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THE NEW STAGE of the SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (October 1961 - January 1962) (Reference Title: ESAU XVII-62)

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THE NEW STAGE of the SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (October 1961 - January 1962) (Reference Title: ESAU XVII-62) ,- APPROVED.$OR RELEASE DATE: MAY 2007 I 26 February 1962 OCI No. 0361/62 Copy No. .,.-4 23 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (October 1961 - January 1962) (Reference Title: ESAU XVII-62) I Office 03,Current Intelligence CENTM'd INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NTAINS INFORM T€E NEW STAGE OE THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (October IXEl - January 1962) This is a working paper, our first systematic survey since spring 1961 of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This paper discusses the stage initiated by Khrushchev's new offensive at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, examines the forms of pressure on the Chinese still available to Khrushchev, and speculates on the possibility of' a Sino-Soviet break in the next year or so. We have had profitable discussions, on many of the mat- in this paper. wi umber of other analysts. I I: I I . THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE Summary and Conclusions .................................... i I . THl3 BACKGROUND ....................................... 2 A . The "Personality Cult............................. 2 B . World Communist Strategy ......................... 3 C . Chinese Programs and Soviet Aid .................. 5 D . Authority & Discipline in the Movement ...........6 E . Soviet-Albanian Relations ........................ 7 I1 . DEVELOPMENTS AT TI# 22ND CPSU CONGRESS (October 1961) ..................................... 11 A; The "Personality Cult" Again .................... 11 B . Soviet Strategy Reaffirmed ......................13 C . Chinese Prograins Criticized. Soviet Aid Brandished ..................................... 16 D . Soviet Authority in Movement Reasserted .........18 111 . TO THE BREAK iVITH ALBANIA (November 1961) ........... 26 A . Soviet-Albanian Polemics ........................26 B . Chinese Support of Albania.. .................... 30 C . Soviet Warnings to China ........................ 34 I IV . PRESSURE AND RESISTANCE (December 1961) ............. 37 A. Soviet Pressure on Albania ......................( 37 B . Polemics on Strategy............................ 41 C . Authority and Discipline ........................ 45 V . CONTINUED DETERIORATION (January 1962) ..............52 A . Renewed Sino-Albanian Counter-Offensives ........52 B . Stronger Soviet Warnings to China ...............60 VI . PROSPECTS ...........................................67 A . Definitions of a "Break" ........................ 67 B . Soviet Pressure on Albania ......................70 C . Political Pressure on China ..................... 72 D . Economic Pressure on China ......................75 E . Military Pressure on China ......................78 F . Pro-Soviet Forces in the Chinese Leadership .....81 G . The Prospects for a Break ....................... 86 THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIEI' DISPUTE Summary and Conclusions In using the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961 primarily to renew the destalinization campaign in the USSR and to extend this campaign to the entire world Com- munist movement, Khrushchev was breaking the uneasy truce with the Chinese party reached at the Moscow conference of the 81 parties in November 1960. Through the "antiparty i groupTfand the Albanian leadership, Khrushchev attacked the Chinese along four main lines: the "personality cult," world Communist strategy, the building of socialism, and authority and discipline in the movemeht. Despite the apparent Sino-Soviet agreement at the Mos- cow conference not to engage in polemics on the course of destalinization in the USSR and the quest.lon of just which parties were still practitaoners of the "personality cult, as of October 1961 the Soviet and Chinese parties c1earJ.y remained in serious disagreement on this matter. It was obvious that the concept of the 7fcultffstood ready to serve the leadership of either party in a fresh attack on the other. Similarly, in discussing the mishmash of Soviet and Chinese positions on world Communist strategy presented in the equivocal declaration of the November 1960 conference, Moscow and Peiping during 1961 had reaffirmed all of their conflicting views. Although these differences had not usually been stated polemically in 1961, the Soviet party had continued to favor an opportunistic strategy of soften- ing Western resistance by peaceful gestures while exploiting indigenous political movements in non-Communist countries primarily by non-military means, whereas the Chinese party had continued to advocate a more militant revolutionary program for the world movement on all fronts, particularly I in the underdeveloped areas. Moscow contended that the I bloc should not accept serious risks of world war, while I Peiping argued that a more militant' program would not in- / I crease the existing risk. Moscow spoke of the danger of expansion of local wars and implied a need for caution in supporting "liberationft wars and popular uprisings, whereas Peiping minimized the dangers of local wars and called for much stronger support of liberation wars. Yoscow held that "peaceful coexistence" should be the general line of bloc foreign policy, while the Chinese held that this concept was retarding the world revolution; as part of this, Moscow endorsed, and Peiping criticized, the idea of negotiations with the West. As regards both colonial areas and independent countries, Moscow minimized and Peiping emphasized the im- portance of armed struggle and other forms of violence; .. whereas YIoscow emphasized, and Peiping minimized, the im- portance of cooperation with bourgeois nationalist forces there. As for specific foreign policies, Peiping had been pleased by the militant features of Soviet policy during 1961--e.g., Soviet statements on Berlin and the Soviet re- , sumption of nuclear testing, but had been very cool to the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting and the Soviet emphasis on dis- armament, anxious about a Soviet rapprochement with the United States and Yugoslavia, irritated by Soviet relations with India, and concerned that Khrushchev might not stand firm on Berlin.. As of October 1961, there also continued to be important differences between Soviet and Chinese positions on building socialism and Communism. Moscow had continued to criticize Chinese domestic programs and the Chinese aim of economic autarky, while Peiping had defended its programs and spoken of need for economic independence to ensure political independ- ence. The USSR as of October 1961 had not moved to restore the program of economic, military, and scientific aid which had existed prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in mid-1960. Further, in 1961 Moscow had cut back shipments of military goods and had apparently discontinued the special preference given China in trade relations; Chinese imports from the USSR had dropped, scientific cooperation had been greatly reduced, and Soviet aid to military research had been drastically reduced or halted. Throughout 1961, the most offensive feature of Chinese behavior had clearly remained that of Peiping's challenge to Soviet authority in the world Communist movement. The chall- enge had been most dramatically illustrated in Albania, but it was also evident in Sino-Soviet relations with the small Asian Communist states and the Communist parties of non-bloc Asian states. The Soviet party had continued in 1961 to in- sist on its right to make generalizations for the movement, it had reaffirmed its favor for the principle of majority rule, it had warned of the dangers of nationalism in the bloc, and 'ii it had hinted at the possible expulsion from the bloc of states continuing to defy Soviet authority. It had been apparent that the forthcoming 22nd congress would be used in part for fresh affirmations of Soviet authority, although it was not foreseen that these would be as spectacular as they turned out to be. As for Albania, Soviet-Albanian relations since mid-1960 had deteriorated along the same general lines as had the Sino- Soviet relationship, but as of October 1961 were worse. Through- out 1961, it had been the Soviet camp:s practice to condemn Albania explicit3y and openly instead of China, while intend- ing the criticism to apply to both; and the USSR had taken several political, economic, and military measures against Albania. Throughout 1961 the Albanian regime had belligerently reaffirmed pro-Chinese positions, and had been acquiring the status of a Chinese dependent; by October, Albania seemed a member of the bloc largely through its ties with Peiping. In attacking the "antiparty group" and the Albanian lead- ers in his reports and speeches to the 22nd congress, Khru- shchevwas aiming primarily at the leadership of the Chinese party, the only significant challenger for leadership of tho world movement. His charges against both of his overt targets were roughly the same as the charges that the Soviet party had made repeatedly against the Chinese privately, in party letters and in international Communist meetings, or had made publicly (sometimes in very harsh terms) without naming the Chinese. In making these fresh attacks and in warning the Chinese by name on the limited issue of supporting Albania, Khrushchev was giving the Chinese yet another chance to retreat while at the same time seeking to persuade them that this I would be their last chance before the Soviet adoption of ex- treme measures. Khrushchev in his central committee report (17 October) used the concept of the "personality cult" to describe the fundamental error of his left-wing domestic and foreign op- ponents--the error responsible for their other errors; and he declared
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