DOCSLIB.ORG

The Politics and Diplomacy of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1980-1992

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Politics and Diplomacy of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1980-1992 The London School of Economics and Political Science A Long Goodbye: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1980-1992 Artemy Mikhail Kalinovsky A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, July 2009 1 UMI Number: U615706 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615706 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ***** \X \S * n Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best o f my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. Abstract This thesis explores the politics and diplomacy of Soviet efforts to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Although Soviet leaders began looking for a way out of the conflict soon after the introduction of Soviet troops in December 1979, the war dragged on because Moscow was afraid o f the damage that a failure in Afghanistan could do to itsTeputatioiTas a leader ot the communist world and a Supporter of national liberation movements in the Third World. Even as Soviet diplomats engaged in international diplomacy in an effort to secure an agreement for a withdrawal, Moscow looked for ways to stabilise its client government in Kabul. This characterised Soviet policy in the region from 1979 onward, not only under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, but even under the reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev. In addition to providing a detailed study of an important and often-misinterpreted conflict, the thesis also situates the Soviet intervention within the growing body of scholarship seeking to understand the Cold War in global context, particularly with regard to the Third World. Thus the thesis focuses on the broader international dimensions of Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, particularly the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, while also showing that communist leaders in Afghanistan were often able to manipulate Soviet decision-making in support of their own internal rivalries. The thesis argues that ongoing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s must be seen in the context of the Kremlin’s official commitment to the Third World, despite the associated difficulties of such a policy. 3 “The day you get in and the day you get out.” -Avon Barksdale Acknowledgements Many debts are accumulated when one takes on a project like this. I would like to thank, first and foremost, my supervisors, Professor Anita Prazmowska and Professor Arne Westad. At George Washington University I was fortunate to have teachers who encouraged me to pursue graduate work and have provided commentary and advice on this project as it evolved; they are Professor Muriel Atkin, Professor James Hershberg, Professor Hope Harisson, and Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya. A number of people in the LSE Department of International History and beyond read chapters and provided invaluable advice and support along the way; they are Dr. Paul Keenan, Dr. Tanya Harmer, Dr. Sergei Radchenko, Dr. Arne Hofmann, Tom Field, Vladimir Unkovski- Korica, Brian Becker, and Taylor Asen. The Cold War Studies Centre/LSE IDEAS has been a home over the last three years, and I would like in particular to thank Jeff Byme, Lisa Aranson, and the Missile Defence Research Project at Columbia House. In Moscow Evgeny Golynkin and Alla Nikolaevna provided warm meals and a welcoming home during my research trips. A number of people assisted with locating sources and helping me reach interviewees, including Professor Vladimir Pechatnov, Professor Vladimir Shubin, and Professor Natalia Kapitonova. This project would have been impossible without the help of General Aleksandr Liakhovsky, who has done more than anyone to record the history of the Soviet war. Sadly he passed away in February 2009, a week before the 20th anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal. At the end of the day this project would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of those closest to me, and so it is my grandmother, my family, and Dayna I must thank, for thinking this was a good idea and reminding me of the same when I found it hard to believe, and for much much more. 4 Abbreviations cc Central Committee CDSP Current Digest of the Soviet Press CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CRA Council of Religious Affairs (USSR) DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan DYOA Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan GARF State Archive of the Russian Federation GFA Gorbachev Foundation Archives GRU Main Intelligence Directorate (Soviet military intelligence) KGB Committee of State Security (USSR) KhAD State Information Services (DRA) INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan RA Republic of Afghanistan RGAE Russian State Archive of the Economy RGANI Russian State Archive of Contemporary History SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SAM Surface to Air Missile UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan WAD Ministry of State Security Table of Contents List of Illustrations.................................................................................................7 Introduction............................................................................................................. 11 Historiography................................................................................ 13 Sources............................................................................................27 Thesis structure............................................................................... 31 Background to the invasion........................................................... 34 Chapter 1 Counter-insurgency and “nation-building” in Afghanistan, 1980-1985..............................................46 Entrapment...................................................................................... 47 Propaganda and limited diplomatic approaches......................... 56 Efforts for stabilization within Afghanistan................................61 Opposition to the intervention within the Soviet E lite ............. 68 Towards a UN role......................................................................... 74 Chapter 2 New Thinking, Old Commitments: Gorbachev and the Afghan W ar.................................87 Old Commitments and New Political Thinking......................... 89 A decision to withdraw, but not a plan........................................ 96 Fighting a limited war.................................................................... 105 Social effects of the war.................................................................116 Chapter 3 Reforming Counterinsurgency: The Replacement of Karmal and the National Reconciliation Campaign, 1986-87...........127 Exit Karmal, Enter Najib................................. ..............................129 National Reconciliation: A New Approach................................ 136 A return to diplomacy. ................................................................... 147 Disappointment.................................................................................. 153 Chapter 4 Superpower Relations and the Geneva Accords...........................164 The US-Soviet Relationship and Afghanistan................................ 165 Initiatives and Concessions............................................................... 172 Towards the Geneva Accords...........................................................182 Chapter 5 Politics and Diplomacy During the Withdrawal............................195 Making the best of the Geneva Accords: The Moscow Summit and after..............................................196 The KGB and Najibullah, the military and Massoud...................... 206 Prolonging the agony............................................................................218 Back over the Friendship Bridge......................................................... 225 Chapter 6 Aid, Politics and Diplomacy after the Withdrawal......................... 233 Setting a precedent for non-intervention: the battle for Jalalabad..............................................................235 Continuing diplomatic efforts: UN, Pakistan, and the US...............244 Dealing with the home front.................................................................254 Towards the final collapse.......................................... 260 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................260
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban
    Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for University Honors with Distinction by, Brandon Smith May 2005 Oxford, OH ABSTRACT AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1996: BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN by, BRANDON SMITH This paper examines why the Afghan resistance fighters from the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen, were unable to establish a government in the time period between the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 and the consolidation of power by the Taliban in 1996. A number of conflicting explanations exist regarding Afghanistan’s instability during this time period. This paper argues that the developments in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1996 can be linked to the influence of actors outside Afghanistan, but not to the extent that the choices and actions of individual actors can be overlooked or ignored. Further, the choices and actions of individual actors need not be explained in terms of ancient animosities or historic tendencies, but rather were calculated moves to secure power. In support of this argument, international, national, and individual level factors are examined. ii Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban by, Brandon Smith Approved by: _________________________, Advisor Karen L. Dawisha _________________________, Reader John M. Rothgeb, Jr. _________________________, Reader Homayun Sidky Accepted by: ________________________, Director, University Honors Program iii Thanks to Karen Dawisha for her guidance and willingness to help on her year off, and to John Rothgeb and Homayun Sidky for taking the time to read the final draft and offer their feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • NORMAN A. GRAEBNER (Charlottesville, VA, U.S.A.)
    NORMAN A. GRAEBNER (Charlottesville, VA, U.S.A.) GORBACHEV AND REAGAN Outside Geneva's Chateau Fleur d'Eau on a wintry 19 November 1985, a coatless Ronald Reagan awaited the ap- proaching Mikhail Gorbachev. The American President, as the official host of this first day of the Geneva summit, had set the stage for his first meeting with the Soviet leader with great care. He led Gorbachev and their two interpreters to a small meeting room with a fire crackling in the fireplace for a pri- vate conversation. The people in the neighboring conference room, Reagan began, had given them 15 minutes "to meet in this one-on-one.... They've programmed us-they've written your talking points, they've written my talking points. We can do that, or we can stay here as long as we want and get to know each other...." The private conversation lasted an hour. During a break in the afternoon session Reagan steered Gorbachev to the chateau's summerhouse for a tete-a-tete before the fire. At the end the two leaders achieved little, yet both re- garded the summit a success. Separated by twenty years, they recognized in each other a warmth and sincerity that promised future success. Reagan observed that Gorbachev scarcely re- sembled his predecessors in his intelligence, knowledge and openness. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze noted, "[W]e had the impression that [the President] is a man who keeps his word and that he's someone you can deal with ... and reach accord." The two leaders, pursuing complementary agendas, had approached the Geneva summit along highly' dis- similar paths.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup the Suppressed Transcripts
    Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup The Suppressed Transcripts: Part 3 Hearings "About the Illegal Financia) Activity of the CPSU" Editor 's Introduction At the birth of the independent Russian Federation, the country's most pro-Western reformers looked to the West to help fund economic reforms and social safety nets for those most vulnerable to the change. However, unlike the nomenklatura and party bureaucrats who remained positioned to administer huge aid infusions, these reformers were skeptical about multibillion-dollar Western loans and credits. Instead, they wanted the West to help them with a different source of money: the gold, platinum, diamonds, and billions of dollars in hard currency the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and KGB intelligence service laundered abroad in the last years of perestroika. Paradoxically, Western governments generously supplied the loans and credits, but did next to nothing to support the small band of reformers who sought the return of fortunes-estimated in the tens of billions of dollars- stolen by the Soviet leadership. Meanwhile, as some in the West have chronicled, the nomenklatura and other functionaries who remained in positions of power used the massive infusion of Western aid to enrich themselves-and impoverish the nation-further. In late 1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development concluded that Russian officials had stolen $45 billion in Western aid and deposited the money abroad. Radical reformers in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, the parliament that served until its building was destroyed on President Boris Yeltsin's orders in October 1993, were aware of this mass theft from the beginning and conducted their own investigation as part of the only public probe into the causes and circumstances of the 1991 coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
    [Show full text]
  • Title of Thesis: ABSTRACT CLASSIFYING BIAS
    ABSTRACT Title of Thesis: CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis Directed By: Dr. David Zajic, Ph.D. Our project extends previous algorithmic approaches to finding bias in large text corpora. We used multilingual topic modeling to examine language-specific bias in the English, Spanish, and Russian versions of Wikipedia. In particular, we placed Spanish articles discussing the Cold War on a Russian-English viewpoint spectrum based on similarity in topic distribution. We then crowdsourced human annotations of Spanish Wikipedia articles for comparison to the topic model. Our hypothesis was that human annotators and topic modeling algorithms would provide correlated results for bias. However, that was not the case. Our annotators indicated that humans were more perceptive of sentiment in article text than topic distribution, which suggests that our classifier provides a different perspective on a text’s bias. CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Gemstone Honors Program, University of Maryland, 2018 Advisory Committee: Dr. David Zajic, Chair Dr. Brian Butler Dr. Marine Carpuat Dr. Melanie Kill Dr. Philip Resnik Mr. Ed Summers © Copyright by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang 2018 Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincerest gratitude to our mentor, Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Domestic Politics and Collapse of the Outer Empire, 1989
    Soviet Domestic Politics and Collapse of the Outer Empire, 1989 FREDO ARIAS-KING n this article, I explore the role of domestic politics in precluding the inter- I vention of the Soviet army in Eastern Europe in fall 1989. A close look at the USSR’s domestic political situation as early as summer 1989 suggests that there was little, if any, intention on the part of the legislators, government, or even the Communist Party to prop up the fast-disintegrating Communist regimes in the East bloc with force. Rather, there is substantial evidence that a revolution in Eastern Europe would be welcomed in Moscow. To my knowledge, this angle has not been examined in the scholarly literature. Many of the leading authori- ties on the collapse of Eastern Europe fail to connect internal policymaking— particularly relating to the creation of legislative power in the USSR and its con- sequences—to the historic collapse of the Soviet Union’s “outer empire.” I do not argue that Soviet democratization caused the collapse of the East European regimes in 1989, but that it was the main factor that precluded an armed inter- vention to save those regimes. Only one of six major books on the revolutions of 1989, for example, even mentions the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, and then only in passing.1 They focus instead on the USSR as a unitary player, with a reformer (Gorbachev) at the helm, surrounded by like-minded advisers advocating new political think- ing, who decided to “allow” the East Europeans to go their own way.
    [Show full text]
  • The Question of Afghanistan and Its Impact on US Relations with Pakistan
    1 Draft, Please Do Not Copy without Explicit Permission from Author The Question of Afghanistan and its Impact on U.S. Relations with Pakistan: The Need for Pragmatic Engagement Abstract: Relations between the U.S. and Pakistan have always been cyclical, oscillating from collaboration and friendship to noncooperation and enmity. A core reason for this is a failure by consecutive American administration to understand the nature of the Pakistani political system, in which social groups are central. Accordingly, U.S. policymakers have expectations and make demands that often manifest through the rubric of democracy promotion. The paper identifies two key obstacles to democracy promotion in Pakistan: ungoverned territories and social identity groups. The section examines these elements in respect to Afghanistan. The reason for that is because the second section expands the argument by shifting attention to U.S. policymakers who appear to have place Afghanistan at the heart of U.S. engagement in South Asia. In doing so, it is argue that as long as Afghanistan remains key to U.S. national security concerns, American interaction with Pakistan remains limited because the relations are not about the U.S. and Pakistan per se, but rather on how Pakistan can help the U.S. meet its national security interests in Afghanistan. Students of history and politics quickly learn that nothing is certain nor absolute, as even definite and incontrovertible evidence may obscure deeper complexities that define inter-state relations, as far too often, common interests trump values. This may explain why foreign policy analysis tends to be grounded in case studies, and less in theoretical scrutiny.
    [Show full text]
  • The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-Geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence
    The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence John O’Loughlin, Frank D. W. Witmer, and Andrew M. Linke1 Abstract: A team of political geographers analyzes over 5,000 violent events collected from media reports for the Afghanistan and Pakistan conflicts during 2008 and 2009. The violent events are geocoded to precise locations and the authors employ an exploratory spatial data analysis approach to examine the recent dynamics of the wars. By mapping the violence and examining its temporal dimensions, the authors explain its diffusion from traditional foci along the border between the two countries. While violence is still overwhelmingly concentrated in the Pashtun regions in both countries, recent policy shifts by the American and Pakistani gov- ernments in the conduct of the war are reflected in a sizeable increase in overall violence and its geographic spread to key cities. The authors identify and map the clusters (hotspots) of con- flict where the violence is significantly higher than expected and examine their shifts over the two-year period. Special attention is paid to the targeting strategy of drone missile strikes and the increase in their number and geographic extent by the Obama administration. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H560, H770, O180. 15 figures, 1 table, 113 ref- erences. Key words: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Taliban, ­­Al- Qaeda, insurgency, Islamic terrorism, U.S. military, International Security Assistance Forces, Durand Line, Tribal Areas, Northwest Frontier Province, ACLED, NATO. merica’s “longest war” is now (August 2010) nearing its ninth anniversary. It was Alaunched in October 2001 as a “war of necessity” (Barack Obama, August 17, 2009) to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and thus remove the support of this regime for Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization that carried out the September 2001 attacks in the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies
    1 The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies Vladimir Tismaneanu The revolutions of 1989 were, no matter how one judges their nature, a true world-historical event, in the Hegelian sense: they established a historical cleavage (only to some extent conventional) between the world before and after 89. During that year, what appeared to be an immutable, ostensibly indestructible system collapsed with breath-taking alacrity. And this happened not because of external blows (although external pressure did matter), as in the case of Nazi Germany, but as a consequence of the development of insuperable inner tensions. The Leninist systems were terminally sick, and the disease affected first and foremost their capacity for self-regeneration. After decades of toying with the ideas of intrasystemic reforms (“institutional amphibiousness”, as it were, to use X. L. Ding’s concept, as developed by Archie Brown in his writings on Gorbachev and Gorbachevism), it had become clear that communism did not have the resources for readjustment and that the solution lay not within but outside, and even against, the existing order.1 The importance of these revolutions cannot therefore be overestimated: they represent the triumph of civic dignity and political morality over ideological monism, bureaucratic cynicism and police dictatorship.2 Rooted in an individualistic concept of freedom, programmatically skeptical of all ideological blueprints for social engineering, these revolutions were, at least in their first stage, liberal and non-utopian.3 The fact that 1 See Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 157-189. In this paper I elaborate upon and revisit the main ideas I put them forward in my introduction to Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) as well as in my book Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: Free Press, 1992; revised and expanded paperback, with new afterword, Free Press, 1993).
    [Show full text]
  • The Blind Leading the Blind
    WORKING PAPER #60 The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan By Artemy Kalinovsky, January 2010 COLD War INTernaTionaL HISTorY ProjecT Working Paper No. 60 The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan By Artemy Kalinovsky THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu Series Editors This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a periodic BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications.
    [Show full text]
  • Produced by the Human Security Centre Lead Author
    1 Human Security Centre – Written evidence (AFG0019) Produced by the Human Security Centre Lead Author: Simon Schofield, Senior Fellow, In consultation with Rohullah Yakobi, Associate Fellow 2 1 Table of Contents 2. Executive Summary .............................................................................5 3. What is the Human Security Centre?.....................................................10 4. Geopolitics and National Interests and Agendas......................................11 Islamic Republic of Pakistan ...................................................................11 Historical Context...............................................................................11 Pakistan’s Strategy.............................................................................12 Support for the Taliban .......................................................................13 Afghanistan as a terrorist training camp ................................................16 Role of military aid .............................................................................17 Economic interests .............................................................................19 Conclusion – Pakistan .........................................................................19 Islamic Republic of Iran .........................................................................20 Historical context ...............................................................................20 Iranian Strategy ................................................................................23
    [Show full text]
  • The Middle East and Western Values — a Dialog with Iran
    127 th Bergedorf Round Table The Middle East and Western Values — A Dialog With Iran October 25 th–26 th, 2003, Isfahan CONTENT Picture Documentation 1 Participants 20 Summary 21 Protocol Welcome 22 I. Culture and International Politics —An Overview 23 II. Culture and International Politics in a Regional Context 51 III. What’s Ahead?—Perspectives for the Future 82 Annex Participants 109 Recommended Literature 116 Map 118 Glossary 119 Index 132 Previous Round Tables 139 The Körber-Foundation 151 Imprint 152 INITIATOR Dr. Michael Kraig, Program Officer, Stanley Foundation, Muscatine/Iowa Dr. Kurt A. Körber Mark Leonard, Director, The Foreign Policy Centre, London Markus Löning, MdB, Member of the German Bundestag, Free Democratic CHAIR Party (FDP), Berlin Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn, Dr. Christoph Bertram, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Director, SWP — German Institute for International Tehran and Security Affairs, Berlin Dr. Abbas Manouchehri, Professor, Tarbiat Modarress University, Center for SPEAKERS Dialogue of Civilizations, Tehran Dr. Reza Mansouri, Dr. Gilles Kepel, Deputy Minister, Ministry for Science, Research and Professor, Institut d‘Études Politiques de Paris Technology, Tehran Dr. Michael McFaul, Alireza Moayeri, Professor, Stanford University Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tehran Dr. Homayra Moshirzadeh, Asghar Mohammadi, Professor, University of Tehran Expert for the Middle East and Arab Countries, Tehran Dr. Ahmad Nagheebzadeh, Ebadollah Molaei, Professor, University of Tehran Deputy Ambassador of the Embassy of the Islamic Giandomenico Picco, Republic of Iran in Germany, Berlin Chairman and CEO, GDP Associates, Inc., New York Dr. Ali Paya, Dr. Johannes Reissner, Head, Department for Future Studies, National SWP — German Institute for International and Research Center for Science Policy, Tehran Security Affairs, Berlin Ruprecht Polenz, MdB, Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia and Asia: the Emerging Security Agenda
    Russia and Asia The Emerging Security Agenda Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Professor Daniel Tarschys, Chairman (Sweden) Dr Oscar Arias Sánchez (Costa Rica) Dr Willem F. van Eekelen (Netherlands) Sir Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom) Dr Catherine Kelleher (United States) Dr Lothar Rühl (Germany) Professor Ronald G. Sutherland (Canada) Dr Abdullah Toukan (Jordan) The Director Director Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Signalistg. 9, S-1769 70 Solna, Sweden Cable: SIPRI Telephone: 46 8/655 97 00 Telefax: 46 8/655 97 33 E-mail: [email protected] Internet URL: http://www.sipri.se Russia and Asia The Emerging Security Agenda Edited by Gennady Chufrin OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1999 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Athens
    [Show full text]