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Formal Modeling and Verification of Train Control Systems

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Formal Modeling and Verification of Train Control Systems N° d’ordre : 372 CENTRALE LILLE THÈSE Présentée en vue d’obtenir le grade de DOCTEUR En Spécialité : Automatique, Génie informatique, Traitement du signal et des images Par Yuchen XIE DOCTORAT DÉLIVRÉ PAR CENTRALE LILLE Titre de la thèse : Formal Modeling and Verification of Train Control Systems Modélisation et Vérification Formelles de Systèmes de Contrôle de Trains Soutenue le 14 Février 2019 devant le jury d’examen : Président, Rapporteur Jean-François PETIN, Professeur, Université de Lorraine Rapporteur Audine SUBIAS, Maître de Conférences HDR, INSA de Toulouse Examinateur Pascal BERRUET, Professeur, IUT de Lorient Examinateur Thomas BOURDEAUD'HUY, Maître de Conférences, Centrale Lille Directeur de thèse Armand TOGUYENI, Professeur, Centrale Lille Co-encadrante de thèse Manel KHLIF-BOUASSIDA, Maître de Conférences, Centrale Lille Thèse préparée au Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille, CRIStAL, CNRS UMR 9189 Ecole Doctorale Sciences Pour l'Ingénieur (ED SPI 072) CONTENTS CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... I LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ VII LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. XI LIST OF TERMINOLOGIES .............................................................................................. XIII CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 1.1 APPLICATION FRAMEWORK AND MOTIVATION ........................................................................ 1 1.1.1 Safety-critical Systems .......................................................................................... 1 1.1.2 Autonomous Trains .............................................................................................. 2 1.1.3 Difficulties and Current Situation of Applying Autonomous Trains ...................... 3 1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................. 5 1.2.1 Modeling of Discrete Event System (DES) ............................................................ 5 1.2.2 Verification of Discrete Event System (DES) ......................................................... 5 1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ 6 1.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................................... 8 1.4.1 Methodological Contributions .............................................................................. 8 1.4.2 Technical Contributions ........................................................................................ 9 1.4.3 Railway Control Applications .............................................................................. 10 1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................................. 10 CHAPTER 2 RAILWAY SYSTEM AND TRAIN CONTROL .................................................. 11 2.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 2 ........................................................................................... 11 2.2 TERMINOLOGY OF RAILWAY SYSTEMS .................................................................................. 11 2.2.1 Railway network structure ................................................................................. 11 2.2.1.1 Railway line ........................................................................................................... 11 2.2.1.2 Railway station and railway node ......................................................................... 12 2.2.2 Basic Railway Elements and Equipment ............................................................. 12 2.2.3 Train Detection, Blocks and Balise ..................................................................... 14 2.2.3.1 Train Detection and Track Circuit ......................................................................... 14 2.2.3.2 Railway Blocks ....................................................................................................... 15 2.2.3.3 Balise ..................................................................................................................... 16 2.3 TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS ................................................................................................. 17 2.3.1 Terminology of Train Control.............................................................................. 17 2.3.2 History of Train Control System Development ................................................... 18 2.4 AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL (ATC) OF METRO SYSTEMS AND CBTC ....................................... 22 2.4.1 Metro Systems and Grades of Automation (GoA) .............................................. 22 2.4.2 Automatic Train Control (ATC) System ............................................................... 23 2.4.3 Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) .................................................... 23 2.5 DEVELOPMENT TENDENCY OF TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS ......................................................... 25 2.5.1 Information transmission ................................................................................... 25 2.5.2 Onboard and trackside equipment ..................................................................... 25 i CONTENTS 2.5.3 Moving blocks ..................................................................................................... 25 2.5.4 Interoperability and fusion of different train control systems ........................... 26 2.6 ERTMS / ETCS .............................................................................................................. 27 2.6.1 Necessity of Developing and implementing ERTMS ........................................... 27 2.6.2 ERTMS Specifications and Legislation ................................................................ 28 2.6.3 ERTMS System Composition ............................................................................... 29 2.6.4 ETCS Levels and their Train Control Methods ..................................................... 30 2.7 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 2 .............................................................................................. 33 CHAPTER 3 STATE-OF-THE-ART FOR THE TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT ..... 35 3.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 3 ........................................................................................... 35 3.2 REVIEW OF METHODS FOR TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT ........................................ 35 3.2.1 Railway Safety Standards and Formal Methods ................................................ 35 3.2.1.1 Railway safety standards ...................................................................................... 35 3.2.1.2 Formal methods application in the railway industry ............................................ 37 3.2.2 Requirements Specification Methods ................................................................. 38 3.2.2.1 Requirement Modeling Methods and Tools ......................................................... 39 3.2.2.2 Requirements Verification and Validation ............................................................ 44 3.2.3 System Design Modeling .................................................................................... 46 3.2.3.1 System Structural Modeling.................................................................................. 47 3.2.3.2 System Behavior Modeling ................................................................................... 47 3.2.4 Implementation Methods ................................................................................... 49 3.2.5 Verification Methods and Tools ......................................................................... 51 3.2.5.1 Testing ................................................................................................................... 51 3.2.5.2 Simulation ............................................................................................................. 52 3.2.5.3 Model checking ..................................................................................................... 53 3.2.5.4 Theorem proving................................................................................................... 53 3.2.5.5 Equivalence checking ............................................................................................ 53 3.2.5.6 Abstract Interpretation and Invariant Method ..................................................... 54 3.2.5.7 Quantitative Analysis ............................................................................................ 54 3.2.5.8 Comparison of Verification and Validation Methods ........................................... 54 3.2.6 Whole lifecycle tools ........................................................................................... 55 3.2.6.1 Rodin Based on Event-B ........................................................................................ 55 3.2.6.2 SCADE Suite ........................................................................................................... 57 3.2.6.3 CPN Tools based on Petri nets .............................................................................. 57 3.2.6.4 RAISE development method ................................................................................
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