<<

Perspective Where Do Emerging Come from? Understanding the origins of pathogens will help us to combat emerging infectious

Mark E. J. Woolhouse

nfectious diseases continue to impose a caused a minor public health problem but still huge global public health burden, ac- had severe economic repercussions for affected counting for more than one-quarter of countries; and there is considerable concern I all deaths annually and a similar fraction about the possible emergence of a new subtype of morbidity. In addition to long-estab- of influenza A, with potentially devastating, lished such as , , global consequences. and , we are also seeing the frequent The evolving nature of infectious emergence of new infectious diseases: HIV/ problems is a challenge to microbiologists on AIDS was unknown 25 years ago and is now one several different levels. There are practical chal- of the biggest killers; the responsible for lenges, such as developing diagnostics, treat- severe acquired respiratory syndrome (SARS) ments, and vaccines, and of designing effective surveillance and intervention strategies. Plus, there are intellectual challenges, in- cluding understanding the complex and Summary multifaceted causes of the emergence and • Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases spread of new pathogens and the reemer- pose both practical and intellectual challenges, gence of those previously thought to be in including understanding their complex causes; decline. Neither the practical nor intellec- developing diagnostics, treatments, and vac- cines; and designing effective surveillance and tual challenges are likely to be met without intervention strategies. developing more effective working partner- • Of the catalogued species that infect ships among those in various disciplines, at , 538 are , 317 are fungi, 287 different institutions, and living in different are helminths, 208 are , and 57 are pro- nations. tozoa; among those associated with emerging and re-emerging infectious disease, viruses are significantly over-represented, whereas hel- minths are under-represented. Pathogen Diversity • Species jumps by pathogens require both the opportunity and capacity to infect a new host A pathogen can be defined as “a species; recent species jumps have usually in- microbial or parasite species that can infect volved RNA viruses, perhaps because their ge- and is capable of causing disease in humans netic lability allows them to adapt quickly to a under natural conditions.” Mark Woolhouse is new host species. Professor of Infec- • Recently emerging or re-emerging pathogens Humans are affected by an impressive diver- tious Disease Epi- most often are RNA viruses having a taxonom- sity of pathogens. My colleagues Sonya ically broad host range, using a phylogenetically Gowtage-Sequeira, Ben Evans, and I re- demiology at the conserved cell receptor, being transmissible be- cently surveyed the recent literature, build- Centre for Infec- tween humans, and occurring in regions under- ing on earlier work by Louise Taylor and tious Diseases, Uni- going ecological, demographic or social change. Sophie Latham, and found 1,407 currently versity of Edin- recognized species of human pathogen. burgh, U.K.

Volume 1, Number 11, 2006 / Microbe Y 511 FIGURE 1 category, with viruses significantly overrepresented and helminths under- represented. Within the scope of our survey, we found reports of 38 apparently novel human pathogen species associated with emerging diseases during the past 25 years (Fig. 1). Some species within this category likely were active before they were identified. For example, al- though HIV-1 was first reported in 1983, it is thought to have begun infect- ing humans several decades earlier. Two-thirds of these novel species are RNA viruses, a finding that may partly be due to ascertainment bias through improved viral diagnostics, especially PCR-based technologies. However, several inherent features of RNA virus biology may also help to explain why there are so many of them in this cate- gory.

The accumulation of newly reported human pathogen species since 1980. The total of 38 Importance of Animal Reservoirs species includes only those associated with emerging infectious disease problems; newly recognized etiological agents of existing disease problems (e.g. Helicobacter Relatively few pathogen species—per- pylori, associated with peptic ulcers, or metapneumovirus, causing respiratory infections) are excluded. Also excluded are novel variants of known species, such as the O157:H7 haps no more than 100—do nothing serotype of E. coli and the H5N1 subtype of influenza A virus. The dates of emergence other than infect and cause disease in of some key examples discussed in the text are highlighted. humans. Many of them are commensals that do not ordinarily cause disease; many others are distributed in the wider Of course, a species count provides only environment such as water or soil; and yet oth- a simple measure of pathogen diversity. Much ers also infect host species other than humans. medically important variation—in traits such as The latter category constitutes the zoonoses, factors, immunogenicity, and drug re- which the World Health Organization (WHO) sistance—occurs within pathogen species as defines as “diseases or infections which are nat- well as between them. However, focusing on urally transmitted between vertebrate animals species proves revealing. Of the catalogued and humans.” Almost 60% of human pathogen pathogen species that infect humans, 538 are species are zoonotic. A small minority of these, bacteria, 317 are fungi, 287 are helminths, 208 the “anthroponoses,” are mainly passed from are viruses, and 57 are protozoa. Within this humans to animals rather than the other way taxonomic diversity, individual species manifest around: measles virus, for example, is essentially a wide variety of life cycles, transmission routes, a human virus that also can infect great apes. pathogenicities, and epidemiologies. But for hundreds of human pathogen species, an We are particularly interested in pathogens animal reservoir is an important feature of their associated with emerging and reemerging infec- biology. tious diseases. These are defined by the Centers The most striking feature of such animal res- for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as ervoirs is their diversity. We share our patho- “diseases of infectious origin whose incidence in gens with ungulates, carnivores, rodents, pri- humans has increased within the past two de- mates, sometimes other kinds of mammals such cades or threatens to increase in the near fu- as bats, and also nonmammals, especially birds. ture.” Of the species in our survey, 177 cause Many of the reservoirs are domestic animals, diseases that are regarded as falling into this but just as many are wildlife species. These pat-

512 Y Microbe / Volume 1, Number 11, 2006 terns apply to the whole range of pathogens from viruses to helminths. Examples of human pathogens emerging via species jump Stephen Morse at Columbia University Pathogen Original host Year reported suggested more than 10 years ago that emerging and reemerging pathogens were virus Bats(?) 1977 O157:H7 Cattle 1982 disproportionately zoonotic, and subsequent Borrelia burgdorferi Rodents(?) 1982 research has confirmed his observation. HIV-1 Chimpanzees 1983 Emerging and reemerging zoonoses are not HIV-2 Primates 1986 associated with any particular animal reser- Hendra virus Bats 1994 voirs but they are associated with pathogens vCJD Cattle 1996 Australian bat lyssavirus Bats 1996 that can infect several different kinds of H5N1 influenza A virus Chickens 1997 hosts. Nipah virus Bats 1999 Several recently emerged human patho- SARS coronavirus Palm civets(?) 2003 gens illustrate these findings. Examples are the SARS coronavirus and the agent respon- sible for bovine spongiform encephalopathy jumps, are poorly understood. One key factor, (BSE), both of which are zoonotic and can infect at least for viral pathogens, appears to be their a wide variety of animals and recently appeared use of cell receptors that are phylogenetically in humans. Even some novel pathogens that are conserved across a range of host species. not now regarded as zoonotic, such as HIV-1, The ability to infect a host species is merely were acquired by humans from animals. the first step; invading the new host species also These are but a few recent examples of a depends on the ability to transmit between indi- process that has been going on for millennia. vidual hosts within a species. Many emerging Jared Diamond of the University of California, pathogens have no or very limited transmissibil- Los Angeles, is among those who note that ity between humans, including variant Creutz- many of the most serious infectious diseases of feldt Jakob disease (vCJD), lyssavirus, influenza humans, including measles, influenza, and A subtype H5N1, and Borrelia burgdorferi, , likely have animal origins. which causes Lyme disease. Other poorly trans- mitted pathogens cause self-limiting outbreaks, including Ebola virus and Escherichia coli Invading New Host Populations O157:H7. Meanwhile, some pathogens such as When a pathogen of one host species first in- the SARS coronavirus spread much more freely vades a new one, it is called a “species jump” among their newly acquired human hosts. (see table). Successful species jumps require both The quantitative framework for evaluating the opportunity and capacity to infect new host the spread of infections through host popula- species. Opportunity depends on the pathogen tions is well developed. A key concept is the contacting the new host, perhaps through reproduction number, R0, the average number changes in the ecology or the behavior of either of secondary infections generated by a single of the host species. The capacity to infect reflects primary within a large population of whether the pathogen is compatible with its new previously unexposed hosts. Only if R0 is host. Even so, the pathogen still may need to greater than 1—that is, if a primary infection surmount a threshold, called the “species bar- generates more than one secondary infection— rier,” generally meaning it cannot establish an can a novel pathogen successfully invade a new infection unless the new host species is exposed host population. If R0 is close to 1, small to a higher dose than was required to infect its changes in infection or transmission rates can original host. For instance, this phenomenon lead to large changes in the potential for patho- holds for the rabies virus and the transmissible gen emergence. R0 could change if there were spongiform encephalopathies. changes in the demography or behavior of the Those pathogens that already have a broad host population, changes in susceptibility of the host range seem more likely to be successful at host population due to decreased immunocom- jumping into new host species than do patho- petence, failures of disease prevention or control gens with narrow host ranges. The determinants programs, or changes to the pathogen itself. of host range, and so of a propensity for species Changes to the pathogens can prove critical,

Volume 1, Number 11, 2006 / Microbe Y 513 according to Rustom Antia of Emory University apparent, but it is striking how often pathogen

in Atlanta, Ga. He argues that, even if R0 for a emergence or reemergence is associated with new pathogen in the human population is ini- human activity. For example, changes in feed tially less than 1, each infection provides an production processes led to BSE in cattle and to opportunity for the pathogen to adapt to its new vCJD in humans; the exotic pet trade led to

host and for R0 to increase. The likelihood of monkeypox outbreaks in the United States; and adaptation occurring is sensitive to the number harvesting bush meat is associated with early of infections, the extent of genetic change re- human cases of both HIV and SARS. The overall quired to affect susceptibility and transmissibil- impression is that changes in the way humans ity, and, especially, to the genetic lability of the interact with their environment, and particu- pathogen. The importance of this last factor larly with animal populations both domestic may help explain why so many recent species and wild, can provide new opportunities for jumps (table) involve RNA viruses, which have pathogens. Andrew Dobson of Princeton Uni- mutation rates several orders of magnitude versity in Princeton, New Jersey, likens emerg- higher than other kinds of pathogen. ing and reemerging pathogens to weeds because We are only beginning to understand the bio- both are adaptable exploiters of unstable envi- logical basis for pathogen adaptation to a new ronments. host. Several veterinary examples, including ca- nine parvovirus, foot-and-mouth disease virus, Future Risks and Ways to Address Them and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, indi- cate that changes affecting only a small number A recent report by the U.K. Office for Science of amino acids in, say, the viral proteins that and Innovation suggests that local and world- determine cell receptor specificity may be all that wide changes will continue to provide opportu- is required for such viruses to gain a foothold in nities for pathogens to shift host species, mean- a new host species. ing we can anticipate continued emergence and The most striking recent example of success- reemergence of infectious diseases. Perhaps the ful adaptation to humans is simian immunode- most striking feature of human pathogens is ficiency virus. This pathogen, having entered the their diversity, making pathogen emergence ex- human population, rapidly evolved to become tremely difficult to predict. The advent of BSE HIV-1. And the possibility of adaptation simi- and vCJD is a good example of a completely larly underlies current concerns about H5N1 unanticipated infectious disease problem. Even influenza A virus causing a pandemic. so, we have some idea of the most likely profile for emerging or reemerging pathogens: • Drivers of Pathogen Emergence an RNA virus; and Reemergence • a taxonomically broad host range; A 2003 report by the Institute of Medicine, • use of a phylogenetically conserved cell recep- Microbial Threats to Health: Emergence, Detec- tor; tion and Response, lists three broad categories • transmissible between humans but at first of factors that drive pathogen emergence and causing only small outbreaks; and reemergence: those relating to hosts, those relat- • occurring in regions undergoing ecological, ing to pathogens, and those relating to the wider demographic, or social change. environment. Human factors include popula- tion growth, urbanization, population health, Refining our expectations of emerging patho- and hospitalization, travel, and migration pat- gens will help us design effective surveillance terns. Pathogen factors include capacities to programs. Surveillance is the first line of defense, adapt to humans and to acquire virulence fac- making rapid detection and identification key tors and resistance as well as failures priorities. Often, the single biggest factor affect- of disease control programs. Environmental fac- ing the scale of an epidemic is the speed with tors include land use, agricultural practices, pro- which initial events are detected and effective duction and supply of food and water, trade in interventions are put in place. Because emerging animals or animal products, and climate change. and reemerging pathogens often have animal The diversity of these drivers is immediately reservoirs, surveillance should be extended to

514 Y Microbe / Volume 1, Number 11, 2006 cover populations of livestock and wildlife. This ally draw a sharp boundary between these strategy already proved appropriate for BSE as sectors, but pathogens do not recognize that well as the West Nile, Rift Valley fever, and boundary. Indeed, humans share the majority avian influenza viruses. of their pathogens with a wide range of other A particular concern is the impact of global- animals, and jumps by pathogens into human ization on the spread of infectious diseases. This populations from animal reservoirs are fre- trend includes not only people but also the quent and natural. In many cases the expertise growing trade in livestock, bush meat, and ex- relevant to an emerging human infectious otic pets, all of which pose risks to human disease problem will be found not in the health. Effective international cooperation, in- medical community but among veterinarians; cluding the timely sharing of data and biological this was the case for vCJD (a transmissible specimens, is essential. The WHO global pro- spongiform encephalopathy), HIV (a lentivirus) gram to combat SARS indicates what can be and SARS (a coronavirus). In the 1960s Cal- achieved. However, many poorer regions of the vin Schwabe, a veterinarian and epidemiolo- world cannot contribute to this or similar pro- gist at the University of California, Davis, grams without significant external investment in coined the term “One Medicine,” to emphasize infrastructure, technology, and human capacity. how much human and veterinary medicine We would all benefit from such investments. have in common. Following a one-medicine Moreover, we need more effective communi- philosophy will be essential if we are to deal cation and cooperation between those work- effectively with future infectious disease chal- ing in human and animal health. We tradition- lenges.

SUGGESTED READING Akakpo, A., et al. 2002. Future Trends in Veterinary Public Health. World Health Organization Technical Report Series 907:1–85. Diamond, J. 2002. Evolution, consequences and future of plant and animal domestication. Nature 418:700–707. Institute of Medicine. 2003. Microbial threats to health. Emergence, detection and response. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. King, D., et al. 2006. Foresight. Infectious diseases: preparing for the future. Office of Science and Innovation, London (http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Detection_and_Identification_of_Infectious_Diseases/Index.htm; http://www.ecdti.co.uk /CGIBIN/priamlnk.cgi?MPϭCATSER^GINT65&CNOϭ1&CATϭ’187’) Morse, S. S. 1995. Factors in the emergence of infectious diseases. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 1:7–15. Woolhouse, M. E. J., and C. Dye (ed.). 2001. Population biology of emerging and re-emerging pathogens. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Biol. Sci. 356:979–1106. Woolhouse, M. E. J., and S. Gowtage-Sequeira. 2005. Host range and emerging and re-emerging pathogens. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 11:1842–1847. Woolhouse, M. E. J., D. T. Haydon, and R. Antia. 2005. Emerging pathogens: the epidemiology and evolution of species jumps. Trends Ecol. Evol. 20:238–244.

Volume 1, Number 11, 2006 / Microbe Y 515