DOCSLIB.ORG

Three NPT Snapshots – and Some Lessons and Implications for Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Cooperation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Three NPT Snapshots – and Some Lessons and Implications for Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Cooperation Working Draft Three NPT Snapshots – and Some Lessons and Implications for Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Cooperation Dr. Lewis A. Dunn November 30, 2016 Prepared for US-Russian Dialogue on the NPT Review Process: Lessons Learned (1970-2015) and Steps Ahead (2016-2020) Geneva, Switzerland December 10-11, 2016 The views herein are those of the author not necessarily those of SAIC or any of its sponsoring organizations Three NPT Snapshots – and Some Lessons and Implications for Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Cooperation During the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation often stood out in the midst of the wider confrontation as one area of engagement and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within that area, Washington and Moscow took the lead in negotiating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, most often referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the NPT – and later cooperated to sustain that Treaty and eventually gain its indefinite extension. With renewed political-military confrontation between the United States and Russia, it is timely to revisit the earlier history of cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and specifically the NPT. Doing so may help to identify possible lessons for rebuilding habits of cooperation between the two countries as one part of a more comprehensive strategy for slowing and then reversing a steady slide into a new Cold War.1 The following paper briefly explores three “snapshots” of U.S.-Russian NPT cooperation: the initial negotiation of the NPT in the mid-1960s; the sustaining of the NPT’s credibility at the 1985 NPT Review Conference; and the Indefinite Extension of the NPT in 1995. For each snapshot, the discussion first describes the overall geopolitical context; the incentives and obstacles to NPT cooperation; and the most prominent specific dimensions of U.S.- Soviet/Russian cooperation. Again focused on a specific snapshot, the paper then puts forward some explanations of successful cooperation. By way of concluding the overall paper, some cross-cutting lessons drawn from all three snapshots and their implications for rebuilding U.S.- Russian habits of cooperation on NPT matters (including Article VI and nuclear disarmament) are explored. 1 For my views on what a comprehensive U.S. strategy to avoid a new Cold War could entail see Lewis A. Dunn, “Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament: Analysis and Reflections,” Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 1 Center for Global Security Research, October 2016, pp. 57-61. https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Document_LLNL-TR-701463_103116.pdf 1 Negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Throughout the process from the 1961 United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty to the opening for signature on July 1, 1968 of the NPT, the United States and the Soviet Union consulted each other and as the negotiations advanced, cooperated closely in crafting the new Treaty. Over time, Washington and Moscow had to work through several very difficult and critical issues on which their going-in positions differed significantly, particularly the Article I “no transfer” obligation and the Article III “safeguards” obligation. Their successful cooperation reflected a strong congruence of U.S. and Soviet strategic interests.2 Geopolitical Context. Turning to some of the most important dimensions of the geopolitical context, the negotiation of the NPT took place against the backdrop of the Cold War military confrontation in the heart of Europe. The Group of Soviet Forces was deployed in East Germany and seen by the United States and its NATO allies to pose a continuing military threat. To buttress deterrence and to reassure a nervous West German government, the United States was in the process of deploying significant numbers of tactical nuclear weapons to NATO Europe and had initiated so-called Programs of Cooperation which entailed dual U.S. and allies’ control over nuclear weapons in the event of a European conflict. Equally important, there was ongoing U.S. and allies’ consideration of the creation of a possible Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) that would have entailed deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on ships manned both by 2 The following discussion draws heavily on George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now,” Arms Control Today https://armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/lookingback.asp#bio; George Bunn, “Brief History of NPT Safeguards Article,” NPTNegHis.ArtIII.6Febr.06; George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems” https://armscontro.org/taxonomy/term/69; “The Impulse towards a Safer World” 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – set of declassified documents on the negotiating history complied by the National Security Archive, www.nsarchive.org.; See Interview of Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen June 14, 2007 – Vienna, Austria, cgs.pnnl.gov/fois/doclib/Timerbaev(transcript)2.pdf; and Roland Timerbaev, “In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925- 2013), https://www. armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/69). 2 U.S. and some NATO countries. For its part, the Soviet Union was “fighting like hell against the multilateral force because they were afraid that the Germans might get access to a nuclear weapon.”3 Growing concerns about nuclear proliferation also were an important part of the context for U.S.-Russian cooperation. In part, this concern was more general: U.S. estimates at the time were that absent effective non-proliferation, upwards of 20-30 countries could seek to acquire nuclear weapons in the decades ahead; the Soviets shared the U.S. concern about future proliferation but also thought that effective international action could prevent such runaway proliferation.4 China’s test of a nuclear weapon in 1964 as well as ongoing debates about acquiring nuclear weapons in other countries reinforced these concerns. Projections at the time of a coming wave of widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were another factor. But for Moscow – and somewhat less so Washington – there also was a more specific concern that West Germany could seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Here, too, West Germany’s expanding reliance on nuclear energy added to that concern. For both Washington and Moscow memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis provided part of the background. In that crisis, the two countries’ leaderships had approached the brink of a nuclear war and come away with a recognition of the importance of finding new ways to manage their own nuclear relationship as well as of the dangers of nuclear war from whatever source. Six months later, the quick and successful negotiation in June 1963 of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) both signaled that recognition and demonstrated their will as well as ability to cooperate. 3 See Interview of Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen June 14, 2007 – Vienna, Austria, cgs.pnnl.gov/fois/doclib/Timerbaev(transcript)2.pdf, p. 6. 4 See “Interview with Roland Timerbaev” Part of “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age,” http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_ED432881A740475493E7664F1DD93816 3 Incentives and Obstacles to Cooperation. The most important incentive for cooperation was a shared interest in nuclear non-proliferation. Both countries wanted to constrain any possible West German pursuit of nuclear weapons; both countries wanted to prevent nuclear proliferation globally. Nonetheless, the relative importance of these two concerns, as noted above, varied. Initially, U.S. support for a possible MLF was the most significant obstacle to cooperation. Indeed, not until the United States signaled its readiness to Moscow to set aside the MLF concept did U.S.-Soviet negotiations begin on the possible elements of a non-proliferation treaty. Even after that U.S. policy shift, difficulties persisted in working out the specific language of the Article I “no transfer” provision, reflecting Soviet opposition to U.S. nuclear- cooperation arrangements with its NATO allies and U.S. unwillingness to renounce all such cooperation. Reaching agreement also proved difficult on the eventual language in Article III on inspections and “safeguards.” Here, a Soviet emphasis that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections should take place in EURATOM countries clashed with those countries’ reluctance to accept such IAEA inspections. In both cases, the U.S. need to consult closely on these matters with its NATO allies, including especially West Germany, was a continuing requirement and an obstacle to Soviet-U.S. bilateral cooperation to find mutually acceptable compromises on outstanding issues. Dimensions of U.S.-Soviet Cooperation. Once the United States had decided internally in 1966 to set aside the MLF concept, U.S. and Soviet officials began a continuing process of official negotiations, consultations, and sometimes informal engagement to resolve their differences on the most critical outstanding issues. The outcome would be the development of 4 identical draft treaties tabled at different points in the ongoing multilateral negotiation in the 18- Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. In particular, during 1966, a working group comprised of three Russians and three Americans developed mutually acceptable language for the “no transfers” provision of Article I and the “not to receive the transfer” provision of Article II.5 Two key players were George Bunn on the American side and Roland Timerbaev on Soviet side. The key compromise reflected an American readiness (with West German concurrence) to drop the MLF and a Soviet readiness to live with limited U.S. Programs of Cooperation with NATO allies but stopping short of any allied peacetime control of nuclear weapons. The initial result was the tabling of identical draft treaties by Washington and Moscow in August 1967 – absent, however, any safeguards-inspections provision because of continuing U.S.-Soviet differences or any nuclear disarmament Article VI obligation given the two countries’ focus exclusively on non- proliferation.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) : an Historical
    Public Diplomacy Division Room Nb123 B-1110 Brussels Belgium Tel.: +32(0)2 707 4414 / 4541 (A/V) Fax: +32(0)2 707 4249 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.nato.int/library Acquisitions List June 2013 New Books and Journal Articles Liste d’acquisitions Juin 2013 Nouveaux livres et articles de revues Division de la Diplomatie Publique Bureau Nb123 B-1110 Bruxelles Belgique Tél.: +32(0)2 707 4414 / 4541 (A/V) Fax: +32(0)2 707 4249 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.nato.int/library How to borrow items from the list below : As a member of the NATO HQ staff you can borrow books (Type: M) for one month, journals (Type: ART) and reference works (Type: REF) for one week. Individuals not belonging to NATO staff can borrow books through their local library via the interlibrary loan system. How to obtain the Multimedia Library publications : All Library publications are available both on the NATO Intranet and Internet websites. Comment emprunter les documents cités ci-dessous : En tant que membre du personnel de l'OTAN vous pouvez emprunter les livres (Type: M) pour un mois, les revues (Type: ART) et les ouvrages de référence (Type: REF) pour une semaine. Les personnes n'appartenant pas au personnel de l'OTAN peuvent s'adresser à leur bibliothèque locale et emprunter les livres via le système de prêt interbibliothèques. Comment obtenir les publications de la Bibliothèque multimédia : Toutes les publications de la Bibliothèque sont disponibles sur les sites Intranet et Internet de l’OTAN.
    [Show full text]
  • Dartmouth Conf Program
    The Dartmouth Conference: The First 50 Years 1960—2010 Reminiscing on the Dartmouth Conference by Yevgeny Primakov T THE PEAK OF THE COLD WAR, and facilitating conditions conducive to A the Dartmouth Conference was one of economic interaction. the few diversions from the spirit of hostility The significance of the Dartmouth Confer- available to Soviet and American intellectuals, ence relates to the fact that throughout the who were keen, and able, to explore peace- cold war, no formal Soviet-American contact making initiatives. In fact, the Dartmouth had been consistently maintained, and that participants reported to huge gap was bridged by Moscow and Washington these meetings. on the progress of their The composition of discussion and, from participants was a pri- time to time, were even mary factor in the success instructed to “test the of those meetings, and it water” regarding ideas took some time before the put forward by their gov- negotiating teams were ernments. The Dartmouth shaped the right way. At meetings were also used first, in the early 1970s, to unfetter actions under- the teams had been led taken by the two countries by professionally quali- from a propagandist connotation and present fied citizens. From the Soviet Union, political them in a more genuine perspective. But the experts and researchers working for the Insti- crucial mission for these meetings was to tute of World Economy and International establish areas of concurring interests and to Relations and the Institute of U.S. and Cana- attempt to outline mutually acceptable solutions dian Studies, organizations closely linked to to the most acute problems: nuclear weapons Soviet policymaking circles, played key roles.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Views of US Alliances in Asia
    When Realism and Liberalism Coincide: Russian Views of U.S. Alliances in Asia Andrew C. Kuchins Alexei V. Zagorsky July 1999 1 2 About the Authors Andrew C. Kuchins is the associate director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research explores the domestic and interna- tional sources for and constraints on the international behavior of the Russian Federation. Kuchins is working on a book titled Russia and the World, which is scheduled for publication by Westview Press in 2000 as part of the series Dilemmas in World Politics. Alexei Zagorsky is a senior researcher at the Institute of World Economic and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is the author of Japan and China: Patterns of Societal Development As Seen by Japanese Historians and has written extensively on Rus- sian foreign and security policy in the Asia Pacific, comparative modernization in East Asia, and Japanese politics. In 1997–98 he was an Advanced Research Fellow in the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard University. 3 4 When Realism and Liberalism Coincide: Russian Views of U.S. Alliances in Asia Andrew C. Kuchins Alexei V. Zagorsky Contemporary discussions of virtually any aspect of Russian foreign and security policy must take as their point of departure the extraordinarily weakened condition of the Russian Fed- eration. There is no comparable case of such a rapid and dramatic decline in the status of a great power during peacetime in modern history. The Russian economy has been in a virtual free fall for most of the 1990s.1 The World Bank estimated the Russian GNP in 1997, using fixed exchange rates not adjusted for purchasing power parity, at $403.5 billion, making Russia the twelfth-largest economy in the world, just ahead of the Netherlands and just behind South Korea.
    [Show full text]
  • N a T O's G L O B a L M I S S I O N I N T H E
    THE MANFRED WÖRNER FELLOWSHIP OF NATO 1998-1999 THE ATLANTIC CLUB OF BULGARIA NN AA TT OO’’ss GG LL OO BB AA LL MM II SS SS II OO NN II NN TT HH EE 2211SSTT CC EE NN TT UU RR YY STRATEGIC STUDY Supported by: THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES Project Director and Author of the Text: Dr. Stefan Popov Working Group: Dr. Lyubomir Ivanov Dr. Solomon Passy Marianna Panova, MIA Marin Mihaylov Sofia May 2000 THE ATLANTIC CLUB OF BULGARIA 1998-1999 MANFRED WŐRNER FELLOWSHIP N A T O ’ s G L O B A L M I S S I O N I N T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y Table of Contents ABSTRACT 1 PREFACE 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 4 INTRODUCTION 5 THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE IN THE 1990s 8 Historical Context: Setting the Stage 8 Critical Position Toward the Debate 11 Europe: Divided or United? 14 Extended Deterrence vs. Diminished Credibility 16 Military Doctrine vs. Military Spending 18 Expanded NATO, Expanded Security Risks? 19 Russia: Friend or Foe? 21 American “Manifest Destiny” 22 Summary Reflection on the Enlargement Debate 24 CONCEPTUAL DIMENSIONS: DEFENSE VS. SECURITY 27 Ideal Types Approach in International Affairs 27 A Concise Definition of the 1989 Epochal Change 30 Subject-Origin of Threat 33 Risky Factors and Situations 40 NATO’s Fundamental Identity Dilemma 44 Remark on a Negative Perception of Enlargement 46 Summary Reflection on Conceptualizing Security 48 HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS: THE YUGOSLAV WARS 52 The Early Yugoslav Crisis: A New Institutional Chaos 52 (a) Confusion Regarding Fundamentals 53 (b) European Institutions: Taken by Surprise 55 (c) UN and the Others 58 (d) Diagnosis: Institutional Paralysis 60 Kosovo: A New Kind of War 62 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ NATO’s GLOBAL MISSION IN THE 21ST CENTURY THE ATLANTIC CLUB OF BULGARIA 1998-1999 MANFRED WŐRNER FELLOWSHIP (a) A New Concept of Security Implied 63 (b) Human rights vs.
    [Show full text]
  • Selected Multilateral Organizations
    SELECTED MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATES Explanatory note: The United States participates in the organizations named below in accordance with the provisions of treaties, other international agreements, congressional legislation, or executive arrangements. In some cases, no financial contribution is involved. Various commissions, councils, or committees subsidiary to the organizations listed here are not named separately on this list. These include the international bodies for narcotics control, which are subsidiary to the United Nations. I. United Nations, Specialized Agencies, United Nations Mission of Observers in and International Atomic Energy Agency Tajikistan Food and Agricultural Organization United Nations Mission to Prevlaka International Atomic Energy Agency United Nations Mission for the International Civil Aviation Organization Referendum in Western Sahara International Labor Organization United Nations Observer Mission in International Maritime Organization Angola United Nations Observer Mission in International Telecommunication Union Georgia United Nations United Nations Transitional Universal Postal Union Administration in East Timor World Health Organization United Nations Truce Supervision World Intellectual Property Organization Organization (Middle East) World Meteorological Organization III. Inter-American Organizations II. Peacekeeping Inter-American Indian Institute United Nations Disengagement Observer Inter-American Institute for Cooperation
    [Show full text]
  • CONFERENCE on DISARMAMENT CD/PV.870 15 March 2001
    CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.870 15 March 2001 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 15 March 2001, at 10.15 a.m. President: Mr. Juan Enrique Vega (Chile) GE.01-60915 (E) CD/PV.870 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 870th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. May I begin by bidding farewell to the Ambassador of Hungary, who will shortly be leaving to take on the functions of Director of the Division for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy in the UNESCO secretariat. Ambassador Joó has represented his country in the Conference on Disarmament since June 2000 and has performed his responsibilities with devotion and diplomatic skill. I am sure that you will wish to join me in conveying to him and to his family our very best wishes for the future. I remember that Ambassador Joó was received here on the same day that I joined as representative of Chile. We are linked by that particular circumstance. Others will recall him for what he says in his farewell statement. Ambassador Joó, you have the floor. Mr. JOÓ (Hungary): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to see you assume the important office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, let me congratulate you on the creative manner in which you have conducted our proceedings. I would also like to express the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Mr. Christopher Westdal, for his tireless efforts to bring our deliberations closer to consensus.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the Conference on Disarmament
    A/57/27 United Nations Report of the Conference on Disarmament 21 January-29 March, 13 May-28 June and 29 July-13 September 2002 General Assembly Official Records Fifty-seventh Session Supplement No. 27 (A/57/27) General Assembly Official Records Fifty-seventh Session Supplement No. 27 (A/57/27) Report of the Conference on Disarmament 21 January-29 March, 13 May-28 June and 29 July-13 September 2002 United Nations • New York, 2002 A/57/27 Note Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. CONTENTS Paragraph(s) Page I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 1 1 II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE .................................................... 2 - 24 1 - 5 A. 2002 Session of the Conference .............................. 2 - 5 1 B. Participants in the Work of the Conference .......... 6 1 - 2 C. Attendance and Participation of States not Members of the Conference ............................. 7 - 8 2 D. Agenda and Programme of Work for the 2002 Session ....................................................... 9 - 16 2 - 4 E. Expansion of the Membership of the Conference .................................................... 17 - 19 4 F. Review of the Agenda of the Conference .............. 20 - 21 4 G. Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference .................................................... 22 - 23 5 H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations ........................................................... 24 5 iii Paragraph(s) Page III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 2002 SESSION ....................................... 25 - 46 5 - 12 A. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament ..................................... 29 - 30 6 - 7 B. Prevention of Nuclear War, including All Related Matters ................................................. 31 7 C. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.....… 32 - 33 7 - 8 D.
    [Show full text]
  • British Forces to Be Trained Verification
    A-PDF MERGER DEMO "~ .~.. ~,,~. TRUST AND VERIFY THE BULLETIN OF THE VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION CENTRE No. 7 February 1990 • British Forces to be Trained In and in conjunction with NATO partners, on where and how Verification often inspections will be carried out. Said Col. Waters: ~Decision-making (regarding when and where inspections witt take place) wilt be at a series of levels... we don't really During his recent trip to BerHn, US Secretary of Siale know whether countries will be given speCific areas for on· James Baker outlined his vision of NATO in the 19909. site inspections ... but we would like to reserve the right to One of the major points in his speech was the proposal to carry out challenge inspections. We believe it is our create a NATO Arms Control Verification S1aff. According sovereign right 10 do Ihis ... but we do need some form of to Mr Baker such an agency would respect the principle central body of review and control. The exact form of this that verification is a national responsibility but would is not yet decided.~ Col. Waters believes this Is the way In assist NATO countries to monitor compliance with arms which any problems regarding independent decisions by control agreements. Britain or any other nation on where and when to inspect will be countered. It is not yet known how many Mr Baker's proposal was also discussed at the December inspections ACIG witt carry out per year. meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels. It was supported by NATO Secretary General Mannfred Woerner According to Col.
    [Show full text]
  • Unraveling the Soviet Union: Gorbachev’S Change in World View
    Unraveling the Soviet Union: Gorbachev’s Change in World View SUSANNE STERNTHAL hen Georgian film director Tengiz Abduladze showed the script of his film W Repentance to then Georgian First Party Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze in 1981, the future Soviet foreign minister took on, as a personal mission, the struggle of getting permission for its production and then later for its release. The film, a surreal depiction of the evils of despotism and the moral need to confront the past, was a transparent allegory about Stalin and Stalinism. Shevardnadze’s family, like those of many in the apparat, including Mikhail Gorbachev, had been ravaged by the purges, and he wanted to break the silence on this painful part of Soviet history. Shevardnadze pitched the film to Moscow saying that it was about “a moral and ethical problem.”1 Five years later, when he was battling for its release, he recounted the deep unease that pervaded the Politburo. Exhuming the Soviet past and questioning Stalin were perceived as threatening the system itself. This was so because, as Shevardnadze explained in his memoirs, “a public con- demnation of the past threatened an inevitable break with its ‘methods.’”2 Indeed, the break with past “methods”—the suffocating party and state con- trols, which spawned a fearful and browbeaten population; the lies about the past, or what Robert Conquest has aphoristically called “the psychological horrors of mass falsification” that buttressed those controls; and the maintenance of a soci- ety and economy in a state of virtual war-preparedness by perpetuating the threat of the enemy and fostering a siege mentality—is precisely what Gorbachev want- ed to change.
    [Show full text]
  • Small States and International Security
    Small States and International Security Fall 2011 International Program Geneva Boston University Dr. Christina Schori Liang [email protected] 1 1. Course Overview “At the beginning of the 21st century, we face a world of extraordinary challenges— and of extraordinary interconnectedness. We are all vulnerable to new security threats, and to old threats that are evolving in complex and unpredictable ways. Either we allow this array of threats, and our responses to them, to divide us, or we come together to take effective action to meet all of them on the basis of a shared commitment to collective security.” (Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, 1997-2007) This course will describe the value of small states in the international system, emphasising predominantly Switzerland’s contributing role to global peace and security. The course will then widen its scope to describe the major international security issues which define the post Cold War world. Lectures will focus primarily on contemporary global security and the broadening security environment describing the main actors (states and institutions) and their multilateral and unilateral approaches to security. The course will then focus on the increasing importance of new security issues that defy individual government control, climate change, pandemics, migration, and terrorism which have called for new approaches to international security. States can no longer solve these issues on their own, they must collaborate multilaterally and with the aid of intergovernmental agencies -- both International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations to develop new forms of global governance. Simultaneously, theorists and policymakers have acknowledged that the very concept of security has changed.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia, America, and Security in the Asia-Pacific
    Russia, America, and Security in the Asia-Pacific Table of Contents Foreword Vladimir Kurilov, President, FENU and Ed Smith, Director, APCSS iv Introduction Russia, America, and Security in the Asia-Pacific Rouben Azizian and Boris Reznik viii Chapter 1 Russia in the Asia-Pacific Alexander Ignatov 1 Chapter 2 Russia and the Asia-Pacific: Trends, Threats, and Common Threads Rouben Azizian 16 Chapter 3 The United States in the Asia-Pacific: A Leadership Challenge Vladimir Petrovsky 37 Chapter 4 Strategic Resets, Security Ripples, and US Interests in the Asia-Pacific Satu Limaye 50 Chapter 5 China and the Asia-Pacific: A Russian Perspective Alexander Kozhevnikov 77 Chapter 6 China and the Asia-Pacific: A US Perspective Elizabeth Van Wie Davis 93 Chapter 7 Japan and the Asia-Pacific: A Russian Perspective Viacheslav Amirov 112 Chapter 8 Japan: Militarist, Pacifist, or Realist? John Miller 129 i Chapter 9 Korea, Russia, and the 21st-Century Challenges Igor Tolstokulakov 146 Chapter 10 Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Problem: The Status Quo versus the Transformative Approach Steven Kim 162 Chapter 11 Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Sergey Smirnov 181 Chapter 12 Arms Proliferation and Buildup in the Asia-Pacific: Advanced Conventional Weapons Richard Bitzinger 198 Chapter 13 Regionalism in Northeast Asia and Prospects for Russia–U.S. Cooperation Artyom Lukin 215 Chapter 14 Regional Cooperation and Security: The United States and Russia 231 Jim Rolfe Index 253 ii Dear Readers, This volume is the outcome of collaborative efforts by Russian and American scholars and experts. The publication of this book was made possible by cooperation between Far Eastern National University (FENU, Vladivostok, Russia) and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS, Honolulu, USA), which jointly conceived and carried out the project Russia, America, and Security in the Asia-Pacific.
    [Show full text]
  • 9 the Russian Federation and Asian Security.Do
    The Russian Federation and Asian Security Marginalization or Integration? Andrew C. Kuchins Stanford University Alexi V. Zagorsky Russian Academy of Sciences October 1998 Contemporary discussions of virtually any aspect of Russian foreign and security policy must take as their point of departure the extraordinarily weakened condition of the Russian Federation. If one looks at economic and military power, the main traditional indices of national strength, Russia’s decline is dramatic. Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Committee on Defense in the Russian Duma, recently wrote that, “Not since June 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now.”1 The 1997 Russian military budget was officially less than $20 billion, and even including hidden or indirect expenses and the domestic purchasing power of the ruble, certainly not more than $30 billion.2 Currently the Russian GNP is approximately 8 percent that of the United States. If that number is not sufficiently sobering, Clifford Gaddy and John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution have pointed out that the Russian economy today is about 25 percent the size of the U.S. economy in 1950—when the U.S. population was equivalent to Russia’s This paper was prepared for the conference “America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia,” August 20-22, 1998 at the Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. 1 Alexei G. Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia,” International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 83. 2 Ibid, p. 97. 1 2 The Russian Federation and Asian Security current population of 150 million.3 Not only are these traditional sources of national power remarkably diminished, but the state institutions responsible for making and conducting foreign and security policy are in various stages of disorder and disability.
    [Show full text]