinson, USA MC Joint Exercise Division, ISAF Planning Team, Joint Warfare Centre

Photos by Richard Bumgardner, U.S. Army Europe PAO Lieutenant Colonel Markus Beck, DEU A, JWC PAO SGT Joseph Patry, FRA A, EUROCORPS PAO TRAINING

French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger (left), and U.S. Army Major General Frederick Rudesheim, Co-Directors of the Exercise UE 12-2 / TE 12/01, listen to a briefing held at Grafenwoehr Training Area at the U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany. Photo by Richard Bumgardner.

ROM 18 March to 05 April four-tier, multi-national, and Computer A total of 1,590 Training Audience (TA) 2012, U.S. and NATO coalition Assisted/Command Post ISAF MRX. Each personnel participated in the exercise. partners participated in Unified training command brought its own unique • HQ ISAF TA – HQ Force Command Endeavor 12-2 / International Se- and distinctive flavor to the CECG and Madrid and TCN personnel; Fcurity Assistance Force (ISAF) Training training provided. The following illustra- • HQ IJC TA – HQs EUROCORPS, Event 12/01 (UE 12-2 / TE 12/01) at Camp tion on Page 26 reflects the individual and NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Spain, Aachen in Grafenwoehr, Germany. The common capabilities and contributions that V (U.S.) Corps, and TCN personnel; mission for ISAF pre-deployment training each command brought to the exercise. For • Regional Command South (RC-S) TA during UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 was to train, re- future combined exercises, those common – 3rd Infantry Division; hearse, foster team building, and contribute capabilities must be leveraged such that the • RC-S Subordinate Unit TA – 3rd Sus- to the preparation of Standing HQs (SHQ), best practices from all training commands tainment Brigade, 30th Medical Com- Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) person- are refined and synchronized to improve mand, 89th Military Police Brigade, nel and units that will be assigned/attached overall quality and efficiency. and 411th Engineer Brigade. to HQ ISAF, HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC), Regional Command South (RC-S) and several subordinate brigade units. A total of 1,576 personnel from four training commands (Joint Warfare Centre/ JWC, Joint Force Training Centre/JFTC, Joint and Coalition Warfare/JCW, and Mis- sion Command Training Program/MCTP), along with elements from the 505th Com- mand and Control Wing came together to form the Combined Exercise Control Group (CECG). The CECG planned, deliv- ered and managed the execution of the four tiers of ISAF pre-deployment training from the United States, Germany, Poland, and Norway. Major CECG Training For the first time, four training com- Command Distribution mands were involved in a highly complex, ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 25 Training

Exercise Control Framework The major advantages gained by collocating and training HQ ISAF and HQ IJC TA together during UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 were team/relationship building, staff synergy while solving realistic and complex problems, and situational understanding of the dynamic and multifaceted ISAF environment.

Common training themes and sto- rylines across all four tiers of TA HQs were created where possible. Transition was the The illustration below shows all various model and then integrating both JCW and overarching theme for the exercise, along Training Audiences and Response Cells MCTP exercise constructs, the TA schedule, with several sub-themes such as force draw present during the MRX. The typical JWC depicted also on Page 28, was developed. down, Afghan National Security Forces ISAF TE Phase 2 Training Model (Crawl, (ANSF) development, ANSF in the lead, Walk, Run), integrating both JCW and The exercise’s operational envi- and enduring relationships post 2014. The MCTP exercise constructs, were utilized for ronment and scenario storylines were de- example on Page 29 illustrates how the pri- the exercise. Training commands and Subject veloped for conditions projected for autumn mary training theme of Transition and its Matter Experts all had various roles and re- 2012. NATO and U.S. training objectives associated storylines of ground logistics sponsibilities throughout Phase 2 (see right from HQ ISAF down to the brigade level lines of communication, security, detainees, portion of the top illustration on Page 28). were synchronized to create four distinctive, and re-integration ran through all echelons Beginning with the JWC ISAF TE but mutually supported battle rhythms. of command.

Training Audience Structure

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26 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 TRAINING

1

3

2 4

1: The JWC Exercise Control Organization with Major General Jean Fred Berger. 2: The CECG planned, facilitated, delivered and managed execution of the exercise. 3: Lt Col Zirkelbach, JWC Info Ops Subject Matter Expert, during a briefing. 4: Major General Berger during an interview with the editors of The Marshall Center’s “per Concordiam” magazine.

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 27 Training

Training Module

The major advantages gained by collo- date and capitalize key aspects of the MRX cating and training HQ ISAF and HQ IJC training programme, and reduce the over- TA together during UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 were WATCH EXERCISE MOVIE all length of future UE/TE exercises. The team/relationship building, staff synergy ON JWC’s YOUTUBE SITE! areas that require further refinement and while solving realistic and complex problems, enhancement by the training commands and situational understanding of the dynam- are the development of a truly CECG and ic and multifaceted ISAF environment. operational environment scenario/content, Bringing three separate training enti- the combined assessment of injects within ties together in such an ambitious manner the Joint Exercise Management Module, proved challenging, but through the chal- combined use of Subject Matter Experts and lenges many learning points have been Observer/Trainers, function of the Facilitat- noted for possible future combined MRX ed After Action Review, use of the replicated endeavors. Based on the trusting relation- HQ ISAF and HQ IJC portals and associ- ships and mutual understanding of how youtube.com/jointwarfarecentre ated HQ Electronic Working Practices, and each training organization (JWC, JCW, and the necessity of Battle Staff Training as a key MCTP) operates, we will be able to consoli- enabler to transition from Phase 2a to 2b.

Training Audience Schedule

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28 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 TRAINING

Exercise Design

The overall cost for NATO to support all to increase the overall quality of ISAF pre- The question, “Should we the planning activities and MRX was higher deployment training should not be over- train together?” (NATO than a normal ISAF TE held in Stavanger, looked. In this manner, economy of force is and U.S.) will always be Norway. This is especially true in the com- optimized in an austere budgetary climate puter information systems, travel, and na- while providing the best possible training answered with a “Yes.” tional per diem funding lines. However, environment to achieve training objectives. in light of shrinking national and military The question, S“ hould we train togeth- budgets combined with global threats tied er?” (NATO and U.S.) will always be an- to common interests, the importance of swered with a “Yes.” The five factors that will munities to continue the U.S. and NATO’s Alliance in ISAF should not be shape JWC’s future involvement in com- NATO coalition partnership; discounted. Additionally, sharing training bined UE / TE are as follows: III. Determine if future combined train- opportunities to capitalize on the strengths I. NATO and national funding; ing activities are suitable, feasible, and best practices of all training commands II. Determine the will of training com- and supportable; I V. Level of Ambition and support from ISAF HQs; V. Identifying Lessons Learned from UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 and applying corrective measures to improve future training.

Ultimately, the decisions taken by NATO Heads of State and Governments during the Chicago Summit will shape the strategic direction for Alliance members and TCNs in Afghanistan. Overall, the sheer magnitude of combining three differ- ent training command training mythologies and seven different training audience HQs for UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 proved challeng- ing. The overarching ISAF pre-deployment training mission to train, rehearse, foster team building, and contribute to the prepa- ration of collective and individual training JWC ISAF Planning Team was satisfied. 

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 29 TS ISAF TRAINING EVENT 12/01 UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 12-2

Interview Colonel John C. Valledor Exercise Controller, MCTP By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO «It is all about saving lives...»

Can you tell us about your current ous exercises, this exercise being a four-tier mission and role in this exercise? exercise has to harmonize the activities of I am the Chief of Contemporary Operating all these entities in one cohesive event. In Environment in the Operations Group of this fast-changing security environment, in- the Mission Command Training Program novation has materialized by leveraging the (MCTP). Here, our team trains U.S. Army skills, expertise and perspectives of the mul- commanders and staffs at the brigade level tiple players. Being a four-tiered exercise, we and above. I am responsible for exercise de- had to expand our knowledge base, look into sign, planning, and in partnership with the how our partners perform complimentary NATO and the Joint Staff – exercise control. functions, and then leverage best working In this exercise, I partner with two other ex- practices. So one of the things we found in- ercise controllers: one from the Joint Chiefs teresting is how we might be able to thread of Staff, and one from NATO’s Joint Warfare the needle together with a core task list that Centre. Together, we leverage the skills and affects the four commands at the same time. capacities of all our organizations to match That is where we are seeing an innovation. the tempo of the Main Event/Main Incidents The script writers and the event managers all List that is going into this exercise. In a nut- leveraging each other’s skills to ensure that a preciate media as an actor in the battlefield. shell, we do three things at the Combined particular inject, which may start at the high- If you are not taking advantage of the train- Exercise Control Group (CECG): we coor- est level of command, threads its way all the ing opportunities of an exercise like this to dinate, we anticipate and we verify exercise way through to the tactical level command- be adept in managing competing narratives, activities amongst exercise stake holders. ers in a seamless fashion. What we found then you cannot really do your job to inform Our function is to coordinate the activities out here is that if we remain open-minded, the public and the decision-makers back in of disparate organizations that are part of then we learn, and that leads us to become our nation states about what it is that we are this exercise. We make sure that the training a true learning organization. It is refreshing doing here and why it matters. scenario, which has been designed over the to see other ideas, perspectives and views course of the nine months, is injected into and then blend those ideas and perspectives What is your message to the soon- the CAX simulation to achieve the Com- into one cohesive approach. We have to look deploying staff? mander’s training objectives. Lastly, we help beyond our cultural differences and we have You have to listen carefully to the team mates the decision-makers to increase or change to guard against ethnocentrism and cultural that are currently operating in the theatre of the tempo of the exercise based on guidance biases that tend to become obstacles to any operations in Afghanistan. Take heed and from our interactions with the training audi- cooperation. I think about the fact that this value from their experience. Once you get ence as well as with the Senior Mentors. is all about the maintenance of the Alliance. into the theatre, you have to gain situational Someday the mission in Afghanistan will understanding rather quickly. You have to What makes this exercise unique? end, and what we do not know is what un- master the electronic information environ- I guess if you put one word to describe this foreseen crises are laying over the horizon. I ment. Do not forget that military service is exercise it would be holism, in that for the like to leverage the effective partnership that about leadership. And if you find yourself as first time we are looking at the entire frame- exists in this exercise so that, when those un- a member of a staff, you are still a leader. And work of the commands operating in the known contingencies materialize, we can still lastly, at the end of the day, this is all about theatre of operations in Afghanistan. We support and strengthen each other. saving lives: whether it is the life of a soldier are training soldiers and leaders from the on patrol or the lives of innocent Afghans tactical level through the intermediate level; What is the importance of media who find themselves in the middle of this the operational level; the ISAF Joint Com- training? conflict, it is all about saving lives. So, if you mand (IJC); all the way to the strategic level, What we learned over a decade of fighting in can take heed, step back, and reflect on these where we have ISAF. So, again, unlike previ- Iraq and Afghanistan is that you have to ap- points, then I think you will do OK. 

30 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 JWC 2014+

Connected Forces through Collective Training

By Colonel Clayton Goya, US AF, Joint Capability Integration Division, Joint Warfare Centre Published first in ACT’s Transformer Magazine

he ability to meet fu- resentative of the majority ture challenges in an un- of NFS air components who predictable global environment may become responsible to can be achieved with the skilled execute NATO’s MJO LOA of Tcoordination of long-term initiatives and 1,000 sorties a day. This im- strengthening of a collective training frame- plies an expected level of re- work. NATO’s Level of Ambition (LOA) is quired augmentation of fully to cope with two Major Joint Operations trained personnel that would (MJO) and six Smaller Joint Operations dwarf the standing staff it was (SJO) concurrently outside the area of re- intended to complement. sponsibility. This is on paper. To make it In addition, the current become reality, the Joint Warfare Centre is fiscal environment creates in a unique position to observe Joint Force definite challenges for NATO to maintain proper training and integration in NATO’s Command (JFC) and Component Com- the expertise and infrastructure to ensure collective training arena. mand headquarters capacities and capabili- the Joint Force and component HQs receive Given a Peacetime Establishment that ties. It is one of the objectives of the STEAD- the proper level of collective training and limits the ability for Components of the FAST series exercises and we observed that exercises. NCS to internally form an embryonic war- the most successful HQs have been the ones fare centre to execute their collective train- that could quickly integrate staff augmen- Improve realism of training ing, exercise and warfare integration is tees into their organisation. For NATO to be more credible and effec- difficult. An alternative is for a Nation to tive, robust collective training and exercises specialise in a domain-specific (land, air or Success may teach a lot challenging the Joint Force and Component maritime) warfare centre by converting an Despite NATO’s recent success in Operation HQs are required. This training must stress existing national centre and partnering with Unified Protector (OUP), where both the internal and external HQ interac- a specific component. Other Nations, as staff augmentees comprised a significant tions expected during both Article 5 and well as the NATO-accredited Centres of Ex- percentage of the HQ staffs, it appears that non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. cellence (COEs), could then cooperate with there is still a gap between the observed ca- Therefore, NATO must build a collective the lead Nation to provide expertise and pabilities of our component-level HQs in training framework dedicated to warfare benefit from these domain-specific capabili- the current NATO Command Structure and integration as the foundation to accomplish ties. These ideas are definitely long-term ini- those estimated necessary to fully support its robust LOA. tiatives requiring further refinement. How- the ambition quoted above. To achieve this vision of robust collec- ever, by strengthening its collective training OUP provides a good basis for illustra- tive training and exercises, NATO must framework NATO can match its robust tion. The air component responsible for the improve its capabilities to match its LOA. A LOA to meet the future challenges of an un- campaign, manned with personnel drawn single organisation at the Joint Force level predictable global environment.  from a large standing staff and heavily aug- as well as warfare-specific organisations mented, was challenged to conduct 24/7 (land, air and maritime) at the component- operations and execute approximately 120 level will be tasked to work cooperatively to For NATO to be more sorties a day – which is about a third of the achieve vertical and horizontal integration maximum production of a SJO (defined as at the component level and above. credible and effective, 350 sorties per day). Currently, the Joint Warfare Centre robust collective As another example, in the most recent executes the collective training and exer- training and exercises Steadfast Juncture 2011 exercise, cise requirements at the Joint Force level. challenging the Joint the NFS air component was supplemented However NATO should consider building Force and Component by augmentees outnumbering the core staff domain-specific warfare or integration cen- to support a sortie generation rate less than tres, either internal to, or partnered with, HQs are required. half that of OUP. This manning level is rep- NCS Component Commands to ensure

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 31 Editor’s Note: After this article was written NATO changed the Deployed Joint Headquarters (DJHQ) concept to be called the Joint Task Force (JTF) concept.

JFC Lisbon, DJHQ Concept and Exercise Steadfast Joist 12

By Major Mesut Yurtdan, TUR A, JFC Lisbon Deputy Chief PAO

«If NATO did not exist, it would have to be invented, because countries with shared values and a shared history of close cooperation can best address [these] problems together.»1 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General

s a result of revolu- First, “broadening NATO’s thinking on designed to meet previous requirements tionary developments crisis management” will include NATO in- need to be revised, not to say re-configured. in communications and tech- volvement at all stages of a crisis. Second, Real life experiences, like Operation nology, we are living in a very introducing cooperative security as a new Unified Protector (OUP), proved Adynamic and changing environment. In core task will not only “bring a proactive that the new Strategic Concept should re- line with this continuous change and global stand towards achieving increased interna- flect in the military as soon as possible. If economic challenges, the definitions of both tional harmony and cooperation and syn- the new strategic concept was not ready, “it “threat” and “security” began to be rewrit- chronizing efforts to deal with the new mul- would have to be invented” under the pres- ten. Nations and organizations try to ap- tidimensional threats” but also provide a sure of the ever-evolving and intertwining preciate the new security environment and better understanding of common problems. characteristics of the crisis. transform related processes and institutions In addition to broadening the core tasks, the The main action undertaken at NATO’s accordingly. All the way back since its foun- new Strategic Concept highlighted the need military level under the Strategic Concept dation, NATO has been aware of the neces- for a more effective, leaner and affordable Al- is the Allied Command Operations (ACO) sity to evolve, viewing transformation as a liance Command Structure as a must, given Reform Process. With the ACO Reform continuous process in order to stay relevant the reality of economic challenges. Process, which will end up with only two in an ever-changing world. The new flavours of the new Strategic operational level deployable Joint Head- The latest milestone for transformation Concept require a change of mindset, espe- quarters, the Alliance is looking to use the of NATO is the new Strategic Concept de- cially at the military level. Answering new clared at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. While threats while cooperating with other actors in (1) “A New NATO for a New World”, maintaining commitment to collective de- a more comprehensive way will require flex- Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, November 2010, fence, NATO’s response to the new security ible and deployable military functions and http://huffingtonpost.com. Above: Operation environment is twofold. constructs from head to toe. The constructs Unified Protector, Canadian Air Force. ►►►

32 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 TRAINING

entire spectrum of its capabilities to create CEUR with more options in pursuit of early balance of kinetic and non-kinetic actions; an effective, leaner and affordable Com- success. The DJHQ model is, therefore, de- (3) Efficient performance by the entire HQ mand Structure. The need for a new model signed to be responsive and is built upon staff as a team, regardless of location. for deployment detailing how to respond to realistic and achievable readiness criteria to a crisis came to light during the planning for ensure sustainability while taking account New Deployability Concept requires the aftermath of the ACO Reform Process. of possible national constraints. change of mindset In practical, the closure of the Force Com- The DJHQ concept is based upon a The new deployability concept contains mands Madrid and Heidelberg is tanta- stepped and scalable model that provides many challenges. First of all, a change of mount to crippling the Deployed Joint Staff options for progressive deployment of ca- mindset within NATO and its Member Element (DJSE) Concept. TheD JSE concept pability “blocks”, each of which combines Nations is required regarding training and can be used only with the ready-to-deploy the qualities of operational functions that personnel’s perspectives. The requirement staff resourced from out of the operational can be tailored to the mission and situa- for Joint Force Headquarters personnel to level headquarters. After the closure of the tion. Each capability block of the DJHQ be prepared and held at various states of Force Commands, their functions must be will require a pool of trained personnel readiness, available to form each mission- passed on to operational level headquarters. from which to draw the operational func- tailored capability block, lies at the heart of Keeping this in mind, with a leaner and tions required by the mission and situation. the DJHQ concept. Without this change of affordable Command Structure, it is clear The capability blocks will provide different mindset, the new deployability model will that NATO’s involvement in a crisis will re- functions to address evolving needs. These be difficult to apply. Training will enable quire flexibility, adaptability, effectiveness, functions will vary from creating the first personnel to be ready to deploy. But, on the readiness and responsiveness. This should operational footprint in-theatre or creating other hand, nations should be aware of the be the key driver of the new deployability situational awareness to providing the full requirements of the deployability, that is, model. To fill this conceptual gap, JFC Lis- suite of capabilities required to support the national caveats should not preclude the ap- bon was tasked to work on a deployability Commander’s Decision Cycle, thus allow- plicability of the model. model, namely the Deployed Joint Head- ing the designated Commander to exercise Second, as compared to the limited and quarters (DJHQ) model, to be used in the command and control from in-theatre. predefined stages of deployment in the DJSE new command structure, and utilize the Forming a seamless, functional head- concept, the new deployability model brings already planned Steadfast Joist 2012 quarters despite distributed and changing in several options of deployment, making (SFJT12) as a test bed to gauge some of the locations will be possible only with a robust gradual deployment possible. On the other elements of this model. Command and Control interface. The flex- hand, gradual deployment brings additional ibility of the DJHQ lies in the adaptability challenges together with the flexibility pro- DJHQ Concept of the employed reach-back and reach-for- vided to the operational level commander. Since each crisis may differ, flexibility and ward capabilities at each stage of the DJHQ The configuration of the processes and the adaptability will be key in understanding deployment depending on the nature and decision cycle during the gradual deployment the security environment and generating scale of the operations. As the Command- phases will require efficiency, fine adjustment a proper, balanced response at the neces- er’s Decision Cycle is projected into theatre, and featured Communication and Informa- sary time, avoiding undesired develop- the robustness of the interaction system- tion Systems (CIS) infrastructure starting ments. This will only be possible with a atically increases, growing from an initial from the very early stages, even before the Command and Control structure standing footprint to full Command and Control ca- Deployment Order. The equipment required ready-to deploy and respond together with pability in theatre.The DJHQ concept places to support such a deployability scheme needs the tactical level elements. From an opera- several challenges on Joint Force Headquar- to be scalable and easily reconfigurable. tional perspective, an early understanding ters that will implement a deployable model In addition to these, a robust and resilient of the operational environment and build- resourced from within their own staff. The Information Management framework will un- ing situational awareness are required to Commander’s Decision Cycle and how it derpin the success of the operation. Starting make preparations relevant. An early visible is executed were reviewed and updated in from the planning phase, Information Man- NATO footprint will provide an opportunity order to accommodate the new challenges. agement will play an important role. During to demonstrate NATO resolve and commit- The JFC Lisbon concept development deployment, the information environment ment. Early influence in-theatre irrespective team reviewed not only the NATO docu- needs to be uniform and without fragmenta- of the location of the main command and ments on the Commander’s Decision Cycle, tion to enable shared knowledge. control functions and the operational level but also the exercise reports and Joint Anal- In addition to the in-service certifica- commander, will make it possible to shape ysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) tion mechanisms, another important point the environment and set conditions. reports from the Steadfast series of is timely evaluation mechanisms to allow The ability to react promptly and ef- exercises. Several changes were made to for the provision of up-to-date readiness fectively to a potential crisis, demonstrate the Commander’s Decision Cycle in order levels with respect to different specialties, a visible NATO presence and exert early to ensure: (1) Integration of Strategic Com- which may be necessary to enable realistic influence will provide the North Atlantic munications, making sure that actions will political decisions and military end states. Council, the Military Committee and SA- be aligned with messages; (2) An adequate And last but not least, real life support ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 33 Training

“Since each crisis may differ, flexibility and adaptability will be key in understanding the security environment and generating a proper, balanced response at the necessary time...”

for deployed forces from early stages on- wards takes careful planning. Depending on the level of host nation support, real life support may require a case-by-case precise assessment during the planning phase. It is worth to note that early involve- The Forward Coordination Element (FCE) Seminar from 1 to 3 February 2012, brought together ment of all JFCs under SHAPE’s leadership in Stavanger NATO’s top echelon military officers and a distinguished team of military/civilian clarifies concerns about the main challenge: Subject Matter Experts. The idea was to provide a venue that allowed for high-level discussions on the roles and responsibilities of the FCE, as the deployed element of the Joint Force Implementation. With all the arguments Commander. The function of FCE was tested for the first time during exercise SFJT 12. given, concept implementation will be no easier than concept development and test- ing. Since the DJHQ concept takes into mands due to OUP. From the very outset, would be provided not only by the JWC, account Lessons Learned taken from real JFC Lisbon was aware of the challenges. Its and JFCs Brunssum and Naples, but also the life operations and based on a realistic ap- agility and flexibility characteristics, which by the Component Commands. proach, it will provide the operational level were observed during SFJT 11 upon the In a very short period from September Commanders with the mechanisms they withdrawal of major partners due to the to December 2011, the DJHQ concept was need to be ready for real challenges. Libya crisis were in place due to the very further developed with the help of exercise limited time allowed for the preparations. and training events (Planning Conferences, Preparing for SFJT12 In June 2011 the Exercise Planning Academics, etc.). The development of the Preparing SFJT12 was a challenging task as Process started to move forward with the Concept together with preparations for the it happened in a period of upcoming chang- DJHQ, as the main aim of the exercise. exercise ended up with a very dynamic pe- es to the NATO Command Structure (NCS) However, for most of the involved parties, riod. As JFCs Brunssum and Naples will be and effects of real-life operations. The Ini- SFJT12 became a challenge due to their in- the two remaining JFCs in the new NCS, tial Exercise Planning process for SFJT12 volvement in OUP or their future role in the embedding them into the exercise became started early 2011. According to the initial new NCS. Having only JFC Lisbon and 1 necessary. This challenge was overcome plan, SFJT12 was at that point of time still GE-NL Corps to form a training audience with the substantial augmentation provided scheduled as an exercise based on the DJSE produced quite a lot of uncertainties. for the exercise. Planning conferences and concept, with JFC Lisbon providing the In summer 2011, JFC Lisbon received finally the Battle Staff Training (BST) in Lis- main HQ and Force Command Heidelberg additional SHAPE tasking that initiated bon enabled a successful integration. providing the main body of the Forward the development of the DJHQ concept. At The Planning Conferences of SFJT12 Element (FE). However, the execution of the SACEUR Commanders’ Conference in were all fruitful, not only for the SFJT12 SFJT 11, some months later, showed that the summer 2010, it was agreed to use SFJT12 exercise itself but also for the development availability of a Forward Element was not as a partial test bed focusing on the initial and maturation of the DJHQ model. a given fact. As the outline of a new NCS deployment stages as outlined in the new First, the idea of having the Forward started to become clear, the aim of the ex- deployability concept. Both the DJHQ Coordination Element (FCE) was devel- ercise started to focus on the DJHQ; not as concept development and SFJT12 exercise oped during the Planning Conferences of a concept, though, but based on the ad hoc preparations were then linked, with SFJT12 SFJT12. The FCE seminar, organized by the solution, already introduced for SFJT11, being an initial test bed, all fully supported JWC, resulted in a better understanding of given the unavailability of the Force Com- by SACEUR. It was guaranteed that support this concept and contributed to further de- ►►►

34 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 TRAINING

The JFC Lisbon enza, Italy) and civilian contractors. From tion. The level of attendance and willingness team is proud of the the civilian perspective, both Mr Victor of the augmentees supported the positive Angelo and Mr Paul LaRose-Edwards, who expectations concerning the future of the contributions to the brought in the expertise of the United Na- DJHQ Concept after the SFJT12 exercise. future NATO JFCs and tions and non-governmental organizations, After the high-level seminar mentioned their missions. The were happy to witness the progress at hand, above, FCE training conducted prior to ex- cooperation with other in cooperation with civilians and under- ecution in JFC Lisbon provided a technical NATO Headquarters, standing of the civilian aspects, which en- training opportunity to properly analyze abled comprehensive products. and refine the structure before testing and including SHAPE and JFCs SFJT12 introduced Gender Advisor interaction with the DJHQ structure during Naples and Brunssum, support for CRP. This support raised the the execution phase. NATO used the NATO made it possible to level of awareness of gender issues, thus Response Force (NRF) certification mecha- achieve a realistic and contributing to cultural awareness, as well. nism to test the new deployability concept. relevant model for future During the CRP, close cooperation between Steadfast Joist 2012 provided one of the Strategic Operation Planning Group the platforms to test some elements of this deployability needs. (SOPG) at SHAPE and the Joint Operation new concept. Because of the aim of test- Planning Group (JOPG) at JFC Lisbon im- ing, some elements of the DJHQ concept, proved the quality of the products. In ad- observations and identification of lessons dition, prior to deployment, the Joint Op- throughout the exercise are critical to the velopment of the SFJT12 training events. eration Liaison and Reconnaissance Team future work on the concept. So, SFJT12 Since the FCE was one of the elements tested (JOLRT) joined the JOPG and maintained participants concentrated at the same time during SFJT12, the observations and Lessons the level of cooperation after deployment on Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned Learned from the FCE Trainings enlightened so as to enable efficient and to-the-point processes. This effort will be managed by the future developments of this element. engagements, with the JOLRT providing ef- a group of specialists from JFC Lisbon, Second, starting from the Initial Planning fective contribution to the planning process. JALLC and OPD. Conference, the Intelligence Syndicate was Guaranteeing the continuity of efforts working on the planning of the knowledge since the beginning of CRP, the FCE will JFC Lisbon, which will find a place in the development processes for SFJT12. They merge with the JOLRT in theater. The OJ LRT historical records of NATO in accordance identified the need for a common interface Team Leader will become the Deputy of the with the ACO Reform Process, consoli- to enable users to share, search and request FCE Commander, and an adequate number dated its expertise and experience on new information or knowledge after realizing that of JOLRT members will continue to work threats and comprehensive solutions, and, having more than one database for different within the FCE to help maintain the level of contributed to the development and test- functions or areas causes the “knowledge us- awareness together with contacts and enable ing of the DJHQ concept. The JFC Lisbon ers” to replicate information from one system a smooth transition from the JOLRT to the team is proud of the contributions to the to the next. The efforts of JFC Lisbon Knowl- FCE. The BST was a great opportunity for future NATO JFCs and their missions. The edge Centre personnel supported by all staff the first trial of JFC Lisbon’s proposal H“ ow cooperation with other NATO Headquar- resulted in the Shared Knowledge Repository to do business” in the DJHQ mode. With ters, including SHAPE and JFCs Naples and (SKR). SKR is web-based software, still under more than a hundred augmentees, the BST Brunssum, made it possible to achieve a re- development, which provides an easy and served as an excellent platform to identify alistic and relevant model for future deploy- simple passage to knowledge by consolidat- lessons and build up the team for the execu- ability needs.  ing the main functions related to knowledge development. SKR shows the light to be the first step of the comprehensive knowledge development effort to be undertaken togeth- er with the other stake holders in theatre.

Testing the elements of the Concept: SFJT12 Crisis Response Planning (CRP) was con- ducted with the support of SHAPE (Mons, Belgium), Joint Warfare Centre (Stavanger, Norway), JFCs Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (Netherlands), ACC Izmir (Turkey), 1 GE- NL Corps Münster (Germany), MC North- The Grey Cell during during exercise STEADFAST JOIST 12, wood (UK), FC Heidelberg (Germany), whose members also took part in the FCE Seminar. Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Liv-

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 35 STEADFASTJOIST 12 exposureJoint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway Photos Valerie Guyoton

Training

Exercise Steadfast JoisT12 By Wing Commander Mark Attrill, he requirement for a cise (ODE) with responsibility for designing Royal Air Force new NATO Command the exercise and providing a suitable vehicle SFJT 12 Lead Planner Structure (NCS), to better to support the concept development, on be- Joint Warfare Centre reflect the ongoing changes and half of both the Allied Commands and the Tchallenges to the World’s security and mili- Joint Force Commands, who would ulti- tary landscape, was ratified during the 2010 mately inherit the concept. NATO Summit in Lisbon. In a somewhat This placed the JWC in a unique posi- With over 800 personnel cruel and ironic twist, the new structure tion to be at the core of early discussions confirmed the reduction of NATO’s opera- regarding the development work of the new spread across the tional Joint Force Headquarters capabili- concept. At the same time, the freedom of ties from three to two with the announce- movement, in exercise design terms, al- Training Audience and ment that Joint Force Command Lisbon lowed the JWC to examine the empirical would be closed by 2013. Shortly after this and anecdotal evidence gathered on previ- EXCON, coming from at news, it was announced the next NATO Re- ous NRF exercises with a view to influenc- least 12 different NATO sponse Force Exercise, STEADFAST JOIST ing and assisting with the new NCS develop- 12 (SFJT 12), would be used primarily as a ment work. We were further helped by the organisations, the new conceptual exercise to develop, assess and fact that neither the nominated Joint Force analyse key elements of the new NCS and Command nor any of the supporting Com- training facility was put in particular the deployable Command and ponent Commands required NRF certifica- Control capability. tion or formal training during SFJT 12. “to the test and delivered, Unlike previous NRF exercises, much To their immense credit and notwith- standing the future of their own Headquar- of the time spent at the early Exercise Plan- providing an effective ters, Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, ning Conferences involved gaining an un- and efficient venue Commander Joint Force Command Lisbon derstanding of the NCS development work (JFC Lisbon), supported by his Staff, agreed and how to support it through the exercise to successfully assess to be the “lead” agency for the concept de- design. Early challenges included a require- velopment and undertake the role of Officer ment to gain individuals’ understanding and analyse the NATO Conducting the Exercise (OCE). As always, that SFJT 12 would be a very different ex- the Commander Joint Warfare Centre was ercise to previous STEADFAST exercises, a Command Structure.” cast in the role of OfficerD irecting the Exer- phrase that would come back to haunt the ►►►

38 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 TRAINING

The FCE Seminar participants at JWC with Major General Berger, Lieutenant General Stoltz, General (Ret.) Ramms, General (Ret.) Dr Olshausen, Rear Admiral Bauza, Rear Admiral Gilday, Rear Admiral Ruehle, Major General Reynes Jr, Brigadier General Weighill, Brigadier General Beulen, former Ambassador Peggy Mason and Mr. Victor Angelo. The Seminar provided a venue allowing for high level discussions on the roles and responsibilities of the FCE.

Officer with Primary Responsibility (OPR) fective deployable Command and Control support both ACT and ACO in this trans- throughout the next 15 months! A second capability. The so-called Forward Coordi- formation effort and it is a privilege to be challenge was to determine where in the ex- nation Element (FCE) emerged from this at the core of this effort to develop the new ercise planning cycle to converge with the early work. The problem was determining NATO Command Structure”. NCS development work and take the exer- precisely where this new element would fit The FCE seminar thus provided us with cise design forward without detriment to in the new NCS and its principle roles and the opportunity to work closely with rep- either the concept development or the exer- responsibilities. resentatives from SHAPE, SACT and the cise. The NCS development work, of course, The questions posed by the creation of three Joint Force Commands and allowed would continue throughout 2012 and the this “new” element provided the JWC with the SFJT12 Exercise Planning Team to have exercise design was adjusted when possible. a natural culminating point to conclude the a sound basis to further plan and execute The early NCS concept development early part of the exercise design and plan- the remainder of the exercise. discussions and workshops determined ning process. An FCE Seminar was subse- Having overcome the early challenges that much of the existing structure could quently hosted by the JWC in early February associated with exercise design and adapt- be retained in one form or another albeit 2012 to provide a venue allowing for high ing to changes in terms of concept devel- with different terminology in true NATO level discussions on the roles and responsi- opment, the Planning Team were now pre- fashion. There was, however, one new piece bilities of the FCE, as the deployed element sented with further potential challenges. of the construct that attracted considerable of the Joint Force Commander. A secondary Exercise SFJT12 would be the first major attention and enthused many to think we aim of the Seminar confirmed the exercise exercise, of any type, to be hosted and run could collectively make a real difference to design and optimized the opportunity to from the new JWC Training Facility at Jåttå, NATO’s ability to provide an even more ef- use SFJT 12 as an effective assessment and following the closure of our more familiar analysis tool for the new NCS concept. training site at Ulsnes Naval Base north of The Seminar brought together a distin- Stavanger. In addition, JWC learned that guished group of senior NATO Command- the JFC Lisbon core staff, augmented from ers and military/civilian Subject Matter elsewhere within the NATO JFC structure, Experts, including General (Ret.) Sir John would deploy in entirety to Norway to ex- Reith, a former DSACEUR, Lieutenant ercise the early transition from the FCE to General Bouchard, former Commander the full deployed Joint Force Headquarters. Operation Unified Protector (Libya), UN As one can imagine the three month Special Representatives and Ambassadors. period between the FCE Seminar and the As Commander JWC stated in his open- culminating Execution Phase of SFJT 12 ing remarks the seminar allowed “the JWC passed very quickly. To accentuate the short to become an enabler in the concept devel- timeline even more, the JWC supported opment of the Deployed Joint HQ (DJHQ) two additional exercise events in Lisbon Sir John Reith model and the FCE. It is our mission to fully although these ultimately did much to pro- ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 39 Training

vide the entire training audience and Exer- cise Control (EXCON) staff with a useful in- troduction to the final phase of the exercise. Mindful of the administrative challenges that we were anticipating with a first use of the new training facility, it certainly helped to have an “away team” that were able to complete a highly efficient bed-in at Jåttå at the beginning of May in preparation for the all important test of concept. The new deployable HQ concept is based upon a stepped, scalable and flexible Command and Control model providing for a progressive deployment of Command and Control capability “blocks” each main- taining key operational functions tailored to the mission and situation. In order to fa- Lieutenant General Stoltz receiving media training from JWC’s media team cilitate this stepped approach, the FCE and DJHQ were physically separated upon their arrival in Jåttå with the FCE staff housed in Learned Centre (JALLC), and JFC Lisbon’s look to further development of the new con- a former bunker facility, to simulate their and JWC’s respective Analysis Sections, cept. The execution phase of Exercise SFJT “deployed” status with the remainder of provided broad coverage throughout the 12 appears to have been a success judging the Deployed JHQ staff accommodated in execution phase, assessing and analyzing a from an early assessment from Lieutenant the new JWC training facility. The first four wide range of processes and activities asso- General Stoltz who was quoted as saying days of the execution phase focused on pro- ciated with the new Command and Control “From my perspective, the Forward Coordi- viding the FCE Commander and staff with concept. Their collective efforts will prove nation Element achieved great results with the environment and issues that they would invaluable as ACO and the remaining JFCs a highly trained small core of staff working most likely encounter in the early in a simulated environment. During days of a Crisis Response Opera- SFJT 12 we were able to fully test the tion. The JWC remit was to deliver FCE’s ability to ‘connect’ and ‘under- a scenario that would assess the ef- stand’ whilst beginning to look into fectiveness of the FCE to prepare an the ‘preparation’ of the Initial Com- environment for the deployment of mand Element, as part of the scal- a more robust Command and Con- able C2 option”. trol infrastructure and a Joint Force. From a JWC perspective, with On the fifth day of the exercise, over 800 personnel spread across the FCE was subsumed into the full the training audience and EXCON, DJHQ, which then worked through coming from at least 12 different the early challenges associated with NATO organisations, the new train- the initial arrival of a Joint Force ing facility was put to the test and Commander into a Theatre of Op- delivered, providing an effective erations. There was a particular em- and efficient venue to successfully phasis placed on the management assess and analyse the NCS, neatly of the transfer of authority from summed up by Lieutenant General what was effectively a coordinating Stoltz as JFC Lisbon’s “lasting legacy function, to that of commanding an to the Alliance”.  operation through the deployment and employment of a Deployed Joint Headquarters. Another new element to The visit of His Majesty King Harald SFJT12, and key to its success as V of Norway occurred while the a conceptual exercise, was the so- exercise was running at the JWC with called A2R Community. This group 631 personnel. (Read about the visit of analysts, drawn from the Op- on page 48). Photo shows the author with His Majesty and Major General erational Preparation Directorate Berger, prior to the tour of the training (OPD), Joint Analysis and Lessons facility. Photo by MSgt Berger.

40 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 Training

 EXCLUSIVE SFJT 12: Commander’s Takeaways

By Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, FRA A Commander of Joint Force Command Lisbon

n stepping away from the with a highly trained small core of select NATO Response Force (NRF) individuals. During SFJT12 we were able certification process normally asso- to fully test the FCE’s ability to “connect” ciated with the STEADFAST JOIST and “understand”. In the next exercise, the Iseries, the Alliance has invested greatly in “prepare” task should receive more focus. this particular exercise to test portions of For this purpose, the FCE needs Component the new Deployability Concept. The main Command Advanced Party counterparts to premise of the new concept is that com- test its ability to prepare for the arrival of the manders have better flexibility in tailoring main body and component forces. the structure of a Joint Task Force Head- Turning to the JTF HQ, my impression quarters (JTF HQ) deploying forward to is that Concept’s modified decision cycle meet a particular mission. proved most promising. It was amended to As both Allied Joint Force Command implement a balanced approach to man- (JFC) Brunssum and JFC Naples agreed on aging kinetic and non-kinetic operational employing a headquarters based on a two- effects and to provide more relevant and pillared structure, JFC Lisbon re-organized  BIOGRAPHY: Lieutenant General Philippe consistent recommendations to the Com- to implement their proposal. This structure Stoltz was born on 16 November 1955 in mander at the Joint Coordination Board. included an invisible pillar with the Strate- France. He is a graduate of the École Spéciale Although we initially faced some dif- Militaire at Saint-Cyr (the French Military Acad- gic Communications (STRATCOM) Advi- emy) and the French War College. He gradu- ficulties caused by lack of understanding sor coordinating the “influence tools” of ated with distinction from the French War Col- on the detailed inputs required to make the Headquarters. Given the importance lege, which he attended from 1989 to 1991. His the process work efficiently, the end prod- of STRATCOM, I see two viable headquar- former duties include Chief of Staff, Djibouti ucts were sound. The initial uncertainty in French Combined Headquarters (1998-2000); ters structure options available to the com- Chief of Operations and Chief of Staff, Special implementing the decision cycle underlined manders. The two-pillared structure has the Operations Command (2000-2003); Command- the need to refine various supporting pro- STRATCOM Advisor serving as a Deputy er Special Land Forces Brigade in Pau (2003- cesses needed in order to implement it. The to the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, 2005). Lieutenant General Stoltz also served outputs of each step, especially the Joint as Deputy Commander Land Forces Command synchronizing the Headquarters’ influence in Lille before being transferred to Marseille Coordination Working Group Director’s assets. The second option organizes the to take command of Land Force Headquarters Session and the Integrated Effects Board Headquarters into three pillars: Operations, Nº3 from 2007 to 2009. In August 2008 he was must be fully understood by the staff. Com- Influence and Support. assigned as deputy Commander KFOR, bring- prehensive training preparing the staff to ing him back for a tour of duty to Kosovo, The choice of one structure over another where he had already had served as the Com- execute the complete cycle is therefore of should be based on the nature of the opera- mander of Multinational Task Force North in utmost importance. To this end, the im- tion, and its kinetic or non-kinetic dimen- 2005. In July 2009, Lieutenant General Stoltz portance of Academics cannot be stressed sion, the capabilities of personnel, as well was assigned Commander of Allied Joint Force enough: it is critical. In the following weeks, Command Lisbon. General Stoltz has been as the Commander’s personal preference. awarded the Legion d´Honneur, the National JFC Lisbon will provide some proposals to From my perspective, the Forward Coordi- Merit Order, the Military Valor Cross with five pass on to JFCs Naples and Brunssum as nation Element (FCE) achieved great results citations and the Overseas Medal. they transition to the new Peacetime Estab- ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 41 Training

As JFC Lisbon is nearing Lieutenant General Stoltz (left) and Major General Berger the end of its operational life, the torch this headquarters has helped to carry in this concept development will be passed to the remaining Joint Force Commands and to pertinent headquarters in the NATO Command Structure.

lishment structure. The two remaining JFCs must ensure each individual understands the Deployability Concept, understands how the decision cycle works, and his or her role in driving the cycle forward. Personnel gathering together for an exercise icebreaker before the training starts. For me, this training necessity reinforces the importance of building a certified, agile and responsive team in each future JFC con- sisting of qualified and trained personnel. I assess that maintaining an appropriate level of skill and readiness for this selected group will be a challenge for NATO. Fortunately, in the run up and execution of the exercise, Lis- bon was able to pull talent from across NATO to both fill the required billets and to make observations. This will ultimately benefit the contributing headquarters as the tremendous task of gathering observations and deriving lessons identified and lessons learned is just beginning. We have to scrupulously follow this process, which will feed the Deployabil- ity Concept’s further refinement. Together with the Exercise participants, the A2R Community from the Operational Prepara- tion Directorate (OPD), Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) will play an in- strumental role in this process. This is truly a NATO team effort! Now, as JFC Lisbon is nearing the end of its operational life, the torch this Head- quarters has helped carry in this Concept Development will be passed to the remain- ing JFCs and to pertinent headquarters in the NATO Command Structure. 

FURTHER READING For these related stories, visit www.jfclb.nato.int * The Commander’s Vision - 2012 * STEADFAST JOIST 2012

42 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 NEWCOMERS

“There are few better opportunities than a JWC exercise or training event to learn about Alliance operations and processes at the operational level.” JWC Office of the Legal Advisor A Voluntary National Contribution’s Perspective of an Alliance Legal Office and its Operations

By Colonel Brian H. Brady, USA A (1) U.S. Army Staff Judge Advocate CJIATF 435

Introduction For the past two years, I have been privi- national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or on Alliance territory. While national force leged to serve as a United States Voluntary the HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC)(3). Units structure appears to be reducing, there are National Contribution (VNC) to the North or specific military capabilities that have opportunities for Alliance and Partner Na- Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Joint War- been offered to NATO are accepted under a tion personnel to serve outside of national fare Centre (JWC) Office of the Legal Ad- separate NATO operational regime known units in NATO Command Structure or visor (LEGAD). An assignment to JWC is as Transfer of Authority (TOA). If you have NATO Force Structure affiliated entities. unique and demands knowledge that may served in Afghanistan, you may have heard Most of my contemporaries have no idea not be possessed even by the most experi- the term RIPTOA (Relief in Place — TOA) that the U.S. Army has personnel stationed enced military personnel. The purpose of as part of a unit’s transition to NATO control. in, amongst other places, Madrid, Valen- this article is to provide references to some For the United States reader, when a Troop cia, Milan, Muenster, Stettin and Stavan- key NATO texts in the context of my service Contributing Nation (TCN) proffers capabil- ger. These assignments create administra- at JWC. As a LEGAD, I will illustrate some ity (personnel or a unit) to NATO, it is the tive and logistical challenges to all nations of the common issues that are addressed by equivalent of a service providing organized, LEGADs serving in NATO headquarters. trained and equipped forces for a combat- I will discuss aspects of an assignment to ant commander. For those personnel going (1) Currently assigned as Staff Judge Advocate, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435, U.S. Stavanger to illustrate a national perspec- to NATO CE posts at the operational level Forces Afghanistan. Formerly assigned to the Of- tive on NATO. Finally, I will illustrate JWC’s (e.g., HQ ISAF, IJC), they may have to receive fice of the Legal Advisor (LEGAD), JWC, Stavanger, Norway. The opinions and conclusions herein are mission with reference to the roles and training mandated by the operational Allied those of the author and do not necessarily repre- function of a LEGAD. Joint Force Command (JFC). This is where sent the views of either, the JWC LEGAD, the U.S. JWC earns its money. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Depart- ment of Defense, or NATO. Assignment Stavanger – NATO Posts (2) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff In- Assignment to a NATO staff post in a NATO Life in Stavanger struction (CJCSI) 1600.01A, Charter For United States European Command NATO Manning Divi- headquarters (known as a Peacetime Estab- Many Americans of my generation served in sion, 10 December 2010. Para. 6a(2)(b).1 indicates lishment/PE post) is a national manpower Germany and BENELUX countries as part that this division, inter alia, “Manages manpower requirements and sourcing strategies for U.S. con- decision, which in the case of the United of Cold War commitments to the NATO tributions to NATO, to include Voluntary National States, after service hurdles have been met, Alliance. We grew accustomed to living in Contributions, dualhat, rotational and non-quota involves a staff element located at the U.S. kasernes or U.S. military communities that post allocations, and U.S. joint requirements. (3) Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directive 45- (2) European Command . The process is slight- were in effect “Little Americas.” Since 1990, 3, Allied Command Operations Crisis Establishment ly different for personnel assigned to opera- the United States and its Allies have signifi- (CE) Management, 10 March 2011. Para. 1-4a de- fines a CE billet as follows: “A CE is a table setting tional posts known as Crisis Establishment cantly reduced or altered their military foot- out the authorized posts for a CRO [Crisis Response (CE) posts such as those found at HQ Inter- print and visibility to the local population Operation] unit, formation or headquarters.” ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 43 NEWCOMERS

Stavanger, Port city

who have to support dispersed clusters of will still be safe. People are friendly, and for (a temporary national identity number that personnel who may be assigned to a com- Americans (perhaps thanks to an expatriate facilitates all life support activity in Nor- mander located in a different country. For population working in North Sea oil-related way—what an American might refer to as an American, therefore, the robust military- professions), more importantly, most locals a “Green Card”). The D-Number triggers sponsored life support that is a feature of speak English. The local population is fit the ability to set up a bank account, obtain military life in Germany does not exist in and has direct access to breathtaking natu- a cell phone, register a vehicle and a host of Norway. Americans living in Norway have ral wonders such as fjords, and a network other life support matters. Other countries to adjust to purchasing goods and services of trails. During operational pauses (block have similar quasi-residential requirements on the local economy rather than relying leave) between major training events, there for NATO personnel stationed on their soil on the Post or Base Exchange (PX/BX) or are tremendous opportunities to experience (such as a residence permit) so this is not Commissary. Scandinavia and its outlying area. unique to Norway. The most important One peculiarity of assignment to Both the weather and seasons take get- piece of plastic I have, apart from my NATO Stavanger for Americans is use of local ting used to: you can get all four seasons in access card, is my local debit card, which banks, rather than a U.S.-based community one day. The oft quoted saying “there is no reflects myD -Number and photograph bank. This has potential tax consequences such thing as bad weather, just bad clothes” and therefore serves as a de facto ID card. I (such as informing tax authorities of the resonates in Stavanger where the wind and hardly ever use any other identification. existence of foreign assets) and requires ad- rain and “fall” sideways or just on the op- ditional steps to get money into the local ac- posite side of the street while the sun shines count (the U.S. does not have a compatible on your side of the street. (4) In 2010, when the author arrived at JWC, Sta- banking system that allows conventional So what “real life support” lessons have vanger was only the sixth most expensive city in the world (source: Yahoo). The author’s economic transfers of cash beyond its borders). The I drawn from two years in Stavanger? Save measure of sticker shock is much simpler: one pint plus side of using the local banking regime money for the assignment; enjoy the natural of Guinness at a Stavanger watering hole costs is that local credit/debit cards work whereas scenery; get involved in the local commu- about 83 Norwegian Krone which is about €18 or $14; a comparable beer in Grafenwoehr costs €2.5 European or Scandinavian vendors often nity; be prepared to conduct more trans- or $3.25 (as of April 2012). reject U.S.-based cards for lack of a micro- actions subject to local bureaucracy (e.g., (5) Norway’s blood alcohol limit is 0.02% and even one drink registering below the limit could create a chip. For all nations, service in Stavanger registering your vehicle; getting a bank ac- presumption that you are driving impaired. Penal- is particularly hard, because it is the fourth count; getting a cell phone); be patient with ties are severe and include potential detention for (4) 30 days, loss of one month’s salary (include hous- most expensive city in the world . Once local authorities who may be unfamiliar ing allowance, cost of living and other amounts that sticker-shock has worn off, life in Stavanger with Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) make up your national compensation), and loss of turns out to be pretty good … at least when privileges; use public transport; and NEV- driving privileges. Incredibly one of my first nation- al disciplinary legal issues dealt with this subject (5) the sun shines. ER, NEVER drink and drive . – Norway is not used to the standard “release of Life in Stavanger is a throwback to an The most important thing a sponsor jurisdiction” regime practiced in other NATO coun- tries under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement earlier era. Crime is almost nonexistent; you can do for their replacement is to ensure (SOFA), therefore it takes longer to for the JWC can leave doors unlocked and your valuables that the newcomer receives a “D-Number” LEGAD or national authorities to gain jurisdiction. ►►►

44 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 NEWCOMERS

JWC LEGAD organization its official texts(8). Upon request, prospective The JWC LEGAD organization and func- LEGADs can obtain a copy of the NATO tion is derived from NATO’s Bi-Strategic Legal Deskbook, which provides a superb Command (Bi-SC) Directive 15-23, which overview of key legal issues and NATO governs the delivery of legal advice within processes. The NATO Legal Gazette (first NATO’s two Strategic Commands(6). The published in 2006) provides NATO LEGAD JWC LEGAD, as is standard throughout practitioners’ insights to current NATO NATO, is part of the Command Group. The issues(9). Once in-processed to a NATO JWC LEGAD is comprised of four lawyers, post, NATO LEGADs will have access to three of whom appear on JWC’s manning Comprehensive Legal Overview Virtual document as Peacetime Establishment (PE) Information System (CLOVIS), which is an “Life in Stavanger turns out to be pretty posts. The fourth position, originally carved online community of interest sponsored by good … at least when the sun shines.” The out from an HQ ACT LEGAD post in Nor- the legal element of ACT’s Staff Element Eu- author participated in the 2011 Tall Ships folk, is now a Voluntary National Contribu- rope(10). These tools serve as a lifeline until Race between the Shetland Islands and Stavanger. tion (VNC) and filled by the United States. the newcomer can get access to more com- The office is comprised of a chief LE- prehensive document handling systems. GAD (currently a Norwegian Naval Cap- tain/NATO grade OF5); two staff legal of- JWC International Military ficers (one VNC U.S. Army Colonel/OF5; Headquarters support — one French Army Lieutenant Colonel/ JWC’s legal status (6) Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive 15-23, OF4); and one NATO International Civilian JWC is subordinate to Allied Command Policy on Legal Support, 23 July 2009. (7) In addition to JWC-hosted exercies and train- (NIC). The NIC position was recently va- Transformation (ACT) located in Norfolk, ing, NATO personnel may attend training at the cated by JWC’s longest serving lawyer, Ms. Virginia. Consequently, JWC derives au- following: NATO School Oberammergau, Germany; Lone Kjelgaard, who is now serving at HQ thority from the juridical (legal) personal- numerous specialized NATO Centres of Excellence; the Joint Force Training Centre, Bydgoszcz, Poland. NATO’s LEGAD. This summer a new NIC ity vested by international agreement in For LEGADs, the NATO School offers the NATO will assume duties at JWC. Unlike other ACT and the Supreme Allied Commander LEGAD Course and more advanced operational law (11) and trageting courses. LEGADs, this office does not have a para- Transformation (SACT) . JWC therefore (8) (Last accessed on 23 April 2012). (9) See e.g., Mr. Richard Pregent, Cyber Defense Group NCOs to accomplish administrative in conducting its mission as a result of its and Counterintelligence, NATO LEGAL GAZETTE, tasks. JWC lawyers are all members of their Paris Protocol [to the North Atlantic Treaty] No. 26, pp. 13-18 (29 September 2011). respective nations’ legal professions, have status as an Allied Headquarters or IMHQ. (10) (Last accessed on 23 April 2012). law degrees, and are licensed to practice law. Outside of Norway, other NATO entities (11) The acronyms ACT and SACT seem to be used JWC lawyers service the diverse range of le- such as NATO Agencies and NATO Com- interchangeably but the institution is properly re- ferred to as ACT while its commander is SACT. gal issues, which arise from JWC’s mission mittees (properly known as “subsidiary (12) The following have profound effect on JWC’s and can be broken down into: JWC Interna- bodies” under Article IX to the North At- legal status, privileges and immunities: A. Agreement between the Parties to the North At- tional Military Headquarters (IMHQ) sup- lantic Treaty), and the International Staff at lantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces, port; NATO Exercise and Training support; NATO Headquarters are conferred privileg- dated 19 June 1951 (The NATO SOFA). NATO Concepts, Doctrine and Integration es and immunities under the Ottawa Con- B. Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic support. vention of 1951. Within Norway, one of the Treaty, dated 28 August 1952 (Paris Protocol). key roles of the JWC LEGAD is to provide C. Memorandum of Agreement between the Min- istry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and Tools available to LEGADs interpretation of JWC’s privileges and im- Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Trans- Few LEGADs gain NATO experience while munities under the Paris Protocol. formation as represented by Joint Warfare Centre, concerning “The closure of Joint Headquarters practicing law in their national posts. Op- North”, the establishment of the NATO Joint War- portunities to access NATO collective legal Host nation relations fare Centre at Stavanger, Norway, and support of training opportunities may also be limited(7). Norway is a model host acting as a receiv- the NATO Joint Warfare Centre at Stavanger, Nor- way, dated 21 June 2006 (MOA). LEGADs filling NATO posts as augmentees ing State for a NATO IMHQ. JWC is an D. Supplementary Agreement between the Kingdom face a significant challenge preparing for Allied Headquarters or IMHQ established of Norway and Headquarters Supreme Allied Com- mander Transformation and Supreme Headquarters their NATO duties. Compounding the lack pursuant to the 1952 Paris Protocol to the Allied Powers Europe, subject: On the Special Con- of exposure to NATO experience and train- 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (also known as ditions applicable to the establishment and opera- tion on Norwegian Territory of International Military ing opportunities is limited access to NATO the Washington Treaty), which established Headquarters, dated 6 August 2008 . documents. NATO’s document handling sys- NATO. JWC’s IMHQ status is further de- E. Local Agreement between Norwegian Defence tems exclude access to personnel who are not fined by a Supplementary Agreement to the Estate Agency [NDEA] and Joint Warfare Centre for The Support of the NATO Joint Warfare Centre in part of NATO Command Structure or Force NATO SOFA with Norway, a Memoran- Stavanger, Norway, dated 5 May 2009. Structure posts. Fortunately there are several dum of Agreement, and some local agree- F. Local Agreement between Norwegian Defence (12) Logistic Agency [NDLO] and Joint Warfare Centre ways to get access to relevant information. ments . Additionally, internal directives for The Support of the NATO Joint Warfare Centre The NATO home page provides links to and policy further implement the intent of in Stavanger, Norway, dated 20 December 2006. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 45 NEWCOMERS

these agreements. This type of cascading authority (manifested by Supplementary Agreements, MOAs, and local implementa- tion arrangements) is a common to other NATO IMHQ Receiving States but what works in one Receiving State does not al- ways work in another. The role of the LE- GAD is to interpret the application of these treaties and agreements to minimize fric- tion points thus permitting JWC to accom- plish its mission within Norway. NATO’s new Host Nation Support (HNS) policy is one area that the LEGAD earns its money. NATO is in the process of implement- ing new HNS policy(13). This policy has ef- fects upon existing agreements with nations that host IMHQ. As host to JWC, Norway is legal obligations. A key lesson learned un- If you are a new staff officer at JWC, you will not immune to the new NATO HNS policy. der the international agreements regime is want to become familiar with the Supple- As the headquarters vested with “juridical that staff should always ask for legal review mentary Agreement and MOA between personality,” ACT authorizes its person- before approaching the Host Nation with ACT/JWC and Norway. The issues are di- nel or subordinate headquarters to negoti- requirements. Absent approval by ACT, or verse and, amongst others, include the fol- ate and conclude international agreements: otherwise facilitated by terms of local agree- lowing: special privileges afforded to Gen- ACT LEGADs working with JWC staff and ments, JWC has limited authority to act eral/Flag Officers assigned to NATO duty in the JWC LEGAD are currently working im- unilaterally. Staffing with the LEGAD will Norway; review of Norwegian extension of plementation details of the new HNS policy. prevent embarrassment or misunderstand- privileges and immunities to family mem- Prior to ACT’s action, the JWC LEGAD had ings from occurring. bers when the service member is deployed to analyze all the implications of the new for extended periods; review of policy con- HNS policy by comparing it to current re- cerning provision and rationing of alcoholic quirements under existing agreements. This beverages and other tax-free items to enti- new policy will eventually result in a new tled NATO personnel; review and reinforce- standard NATO format known as a Garri- ment of JWC privileges to import and export son Support Agreement (GSA). free of duty and taxes, NATO-related goods JWC’s relationship with Norway creates and services; review of new agreements to a reciprocal relationship that the LEGAD extend Norwegian logistics or real estate fa- is often requested to review under existing cilities and services to JWC personnel. As a result of these issues, all JWC LEGADs gain more than passing familiarity with the key international agreements governing JWC’s IMHQ status in Norway.

NATO acquisition and contracting JWC has its own contracting authority, which is derived from delegation from ACT under the Paris Protocol. This treaty-based authority is implemented within both ACO and ACT by Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive, 60-70. This policy also contains standards of conduct and improper business practices guidance that is essentially based on ACO rules. For an American lawyer who

JWC LEGADs (from left): Captain (N) Audun Westgaard, Colonel Brian Brady, Lieutenant Colonel Eric Aguera, June 2012. Inset: Colonel Brady with Brigadier General DePalmer at his Farewell Breakfast. ►►►

46 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 View of Lifjell Mountain and Gandsfjord from JWC. Photo by Valerie Guyoton.

has practiced U.S. Government contract law, precludes extension of privileges and im- (17) Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces, I derive much comfort knowing that the ter- munities to Norwegians or other persons dated 19 June 1951 (The NATO SOFA). Article 1b minology and methodology used in NATO who are considered “ordinarily resident” in states: “ ‘Civilian component’ means the civilian personnel accompanying a force of a Contracting practice mirrors national methodology. Norway (e.g., a lawful resident of Stavanger Party who are in the employ of an armed service Contracting Officers have broad discre- in the oil industry who then applies for a or that Contracting Party, and who are not stateless tion when it comes to seeking legal advice. NATO position). persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, Unlike national practice, “[n]either ACO/ Understanding the legal nature of NICs nor ordinarily resident in, the State in which the ACT has not established a mandatory (e.g., is important, because it impacts their op- force is located.” (18) Paris Protocol, Article III, para. 1.b: “ ‘civilian monetary) threshold above which legal re- erational use. JWC deploys its personnel component’ means civilian personnel who are not view must be sought.”(14) The guidance ad- to NATO operations as part of its exercise stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which (19) is not a Party to the Treaty, nor nationals of, nor or- monishes Contracting Officers to seek legal preparations . For example, JWC will de- dinarily resident in the receiving State, and who are counsel “[e]specially when unusual, com- ploy a team to Kabul as part of its Training (i) attached to the Allied Headquarters and in the plex and sensitive matters are at hand.”(15) Refinement Conference andD ata Capture employ of an armed service of a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty or (ii) in such categories of civilian This discretion is mitigated by local SOP, for ISAF Training Events. While deployed, personnel in the employ of the Allied Headquarters which in the case of JWC makes the LEGAD NICs may find themselves in the unusual as the North Atlantic Council shall decide.” (19) ACT Dir. 45-4, Personnel Selection and Deploy- part of the JWC Requirements Board ensur- situation of being excluded from the support ment Guide for NATO Missions, 15 April 2010; see ing legal oversight at the initiation phase of their nation’s Deployed National Support also ACO Dir. 50-11, Deployment of Civilians, 30 June 2010. of a requirement. JWC’s contracting policy Element. For NATO civilians deployed in (20) ISAF Civilian Human Resources Policy and also establishes Established Financial Limits support of ISAF, the ISAF Civilian Human Regulations (CHRPRs), 16 March 2011 govern the for competition purposes for the procure- Resources Management Office provides the employment of civilians and their general support (including provision of body armor and helmets). ment of “basic, noncomplex supplies and equivalent services that a deployed soldier Note that ISAF possesses unique recruitment au- services.”(16) would find at an NSE(20). The JWC LEGAD thority for civilians who are not classified as NICs which is found not only in ISAF CHRPRs but also must therefore have a working knowledge ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 119 Civilian personnel of NATO civilian personnel rules and inter- subject: HQ ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 119, Recruitment of International Civilian NATO employs its own permanent work- national agreements governing their status Consultants (ICC) and Local Civilian Hire (LCH) In force known as NATO International Civil- wherever they are utilized(21). Support Of the ISAF Mission, 22 February 2011; ians (NIC). NICs are governed by NATO ; for general NATO policy on theatre authority to establish ICC and LCH, see para. 1-7, ACO Direc- personnel rules set forth in the NATO Ci- tive (AD) 45-3, Allied Command Operations Crisis vilian Personnel Regulations commonly Establishment (CE) Management (10 March 2011). (21) See e.g., Military Technical Agreement be- referred to as the “Red Book.” For the pur- Continued on Page 72. tween the International Security Assistance Force poses of receiving certain privileges and and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (4 January 2002). Annex A sets forth the status of immunities (e.g., no taxation), under terms forces arrangement; see also the Exchange of Let- of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement ters between the NATO Secretary General and the (13) NATO Command Structure Host Nation Sup- (SOFA), civilian personnel are part of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan port (HNS) – Policy and Standards (PO (2011)0020, (22 November 2004) clarifying that “ ‘NATO Per- “civilian component” of a sending State’s 8 Feb. 2011[effective 14 February 2011]). sonnel’ means the military and civilian personnel deployed force present in the receiving (14) Bi-SC Dir. 60-70, Bi-Strategic Command Pro- assigned or attached to or employed by the North curement Directive (22 December 2004) – At para. (17) Atlantic Treaty Organization, its member States, State . Since NICs are hired by NATO or 1-2d, Legal Advisors and non-NATO Troop Contributing States that are its IMHQs, they are included as members of (15) Id. operating under NATO command and control ar- (16) JWC SOP 602, JWC Standing Operating Proce- rangements or in support of the International Se- the “civilian component” by the Paris Proto- dures – Purchasing and Contracting Execution (15 curity Assistance Force.” col(18). The NATO SOFA and Paris Protocol March 2007).

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 47 The ROYAL VISIT Of King Harald V of Norway To the Joint Warfare Centre and Naval Basic Training Centre Harald Haarfagre VISIT

From left: King Harald V of Norway, Brigadier General DePalmer, Major General Berger and Brigadier Gustavsen, 14 May 2012. Below: Children waving flags at the JWC Main Gate. The ROYAL VISIT Of King Harald V of Norway To the Joint Warfare Centre and Naval Basic Training Centre Harald Haarfagre

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC Photos by MSgt Herbert Berger, DEU A, JWC CPO Valerie Guyoton, FRA N, JFC Lisbon

His Majesty King Harald V paid a His Majesty proceeded to Camp Madla. The royal motorcade vehicles then visit to Norway’s Naval Basic Training Cen- Crowds lined the streets to catch a glimpse made their way to Jåttå, where JWC staff tre Harald Haarfagre, commonly known as of King Harald as the royal cortege rolled family members waving Norwegian flags Camp Madla, and NATO’s Joint Warfare past. Waving flags and applauding, they welcomed the monarch at the main gate of Centre (JWC) in Stavanger on Monday 14 made the mood in Stavanger one of joy and the base. Up the hill, at the entrance of the May 2012. The visit was a response to an excitement. JWC E-Block, Norwegian conscripts stood invitation offered by French Army Major stiffly at attention and JWC military person- General Jean Fred Berger, Commander nel saluted as Major General Berger greeted JWC, at an audience with His Majesty at the and officially welcomed His Majesty. After Royal Palace in Oslo on 5 September 2011. a brief photo opportunity, the royal party This wasH is Majesty’s first visit to the proceeded inside the building for another two Stavanger-based entities, although he photo opportunity by the flags of Norway visited the Norwegian National Joint Head- and the NATO Alliance. Next came the quarters together with the former President signing of the visitor’s book, a briefing ses- of the Republic of Bulgaria, Mr Georgi Par- sion on the JWC’s mission and activities vanov, in 2006, when the Norwegian HQ and a lunch at the JWC’s VIP Dining Room. was co-located with the JWC. His Majesty’s As part of the visit programme, His arrival at Stavanger Airport Sola reflected Majesty was walked around the JWC’s new a joyous spectacle as second graders from Upon arrival at Camp Madla, His Majesty training facilities and observed first-hand a Sola and Klepp waved flags and held up was received by the Chief of the Naval Staff, computer assisted/command post military flowers to greet him. Two students, Emma Rear Admiral Bernt Grimstvedt and Com- exercise, Steadfast Joist 12. By chance, Kristina Keane and Miriam Skjelde, both mander Naval Basic Training Centre Harald the royal visit occurred while the exercise wearing a bunad, the Norwegian national Haarfagre, Commander SG Per Jan Skjegs- was running at the JWC with 631 personnel costume, extended a bouquet of spring tad. He then inspected a guard of honour, from NATO’s Joint Force Command Lisbon flowers to the visiting monarch, who was received a briefing on Camp Madla and its and Force Command Heidelberg as well as dressed in Admiral’s uniform. After the joy- history, attended a parade ceremony, met other organizations assembled in Stavanger ous greet with the children in crisp, windy and greeted conscripts and staff members, to train in the full spectrum of joint opera- Stavanger weather, the motorcade carrying and attended a pass in review. tional level warfare and benefit from state- ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 49 visit

“NATO has the ability to make things work across Nations and cultures; this is something that has always been NATO’s strength.” King Harald V

of-the-art military expertise in a NATO-led Art of War”, given to the JWC as a token of The General said: H“ is Majesty visited Crisis Response Operation. Steadfast congratulation by the Norwegian Govern- us during an exercise involving 900 people, Joist 12 was the first training event ever ment. Following Major General Berger’s with approximately 600 of them working to be conducted in the new facility. His brief explanation of the artwork, His Maj- side by side in Stavanger. As NATO’s foot- Majesty walked through various exercise esty then allowed a short interview session print in Norway, the JWC sincerely wel- organizations, including the Situation Cen- with the members of the local media and comes the visit of the King of Norway. It tre, the Grey Cell and the Joint Operations said he found great joy and interest in the holds significant importance in that it will Centre, where he received briefings and met visit. The monarch stressed that he regards go a long way in further strengthening the with the staff members and mentors. He NATO’s presence in Stavanger as important bond of friendship with Norway. The sup- also watched a short movie about NATO’s for Norway. “NATO has the ability to make port of His Majesty in uniform – he is the Comprehensive Approach. Produced by the things work across Nations and cultures; chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces – was JWC Media Section, the movie highlighted this is something that has always been NA- very impressive and I feel very proud of it.” the importance of political, civilian and mili- TO’s strength,” he went on to say. tary interaction in Crisis Management Plan- Major General Berger acknowledged Born on 21 February 1937, His Maj- ning to help tackle the complex challenges of that he was honoured to host King Harald esty King Harald V is Commander-in-Chief international security. at the JWC and added: “His Majesty’s visit of Norway’s Armed Forces, and holds the At the end of the visit, His Majesty and is an occasion to celebrate the warm and en- rank of General in the Army and Air Force, Major General Berger stood in front of Ole during friendship between Norway and the and Admiral in the Navy.  Lislerud’s ceramic artwork “Peace and the NATO Alliance.”

Briefing at SITCEN

Pass in review at Camp Madla

A visit to the Grey Cell His Majesty´s arrival in Stavanger

50 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 Website www.jwc.nato.int facebook.com/jointwarfarecentre NEWS youtube.com/jointwarfarecentre Nordic Foreign Ministers make first official visit to JWC The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Iceland and Norway together with the Finn- ish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Director General for Political Af- fairs Ministry visited the JWC on Friday 4 May 2012. This was the first official visit paid by the respective Nordic Ministers to the Cen- tre. Their Excellencies Mr Villy Søvndal (Den- mark), Mr Össur Skarphéðinsson (Iceland), Mr Jonas Gahr Støre (Norway) as well as Mr Pertti Torstila (Finland) and Mr Björn Lyrvall (Sweden) were warmly welcomed by Major General Jean Fred Berger and senior officials at the JWC premises in Jåttå, Stavanger. The official programme concluded with the Min- isters meeting with JWC staff members from the Nordic countries. SUPPORT OUR FIGHT AGAINST CHILDHOOD CANCER

Royal Dutch Navy Commander (Cdr) Robbert Jurrian- sen who is currently employed at NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway, is raising money for the Dutch charity foundation KiKa (Kinderen Kankervrij, or, Children Cancer-Free) to support research in the fight against childhood cancer. As part of the charity fund- raiser, he organized a rubber duck race, which was held on Saturday, June 16th, in the historic fjord of Hafrsf- jord. In order to urge charity donations, Cdr Jurriansen is running the Stavanger Marathon on 1 September and the New York Marathon on 4 November this year. For more information on the fundraising activity, e-mail Cdr Jurriansen directly at [email protected]

 Signature of a joint declaration between the JWC and the City of Stavanger

The Honorable Mayor of Stavanger, Christine Sagen Helgø and the Com- mander of NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre, French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger, signed on 18 Janu- ary a Declaration of Cooperation that aims to enhance the strong ties, good communication and partner- ship between the Joint Warfare Cen- tre and the City, as well as to establish a framework to examine the possibili- ties of constructive and collaborative activities for mutual benefit.

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 51

JWC 2014+

«All organisations have cultures and those cultures can be a force multiplier when aligned to the visions and goals of the organisation. Understanding how organisational culture contributes to, or hinders, change and effective performance is something we should all be aware of here at the Joint Warfare Centre.» Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer

ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE DOES IT MATTER? By Garry Hargreaves SMC4 Division, Joint Warfare Centre ILLUSTRATIONS GRY HEGE RINALDO

ften disregarded, or enduring; having the ability to provide sus- ditable, the shared beliefs and values of an considered late in any tenance to organisational effectiveness or organisation are not so easily observed; yet strategic redirection, organ- conversely accommodate and nurture re- they have the potential to be far more potent isational culture is the critical sistance to change, leading to an inevitable and resilient. Opart of what makes an organisation tick. reduction in organisational effectiveness. Organisational cultures influence what Sometimes described as the feel of an organ- Consequently, it is critical for an organisa- people say, and what people do, when they isation, or portrayed as “how things get done tion to understand its organisational cul- are not being watched. That potency may be around here”, cultures are the intangible but ture and be able to relate and synchronise revealed in alarming ways: the current U.S. powerful effects of senior staff’s behaviour its evolution with the organisation’s visions Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, comment- combined with the policies, procedures and and goals. ing on a recent event in Afghanistan, said: practices that create the operational envi- “this incident absolutely violates both our ronment. This influences our actions and Where do they come from and what regulations and, more importantly, our core determines behavioural norms. Organisa- do they do? values.” He is clearly saying that core values tional culture describes the subconscious, An organisational culture derives from the trump regulations; he is not alone in this subtle psychology of the workplace. Not deeply embedded beliefs and values of the assessment of the influence that organisa- only do all organisations have cultures, most organisation’s members, especially the lead- tional cultures can have. have subcultures silently operating within ership. It resides at a psychologically deeper An organisational culture has the at- the overarching organisational culture. If level than policies and procedures ever tributes of permanence and resilience and the organisation is to be highly effective could. Over time, the organisational cul- when the culture is appropriately aligned, it then these cultures need to be consistent. ture becomes the DNA of the organisation can be a real asset for a business that is eager Organisational researchers tell us that and to make things even more challenging, to evolve or transform. businesses ignore organisational cultures at whilst an organisation’s policies, procedures Conversely this can become a serious is- their peril. Cultures are highly robust and and practices are readily observable and au- sue for an organisation that wants to adapt, ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 53 JWC 2014+

but is subject to significant levels of staff churn and rotational leadership, as is the case for the JWC and many other Commands. How do we maintain direction and drive on the journey towards a new vision when the person at the helm, and the senior managers, disappear before we ever get near it?

• Deeply understanding “intent” will go a long way to ensuring that a vision becomes a reality. • Use the fact that the more persistent staff, civilians and Norwegians in our case, will have significantly more in- fluence on the organisational culture than their position in the organisation might lead you to believe. • Start your cultural awareness cam- paign early.

Cultural transformations cannot be values along with beliefs that supported the (serious Article 5 missions) were suddenly achieved through a rapid or superficial ap- mission. Ten years had allowed us to develop OPRs planning the integration of experi- proach; they take time and the engagement supporting cultural norms that aligned what ments into NRF events with out-of-area of the right people. The problem is that in we thought, said, and did, to the role of the and non-military actors. They were asked to many organisations, transformation of the JHQ North and the Vision of the Command- lead multinational planning syndicates and culture starts long after new visions have er. People sat tight, they knew their roles, the were exposed to operational uncertainty been embarked upon, leading to an inevita- work was stable and involved little travel. and highly volatile travel demands. You can ble lag that diminishes organisational effec- Then we became, almost overnight, appreciate the culture that resided in JHQ tiveness. Let me provide you with a tangible the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). North was not the one that fit best with the example. In 2003, we were an operational People that were previously running plans new mission of the JWC. Luckily, we were HQ with a well-understood mission and to combat invasions from the North-East able to start slowly and evolve gently into the new culture; since the first events were modest (approximately 15 percent) com- pared with the scale of the events that JWC delivers today. Evolving the organization culture was perhaps even more challenging for ACT. A staff officer sat at a desk worried about shipping corridors in the maritime world of SACLANT was suddenly responsible for considering global security challenges twenty years ahead. Might that require a very different mind-set and behavioural norms? Of course it would, yet we often leave the cultural alignment until after the organisational change. One side effect of organisational strat- egy conflicting with personal values and beliefs is the psychological distancing of the staff from their business environment. This results in compliant rather than committed behaviours. Organisational ambivalence can result; and whilst the team may look like it is performing from the outside, it is highly unlikely to be operating at peak potential. If we do not, or cannot, identify the support- ►►► JWC 2014+

ing organisational culture, we will not be able to translate the visions of the leadership into our day-to-day behaviours in order to reach new levels of operational effective- ness. Given JWC’s current and emerging role in NATO, I wonder if we will have the time to get our cultural act together like we did in 2003. Like a boat dragging its anchor along the bottom of the sea, organisational culture can certainly slow you down, per- haps even snag and halt any progress at all. A misaligned organisational culture can ap- ply a significant braking effect to any change or development initiative.

Why consider this now? Our Commander, Major General Jean Fred Berger, is re-aligning the JWC Vision for post-2014. Do we wait until then to start to re-adjust the reinforcing processes and iden- tify congruent behavioural norms? Or, do we begin to consider what we might need to introduce or revitalise now? Before focusing spectrum joint operational warfare” is com- given issue. If the vision requires “staff flex- on the benefits of getting the culture aligned pliant ambivalence enough? Of course not; ibility” but the personnel regulations don’t with the business, I want to explore briefly but if we don’t do something to first identify support that, or when policies and processes the “so what” of getting it wrong. and then align behaviours and processes to are not supportive of, and congruent with, the vision, then maybe compliant ambiva- the organisational visions then people will In a military environment, toxic, lence will be as good as it gets. be unable to identify the required behav- inflexible, energy draining cultures are sup- A lack of coherence and congruency ioural norms. On the other hand, when posed to be unlikely. Compliance can be regarding organisational cultures can be you get the vision, policies and procedures demanded and disharmonious behaviours debilitating. Let’s say that the vision is “to aligned, the silent, invisible wind of culture rapidly and conclusively stamped out. How- be the best”, but the procedures force you will propel the organisation effortlessly to- ever, as “NATO’s training focal point for full to pick the cheapest possible solution to any wards the goals.

The Jaws of Culture

Internal Turf Wars Adapting the diagram Change Resistance that Boris Diekmann Historical Reliance (Senn-Delaney) showed Blame Culture us back in October 2011, you can visualise how Unaligned Goals real opportunities for ChangeChange Levers Levers Staff Churn increased effectiveness • NewNew JWC JWC strategy strategy and change can be stifled • JWCJWC reputation reputation through an inappropriate •New New training training techniques organisational culture. • Operation in one building Operation in one building No matter how many • DynamicDynamic environmentenvironment • Improving performance great ideas are fed into Improving performance • Corporate knowledge the system they will be • CorporateImproved processes knowledge degraded, deformed or Improved processes Insufficient Business digested altogether unless as usual? Teamwork the organisational culture Trust supports their existence. (© 1994-2010 Senn-Delaney Openness Leadership Consulting Group) Shared Vision

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The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 55 JWC 2014+

Attribute How can we know if we have an effective organisational culture?

Does the organisation create and sustain friendships and out-of-office loyalties? Does it care about the people Relationships and outside of the work domain? Is there evidence of cross divisional pan national friendships evolving? Communications Do people listen to others in order to understand their viewpoint or do they listen for a gap in order to force home their own point? Is there evidence of positive corridor/canteen discussions taking place?

Is the staff encouraged and supported in order to stretch their role? Is there evidence of risk tolerance or are Trust and witch-hunts prevalent? Is there evidence of unnecessary micro-management? Do the staff work harder/longer Commitment to get something finished? Are they proud of their efforts? Do they understand that what they do is important? Do they understand how they personally contribute to the overall goals of the JWC?

Do all levels celebrate and share in successes? Is the JWC somewhere that others aspire to be employed? Is Recognition and the staff told (meaningfully and specifically) that what they do is important? Do we allocate “special” assign- Empowerment ments to the high performers? Do the ideas coming from the bottom manage to percolate to the top? Before making decisions do managers consult with subordinates? Is there evidence of a “my way or the highway” state of mind?

Is there evidence of all levels of “walking the talk”? Are diversions from cultural norms dealt with swiftly and Credibility and consistently? Do peers provide feedback to ensure that standards are maintained without the need for the Humility heavy hand of management? Do others consider the organisation smug? Does it rely overly on its current reputation? Is there evidence of “tribal” sub cultures emerging? Does the organisation tolerate over inflated personal egos or indulge those engaged in self-promotion?

Are individuals encouraged to operate outside of job descriptions in order to come to the aid of others? Do the Flexibility and policies and procedures mirror the flexibility desired? Is an attitude of “what more can I do to assist” evident in Accountability the workplace? Do people raise their hands to state “I can do this”?

Do the staff communicate respectfully between themselves and others? Do they talk respectfully about our Respect and customers and sponsors? Are they tolerant of minority views and mindful/respectful of national cultural differ- Tolerance ences? Do they say “in my nation we do it this way” or do they say “in JWC we do it this way”?

Are people bright eyed, energetic and engaged in their roles? Do we leach our best people to other organisa- Enjoyment and tions? Are they going off to do the same job for someone else? Do they look forward to coming to work? Learning Is transformation and evolution within the mind-sets of the staff? Is there a commitment to innovation? Are failures seen as an opportunity to learn and grow?

Do the staff refer to management activities as “they are doing, they are planning, etc.” or do the staff talk about Organizational “we are doing, we are planning, etc”? Is there evidence of shared values and committed staff? Do the staff un- “Oneness” and a Shared derstand what our Vision means to the organisation and themselves? Does what is important to us as individuals, Sense of Purpose compliment the organisation’s Vision? Is it the Commander’s Vision, the JWC Vision or is it our Vision?

Aligning words in spite of the extant policies and proce- bers of that team will do. Take as an example and deeds dures. There were JWC staff on buses from a professional soccer team where the players I have often Romania, leaving rental cars at borders, know instinctively where the other players heard organ- flying indescribable routes into Norway in their team will be. This is not just train- isations claim, but, the leadership was “walking the talk”, ing; it is made possible because of a shared “people are the demonstrating that their people were in- awareness of common goals and acceptance most important deed most important to them. That incident of behavioural norms. Professional teams resource we have”, changed my beliefs, affected my values and do not like surprises — they develop a game but is that claim influenced my future behaviour. plan matched to the vision of the coach and borne out in practice? the abilities of the team. The shared values I remember thinking about Components of organisation provide a sense of order enabling other team that as I, and many other JWC staff, were cultures members to understand intent and expecta- brought home during the infamous Icelan- Shared values and beliefs are what drive tion and yet these shared attributes operate dic volcanic ash incident. The Commander our corporate identity and influence our for the most part outside of our awareness. at that time, Lieutenant General Wolfgang personal behaviours, not just at work, but So what are some attributes of highly effec- Korte, said to his staff “get my people home” in every aspect of our lives. Highly effective tive organisational cultures? and they did, working around the clock and teams somehow “know” what other mem- ►►►

56 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 JWC 2014+

Clockwise: Briefer Mr Boris Diekmann (Senn Delaney) with the author (right); JWC training facility; JWC NATO civilians discussing, inter alia, how our values and beliefs transform our behaviours at the annual Civilian Development Integration Course; a slide presented at the CDI Course.

Powerful organisations are messy, unpredictable process of change. with effective organisational cultures do not transformational, adaptable and able to re- Cultures remain effective by adapting and just comply with the visions, they commit to fine their practices and outputs to meet the constantly re-aligning themselves to the them; with their hearts and minds. changing Levels of Ambition and integrate business. Just as poor cultures sap moral The well-respected management guru the very latest concepts. I trust that some of and drain engagement; effective cultures Peter Drucker is often quoted as saying those words are familiar to the JWC read- have a contagious element that allows staff “Culture eats strategy for breakfast”. It is a ers. If we are to become powerful, transfor- to soak up organisational challenges and re- position that I have seen borne out in prac- mational, adaptable and integrative, might main motivated through difficult periods of tice. As we move towards 2014, adjust to we need to have a culture that fosters some uncertainty. emerging realities and start to re-look at of these attributes? Sure, but don’t we have our spinning plates, we should ensure that enough to do without trying to keep yet an- What can I do? we do so through an organisational culture other plate spinning in the air? Know your organisation’s Vision. That does that does not lag the JWC Vision. The cul- Look again at the first sketch in the ar- not mean being able to repeat it or know ture needs to walk hand-in-hand with the ticle (Page 52): what do you now notice? where it can be found in the Tasker Tracker. Vision so that we can be effective through Sometimes we get so engrossed in keeping It means translating it into something that change thereby avoiding the requirement to certain plates spinning that we do not realise is meaningful for you, something that reso- play catch up post change.  that others may be about to drop off. The nates with your core values and beliefs. It easiest one to neglect is the one that does not means seeking clarification to give meaning normally thrust itself into our consciousness; to the lofty aims of the leadership so that in that which represents our corporate val- your daily work you know, specifically, how About the artist ues and beliefs and determines behavioural you are contributing and why it is impor- Contemporary artist GRY HEGE RINALDO was norms — the organisational culture. tant for you to continue to do so. born on 27 January 1974 in Stavanger, Norway. Her collections include The University College Lon- An effective organisational culture pro- Highly effective organisations consist of don Art Collection, London/England; Haugesund vides and nurtures the environment where people who believe in what they do and who Billedgalleri, Permanent Collection, Haugesund/ Norway; Stavanger Art Museum, Stavanger, Nor- self-motivation and commitment to or- value the contribution their organisation way (with six pieces of oil paintings); The Danish ganisational improvement is the norm. It makes; these people are able to connect their Bank, Copenhagen, Denmark. View more of the artist´s work at: www.kunstgalleriet.no; www.gal- is likely to exhibit a high tolerance of am- contributions directly to higher-level visions lerinb.com. Rinaldo’s website, www.gryrinaldo.com biguity that will enable it to cope with the of the leadership. People in organisations is currently being re-designed.

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 57 CYBER AND SPACE The2023 year is 2023

An Experiment in Coalition Space Operations

 Cover Story Schriever Wargame 2012 International

By Lieutenant Colonel Todd Waller, US AF Space and Cyber SME, Joint Training Division, Joint Warfare Centre

Space: What is it good for? everyday life in the modern world depends precise delivery of munitions, and warning To some it is the final frontier. To others it on a host of satellites. As an example, a that ballistic missiles might be coming your is the ultimate high ground from which to menagerie of digital devices have evolved way are just a few of the space services that shape the outcome of terrestrial battles. To up around the free position and timing enable modern military operations. Within most though, it is out of sight, out of mind. data provided by GPS (a.k.a. Global Posi- the Alliance, a number of nations have their Ironically, the same people who are not es- tioning System). GPS supports everything own space capabilities and are planning in- pecially cognizant of space are probably under the sun from the safe passage of air vestments for future capabilities. However, some of the most avid consumers of space and sea traffic to the operation of electric- unlike soldiers, tanks and airplanes that can services without even realizing it. Ever ity and telecommunications grids to the be assigned by Alliance Members to sup- made a phone call to someone on another execution of financial transactions. How- port a NATO operation, satellites are sov- continent? When visiting a new place, do ever, it is not just regular folks that depend ereign assets. In the spirit of NATO’s new you use an old fashioned map to get around, on space. Military operations are equally, if emphasis on Smart Defence, how then can a or do you use a Garmin or TomTom? Do not more dependent, on the services satel- Joint Force Command (JFC) Headquarters you enjoy cable TV? Perhaps you didn’t lites provide. Command and control, ac- effectively leverage the combined (and sov- know, but all of these activities are enabled curate weather forecasts, detailed imagery ereignly controlled) space resources of the by satellites operating in space. The fact is, of the battlefield, exact position data for the Alliance to support an operation? Earlier ►►►

58 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 Clockwise: AFSPC Commander, General William Shelton, addresses wargame participants. Radiotelescopes in New Mexico. JFCBS staff members Brigadier General Eddie Staes and Lt Col Chris Parent play roles as the JFC COM and COS. Brigadier General DePalmer, COS JWC (sitting at the front) played role as SACEUR. (All photos, except the radiotelescopes are by AFSPC PAO.)

this year, the United States Air Force Space Community, industry and Alliance Member resided with the JFC. One way the JFC ex- Command (AFSPC) explored that possibil- Nations played interactive supporting roles ercised SCA was by directly liaising with ity with NATO and Coalition Partners. as the JFC executed its mission in the midst the nations to request space support for the of various space and cyber challenges. operation in accordance with predefined Operation JOLLY ROGER Approximately, 270 military and civil- agreements. A Space Coordinating Working A United Nations-sanctioned NATO coun- ian experts from the United States, France, Group, led by JFC J3, also emerged as a pro- ter-piracy mission, known as Operation Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, totype for identifying and prioritizing JFC JOLLY ROGER, has commenced in the Canada, United Kingdom, Turkey and Aus- space requirements and synchronizing their Horn of Africa: the year is 2023. Al Shabaab, tralia participated. fulfillment using coalition space resources. an Al Qaeda affiliate in Africa, is supporting These “prototypes” were an excellent way to piracy operations and the space and cyber Institutionalizing Space in NATO explore how NATO might organize itself to environments in the Joint Operations Area The good thing about a wargame set in 2023 support coalition space operations. There is are contested. The space situation is also is that you can make things up. Accordingly, no doubt current NATO operations depend more complex since a 2023 setting naturally several fictitious organizational elements extensively on space (SATCOM, GPS, and implies a higher concentration of space ob- were created to facilitate the coordination imagery to name a few), but if a JFC-di- jects and debris in orbit. of Allied space capabilities in support of rected operation is to fully exploit Alliance This was the scenario behind AFSPC’s the operation. Within SHAPE, a prototype space resources, it needs an institutional- seventh Schriever Wargame conducted “Space Awareness Cell” operated from with- ized framework that includes space organi- this April at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. in the Comprehensive Crisis Operations zation, doctrine, and trained professionals. Known as Schriever Wargame 2012 Inter- Management Cell (CCOMC). Its role was to This will enable the deliberate synchroniza- national (SW12I), this year’s wargame ex- provide space awareness to Supreme Allied tion of space effects with other operational plored the operational level challenges of Commander Europe (SACEUR), facilitate effects (such as those created by air, land, coalition space operations. national space support to the JFC’s opera- sea, special forces, and information opera- A notional NATO JFC was the game’s tion and communicate with NATO HQ and tions) in both the planning and execution of centrepiece and numerous entities such as other strategic level entities as required to operations to achieve military objectives. At Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Eu- support the operation. a time when resources are constrained, and rope (SHAPE), U.S. European Command, Space Coordinating Authority (SCA), space is a significant national investment, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Op- as currently defined by Allied Joint Pub- it makes sense to share resources… that is erations Command, the U.S. Interagency lication 3.3 (A) Air and Space Operations, Smart Defence. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 59 SPACE Photos by AFSPC PAO Photos by

The Wargame’s Most Valuable Players Broad Alliance participation in SW12I series of Steadfast exercises. However, The nations were the Most Valuable Players was a positive sign of NATO and Alliance- there are limitations. An exercise is a full of SW12I. National contributions of person- Member interest in coalition space opera- dress rehearsal of real forces. A wargame nel and space capabilities (those identified tions. National willingness to make space is an exploration of concepts, processes in a notional 2023 space order of battle) resources available to Operation JOLLY and decision making. A wargame might were the quintessential currency of the ROGER was the key to SW12I success and allow assumptions to be made in places, wargame enabling meaningful interactions it will be the same for any real NATO op- where an exercise demands details. SW12I between all the major players. At the risk eration in the future. That’s why any serious allowed NATO players to create the ele- of oversimplifying the wargame, a primary NATO space transformation must be un- ments they needed to make the game work. JFC role was to identify operational space dergirded by national support. A Steadfast exercise must replicate the requirements, or more specifically space ef- real world to be of value to the participants. fects requirements, and the role of the na- In the absence of a NATO space cadre at the tions was to fulfill those requirements using Making Space a part of Steadfast operational level, mechanisms to support their sovereign space assets. Exercises the identification and prioritization of op- From the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) per- erational space effects requirements, and a spective, one of the most useful aspects of timely way to connect those requirements to “There is no doubt current SW12I was its exploration of space at the Alliance space capabilities, the JWC’s intro- NATO operations depend operational level. Since the JWC produces duction of space to Steadfast exercises extensively on space, but training for NATO’s operational level head- will be limited. If, on the other hand, NATO if a JFC-directed operation quarters, the JWC’s senior leadership fol- elects to mature its organic space capabilities lowed SW12I with great interest. The JWC through the development of policy, training, is to fully exploit Alliance Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Brigadier organizational structures, and the necessary space resources, it needs an General Steven DePalmer, played the role linkages to national space capabilities, then institutionalized framework of SACEUR when necessary and the author the JWC will have a considerable opportu- that includes space of this article participated on the JFC staff. nity to improve NATO’s coalition space op- organization, doctrine, and This gave JWC clear insight into the ele- erations competence during Steadfast trained professionals.” ments that would most likely fit into its own series exercises. 

60 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 RETHINKING THE TOP OF THE WORLD THE ARCTIC A Norwegian Perspective

«The observed increase in activity in the Arctic over the last years provides clear evidence of ongoing changes in, and growing interest for, the region.»

By Brigadier Tor Rune Raabye, NOR A Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff/Operations Defence Staff Norway

Introduction The Laws of Nature still apply. There is a reason why populations We have been hearing about global warming for the last 30 years. have evolved and established themselves around the equator rather Over the last decade, and all over the world, people have started be- than in the Arctic. People and infrastructure are scarce in polar re- lieving in it. The Arctic, more than any other location on earth, has gions. Warm Gulf Stream waters, however, have helped create the responded directly to global warming. Climate changes are not the necessary conditions for human life in parts of the Arctic. Winter only reason for the renewed interest in this region, though. Future open ports, for both civilian and military purposes, have been, and outlooks and their economic, social and political implications are continue to be, important. The economy and wealth of some of the potentially more important, not to mention newly discovered natu- Arctic states rely heavily on the ocean, for food and prosperity. ral resources (oil and gas) and the perspective of a possible secure ice ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 61 ARCTIC

refers to the area located beneath the Polaris or Pole Star, also known as the North Star, to be found in the constellation Ursa Minor, and consisting of the northernmost portion of the world, sea and land. The Arctic is a polar region located around the North Pole. It consists of vast ice-covered ocean surrounded by treeless permafrost land. The Arctic covers approxi- mately one sixth of the earth’s land masses. The northernmost point on the earth’s sur- face is the geographic North Pole, at 90 de- grees North latitude. The North Pole is locat- ed about 725 kilometres north of Greenland in the middle of the Arctic Ocean, where the sea has a depth of around 4 087 metres. There are several definitions of the Arc- tic, one being the land and sea north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33' North), which is also the approximate southern limit of the Mid- night Sun and the Polar Nights. Another is the line above which the average daily tem- perature of the warmest month (July) does not rise above 10 °C. The area north of the tree line, or permafrost area, is also used to determine the Arctic, permafrost being pe- rennially frozen ground that remains at or below zero °C (32 °F) for two or more years. In this article, the Arctic shall mean the area north of the Arctic Circle.

free passage across the Arctic, and the open- ing of new cost-effective shipping routes be- tween Europe/North America and Asia. So no wonder why the Arctic region is on the legal and political agenda of many Arctic and other states. This article intends to shed some light on what is happening in the Arctic. It will, how- ever, only take a look at some topics and only scratch the surface. Hopefully, though, this will be sufficient to inspire readers to learn more on their own.

Source: Arctic Climate The retreating ice-shelf: Definition of the Arctic Impact Assessment “The Arctic is warming The word “Arctic” is thought to come from (ACIA), 2004, Impacts nearly twice as fast as the the Greek word arkεtos, meaning “bear”. It of a Warming Arctic. rest of the earth.”

62 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 ARCTIC

Arctic Climate We know that the earth’s temperature fluctu- ates naturally, and, that the earth currently is in an interglacial period (in between ice- ages). Solar variability and volcanic aerosols are well known to have an impact on the cli- mate. Snow and ice reflect solar energy, and less ice and snow will cause more energy to be received and assimilated by the sea/soil. We further know that Arctic shrinkage leads to captured methane being released from the ice and the permafrost. A rise in greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions driven by human activity leads to a warming in the atmosphere of the earth. Human-created changes to the climate result in uncertain predictions for the future. Scientists agree that the climate of the Arctic region is changing. Evidence of the rise in temperature is provided by hard data gathered from the last 40 years of recording Helicopter view of U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard ships in the Arctic Ocean. Photo by Jessica Robertson, U.S. Geological Survey © USGC. and research. The climate in the Arctic is harsh and strong winds appear frequently. Precipita- tion is low and mainly in the form of snow. the last 2 000 years (average of 3-5 °C). The Social aspects The weather is known for its unpredictability last 30 years have seen a radical and disturb- Today eight nations see themselves as Arctic and rapid changes. Storms may intensify due ing change, though with a rise in temperature states. These are (population in brackets): the to increased temperature. Polar cyclones oc- of 2 °C. The Gulf Stream not only has an effect United States (313 million), Canada (35 mil- cur, caused by low depression, and are likely on the climate, but is also affected by changes lion), Denmark (5.7 million) and Greenland to move further north in the future, thus to the climate. There are several scenarios for (57 000), Finland (5.4 million), Iceland (320 providing safer weather conditions south in us to consider that threaten the Gulf Stream 000), Norway (5 million), Russia (143 mil- the Arctic basin. Air temperatures vary from as it exists today, while also reinforcing the lion), Sweden (9.4 million). Approximately year to year, and there are local differences. At effects of an increase in temperature. 4 million of these live in the Arctic, mainly present, at some locations in the Arctic, the Arctic sea ice fields show enormous dif- holding jobs in sectors such as natural re- air temperature has risen by up to 6 °C dur- ferences between summer (September -low) sources exploitation, security, research and ing the last 30 years. In Norway, the average and winter (March -high). Indeed, they likely provision of support services to people living temperature for March 2012 was recorded as reached their maximum extent for the year on and operating in the area. the warmest March ever since weather data 18 March 2012 covering 15.24 million square started being tracked back in the 19th century. kilometres, while the average minima over History We also know that the oceans conveyor the last years have varied between 4 million After the establishment of NATO in 1949, belts, especially the Gulf Stream, have had and 7 million square kilometres and show the militarization of the Arctic continued a large impact on the Arctic climate. Warm declining trend. Research has shown that the throughout the Cold War. As a result of water from the Pacific Equatorial Current is multi-year ice in the Arctic is slowly declin- America’s polar strategy, radar early warning brought past the coast of the United States ing compared to first year ice. Permafrost loss systems and airbases were set up from Alaska as well as up north along the European west per year has been steadily increasing and the to Greenland. Inside the Soviet Union, the coast before flowing into the Arctic Ocean. mean Arctic sea ice thickness is in decline. Kola Peninsula became a core area for nucle- This has given a hospitable climate and ice- Current estimates are that the Arctic is ar submarines, strategic bombers, and home free ports on both the east and west coasts warming nearly twice as fast as the rest of base for the Northern Fleet. In 1958, the U.S. of the United States, Canada, and Iceland, as the earth. The Arctic area is very sensitive to nuclear submarine Nautilus accomplished well as along the Norwegian coast and that of climate change and whether defined by the the first undersea voyage to the geographic Northwest Russia. After the water is cooled tree-line, the temperature line or the per- North Pole. in the Arctic, it sinks and then travels back mafrost line, is likely to continue to shrink. NATO focused on collective defence to the equator to be warmed up again. Scien- Because of the different factors with second and how to best defend its members from tific research has proved that the Gulf Stream and third order reinforcing effects, it is hard the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Alli- temperature off the coast of Svalbard (Fram to provide solid predictions of how fast the ance (WP). In North Norway defence infra- Strait at 1 500 metres depth, 79 degrees Arctic is actually shrinking and when it will structure was established as part of NATO’s North) has remained remarkably stable over eventually stop doing so. strategy for allied reinforcements. Detailed ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 63 ARCTIC

temporary. One of the achievements is the 2010 Search and Rescue Agreement: Agree- ment on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, which is the first legally binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council. All Arctic states are concerned about sustainable development of the environ- ment. The key words here are protecting in- digenous peoples and their way of life, as well as the existing biodiversity. This effort will be valuable for many generations to come. The energy security risk is assessed as very low for the Arctic littoral states. Their energy requirements are met and supplied, and there are adequate agreements and some cross-border transmission capacity. The Nautilus: the world’s first Arctic submarine, 21 January 1954, in the The necessary infrastructure to support new Thames River shortly after a christening ceremony. Photo by U.S. Navy. exploitation sites is not in place, though. Sustainability and security will need to be planning and exercises to prepare forces and Policy built into the plans to this effect. headquarters for a possible war against the Arctic region policies have some common- There are still nuclear waste, weapons WP were undertaken on an annual basis. alities across the five littoral states, even if and reactors in the Russian part of the region. Between 1950 and 1990, around 132 nuclear their focus and priorities inevitably vary The states involved share a common interest weapons tests were conducted on the island to a certain degree. All the Arctic states to control these facilities and find adequate of Novaja Zemlja in the Soviet Union part are preoccupied with sovereignty (and the solutions for storage and safeguarding. of the Arctic. Military intelligence gathering means to defend it, such as coastguard and Constant surveillance and assessments and capability development were extreme defence forces), their right to exploit natural of the climate and the human activity in the on both sides. The Russian Federation was resources, commercial development, mari- Arctic are essential for a nation’s ability to re- founded in 1991 following the dissolution of time shipping, increase in human activ- spond to a given situation and develop good the Soviet Union. ity, scientific research for future usage, and strategies. The requirement for control of ex- protection of the environment. Research isting legislation and judicial matters within Legal aspects has been an international effort through a their own areas of responsibility, as well as A legal framework, accepted by all states collaborative network. The nations’ govern- the other states’ willingness and capability to present in the region is paramount to coop- mental and non-governmental organiza- do the same, are also essential to confidence eration and security. The five nations bor- tions all contribute to the common interests. building and trust between states. dering the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Information is shared, but does information Non-Arctic states mainly pursue eco- Norway, Russia and the United States) have sharing include sharing all types of informa- nomic interests in the Arctic like natural agreed that the 1982 United Nations Con- tion and, if so, to what extent? resources (oil and gas), shipping routes, vention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) tourism and fisheries. They are always on is to form the legal basis for all activities in Today the eight nations that see the watch for new strategic realignments. the region. The states all want secure access themselves as Arctic states are all mem- Naval presence in the Arctic has so far been and their share of available natural resourc- bers of the Arctic Council. Six indigenous limited to vessels from European states. es to foster economic activity and prosper- people are also represented on the Arctic ity. Nations strongly anticipate oil and gas Council through the following organiza- Economy extraction, mining, fishing and shipping tions: Aleut International Association, Arc- The Artic states already have a significant within their territorial waters (12 nautical tic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council economic interest in the Arctic. Indeed the miles), and Exclusive Economic Zone (200 International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Arctic contribution to their Gross Domes- nautical miles). All the littoral states pursue Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples tic Products (GDP) is today approximately Extended Continental Shelf recognition. In of the North, Siberia and Far East, and the twelve percent for Russia, six percent for 2008, Arctic littoral states committed to ap- Sami Council. Established in 1996, the Arc- Norway, and less than one percent for Can- ply the existing legal framework to delimita- tic Council serves as a high-level intergov- ada, Denmark (Greenland) and the USA. tion in the Arctic. ernmental forum for political and scientific This is a clear indication of the Arctic’s im- discussions on common issues. Observers portance to some nations, and hence, their are permitted and can be permanent or increased political and economic focus on ►►►

64 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 ARCTIC

future development and exploitation of its A harsh winter climate and the absence tanker traffic is mainly resupply of smaller assests. Fish has been the silver of the Arc- of major population centres, and any exten- settlements and extraction of industrial tic for a long time. Also the whales, seals and sive commerce and cooperation have led to goods and materials. Most activity is ob- other species used to be important as prey the Arctic having a very minimal supporting served along the Norwegian coast and the by humans. Arctic waters hold large quan- shore side infrastructure, the only exception Northwest coast of Russia. tities of fish. Typical species caught include being the infrastructure found along the Tourism so far is not very common, cod, char, flounder, capelin, sucker, trout and Norwegian and Russian coastlines. For each except for polar expeditions. The last 10-15 whitefish only to mention a few. Fisheries littoral state, the marine infrastructure cur- years, however, have seen growing aware- have increased steadily in recent years, most- rently includes about 50 ports, of which the ness of the Arctic and tourism is up, ranging ly due to the warmer climate and the large largest is Murmansk (330 000 inhabitants) from private polar expeditions to Northern amount of resources. Vessels tend to go to located in Northwest Russia. The largest U.S. Light (Aurora Borealis) or polar bear (Ursus Arctic seas for longer and longer periods of port is Kodiak (6 273), while for Canada it Maritinus) viewing trips. time each year. Fisheries are seasonal, rather is Iqaluit (6 200), for Norway Tromsø (68 Tourists arrive by boat (passenger ves- than year-round, with the highest fishing ef- sels, ferries) or air to one of the few civilian fort occuring around autumn and winter. airfields or ports that exist. The ferry activity Norway is the Arctic state that ben- is almost year-round, while passenger ves- efits the most. This includes ownership of sels come mainly during the summer sea- around half of the number of fishing vessels, son. Cruise ships tend to focus on Svalbard,

while Russia profiles as a good number two. Nordkapp, Norway Greenland and the Canadian archipelago. Fisheries are concentrated in the Norwegian There is also some activity in U.S. and Rus- and Barents Seas. No fishing activities are sian waters. Recent predictions about natu- observed in the Arctic basin – north of 82 200) and for Greenland Nuuk, also known ral resources such as gas, oil and minerals degrees North latitude. A rigid monitoring, as Godthaab (15 047). These ports are where look promising for some Arctic states. Most control and surveillance system has been the population exists. The states all see em- of the known petroleum deposits are within established in Norwegian as well as Russian phasis on developing the infrastructure as a Exclusive Economic Zones. national waters to crack down on illegal, foundation for economic and social growth. Today, petroleum activity and develop- unreported and unregulated fishing so as to Recent years have seen a small increase in ment are conducted gradually at a controlled help sustain fisheries and saving species for overall marine shipping activity, always ex- pace. Most offshore activity is performed by future generations. pected to peak in September. The cargo and combinations of consortiums from multiple

Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold In addition to Norwegian newspapers and media, for more background information see the further reading below:

http://www.arcticportal.org http://www.arctic-council.org http://www.grida.no http://nsidc.org

Maps with overlays http://www.arcticpeoples.org http://www.kystverket.no/en/ http://en.wikipedia.org http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/ http://www.mapmatters.org http://natolibguides.info/arcticsecurity

The Norwegian Naval Home Guard vessel Olav Tryggvasson during the exercise Cold Response 2012. Photo by Nils Bernt Rinde

countries. The only offshore field currently tions and organizations from across Europe fer. Defence forces stationed in the Arctic in production in the Arctic is the Snøhvit and Asia. Observed mostly in the summer are equipped and trained primarily for cold (Snow White) gas field off North Norway. season, maritime research activities have weather operations. In respect of other units Located some 600 kilometres north of the increased by more than 100 percent over belonging to the Arctic states, but located Kola Peninsula, the Russian-controlled the last five years. Offshore research is un- outside of the Arctic region itself, capabili- Shtokman gas development is thought to be dertaken by a small number of ships and or- ties and skills vary. How many they are and one of the world’s largest natural gas fields ganizations. Russia and Norway own most how often they train also depend on their with reserves estimated at 3.8 trillion cubic of the research ships, while others come mission. Some smaller units have high skills metres of natural gas and more than 37 mil- from the United States, the UK, Germany, in winter war fighting, while others have lion tonnes of gas condensate. Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, and China, just situational awareness only. Sea lines of communications across the to mention the most important ones. Mari- Military tasks in the Arctic may typical- Arctic have been a human dream for almost time research ships have focused on the ly be: provision of assistance in support of half a millennium. Increased temperatures Norwegian and Barents Seas and tend to civilian security tasks; development of situ- and ice melting make this project more likely sail to different locations from year to year. ational awareness through surveillance and to succeed today than ever before. Depend- On land, Svalbard has become a centre for reconnaissance; search and rescue opera- ing on the ice state, the route could be north Arctic research. Around 20 countries were tions; regional security cooperation; disaster westerly or north easterly or a combination engaged in research work in or from Sval- response; maritime security; border control; of the two. Current experience and short- bard in 2011. air, sea and land control; power projection; term predictions favour the north easterly establishment of operational or logistical route, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), some- Military presence and role bases; deterrence; air and missile defence times referred to as the North East Passage. All Arctic States use their military means − to mention only a few. This includes the To get an idea of the distance savings avail- and coast guard in support of their national protection of certain military capabilities able from a transit through the Arctic, a ship interests. Iceland, however, has a coast guard and continuous intelligence operations. will have to travel 12 200 kilometres only but no defence forces. The military ambi- Today, for most of the Arctic states, to get from New York to Yokohama, Japan tions among the Arctic states differ. Some of long-term political and economic interests while the distance via the Panama Canal them use military forces to support civilian are the main factors driving their Arctic is 15 800 kilometres. Today, the amount of tasks, others not. Command, Control and military development. With the Arctic shipping across Arctic waters is low, with all Communications vary, as do responsibili- NATO member countries for the last ten the activity being seen on the Russian side. ties and missions. None of the Arctic states years focused on operations in Iraq and About 20 ships made the passage last year, can be said to have an aggressive military Afghanistan (desert), Arctic and maritime mostly in late summer. stance although the actual presence of mili- high intensity war fighting has been reduced Maritime research has grown in interest tary personnel may, at times, be interpreted in priority to a manageable level. and importance over the last decade, involv- and perceived as if they do. The threshold ing not only the Arctic states, but also na- for using military force is thought to dif- ►►►

66 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 ARCTIC

Information Infrastructure in the The Arctic states share information through Arctic: Map by UNEP/ GRID-Arendal. a variety of means. These range from orga- nizational meetings, bilateral talks, press conferences, media events, internet sites, exchange of scientific reports and findings, etc. The Arctic states all utilize media to dis- seminate information in line with their pub- lic relations strategies. Strategic communi- cation is one thing that one cannot afford to neglect in our time. It is utilized to share opinions, try out opinions, affect opinions or show ability to enforce decisions as a “player”. A free media sector must be able to cover all of the Arctic and its peoples. Small interest groups must be heard and all aspects of knowledge must be shared. To- day, Arctic governmental and non-govern- mental organizations utilize the internet to share information and documents and for communication. Social media allow for fast communication with huge masses of people simultaneously. Arctic universities and col- leges linked in a network is another positive way of sharing knowledge, products and opinions in order to build confidence and reinforce knowledge and understanding.

Future challenges Arctic states have many political interests in common. Their priorities, however, may has to be followed by an analysis and shar- as to prevent undesired effects at some later not always be the same, and this may cause ing of information on a regional basis to en- stage. The long-term effect of the Chernobyl conflict of interests. Several boundary issues sure that trends and/or serious implications nuclear accident (Ukraine, 1986), for in- have been resolved lately, one proof of which are spotted at an early stage. stance, is still felt in the Arctic. The sheer is the maritime delimitation agreement be- Natural resources are considered to be presence of nuclear weapons and waste can tween the Russian Federation and Norway, sufficient for the near future, but are not even- be perceived as a threat. A reduction of nu- which is a genuine example of an important ly distributed among the Arctic states. These clear capabilities in the Arctic will likely be step forward. Removing potential sources of export quite substantial amounts of energy looked upon as a confidence measure. future conflict is a continuous effort for all. such as fossil fuels, hydropower and nuclear A major concern across the Arctic is how The Arctic’s biodiversity is vast and energy. A more challenging factor, however, to maintain and secure future generations’ its ecosystems are vulnerable. Climate is the outside world’s requirements for en- possibilities of exploiting the living resources changes will impact the survival of species, ergy. Energy can be utilized as a political tool of the ocean such as fish. So far, there are the migration of some species and human to promote national interests. Approximately few documented adverse effects of a warmer utilization of species for prosperity and 80 percent of the gas supplies from Rus- Arctic. What is certain, though, is that fishing economic growth. The various policies and sia to Europe flow through pipelines across fleets will migrate where the fish is, travelling agreements governing fish catches and land- Ukraine. This situation has caused rows that farther from ports and staying longer at sea. ings, marine fisheries minimum sizes, legal have grown into transnational political is- Illegal fishing is likely to occur at the same fishing gear, etc. require special attention to sues. Also the Arctic region may come under locations as legal fishing. If this trend contin- prevent nations from damaging an already influence, and face pressure, from countries ues, increased surveillance, control measures, very vulnerable ecosystem. Discord is likely short of energy resources. security forces and search and rescue capa- to occur in the event of failure not only to Nuclear weapons reduction and nucle- bilities will be required. Solid agreements on share information and data, but also to adopt ar waste reduction are a priority for smaller legal issues and regulations, adequate com- tough decisions binding on all. Knowledge states as part of their focus on non-prolif- munications and ability to communicate in is key to success but should be coupled with eration and nuclear free zones in an effort the same language at the appropriate level a strict control regime and a wide data col- to eliminate potential risks of environmen- will become all the more important in the lection focus. And of course, such an effort tal disasters and sources of conflicts, as well future due to increased activity. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 67 ARCTIC

Development in general and extraction the oil to burning it. Oil trapped in pock- and the ability to solve future challenges of natural resources in the Arctic will lead ets under the ice presents the most intri- together. NATO’s future regional focus will to increased shipping traffic. New popula- cate challenge for which there are currently need some creative thinking. An adequate tion centres may be established and existing no solutions. A blowout or oil spill from NATO comprehensive approach in respect ones will grow, thus requiring more trans- a tanker could have very negative effects of the Arctic is required. The know-how portation of goods and materials. There are across borders and impact relations across and the ability to operate military forma- relatively few aids for navigation, and com- the whole region. So it is essential to ensure tions in cold weather conditions need to be munication relays have poor coverage ex- that exploitation of oil and gas is tightly bal- sustained. This requires frequent training cept along the year-round ice-free coastline. anced with the need to preserve and protect and exercises. More military cooperation New routes offer few major ports or safe ha- the environment. Response equipment for and transparency among the Arctic States, vens. Search and rescue capabilities are lim- handling oil spills on water need to be devel- including Russia, will most likely contribute ited. Navigating the Arctic is not risk-free. oped to allow for a robust response should a to the further development of the NATO- Sailors of the region are aware of the chal- contingency arise. This will also reduce the Partnership for Peace programme. lenges, outsiders sometimes not so much. risk of environmental activists making high With a potentially increasing shipping sec- profile protests, which may turn violent Summary tor, the authorities together with the sector and, if they materialize, may not only im- There are many future challenges to cope will have to improve climate predictability pact decisions on exploitation and strategic with in the Arctic, some already known, and develop common regulations, as well planning, but also tarnish public image and some yet to be known. The increased activ- as basic infrastructure and support to help international relations. ity in the region brings demands that we act sustain continued operations. New and stable transportation lines as responsible stewards of the fragile Arctic Tourism will most likely increase. The across the Arctic would make it easier and environment for the good of all, in particu- Arctic is still seen as quite an exotic destina- more cost-effective for trade between the lar future generations. More commercial, tion, and warmer climate and a recent in- Western world and Asia. Distances from maritime and tourist activity will increase crease in civilian air and shipping traffic will production sites to markets may be short- the risk of accidents, disasters and illegal draw attention as long as rates are kept low ened by as much as 7 000 kilometres. This activities. Such negative impacts must be enough. No doubt there will be incidents in could lead to renewed interest in, and re- planned for, and due account must be taken the future, which again demands adequate newed prospects for, cooperation between of the need to protect and preserve the en- and reliable search and rescue capabilities. the nations involved. However, weather vironment. Revitalizing or expanding Arc- There is minimal risk of conflict being conditions on the Arctic route will remain tic military capabilities is something that is caused by disagreement over ownership of harsher than on other existing routes. Pack driven by national strategic interests. More petroleum resources. There are, however, ice and ice-covered waters are chokepoints, transparency should be the norm for infor- other challenges to consider and overcome. as are drifting icebergs and ice, which will mation on military activities in the Arctic in Exploitation of oil and gas is not easy given continue to pose a challenge. Pack ice may order to reduce the risk of incidents and po- the harsh environment. A lot of appropri- be as deep as 40 metres. Other challenges litical spill-over but should not hinder good ate technology is being developed and goes include lack of predictability, rapid changes cooperation and future development since hand in hand with the commercial require- to weather and ice conditions, icing of ships, all have a common interest in solving Arctic ments and prosperity outlook of the states darkness (winter time), fog (summer) and challenges. involved. Building oil or gas installations, high seas. For the foreseeable future, con- It is important that nations have a long- whether fixed or mobile, and rugged enough ventional shipping routes are likely to con- term perspective on the development of the to withstand the climate conditions, includ- tinue to be used as they offer the advantage Arctic. Building trust and confidence among ing massive amounts of drifting pack ice, is of being more secure. Also inland logistics the Arctic states is paramount to success. As a challenge. Huge distances, scarce popula- and transhipment infrastructure need con- are the acceptance of legal frameworks and tion and little infrastructure only add to the siderable development to favour a maritime the willingness to solve future disputes and complexity. Sustaining an operation will re- route across Arctic waters. Increased ship- issues jointly, in existing or new arenas. In quire heavy support infrastructure. ping would result in security challenges, and respect of countries outside the Arctic, the Given the fragility of the eco-ystem, the Bering Strait could become a new mari- Arctic states need to share more information large blowouts could pose a significant time chokepoint. and knowledge in order to instill confidence threat to the biodiversity and long-lasting Knowledge, more transparency and and gain support, which is important in or- survival of sea life. How to contain pollu- more cooperation in terms of military ac- der to help foster constructive development tion, were a blowout or oil spill to occur, tivities are essential in reducing the per- and good cooperation in the future. The ob- is challenging. Today, equipment exists for ceived tension in the Arctic. Today, we see served increase in activity in the Arctic over open water handling, and progress is made a rise in training events, especially on the the last years provides clear evidence of on- on how to tackle blowouts and oil spills in Canadian, Norwegian and Russian side. going changes in, and growing interest for, waters with ice conditions. Experiments are It is important for the common interest to the region. This is unique in that it creates being conducted to better understand a va- include Russia and other Arctic states in not only new challenges, but also, and more riety of clean-up options, from containing common exercises as it allows building trust importantly, new opportunities. 

68 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012  Cover Story

Afghanistan ISAF TE 11/02 Interview Special Operations Forces to become more in demand beyond 2014

By Inci Kucukaksoy PAO, Joint Warfare Centre

The Commander of U.S. Special working alongside local communities in se- Village Stability Operations are the pri- Forces, Admiral William H. McRaven, lected rural villages, helping build and train mary effort of the Special Operations Forces who commanded the Special Operations local police forces to defeat the insurgency, due to the fact that turning over security team that captured and killed Osama bin engaging in tactical firefights with the en- responsibility to Afghan National Security Laden, summarized principles of the special emy and improving the population’s percep- Forces (ANSF), even though they are well- operations as: Simplicity, Security, Repeti- tion of the central government and ISAF/ trained and properly equipped, also neces- tion, Surprise, Speed and Purpose. In Af- Coalition troops. sitates the mobilization of the rural villages ghanistan linking with the population and Helping build trust in a peaceful future that are outside the Afghan Government’s firepower solutions go hand in hand for is an exceptionally daring and demand- range of security in order to protect and the Special Operations Forces. However, it ing task. Known as “Village Stability Op- serve the country. is their unconventional warfare capabilities erations”, the strategic goal of this four-stage The training of ANSF is critical for that receive more attention than their men- programme (Shape, Hold, Build and Tran- Afghanistan’s future. Commander of ISAF torship and training role in the counter- sition) is to strengthen local institutions at and U.S. troops in Afghanistan, U.S. Ma- insurgency (COIN) fight, which seeks to the village/district level, which ultimately rine Corps General John R. Allen, said the bring security and stability to the Afghan connects to the national-level governance people. In Afghanistan, while hunting ter- efforts, in order to stabilize the country. This Above (left): A village elder talks at a local rorists, killing and capturing their leaders effort also supports the end of the combat Shura. U.S. Army photo by Sgt Ben Watson. and discouraging any counter-attacks, the mission in Afghanistan, which has already (Right): Special Forces anti-insurgent Special Operations Forces have also been begun. operations, photo by U.S. DoD. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 69 training

ISAF TE 11/02: Special Operations Forces training at Ulsnes Training Facility, December 2011. Photo by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO.

The final Phase of the training on their “road to Kabul” for personnel from Force Command Madrid (FCMD), NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Spain (NRDC-SP) and US V Corps, as well as Individual Augmentees (IAs), deploying to HQ ISAF or IJC in the first few months of 2012 was held at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), Stavanger 2–15 December 2011. Over the past four years the Training Audience has grown from 175 per event to a peak of 383 personnel in December. The break down of personnel is very interesting and shows that personnel are coming from, not just within NATO, but also across the Globe. There were 105 from EUROCORPS, 83 from NRDC-SP, 64 from FCMD, 25 from US V Corps and 106 IAs from the ISAF Troop Contributing Nations. Non NATO personnel travelled from as far as Australia and New Zealand, as well as from the Ukraine and Ireland to attend the training. — Extracted from an article by Squadron Leader Dean Gibson, Royal Air Force, JFC Brunssum in Northern Star magazine.

following words in his COMISAF Letter to “As part of ISAF’s comprehensive COIN said, adding: “To conduct successful special the Troops, dated 18 July 2011: “In the field, campaign, the Village Stability Operations operations, we rely on logistics support and Afghan National Security Forces’ formations programme has achieved considerable suc- other specialties, such as medical expertise are growing in size and in confidence. Af- cess in selected villages across Afghanistan, and intelligence units. Without the support ghans are fighting for their country, and we and with full consent of the locals, in under- of HQ ISAF Joint Command and the Coali- must facilitate this everywhere we can, seek- mining the insurgency’s influence, reinforc- tion, special operations troops in Afghani- ing opportunities for Afghan leadership to ing the village elders and gaining trust of the stan cannot do what they do on the front step forward in their institutions and in the population for stabilization and reconcilia- lines. We are a small rapid team in combat field. Moving the ANSF to the lead, at every tion activities. Both in theory and practice and we heavily depend on everything that level, is crucial to success. We know our re- we are changing the overall relationship the larger force like HQ ISAF Joint Com- cruiting, development, and fielding plans re- with the Afghans. We are treating the local mand can provide.” main sound; and in the field, the ANSF want population as the primary solution in their “In general, the SOC-JC HQ mission to fight for their Afghanistan. The require- own security. Each individual is the main involves working with our Allies as well as ment for trainers and advisors will continue player and they understand that. Lasting working with the General Purpose Forces to to grow in importance and evolve over time.” peace and stability depends on full integra- help them understand how to execute joint tion of all national elements in Afghanistan. special operations. Particularly for Afghani- In order to explain the role of the We aim to create conditions for good gover- stan our aim is to explain how Special Op- Special Operations Forces within the over- nance, security and development, which are erations Forces can support the Joint Force all campaign in Afghanistan and give an the three tightly-woven pillars of the Village Commander’s Concept of Operations, and insight into the Village Stability Operations Security Operations. We are working hard how they can complement the mission. Here initiative, Colonel Stuart Goldsmith, the Op- to enable a responsible and effective transi- at the JWC, we explain what the U.S. Special erations Officer of U.S. Special Operations tion to Afghan security lead in 2014.” Operations in Afghanistan are doing, and Command – Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) Many nations serving in Afghanistan, what ISAF Special Operations Forces are HQ, and his team came to Stavanger, Nor- under the banner of NATO/ISAF, has doing, and how these together complement way, to participate in the ISAF pre-deploy- their elite special operations troops there NATO operations in country. This is espe- ment Training Event 11/02 (ISAF TE 11/02) conducting joint special operations for cially invaluable for prospective staffs get- run by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) from the overall mission success. Colonel Gold- ting ready to deploy that may not have a lot 2 to 15 December 2011. Goldsmith explained smith underlined the importance of unity of experience with the Special Operations the purpose of the training event: of effort: “We cannot save the day alone,” he Forces,” the Colonel further said. ►►►

70 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 TRAINING

“Because of the extraordinary courage and skill of our ISAF Coalition Partners, and the Afghan National Security Force’s fighting men and women, this spring and summer, the insurgents have come back to find that many of their caches are empty; their former strongholds are untenable; and a good many of their foot soldiers absent or unwilling to join the fight. And, most importantly, insurgents are facing a battle-tested and increasingly capable Afghan National Security Force that is also serving as a source of pride to the Afghan people and a symbol of unity for this country. During the last 12 months, the Afghan security forces have expanded from 276,000 to 340,000. They will reach their full surge strength ahead of the scheduled deadline in October.” — General John R. Allen, ComISAF, Chicago Summit, 21 May 2012. Photo by Christian Valverde, French Navy, ISAF PAO.

A Special Operations officer on the governance connect to district/province- the growth and development we have seen SOC-JC team noted that the JWC training level governance, development and security. through the Village Stability Operations ini- reflected the current and future security The district/province level then connects to tiative. The centre of gravity for the Special environment very realistically, especially the Afghan Government, which will ulti- Operations Forces in Afghanistan is the pop- preparing the Training Audience for uncon- mately support the rule of law in the coun- ulation and winning their support. COIN ventional threats. He said: “Through the Vil- try and build capacity for enduring stability. aims to defeat the insurgency but the priority lage Stability Operations across the country, What we have so far achieved through the is given to keeping the population safe. How- we establish relationships with many village Village Stability Operations programme is ever, we are not trained to hold a country elders, who are the main decision-makers. an extremely important investment for the without enough conventional forces to sup- Following the invitation of the elders, we future of Afghanistan.” port us for airpower, supplies and medical embed ourselves in Jirgas and Shuras to fully “The Training Audience in Stavanger is aid, so we are not without challenges.”  assess their individual security and devel- very receptive,” added Colonel Goldsmith. opment needs. These remote villages have “We identify their training needs, share either no or limited civil and security ser- best practices and lessons learned in tac- Extracts from ISAF Commander´s vices of the Afghan Government. If elders tics, techniques and procedures and help Enduring Priorities, May 2012 need increased security and have the will improve interoperability. The training at the to degrade insurgent influence and control, Joint Warfare Centre improves the efficien- we help them establish a local police force, cy and effectiveness of modern warfighters “We want the ANSF to be in the also known as the ‘Afghan Local Police’. We and adjusts their mindset about the mission lead. We think that is the right thing oversee that the right people are selected to of Special Operations Forces today and in to do. It is the ultimate symbol of make up the Afghan Local Police. We train the future. It will have a direct impact on the sovereignty of Afghanistan.” them, we live with them, fully embedded, ground. This is a real education.” — General John R. Allen Commander of ISAF and U.S. troops and we fight with them and gain their trust According to Colonel Goldsmith, there in Afghanistan and confidence. This is an extremely com- will be a growing role for Special Operations plex environment as it also supports the Forces in Afghanistan, once the majority of • The Coalition will continue to support nationwide Afghan-owned and Afghan-led conventional forces leave Afghanistan, to Afghanistan through 2014 and the “decade of transformation” that will follow. model of operations.” help prevent a potential return to chaos and According to the SOC-JC team, stabi- insurgency. • Transition is a reality; it is the Afghans lisation, achieved by dynamic interaction “We will be engaged in a pretty robust assuming the lead responsibility for with the locals, is the most effective instru- role in counter-terrorism and training, security with the international community in close support and partnership. ment in support of the Afghan government. both belonging to the realm of Special Op- Does the future of Afghanistan depend on erations. Special Operations Forces have • The ANSF’s combat effectiveness has villages resolved to battling insurgency? The the best trainers and the toughest fighters. begun to fracture the insurgency and The Special Operations officer responds: We will continue developing the capacity of persuade its commanders and fighters to reintegrate and return home. “This is a bottom-up COIN methodology Afghanistan’s national security forces to op- where the tribal leaders and village-level erate effectively. We are very encouraged by

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 71 JWC Office of the Legal Advisor NATO Training and Exercise Support

By Colonel Brian H. Brady, USA A U.S. Army Staff Judge Advocate CJIATF 435

 Continued from Page 47. The ISAF exercise construct duties requiring creativity, and include the The JWC lead LEGAD officer forIS AF train- following: scenario development including ing must have some experience or knowledge “preparing United Nations Security Council of the ISAF mandate in order to be effective. Resolutions, Status of Forces Agreements;” The JWC lead LEGAD is expected to serve, prepare EXPLAN Annex, Rules of Engage- NATO collective training and inter alia, in the following roles: LEGAD ment; assist with scripting for legal realism; exercises Subject Matter Expert (SME); Functional serve as Observer/Trainer during Phases 1, 2, JWC’s Programme of Work (POW) is Area Training (FAT)/Battle Staff Training and 3; prepare briefs or point papers on legal weighted heavily in favor of Allied Com- (BST) moderator for the LEGAD training issues (ROE, LOAC, legal basis for the mis- mand Transformation’s exercise and training audience; instructor on legal topics during sion). The Observer/Trainer role may include mission. JWC is not just a training platform, Mission Specific Training (MST) and Cross- travel to a JFC to assist the LEGAD staff in however, since it also works transformation FAT; and role player during the exercise. their roles or present the legal scenario to the projects, which will be discussed in the final During my tour at JWC, I was fortunate training audience. Knowledge of NATO doc- section of this article. From my perch, JWC’s to have deployed to Afghanistan twice. JWC trine, Command and Control structures and biggest focus is upon ISAF Training Events, may send its personnel to Kabul during operational processes (such as ROE and joint ISAF Predeployment Training (IAPDT), the ISAF Training Refinement Conference targeting) are critical skills. and STEADFAST (NATO Response Force/ or Data Capture. While travel to theater is NRF) exercises and training. These exercise challenging, it pays off by giving JWC per- Exercise logistics and training events require significant build sonnel personal knowledge of the latest Exercise logistical support and host na- up and participation from the commands command arrangements and processes. As tion support are identified up to five years that JWC supports. Key NATO training a LEGAD it gave me key insights to theater in advance of a NATO exercise under the guidance comes from Bi-SC 75-3, which not LEGADs at not only HQ ISAF and the IJC Military Training and Exercise Program only outlines the collective training process but also NTM-A, and a handful of other le- (MTEP). As part of the MTEP process, but also key roles played by commanders in gal offices, (such as RC-North’s LEGAD, and the Strategic Commands identify the host ACT and ACO. Norway’s Contingency Command Legal Of- nation for the exercise. Templates for re- The commander (e.g., SACEUR or fice both located in Marz-e-Sharif). questing and developing HNs agreements COM JFC Brunssum) requiring an exer- ISAF training events depend in large part are found in Allied Joint Publication (AJP) cise is designated the Officer Scheduling the upon SMEs from theatre. During the past 4.5A. For logisticians and LEGADs alike, Exercise (OSE) who places the requirement two ISAF training events, JWC-sponsored AJP 4.5A provides a useful template, which on NATO’s master exercise calendar and es- SMEs have included not only HQ ISAF and is useful not just for exercises but also oth- tablishes command training objectives. The IJC LEGADs but also NATO Training Mis- er operational logistical support require- OSE may designate an Officer Conducting sion-Afghanistan (NTM-A) LEGADs who ments. Note that some nations may require the Exercise (OCE) who may command a bring a critical perspective for the transition substantial staffing to accept HNS MOUs, NATO Force Structure entity (e.g., COM phase of the ISAF mission. The prospective Technical Arrangements. Other processes NRDC Italy). In turn the OSE will designate JWC LEGAD cannot rely on SMEs alone and exist to obtain support within NATO out- an OfficerD irecting the Exercise (ODE). must possess rudimentary knowledge of the side of normal acquisition channels. These The ODE “supports the OCE for the de- ISAF mission. Consequently, this portfolio rules developed as a result of NATO experi- tailed planning and overall execution of the demands a lawyer who is deployable and ence during United States’ Return of Forces exercise by creating the conditions, which equipped for missions down range to obtain to Germany (REFORGER) exercises in the allow the achievement of the exercise aim currency in ISAF operations. 1970s when Host Nations declined to be and objectives.” JWC is normally the ODE bound by U.S. contracting clauses and the and supports exercises and training through The NRF exercise construct Department of Defense found its operations scenario development, Lessons Learned NRF training takes a different tack from to be impeded by foreign military sales and capture, analysis, and execution of the script ISAF exercises and uses a phased approach offshore procurement legal regimes.(22) system known as the Joint Exercise Manage- to develop an operational level staff. The As an outgrowth of this experience, many ment Module, JEMM. JWC lead LEGAD has several additional NATO Nations and entities (such as SHAPE) ►►►

72 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 NEWCOMERS

have what are now known as Acquisition and a force multiplier and provides TCN com- Upon review of Operation UNIFIED PRO- Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) with manders with additional operational tools TECTOR (OUP – the NATO-led mission to the United States, enabled under the succes- in their legal kitbags. enforce the UNSCR mandate in Libya) SA- sor law to the NATO Mutual Support Act of In an Alliance operation, Alliance rules CEUR declared that NATO must train more 1979. During a recent exercise in Germany it provide both the political and military frame- lawyers, amongst other personnel, to assist was necessary to remind both parties (NATO work for unity of effort. Under NATO doc- with Targeting. JWC assists with that goal and a HN) that a Standard NATO Agreement trine, there are three types of multinational during its two annual ISAF Training Events, (STANAG) existed to provide equipment to command structures: Fully Integrated; Lead and two NATO Response Force (NRF)/ NATO and that no basis existed to subject Nation; Framework Nation. NATO is the STEADFAST series exercises. Three months NATO personnel to a HN property account- prime example of an Integrated Command before Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples ability regime. One lesson learned is that for Structure, which provides a common um- executed OUP it had participated in NRF ex- an ACSA to work, an official designated as an brella of ROE, staff procedures and political ercise STEADFAST JUNO 10. As a LEGAD ACSA Officer must be present during Initial aims. ISAF is NATO-led but is complement- Observer/Trainer, I had the unique opportu- Planning Conferences to determine NATO ed by Operation ENDURING FREEDOM nity of working with the JFC Naples LEGAD or other sending nation’s support require- (OEF), which is a Lead-Nation Command as they refined their operational capabilities. ments. Note also that the definition of HN and Control structure characterized by ad The following sections outline some com- may include another sending state that has hoc bilateral arrangements. During ISAF mon issue areas that are exercised at JWC. a facility location on a receiving states’ soil. pre-deployment exercises, the LEGAD must Finally, remember that entering into agree- make distinctions between NATO authori- Rules of Engagement (ROE) ments with a nation requires appropriate ties and Lead-Nation authorities since many NATO has its own Rules of Engagement as authority to negotiate and conclude an inter- commanders are dual-hatted depending on part of its integrated Alliance Command national agreement. mission type or national caveat. During ISAF and Control structure. The LEGAD who ad- exercises it is common to hear the term “co- vises a commander on operational matters Alliance/Integrated Command alition forces” used to describe NATO TCNs. needs to be versed in the general menu of Structure operations Strictly speaking under ISAF´s Military NATO ROE. ANNEX E of NATO OPLANs Technical Agreement (MTA) with Afghani- will contain operationally tailored ROE, “[W]hen a group of countries wants to launch stan, only forces assigned to or partnered which are approved by the North Atlantic a joint intervention as a coalition – which with the US-led OEF are defined as “coali- Council (NAC). The key guidance is issued confers political legitimacy – only NATO can tion forces”: in practice all players in-theatre, via ROE Implementation message (ROE- provide the common command structure and ISAF or OEF, are referred to as coalition IMPL – pronounced “Row-impull”), which capabilities necessary to plan and execute forces despite the technical distinction under give detailed rules tailored to the mission. complex operations.”(23) the MTA. While the mission in Afghanistan Additional legal definitions and guidance is a team effort demanding complementary will be contained in the OPLAN’s legal AN- JWC has a critical role preparing the staff capabilities of all ranges of command and NEX AA. NATO does not issue ROE on self of NATO Command Structure and NATO control structures, non-military entities, un- defence, because NATO considers self de- Force Structure entities for their operation- der the Comprehensive Approach, NATO fence to be a matter of national law. NATO al-level roles. There are few better opportu- LEGADs must make accurate use of termi- exercises give plenty of opportunity to test nities than a JWC exercise or training event nology to ensure their commanders can le- sufficiency of ROE and use of force. to learn about Alliance operations and pro- verage all the appropriate legal tools available cesses at the operational level. Just as impor- to them while wearing the right “hat.” tantly, JWC collective exercises and training (22) For the seminal discussion of this history see provides a unique opportunity to network Build NATO legal capacity for Captain Fred T. Pribble (now Colonel retired and with other LEGADs who will likely col- future operations General Counsel for the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency), A Comprehensive Look at the NATO Mu- laborate in real world operations where the tual Support Act of 1979, Military Law Review, July luxury of the “crawl-walk-run” approach to However successful, NATO’s intervention in 89, pp.187-255. (23 & 24) Daadler, Ivo H. and Stavridis James S. training, including ice breakers, will be long Libya suggested that the organization must Admiral U.S. Navy [Supreme Allied Commander Eu- past. JWC must constantly advertise oppor- strengthen its basic infrastructure if it hopes rope and U.S. European Command], NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention, tunities for LEGADs. In order to do this, to increase its role in global security . . . With- FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March-April 2012, p. 4. The au- the JWC LEGAD must network with Troop in the command structure, for example, the thors go further by comparing NATO Alliance oper- Contributing Nations’ (TCN) legal staff, Alliance has failed to devote the necessary re- ations to multilateral coalitions which “by contrast, have no common doctrine for conducting military their assignments offices and training de- sources to developing key skills, including the operations, no common capabilities or command partments. For LEGADs whose command- capacity to find and engage the types of mo- structure for quickly integrating national forces into a cohesive campaign, and no standing mechanisms ers are dual-hatted as a leader of a NATO bile targets common in contemporary opera- for debating then deciding on an agreed course command or force, JWC collective training tions, plan joint operations in parallel with of action. Such ad hoc coalitions therefore almost always rely disproportionately on a single nation puts the legal issues into perspective. The fast-paced political decision-making, support to bear the brunt of security burdens that ideally mix of national and NATO authorities is the targeting process with legal advice . . . (24) should be more equally shared.” ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 73 NEWCOMERS

One overlooked aspect of NATO ROE HQ ISAF has pushed the targeting pro- testing their validity. Second, JWC convenes exercises is fixing the role of the ROE Staff cess to the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), working groups to analyze and develop Officer – a post on the PE or Crisis Estab- which manages the Targeting Operations NATO concepts such as the Comprehensive lishment manning document that locates Cell (TOC) and a variety of working groups Approach. As a LEGAD, the Comprehensive this officer in the Operations Directorate or and boards to nominate, approve, then ser- Approach lends itself to examination of the CJ3 of a NATO operational staff. In some vice the target. The IJC has split the normal legal relationships between NATO forces cases that officer may be a trained LEGAD, NATO practice into two processes: kinetic and civil-military actors. The legal aspects but may not be operating under the direct targeting is handled by the Joint Target- created by the relationship between non- supervision of the command’s Chief LE- ing Working Group (JTWG – pronounced NATO actors and NATO-oriented actors GAD. From a Chief LEGAD perspective, “Jit-Wig”) resulting in the Joint Prioritized in CIMIC, Stability Operations, and Rule of this is the time to ensure that only officers Effects List (JPEL—pronounced “Jay-Pel”); Law lend themselves to doctrine develop- assigned to the command’s LEGAD deliver and non-kinetic targeting which results in ment. For example, the newly established legal advice. Ultimately ROE are a com- the Joint Prioritized Influence List (JPSIL— NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission mander’s tool, therefore the ROE StaffO f- pronounced “Jip-Sill”). Training all deploy- (NROLFSM) as a subordinate command of ficer should be an operations officer so that ing LEGADs in this core process ensures COMISAF will present an excellent oppor- the operations community can build capac- that NATO forces comply not only with in- tunity for NATO to fine tune the definition ity in developing ROE. ternational law but also command intent to of Rule of Law and how it is executed. minimize civilian casualties. NATO doctrine Targeting provides LEGADs with additional tools to Multiple Futures While knowing the ROE and sliding scale of facilitate delivery of cogent legal advice. ACE ACT sponsored a review of drivers of change national defence rules, it all comes together Directive (AD) 80-70, Annex K provides an in an attempt to identify emerging threats in Targeting. NATO has a refined Target- extensive list of desired effects and Targeting and the security implications they pose for ing process. This process results in what is options for a commander. When combined NATO. As part of ACT’s and JWC’s trans- known as the Joint Prioritized Target List with NAC-approved targets and command- formational review of NATO concepts and (JPTL – pronounced “Jay-Pit-ul”). Under er’s intent, this doctrine provides LEGADs a doctrine, JWC can integrate various futures the standard process, practiced during NRF meaningful way to articulate their advice and into its exercise scenarios to explore opera- exercises, the JPTL includes both kinetic achieve a rational operational end state. tional ways and means to neutralize future and non-kinetic (e.g., influence) targets. threats. The Comprehensive Approach is a NATO Targeting is part of an Effects Based NATO Concepts, Doctrine and start down this path. Additionally, NATO Approach to Operations (EBAO). NATO’s Integration experiments in scenarios operating under emerging operations doctrine formulated JWC, as SACT’s agent, will be responsible for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations in the Comprehensive Operations Planning managing collective experimentation in exer- can address the legal issues that arise from Directive (COPD) reinforces use of effects cises. JWC will assign an Experimentation In- increased cooperation with non-NATO en- in NATO planning as part of what it terms tegrator and lead the Operational Experimen- tities. As NATO transforms its structures, the “Comprehensive Approach.” The effects tation and Capability Integration Process. new staff processes have to develop to rap- approach is also used at the joint operation- Furthermore, JWC provides concept integra- idly counter asymmetric future threats. al level by the United States, although it may tion of innovative or mature concepts (meth- not be practiced by its service components ods, procedures and/or techniques) as directed Conclusion at the tactical level. by HQ SACT and ACO on exercises focusing on Service at NATO’s JWC provides a unique For JWC LEGAD training of personnel the operational level. (Bi-SC Dir. 75-3) optic into the way the Alliance prepares for designated to fill either a JFC operational staff operations and its conduct of daily business PE post (such as ROE Staff Officer, or JFC The Comprehensive Approach on Alliance territory. With a drawdown of Operational Law LEGAD), or an officer fill- The NATO approach to the operational art sending states forces on Alliance territory, ing an ISAF Joint Command (IJC) CE post, emphasizes leveraging of all tools to achieve more Allied staff will be exposed to integrated the LEGAD may have to educate the training the desired NATO End State. While COIN Alliance operations. From time-to-time this audience on NATO’s EBAO. Alternatively the has taken on a life of its own in both NATO may place staff beyond their comfort zone. LEGAD must be sensitive to the training au- and national doctrine, the Comprehensive Requirements for NATO personnel trained diences’ attitude and cultural proclivities con- Approach is NATO’s answer to volatile, un- in the operational art will be immediate and cerning effects as part of theN ATO targeting certain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) allow little time for preparation once a crisis process. For a U.S. LEGAD, however, NATO operations environments. In essence, the response operation is being executed. JWC’s Targeting is similar to the process defined “[C]omprehensive Approach can be de- training and exercise platforms allow this by United States’ joint operational doctrine, scribed as a means to ensure a coordinated new breed of staff officer to learn key NATO which uses the JIPTL. For ISAF operations, and coherent response to crisis by all relevant processes and identify the many legal issues LEGADs at all levels (tactical or operational) actors,” (COPD, Annex A). Several initiatives associated with future scenarios. I trust that must understand effects to achieve their com- follow from adoption of the Comprehensive relating my perspective as a JWC LEGAD has mander’s intent and ensure success with criti- Approach. First, JWC uses experimentation contributed to the reader’s better understand- cal staff processes which occur at the IJC. and integration of concepts into exercises ing of the NATO operating environment. 

74 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 INFO OPS

 Cover Story

Information Operations vs. Targeting: TWO SHIPS ON A COLLISION COURSE

By Major Martijn van der Meijs, NLD A SME Information Operations/STRATCOM Joint Warfare Centre, Joint Training Division

Doctrinal overlap The purpose of this article is to outline some and when looking at it a bit closer one will velopment, a target is defined these days as recent developments within the military quickly realize that information activities “a selected geographic area, object, capabil- functional areas of Information Operations (“actions designed to affect information ity, person, or organization (including their (Info Ops) and Targeting, but also to point and/or information systems”) encompass will, understanding, and behaviour), which out the doctrinal overlap, which has devel- almost every military activity: anything a can be influenced as part of the military oped bet ween the two functional areas in military force does, whether it is a lethal or contribution to a political end-state”. recent years. a non-lethal activity, will inevitably send a Comparing these two definitions touch- One of the main documents outlining message. As a consequence, Info Ops staff es on an issue which, in my mind, NATO the doctrine on Info Ops is Allied Joint Pub- officers will want to coordinate almost ev- as a whole is struggling to resolve. Info Ops lication (AJP) 3.10 from November 2009. In erything, and AJP-3.10 specifically men- has historically involved coordinating ki- it, Info Ops is defined as “a military function tions amongst others Psychological Opera- netic and non-kinetic activities. Simultane- to provide advice and coordination of mili- tions, Presence/Posture/Profile, Key Leader ously, Targeting has, over the last few years, tary information activities in order to create Engagement and Physical Destruction. started to focus more on “influencing” and desired effects on the will, understanding not only on physical destruction. As a result, and capability of adversaries, potential ad- Targeting, on the other hand, both functions are now overlapping more versaries and other North Atlantic Council is a well-established military function that and more. (NAC) approved parties in support of Alli- goes back centuries. It has traditionally fo- ance mission objectives.” cussed on physical destruction and is de- Coordination of activities and effects In short, it is a coordinating function fined in both AJP 3.9 (2008) and ACO Di- There is no doubt about the importance of without its own capabilities or troops-to- rective 80-70 (2010, under revision). In both coordinating and synchronizing military task. The definition is also rather abstract, these documents, and as a relatively new de- activities so that they complement each oth- ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 75 INFO OPS

«When there is a doctrinal overlap such as this, without a clear delineation of responsibilities, it can result in confusion, duplication of effort, a lack of coordination but more significantly could result in prolonged operations, waste of resources and loss of life.»

er to achieve synergy in accomplishing the Influencing Population. Doctrinally, KLE ing a Joint Fires and Influence Branch, effec- effects necessary to reach Operational Ob- quickly becomes both functional areas’ re- tively combining Targeting and Info Ops in jectives. Even though the NATO-term “Ef- sponsibility. In practise, should a Key Lead- one Branch. Similar approaches have been fects-Based Approach to Operations” is no er Engagement Plan (including background adopted by recent reorganizations in other longer in use, the principles it outlined are information/target folder, scheduling and NATO headquarters. This approach also ef- still valid and practised within a Compre- meeting preparation) be developed by Info fectively returns ownership of the coordina- hensive Approach. And there are ample ex- Ops or by Targeting? tion process to where it belongs: with a J3, amples from operations like ISAF and Uni- One could even argue (although I DCOS OPS, COS and ultimately the COM, fied Protector and numerous NATO haven’t actually seen it done before) that as opposed to a separate functional area. exercises where there is a clear understand- selecting all Influencing Leadership-iden- ing across NATO of the importance of using tifiers in JTS, combined with the relevant I am quite sure that some readers’ clearly defined effects as a foundation for Target Folders, effectively becomes a Key first response would be something like: “it’s conducting military activities. Leader Engagement Plan. Similar examples not an issue; we do it in this way and that is However, the doctrinal overlap between of this doctrinal overlap exist with regards how it should be done”. But I am also quite Info Ops and Targeting, as mentioned ear- to leaflet-drops or radio-broadcasts. sure that they (or their predecessors) must lier, increasingly raises issues about how this Of course, NATO headquarters usu- have gone through quite some discussion to coordination is conducted within a head- ally find pragmatic solutions to these is- get to where they are now. And although it is quarters, who is responsible for it and how sues. ISAF for example, instead of using a great when a headquarters has found a way to it supports a Decision Cycle. Joint (Prioritized) Target List, started using make it work, it does become an issue when Take for example Key Leader Engage- a Joint (Prioritized) Effects List, differenti- headquarters with different solutions need ment (KLE); the capability to engage with ating between a list for kinetic engagement to work together (like a Joint Force Com- key leaders in an Area of Operations to and non-kinetic engagement. This over- achieve specific desired effects. KLE is clear- comes some of the political sensitivities of ly mentioned in AJP 3.10 as a capability for having some Key Leaders on a Target List, Above (left): A soldier takes notes during Info Ops to coordinate. At the same time, but complicates the coordination process by a Key Leader Engagement in Afghanistan. Targeting also considers KLE in an effort to having to use two separate lists. Photo by U.S. Air Force Sgt Rebecca F. Corey. Right: while moving to a new target, the influence key persons. In fact, AD 80-70 (in Meanwhile, the Allied Rapid Reaction joint force received hostile fire and returned Annex K) lays out Joint Targeting System Corps (ARRC) decided to resolve the issue fire in Wardak Province, Afghanistan. Photo (JTS) codes for Influencing Leadership or in a more organizational approach by creat- by 55th Combat Camera Team. ►►►

76 The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 INFO OPS

 Cognitive and Physical Effects Activities in the Physical Domain (red arrows) can create Physical and often also Cognitive of this article: if Info Ops and Targeting are Effects. Activities in the Information Domain (yellow arrows) can create Cognitive and two ships on a collision course, this article occasionally also Physical Effects, but the Cognitive Domain can never be influenced directly. intends to act as a warning signal in a ra- dar system. Even if the radar does not offer a solution, it does alert the two ships of an impending collision urging the captains to take action to steer clear of each other. I can’t predict where this will lead, but I do sense that Info Ops as a functional area is fading somewhat. The requirement to synergize military activities remains crucial, but, as an observation, it is increasingly becoming an integral part of decision-making processes and functional responsibilities and less the responsibility of a separate functional area in a section somewhere deep down in an organization. Also, Info Ops was initially intended to act as an umbrella function to coordinate information activities. Some of its responsibilities have been taken over by the umbrella function of Strategic Com- munications (StratCom), but with the advantage that StratCom, besides Info mand with its Component Commands). It List, Synchronization Matrix and inputs for Ops and Psychological Operations, also might well turn out that specific tasks in one a Joint Coordination Order or Fragmenta- covers Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy headquarters are executed in a Targeting tion Order were finalized. This pragmatic outside the military realm. In that sense, Section, whereas another headquarters ex- approach worked quite well, but it goes Info Ops has become an umbrella under an ecutes the same tasks in an Info Ops Branch against the present doctrines on Info Ops umbrella, and you really only need one to or an Engagement Section. When there is and Targeting. This could be overcome by stay dry...  a doctrinal overlap such as this, without a naming the two working groups Cognitive clear delineation of responsibilities, it can Effects Working Group and Physical Effects result in confusion, duplication of effort, a Working Groups. lack of coordination but more significantly One of the additional advantages is could result in prolonged operations, waste that differentiating between Cognitive and of resources and loss of life. Physical Effects is a universal concept that is applicable in any type of military operation, Physical and Cognitive effects although the composition of the respective In a recent Steadfast exercise, Joint working groups (just like the composition Force Command Lisbon (JFCLB) faced of the headquarters) would have to be tai- the same kind of issues. Their approach to lored to the operation. In a Natural Disaster solving this (and I am a strong supporter of Relief operation, for example, a Physical Ef- this approach) was to differentiate between fects Working Group would largely depend Physical and Cognitive Effects where Physi- on contributions by medical officers and cal Effects are physical changes to a system engineers. or system element while Cognitive Effects are related to will, understanding, percep- So what? tion and behaviour of people. This article highlighted some of the issues As part of their Decision Cycle, JF- related to the doctrinal overlap between CLB tasked their Info Ops Working Group Info Ops and Targeting and outlined some (IOWG) to focus on Cognitive Effects, pragmatic solutions to these issues as ob- while the Joint Targeting Working Group served in different NATO headquarters. But (JTWG) focussed on Physical Effects. The perhaps my most important aim is to in- separation of tasks was then joined and crease the awareness of the doctrinal over- Anyone wishing further information and guidance is coordinated in an Integrated Effects Board lap across the different functional areas. I invited to contact the author (right) by e-mail on: where the KLE-plan, Joint Prioritized Target am referring back to the analogy in the title [email protected]

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 77 «The role of the JWC’s Media Simulation Section is to create a realistic media environment that allows commanders and their staffs to train on media as a weapon system.»

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1: WNT technicians executing a live broadcast. 2: WNT Producer Pete DuBois briefing Lieutenant General Stoltz before his interview.3: Lieutenant General Stoltz at WNT studio getting feedback on his media training interview. Opposite: WNT Producer Laura L. DuBois interviewing Rear Admiral da Cunha live. MEDIA

JWC launches new live broadcast studio

By Laura Loflin DuBois WNT Producer and News Anchor, Media Simulation Section, Joint Warfare Centre

he Joint Warfare Cen- situation on the ground in a far more real- tre (JWC) launched its new istic and timely manner, based on the reac- live media simulation capability tions and responses that we receive from the during the execution of Exercise training audience as they wrestle with the TSteadfast Joist 2012 (SFJT 12). This variety of challenges within the comprehen- bold and unprecedented capability sets the sive environment in which they operate.” new standard in exercise media simulation, which has become an essential component Winning modern wars has become in military training exercises and mission more dependent on carrying domestic and rehearsals. A 20 million Norwegian Krone international public opinion than making investment, this live production capability Portuguese Navy Rear Admiral tactical advances on the ground. Command- reflects NATO’s commitment to compre- Fernando da Cunha, Joint Force Command ers have to be able to function within the new hensive operational-level training, inclusive Lisbon Chief of Staff experienced this first- information battlespace. They must be able of the media battle space. hand during SFJT 12. “The Media Cell in to manage the flow of information in a way JWC is a very important asset in the train- that supports their military objectives while According to French Army ing and certification process,” commented remaining within their political boundaries. Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, Rear Admiral de Cunha. “First, due to the It is a complicated and challenging environ- Commander, Joint Force Command Lisbon professionalism of the media team available ment, but with the JWC’s additional media and SFJT 12 NATO Response Force Com- at JWC, they cleverly provide the ‘camera training capabilities, NATO commanders mander, “As media perception is almost al- and interviewer’ pressure that is expected to will now be more prepared than ever before. ways critical to the success of the operation, be experienced in real world live operations. because it ensures the support from the in- Second, they provide the challenge and the volved nations and helps the acceptance of pressure to the ‘interviewed’ to know that the force in the country it is deployed, the their interview’s content may and will be preparation of these media events remains watched by the target audience and that the one step that cannot be missed if you want statements made may and will be used by to train properly.” the role players and exercise control in the The role of the JWC’s Media Simulation future either ‘against or in favor’ of NATO’s Three Swords News Section is to create a realistic media envi- position.” ronment that allows commanders and their An essential component of the live pro-  The JWC Media Team launched “Three Swords News”, a television staffs to train on media as a weapon system. duction capability is the distribution system. news programme aimed at The team replicates television news, print This was also launched during SFJT 12. The providing periodic updates on news and social media platforms all distrib- media team controls the video distribution JWC events and activities. uted through an online intranet website. In- channels, and can now actively push media  The premiere programme focused on the visit of His Majesty King terviews, press conferences, and newscasts products to the training audience, rather Harald V of Norway, as well as are normally edited in post-production to than relying on the training audience to pull the visit of the Nordic Defence give the impression of being broadcast live. them from the internet. Ministers and a meeting of the It has been an accepted artificial element of At any time the media team can redirect leaders of the Joint Warfare Centre, Joint Force Training exercise design. That has now changed. With the 116 monitors throughout the headquar- Centre and the Joint Analysis and the launch of its new state-of-the-art broad- ters to focus on the media products. From Lessons Learned Centre, known cast studio, the JWC Media Simulation Team an Exercise Control perspective, this has collectively as the “Triple J”. can now produce and broadcast true live made a significant contribution towards  The next edition of Three Swords News is expected to be produced news programs directly to the training audi- the delivery of so-called dynamic scripting. in the fall. Three Swords News ence. It’s a firstfor the media simulation com- According to SFJT 12 lead planner Wing can be found on the JWC website, munity and the impact on the training audi- Commander Mark Attrill, “the live studio www.jwc.nato.int. ence has proven immediate and effective. now enables us to deliver any changes to the

The Three Swords Magazine 22/2012 79 Joint Warfare Centre PO Box 8080, Eikesetveien 4068 Stavanger, Norway

Photo Valerie Guyoton

Joint Warfare Centre provides NATO´s Scan the QR code with your mobile device to visit www.jwc.nato.int to learn more. training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare.