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Iprisviewpoints 115 IPRIS Viewpoints JANUARY 2013 Shinzo Abe’s Return: What Does it Mean for India? RAJARAM PANDA Visiting Faculty, School of Language, Literature and Culture Studies (SLLCS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India After three years in opposition, Japanese voters returned Is the LDP the Real Winner? the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) back to Although the LDP emerged victorious, neither the LDP power in elections held on December 16, 2012. The victo- or Abe are particularly popular, but rather the DPJ was ry means the hawkish former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe so unpopular. With the LDP having won a decisive two- gets a second chance to lead the nation after a one-year thirds majority in the Lower House, it will allow it to re- stint in 2006-2007. He would be Japan’s seventh prime submit and pass legislation rejected in the Upper House. minister in six-and-a-half years. It could also further In practice, however, forming a political coalition on any heighten tensions with rival China. of these objectives will not be easy. The Japanese polity Earlier polls predicted that the LDP and its ally New is deeply split on these and other issues. The Restoration Komeito stood to gain two-thirds of the Lower House Party, for example, which shares Abe’s views on consti- seats – enough seats to overturn decisions by the Upper tutional and defense issues, will not solve Abe’s problem House. As it transpired, the LDP and New Komeito to- of commanding a majority in the Upper House where the gether romped home with 294 and 31 seats respectively. Restoration Party has only three seats. And the LDP’s Before the election, the LDP had 118 seats. main coalition partner, the Komeito, is wary of support- Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s obsession with raising ing these changes. The configuration of policy positions the consumption tax rate, which was not included in the across parties means that Abe would have to take po- Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) 2009 election mani- litical philandering to new heights that would enable the festo, showed that he was completely under the control LDP to do what it wants. of Finance Ministry bureaucrats. During the DPJ adminis- On economic issues, the LDP and Komeito have similar tration, workers’ wages stagnated and part-time workers positions: inflation target; dealing with the high yen; and came to account for more than one-third of the nation’s spending up on infrastructure. The infrastructure budget workforce. On election day, the DPJ’s numbers in the Lower has been shrinking over time and there is a case for revi- House decreased to a record low with only 57. In addition, talization of Japan’s ageing infrastructure. Abe has pro- the diplomatic squabble between Japan and China over posed lavish spending on public works to stimulate the ownership of the Senkaku Islands must have made some economy and if this happens, this will rewind the efforts segment of Japanese voters feel that Japan is weak-kneed. of the DPJ to cut the government’s bloated debt. IPRIS Viewpoints SHINZO ABE’S RETURN: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INDIA? | 2 Experiences in the past do not suggest that Abe’s pro- pretation is that the Constitution prohibits Japan from posals will succeed. His reflationary policies to end per- exercising that right. If the right to collective self-defense sistent deflation are unlikely to succeed as extreme mea- can be exercised, Japan would be legally able to take mil- sures are strong pill with potentially serious side effects. itary action to defend a nation with close ties with Japan For example, after World War II, the government forced if that nation is militarily attacked by a third party. Atten- the Bank of Japan to buy government bonds to generate tion must be paid to the fact that while a constitutional cash to fund a recovery. This resulted in hyperinflation revision requires the support of two-thirds of the Diet and commodity prices spiked 70-fold from 1945 to 1949. members to initiate a national referendum, changing the In 1989, a new law abolished the power of the Finance government’s interpretation of the Constitution related Minister to replace top Bank of Japan executives, while to the right to collective self-defense does not require giving central bank greater independence. Now Abe pro- such a procedure. poses to amend the Bank of Japan law. Analysts across The LDP and other parties calling for the exercise of the board in Japan say that Abe’s proposals go against “les- right of collective self-defense can enact a bill that will sons learned from history” as government intervention change the government’s traditional interpretation. Ex- by developed countries in central bank decision-making ercising the right to collective self-defense would open can have serious repercussions. This makes Australian the way for involving the country in a military conflict not economist Peter Drysdale to remark that letting the LDP directly affecting it. This would violate Japan’s defense- lead on infrastructure revitalization is rather like “putting only policy. Such a bill would completely gut the no-war a vampire in charge of the blood bank”.1 Article 9. The irony is that the LDP and Komeito tied up with the The LDP draft calling for revision of Article 9 to create a DPJ to enact the bill that will double the consumption tax National Defense Force (NDF) states that the proposed rate to 10% from October 2015, despite the risk that do- NDF, under a specific law, can take part in international ing so will further wreck the Japanese economy by induc- cooperative activities to help maintain peace and security ing a fall in tax revenues. The Japan Restoration Party’s in the international community – a concept that can be economic policy is based on neoliberal fundamentalism. used to justify Japan’s participation in virtually any type For example, it calls for abolishing the minimum wage of military mission abroad. system. Even during his tenure in office, LDP’s Junichiro Even without revising the Constitution, the LDP may try to Koizumi pushed similar neoliberal economic policies and enact a bill to expand the Self-Defense Forces’ activities people’s lives did not improve and poverty became a real overseas. Given Japan’s military aggression in the Asia- issue. Pacific region in the 1930s and 1940s, the LDP’s posture might arouse suspicions about Japan’s true intentions Issue of Constitutional Revision among neighboring and other countries, thus destroy- The political parties’ stances on the Constitution, espe- ing the international community’s trust in Japan. It could cially regarding the war-renouncing Article 9 and the also lead to a fierce arms race and destabilize East Asia. right to collective self-defense, are important. Unfortu- nately the government’s traditional interpretation has Nuclear Issue been that the Constitution prohibits the exercise of the Being an island country unlike Germany, Japan can- right to collective self-defense. There are fears that not just get energy from other countries in a pinch and changes to Article 9 and to the government’s interpreta- therefore has to rely on nuclear energy, and pre-election tion of the right to collective self-defense would shatter day polls showed about 80% of Japanese want to phase the trust Japan has gained from the international com- out nuclear power after the March 2011 meltdown at the munity through its adherence to its constitutional no-war Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. But nuclear energy principle in the decades that followed the end of World ended up not being a major election issue. As a result, War II. Such views indicate that changes would only con- the staunchly anti-nuclear Tomorrow Party, formed just tribute to the destabilization of East Asia. It seems likely three weeks ago before the elections, captured only 9 that the safest route for the LDP and its partners is simply seats. The LDP is the most pro-nuclear party, and has to change the government’s current interpretation that said Japan should decide over the next 10 years what bans the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, sort of energy mix is best. Abe, considered one of the while not revising the Constitution’s no-war principle. more conservative figures in the LDP, pursued a nation- Both the LDP and the Japan Restoration Party call for alistic agenda pressing for more patriotic education and revising the Constitution, including revision of the war- upgrading the defense agency to ministry status during renouncing Article 9, and for exercising the right to col- his previous tenure. lective self-defense. Broadly, the LDP’s traditional inter- Although the Fukushima catastrophe highlighted the in- herent danger of operating nuclear power plants in Ja- pan, Abe opposes the elimination of nuclear power. He 1 Peter Drysdale, “Japan: an election for what or to where?” (East Asia says nuclear power plants whose operations are veri- Forum,17December 2012). IPRIS Viewpoints SHINZO ABE’S RETURN: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INDIA? | 3 fiably safe should be brought back online. But nuclear be analyzed from this perspective. Abe is not shy in artic- waste storage facilities at such plants are almost full and ulating his government’s policy to review Japan’s military no technology exists at present to ensure the safe, stor- strategy, whose primary aim is to offset China’s growing age of high-level radioactive waste. military power. The new National Defense Program Guidelines adopted in Stance on Foreign Policy 2010 by the DPJ called for gradual reductions in defense A government led by Abe could mean a shift in Japa- spending and in the size of Japan’s military, particularly, nese foreign policy that discomforts some of the coun- in the number of tanks and infantry members.
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