JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Editorial

t the launch of the NATO Response Force A(NRF), it was described by the Secretary General as “make or break for NATO”. This is a daunting build-up, but it is one that has concentrated the minds of all those involved in developing the concept and achieving Full Operational Capability. As the Air Component Commander responsible for the air assets assigned to NRF 7 and 8, I have become intimately familiar with the challenges this involves. The process of preparation of those forces offered to the NRF by Troop Contributing Nations began some time ago, and the training and certification of these forces bring their own demands. Clarity of purpose, unity of effort and quality of endeavour encapsulate the aspirations of the Joint Commander. These are characteristics familiar to many of us who have been involved in air operations over many years and it is to these noble aims that this edition of the JAPCC Journal is dedicated.

The response to the first edition of the Journal was overwhelmingly positive, and I honestly believe this second edition is even better. It is through the Journal and the JAPCC’s work on bare- base activation, strategic lift, distributed simulation training and other associated projects, that the organisation will make a valuable contribution to the effectiveness of the air contribution to the NRF. The message is clear: for those of you involved in NRF-related work, the JAPCC may well be able to offer help and advice that will make your job easier! The Journal of the JAPCC welcomes unsolicited manuscripts of up to 1000 words in length. Please e-mail your manuscript as an electronic file in either MS Word or WordPerfect to: [email protected] Robert H. “Doc” Foglesong We encourage comments on the General, USAF articles in order to promote elite Director, Joint Airpower Competence Centre discussion concerning Air and Space Power inside NATO’s Joint Air community. All coments should be sent to [email protected]

The Journal of the JAPCC, Roemerstrasse 140, D-47546 Kalkar, Germany

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transforming Joint Air Power: The Journal of the JAPCC

Director Joint Air Power Competence Centre Gen Robert H. Foglesong

Executive Director Joint Air Power Competence Centre Lt Gen Hans-Joachim Schubert Transformation & Capabilites Editor Air Cdre Martin W. Halsall 6 The NRF Air Concept Editorial Board Gp Capt Robert Williams Lt Col Claudio Icardi Lt Col Kenneth Kerr Wg Cdr Peter York Maj Gert-Jan Wolkers Maj Panagiotis Akinosoglou SMSgt Edgar Hersemeyer MSgt Richard Bago

Associate Editor Maj Frank Weißkirchen

Managing Editor Christiane Rodenbücher

Production Manager 8 Building NRF Air Power Simon Ingram

Design and Art Production SSgt Duane White

The Journal of the JAPCC is the professional 11 Deploying the NRF: publication of NATO’s Joint Air Power Meeting the Airlift Challenge Competence Centre aiming to serve as a forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on NATO air power related issues such as doctrine, strategy, force structure and readiness. The views and opinions expressed or implied in The Journal of the JAPCC are those of the authors 15 Time Sensitive Targeting: and should not be construed as carrying the official Time for a Change? sanction of NATO.

All articles within this issue not bearing a copyright notice may be reproduced in whole or in part without further permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice may be reproduced for any NATO 19 Targeting for Effects purpose without permission. If any article is being reproduced, The Journal of the JAPCC requests a courtesy line. To obtain permission for the reproduction of material bearing a copyright notice for other than NATO purposes, contact the author of the material rather than The Journal of the JAPCC. M Denotes images digitally manipulated.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 CONTENTS

View Points Out of the Box

26 NATO Air Operations in a 42 Do we still need “the man” Joint Environment: Interview with Lieutenant in the cockpit? General Jean-Patrick Gaviard, FAF

Inside the JAPCC

43 News 27 New Challenges for NATO: Some Political and Security Considerations Regulars

30 Deployable Operations Capability: 45 Bios The NATO Air Command and Control System 50 Book Review

31 Preparing the Warfighter: The Work of the Joint Warfare Centre

Front and back cover page: SSgt Duane White, USAF.

34 The Joint Air Power Content photos left page by NATO, USAF (3), Contribution to the NRF: Airbus. A Land Perspective Content photos right page by French Air Force, USAF. 37 Let’s Get SMART!

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

Photo by Defensiekrant

Prepared: NATO can cope with the security challenges of tomorrow

By Lieutenant Colonel Claudio Icardi ITA A, JAPCC

he NATO Response Force Capability Commitments, 15 potential future threats, based T(NRF) is moving towards the October 2002). The dramatic more on required NATO achievement of Full Operational change from a predictable to an capabilities for achievement rather Capability. At this time, NRF 5 is asymmetric and unplanned threat than just on considering only in place, Joint Force Headquarters has resulted in the adoption of a known threats. Rapid decision Lisbon is the nominated Joint Force functional rather than a processes have been established to Command (JFC); NATO Rapid geographical approach. Territorial achieve coherence in terms of time Deployment Corps of Spain defence remains an Alliance core responsiveness. However, this is no (NRDC Spain) is the Land function but, against a minimal longer the Operational Planning Component Command (CC); the territorial threat, security could not Process done in a fast manner, but French Joint Force Air be delivered without addressing the something new. Component Command (JFACC) potential risks and threats arising is the Air CC and Italian Maritime far from home. Projecting stability NATO has committed itself Forces (ITMARFOR) is the has become the precondition for to a continuous transformation Maritime CC. Against this the overall security environment. process, which encompasses the backdrop, this article considers development of a high readiness how the NRF concept originated Air responsiveness joint force able to execute the full and how it is now being delivered. and rapid decisions spectrum of missions. The NRF is an expeditionary package, flexible, NATO has undergone a Consequently, NATO military deployable at high readiness, striking transformation to cope forces were challenged to become technologically advanced and with the new century’s geopolitical more deployable, thus increasing interoperable. It has provoked a challenges (see for example US their effectiveness and to shift from cultural transformation, focusing Defence Secretary Rumsfeld’s a threat-based approach to a and accelerating the Alliance White Paper for NRF, 20 capability based one. This required initiatives to improve military September 2002 and the Prague planning using generic scenarios of capabilities and optimise defence

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 planning. It has been and will each operational Joint and Graduated Forces HQs or remain a catalyst for the overall Component HQ before the permanent NATO CCs. The CCs transformation. Moreover, the respective stand-by NRF period. rotate every twelve months, with NRF has been an invaluable way Jointness is crucial to the tailored the exception of the Land to keep Europe abreast of the package, which requires training Component, which has a rotation latest technological and with a strong joint aspect. Each cycle of six months. However, the geopolitical changes. year Allied Command Operations 2005 programme has seen, for the (ACO) in Mons, Belgium, conducts first time, the participation of a The Force Generation dedicated NRF exercises to train national Air HQ, the French and Process designates the pool of and certify the package. The the United Kingdom JFACC for national forces along with the exercises, which are controlled by NRF Air 5 and 6 respectively. necessary command and control the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in arrangements to ensure rapid Stavanger, Norway, and the Joint During Exercise ALLIED response and cohesion of force. Force Training Centre (JFTC) in ACTION 05, the French JFACC Rather than a force assembled on Bydgoszcz, Poland, on behalf of confirmed the importance, an ad hoc basis, the NRF gives to Supreme Allied Commander previously highlighted in former nations the opportunity to Transformation (SACT) in exercises, of collocating forward the contribute to an integrated pool of Norfolk, USA, train the Air Component Commander forces. With this modular operational joint level (JFCs and (ACC) with the JFC. As the JFC’s approach, nations are encouraged CCs). The Strategic Commander, best adviser on air power issues, the to invest in specific capabilities SACEUR, trains and certifies the NRF ACC represents the air independent of their different JFC, which, in turn, trains and perspective at the joint operational military budgets. Once the mission certifies the CCs. Unit training and level. His deployment forward, is identified, the force package is certification are accomplished by together with a dedicated staff, further tailored. the nations and verified by the greatly enhanced the overall respective CCs. jointness of the excercise. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Air perspective at the joint Commander NRF ACC sets the standards and develops operational level retained the majority of his staff in training, readiness, reporting and the Rear. Command and Control certification programmes that the The rotation cycle includes, at the was then tailored to meet specific NATO Response Forces and HQs operational joint level, three JFCs requirements and circumstances. have to achieve. An exercise (Naples, Brunssum and Lisbon) and Reachback (R/B: reachback is the programme is in place to certify at the Component level, National process of obtaining mission

Worldwide: Projecting stability as the precondition for security, Photo by Belgian Army NATO supports the stabilization process in Afghanistan

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

Photo by RAF Expeditionary: NRF is flexible and deployable at high readiness

essential Command and Control promoting improvements in the logistic approach is required in the products, services and application areas of Alliance military future in order to increase in a timely manner by using capabilities and interoperability and deployability and flexibility. communications between the it is a test bed for experiments on deployed and non-deployed future concepts. The NRF will The purpose of the NRF is elements of a HQ) is the key tool help accelerate those initiatives and therefore to enable the Alliance to to enhance relations between the improve Alliance Defence face the new threats and react NRF ACC and the permanent Planning. However, a gap still exists rapidly to events. Air power offers HQ. The air battlestaff remains in between the political aspiration of to the decision makers a range of the rear and the Air Operations developing the force and the options to support political efforts Centre (AOC) and the Deployed military and financial resources; even before the first shots are fired. Operating Bases (DOB) are further more manpower, equipment and But the operating environment away. The AOC cannot be split money has to be allocated in the needs to be more joint and into cells and could be deployed as force generation process. multinational than it has ever been a whole or not. Therefore, R/B in the past and in the future we optimises the organisation at the More effort in need more focus on logistics, CIS, operational level, but it does commitment is necessary airlift and the whole force require a flexible Command and generation process. Control architecture. Strategic airlift and logistics are two areas requiring special focus. In Also, the forces will fight The Communications and particular, strategic lift went together on unpredictable Information Systems (CIS) are the through some good initiatives, but battlefields, where the speed of essential enablers of effective it still remains a national decision-making and the command and control. Reliable responsibility and it is an area collaborative actions required are and robust connectivity to enhance where the European nations need decisive factors for the success of R/B capabilities including technical to raise their commitment. From a the mission. Interoperability support are required, e.g. NATO perspective, the JFC must therefore represents a vital bandwidth and satellite consider the availability of assets in ingredient, not only between communications. A more effective the first place to cope with the NATO and nations, but especially result can be achieved with less concept of operations, rather than the interoperability of training, aircraft, UAVs or ground based air waiting for a national allocation of procedures and tactics. This seems defence systems, but not with less the assets or even for a private to be a very promising way to gain connectivity. The NRF is also a company agreement. From a quick wins for NRF air. catalyst for focusing and logistic perspective, a stronger joint

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites BuildingBuilding NRFNRF AirAir PowerPower

By Major General M Veysi Agar TUR A, CC-Air Izmir

perational Rehearsal NOBLE CC-Air Izmir sees the most importantly, a higher state of OJAVELIN 2005 (NJ05) was NRF Operational Rehearsal as the NRF combat readiness for NATO held in spring 2005 in the Spanish premiere NATO exercise, which as a whole. During NJ05, because Canary Islands to validate the should be given the highest of fiscal constraints, the Air NRF’s expeditionary concepts for priority in the NATO exercise Component Command (ACC) readiness, planning, command and calendar for funding and delivery. lacked many of the capabilities that control, deployment, sustainment, Moreover, it is operationally were most appropriate to the execution and redeployment. The imperative that all formations scenario. While valuable training deployment involved over 2000 involved in NRF activities was achieved with the forces NRF personnel, including a participate collectively in a similar available, additional forces were Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF) practice during the months prior needed to achieve the desired effects. and over 580 airmen under the to their deployment vulnerability. leadership of Component The NRF Combined Joint Command Air Izmir (CC-Air NRF Operational Statement of Requirements Izmir). Adapting to the rapid NRF Rehearsal Vital (CJSOR) depicts combat forces planning cycle, tight budget with an impressive array of restrictions and the limited I believe for the NRF Operational capabilities. However, whilst the deployment of support serials all Rehearsal to achieve its full CJSOR provides sufficient numbers presented significant challenges. potential, NATO common and types of aircraft, it often funding should resource a contains “hidden shortfalls” in the However, NJ05 also clearly substantial proportion of the support capabilities, which demonstrated that NATO has an rehearsal’s deployment costs. effectively compromise the NRF expeditionary Air Force. In this Reducing the cost to nations would ACC’s ability to support and sustain article, I have identified six entice more nations to commit their the force. recommendations that I believe forces. A more robust commitment would enhance the Alliance’s future would also provide improved Moreover, some nations NRF air capabilities. training value to participants and, only bid support assets for their own

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 M

Validation: Operational rehearsal NOBLE JAVELIN 2005 as the blue print for expeditionary concepts

Photo by Defensiekrant

force contribution and do not offer footprint by increasing economies planning. Air Command and assistance for the more general of scale across the nations and Control (C2) suffered badly during support that is required to operate reducing duplicated support the early stages of NJ05 due to an airbase – this could range from personnel. During NJ05 many delayed Computer and Information operations officers, to fuel truck CJSOR NRF 4 assets did not meet Systems (CIS) connectivity. NATO drivers, to medical and catering Allied Command Operations must continue to emphasise support. This unbalanced approach (ACO) Force Standards. This expeditionary CIS support to ensure leads to a precarious reliance on host complicated operational planning, NRF Commanders can count on nation support, which cannot be force integration and air campaign rapidly deployable, global C2 guaranteed in the crisis scenarios for execution. To ensure the NRF Air connectivity, which needs to be 24/ which the NRF was foreseen. Commander has the capabilities he 7 and 365 days/year. needs to meet mission requirements, More descriptive NRF SHAPE must more clearly articulate CIS support vital CJSOR serials force requirements through more for operations descriptive CJSOR serials. Worst To overcome these problems, case, it is essential that mandated Until the new Air Command and NATO must incorporate CJSOR NRF CJSOR assets comply with Control System (ACCS) is serials for national support elements ACO Force Standards or, if the operational, identifying a lead and nations must also provide details operational requirement is less Nation for DOB C2 and CIS of how they will support and sustain demanding than ACO Force coordination is vital. That lead their force contribution. Ideally, the Standards, it must fall to SHAPE nation must provide crucial Alliance should encourage individual to provide more descriptive NRF leadership in the planning and nations to provide support CJSOR serials. implementation of C2 and the early capabilities capable of sustaining an development of the CIS operational entire Deployed Operating Base NRF operations are requirement planning to ensure full (DOB), which would reduce both characterised by short-notice, rapid compatibility with NATO CIS deployment costs and the NRF deployment with minimum architecture, equipment and

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

forces in accordance with ACO Force Standards, Nations must identify and nominate NRF ACC units and personnel a minimum of 18 months prior to the NRF deployment vulnerability window. With this information, units requiring a TACEVAL visit for NRF certification can be scheduled in the year prior to their NRF rotation. It is appropriate, Photo by however, that the HQ staff and Royal Air Force Support: More general assistance is needed AOCs be assessed prior to their certification as fully mission encryption. In turn, each critical to assess effectively the capable in advance of their ready deploying nation must take mission readiness of NRF air- period. NJ05 was the first time responsibility to ensure its CIS declared CJSOR forces, Air that ACO Force Standards were hardware and software is Operations Centres (AOC) and the used to assess a NRF AOC. CC- compatible with the latest NATO HQ battle staff. The Tactical Air Izmir and Ramstein are CIS systems. Evaluation (TACEVAL) working together to draft programme, using existing ACO criteria for CJFACC and AOC Embrace effects based standards and guidance, should be assessments in the future. approach to operations applied to NRF forces but not in an exercise or operational rehearsal. Continue to improve CC-Air Izmir fully embraced the While an operational rehearsal is an NRF capabilities Effects Based Approach to excellent venue to evaluate Operations (EBAO) and deployment readiness and HQ, In summary, NATO is capable developed an air campaign focused AOC and DOB command and of NRF expeditionary air on achieving “air effects” in control, it does not provide a suitable operations. The deployment of support of the DJTF campaign’s venue for TACEVAL to evaluate the NRF ACC to conduct air “overarching effects”. However, and/or certify individual NRF operations during NJ05 was an legacy Operational Planning units. Instead, current ACO Force unqualified success. To build on Process (OPP) techniques Standards provide a better basis for this success, the six remained evident and attempts to individual NRF unit certification by recommendations above will apply EBAO at only the DJTF incorporating these units into the help to strengthen NATO’s and Component Command levels annual TACEVAL programme. ability to train, evaluate, project produced significant disconnects and sustain NRF air power in in campaign planning and In order for TACEVAL order to fulfil NATO’s targeting processes. to evaluate and assess NRF worldwide NRF ambitions.

EBAO methodology is Training and Evaluation: NRF Operation Rehearsals are vital contemporary NATO doctrine, which must be embedded in every headquarters involved in operations. NATO should embrace EBAO by facilitating Allied Command Transformation development of an Alliance common approach. Additionally, the NRF crisis establishment needs revision to ensure that staff functions and structure facilitate EBAO planning. Definition of NRF air certification criteria is Photo by Defensiekrant

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites M DEPLOYING THE NRF

MEETING THE AIRLIFT CHALLENGE

Image courtesy of Boeing By Colonel Carlo Massai ITA A, JAPCC

n the new NATO expeditionary achievement of full operational a Combined Joint Task Force Ienvironment, the subject of rapid capability next year, it is interesting (CJTF), albeit a CJTF deployment deployability has now come to the to assess NATO progress in could make much more use of fore. New military capabilities are meeting the NRF airlift challenge. sealift, due to slower intervention now required, or at least capabilities times. Therefore, in some ways, the that are different in both size and My comments are based shorter readiness timescales for organisation to previous years. This upon a study conducted in the Joint NRF means that it could be the area is certainly a key focus for both Air Power Competence Centre NRF that represents the greatest test NATO and national force planners. (JAPCC), which looked at the of military airlift capability. current NATO airlift capability Rapid airlift of forces against two generic NRF Methodology of now vital deployment scenarios. The scenarios JAPCC study focused upon middle Africa (3,300 A fundamental component NM), which represented a All NATO airlift assets were in the deployability jigsaw is having continental deep inland deployment, included in the study, with the main the capability to be able to “lift” the together with the Bahamas (4100 assets being the A-310, TU-154, required force rapidly to the NM), a coastal scenario. Quantifying KDC-10, KB0707, C5, C17, required destination in the required what should represent a “typical” Tristar and VC10. We also assumed timescale. Clearly, sealift plays a vital NRF size was always going to be that the current NATO work to part in all this but the real premium difficult, particularly when one provide a short readiness An 124 in today’s uncertain world rests considers the sheer range of heavy lift capability was successful. upon having a strong military airlift potential NRF missions – we However, with this exception, we capability. Without the airlift, the therefore took a balanced did not assume the availability of readiness timescales for deployment approach, drawing upon the any other commercial aircraft. are unlikely to be met, particularly emerging CJSOR for a full NRF when one considers the distances deployment (NRF 7), together with The JAPCC study also involved and the likely deployment data from the NATO MOVEX 04 included a host of other scenarios. This is particularly the exercise, which simulated a NRF 3 assumptions, all of which were case for the NRF, with force and 4 deployment. This approach meant to ensure that the scenario elements held at high readiness to identified a potential NRF modelling process, together with deploy worldwide rapidly. requirement to move some 22000 the subsequent findings, were as personnel and around 100,000 tons realistic and robust as possible. In this article I will examine of equipment – this excludes Assumptions were therefore made the current NATO airlift capability maritime forces, which we assumed on issues such as aircraft to meet likely NRF deployment were self-deployable. The numbers serviceability, aircrew availability, requirements. With the NRF’s Initial appear to be huge, but are not if APOE, APOD / FOB aircraft Operational Capability having been you compare them to those related handling capabilities, plus loading / delared in 2004 and with its to the higher scale intervention of unloading times.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 In terms of a timeline, the Against this backdrop, the the NRF requirement, it is JAPCC study set a requirement for aim of the JAPCC study was to interesting to examine the question the full NRF deployment to be compare the current NATO airlift in more detail by breaking the airlift completed by air within a total capability against the identified requirement down into its two main period of one month. Interestingly, requirement and then to make components: manpower and current NATO planning only recommendations to overcome any equipment. In terms of manpower, provides details of Notice to Move shortfalls over the next 10 years. the study highlighted no problems – the time needed by the force to in moving the military personnel – prepare and depart from the home Deploying equipment in assets such as the Airbus A310 or base. The deployment timescale is shorter timescales equivalent aircraft are already widely left to the operational planners available in the inventory of dealing with the specific I will now highlight some of the key European NATO nations and our deployment. Although NATO findings of the study. Firstly, the study showed that all the personnel policy does not specify a figure, we study suggested that, whilst it would could be moved well within the felt that a one month timeline was a be feasible today for NATO to NRF planning timescales. good benchmark. Finally, the execute a short notice deployment JAPCC study did not assume any by air of an NRF size combat force, The position for the use of sealift , primarily because of this could only be done with much movement of “standard size” the relatively short notice for assistance from the US Strategic equipment, that is equipment that completing the NRF deployment. airlift fleet. I think this finding fits into a C-130, was also positive. illustrates very starkly that, NATO already possess a number All of the above data and excluding the USA, and with the of tactical airlifters and these assets assumptions were then modelled possible exception of the UK, the could achieve the requirement within the NATO computer remainder of the NATO members within the planned timescale. simulation tool, which is known as currently possess insufficient in- the Allied Deployment and house strategic military airlift to be Understanding of current Movement System (ADAMS). able to deploy the required capability problems NATO routinely uses ADAMS to manpower and equipment in the simulate movements options and to new and much shorter timescales. However, the JAPCC study develop NATO deployment plans. showed that NATO currently has As such, it is a computer tool which Apart from comparing the insufficient airlift capacity to has an excellent track record. current total airlift capability against arrange the timely airlift of out of

Photo by US Air Force

Workhorse: The C130 transporter is used by many NATO Nations

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

size equipment, by which I mean the aircraft, especially its load- At present, the NATO equipment that does not fit into a carrying capability and its range, doctrine on movements and C-130. The study highlighted that together with the number of transportation establishes different the massive use of light transport airframes expected to be delivered, roles for NATO and the nations. aircraft cannot compensate for the the JAPCC study identified that it NATO commanders are lack of the heavy type assets will be more than sufficient to “fill responsible for establishing the total necessary to move outsized and the gap” highlighted earlier in this movement and transportation heavy equipment. Because of their article. Importantly, the A400M requirements. Member nations are cargo bay dimensions and weight can move out of size equipment. responsible for obtaining all the limitations, neither the C-130 nor transportation resources required to C-160 can carry the majority of the The introduction of the deploy, with this responsibility equipment necessary for a full NRF A400M should therefore enable the spanning the full spectrum from the deployment. According to the timely deployment of the NRF APOE to the APOD/FOB. JAPCC study, almost 60% of the without prejudicing the availability NATO commanders must then total equipment could not fit into prioritize, coordinate and deconflict the C-130 or C-160 and would Operational: The JAPCC looked at the the deployment of forces – this is therefore require the use of a C-17, A400M as a NATO airlift alternative done by using the SHAPE Air C-5 or the lease of an An-124. Such Movements Coordination Centre a figure illustrates that the current (AMCC) who transform the lack of capability to move out of complete airlift package into the size equipment does present NATO Operational Commander’s NATO with real limitations in final Deployment Plan. quickly moving the types of equipment that the NRF would We believe there is now a need on deployed operations. strong argument for the NATO commander to take control of the However, whilst meeting the NRF deployment from the airlift challenge in the short term assembly area or APOE all the way will not be easy, the JAPCC study through to the deployed location. also highlighted that the NATO Image by Airbus Such a move would reduce the need position in the medium and longer for coordination, speeding up the term is much better. The key to movement execution. We believe this step change in NATO of US and UK strategic airlift assets the best method of achieving this capability will be the acquisition of for national tasks, nor requiring would be to arrange for NRF the A400M. Seven European NATO to depend upon commanders to be given pre- Nations have agreed to buy a total complicated and expensive lease assigned command and control of of 180 A400M aircraft over a 12 year arrangements for An 124s. airlift assets – perhaps as part of the period starting in 2009 and running However, it will be some 10 years CJSOR process, where each nation up to 2021. The A400M is planned before the A400M is available in specifies which operational assets it to replace the C-130 Hercules and good numbers. will provide to each NRF. C-160 Transall in many European countries. Compared to such Need to improve Such assured availability of aircraft, the A400M will provide a management of airlift airlift would allow NATO useful increase in load-carrying commanders to more quickly match capability, whilst also retaining Beyond aircraft numbers and out of the airlift assets with the important tactical characteristics size capability, the JAPCC study corresponding units to be moved, such as short take-off and landing also raised questions concerning the together with the priority for and soft field operations. management of NATO military moving them, thereby speeding up airlift assets. In particular, the issue the whole deployment. We also As such, the planned of whether it is now time to change believe that such a move would introduction to service of the from the present arrangements reduce the risk of overlap and waste A400M represents a crucial where air transport is controlled by in the use of precious airlift assets – capability improvement for NATO individual nations, to a situation whilst individual nations and the and NRF deployability. Based based upon a more integrated and AMCC all undoubtedly do their upon the military requirement for NATO led approach. best to cooperate and coordinate in

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 their use of airlift, this will always UK Strategic airlift assets to really need to move 22,000 be sub-optimal when compared to deploy the NRF. Without these personnel and 100,000 tonnes of a fully integrated approach. Also, types of arrangements, the current equipment or is there scope for a on a day to day basis, there might “out of size” problem could mean more streamlined approach? Could be benefit in developing a “NATO that NATO could face a situation we slim down some of the Airlift Management Centre”, where the air deployment of the movement requirement by trying perhaps along the lines of the NRF is not possible in the to change some of the logistics European Airlift Centre at required timescales. capabilities from being a purely Eindoven, but with a more executive national responsibility to being a role. This might serve to improve We also need to take another more collective one? Apart from overall NATO airlift organisational close look at commercial aircraft reducing the airlift requirement, arrangements, enhancing availability, looking upon it as an such a change would also help by compatibility and interoperability alternative to military lease. The US reducing national costs and also across the Alliance and thereby development of the Civil Reserve optimise the teeth to tail ratio at the helping to mitigate the effects of the Air Fleet is a good case in point. deployed base. In sum, we need to current airlift shortfall. Whilst there can be difficulties actively manage the A400M gap, coming up with a range Managing the of measures and initiatives airlift gap to help ensure that the NRF can still meet its The JAPCC study also readiness and deployment made some proposals on requirements, albeit how to manage the with some increased capability gap until the military risk. A400M arrives in large numbers in about 2015. Taking the JAPCC study forward Looking at the current capability gap in a In conclusion, I hope this positive way, I would argue article has served to that the JAPCC study has Innovation: Comercial lease options need to be explored provide a useful been invaluable in perspective on a capability developing a good understanding of regarding assured aircraft which is fundamental to NATO the current capability problems, availability, together with potential operations. The results of the JAPCC study have now been from which options can then be security problems, especially at the briefed across the NATO developed to rectify them. deployed location, the sheer size of Encouragingly, this is already command structure, where feedback the civilian charter market suggests happening across NATO, with the has been very positive, and some that this is an option we must initiative to develop a formal airlift aspects have also being explore more fully – certainly in contract with the aviation industry considered within the NATO the period before the A400M to provide an assured (and short Defence Requirements Review enters service. notice) lease of An 124 aircraft being process. The study has also been a case in point. However, this will passed to HQ SACT, who are provide a capability to move only Other innovative solutions looking to incorporate many of the some 4% of the required NRF should also be explored. A good recommendations into their cargo, which is nowhere near current example is fast sealift – new transformational project concerning enough. Yes, you could increase it, technologies indicate that it might “Expeditionary Operations”. but it still does not radically change be possible to obtain ships capable the numbers. of cruising at 30 knots, as opposed There are clearly a number to the 12 knots of previous years. of important airlift issues to tackle, Another potentially useful particularly over the next 10 years, initiative would be to work with Finally, perhaps we should go but we believe that the JAPCC USAF and RAF colleagues to back to basics and have another hard Airlift Study has given NATO the establish a formal mechanism to look at the stated movement information to help it to meet the allow NATO access to some US and requirement for the NRF. Do we NRF airlift challenge.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

Photo by EADS By Squadron Leader Tim Harrison GBR A, HQ ARRC Time for a Change?

he shout goes up in the Joint Collateral Damage Estimate with lucrative targets that have just TOperations Centre. A well- allowed) and that, most importantly, appeared or been discovered. It is rehearsed procedure swings into engaging it is legal. The current routine business and therefore it is place. Representatives from across method sees the Fire Coordination fair to ask the questions: “What the HQ gather to discuss the Officer then collecting all the makes TSTs different? In fact, are possibilities and implications of information and agreement they different and, if so, what then striking that target. The target has signatures on a (paper) target folder. is the big deal?” been categorised by both the Intel Once all the solutions have been and the senior Fire Coordination gathered, the Commander will To begin this, I think we Officer and, as it fulfils the LCC decide which means to engage the must first look at what constitutes a guidance as a significant target, all target will be used. The engagement TST. NATO defines it as: available effort will be expended in would then take place using organic order to strike it. Once the detail assets and the whole process resets “…those targets requiring has been briefed, the Team then ready to meet the next challenge. immediate response because they disperse to their own areas where The team have all been doing their pose (or soon will pose) a danger they provide answers and possible own jobs but have been involved in to friendly forces or are highly strike solutions. They also ensure the target as an additional task. lucrative, fleeting targets of that any potential solution complies opportunity whose engagement is with the guidance given in the The above procedure is of a high enough priority to targeting directive, that the response replicated throughout the command warrant immediate action to is proportional (falling within the chain and is how the Army deals support campaign objectives”.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 M “Though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.”

Sun Tzu, the Art of War

“Target!! BM21 identified by Phoenix at grid 8352156784”

Interestingly, in this definition, Operations Coordination System For example, a potential target or there is no mention of the air tasking (ADOCS) and has had the system track could be detected by a Link order cycle or whether or not this configured specifically for land 16 capable platform (ASTOR/ target falls within or outside the operations. ADOCS provides the JSTARS). The target data would cycle. We are dealing with an ability to collaboratively manage therefore enter the ADOCS system opportunity that is of such high and work on targets and has proved by Link 16 data transfer. The G2 priority to the Joint Force invaluable during recent operations. Staff then have the opportunity to Commander (JFC) that everything Given collateral damage limitations, work on the data and, if necessary, else should be sidelined until an land’s preferred means of TST to authenticate it from other sources. option has been exercised. engagement will frequently be the Once sufficient granularity has been Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft gained and the target is categorized TSTs and component that are tasked through the Air as a TST, the other TST team dynamic targets are defined in the Support Operations Centre members are alerted to the data by JFC TST Matrix. So what does HQ (ASOC). the system. All can now work on ARRC have to offer to the JFC in the target data from their own response to a TST and how does it Seamless transfer of data, workstation and manipulate the go about actually passing data and corroborated & efficient picture to suit their own needs. information around the HQ? HQ ARRC is very well situated for However, this means of attack From the ASOC perspective information systems support and it should not be seen as exclusive and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and has been actively involved with the all available means of achieving CAS stack aircraft data can be NATO Command Control and desired operational effects should be trawled. Aircraft configurations and Communications Agency (NC3A) considered. Using ADOCS, the weapon loads are visible as is in developing a NATO TST Tool. end-to-end process becomes a weapon effect data and the ability However, for the last three years seamless transfer of data that, once to carry out automatic weapon HQ ARRC has also used a tool corroborated, is not molested or ‘fat target pairing. Once a solution has called the Automated Deep fingered’ by anyone in the chain. been found, it is offered to the

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

Senior Fire Coordination Officer. He then compares the different solutions and decides which should be offered to the JFC. Execution, once granted, is an equally simple process. ADOCS can produce and send an automatically populated CAS tasking brief to any aircraft provided that the aircraft designated to conduct the mission is Improved Data Modem (IDM) capable. The system produces an automated acknowledgment of the mission and will inform the originator via ADOCS once the mission has been completed thus alerting the Battle Damage Assessment staff to start collecting data from their sources. Time Sensitive Targeting: “Targets requiring immediate response because they pose a danger” (NATO) Photo by Royal Air Force Equipped with the best available weapons rests with the JFC, through the Rather, it is simply another, Joint Targeting Working Group perhaps more dynamic string to All of the above begs the question: (JTWG). The nomination of those the targeteers’ bow. NATO now “Should TST be shrouded in targets to the JTWG for priority needs to take a holistic approach to mystery or is it just business as consideration will come from a TST by stringent examination of normal from the land perspective variety of sources but, in particular, the entire targeting process in the with a few more rules and a higher all CCs will be required to broader context of EBO. Evolving degree of importance?” In joint nominate their targets of choice, concepts should develop the ability operations until now, the JFACC regardless of which CC will to share data and work has been seen as the most readily ultimately be called upon to engage collaboratively, in preference to available CC equipped with the them. I would therefore argue that adopting individual CC stovepipes. best available weapons for the TST should not be seen as some engagement of TST. However, mythical beast, surrounded by The cross-component responsibility for deciding which mystery and awe and treated challenge for all of us in NATO is targets to attack, including TST, differently to all other targeting. to actually make that happen.

Photo by US Air Force

Consciousness: TST is not a mythical beast, but a more dynamic string to the targeteers’ bow

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Image by Duane White

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

TARGETING FOR EFFECTS

By Major Allen Pennington USA A, CC-Air Izmir Photo by US Air Force

n recent years, much has been one Senior Airman familiar with important, point is illustrated by the Iwritten about Effects-Based this target gave me the information Senior Airman’s firm understanding Targeting (EBT) and Effects-Based I needed. “We think there might be of what was to be accomplished. Operations (EBO). Over my last Weapons of Mass Destruction at She understood the desired result two years as the CC-Air HQ Izmir’s this facility”, she said. “We want to and how this target and others, Chief Targeteer I’ve heard many say deny them access to it, so we picked helped achieve that result. The point “We already do Effects-Based a few DMPI to get it on the target is that targeteers, when given Targeting”. I’ve also heard many list”, she added. She had given me adequate time for planning, planners and operators say “If you the information that had been lost normally accomplish a type of accomplish good objectives-based in the traditional targeting and operational effects analysis. The planning then the result is the same”. Command and Control (C2) targeting team at the CAOC had I believe there really is a difference process. been given an objective by the in conducting EBO. This article planners and, starting with that presents my view of real Effects- She had given me the objective and the desired end-state, Based Targeting, how it relates to precise desired effects. Armed with had worked backwards to identify EBO and why we should embrace this jewel of information, and some a desired operational effect: enemy the concept. good intelligence on the facility, we forces unable to employ WMD. selected the optimum aim points Lessons learned and release parameters to deny Analyzing and from the desert access to a specially secured area of understanding effects the target facility. This transformed The mission seemed simple at first. the mission from six wasted sorties From this first level effect, they had Six Desired Mean Points of Impact to a precision engagement that undoubtedly identified several sub- (DMPI) on a weapons storage could achieve tactical, operational, effects including: enemy forces facility, 48 Gator Mine cluster and strategic-level effects. unable to access WMD in storage munitions and six Strike Eagles to areas. From that desired effect, they deliver them. But, for the unit The Strike Eagle example were able to identify individual targeteer weaponeering this above illustrates two important targets, DMPI and desired tactical mission, it became clear that the points. The first is the importance effects. This is the thought process intended purpose of the strike was, of relaying your desired tactical of a good targeteer. Unfortunately, well, not clear. Employing mines effect to the team executing the this result-to-action analysis is usually implied that we were trying to deny mission. If we had flown the not fully documented during the the enemy access to the facility. But, mission against the DMPIs fragged target development stage. Instead, not even six mighty F-15Es could by HHQ, we would have wasted we simply document the connection carry enough mines to deny access six valuable sorties while risking at between the target and the to such a large complex. A secure least twelve lives. But, by objective. This is unfortunate for call to my colleagues at the understanding the desired tactical three main reasons. Combined Air Operations Centre effect, we were able to plan a (CAOC) was in order. After precision engagement to achieve First, once we engage our speaking with multiple targeteers, that effect. The second, and more targets and the enemy reacts, we

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Fig. 1 will probably need to adjust our of targets, desired tactical effects that would allow for more detailed targeting. This would be much and desired operational effects, then analysis of effects prior to target easier if the full effects analysis were we can focus our collection and selection. The result was beneficial recorded so we could simply back analysis efforts to better assess the and many lessons were learned. We up a couple of steps and easily see resultant operational effects based used a two-tiered approach to the anticipated impact of changes on inputs from plans (desired define effects and target on the effects “tree”. Or, if effects), operations (means), and nominations were based on the necessary, re-examine that effects intelligence (observed effects). bottom tier. For tier one, the DJTF analysis based on our observations would define overarching desired of the battlespace. So, having a common effects and two levels of sub- understanding of how the effects. Second, a great synergy battlespace is to be shaped (desired could be unleashed if all operations effects) at the operational and For tier two, the were planned, targeted and tactical levels is a very good thing, components would then define their executed based on one agreed but how does that relate to desired effects necessary to achieve effects analysis. Having this targeting? the DJTF-defined effects and common, detailed depiction of the provide targeting nominations campaign in use by operations, plans Very robust effort based on these component-level and intelligence facilitates better to employ EBO effects. The basic structure of sharing of information and effects is shown in simplified form identification of links between During Operational Rehearsal in Figure 1. Using this different actions. NOBLE JAVELIN 05 (NJ 05), the methodology, the air component NRF Air Component Command could show a clear, continuous Finally, conducting this (NRF ACC) made a very robust linkage of NRF ACC actions and analysis and using it for the basis of effort to employ EBO from the top targets with the DJTF’s overarching reporting will support a more down. Prior to execution, the joint effects. Initially, we suffered the robust combat assessment effort. players involved in targeting agreed same difficulties in selecting targets If we know and record the linkage to changes in the planning timeline that we normally encounter during

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Transformation & Capabilites

Fig. 2

every Peace Support Operation smuggling”. Once these desired Working Group (JTWG). (PSO). Identifying the things you effects were understood, then the However, our nomination of the want to affect is difficult since we required actions and targets (means) LCC to achieve a desired air effect are often restricted to non-lethal were easily identified. In the case raised eyebrows at both the joint actions. Unlike other exercises of “deny use of infrastructure”, we level and LCC HQs. This is however, these problems lessened targeted small airfields and airstrips contrary to the more common significantly after the first few days in the operations area. scenarios in which the LCC would of NJ 05. nominate targets for attack by the However, instead of using ACC in support of land objectives. Understanding of traditional lethal weapons, such as However, the target nomination desired effects bombs or air-delivered mines, our process is about identifying the recommended weapons were targets each component requires to Over the first couple of days of obstructions placed in the take off be engaged and a major NJ 05, NRF ACC planning, and landing areas. The responsibility of the JTWG is to operations, and targeting personnel recommended component for prioritise and allocate targets to the met to further develop the air execution was the NRF Land component best suited to engage. effects analysis and our common Component Command (NRF effects tree. As we expanded the LCC). Analysis of other effects led Clear link of DJTF’s desired effects into desired to targeting of aircraft operators targets and effects air effects, potential targets became and pilots, using psyops, to obvious. Furthermore, the discourage involvement in The need to synchronise operations significance of the targets was more smuggling. These are two examples during PSOs and the need to clearly easily understood across the staff. of targeting opportunities that were link targets to specific effects will For instance, as shown in Figure 2, captured and actioned as a result of drive changes to the NATO target when considering the DJTF’s good effects analysis. Moreover, nomination process. So what is the desired effect of “prevent arms the relevance of these targets to the impact for the targeteer? The smuggling”, the obvious first-level DJTF’s desired effects was easily answer is more detail, and more air effect was to “prevent air demonstrated to the Joint Targeting detail means a better targeting

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 solution. Some may be concerned result, in the end, is a more even an effects-based approach, we can about having too much detail in the pace of target adjustment rather fuse information from operations plan and trespassing on the tactical than an all-at-once replacement of (achieved tactical effects), traditional commander’s turf. However, if the Joint Prioritized Target List BDA (confirmed tactical effects), accomplished correctly, we are (JPTL) with each new JCO. and intelligence (observed putting more effort into defining operational effects) to form a more what is to be accomplished (the On the back end of the complete picture of our progress. effect) instead of how to targeting process, having well- Figure 3 illustrates one example of accomplish it (the means). defined and agreed desired effects an effects-based assessment. helps us to focus our combat In NJ 05, we found that in Learning contrast to very broad OPLAN or through exercises Joint Coordination Order (JCO) “On the back end objectives, DJTF and component- of the targeting While JFC Naples and CC Air Izmir level desired effects are much more process, having well- have been innovative in exploring focused. This clearer guidance defined and agreed Effects-Based-Operations, NATO makes the targeteers job easier but desired effects, as a whole has some distance to go it requires more time up front in the before institutionalising this planning process to absorb changes helps us to capability. We have learned a lot to the desired effects. focus our combat through our collective experiences assessment efforts”. in the NRF exercises of the recent Even pace of year. The targeteers of CC-Air target adjustment Izmir have already recognized assessment efforts. Under the several advantages to its The most time-consuming traditional process, the focus of implementation. analysis will be accomplished during combat assessment was on mission the Joint Operations Planning accomplishment (Phase I Battle The bottom line is better Group (JOPG) and Air Operations Damage Assesment, BDA), physical guidance, better targeting solutions, Planning Group (AOPG). A good and functional target damage (Phase a better basis for combat analysis of the required effects will II BDA), and overall target system assessment, and, perhaps most require little adjustment over time damage (Phase III BDA). Phase II importantly, better coordination and advancing to the next phase of is not timely and physical or across the NRF. As we see further an operation tends to be a gradual functional damage does not development and formalization of adjustment of desired effects and provide a complete picture of our this process, I’m certain we’ll see the means to accomplish them. The progress towards objectives. Using some thinning in the fog of war.

Fig. 3

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points

NATO Air Operations in a Joint Environment

Interview with Lieutenant General Jean Patrick Gaviard, Chief of Air Defence and Air Operations, FRA A

Lieutenant General Jean-Patrick Gaviard, The French Air Force Chief of Air Defence and Air Operations elaborates about his understanding of proactive commanding, the lessons learned during Exercise ALLIED ACTION 05 and his vision of NATO’s future Air Command and Control Architecture.

An interview by Wing Commander Pete York of the JAPCC

it events which occurred in Kosovo could not and should not happen again in the future.

Question: You emphasised the unique role played by the Air Commander both in advising the Joint Force Commander (JFC) on air issues and in directing air operations. Do you think that the Air Commander has a greater need to deploy forward with the JFC than the other CC Commanders and does the Air Commander need Photos by French Air Force (3) to remain physically located beside the JFC?

Question: Sir, you recently Answer: Operation ALLIED Answer: There is no doubt at all commented on the need for a pro- FORCE was conducted too deep in my mind that the Air active operational level of in current ops. It was a mistake to Commander should be physically command of operations in order locate the Air Commander at located with the JFC. In that to synergise the activities of the Vicenza in routine contact with his position, he is well placed to hold subordinate Component current ops staff and the informal discussions with the JFC Commands (CC). Amongst other Recognised Air Picture (RAP). The in order positively to help him things, you also said that result was that tactical level decisions develop the Joint Plan, which the Operation ALLIED FORCE, the predominated the whole campaign Air Commander can agree to and Kosovo Campaign in 1999, and, to a certain extent, the staff lost then interpret for the ACC through became unnecessarily protracted sight of the strategic and his Air Operations Directives and politically controversial. What operational level objectives. This (AOD). If the Air Commander is operational level lessons should we was a major lesson learnt, which has located remotely from the JFC he learn from this and how should the hastened the introduction of Effects will be limited to VTC discussions, military avoid repeating the Based Operations (EBO). EBO where it is more difficult informally mistake, especially in relatively low forces commanders to consider to express opinion and virtually level, outwardly single CC which of the components is best impossible to develop an agreed operations? Do you think that placed to achieve a specific effect. plan of action. Of course, this single CC operations are at all likely This concept is much broader than holds true for the other CC Cdrs in the future? single CC thinking and because of too. I am in full agreement with

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 the Supported/Supporting CC anticipate that 90% of his time will limitation in your experience with arrangement, which works very be spent alongside the JFC looking operating the French Deployable well. During the recent Exercise forward. He does not need many CAOC facility and, if so, what ALLIED ACTION 05 (AA05), the people around him to support the have you put in place to overcome CC Cdrs developed an excellent JFC; two targets experts from A2 the difficulties? working relationship, which served and a representative from A5 Plans the planning process well. will most often be enough. For me, Answer: This is a significant small is beautiful here. challenge. During AA05, real Follow-up Question: The price the communications problems arose Air Commander pays for deploying aboard the USS Mount Whitney forward with the JFC is [where the JFC and CCs were relinquishment of a major element operating afloat] in rough seas. of control over the direction and Moreover, in this exercise, we support that he can give to the ACC were not playing with UAV, Staff. Do you see this as a problem? which would massively increase the bandwidth requirements. We Answer: There can only be one have found that the provision of boss. He must retain control and adequate communications is easier responsibility for all the activities of to manage in a national context his command and the whole staff than within NATO. Nations have must work together as a team. The national assets, which are not Air Commander needs to have the declared to NATO, and it is easier confidence in his staff to do as he for Nations to procure time on asks them, even from afar. That said, national commercial satellites in in something as complex as much the same way as shipping or operational level planning, airlift would be procured from misunderstandings do occur. Question: Deployed operations industry in times of crisis. In even Sometimes it will be necessary for with NATO’s CJFACC have a small operation, the data transfer the Air Commander to take an clearly shown that communication requirement will be very large. In aircraft to fly to his ACC HQ, his between split elements of an Air order to accomplish NATO’s CAOC or even a Forward HQ requires massive bandwidth in ambitions to provide deployable Operating Base (FOB) to explain order to handle the vast data transfer C2, the CIS requirement is what he needs. He should, however, requirement. Has this been a fundamental to success. Without

Direction: General Gaviard meets NATO personel on Exercise ALLIED ACTION 05

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points

it, the Commander must deploy his hardly used it. However, there will perform this function on his behalf entire staff, with attendant life be infrequent strategic occasions such that the Air Commander’s support and vulnerability costs or when the JFC will want to see the thoughts and activities can be he will be blind and the whole RAP; Time Sensitive Targeting directed towards the long term and deployability concept will be flawed. (TST) is a good example of this. The not the short term future. Therefore, in my view, provision of Air Commander will need the RAP a reliable, deployable CIS capability Question: I understand that you with sufficient bandwidth to handle will be leaving your post as the the full spectrum of deployed “There can only be French Chief of Air Defence in operations is of paramount the near future. Hypothetically, importance. A gateway facility, one boss. if you were starting from a blank which enabled the automatic direct piece of paper now, how would interconnection of classified national He must retain control you design NATO’s future Air systems with NATO, was and responsibility for C2 Architecture? successfully used during AA05. all the activities of Answer: Very interesting question. Question: There appears to be a his command and the Firstly, I must stress that my answer difference between NATO and whole staff must to this question will represent my national doctrine on whether the work together as military solution; it may not be Air Commander needs constant politically acceptable to either access to the Recognised Air Picture a team”. NATO or the EU. Secondly, we at the air operational level. What is should note that only air uses the your position on this? NATO CC level of command in simply to show the JFC in real time NRF rotations; both Land and Answer: I believe there is a what is going on. However, at no Maritime CCs have used national difference between training and time should the Air Commander assets as their NRF CC reality here. During our recent use the RAP to involve himself at contributions; the Italian and experience in AA05, the RAP was the tactical level; he must rely upon Spanish NATO Rapid Deployable available to me throughout but I his CAOC Commander to Corps (NRDCs) and

In action: Two Mirage 2000-5 take off at Darwin, Australia, during Exercise PITCH BLACK 2004

Photo by Royal Australian Air Force

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Photo by FRA

In discussion: General Gaviard talks to Exercise ALLIED ACTION participants

UKMARFOR are examples. I have Therefore, in preference to NRF question to which I think you know been very impressed by the way in ACC leadership by the two the answer. In Afghanistan, which both CC-Air Ramstein and NATO ACCs, in the medium currently there are representatives CC-Air Izmir have prepared for term, I should like to see national of 37 different nations. and stood up their respective Communication without a common deployable C2 capabilities, as language would be very difficult. In demonstrated very successfully the future, I see more rather than recently in Exercise CLEAN “I should like to see fewer combined operations in which HUNTER. Moreover, I see a useful National JFACCs a common language will be needed. future for the two NATO ACCs increasingly taking Therefore, the ability to in developing doctrine and air communicate across nations will be policy issues. However, the two responsibility for increasingly fundamental to NATO ACCs must rely on providing the complete military credibility. Nations to fill a Combined Joint ACC, their air forces Statement of Requirement and support to NRF Personally, I find the ability (CJSOR), to provide logistics to converse in English and Spanish, support to flying operations and to air operations”. as well as my native French (also a provide operations, fire and principal language of NATO) is a medical support on FOBs. NRFs huge asset, which breaks down 5 and 6 have used the French and JFACCs increasingly taking many barriers both professional and UK JFACCs as their ACCs. responsibility for providing the social. It is my view that complete ACC, their air forces and organisations like NATO and the Increasingly, other nations support to NRF air operations. EU do not do enough to train are also developing their own foreign language skills. Native JFACC capabilities; JFACCs in Question: As the architect of the English speakers, in particular, Italy, Germany, Spain and French JFACC, you made the could do much more to improve Denmark are well advanced. brave decision that the chosen their language abilities, which would Nations could assign not only their operational language in training, be of benefit not only to themselves JFACC (to provide air C2) but also exercise and operation would be but also to the organisations in which air forces, their own logistics English. Could you please explain they work. support and a full suite of FOB your reasoning for this decision. support as a complete package. Answer: This is a mischievous Sir, thank you for the interview.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points

Photo by Defensiekrant

New Challenges for NATO Some Political and Security Considerations

By Dr. Pietro Battachi, University of Florence

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Global: Flags of NATO and partner countries at the Prague Summit 2002

Photo by NATO

ixteen years after the fall of the terrorism and failed states’ In an increasingly unstable S Berlin Wall, NATO still seems proliferation. The old game with and turbulent international system, in search of its identity. There is a only two major actors has been NATO represents one of the most rivalry within NATO on whether it replaced by a multilateral important agencies capable of should concentrate as an environment composed of world providing resources to fulfil organization for collective defence powers, medium powers together international security concerns. or should it be an enlarged forum with regional interests and political From the military perspective, a for international security. The entrepreneurs - producers of transformation process inside the priority for NATO is the organized violence to name a few, Alliance has been established. redefinition of its own spheres of all capable of implementing various Transformation is the process of mission and intervention. strategies different from combining new concepts, cooperation or defection. capabilities and organizational From containment models in order to exploit or to projection Milestone: NRF - a new era for NATO maintain a strategic advantage. The new concepts include the NATO During the Cold War, the Alliance Response Force (NRF) and the nations shared, under American capabilities outlined within the leadership, the common Soviet Prague Capabilities Commitment. threat. It was a defensive organisation, formed to contain the Extended reach: USSR’s political aspirations, with any NATO Response Force offensive initiatives being very limited and usually in response to The NRF is the key element of the Soviet actions. The strategic transformation process, a force interaction recalled a common maintained at a high operating prisoner dilemma: two players with readiness, flexible and capable of two strategies, cooperation or responding rapidly to contingencies defection? NATO’s options were anywhere on the globe. Unlike the interdependent, only the lead actor Photo by NATO European Reaction Force, the on each side of the opposite block NRF will be capable of operating could take decisions, while the NATO’s objectives changed from throughout the spectrum of others, on the periphery of the containment of the Soviet Union conflicts up to high intensity international system, were to the creation of conditions of combat. Each NRF is a force subordinate to one or the other stability and security outside its package, shaped by contributions major player. own borders. Crisis Response by individual member states. It Operations, the non-Article 5 must be able to conduct a forcible Today the simple features missions, not contiguous to entry operation in theatre and be of the bipolar competition have NATO nations’ borders, have self-sustainable for one month definitively faded. NATO no become the core mission of the while preparing for the arrival of longer has to cope with a static new enlarged NATO Alliance as the follow-on forces. threat, but a spectrum of risks opposed to the more traditional including Weapons of Mass defence of NATO sovereignty The shape of the force varies Destruction (WMD) proliferation, embedded in Article 5. in accordance with the type and the

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points

Photo by Defensiekrant principle, NATO must find a way to relax its use in order to avoid not making appropriate decisions. At the substantial level a kind of “double standard” inside the North Atlantic Council (NAC) could be created; having Article 5 decisions (typically cases of collective defence) decided by the consensus principle and a different approach used for non- Article 5 cases.

Flexible: NRF has to be able to react to escalating situations Each solution implies that a review of the voting criteria inside intensity of the mission; great process, particularly if it is still up the NAC is needed. It may be flexibility is required to tailor the to the task. The Alliance must be possible to achieve a modality similar force package to the specific mission capable of making rapid decisions; to the EU, one based on the so-called and to be able to respond to typical therefore a fast and easy procedure reinforced cooperation principle. contingencies. The mission spectrum needs to be developed to allow for This principle enables the EU to can run the gamut from short notice employment of the progress in a specific field in which humanitarian relief operations to NRF. This requirement needs to some of the member states cannot peace support operations (PSO). In be understood by all the member temporarily participate. The process the first case, the force has to nations including new ones, who requires all the members to agree on guarantee the necessary security might have joined the Alliance for the basic issue of the policy (for framework, which includes different reasons and might see the NATO this would be an initial reconstruction and other assistance security challenges in a slightly NAC level decision) then some activities. The forces will not be different way. nations, for national reasons, would equipped for high intensity combat, not participate in the operation. The but would be capable of maintaining Improve consensus members not participating with a secure and safe environment, while development process their troops would not delay preventing the escalation of violence. mission preparation once it has been On the one hand, each member approved by the NAC. The only In the PSO case, the objective nation will have to speed up its other solution is the formation of a is similar to Operations national procedures allowing coalition of countries with a DELIBERATE FORCE and military contingents to be sent common agreed interest in a specific ALLIED FORCE; to modify the abroad. On the other hand, mission. This coalition could not political conduct of an antagonist NATO needs to find a common carry out the mission on behalf of forcing him to accept externally and more effective agreed procedure to NATO, but it might seek the internationally agreed (UN or authorize the NRF employment. participation of other NATO NATO) conditions. It requires the This latter issue must balance the nations (coalition of the willing). capability to insert a ground force national need of each nation being in theatre capable of achieving the part of the decision-making It’s not yet clear if a review defined political objective and the process with NATO’s ability to of the NATO decision-making ability to carry out air and maritime efficiently and effectively process will take place and, if it does, operations appropriate to support authorise the NRF deployment. what shape and manner it will the land operations. During PSO, assume. However, it is imperative the NRF will be an instrument NATO’s decision-making that, if NATO wants to continue aiming to maintain the status quo process is ruled by the “consensus to influence the international scene, on the field while, during peace principle”, which in the past the “consensus principle” is revised. enforcement operations, it will guaranteed Alliance cohesion and a Only when NATO achieves a become a coercive instrument able harmonization of points of view balance between the “great to modify the status quo to its own through a single policy. Today numbers” of enlargement and advantage. The new transformation NATO must progress beyond using speedy and effective decision- process raises questions about only the consensus principle. While making, can it be said to have NATO’s political decision-making not abandoning the consensus overcome this difficult challenge.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Deployable Operations Capability

The NATO Air Command and Control System By Kenneth Nesbitt, ThalesRaytheonSystems

eployed operations will be a monitoring, supervision and total of 56 operator work positions Dcentral feature of future reporting of all assigned resources and a capability to execute an Air NATO real-world operations and and air operations. Tactical ARSs Tasking Order (ATO) of up to 1000 training activities, particularly those (Air Control Centre, RAP sorties a day. However, as associated with the NATO Production Centre, Sensor Fusion mentioned already, the number of Response Force (NRF). The Post) will provide the coordinated shelters and thus available work surveillance, identification, air mission control and air traffic control inputs. The Deployable ACCS components (DAC) will have the same operating software and the same capabilities as the fixed ACCS sites. However, the deployable units offer the advantage of being scaleable in size and composition to match the level of activity of the specific operation.

Photos (2) by ThalesRaytheonSystems The DCAOC will have identical functionality to a static NATO Air Command and ACCS CAOC. The DCAOC will positions, can be adjusted to suit the Control System (ACCS) will also provide interoperability to planned scale of operations. provide unified air C2, which will other C2 systems such as the Interim enable NATO’s European nations CAOC Capability (ICC) and Use of the same hardware, seamlessly to manage all types of Theatre Ballistic Missile Control software and procedures in the air operations over their territory System (TBMCS). The DAC as those used in the static and beyond. deployability concept configures the ACCS units will greatly reduce the DCAOC equipment to be packed training requirements for staff The system will enable the in transit cases, which can be rapidly manning the deployable units. integration of air traffic control, transported by air, land or sea. Moreover, the ability to quickly surveillance, air mission control, There will be two Deployable augment the DAC with airspace management and force CAOC Units, one based at Uedem, internationally mixed crews will management functions. ACCS is Germany, and the other at Poggio be simplified. designed to update NATO Air C2 Renatico, Italy. capabilities with a modern, flexible The DARS implementation system, which includes the ability The Deployable ARS for NATO is well advanced and the to support deployed operations (DARS) receives and integrates the initial contract phase, called DARS worldwide, with reach back into the sensor and data link picture from First Article, is nearing completion NATO static air C2 system. all contributing sources to form and with testing scheduled to be finished distribute the Joint Environment in Dec 2005. DARS First Article The first phase of the ACCS Picture (JEP) to C2 participants. A will deliver 5 shelters, one of each Programme will field two types of full DARS configuration will type, 1 OS, 2 LSS (comms and data entity in both static and deployable comprise 11 ISO containers, links), and one Transport Shelter for configurations. In Combined Air comprising 7 Ops Shelters (OS), 2 logistics. Once NATO accepts the Operations Centres (CAOC) and Link Support Shelters (LSS) and 2 DARS First Article shelters, the six Deployable CAOCs (DCAOC), Transport Shelters (TS) for remaining Operations Shelters will ACCS will provide the capability equipment and logistics support. be completed and the full DARS for planning, tasking, coordination, The 7 OS’s together can provide a system will be delivered.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points Preparing the Warfighter: The Work of the Joint Warfare Centre By Air Marshal Peter Walker, GBR A Director Joint Warfare Centre

his is an important time for the Command Transformation, the we can relieve the Operational Twhole subject of operational Centres of Excellence (COEs), the Commands and the supporting training, not least because of the JFTC, the JWC and the Operational Components of the demands of advent of the NRF. The new Commands to do what we can to training and the development of NATO structure reflects the improve the performance of those new concepts. This is the primary importance of training and both the Staffs that support the Command role of the JWC. The NATO site Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and its of Operations. at Jåttå, Stavanger is the home of sister organisation, the Joint Force the JWC. A temporary 2-storey Training Centre (JFTC), have key The reality of building is being erected on the roles in mission training. As we sustained operations upper car park to accommodate the work to develop our collective JWC staff whilst the current responsibility to see how we can As NATO becomes more involved building is extended into the new improve our contribution to with sustained operations, such as training and experimental centre. NATO and to share knowledge of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, The terms of reference for the best practice where we see it, we and continues to develop new JWC, issued by the Military must work together across Allied capabilities such as the NATO NRF, Committee, require the Director to:

Photo by German Armed Forces

Joint Exercise: C2 aboard HMS Invincible during Exercise NOBLE JAVELIN 05

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Fig. 1

• Promote and implement the NRF training, when will conduct the next NRF exercise NATO’s joint and combined components operate under a joint with JC Lisbon, Exercise ALLIED experimentation, interoperability HQ, JFTC will support the JWC WARRIOR. At the same time we and doctrine development process. by providing EXCON support at will be assisting JC Brunssum in the Component level as shown in the preparation for next year’s • Conduct and enhance joint the Figure 1 above. exercise round, which will include and combined training at the an out of area exercise for the NRF operational level in support of the If that is our mission, how and further work on the ISAF operational commanders. is it executed? The short answer is mission, as NATO looks to the through the exercise and training further expansion of the ISAF Area • Assist Allied Command programme. At the JWC we have of Responsibility. Operations (ACO) in conducting been working hard to establish our the evaluation of collective Battle reputation as the first port of call The JWC Training Delivery Staff Training. for training and this year we have Model, showing the different successfully conducted exercise elements that interlock to provide The Director of the JFTC ALLIED ACTION to qualify a coherent and complete exercise serves as the focal point and centre Joint Command Lisbon for the organisation in support of the of expertise for NATO Joint NRF command. The JWC played operational commander’s training Operations and Warfare at the host to both Strategic Commands objectives is shown in Figure 2. tactical level and, as a priority, at their annual Strategic Where possible HICON and provides support to the NRF Conference, ALLIED REACH. LOCON will be provided by the component commanders in the We have conducted training for real organisations – by SHAPE, training and exercising of the NRF. Iraqi key leaders and hosted, for from within the components and, JWC’s and JFTC’s responsibilities Joint Command Brunssum, pre- for example, the International complement each other: whilst deployment mission rehearsal Committee of the Red Cross and JWC concentrates at the Joint training for the ISAF headquarters. the United Nations Assistance Force command level, the Mission in Afghanistan. I am quite preparation of components to As I look to the autumn confident that the JWC and the operate within a joint environment programme of work we will host JFTC cannot do all this work by is a JFTC responsibility. During another Iraqi training event and we themselves; we will have to draw

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points

Fig. 2

on the experience of staff from COEs to develop this doctrine will be other tasks as the across the Alliance in order to for advancement through ACT. relationships between the continue to deliver a quality product. The JAPCC should also look for organisations develop and I see a We have to encourage a supported- opportunities to test and role for the JAPCC in enhancing supporting mindset that looks for integrate new concepts into the the air element of our ISAF subject matter expertise for our training, by drawing on the mutual gain. The JAPCC can experience of those who have contribute to this work and make a served in the Tactical Air mark on the Transformation of the “The JAPCC will have a Operations Centre. Other tasks Alliance. We are clear in both the key role in identifying areas could include writing a guide for the JWC and the JFTC that we must where our doctrine is out of air liaison officers, who are often have a relationship with the COEs augmentees, so that, as they deploy and in our terms of reference we date or not relevant to the in support of a particular are encouraged by the MC to new world we live in. commander, they have a point of develop these relationships. reference for their work. We will look to the Centres We see a number of mutual areas These are all ideas that will of interest and coherence: we look of Excellence to develop this develop over time and will require to the COEs, as a resource for doctrine for advancement work to address tertiary issues such expertise, to augment our own through Allied Command as funding responsibilities, but we observer trainers who may not have should not see these as impediments. the relevant experience or training Transformation”. This is an interesting time to be in in air matters. This role requires staff NATO: we have never been busier who can watch a headquarters staff and we have never lived in a time in action and provide advice, training environment, through when the enthusiasm for guidance and if necessary some close cooperation with the JFTC. development and change has been training, in order to improve It will have a valuable role to play greater. The JAPCC is an integral performance. The JAPCC will in identifying best practice part of this new paradigm and we have a key role in identifying areas amongst the Air C2 community and the JFTC look forward to a where our doctrine is out of date and then promoting and mutually rewarding relationship as or not relevant to the new world publicising best practice for the we all take the training of deployed we live in. We will look to the benefit of all practitioners. There NATO forces forward.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 The Joint Air Power Contribution to the NRF: A Land Perspective

By Lieutenant General José Javier Arregui Asta Commander NRDC-SP & NRF (5) LCC

Photo by SPAF

he NATO Response Force Nuclear (CBRN) events or nations (quick response operations Tis a high readiness, joint and humanitarian crisis situations), Crisis to support diplomacy, as required). combined force, capable of Response Operations (CRO), Spain’s NATO Rapid Deployment performing certain missions on its including Peacekeeping, Counter Corps is commanding NRF 5 (L), own, of deploying as an initial entry Terrorism (CT) operations and after successfully achieving a force that prepares the theatre for embargo operations. demanding certification process follow-on forces, or providing a culminating last May in Exercise show of force. In all of these The NRF could be deployed ALLIED ACTION 05. During missions the strength of the NRF as an initial entry force to facilitate this period, we had the opportunity must be proportional to the the arrival of follow-on forces in a to train with different components scenario. The NRF may be Joint Operations Area from a benign in a real joint team and to gather deployed as a stand-alone force for up to a hostile environment, with important lessons to set the crisis response such as Non- or without host nation support, (e.g. conditions to maximize joint combatant Evacuation Operations peace enforcement), or as a planning and campaign execution in (NEO), Consequence Management demonstration force package, in the complex theatres where the (Chemical, Biological, Radiological order to show the resolve of member NRF will be deployed.

Wide range: NRF can be deployed as an initial entry force or as a demonstration force package

Photo by Defensiekrant

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points

Demanding: Projection of force - a complex task

Photo by Defensiekrant

For the purpose of this article, I will planners raised the need for ten initial entry and the arrival of follow focus on Air/Land cooperation, strategic transport and fifteen tactical on forces. During AA 05, the sharing my Land Component transport planes. These were not majority of incidents gave all Command (LCC) Commander listed in the CJSOR. This will components the impression that thoughts in order to enhance the represent a key challenge for these types of operations will be contribution of Joint Air power. NATO. Rapid response implies land-centric, with the main effort enough airlift assets. The nature and overburdening the NRF (L), from The NRF theatre of size of the NRF (L), a light- securing APOD and land lines of operations could vary from semi- medium Brigade plus LCC units, communication (LLOC), to hostile to permissive; possibly must be recognized by the Joint protecting humanitarian relief and from well-found bases to bases Command and the other supporting HN security forces. with little Host Nation Support Only an understood designation of (HNS). Such operations could also the LCC, as the supported face asymmetric threats and a non- command and a flexible, and linear battlefield. Nevertheless, the perhaps, collocated air land key point is that the projection of structure, can overcome the the force will always be complex challenges of developing a clear and and truly demanding, due to fast decision making process and distance, the availability of Sea Ports execution of air support. of Debarkation (SPOD) and Air Ports of Debarkation (APOD), and The synchronization of the amount of equipment to deploy. ground manoeuvre with close air Photo by JAPCC support, although a LCC Strategic airlift will be Joint: Ground manoeuvre and close responsibility, will also raise new needed to deploy quickly and the air support challenges in this new NRF current shortfalls in the CJSOR will framework. Many possible targets clearly create constraints to the NRF components as a vulnerable force will be blended with the population deployment. We all know that at the initial stage of the projection, and located in urban terrain, they NATO should address these with limitations to conduct combat may present a low signature and be shortfalls, but they must be operations as a stand alone force, protected by Man Portable Air considered as a major problem to thus requiring full support from the Defence Systems (MANPADS) and the capability to react quickly against other components, with the ACC Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). the emerging threats of our times. playing a major role. Shaping the Close Air Support (CAS) requests battlefield by securing no fly areas, and execution will demand positive During AA 05, within the providing air superiority, controlling control by Forward Air Controllers Zoran Sea scenario, in order to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) (FAC)/Tactical Air Control deploy the NRF Land (L) light airspace and contributing to Personnel (TACP), embedded with forces package that was required to Intelligence, Surveillance, Target ground units, to avoid collateral open and secure one APOD and Acquisition and Reconnaissance damage and fratricide. The LCC one nearby city (three battalions and (ISTAR), will be critical JFACC tasks staff, mainly the fire support some combat support units), the in support of the NRF(L) during element , will integrate all lethal and

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 non-lethal fires needs and will send without doubt, the interoperability A strong LCC liaison team, with them to the Joint Targeting between the different Joint Force clearly delegated authority, the Working Group (JTWG) for Air Component Command correct rank and fully aware of the approval. The execution of this (JFACC)/CAOCs and the LCC/ land component commander’s Air support will be coordinated AOCC, through the sharing of CIS intention, deployed to the JFC, through the joint fires and air space tools like the NATO SECRET (NS) JFACC and CAOC, and the proper management cell (JFASMC) inside (ICC) and MISSION SECRET Air Liaison Element (ALE) and the LCC Operation Centre, where (MS), like the one implemented to AOCC deployed to the LCC/NRF, Air Operations Coordination command and control LCC units will set the conditions for success. Centre (AOCC)/G3Air/FSE in NRDC-SP. This issue, although During AA 05, the deployment of representatives will de-conflict under study, is creating real a flag officer to the Joint airspace and clear the air support constraints to the maintenance of the Coordination Board (JCB) and a missions. Enhancing AOCC/LCC reach back, due to the problems of Ground Liaison Element (GLE), coordination and clearance of CAS, sharing information between the supported by LCC/CIS, both to through fast and shared Computer two CIS platforms. With the JFACC the JFACC and the CAOC, was the Information Systems (CIS) assets deployed far away from the right way to have a common Land with the Combined Air Operations CAOC, and the NRF/AOCC also and Air picture and to speed up the Centres (CAOC), will improve deployed, the sharing of a common time between request and support. reaction time and create safe routes picture will be paramount to to hit those sensitive targets that In summary, the NRF threaten the NRF land units. Continuity: Information-flow from LCC needs Joint Air Power from planning to realizing joint and combined the beginning of the operation: operations worldwide The laws of modern initially to rapidly project the ground warfare have brought new forces to a distant Theatre of constraints to Commanders. The Operations (TOO); subsequently, to Rules of Engagement (ROE) will support the forces during the land- always be reactive to the opposing centric operations, in an economy forces’ actions and limit the of land forces scenario. To attain deterrence capability of the Joint the best result, land and Commander. Joint Air Power will corresponding air staffs must work be one of the most important in close coordination and share a factors for deterrence, but the common understanding of the ROE will create additional situation; jointness is a must to problems for clearance of the fires achieve success in the NRF. We have in support of the NRF(L). the right tools to do this, through our liaison teams and boards, such Non lethal-fires will as the GLE, ALE, AOCC, assume a major role in these JFASMC and others; our main asset scenarios, and the main effects will is the will to plan and fight as a team. no longer be achieved by the use Photo by Defensiekrant of massive or precision fires, but Finally, I must conclude that by the synchronization of a joint provide accurate air support to land NRF(L) will need support from information operations campaign. operations. We must solve this issue, other component commanders The challenge will be to smooth and case by case, on each NRF, due to when deployed to a distant TOO speed up the process of changing different MS platforms currently in and within the short notice to move. or putting into effect a new ROE use by the different NRDCs. Joint Air Power will play a key role in order to be executable within the to overcome the challenges of possible timeframe. In the modern All these points must be deploying the force. As the doctrinal battlefield, targets will appear and embedded in the planning process concept of the NRF develops, the will threaten vital assets and by joint commissions and boards, major way ahead to maximize air disappear or assume passive modes at all levels, interchanging and power will certainly be through joint very quickly. ROE changes should developing the OPLAN and the and combined training and by react accordingly to sustain Joint related Components’ supporting finding new solutions to improve Force credibility and our force plans with a common picture and the way we fight the new threats protection. Another key issue is, the vision of the Joint Commander. anywhere in the world.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 View Points

Let’sLet’s GetGet SMART!SMART! Photo by Royal Air Force By Air Commodore Martin Halsall GBR A, JAPCC

istributed simulation has strides in this area. Only recently, a FIRST WAVE, which took place in Dattracted many acronyms: 3-star Admiral encapsulated the November 2004. This TD proved Distributed Mission Operations impact of his latest DMO exercise the concept: air simulation systems (DMO); Mission Training through by stating that… “On the evidence from 5 nations operated successfully Distributed Simulation (MTDS); of what I have seen over the past in a virtual environment, controlled Networked Operations in a Virtual few days, it is conceivable that the from a Distributed Mission Environment (NOVE); and now Fleet will no longer have to put to Operations Centre in Scotland. NATO SMART, Simulated Mission sea to train, we can now do that And Rehearsal Training. effectively whilst tied up in harbour. Enormous challenges We will go to sea either to validate and many traps Significant advantages or to fight.” Armies too have and low risks rapidly adopted the DMO concept The challenges were enormous, and the sophistication of the Land even though, in theory, there were However, regardless of the tag Component Commander’s virtual no technological showstoppers. applied to it, the linking of mission battlespace on the ground and in the After all, the Americans had been simulators of various types, located air is evolving at a startling pace. practising DMO for at least six in different countries often This is no time to sit back and trot years and were getting more and separated by thousands of miles, in out the “air forces alone are at the more adventurous in their level of a virtual air battlespace, is a hugely cutting edge of military ambition. However, as a first impressive concept. Furthermore, it technologies” maxim. NATO effort, the traps were there, has highly significant operational, not least the challenge of security. financial and environmental That said, the air Once linked to the system, nationally advantages and, given the extensive environment has been selected by protected information held within experience already gained nationally Headquarters Strategic Allied the simulators database could be and through multilateral Command Transformation (HQ exposed to all other users and arrangements, is relatively low-risk SACT) to be the lead environment would have to be sanitised. and cheap at the price! Whilst for the NATO simulation project, Obviously this raised fundamental unashamedly for this journal, I am NATO SMART. The initial idea of concerns amongst some nations, but focussing on the applicability of developing a NATO capability in unfortunately too late in the NATO SMART to the Air this area was advanced by the planning to allow a solution to be Component Command (ACC), I NATO Research and Technology found or to avoid the withdrawal should point out right at the start Organisation (RTO), which initiated of two nations’ simulators. This that our land and maritime a seven nation Technology remains a difficult area. In most colleagues have also made great Demonstrator (TD) Exercise other respects, FIRST WAVE was

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 a success and satisfactorily proved through a Combined Air commitments because of the that the concept was worthy of Operations Centre and/or an E3, prohibitive costs of preparation, further development. engagement, using Special certification and rehearsal training – Operations Forces or a Forward Air much of which could be achieved Significant operational Controller, and post-attack through the sophisticated simulation flexibility assessment; the command group networks that SMART provided. role in the decision making process Since then though, transitioning the could also be exercised if required. Other financial benefits project from the RTO (research would accrue from using live flying and development) environment to A simulated information only for core tasks and/or reduced a more focussed operational exchange system (eg Link-16) could training deployments, once nations concept has been challenging and be used routinely in a way that (and more importantly, the aircrew) SACT needed the assistance of a would be almost impossible to were convinced of the validity and knowledgeable partner. At about create in a LIVEX because of value of SMART training. the same time, the JAPCC was frequency and other restrictions. The Environmental benefits are obvious forming and as one of its first tasks scenarios used could be specifically and would also be a useful bi- assessed that this was a tailored to both air-centric product of a measurable shift transformational development that (RENEGADE) and joint mission from real to simulated sorties, to had huge potential. Not only did it rehearsal, and it is here that the be exploited whenever the seem to offer great operational JAPCC sees huge potential for the military came under pressure flexibility and value for the new preparation and accreditation of from environmental lobbyists. NRF concept, but also it had mission-ready air forces (and air significant positive financial and support to the LCC) for the NATO Direction and guidance environmental implications too. Response Force (NRF). to new operations

The operational flexibility Financial benefits The first NATO SMART Steering offered by NATO SMART covers from many sources Group meeting took place in late many aspects of the application of August 2005 at the JAPCC, chaired Alliance air power. It will, for Similarly, this is where the first by the author of this article. This example, permit a realistic, complex tangible financial benefit can be allowed direction and guidance to air scenario to be practised which identified. Experience to date be given to the new operations and could involve all the elements of, say, would seem to suggest that nations training working group, also chaired a Time Sensitive Target (TST) are unwilling adequately to meet the by a JAPCC staff officer, to start engagement: detection by requirements of the Combined its crucial work in developing the Intelligence, Surveillance, Tracking Joint Statement of Requirement users’ needs and in planning the finer and Reconnaissance assets, air C2 (CJSOR) for future NRF detail of the SMART event planned for late 2007 or early 2008. In this way, I hope that some momentum Opportunity: Simulation offers great mission rehearsal Photo by US Air Force has been injected into a very worthwhile project that, for various reasons, had begun to lose its way.

NATO SMART will offer operational flexibility in a cost- effective and environmentally friendly way. It will allow mission rehearsal, particularly for the NRF, on a scale and complexity almost impossible to replicate on a live basis, which will revolutionise the way we train and result in an operationally “smarter” NATO air community, more effective, more responsive and better prepared for the complexities of today’s world.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Out of the Box Do we still need “the man” in the cockpit? By Colonel Hans Wolf DEU A, JAPCC

Photo by US Air Force

nce upon a time, in the part painful period of extensive trial and anymore and will inevitably Oof the world NATO calls error, aerodynamic and space flight become more common. The time “The Southern Region”, an operations eventually became a is here when not only flight ingenious man named Daedalus and successful routine with the attendants may become pregnant, his son Icarus tempted the gods of exception of some inherently but pilots too (my sincere apologies their era by strapping on a glued residual risks, most of which are to women’s lib for this politically contraption of artificial wings and under-estimated, negligently incorrect notion). taking to the air in good faith. They disregarded, or not recognised believed that flying would be the early enough by the operator When we talk about only way to get them away from himself or by his designated “unmanned flight”, we do not Minos in Crete. Icarus grew maintainers. Manned space flight refer to a previously unknown exhilarated by the thrill of flying seems to have passed the apex of its gender, but rather want to express (which most flyers will understand), importance, so it seems, pending that no human being is involved. got too close to the sun-god Helios far-reaching technological and However, this is not entirely true, when his wings disintegrated and physiological developments to if one considers remotely he crashed into the deep blue sea. explore and use the deeper solar controlled flying machines where system (and beyond) in the future. a human operator makes control Trial & error inputs while staying on terra brought success The current vehicles must firma. Future levels of automation be replaced to achieve future might enable us to sit back, relax, With regard to effects-based objectives in space at a lower risk, and observe vehicles to launch, operations, this cannot really be as we all have witnessed during the fly, and land autonomously, i.e. called a success story but it certainly most recent space shuttle flight to without any controlling action by inspired followers to find safer the International Space Station in a human being. ways of getting airborne, staying orbit and back to earth. But why aloft, and making landings one can are we talking about “manned Exotic visions walk away from. The multi- flight”? The other sex has come a of future technology talented Leonardo da Vinci was one long way and women have also of the genius proponents of flying found their way into cockpits of This article focuses on UAV- some centuries later, devising aeronautical and space vehicles. technology developed to remove numerous plans for flying Their successful employment as the human being from the cockpit. machinery, albeit all designed for space shuttle commanders or as The advancements in the area of human beings in control onboard civilian and military aircraft miniaturisation, micro electro- and never flight-tested. After a commanders is not unusual mechanics, and morphing

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 technology are another exciting The answer might be found by albeit under a different domain of the future and deserve looking into the following areas of combination of factors. special consideration in subsequent key interest: Nevertheless, the detrimental publications. The existence of even effects are identical for the more exotic visions such as mote • Less risks for humans whilst individual human being, i.e. being technology (e.g. SMART DUST) airborne. a matter of life and death. The are acknowledged but must be possibility of being killed during reserved for future articles in this • Less flight-physiological air/space operations will journal. This article assumes further limitations for humans. influence the human being in that the reader appreciates the onboard control of such inherent qualities and characteristics • More effects-based effectiveness. operations and dilute the of air and space operations in effectiveness. This can range from general and their value for military • More effects-based efficiency. complacency to somewhat applications in particular. reduced aggressiveness or even to The airborne/spaceborne complete refusal, unless the Just to make sure we are human will always be exposed to mindset is that of a kamikaze singing from the same sheet of risks stemming from technical pilot or suicide bomber. music, the following definition of failures, flight physiological UAV is offered for convenience: limitations of the human body, Unquestionably, the use of and most importantly, late or no UAVs will eliminate the risk of • UAVs are vehicles sustained in recognition of imminent risks in being killed whilst airborne/ flight by aerodynamic lift and conjunction with flawed spaceborne. However, mental controlled without an onboard decision-making processes in and physiological consequences of human being. critical situations. controlling UAVs from the surface may result from trying to • UAVs may be recoverable or Risks & threats control the mission under adverse expendable. affect the safety circumstances. Stress will probably have the main • UAVs may be operated Specifically in military operations, distracting influence on operators autonomously or remotely. the risks or even threats created by sitting in front of a remote opponents affect directly the safety control console without any seat- This article examines the advantages of airborne/spaceborne human of-the-pants feedback. This factor of removing the human from beings. To a certain degree, acts of can only be eliminated by fully onboard control of aerial vehicles. terror fall into the same category, automated, autonomously operating UAVs following a predetermined mission plan with Supremacy: UAVs can be operated remotely, reducing human risk no or very limited capabilities to respond automatically to external influences or to be dynamically re-tasked.

UAV technology delivers constant improvements in sophistication, thus providing better effects-based results by progressing from sensor-focused to delivery-capable systems, composed of a ground station, appropriate communications architecture and usually multiple air platforms. Payload packages offer a variety of tactical applications, only limited by weight, size, and power supply requirements.

Photo by Boeing Company UAVs provide extended on-station times, i.e. long loiter

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Out of the Box

Painting by Carlo Saraceni leading responsibility for that and “Caduto di Ikaros” must provide robust, reliable concepts to other airspace users. Talking about the civil world, they are the majority out there and will definitely develop into UAV customers in the future. This could accelerate the further developments much faster than expected by some senior planners. It may also develop into a very competitive market, making UAVs more affordable but high-tech payloads more expensive.

UAVs have begun to earn their widely acknowledged place in the world of aviation and are a most Development: Growing sophistication from Icarus..... welcome complementary capability for a broad arena of and long endurance. UAVs are different place with different future applications – they deserve perfectly suited for the dull, functions and different challenges growing attention, even if they just dirty, and dangerous tasks. to be mastered. do the dull, dirty, and dangerous Quickly advancing developments jobs for us. And yes, we do need make UAVs also a first choice for However, the actual “the man” in the cockpit for some the glamorous and glorious tasks employment of UAVs must be time to come, until technology as well. closely coordinated with other air delivers computers that are capable and space movements, not only of taking the right (or wrong) on- Growing sophistication within a limited operations area but the-spot decisions in flight. But will drives costs of acquisition, also for transit to and from their computers ever be able to enjoy the operation, maintenance and repair operating bases and areas, which sentiments expressed by John G. up to a point where UAVs lose one could be quite far away, where they Magee, Jr’s. poem “High Flight”? of their original attrition-related might be operating “pilotless” in advantages. Modern, state of the art non-military airspace. Everybody should be UAVs are not necessarily privileged to enjoy such an almost disposable or easily replaceable, The civil air traffic control religious experience. Since the especially when being configured organisation has some very specific JAPCC is a future-oriented, as integrated sensors, as laser concerns with mixing piloted and transformational, non-profit designators, as tankers or as remotely controlled or fully agency, we are currently considering weapons platforms, for example. automated systems in the same offering free seats on the first un- airspace. These must be resolved piloted A380 passenger flight from It seems that a modular quickly in order to ensure a fail- Weeze to London Stansted. family of complementary UAVs safe operational air environment. can provide the affordability, The military community has the Welcome aboard, you all! together with the combined and joint usability needed by the military. The military domain must stay away from being a technology- maturing agency and refrain from prematurely employing nice-to- have but technologically unstable systems. This risk must remain with the developing defence industry.

Will the employment of UAVs reduce the requirement for “the man-in-the-loop”? Our assessment is that “the man” will always be in the loop, albeit in a ... to FILUR: Sweden’s stealthy UAV demonstrator Photo by SAAB Technologies

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 “High Flight”

by John G. Magee Jr.

Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of earth And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings; Sunward I’ve climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth Of sun-split clouds - and done a hundred things You have not dreamed of - wheeled and soared and swung High in the sunlit silence. Hov’ring there, I’ve chased the shouting wind along, and flung My eager craft through footless halls of air. Up, up the long, delirious, burning blue I’ve topped the wind-swept heights with easy grace Where never lark, or even eagle flew - And, while with silent lifting mind I’ve trod The high untrespassed sanctity of space, Put out my hand and touched the face of God.

Photo by NASA

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Inside the JAPCC NEWSNEWS New frontiers: JAPCC support to the African Mission in Sudan

Overview of current topics

Over the last six months the JAPCC has gone from strength to strength and has been engaged in a wide series of tasks in support of both NATO and its individual nations. These tasks have ranged from looking at current capabilities and making recommendations for Photo by JAPCC improvements to looking at some longer term and more visionary air JAPCC gets itself closer to full Defence University. The JAPCC power concepts and projects. operating capability. has also established good contacts Although still not a year old, the with branches of industry and JAPCC has already developed a Establishing contact academia, which we see as important strong capability across a broad across NATO partners in the development of spectrum of air power issues. This future JAPCC project work. article provides brief information In the last few months the JAPCC on some of the current topics and has been busy establishing strong Transforming Air Power - what the JAPCC hopes to tackle in relationships with a variety of future deployability the future. NATO and external organisations which we believe can help us achieve The JAPCC has recently published The SACT/JAPCC our transformational air power two important studies, namely the programme of work mission. We have recently Deployable Airfield Activation completed a series of visits and Wing (DAAW) concept and a In June 2005, Vice Admiral Stricker briefings to major NATO HQs, study on Strategic Airlift Support (Deputy Chief of Staff, SACT) which has enabled us to establish an to NRF deployments. Both of signed a Letter of Agreement with effective network of contacts across these studies are transformational Lieutenant General Schubert, the the whole NATO community, in nature and are currently being Executive Director of the JAPCC. including the NATO Consultation, incoporated into SACT Integrated The letter set out an agreed Command and Control Agency. Capability Team work. programme of work and spelt out We were also delighted to hear how the JAPCC will support recently that Romania have agreed Improving NATO Air C2 SACT in achieving its to join the JAPCC, bringing the transformation goals, setting out a JAPCC international community The JAPCC fielded a team of range of JAPCC projects that will to a total of 17 nations. evaluation staff on Exercise CLEAN be tackled over the coming months. HUNTER 05, which was held at Among the JAPCC projects are In addition, we have also Soesterburg, in the Netherlands. A work on expeditionary air logistics, established good contacts with key aim of the exercise, and the airlift, force protection, future appropriate national centres of purpose of JAPCC’s involvement, SEAD, the air concept for joint excellence, including a recent series was to examine the underlying strike and the SMART project. of visits to five US Battlelabs. This assumptions for the Deployable The JAPCC sees the SACT JAPCC programme has also CAOC, including its concept of Programme of Work as a key generated enquiries from nations, operations, and to test the capability vehicle for further developing the including a request for JAPCC of the current organisation to meet effective and efficient use of joint support to lecture at the Belgian the laid down requirements. NATO air power. We also Defence College and an invitation anticipate that further tasks will be to provide a briefing on NATO The JAPCC report provided added to the programme as the transformation at the US National recommendations on strengthening

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 the DCAOC capability and also set capability. In recent months we have JAPCC Air Power out actions which should lead to established links with nations who Conference NRF certification in time for NRF have a strong background in this 7, and a fully deployable CAOC area, together with other associated As the JAPCC Journal goes to in 2008. centres of excellence, industry and press, arrangements are now well academia involved in research on advanced for the JAPCC Joint Air ALLIED WARRIOR 05 UCAVs. Beside participating in and Space Power Conference, to be various NATO UCAV related held at the end of November. The JAPCC staff participated as panels we aim to identify and theme of the conference is “How observers in Exercise ALLIED develop appropriate UCAV do we ensure that NATO air WARRIOR 05, which was a NRF projects in the coming months. power remains relevant”? 6 planning exercise to test the JFACC-JFLC-JFMC lines of C4ISTAR matters We expect over 200 senior communication. Such exercises officers to attend from across the provide a useful hands-on Within the JAPCC C4ISTAR NATO community, together with experience to JAPCC officers on Branch, the build up of ISR/JISR leading academics and key industry current NATO procedures and experience is now progressing leaders. The key note speech will working methods and also give quickly. Subject matter experts in be given by the Chairman of the invaluable “real time” practical airborne early warning, air ground feedback to us which we can then surveillance, space operations, Air use to inform our project work. C2 data links and communications are now in place. Initial contacts JAPCC support to with the main NATO C4ISTAR exercise in Africa stakeholders have been established NATO Military Committee. We and the JAPCC has also begun will provide a full report of the Two members of the JAPCC contributing to some of the NATO conference proceedings in the next recently deployed in support of the C4ISR framework documents, such edition of the JAPCC Journal. African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). as the Joint ISR concept and the Wg Cdr Andy Ingham and LTC Alliance Ground Surveillance JAPCC future work John Fletcher spent what was a Concept of Operations. The and priorities busy but very productive month JAPCC is also making a strong on the exercise, alongside a number contribution to various NATO JAPCC’s efforts in the coming of other NATO personnel. The working groups, including the months will be concentrated on the aim was to support the African Ground Surveillance Operational delivery of our SACT programme Union and the UN in running a Users Group, the Joint UAV panel of work, together with our focus CPX in the Darfur region of Sudan and the Deployed Forces CIS on the NRF, in particular the value for the AMIS force HQ and the working group. that improved, integrated and eight deployed sector HQs. deployable Air C2 can bring to it. NATO Air Defence 2020 We also see UAVs as critical to The exercise was considered expanding the Alliance’s capabilities a great success and has paved the JAPCC has been asked by SHAPE and we will develop a series of way for further capacity building and SACT to develop a paper workstreams in this area. Air to start in the near future. The two concerning NATO’s medium to logistics will also continue to be a JAPCC officers also felt it was long term requirements for key priority. invaluable to see some of the integrated air defence. The paper practical issues of such a is seen as a key transformational The important point that we deployment at first hand and felt issue and it will take account of would stress to all readers is that it had been a good learning the planned introduction of the the JAPCC is here to provide experience for all parties. new NATO Air Command and support to both NATO and its Control System. It will also individual nations – if you would UCAV developments undoubtedly drive future like us to help you with a joint air concepts and requirements, power topic, please contact our The JAPCC have initiated work to including doctrine. We aim to Director of Staff via develop a firm foundation in complete this ambitious but vital [email protected] or telephone UCAV subject matter expertise project by late 2006. +49 (0) 2824 90 2225.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Regulars

Bios

Air Marshal Peter Major General M Lieutenant General B. Walker, Director Veysi Agar, TUR José Javier Arregui Joint Warfare A, is the Chief of Asta - ESP L - Centre, GBR A, Staff in Component joined the Spanish has flown Phantom Command-Air Army as a voluntary and Tornado F3 Izmir. He graduated soldier in 1960. He aircraft. He from the Air Force has held a range of commanded No Academy in 1974 command and staff 111 (F) Squadron, converting the and was awarded his pilot’s wings in appointments, including with Anti Squadron to the Tornado F3. He 1976. He has accumulated more than Aircraft Artillery Regiments, the completed a tour as the Officer 3500 flying hours mainly in training and Combined Group I SAM and at the Commanding RAF Mount Pleasant, the KC-135 tanker aircraft. General Agar Spanish Military Academy. He was also Falkland Islands. He has held a number completed the Air Force Staff College one of the military instructors for HRH of senior national staff positions in 1973, the NATO Defence College in Principe Felipe, Prince of Asturias. He including Deputy Director of 1988 and the Armed Forces Defence has also completed a tour with the US Operations at the Joint Headquarters College in 1997. Amidst many other Army TRADOC. More recently, he has (HQ) at High Wycombe and the UK’s high level appointments, General Agar been Commander of the Spanish Canary Director of Operational Capability, later has served as the Commander of the Island Command. In May 2004, he took the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff 10th Tanker Air Base and Co- up his current appointment as (Ops) where he was responsible for the Commander of Operation Commander of the Spanish Manoeuvre UK lead of Task Force HARVEST in NORTHERN WATCH at Incirlik Air Forces and NATO Rapid Deployable Macedonia, the initial UK response to Base, Adana, Turkey. Corps Spain. the September 11th terrorist attack and for the UK-led ISAF mission to Afghanistan. AM Walker has served previous tours in NATO, in HQ AIRCENT as ACOS Ops and in Air Commodore Colonel Hans- SHAPE as ACOS Policy & Martin W. Halsall, Jürgen Wolf, DEU Requirements. He took up his present GBR A, is the A, is the head of appointment of Director Joint Warfare Assistant Director Future Capabilities Centre in 2005. Transformation of Branch at the the JAPCC. He is JAPCC. He is a Lieutenant General a fast jet navigator qualified F-104 Jean-Patrick and has over 2500 Starfighter and F-4 Gaviard FRA A, flight hours in F4 Phantoms and Phantom instructor pilot, having a graduated from the Tornado F3 aircraft. He previously total of 3500 flying hours. He has French Air Force served as Chief Policy Branch, NATO commanded 74 Fighter Squadron in Academy in HQ Allied Forces North Western 1980 and then the GAF F4 Training September 1971 and Europe; Commander British Forces Squadron in George AFB California. was awarded his Italy (Air) and Duty Commander in On his return to Germany he pilot’s wings in 1975. He has the NATO CAOC at Vicenza; commanded the Flying Group of the accumulated 4000 flying hours as a Commander Western Sovereign Base Fighter Wing Richthofen. He has also fighter pilot on SQN 2/13 at Colmar Area and Station Commander RAF served the German Air Staff in Bonn and on SQN 3/33 at Strasbourg. General Akrotiri, Cyprus, being responsible for in a variety of air defence related Gaviard attended a training course at the the preparation and operation of the posts, including the acquistion of air nd Advanced Air Studies Centre in Paris Base for the 2 Gulf War, and Deputy to air missles and the EF2000 from September 1989 to February 1991. Commander NATO CAOC 3, Reitan, Typhoon aircraft. In NATO, he has During Operation ALLIED FORCE, Norway. Air Commodore Halsall is a held air staff posts at both operational the Kosovo Campaign, General Gaviard graduate of the Advanced Staff College and tactical levels. He also had two served in Naples as the French assistant in Toronto, Canada. He has recently assignments in the Balkans as Chief to the Commander Allied Air Forces decided to leave the RAF and will be of Staff German Military Southern Europe. Since September 2003 replaced by Air Commodore Ian Representative IFOR Zagreb and he has been Commander of the Air Dugmore in early 2006. Sarajevo and Chief JVB and Protocol Defence and Air Operations Command HQ SFOR, Sarajevo. in Taverny. He now works as a defence advisor to the French government.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Lieutenant Squadron Leader Major Allen Colonel Claudio Tim Harrison, Pennington USA Photo Icardi - ITA A - is GBR A, was A, is an expert on all employed in the commissioned into unavailable matters concerning JAPCC as the the Royal Air targeting. He has just Joint Interoperability Force in 1989. He completed a tour as and Doctrine staff completed his the Component officer. He has a RAF Regiment Command-Air total of 2000 flying hours mainly as a professional training at the RAF Izmir Joint Targets Branch Head and is navigator and flying instructor on the Regiment Depot, RAF Catterick. His now a current intelligence analyst with Tornado. He has spent most of his diverse career has so far included work Joint Force Command Naples J2. He is flying career at the 6th Wing Ghedi as a Vehicle Commander, a Ground a graduate of the USAF Combat where he became a combat ready Based Air defence expert, a Combat Targeting Course and his background navigator, a package commander and Survival specialist instructor and a Close includes tours with the 497th Intelligence flying instructor. He served as an Air Support Advisor to the Army. He Group, the Air Force Information instructor at the Tornado TTTE in has been involved in many operations Warfare Centre and most recently as the Cottesmore in the UK and later was a and exercises, including Operation Target Intelligence Chief and founding member of the Italian Air GRANBY (Gulf War I), in Macedonia Intelligence Flight Commander for the Force Tornado Conversion Unit during Operation ESSENTIAL 4th Fighter Wing during Operation where he became a flight examiner and HARVEST, in Afghanistan and latterly IRAQI FREEDOM. standardisation chief. In 2002 he in Operation TELIC in Iraq. joined the former Reaction Force Air Staff. He was deployed to Pristina – Kosovo as Chief of the Airfield NATO Cell in 2003.

Colonel Carlo Dr Pietro Batacchi Mr. Kenneth Massai - ITA A - is (MA, PhD) is Nesbitt is an a member of the currently the chief Photo operations advisor Combat Support editor of the unavailable and Director of Branch at the magazine “Panorama Business JAPCC. He Difesa”. He has a Development for graduated from the doctorate degree in Air Command Air Force political science Systems Academy in 1982, receiving his wings (University of Florence); a master’s International (ACSI), a Thales in 1983. He has spent almost his entire degree in international strategic studies Raytheon Systems company based in flying career as a pilot of the Italian (Italian Joint Supreme Military Institute) Paris. ACSI currently manages the Special Air Transport Wing, where and is a research fellow doctorate in development, integration and he occupied the positions of political sciences (University of installation of the NATO Air Squadron Commander and Chief Florence). He has contributed to various Command and Control System (ACCS). Officer of Operations in Ciampino Italian defence editions like “Analisi Ken Nesbitt spent more than 27 years (Rome). In 1998 he was assigned to Difesa”, “Informazioni della Difesa”, in the Canadian Air Force as a specialist the IAF Operational Centre “Rivista Marittima” and portals like in Command and Control of air becoming Planning and Tasking “Equilibri” and “Politica Estera”. He operations and Air Battle Management, Section Chief. In 2003 he became a has been a research fellow for the Centre in both ground based and airborne C2 member of the former Reaction of Defence Studies and Security and the systems. A total of nine years were spent Force Air Staff in Kalkar, at which Centre of Military Strategic Studies. in operational flying with NATO time he was in charge of airfield AWACS in Germany, accumulating over monitoring activities for SHAPE. 2200 flying hours and participating in Promoted Colonel in July 2004, he is Gulf War I, Bosnia, UN Operations, the JAPCC subject matter expert on Anti-terrorism contingencies and the all military airlift matters. Iraq War.

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 Regulars

Book Review

Space Security 2004 by Simon Collard-Wexler, Jessy Cowan-Sharp, Sarah Estabrooks, Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., Dr. Robert Lawson, and Dr. William Marshall. Northview Press Ltd., Toronto Canada, June 2005, 189 pages. Available at www.securityspace.org (free)

Space Security 2004 offers a good summary of current space issues. It combines survey results from space professionals around the globe with facts on space developments in 2004. The final product is an assessment of the “security of space”. To aid readers, an executive summary is in the book and on the web site. The eight chapters focus on the space environment, commercial space, civil space, space law, and four chapters are on military space developments. Twenty eight trends in space security are also identified. In general terms, space developments in 2004 aided the security of space and decreased the security of space. As an overall summary of the security of space, most of the US Space Security Working Group (71%) felt “that space security had been somewhat reduced in 2004”. NATO personnel should keep in mind that the authors’ definition of space security assumes that space-based threats will reduce space security. One should think twice about that assumption. Does an armed police force increase the security of a region, or does an un-armed police force increase the security in an area? Regardless of the question, this book does an excellent job of summarizing space issues and developments. It is a recommended must reading for all NATO space decision makers.

Reviewer: Daniel Lewandowski, Lt Col, USAF

Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case Studies by Eric Larson et al RAND Corporation, 2003. Paperback, 136 pages. ISBN: 0-8330-3287-9. Available at: www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1603 (free)

Interoperability can be defined as the capability of different forces to accept and provide services in order to operate effectively together. The report provides an insight into interoperability, analyzing the data from a number of recent operations. Interoperability at air forces level is assessed not only from the systems, but also from the doctrinal, organizational and procedural perspectives. The answers to “for what mission? “, “for what capabilities?” and “with whom?” are obvious after Larson’s analysis: interoperability is essential for the entire spectrum of multi-national missions and capabilities. The report reveals the challenges of coalition operations at the strategic, operational, tactical and technological levels. Unity of purpose, effort and command is crucial for interoperable forces, although political needs are often mirrored in the way the national forces support the operation. The “standing- up period” for coalition forces is a strategic challenge. National and coalition security provisions and the resizing of the forces are key issues at the operational level. Force integration, especially in cases with scarce air capabilities, can add complexities at the tactical level. Interoperability challenges at the technological level could hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation. The author provides a strong justification for the NATO Response Force concept and its further development.

Reviewer: Panagiotis Akinosoglou, Major, Hellenic AF

JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005 JAPCC Journal Edition 2, 2005