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EASO Country of Origin Information Report

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Iraq Actors of Protection November 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Iraq Actors of Protection November 2018 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9476-067-8 doi: 10.2847/62404 © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2018 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: US Department of Defense, Iraqi Federal Police training as part of Operation Inherent Resolve in February 2018, public domain, (url) EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION — 3 Acknowledgements This report was co-drafted by the EASO COI sector with research contributions from the COI unit of the Romanian General Inspectorate for Immigration, Ministry of Internal Affairs. Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed by reviewing this report together with EASO: Estonia, Estonian Police and Border Guard Board Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation. Additionally, the following individual expert reviewed this report: Dr. Geraldine Chatelard, Contemporary Historian and Social Anthropologist. Dr. Chatelard is an independent consultant and social scientist currently associated with the Iraq (Erbil) branch of the Institut français du Proche-Orient (French Institute in the Near East). For the past 15 years, she has conducted research and written on migration and displacement issues in the region, including the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Iraq. Since 2014, she spends on average one third of her time conducting field research in various regions of Iraq (Kurdistan, Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra and other southern governorates, and more recently Mosul) including on forced displacement, the return and reintegration of migrants and refugees, and the politics of religious identities. The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. 4 — EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................3 Contents ...................................................................................................................................................4 Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................................7 Glossary and abbreviations .....................................................................................................................8 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 10 Methodology and sources ................................................................................................................ 10 Structure and use of the report ....................................................................................................... 10 Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 11 1. Basic data .......................................................................................................................................... 12 2. Context .............................................................................................................................................. 13 3. State structure and governance ....................................................................................................... 15 3.1 Executive branch ........................................................................................................................ 15 3.2 Legislative branch ....................................................................................................................... 16 3.3 Judicial branch ............................................................................................................................ 16 3.4 Federal system and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................... 16 3.4.1 Provincial councils ............................................................................................................... 17 3.4.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq ..................................................................................................... 17 3.4.3 Disputed territories ............................................................................................................. 18 3.5 Elections, political parties, lists and coalitions ........................................................................... 18 3.6 National elections in May 2018 .................................................................................................. 19 3.7 New 2018 Iraqi government....................................................................................................... 21 3.8 Corruption .................................................................................................................................. 22 3.8.1 Efforts to fight corruption ................................................................................................... 23 3.8.2 2018 protests ...................................................................................................................... 24 4. Legal framework ............................................................................................................................... 24 4.1 Constitution and fundamental rights overview ......................................................................... 25 4.2 Criminal law and anti-terrorism laws ......................................................................................... 26 4.3 Arrest and detention procedures .......................................................................................... 27 4.4 Authority to arrest and detain ............................................................................................... 28 5. Security institutions .......................................................................................................................... 29 5.1 ISF command and structure ....................................................................................................... 29 5.2 Ministry of Defence and Iraqi Army ........................................................................................... 31 EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION — 5 5.2.1 Mandate and structure ....................................................................................................... 31 5.2.2 Capacity and effectiveness ................................................................................................. 32 5.2.3 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 33 5.3 Ministry of Interior and police.................................................................................................... 34 5.3.1 Mandate, structure, capacity .............................................................................................. 34 5.3.2 Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................... 37 5.3.3 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 38 5.3.4 Emergency Response Division (furqa ar-red as-suriya) ...................................................... 40 5.3.5 Provincial Emergency Police Battalions .............................................................................. 40 5.3.6 Border Guards (haras hadud al-Iraq), Facilities Protections Service, and Oil Police .......... 41 5.4 Popular Mobilisation Units or Forces (al-hashd al-sha’abi) ....................................................... 41 5.4.1 Mandate and structure ....................................................................................................... 41 5.4.2 Capacity ............................................................................................................................... 44 5.4.3 Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................... 45 5.4.4 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 45 5.5 Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) (jihaz mukafahat al-irhab) ..................................................... 47 5.5.1 Mandate and structure ....................................................................................................... 47 5.5.2 Capacity ..............................................................................................................................
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