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Download Article (PDF) Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR), volume 129 Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017) From Civil Islam towards NKRI Bersyariah? Understanding Rising Islamism in Post-Reformasi Indonesia Associate Professor Leonard C Sebastian, PhD Coordinator, Indonesia Programme S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Nanyang Technological University - Singapore E-mail: [email protected] Alexander R Arifianto, PhD Research Fellow, Indonesia Programme S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Nanyang Technological University - Singapore E-mail: [email protected] Abstract- The successful Defending Islam campaign against former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama is clear evidence that Islamism is rising in INTRODUCTION post-Reformasi Indonesia, something that is not well- analyzed in recent scholarships on Indonesian Islam. On 2 December 2016, approximately 2 to 4 Influenced strongly by Civil Islam thesis, they have million protesters marched in Jakarta in the so-called failed to study hardline Islamic movements due to its Second Defending Islam rallies, demanding the premises that: 1) the dominant mode of Islamic removal of the city’s governor Basuki Tjahaja discourse in Indonesia is the moderate Islam Purnama (popularly known as Ahok) from office and represented by organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama for him to resign and be put on trial based on the (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and 2) hardline Islamism charge that he had blasphemed Islam in one of his re- represents a fringe element to the moderate theological discourses embedded in Indonesian Islam. election campaign speeches. The rally was the largest mass mobilization protests held in Jakarta since I argue that rising Islamism in Indonesia is attributed to Indonesia underwent its democratic transition after the following factors: Hardline Islamist groups are able the 1998 Reformasi which toppled the country’s long to promote their exclusivist public theologies using the term dictator Suharto. The overwhelming force following mechanisms: 1) Appealing for solidarity and against Ahok shown in this and a number of other common experiences as Indonesian Muslims to Defending Islam rallies was successful in turning persuade more moderate Muslims to join their activities, 2) Using religious propagation (da’wa) public opinion of most Indonesians, and Jakarta institutions such as campus da’wa groups, state voters in particular, against the governor, resulting in companies and bureaucratic institutions, and social his re-election loss to Anies Baswedan, whom have media outlets to promote their theological viewpoints to touted his pious Islamic credentials, in the Indonesian Muslims, and 3) Seeking out allies in gubernatorial run-off election held on April 19, 2017. national and local government in order to have their About three weeks later, he was convicted for policy agenda (e.g., restrictions against religious committing blasphemy and was sentenced to two- minorities) implemented at both national and local year imprisonment. levels. Meanwhile, moderate civil Islamic groups are losing their appeal because these groups (particularly The organizer of this protest was an umbrella NU and Muhammadiyah) have moved their central group called The National Movement to Guard the focus from religious propagation to social activism and Indonesian Ulama Council’s Ruling (GNPF MUI), in politics. response to a religious ruling (fatwa) issued against Keywords: Indonesia, Islamism, civil Islam, social Ahok in late October 2016 from the Indonesian movement, religious intolerance, Reformasi Ulama Council, Indonesia’s quasi-official arbiter of Copyright © 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press. 301 This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR), volume 129 Islamic legal affairs. The group was organized by a w(shari’a) la in whole or in part, increased intolerant number of hardline Islamist groups such as the actions against religious minorities, and so forth. Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and Indonesian Islamic Community However, until the rallies took place, few Forum (FUI), along with two dozen other Islamist scholars have written extensively about hardline groups. In addition to these hardline Islamist groups, groups such as FPI, FUI, and HTI, in favor of tens of thousands clerics and activists from moderate Islamic groups like NU and 2 Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah. I argue that the rise of hardline Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which Islamist groups in Indonesia in the past two decades are widely known as advocates of moderate Islam in has gone relatively unnoticed because most scholars the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, studying Indonesian Islam, in varying decrees, are also participated in the rallies, despite the repeated informing their research based upon Bob Hefner’s calls from leaders of both organizations for them not Civil Islam thesis, which argues that Islam in to do so. Indonesia is largely shaped by moderate Islamic groups that promote democracy, pluralism, tolerance The success of Defending Islam rallies came and other liberal values that were internalized and about after a number of troubling signs regarding the made compatible with Islamic teachings by these rise of hardline Islamist groups in Indonesia over the groups. Hefner’s emphasis on pluralist Islamic past decade or so. In addition, dozens of intolerant groups as drivers of Indonesian democracy, and his actions committed by hardline groups like FPI negative portrayals of hardline Islamist groups and against different religious minorities have taken place activists who sought to bring about a more literalist since the end of Reformasi in 1998, while both the interpretation of Islam in Indonesia, have security forces and the judiciary unable or unwilling inadvertently promoted more scholars to study the to resolve them to the satisfaction of the groups who former group rather than the latter. were victimized. Lastly, more Indonesian regions are adapting shari’a regulations over the past two By treating hardline Islamism as an anathema to decades. According to one recent study, at least 442 the Civil Islamist, Hefner has failed to take into local shari’a regulations have been enacted by over account these groups seriously as civil society 100 regional governments by 2016 (Pisani and organizations which despite their theological Buehler 2017). These regulations require women to differences, due share some, but not all wear hijab in public, prohibit the consumption of characteristics as civil associations with their Civil alcohol and prostitution, and ban Muslim minority Islamist counterparts, namely the fact that they are sects, such as Ahmadis and Shiites, within their independent, voluntary associations where free 1 discussion of ideas occurs and they promote their respective localities. ideas freely to recruit new followers. However, they All of the above observations could serve as are advocating exclusive public theologies to promote evidences that hardline Islamist groups have gained their hardline Islamist agendas to the Muslim popular following among Indonesian Muslims and audiences as well as sympathetic policymakers, increasingly control religious opinion in Indonesia instead of inclusive public theologies promoted by through their control of both conventional religious civil Islamic groups.3 I argue the hardline groups are propagation activities (da’wa) (e.g., mosques, radio, and television networks) as well as online/social 2 media da’wa activities (footnote here). Accordingly, A number of scholars did focus their research on Indonesian Muslims also increasingly showing their these hardline groups, including Wilson 2015 (on religiosity in public and, as indicated in opinion polls, FPI), Ward 2009, Osman 2010, Muhtadi 2009, and are increasingly become politically conservative - Njoto-Feillard 2015 (on HTI), and Munabari 2017 supporting actions ranging from public expressions (on FUI). However, the number of publications on of Islamic piety, the implementation of Islamic these groups are still smaller compared to academic publications on moderate Islamic groups like NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as on Islamist parties like PKS. 1 These figures do not include regulations in the form 3 Exclusivist and inclusivist public theologies are of local government decrees (Surat Keputusan) concepts originally invented in Nukhet Sandal, signed by regents, mayors, or governor as well as Religious Leaders and Conflict Transformation: local agency’s head (Kepala Dinas) decrees, which Northern Ireland and Beyond (New York: are increasing in frequency compared to local Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 8 in her work regulations (Perda) over the past few years. which explores the role of religious groups in ending 302 Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR), volume 129 able to effectively promoted their exclusive public young Muslims in high school or university theologies in post-Reformasi Indonesia by taking propagation (da’wa) institutions. advantage of the open public sphere created once democracy has taken hold in Indonesia, and by H2: Politicians and state officials develop alliances portraying their vision of Islam as simplistic, yet and networks with hardline Islamist groups in
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