Asian International Studies Review Sukeui Vol. 21 Sohn No.2 (December 2020): 55-77 55
Received September 15, 2020 Revised December 4, 2020 Accepted December 11, 2020
Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election*
Sukeui Sohn**
The purpose of this study to examine the degree of ‘rightward shift’ among Japanese politicians as well as voters by analyzing the result of the 2017 general election, particularly focusing on the split of Democratic Party (minshintō) and the consequent realignment of opposition bloc between moderate conservatives, represented by Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (rikken minshutō), and hardline conservatives who joined newly-established Party of Hope (kibō no tō). Particularly, the district-level analysis of eighty-five districts reveal that the moderate-hardline alignment among voters appears to be solidified, and there seems low level of vote mobilities between the two blocs. Instead, the electoral results indicate that political parties are competing one another within its respective blocs. While the overall tendency of new voters to support new rightwing party may serve as one of indicators to elucidate Japan’s rightward shift, given the ambiguity of candidates’ positions on constitutional revisions as well as poor performance of PoH candidates against CDPJ, it is questionable whether such trend can be accounted for permanent or holistic shift to the rightist ideology. Keywords: Rightward Shift (ukeika), Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Party of Hope, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), The 2017 General Election, Opposition Realignment
* This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2019S1A6A3A02102886). ** HK Research Professor, Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea; E-mail: [email protected] DOI: 10.16934/isr.21.2.202012.55
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 56 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election
I. INTRODUCTION
The resurgence of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) after the inauguration of the second Abe cabinet in 2012 is often conceived as the triumph of hardline conservativism in Japan. Once characterized by redistribution of wealth from competitive firms to highly protected rural economies, the dismantlement of so-called LDP system after the 1990s put an end to long-held clientelist practices between the ruling party and its rurally-based supporters (Kabashima 2014, 3).1 What came to rise instead was electoral competition that centered on parties, rather than politicians, generated by the new electoral system installed for general election since 1994 (Maeda 2009; McElawin 2012; Reed, Scheiner, and Thies 2012; Reed 2014). Along with the development of party-centered political competition surged the ‘presidentialization’ of Japanese politics in which the role of party leadership became more critical than it was in the past in influencing electoral performance (Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Sasada 2010; Jou and Endo 2015). Against this backdrop, the unprecedented longevity of prime minister Abe’s second term and the consecutive electoral victories in national elections throughout his eight-year-tenure has invited speculations regarding the ‘rightward shift’ of the Japanese electorate. The consecutive triumphs of Liberal Democratic Party, as well as the rise of rightwing ‘third’ parties that have gained substantial support in the post-2010 electoral competition, have overshadowed the ‘liberals’ within Japan’s political market, which, particularly after the split of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2012, seemed to remain unable to overcome seemingly chronic divisions of political interests. While it is easy to mistake prime minister Abe’s wire-to-wire race as well as the former DPJ’s unfortunate unfolding after it fell out of power in 2012 as the victory of the hardline conservativism in Japan, it is premature to assume that the liberals and moderate conservatives are no longer competent in Japan’s political market. One recent incident that symbolized the reinstitution of moderate conservative ideology was the split of Democratic Party (minshintō) and consequent ideological realignment among opposition bloc centering on hardline Party of Hope (PoH, kibō no tō) and moderate Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ, rikken minshutō) just days before the 2017 general election held on October 22. This party realignment among Japan’s oppositions was induced by ideological regrouping of political actors, rather than clash of factional or political interests. In other words, the results of 2017 election allows us to investigate the degree of ideological divide among Japanese politicians as well as voters. The purpose of this study to examine the degree of ‘rightward shift’ among Japanese politicians as well as voters by analyzing the result of the 2017 general election, particularly focusing on the split of Democratic Party (minshintō)
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 57 and the consequent realignment of opposition bloc between moderate conservatives, represented by Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (rikken minshutō), and hardline conservatives who joined newly-established Party of Hope (kibō no tō). The following section provides contextual backgrounds of shifting ideological divide among political parties, focusing on the rise of moderate and hardline conservatives that pushed the axis of policy competition to the ‘right.’ Section III examines the ideological inclinations of running candidates in the 2017 general election by utilizing UTAS survey to analyze the political elites’ attitudes toward constitutional revision, particularly of Article 9, which continues to serve as an important divisive policy between hardline and moderate conservatives. Sections IV and V focuses on the split of Democratic Party and opposition realignment as well as the electoral performance of CDPJ’s candidates and former DP independents in eighty-five single-member districts against candidates from hardline parties, including the LDP and Party of Hope, to assess the degree of moderate-hardline divide among Japanese voters.
Ⅱ. Ideological competition in post-reform Japan in the Post-Cold War context
The assessments of the ‘rightward’ shift of Japan under prime minister Abe’s leadership are sharply divided. While some claim that Japan under Abe has nurtured nationalism (Berger 2014), others interpret Abe government’s proactive defense policies, such as the launching of National Security Council in 2013, changing the interpretation of Article 9 to allow the exercise of the right of collective self-defense in 2014, upgrading of defense capabilities to counter Chinese aggression in maritime security, as an extension of long-term incremental development of postwar Japan’s security profiles (Oros 2017; Easley 2017). The triumph of ‘military realists’ in the post-Cold War era is understood as caused by increasing external threats from North Korea and most of all China, as Japan’s status as economic superpower was gradually overshadowed by Chinese presence in the region (Sakai 2019). The significant transformation of external environment in the post-Cold War setting cast shadow upon the domestic reconfiguration of ideological contests as well. Once characterized by the competition between overreaching conservative values (LDP) and progressives (socialists) under the 1955 system, in the post-Cold War context, the Japanese conservatives underwent considerable restructuring in terms of ideological balances. Though initially caused by a factional strife within the dominant Takeshita faction, the LDP’s brief loss of power in 1993 as well as the concurrent jijiho-jishasa conflicts throughout the 1990s was characterized by the diverging views on the directions of national
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 58 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election security profiles (Ōtake 1999, 41-87). The decline of socialist party and the following rise of the Democratic Party of Japan propelled the LDP to accentuate ‘hardline’ conservatives values, creating policy/ideological competitions that are centering on the ‘moderate/centrist’ and ‘hardline’ conservatives (Nakano 2015). That LDP is undergoing rightward shift in terms of policy preferences is discussed in terms of shifting policy axis in the post-Cold War context, in which the socialists, who represented the ‘opposition’ vis-à-vis the conservative LDP, were replaced by the ‘new conservatives,’ represented by New Frontier Party (1994-1997) and then Democratic Party of Japan after the 1990s. A series of surveys conducted by Asahi Shimbun and the University of Tokyo illuminates the LDP members’ growing tendency to conform with the party leadership in regards to hardline agendas such as exercise of the right of collective defense and constitutional revision. According to the survey, such ‘rightward shift’ in terms of party’s policy proposals began in the 2009 general election as a reactionary swing vis-à-vis DPJ’s pursuit of ‘people’s life-first’ agendas that attracted centrist voters.2 The survey indicates that, along with the rise of ‘rightwing’ populist parties, such as Japan Restoration Party (Ishin no kai), who shares the closest policy preferences with the LDP particularly in such policy fields as the legalization of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and constitutional revision, the Japanese politics are undergoing holistic shift toward rightist ideology, at least among political elites. Furthermore, starting in the 2010s, locally-oriented new parties characterized by hardline proclivities, such as Japan Restoration Party (JRP) from Osaka and Party of Hope from Tokyo, have entered the scene of electoral competition. Hashimoto Tōru, the founder of Osaka Restoration Party which later expanded as national party as JRP, has expressed support for hardline agendas, such as reforming of constitution’s amendment procedures3 and enhancement of ethics education.4 The Japan Innovation Party (ishin no tou), succeeding the basic foundation of the JRP, continued as ‘pro-revision’ force, often demonstrating its willingness to offer cooperation to the Abe leadership in exchange for political favors in the local affairs.5 Similarly, Koike Yuriko, the Tokyo Governor and the founder of Party of Hope, had advocated constitutional revision in her political career as LDP representative, strongly approving the cabinet resolution in 2014 that legalized the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.6 Even after her relationship with LDP went downturn when she decided to run for Tokyo Governor in 2017 without party’s official support, Party of Hope stated its commitment to promote discussions for constitutional revision, including the Article 9, in its party manifesto for the general election.7 Both parties made significant national debuts: The JRP earned 20.4 per cent vote share in proportional representation in 2012, while Party of Hope earned 17.4 percent in 2017. The electoral successes of these hardline parties such as JRP/JIP and Party
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 59 of Hope (integrated to Democratic Party for the People, DPDP, kokumin minshu tou, in 2018) after the 2010s have bred speculation that the voters’ significant support for the ‘third forces’ are indicative of the people’s proclivities for ‘rightward agendas.’ Yet the studies on Japanese voters provide distinctive views–the rightward shift of the Japanese political sphere is not necessarily congruent with the general public, who remain reluctant, or at least skeptical, toward the Abe cabinet’s forcible agendas in the policy fields such as constitutional revision and the package of 2014 security legislations. The rise of youth movement in 2014, organized by Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs), against Abe cabinet’s passing of security legislations, is discussed as the most symbolic of democratic movement that mobilized a significant number of activists who filled the streets in front of the National Diet Building (Kingston 2015; Dudden 2017). The aforementioned survey also indicates that the voters’ political stance remains unchanged since 2003, when the survey first took off. It indicates that the apparent ‘rightward shift’ by the political parties is dissociated from the voters’ policy preferences and does not necessarily imply the holistic rightward move of the Japanese populace. Furthermore, recent studies suggest that Japanese voters have become detached from ideological contests between ‘right–conservative’ and ‘left–progressive’ spectrum, demonstrating increasing ‘centrist’ proclivities in making voting decisions (Takenaka 2017; Takenaka, Endo, and Willy 2015). The utmost concerns of the public remain to be economic and social welfare policies, and the analyses demonstrate that the people’s support for the Abe government is founded upon the success of Abenomics particularly in the early years of Second Abe cabinet (Arai and Nakajo 2018; Maeda 2018).
Ⅲ. Examining the vote shares in the post-reform elections and parties’ stance on Constitution
It is critical, then to assess whether political changes particularly after the 2010s are truly the reflection of voters’ rightward shift. While Japan’s rightward shift in the post-Cold War era illuminates the changing party competitions among political parties as well as the alteration of regional environment, they fail to elucidate upon whether such dynamics are congruent with voters’ ideological or policy preferences. Put another way, it is necessary to shed light not only on the structural shifts of party competitions, but also on how voters react to such changes. This section first provides overview of the party’s vote shares in the past eight general elections, then examine the running candidates’ attitudes toward constitutional revision, particularly of Article 9, which serves as the indicator of
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 60 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election their moderate/hardline proclivities. In terms of party support, it is unclear whether voters’ preferences are expanding vis-à-vis the LDP. Figure 1 shows the vote shares by major party in both SMD and PR in general elections held between 1996 and 2017, along with turnout rate. The average party support for the LDP, estimated by the party’s vote counts in PR, is 31.9 percent in the past eight elections, highest being the 2005 election which is known as the ‘postal dissolution’ by prime minister Koizumi, recording 38.2 percent. What is significant is the LDP candidates’ vote share in single-member districts, which recorded average of 43.6 percent, much higher than the LDP’s party votes. Such gap in vote shares between two tiers seems to have derived from LDP’s arranged electoral cooperation with its coalition partner, the Kōmeitō, who has gained 12.9 percent vote share in the proportional representation (Liff and Maeda 2018).
Figure 1. Vote share by party (SMD, PR) in general elections (1996-2017)
On the other hand, between 1996 and 2014, the Democratic Party of Japan recorded average of 29.2 percent in single-member districts and 26.6 per cent in proportional representation, indicating that the party’s vote-collecting capabilities are similar in scale in both electoral tiers. The LDP’s share of party vote declined rather sharply after 2005, recording the lowest in 2009 at 26.7 percent. In the 2012 election, when the Abe government made a grand comeback, the LDP’s party vote showed similar level with the 2009 election by recording 27.6 percent. While the number recovered slightly after 2014 to about 33.1 percent and 33.3.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 61 percent in 2017, it remains lower or similar to pre-2005 elections. Put simply, the LDP’s ‘party support’ indicated by its vote share in PR is not necessarily indicative of the voters’ growing support of the LDP. Instead, the new parties that advanced from local politics have demonstrated high level of support in party vote. Japan Restoration Party earned 20.4 percent vote share in proportional representation in its first national election in 2012, which seem to have been drawn from the pool of DPJ votes, whose shares of party vote declined sharply from 42.4 percent to 16.0 percent between 2009 and 2012. In 2017, the Party of Hope mustered 17.4 percent in vote share in proportional representation. Such successful performances of locally originated parties, both of which are characterized by hardline agendas, have invited speculations regarding the ‘rightward shift’ of Japanese voters who demonstrated high level of support for them. In assessing the policy position of these political parties, especially in terms of moderate/hardline spectrum, this study analyzes the candidates’ attitudes toward constitutional revision, particularly their stance on Article 9. Also known as ‘peace clause,’ the Article 9 served as the symbol of pacifist ideology throughout the postwar decades, despite the fact that its legal constraints imposed upon possessing of military capability have been largely watered down due to consecutive ‘reinterpretation’ of the specific clause (Izumikawa 2010; Wada 2010). Nevertheless, Article 9 continues to serve as the dividing line between moderate and hardline conservatives (Ryu 2018). While the constitutional amendment itself does not necessarily constitute as ‘nationalist drive,’ as the following analysis shows, the political parties’ attitudes toward constitutional revision are roughly divided over the issue. For analytical purposes, this study categorizes parties that demonstrate strong inclination of amendment in general as ‘hardline,’ while those with little inclination as ‘progressives’ (mostly JCP) and moderates (CDPJ). To analyze parties’ policy position vis-à-vis constitutional amendment, this study utilizes The UTokyo-Asahi Survey (UTAS) conducted by Masaki Taniguchi of the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo and the Asahi Shimbun (sample 1180, sample rate 96.6 percent) before the 2017 general election vis-à-vis running candidates. Table 1 shows the candidates’ attitudes toward constitutional amendment by party affiliation. Asked whether Japan’s constitution needs to be amended, of 1180 candidates who run either or both in single-member district and/or proportional representation in 2017, 708 said ‘strongly agree’ or ‘somewhat agree.’ Japan Innovation Party (nippon ishin no kai, 2016-) demonstrated the highest party coherence in terms of the necessity of constitutional amendment at 98.0 percent, followed by LDP (91.9 percent), Party of Hope (79.6 percent), and Kōmeitō (60.4 percent). On the other hand, only 27.8 percent of CDPJ candidates claimed that constitutional amendment was
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 62 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election necessary, and none of JCP candidates did. If we exclude JCP candidates, 79.5 percent of all candidates from major parties agreed to the necessity of constitutional amendment. At the same time, within Party of Hope, it is possible to find twenty-point gap between those who formerly belonged to Democratic Party and other recruits, indicating relatively lesser degree of amendment drive among those who had formerly belonged to the Democratic Party.
Table 1. Candidates' attitudes on the necessity of constitutional amendment by party affiliation (2017)
% o f Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly Total strongly/ Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree NA #Candidate somewhat agree LDP 277 31 7 1 0 19 335 91.9% Kōmeitō 2 30 16 2 0 3 53 60.4% JIP 45 3 1 0 0 0 49 98.0% PoH Former DP 18 62 21 7 1 7 116 69.0% Other 89 18 2 2 1 7 119 89.9% CDPJ 1 21 11 22 21 3 79 27.8% JCP 0 0 0 0 236 7 243 0.0% Source: The U-Tokyo Asahi Survey (UTAS) conducted by Masaki Taniguchi of the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo and the Asahi Shimbun (2017)
While an overwhelming number of candidates display their preferences for constitutional amendment, however, there seems no apparent consensus among political parties as to what should be the subject of revisions.8 First, LDP seems to be the only enthusiasts on the revision of Article 9, for which 130 candidates said it should be the first priority for revision, while only twenty-one candidates replied the same from other political parties. Instead, the candidates from opposition parties demonstrated diverse preferences when it came to constitutional amendment. LDP’s coalition partner Kōmeitō ran fifty-three candidates, and only one of them acknowledged the Article 9 as an urgent matter, while the most popular clauses for revision were state of emergency clause (11) and environmental rights (7). The JIP candidates picked amendment procedure (Article 96) as the most critical item, which thirty candidates named the highest priority. For the candidates of Party of Hope, while seventeen of them listed the Article 9 as the top priority agenda, the most popular clause for amendment was the provision of local governance, which fifty-one named the top priority. Of twenty-two candidates from CDPJ who replied that amendment was necessary, only two advocated revision on Article 9, while revision on local governance clause and dissolution of House of Representatives each earned the highest point.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 63
From the survey, it is possible to draw out some implications regarding the candidates’ attitude toward constitutional amendment and ‘rightward shift.’ First, while the proportion of LDP candidates who consider constitutional amendment as necessary is considerably high compared to other parties, even within the LDP, it is notable to point out that less than half of running candidates listed the peace clause as the priority agenda for amendment. Second, Kōmeitō and major opposition parties demonstrate diverging interests when it comes to what should be prioritized if amendment were to take place, but only 5.0 percent of them (excluding the JCP) consider peace clause as the top priority agenda for amendment. It is also significant that the candidates from Party of Hope and Japan Innovation Party, who are often considered ‘rightists’ or ‘pro-revision forces,’ are equally less enthusiastic about making alterations to the Article 9. While the JIP candidates’ overwhelming interests in amending the amendment procedure (Article 96) often invite speculations regarding the party’s identity as ‘revisionist’ party, to link revision of amendment procedure directly with alteration of the most critical clause of Japanese Constitution is oversimplification. Put differently, party leaders’ nationalist proclivities alone cannot be directly associated with the rise of ‘nationalism’ or rightward shift in Japan’s party competition.
Ⅳ. Split of Democratic Party in 2017 and parties’ ideological realignment
Even though the rise of populist ‘rightwing’ parties as well as the political actors’ growing support for ‘constitutional revision’ are considered indices of Japan’s holistic rightward shift, when we look closer at the running candidates’ attitudes toward constitutional revision, as well as the Article 9, the evidence does not demonstrate starkly ‘rightist’ agendas among conservatives in the opposition bloc. The diversity of candidates’ policy preferences, analyzed in the above survey, implies that political actors’ inclination for amendment has developed neither holistically nor unilaterally. Similarly, it is possible to assume that the voters’ preferences are also developing by reflecting diverse political interests of their own rather than simple pursuit of vaguely shared ‘nationalism.’ In other words, the ‘rightward shift’ of voters’ political interests must also be understood within the wider configuration of political ideals put forth by political parties. Nevertheless, one recent incident reintroduced the moderate-hardline competition among conservatives within Japan’s political market, inducing significant opposition realignment: the split of Democratic Party in 2017. After incorporating Japan Innovation Party (ishin no tō) and re-established as Democratic Party (Minshintō, DP) just before the Upper House election in 2016, the inter-party coherence in terms of ideological preferences among the members
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 64 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election of largest opposition party grew even dispersed. Furthermore, the landslide victory of Party of Hope at the 2017 Tokyo metropolitan assembly election cornered the DP, who was only able to win five of 128 assembly seats. Anticipating the imminent dissolution of the lower house, Maehara Seiji, then the party leader of DP, discussed merger with Party of Hope, after which he announced that the members of DP would receive party endorsements from PoH, in order to create “two-party platform” in the single-member districts against the LDP.9 Even though Maehara denied the ‘dissolution’ of the DP and subsequent merger with PoH, claiming that the negotiation over party endorsements of former DP candidates would be carried out on ‘equal grounds’ with those who were already the members of PoH, Koike Yuriko, the party leader of PoH, approached the issue with different idea. Known for hardline conservative drive especially in national security field and the issues on constitutional revision, Koike rejected Maehara’s request to endorse all DP members and claimed that those who do not share the same views on the issues of national security and constitution with the founding members of PoH would be ‘crossed off’ from the list of party endorsements.10 The exclusion of ‘liberals’ caused heated debate and criticism toward Koike and led to the formation of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ, rikken minshu tō) on October 3 under the leadership of former chief of cabinet Edano Yukio, who led a small number of (former) national representatives who refused to join Koike and Maehara’s cause.11 Along with those who claimed to run as independent in the upcoming general election, the Democratic Party was split into three political groups to run campaign for the 2017 general election–CDPJ, PoH, and independents. Started out as with a handful of Edano’s closest political allies, CDPJ managed to run sixty-three candidates in district competition for the 2017 general election, while PoH endorsed 198 district candidates. In addition, twenty-two former DP members who did not join neither CDPJ nor PoH run as independents (Pekkanen and Reed 2018). In other words, the split of DP was a symbolic incident that explicitly divided the moderate-hardline spectrum within the opposition bloc. It was significant particularly because the formation of CDPJ ideologically refined the anything-goes ideological texture among the opposition forces whose only common denominator was their ‘non-LDP stance.’ In other words, it reintroduced the traditional policy axis centering on national security issues among the political parties. Furthermore, the defection of moderate/liberal conservatives from the DP, as well as their absolute disadvantage (due to lack of time and resources to prepare for the general election in less than ten days), built a momentum for liberals among the political elites, including progressive Japan Communist Party, to engage in electoral cooperation, leading to a significant
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 65 number of withdrawals of JCP candidates from district competition.12 As shown in Figure 2, the ideological blocs before the 2017 general election was realigned between progressive/moderate conservatives centering on CDPJ and hardline conservatives represented by LDP and Party of Hope.
*Parties in rectangular shapes were dissolved before the 2017 general election
Figure 2. Party's realignment and left-right positioning
Such reshuffling of party alignment colored by ideological cleavage was rather unique in the post-reform elections, since the electoral competition in Japan tended to evolve around economic and social policies rather than ideological competitions. Put from another perspective, the 2017 election serves as the indicators in assessing the voter’s attitude vis-à-vis ideological contests between moderate and hardline conservatives. The rest of this paper analyzes eighty-five single-member districts in which CDPJ and former DP independent candidates ran in the 2017 general election by comparing the differences in vote gains from the previous 2014 election, in order to elucidate upon the degree to which the Japanese voters have looked to the ‘right.’
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 66 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election
Ⅴ. Examining Voters’ Preferences
The split of the DP in 2017 and the consequent launching of Party of Hope and CDPJ was caused by the diverging ideological positionings of the two political groups. Koike’s caustic remark that rejected ‘liberalist’ within the DP only highlighted her party’s ‘rightist’ stance upon constitutional amendment and national security policies, and established policy axis between ‘hardline’ and ‘moderate’ conservatives within the opposition bloc. Put from another perspective, by analyzing the electoral results of the 2017 general election, it would be possible to assess the degree of ‘rightward shift’ not only among the political parties and candidates, but also among Japanese voters. In the 2017 general election, the LDP won 215 single-member districts and sixty-six seats from proportional representation tier, earning the total of 281 of 465 assembly seats (60.4 percent seat share). The CDPJ became the first opposition party by earning fifty-four seats (17 single-member districts, 37 PR), followed by Party of Hope’s fifty seats (18 single-member districts, 32 PR). From the outlook, the LDP’s overall victory seems unchallenged, while the CDPJ and Party of Hope equally split the opposition votes. Yet when we only look at the eighty-five single-member districts where former DP members run the campaigns, it is possible to draw another picture. Given that the CDPJ was launched only one week before the call for general election, one of difficulties Edano and CDPJ leadership faced before the 2017 election was candidate recruitment. Lacking time and resources, CDPJ was only able to run sixty-three district candidates in 289 districts, while Party of Hope recruited 198 district candidates, including 109 former DP members. If we compare the electoral performance of the two opposition parties in the eighty-five districts (including those districts where former DP independents ran13), it is possible to highlight higher electoral performance of the CDPJ candidates than the national-level result indicates. While CDPJ earned 8.53 percent vote share nationwide because of the limited number of district candidates, its sixty-three candidates earned 26.57 percent vote share, and adding the vote share of twenty-two former DP independents with whom the CDPJ had prearranged fielding strategy, the vote share amounts to nearly forty percent (Table 2). Such performance is only five points behind the combined vote shares of candidates from LDP, LDP independents, and Kōmeitō which recorded 45.26 percent. Party of Hope, on the other hand, while recording twenty percent vote share nationwide, forty candidates who ran in the eighty-five districts were only able to earn 7.76 percent. What is noteworthy is the electoral performance of Japan Communist Party. JCP and CDPJ engaged in electoral cooperation in a significant number of single-member districts where CDPJ candidate ran, which generated significant gap in vote share between two district groups. It is possible to assume that
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 67 electoral mobilization from the JCP to the CDPJ candidates led to the considerably high performance of CDPJ’s district candidates.
Table 2. Vote share and number of candidates in SMDs
85 Districts ALL SMDs Vote Share ＃Candidate Vote Share ＃Candidate CDPJ 26.57% 63 8.53% 63 Former DP Independent 13.39% 22 LDP 41.94% 79 47.82% 277 LDP (Independent) 0.78% 2 Kōmeitō 2.54% 5 1.50% 9 PoH 7.76% 40 20.64% 198 JRP 2.93% 15 3.18% 47 JCP 3.13% 30 9.02% 206 Independent 0.57% 7 7.79% 73 Other 0.40% 16 1.52% 63 TOTAL 100.00% 279 100.00% 936 Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
The following sections examine how voters reacted to the competition between liberal and hardline conservative camps by comparing each party’s vote counts between 2014 and 2017 general elections. Since the structure of competition plays one of the key roles in inter-party competition during elections, the districts are divided into four district groups–(1) two party competition between CDPJ and LDP/Kōmeitō (15 districts); (2) three-party competition among CDPJ, LDP, and PoH (19 districts); (3) districts in which JCP ran its candidates against CDPJ candidates (15 districts), and (4) districts in which former DP independents ran (19 districts).
1. CDPJ vs. LDP/Kōmeitō
The candidates from the CDPJ and the ruling coalition engaged in one-on-one competition in fifteen districts, twelve of which became the stage for two-party competition between CDPJ and LDP.14 Among the twelve districts, the CDPJ candidates won in five districts, while LDP secured seven seats. In the previous general election held in 2014, in the same districts, LDP won in nine of eleven districts while only two DPJ candidates won,15 suggesting that CDPJ candidates earned higher portion of votes than the DPJ candidates did in 2014. The higher electoral performance of the CDPJ candidates in 2017 was caused by one specific factor–lower number of candidates. The average number of candidates
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 68 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election per district in those twelve districts declined significantly between 2014 (3.08) and 2017 (2.08) due to withdrawal of JCP in all districts. In 2014, JCP candidates earned nearly 12 percent of vote share, which presumably were casted for CDPJ candidates in 2017. While the ‘liberal conservative votes’ were concentrated on CDPJ candidates, the LDP candidates’ vote share only increased by 4.3 percent despite contraction of the number of candidates (Table 3).
Table 3. Results of CDPJ vs. LDP candidates
2017 general election 2014 general election #candidate #vote count Vote share #candidate #vote count Vote share CDPJ 12 1221731 47.2% DPJ 11 778490 33.8% LDP 12 1360123 52.5% LDP 11 1109294 48.2% Other 1 7632 0.3% JCP 12 273134 11.9% PFG 1 101581 4.4% JIP 1 26211 1.1% Independent 1 13444 0.6% Total 25 2589486 100% 37 2302154 100% Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
The same tendency was also found in three districts where CDPJ candidates faced Kōmeitō head-on. Here, JCP also withdrew from the district competitions, which led to the increase of CDPJ candidates’ vote share by seventeen percent–the same proportion as JCP candidates’ vote share in 2014. Kōmeitō’s vote share, on the other hand, increased by 5.4 percent, which seemed to have come from those who supported Nishimura Shingo, candidate from Party of Future Generations (jisedai no tou) who ran in Osaka 16 in 2014. Initially established by Ishihara Shintarō, PFG advocated hardline nationalism and conservative values. When this short-lived political party disappeared from the competition, the ‘nationalist conservative votes’ seemed to found their way to support the LDP’s coalition partner (Table 4).
Table 4. Results of CDPJ vs. Kōmeitō candidates
2017 general election 2014 general election #candidate #vote count Vote share #candidate #vote count Vote share DPJ/ CDPJ 3 228598 45.1% People's Life 3 140342 28.0% Kōmeitō 3 278182 54.9% Kōmeitō 3 247703 49.5% JCP 3 85877 17.2% PFG 1 26567 5.3% Total 6 506780 100% 10 500489 100% Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 69
2. Three-party-competition: CDPJ vs. LDP vs. PoH
The above analysis suggests that the contraction of number of candidates to two-party competition led to the reassembling of moderate-hardline conservative votes that tipped the scale for liberal conservatives. How, then, would voters react to the ‘third party’ whose ideological and policy profiles are closer to hardline conservative values? The three-party competition between CDPJ, LDP, and PoH in 2017 took place in nineteen districts, from which the JCP also withdrew and engaged in electoral cooperation with CDPJ.16 Accordingly, the number of candidates in those districts declined from seventy-three to sixty-two between 2014 and 2017, marking 3.2 candidates per district. The absence of JCP candidates led to the increase of CDPJ’s vote share between the two election by seven percent,17 while the LDP’s vote share declined by 5.2 percent. Party of Hope, on the other hand, earned mere 16.1 percent, and no single candidate won in district competition. It appears that the rise of ‘third party’ did not erode liberal conservatives’ support base as much as that of the hardline conservatives. Despite the withdrawals PFG candidates from eight districts, who earned total of 95,000 votes in 2014, the LDP’s absolute vote gains declined by 30,000. Furthermore, it is critical to point out that the candidates from Party of Hope seemed to be the final destination of non-regular voters. In this district group, 375,000 voters were ‘new’ voters who did not vote in 2014 but showed up at ballot booth in 2017. Assuming JCP votes in 2014 were cast for CDPJ candidates, a significant proportion of PoH’s nearly 650,000 votes was likely to come from the ‘new voters.’ It indicates that the so-called ‘floating voters,’ who do not share strong party identification or are not incorporated into support organization of political parties/candidates, are likely to support the ‘third party.’
Table 5. Results of CDPJ vs. LDP vs. PoH
2017 general election 2014 general election #candidate #vote count Vote share #candidate #vote count Vote share
CDPJ 19 1620546 40.2% DPJ/JIP/ People's Life 18 1217323 33.2% LDP 19 1704688.9 42.2% LDP 19 1734733 47.4% PoH 19 648069 16.1% JCP 18 480285 13.1% HRP 2 8113.083 0.2% PFG 8 95862 2.6% Independent 1 51495 1.3% Genzei 1 18343 0.5% Other 2 2877 0.1% SDP 1 5076 0.1% Independent 6 90467 2.5% Other 2 19084 0.5% TOTAL 62 4035789 100.0% 73 3661173 100.0% Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 70 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election
3. Slit of liberal camp: CDPJ vs. LDP vs. PoH vs. JCP
While the two district groups discussed above indicated that contraction of the number of liberal conservative candidates (withdrawal of JCP candidates) led to significant increase in the CDPJ candidates’ vote gains, the third district group in which the JCP did not withdraw from the district competition presents the limitation of the consolidation of liberalist camp. In 2017, the CDPJ, LDP, PoH, and JCP were the major competitors in fifteen districts, and in all districts LDP candidates (one candidate was LDP independent) were elected.18 The fifteen CDPJ candidates demonstrated stagnant vote share at 25.4 percent, given that in 2014 DPJ ran only twelve candidates in this district group and earned 21.6 percent. The vote shares of JCP’s fifteen candidates declined by 6.2 percent between the two elections. What is striking is the combined support bases of the two parties: The absolute combined vote gains of CDPJ and JCP candidates marked a nearly same point at around 1,121,000 votes (Table 6). On the other hand, the hardline bloc, namely candidates from LDP (including LDP independents) and PoH earned 65.7 percent vote share combined, an increase from the combined vote shares of LDP (independent), PFG, and JIP in 2014 which recorded 61.5 percent. The numbers show that the PoH became the new voting target for those who voted for PFG and JIP in 2014, as well as about 272,800 ‘new voters’ indicated by the increase of absolute vote gains in these districts.
Table 6. Results of CDPJ vs. LDP vs. PoH vs. JCP
2017 general election 2014 general election #candidate #vote count vote share #candidate #vote count vote share CDPJ 15 843219.08 25.4% DPJ 12 671446 21.6% JCP 15 277993.05 8.4% JCP 15 454125.06 14.6% Subtotal (Liberal) 1121212.1 33.74% 1125571.1 36.26% LDP 14 1507698.9 45.4% LDP 14 1543997.8 49.7%
LDP 2 137966 4.2% LDP Independent Independent 3 175916 5.7% PoH 15 537061 16.2% PFG 5 93422 3.0% JIP 2 96637 3.1% Subtotal (Hardline) 2182725.9 65.7% 1909972.8 61.5% People's Life 1 9663 0.3% SDP 1 14718 0.5% Independent 2 14104 0.4% Independent 4 39192.152 1.3% Other 2 4675 0.1% Other 1 4883 0.2% Total 65 3322717 100.0% 58 3104000 100.0% Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 71
The results of the district group indicate that the CDPJ and JCP are scrambling the limited number of voters who are inclined to liberalist values without accomplishing the expansion of supporters or attracting the ‘floating votes.’ The emergence of new rightist party, on the other hand, led to the increase of vote share among hardline nationalists, which manage to take hold of sixty-five percent vote share.
4. Former DP Independents
Amid the party realignment centering on the formation of Party of Hope and CDPJ, twenty-two DP politicians declared to run campaigns as independents. Among them, nineteen candidates were former representatives who ran the 2014 general election as DPJ candidates.19 These candidates were mostly well-established veteran politicians with strong personal support in their districts, including former prime minister Noda Yoshihiko (Chiba 4), Okada Katsuya (Mie 3), and former DP leader Maehara Seiji (Kyoto 2). In fact, twelve of these candidates had managed to win in district competition in 2014 against LDP despite plummeting support for the DPJ. In 2017, their decisions to not join the Party of Hope was grounded on Koike’s ambiguous attitude toward the LDP, with which she insinuated the possibility for future cooperation in the Diet, questioning the PoH’s seriousness about ‘defeating’ the LDP (Pekkanen and Reed 2018). At the same time, these multi-elect candidates, who had occupied core posts in the DP and pushed for merger with PoH in the first place, were reluctant to make sudden change of strategy and join the CDPJ. Put differently, these candidates were best characterized as one of the most competitive alternative to the LDP, and given that most of them eventually joined the CDPJ after the election, it is possible to assume that their policy inclinations were closer to moderate conservative values. Table 7 compares the vote counts and shares of nineteen districts in which former DP independents, who had also run as DPJ candidates in corresponding districts in 2014, ran the campaign in 2017. The vote shares of former DP independents increased by 5.3 percent between the two elections, while that of LDP’s only slightly increased by 0.3 percent. While there seems to be certain level of cooperation between the independents and JCP candidates, for JCP withdrew from ten districts, its degree remained small compared to first two district groups. On the other hand, the voting decisions of ‘new voters’ for this district group demonstrates distinct characteristic from the two previous groups that were colored by split of conservative or liberal camps. In 2017, in these nineteen districts, about 374,000 new voters cast their vote.20 Of which, in absolute terms, 39.2 percent were supposedly cast for moderate bloc (independent or JCP), while 60.8 percent led to the vote increase of hardline candidates from either LDP,
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 72 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election
PoH, or JIP. In earlier groups, the new voters displayed starkly pro-hardline inclinations, leading to the significant vote gains by PoH candidates. Other than the name values of these incumbent candidates, another factor that may have induced relatively ardent support by the ‘new voters’ was their non-LDP stance rather than ideological appeals. The former DP candidates’ emphasis on their detachment from inter-party competitions as well as invariable criticism vis-à-vis LDP dominance seemed to have attracted those non-regular voters who are decoupled from ideological competitions.
Table 7. Results of district competition for former DP independents
2017 General Election 2014 General Election #candidate #vote count vote share #candidate #vote count vote share Independent (DP) 19 2019025 51.8% DPJ 19 1640725 46.5% JCP 9 117921 3.0% JCP 19 349527 9.9% Subtotal (Liberal) 2136946 54.8% 1990252 56.4% LDP 19 1599256 41.0% LDP 19 1438151 40.7% PoH 1 40495 1.0% JIP 4 58321 1.7% JIP 3 96780 2.5% PFG 1 12888 0.4% Subtotal (Hardline) 1736531 44.5% 1509360 42.8% SDP 1 11801 0.3% Independent 1 3375 0.1% Independent 1 19510 0.6% Other 5 22342 0.6% Other
Total 57 3899194 100.0% 67 3530923 100.0% Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Ⅵ. Conclusion: Liberalist pushback?
To the question of whether Japan’s political actors, both candidates and voters, are undergoing ‘rightward shift,’ this study provides mixed answers. First, as the result of running candidates’ survey indicates, while the support for constitutional amendment is expanding among politicians, they demonstrate diverging interests when it comes to the specific contents of revisions. More significantly, exceedingly small portion of opposition candidates display their inclinations to alter peace clause of the constitution. Second, despite LDP-Kōmeitō coalition’s overwhelming control of the lower house, the party support for the ruling LDP has remained stagnant. Even in district competitions, the LDP candidates’ vote gains were stable yet significantly limited compared to new
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 73 political forces such as CDPJ and PoH. The four case studies analyzed the effect of party split and ideological realignment among political parties. First, in thirty-four districts in which JCP withdrew from the district competition, the CDPJ was able to incorporate ‘progressive votes’ which had been cast for JCP candidates in 2014. Especially, the CDPJ’s competitiveness improved significantly between the two elections in those districts where LDP or Kōmeitō candidates were the only opponent. Second, the entries of PoH, who had gained support from voters with hardline proclivities, constrained electoral performance of LDP candidates, not CDPJ’s. Similarly, in those districts where JCP fielded its candidates, the CDPJ candidates’ vote gains were less significant than those without JCP candidates. In other words, the liberal/moderate-hardline alignment among voters appears to be solidified, and there seems low level of vote mobilities between the two blocs. Instead, the electoral results indicate that political parties are competing one another within its respective bloc. Lastly, it is possible to observe that one of the critical sources of vote for PoH was the new voters who were absent in 2014 but cast their votes in 2017. At the same time, while in those districts where CDPJ candidates ran the new votes were characterized by hardline inclination, it is noteworthy that a significant portion of new votes were targeted at former DP independents, perhaps representing voters’ preference toward non-LDP value of the incumbent candidates. Contrary to overwhelming strength of LDP-Kōmeitō coalition represented by the number of seats in the Diet, the detailed analysis of CDPJ’s electoral performance at district level suggest that the competitiveness of liberalist bloc is disproportionally undervalued. While the overall tendency of new voters to support new rightwing party may serve as one of indicators to elucidate Japan’s rightward shift, given the ambiguity of candidates’ positions on constitutional revisions as well as poor performance of PoH candidates against CDPJ, it is questionable whether such trend can be accounted for permanent or holistic shift to the rightist ideology. In fact, fair performance of former DP independents, who attracted significant portion of new voters, as well as the CDPJ’s electoral results suggest that the 2017 general election became a stage for liberalist pushback to a certain degree. At the same time, this study is limited given that the CDPJ was only able to run in little more than twelve percent of districts in this election, and to which direction Japan goes from here remains to be investigated in future studies. It is also quite noteworthy that the general elections that were held under prime minister Abe’s leadership were characterized by significantly low turnout rates. As shown in Figure 1, from 2012 election’s 59.3 percent, it declined sharply to 52.7 percent in 2014 and 53.7 percent in 2017. Such disinterest of nearly a half of the voting population may indicate that a significant portion of Japanese voters
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 74 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election are less than enthusiastic about the hardline agendas burnished by the administration. To draw a holistic picture of whether Japan is ‘turning right,’ it would be critical to shed light on the ‘silent electorate’ as well.
REFERENCES
Arai, Kiichiro, and Miwa Nakajo. 2018. "Survey of Candidates' Policy Preferences." In Japan Decides 2017, edited by Robert Pekkanen, Steven Reed, Ethan Scheiner and Daniel M. Smith, 149-164. London: Palgrave McMillan. Berger, Thomas U. 2014. Abe's Perilous Patriotism: Why Japan's New Nationalism Still Creates Problems for the Region and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dudden, Alexis. 2017. “Japan's Antiwar Legacy.” Dissent, 64(2):106-107. Easley, L. E. 2017. “How proactive? How pacifist? Charting Japan's evolving defence posture.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(1):63-87. doi: 10.1080/10357718.2016.1181148. Hideo, Ōtake. 1999. Nihon seiji no tairitsu jiku [Policy axis of Japanese politics]. Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho. Hughes, Christopher W. 2006. “Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy.” Orbis, 50(4):725-744. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2006.07.011. Itagaki, Eiken. 2008. Minshutō habatsu kōsōshi [History of DPJ's factional struggles]. Tokyo: Kyōei Shobō. Izumikawa, Yasuhiro. 2010. “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy.” International Security, 35 (2):123-160. Jinbo, Ken. 2013. “Gaikō, anpo: From the pursuit of ideals to realism.” In Minshutō seiken shippai no kenshō, edited by Nihon Saiken Initiative, 125-158. Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho. Jou, Willy, and Masahisa Endo. 2015. “Presidentialization of Japanese Politics? Examining Political Leader Evaluations and Vote Choice.” Japanese Journal of Political Science, 16(3):357-387. doi: 10.1017/S14681099150 00237. Kabashima, Ikuo. 2014. Trajectory of Postwar Politics: Formation and Trans- formation of the LDP System (Sengo seijino kiseki: Jiminto shisutemuno seikei to henyo). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Kingston, Jeff. 2015. “SEALDs: Student Slam Abe's Assault on Japan's Constitution.” The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus, 13(36):1-9. Krauss, Ellis S., and Benjamin Nyblade. 2005. "‘Presidentialization’ in Japan? The Prime Minister, Media and Elections in Japan." British Journal of
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 75
Political Science, 35(2):357-368. doi: 10.1017/S0007123405000190. Liff, Adam P., and Ko Maeda. 2018. “Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system.” Japanese Journal of Political Science: 1-21. doi: 10. 1017/S1468109918000415. Maeda, Ko. 2009. “Has the electoral-system reform made Japanese elections party-centered?” In Political Change in Japan: Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, and the Koizumi Reforms, edited by Steven Reed, Kenneth. M. Mcelwain and Kay Shimizu, 47-66. Stanford: Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Maeda, Yukio. 2018. “Public Opinion and the Abe Cabinet: Altering Valence and Position Issues.” In Japan Decides 2017, edited by Robert Pekkanen, Steven Reed, Ethan Scheiner and Daniel M. Smith, 127-148. London: Palgrave MacMillan. McElawin, Kenneth Mori. 2012. “The Nationalization of Japanese Elections.” Journal of East Asian Studies 12:323-350. Miura, Mari, Kap Yun Lee, and Robert Weiner. 2005. “Who Are the DPJ?: Policy Positioning and Recruitment Strategy.” Asian Perspective, 29(1):49-77. Nakano, Kōichi. 2013. “Minshutō no ayumito 3-nen 3-kagetsuno seiken [History of the DPJ and three-year and three-month-rule].” In Mishutō seiken shippai no kenshō, edited by Nihon saiken inishiatibu, 3-10. Tokyo: Chukō Shinsho. Nakano, Kōichi. 2015. Ukeika suru nihon seiji [Japanese politics under rightward shift]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho. Oros, Andrew. 2017. Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Columbia University Press. Ōtake, Hideo. 1999. Nihon seiji no tairitsu jiku [Policy axis of Japanese politics]. Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho. Pekkanen, Robert J., and Steven R. Reed. 2018. “The Opposition: From Third Party Back to Third Force.” In Japan Decides 2017: The Japanese General Election, edited by Robert J. Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed, Ethan Scheiner and Daniel M. Smith, 77-92. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Reed, Steven R. . 2014. “The Evolution of the LDP's Electoral Strategy: Towards a More Coherent Political Party.” In Evolution of Japan's Party System: Politics and Policy in an Era of Institutional Change, edited by Leonard J. Schoppa. Tronto: Tronto University Press. Reed, Steven R. , Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies. 2012. “The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan.” Jounal of Japanese Studies, 38(2):353-376. Ryu, Yongwook. 2018. “To revise or not to revise: the ‘peace constitution’, pro-revision movement, and Japan's national identity.” The Pacific Review,
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access 76 Examining Opposition Realignment and Japan’s Rightward Shift in the 2017 General Election
31(5):655-672. doi: 10.1080/09512748.2017.1408673. Sakai, Hidekazu. 2019. “Return to Geopolitics: The Changes in Japanese Strategic Narratives.” Asian Perspective 43:297 - 322. Sasada, H. 2010. “The Electoral Origin of Japan's Nationalistic Leadership: Primaries in the LDP Presidential Election and the “Pull Effect”.” Journal of East Asian Studies 10 (1):1-30. Shuichi, Wada. 2010. “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and security policy: realism versus idealism in Japan since the Second World War.” Japan Forum, 22(3-4):405-431. doi: 10.1080/09555803.2010.533477. Smith, Daniel M., Robert J. Pekkanen, and Ellis S. Krauss. 2013. “Building a Party: Candidate Recruitment in the Democratic Party of Japan, 1996-2012.” In Japan Under the DPJ: The Politics of Transition and Governance, edited by Kenji E. Kushida and Phillip Y. Lipscy, 157-190. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Sneider, Daniel. 2013. “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan.” In Japan Under the DPJ: The Politics and Transformation and Governance, edited by Kenji E. Kushida and Phillip Y. Lipscy. Standford: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Takenaka, Yoshihiko. 2017. “Yūkensha no ukeika wo kenshō suru [Examining the rightward move of the voters].” In Tettei Kenō Nihon no Ukeika, edited by Tsukada Hotaka, 108-126. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Takenaka, Yoshihiko, Masaaki Endo, and Jou Willy. 2015. “Yūkenshano datsu ideorogiito Abe seiji [Voters' detachment from ideology and Abe politics].” Leviathan 57:25-46. Winkler, Christian G. 2017. “Right On? The LDP’s Drift to the Right and the Persistence of Particularism.” Social Science Japan Journal 20 (2): 203-224. doi: 10.1093/ssjj/jyx021.
ENDNOTES
1 Kabashima defined rural-intensive political and economic systems of postwar Japan as ‘LDP system’ which consists of three interrelated factors: (1) higher political participation in the rural areas, (2) rural-biased malapportionment, and (3) leadership positions of the LDP representatives from rural districts. 2 Asashi Shimbun Digital. July 13, 2019. “Jimin, 15nen de susunda junka” [LDP’s purification advances over fifteen years]. Asahi-Tōdai Taniguchi Kenkyūshitsu Kyōdōchōsa (UTAS). Accessed on July 20, 2020. https://digital.asahi.com/ articles/DA3S14053549.html
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access Sukeui Sohn 77
3 Asahi Shimbun, 6 July 2012 4 Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 2012 5 Asahi Shimbun, 25 March 2016, 3 September 2017 6 Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 2017 7 Asahi Shimbun, 11 October 2017 8 In the survey, the candidates were given eleven choices to choose and rank top three items they consider most urgent for amendment: (1) renunciation of war and SDF, (2) citizens’ rights and duties, (3) amendment procedure, (4) local governance, (5) bicameralism, (6) information disclosure, (7) privacy rights, (8) environmental rights, (9) state of emergency clause, (10) dissolution of House of Representatives, and (11) other. 9 https://www.minshin.or.jp/article/112651 10 https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S13158267.html?iref=pc_ss_date 11 https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASKB24STYKB2UTFK00F.html?iref=pc_ss _date 12 JCP usually fields district candidate in every SMDs, but the number of JCP candidates declined from 292 in 2014 to 206 in 2017. 13 It includes three candidates who ran as JIP (ishin no tō) in 2014, before the party was dissolved and split into two political groups. These three candidates belonged to the group that later joined DP in 2016. 14 Districts for this group were: Hokkaido 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, Niigata 1, Gunma 3, Shimane 1, Yamaguchi 3, Fukuoka 3, Kumamoto 4, Oita 3 (for LDP), and Hokkaido 10, Osaka 6, Osaka 16 (for Kōmeitō) 15 In 2014, neither LDP nor DPJ run their candidates in one of the twelve districts (Kumamoto4). 16 Three-party competition does not include those minor candidates who earned less than five percent vote shares. The nineteen districts were: Hokkaido 4, Saitama 5, Chiba 3, 5, Tokyo 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 16, 18, Kanagawa 1, 4, 7, 12, Aichi 1, 3, 5, and Okayama 1. 17 Including the vote gains of candidates who run as DPJ/JIP/People’s Life candidates in four districts in 2014 and switched to CDPJ in 2017 18 These fifteen districts were: Chiba 7, 13, Tokyo 4, 8, 10, 11, 19, 22, 24, 25, Kanagawa 2, Yamanashi 2, Shizuoka 1, Shizuoka 7, Fukuoka 1. 19 These nineteen districts were: Hokkaido 8, Miyagi 5, Fukushima 1, 3, Tochigi 2, Chiba 4, Niigata 2, 3, 4, Yamanashi 1, Nagano 1, Shizuoka 3, Aichi 7, 8, Mie 3, Kyoto 2, Osaka 11, Saga 1. 20 Subtracting the vote gains by Independent/Other in 2017 and SDF/Independent from 2014 vote counts.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 10:48:20AM via free access