71-27,559
SILVER, Jacob, 1941- FRANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL LOYALTY.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 Political Science, general
f ■ University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
. . ...
©Copyright by
Jacob Silver
1971 FRANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL LOYALTY
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Jacob Silver, B.A., M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University 1971
Approved by
^. X/ocu. / Adviser Department of Political Science VITA
November 6, 1 9 4 1 ...... Born - Brooklyn, New York
1963 ...... B.A., Rutgers - The State University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
1964 ...... M.A., Rutgers - The State University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
1964-1968 ...... Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1967 ...... National Science Foundation Summer Fellowship
1968-1971 ...... Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Memphis State Uni versity, Memphis, Tennessee
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Political Science
Comparative Political Analysis. Professors Giacomo Sani, James B. Christoph
International Politics. Professors Edwin H. Fedder, James N. Rosenau, Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.
Political Behavior. Professor James A. Robinson
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
VITA ...... ii
LIST OF T A B L E S ...... v
LIST OF F I G U R E S ...... vii
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
II. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL LOYALTY AND THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS ...... 6
A Definition of Political Loyalty ...... 7
The Structure of Political Loyalty ...... 7 Objects of Political Loyalty ...... 10
The Acquisition of Political Loyalty ...... 15 The Linkage between Political Loyalty and Political Integration ...... 37
III. FRANCE AND E U R O P E ...... 45
The Symbol of E u r o p e ...... 46 Traditional National Values ...... 51 The Post-World War II Situation ...... 55
IV. FRANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: FINDINGS ...... 90
The Analytic M e t h o d ...... 90 F i n d i n g s ...... 95
Diffuse transnationalism ...... 106 Supranationalism...... 110
Interpretative Method ... 113
Derivation: diffuse transnationalism ...... 124 Derivation: supranationalism ...... 132
Initial Implications...... 153
H i Chapter
V. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS— AN INTERPRETATION OF .THE FINDINGS ...... 158
The Transnational Loyalty Acquisition Process .... 158 The Process of International Political Integration . . 175
VI. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL LOYALTY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION ...... 183
A P P E N D I X ...... 186
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 222
iv LIST OF TABLES
Table Pa8e
1. Differences in Support of Supranational Europe between General Public and the Upper Socioeconomic Groups of Four Western European Countries ...... 25
2. Differences in Support for the Unification of Europe between Higher Educated and Higher Income Groups and the General Public in Four Common Market Countries . . . 26
3. Difference in Support for Supranational Europe between the Upper Socioeconomic Level and the General Public in F r a n c e ...... 28
4. Difference in Attitudes toward Europe between the Leader ship and the General Public in Town of Sedan, France in 1963 29
5. French Interpretation of Several Characterizations of German Rearmament ...... 77
6. Degree of Neutralism among Frenchmen as Measured by a National Sample Conducted in October, 1954 ...... 79
7. Degrees of Support for the Replacement of the French Army with a European Army among French Socioeconomic Groups in April, 1968 ...... 82
8. Degree of Support of Supranational Political Organization of Europe among Frenchmen in April, 1968 ...... 84
9. Top Nine Loadings for IFOP #B401 Rotated Factor #1 . . . . 109
10. IFOP #4201— June, 1962— Orthogonally Rotated Factors . . . 116
11. Ranked Loading Pattern for IFOP #4201 Rotated Factor #1 . 117
12. IFOP #7071--May 25, 1965--Orthogonally Rotated Factors . . 118
13. Ranked Loading Pattern for IFOP #7071 Rotated Factor #1 . 119
14. Distribution for Diffuse Transnationalism and Supra nationalism— Survey #4201 125
v Table Page
15. Rank Order of Correlates with Diffuse Transnationalism Indicator— IFOP #4201 126
16. Rank Order of Correlates with Diffuse Transnationalism Indicator--IFOP #B401 131
17. Rank Order of Correlates with Supranationalism Indicator— IFOP #4201 ...... 134
18. Rank Order of Correlates with Supranationalism Indicator— IFOP # A 9 4 1 ...... 139
19. Rank Order of Correlates with Supranationalism Indicator: European Army--IFOP #7071 143
20. Rank Order of Correlates with Supranationalism Indicator: European Diplomacy and Defense--IFOP #7071 ...... 145
21. Rank Order of Correlates with Supranationalism Indicator: Principle of Federal Tax— IFOP #7071 ...... 146
22. Ranked Loading Pattern for IFOP #7071 Rotated Factor #2 . 148
23. Ranked Loading Pattern for IFOP #7071 Rotated Factor #4 . 150
24. Rank Order of Correlates with Supranationalism Indicator: Relinquishment of Sovereignty--IFOP #7071 151
25. Overview of Findings ...... 154
26. Transnational Orientation Variable Sets ...... 155
27. Distribution of Supranationalism by Income and by Level of Formal Education--Survey #4201 159
28. Per Cent Frenchmen Who Favor Supranational European Federation ...... 165
29. Per Cent Supporting Supranationalism among the Total Population and the Elite in France, 1957 to 1968 .... 167
vi LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Supranationalism Trend: 1957-1968 ...... 168
2. The International Integration Process ...... 178
vii , FRANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL LOYALTY
By
Jacob Silver, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1971
Professor Giacomo Sani, Adviser
The basic finding was of the existence of two distinct trans national political orientation patterns among Frenchmen. Variable clusters associated with each of these orientation patterns indicate that these patterns correspond to two social groupings in France. The distinguishing objective characteristics of these two groupings has been interpreted to indicate a processual relationship of the two orientation patterns and the dynamics of transnational orientation acquisition in a society.
Substantively, one group of Frenchmen was found to share a rather diffuse transnational European political orientation, indicated by asserted commitment to the political unification of Western Europe, not further stipulated. Other political attitudes associated with dif fuse transnationalism are a preference for neutralism and the French national values represented by Gaullism. The objective characteristics associated with this grouping are medium and lower income levels, low frequency of education above secondary school, and a preference for 2
Catholic parties.
The second group of Frenchmen was found to share a commitment to a more specific supranational orientation. This "higher" level of
transnational orientation is evidenced by assent to such proposals as
for a European army and central or federal European political insti
tutions with authority to make a common foreign policy, to levy and expend tax monies, and to make other important decisions. Other political attitudes associated with supranationalism are a preference for a pro-United States foreign policy and a distinct anti-Gaullisra.
The objective characteristics associated with this grouping are a higher than average income, a disproportionately high frequency of university and graduate degrees, and a tendency to be constituted more frequently by males.
Since approximately 1965 the group exhibiting supranationalism has constituted a majority of Frenchmen. Among higher status indi viduals, however, a supranational majority has existed since the early
1950s. But the diffuse orientation and its associated political atti tudes represents the traditional French transnational orientation. In fact, it represents components of traditional French nationalism. In contrast it is demonstrated that the supranational orientation repre sents a newer and different form of loyalty, specifically it indicates a degree of transnational European political loyalty.
Because of the timing of the emergence of supranationalism as a widely held attitude, its rate of growth, the relationship of the mass trend ,to the trend of high status individuals, who have consistently exhibited prior commitment to supranationalism, a model of the societal loyalty acquisition process has been derived and posited. The model is referred to as the two-phase process of loyalty acquisition. Briefly stated, it is observed that loyalty is learned behavior. Learning occurs according to certain principles, the major one of which is the principle of reinforcement. Social learning is a distinct process which occurs according to a separate set of principles, all of which are derivative from basic learning theory. The social learning process functionally distinguishes high-status individuals from non-high-status individuals in a population. The learning of new habits occurs directly by high-status individuals, or elites. These habits are learned indirectly by nonelites, or the mass population, by responsive learning to the exhibition of these habits by elites. Thus the acquisition of loyalty patterns, especially new loyalty patterns, by a society is a two-phase process.
By way of stipulating the functional role of the loyalty acqui sition process in the macro-political process of international inte gration, a model of the integrative process is offered. The theoretical contention here is that the international integrative process is a sequentially mixed morphogenetic and morphostatic process in which loyalty acquisition is one of the interfactorial dynamic links. CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The effort represented herein is primarily theoretical. It is
my conception of a proper theoretical venture, however, that empirical
substantiation be offered. Thus, a substantive component is contained.
The object of focus is the concept of political loyalty. I have
undertaken to define the concept in behavioral terms, and in such terms,
I offer a theory of political loyalty acquisition.
But it is incumbent upon me, I should think, to explain my choice
of political loyalty as the object of investigation. I offer the fol
lowing line of reasoning in response.
Sound social, including, political, theory has to be expressed
ultimately in terms of individual behavior. Individual human beings are
the basic elements of any social or political system. From this per
spective a political system should be understood in terms of patterns
of individual orientations and interactions. The former refers to the
system's structure, while the latter refers to its dynamics. And it is
to the pattern of individual orientations that I apply the term loyalty.
Thus, I conceive of political loyalty as the psychical glue that holds political systems together.
Loyalty, therefore, directly relates to system stability and change. Stable systems, then, are those whose members share a
1 commitment to a common set of symbols, structures, or values; or the members may commit themselves to distinct, but nonconflicting symbols.
This definition may be rephrased to read that the system's members must
share a cathectic and cognitive orientational pattern to a common object or set of objects, or the members may possess distinct but harmonious orientational patterns.^- Systems change when orientational patterns change.
System change is an important object of inquiry because it has historically frequently been related to violence. The disintegration or nonintegration of political systems has often occasioned mass violence.
And here I am referring not only to internal or civil wars, or wars of national liberation. I am also referring to the condition of Europe
from the fourteenth century to the Second World War. Certainly, the fragmented social and political structure of that continent could not afford peace. Hence, the reduction of such fragmentation and the pro cess of integrating separate adjacent systems into a single one would appear to promise peace in certain regions. Indeed, I would assert that it would probably reduce violent conflict in most instances, although I should add that this solution does not seem feasible in some areas. I am referring here to situations in which there is a great degree of incompatibility of major values. But this is not the case for Western Europe, where international political integration is the most promising means of regional peace.
■*-My analytic division of orientation patterns into cathectic and cognitive components derives from Talcott Parsons' "Theory of Action." Cf. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, ed s ., Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), esp. Part I, pp. 3-29. 3
International political integration represents a form of system
change. And since loyalty relates to systemic structure, it should
relate to the process of international integration. But the particular
form of change involved in this process is the merging of separate
states into a single transnational system. This would involve the
development of transnational orientation patterns on the part of the
populations of the participating states. Thus, the particular type of
loyalty involved in the process of international political integration
is transnational political loyalty.
This, then, represents the particular object of this study. And because transnational loyalty directly relates to the process of inter national political integration, I have also attempted to offer a pre liminary model of the international integrative process. This process has been only preliminarily modeled because this effort was undertaken by way of elaborating upon the theory of loyalty acquisition, which remains the prime theoretical focus of this study.
I should also state that the study is further restricted to an analysis of transnational loyalty among Frenchmen, particularly relating to French political integration into a union of the six national Common
Market members, or a broader western European union. This restriction was dictated in part by manageability. However, on theoretical grounds, this restriction to a single political system also largely obviates any interference of national political culture as a variable. This is not to deny the effect of intranational cultural factors, but the analysis remains considerably simplified by its restriction to a single national system. The restriction to a single national political system also
obviates other potential problems. One can assume, in this connection,
that concepts and even survey questions are understood with a rather
high degree of congruency owing to a shared national experience. And
one can assume a high degree of homogeneity among individuals with
respect to the defining criteria of analytically designated groupings,
such as religious or socioeconomic groupings.
This relates to the type of empirical data I have analyzed in
this study. This consists of French national public opinion survey
responses. The method of analysis brought to bear on these include
factor analysis and intercorrelation matrix analysis. I discuss the
data and analytic technique in chapter iv, prior to describing the
findings.
My theoretical formulation offers nothing original in its com
ponents . It is only in its synthesis that any originality may exist.
My argument may be briefly stated. I observe that loyalty is learned
behavior. Learning occurs according to certain principles, the major
one of which is the principle of reinforcement. Social learning is a
distinct process which occurs according to a separate set of principles,
all of which are derivative from basic learning theory. The social
learning process functionally distinguishes high-status individuals from
among non-high-status individuals in a population. The learning of new habits occurs directly by high-status individuals, or elites. These habits are learned indirectly by nonelites, or the mass population, by responsive learning to the exhibition of these habits by elites. Thus,
the acquisition of loyalty patterns, especially new loyalty patterns, by a society is a two-phase process.
I contend, substantively, that commitment to European supra- nationality among Frenchmen has grown significantly. I further contend that this supranational commitment actually represents transnational political loyalty. The growth in transnational loyalty has occurred at the mass level in France because of the rise of a new generation of elites which is responsive to different values than was the previous generation. At the elite level, this change has occurred because of the radically altered political and economic situation in which France has been operating since the end of World War XX.
I repeat at this point that my main attempt has been to develop a behavioral theory of loyalty acquisition. In chapter v, I attempt to relate loyalty and its acquisition to the process of international integration, from the perspective of a single nation, France. The derivation and explication of my theory of loyalty acquisition is given in chapter ii following. CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF POLITICAL LOYALTY AND
THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS
In the preceding chapter I have offered a general concep
tualization of the nature of political loyalty by referring to it as
"the psychical glue of political communities." My purpose in the
previous chapter is to argue the significance of the concept of loyalty
as an analytic device for the study of political integration. Thus my
conceptualization and terminology regarding the concept of loyalty has
thus far remained vague. My purpose in the present chapter is to engage
in a detailed analysis of the nature of political loyalty and its
relation to the process of political integration. My attempt to meet
this purpose shall, to borrow an expression from Braybrooke and
Lindblom, "... pass through several stages of complication."^ I shall
first offer an extensive definition, by way of conceptual elaboration,
of the phenomenon. I shall then attempt to identify its particular
behavioral character. Second, I shall review suggestions and propo
sitions from relevant literature regarding the process whereby political
loyalty is acquired. And third, I shall explore the relationship or
linkage between political loyalty and international political
■'■David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 17.
6 7
integration. The second and third portions of this analysis will then
be pursued in chapter v below.
A Definition of Political Loyalty
The initial stage in the analysis of the phenomenon of political
loyalty, and a prerequisite to the designation of appropriate empirical
indicators, is a detailed definition of the term. It has been already
established that political loyalty refers to a form of social behavior
pertaining to individual members of a social group. Any form of social
behavior may be described in two distinct and interrelated ways. The
first of these is a definition in terms of its structural or -static com
ponents. The object here would be to distinguish political loyalty from
other forms of social behavior. The effort involves the description of
components sufficient both to Identify the behavioral form and to dis
tinguish it from all others. The second way in which a form of behavior may be defined is in terms of its dynamic qualities. Here the object is to identify the manner in which political loyalty relates to other forms of social behavior.
The structure of political loyalty
Harold Guetzkow's conceptualization of political loyalty will be
2 Cf. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry; Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 364-65. On these pages Kaplan distinguishes between "structural explanations" and "functional explanations" in a manner analogous to my two types of definitions, in that he identifies the same two aspects of the objects of inquiry which I have. 8 3 largely used here. In the formulation of a definition of political
loyalty I shall also attempt to reflect the general pattern of concep
tualization of the term as evidenced in the scholarly literature.
Hence, in structural terms political loyalty shall be considered a
species of a more general loyalty pattern. The general concept of
loyalty has been defined as a supportive attitude of'a person or persons
toward either a social object or a socially related object;. Thus,
Guetzkow defines loyalty as:
An attitude predisposing its holder to respond toward an idea, person, or group with actions perceived by the holder to be supportive of, and/or with feelings which value the continued existence of, the object toward which the attitude is directed.^
And Josiah Royce has offered his slightly more stringent definition of
loyalty as:
The willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause.
And though in the above statement Royce only identifies a "cause" as the object of a person's devotion, he does go on later in his essay to define "cause" as a social goal,^ although a particular cause may be quite abstractly and distantly related to individual human beings or
3 Harold Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization, Publication No. 4 of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions (Princeton, N.J.: Prince ton University Press, 1955) (hereinafter referred to as Multiple Loyalties).
^Ibid., p . 8.
^Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), pp. 16-17.
6Ibid., pp. 51-53, 252. social groups. That loyalty involves an orientation toward a social object, a social collectivity, or symbols thereof, is also stressed by
Talcott Parsons in his definition of the concept. Parsons distin guishes between the cathectic and expressive aspects of an individual's orientation toward a social collectivity. The former refers to the positive or negative nature of the orientation. The latter involves the mediation of the attachment through symbols which serve as integrating devices. Because of the nature of the indicators used in the analysis described below, this study actually, in Parsons’ terms, involves an analysis of loyalty in terms of its expressive orientation pattern.
So, loyalty, in structural terms, shall be here understood as an individual's positively cathected orientation to a social object or a socially pertinent object. These objects may be, or may be represen tative of, individuals or social collectivities.
Political loyalty, then, shall be defined as an individual's orientation toward objects of both social and political pertinence. At this point it should be stated that politics, in the sense with which I shall be using that term, refers not only to a species of social behavior, but, specifically, to a species of societal behavior. Thus, political loyalty here denotes the loyalty of an individual to a social collectivity or to a society as a political system. If society is con ceived as an integrated social collectivity, then I should further assert that political loyalty may be directed toward an unintegrated, or only partially integrated, collectivity, with the anticipation that
'Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 77-78. 10
It will in the future be integrated. Harold Guetzkow offered a similar
formulation with his definition of national loyalty, which he defined
a s :
Loyalty directed toward a nation-state, in actual existence or still-to-be-realized
An important point to be observed here is that loyalty need not be
directed to an existent political system. Guetzkow refers simply to an
anticipated future state. Loyalty could also be directed to a system which has only existed in the past. In this case the aspiration would
be that the perceived past system would be reconstituted in the future.
This form of orientation has been referred to by Hans Kohn in his dis
cussion of national identity.® The reasons offered by both Guetzkow and
Kohn relate to man's anticipation capabilities as well as to his
capacity for romantic nostalgia. I would also suggest, however, that,
especially at times of system change, imperfect and/or differential
system perception would sometimes explain individual loyalty to non existent political systems.
Objects of political loyalty
Having thus far defined political or national loyalty as loyalty directed to a societal political system or to a nation-state, it is still necessary to designate the specific symbolic or expressive objects
®Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties, p. 11.
®Hans Kohn,Koh The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1961), pp. 13-15. 11
of orientation. Guetzkow has referred to these in his essay on
loyalty.I®
Qfjhere are different types of national objects; citizens some times attach to the people and the land, to the leader, to an ideological concept of what the nation-state is or should be, or to the institutional and legal embodiments of the state.
Guetzkow further states that individuals may orient themselves simul
taneously to two or more objects, and that "there is tremendous variation among persons and within the person himself as to the defi nition of the object of the loyalty, making for much ambiguity
Guetzkow, then, lists four objects of orientation:
1. The people and the land.
2. The leader.
3. An ideological concept.
4. The institutional and legal embodiments of the state.
The first object seems to refer to a specific ethnic collectivity, or a nationality. The inclusion of this object therefore distinguishes
Guetzkow's concept of national loyalty from my more general concept of political loyalty. As I have just defined this concept aboVe, political loyalty does denote the loyalty of an individual to a social collec tivity or to a society as a political system. But I do not propose to restrict the social collectivity only to a national group. It may be more or less extensive than such a group. Thus, I would include within my definition the by-now proverbial attachment felt by General Robert
E. Lee for his home state of Virginia at the outbreak of the American
^Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties, p. 11.
11Ibid. 12
Civil War, as well as the attachment Dag Hammerskjold appeared to have
felt to the United Nations and its popular constituency. However, I
have already allowed that political loyalty does contain a social com
ponent, although it need not be to a single ethnically defined people,
and I am willing to include within this concept the physical territory
or ''land" identified with the social collectivity in question. So I would conceptually stipulate, in a manner a bit more restrictively than
Guetzkow, that political loyalty necessarily includes a social com
ponent .
To continue this more restrictive definition, I would also argue
that, especially among those peoples who have passed through an era of 12 nationalism, political loyalty also necessarily involves orientation to political institutions with legally defined jurisdictional authority.
This seems to correspond to Guetzkow's fourth object, "the institutional and legal embodiments of the state."
With regard to the two remaining objects listed by Guetzkow, I would argue, first, that attachment to an individual leader is not a component of political loyalty as I am defining the concept. To reiterate I have defined the concept to denote the loyalty of an indi vidual to a social collectivity as a political system. Thus I am assuming that the individual is capable of orientating himself to social objects in a functionally differentiated manner. Thus, a person would
12 For a detailed discussion of this ideological movement cf. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, as well as Kohn's The Age of Nationalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). The French experience is particularly dealtwith in his Prelude to Nation-States (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nos trand Co., Inc., 1967). 13
not orient himself to a leader qua person, but rather to a leader's
authority or office. However, this is not to say that there are not
individuals who do orient themselves to leaders qua persons, or who do
include such an orientation among the others listed above. But, if one
may assume, as I do, that social orientation patterns are evolved cul
tural behavior, such personal orientations represent ancient, or primi
tive, residua of former societal patterns. The point here is that such
orientations do not have symbolic significance equivalent to the object
of political institutions, and cannot be included in the definition of
political loyalty which is here being evolved.
I would also exclude Guetzkow's third object, the ideological
concept of what the system is or should be, from this definition of
political loyalty. This particular type of orientation does not repre
sent attachment to a political system per se. Rather, it is a posited or prospective characterization of a political system, itself either existent or prospective. Thus, orientation toward such an ideological concept presumes prior commitment to such a system. Hence, such an orientation remains distinct from the concept of political loyalty.
Summarizing the components of the concept of political loyalty just discussed, the concept is defined to refer to an individual's orientation to a functional segment of a social collectivity, as well as to political institutions with legally defined jurisdictional authority. I thus differ from Guetzkow1s formulation of the concept of national loyalty by defining social collectivity more broadly and by requiring the inclusion of the above two general objects. Guetzkow seems distinctly to propose a more flexible orientational scheme, 14
with alternative orientational objects.
Support for the formulation I am developing here is provided by
Joseph R. Strayer in his historical analysis of the development of the
European nation-state.^ Strayer argues that with the evolution of
the modern European national political systems from the personal king
ships of the immediate post-Roman period, there was a parallel evo
lution of orientational patterns.
The first political units to emerge in Europe from the ruins of
the Roman Empire were regna.*4 These units were defined by loyalty to a
ruler. The specific objects of orientation were the persons of the kings. Strayer goes on to say that feudalism preserved these orien
tational patterns inasmuch as it was only a fragmented version of the regnum. The major change in European orientational patterns came with
the development of nation-states. These entities, with their con comitant national loyalty emerged after the development of institutions 15 which curbed violence, specifically the courts of law. When these proved to be effective, people developed an identity with these insti tutions as well as with the rulers. Further national integration developed with identity more specifically directed to the system of laws and to the common political institutions.
Thus, in Strayer1s description of the European experience, national loyalty evolved from a diffuse orientation to persons to an
13 Joseph R. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation- Building in Europe," in Nation-Building. ed. by Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 17-26.
l4 Ibid., p. 18. 15Ibid., pp. 19-20. 16Ibid., p. 24. orientation to functionally specific institutions. Orientation to
these institutions also implied an orientation to a specific territory
in that the institutions functioned over an effective territorial jurisdiction in which they successfully mitigated violence, or performed
some other socially desired function. Hence, at least where Western
Europeans are concerned, although there is no reason to assume the pro cess is peculiar to this population, it can be assumed that functionally e> specific loyalty orientation patterns are common in the political behavior of these people. And this further sustains the structural definition of loyalty I have formulated above. To restate it, political loyalty refers to an individual's orientation to a functional segment of a social collectivity, as well as to political institutions with legally defined jurisdictional authority.
The Acquisition of Political Loyalty
Having defined political loyalty in terms of its structure, as the behavior in which individuals relate themselves to ,a p o l i t i c a l sys tem, I should now like to discuss its genetic nature, relating to the manner in which individuals acquire such behavior. In considering the origin or the process by which political loyalty comes to be acquired by individuals a comprehensive set of two mutually exclusive alterna tives could be posed. Pursuing this, either political loyalty, as a type of general loyalty, is an expression of an internally determined process, or it is an expression of a process involving factors external to the individual. If loyalty were the former, it would be a type or component of some basic organic drive, "human instinct," or some other 16
chemically or genetically determined form of behavior. However, if this
were so, differences in loyalty behavior between individuals would
either be nonexistent or randomly distributed,^ But it has been
repeatedly demonstrated that differential degrees of loyalty or its
counterpart, alienation, have patterned distributions in societies. In
this connection, Buchanan and Cantril have demonstrated that social and
political alienation correlates with low income or low socioeconomic 18 class status. Similarly, Karl Deutsch has shown that socioeconomic
status explains different rates of social assimilation of exogenous
groups.
It is empirically known, for instance, that members of many peoples often assimilate very slowly, or not at all, in new countries of residence where the average standard of living is much lower than it was in their country of origin, and that they often assimilate far more readily in countries where the living standard is considerably higher than it was in the regions where the newcomers came from. The persistent non-assimilation of the Germans in most of Southeastern Europe, their easier assimi lation in France, and their ready assimilation in the United States are cases in point.19
These authors, then, have demonstrated social attachment, thus, loyalty,
A third possibility, of course, exists. This is that dif ferences in loyalty behavior are genotypically peculiar. And since a great number of genotypical permutations may be identified, genetic structure may be a factor. But, as I endeavor to demonstrate below, the role of external factors evidence such predominant control that they may be considered determinative.
^■®William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1953), pp. 19-22 (hereinafter referred to as How Nations See Each Other) .
in iJKarl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (2d ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 158-59 (hereinafter referred to as Nationalism and Social Communication) . 17
to be patterned among populations. This tends in itself to negate the
internal determinant alternative.
But the authors just cited have further suggested a general
hypothesis relating to the development of loyalty, as well as suggesting
a particular character for the concept. This general hypothesis, which
I have dubbed the "Welfare Hypothesis," posits a relationship between
loyalty and conditions of personal or social reward. This hypothesis
has also been supported, and more explicitly stated, by other analysts
of national or international integration.
One such analyst is Rupert Emerson, who posited the following in
a discussion of the process of the development of national loyalty in
Africa:
A prime need for the building of a sense of national community in the new states is that at least a substantial segment of the people come to feel that their vital interests are linked with the state and that their well-being is enhanced by membership in it.20
Here Emerson posits a correlation between the development of national
loyalty and the attainment of "vital interests" and the enhancement of
"well-being." Generally, this seems to assert the contingency of per
ceived rewarding experience and the development of loyalty. Similarly,
Ernst Haas, in referring to the process of international integration,
and its concomitant process of the development of supranational loyalty,
has concluded: "Integration proceeds most rapidly and drastically when
it responds to socio-economic demands emanating from an industrial-urban
on ^Rupert Emerson, "Nation-Building in Africa," in Nation- Building. ed. by Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 115-16. 18
21 environment." Haas restricts his generalization to an "industrial-
urban environment," but the basic "Welfare Hypothesis" is still indi-
cated--that of a contingency between satisfaction of "socio-economic
demands" or rewards and development of political loyalty. And Leonard
Doob even, more explicitly supports the hypothesis in his generalizations
derived from his study of patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism:
People supporting internationalism are convinced that not all their personal welfare is linked to the nation, but that some or much of it is dependent upon international organizations; national sovereignty appears less important.^2
This illustrates the contingency which I have described as the
"Welfare Hypothesis." But Doob also indicates a variant of this
hypothesis, which may be referred to as the "Security Hypothesis." This
latter hypothesis posits a contingency between the perceived security
afforded by a system and loyalty accorded that system. In this con
nection Doob asserts that patriotism or nationalism develops out of the
perception by people of the instrumentality of the government or the
state in the solution of a major problem or crisis. As examples of this
he atrributes United States patriotism both to the provision of land to
settlers, as well as the security provided in the settlement of the
West. As another example, he attributes the growth of supranational
European loyalty to the promise that European integration would
21 Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," International Organization, XV, No. 3 (Summer, 1961), 378, Cf. also Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 111. 22 Leonard W. Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psycho logical Foundations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 20. Cf. also pp. 14-15. 19 23 eliminate European wars. And as a more explicit statement of the
"Security Hypothesis" Doob also asserts that "... the greater the
threat which the outgroup seems to pose, the more significant does the group become in facilitating both patriotism and nationalism."2^ It
should be added here that Doob refers to threat in terms both of to culture as well as to physical security.
So, Doob refers to a contingency between perceived threat and national loyalty. I have labeled this posited contingency the "Security
Hypothesis" because the quality achieved or sought after by increasing social cohesion is security. And I have referred to this hypothesis as a variant of the "Welfare Hypothesis" because security, I would offer, represents a rewarding condition. Thus, the "Security Hypothesis" still posits a contingency between a reward or a rewarding condition and loyalty.
This "Security Hypothesis," as I have just defined it above, has also been enunciated, though not labeled as such, by John H. Herz. In an essay discussing the concept of "territoriality" and the viability of the modern state system Herz posits the following:
Throughout history, that unit which affords protection and security to human beings has tended to become the basic political unit; people, in the long run, will recognize that authority, any authority, which possesses the power of protection.25
23Ibid., pp. 117-18. 24Ibid., p. 257.
25john H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics. IX, 473-93, 474. Cf. also J. H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), esp. pp. 40-41, 70-75. In a subsequent article, "The Territorial State Revisited," Polity, I, No. 1 (Fall, 1968), 11-34, Herz revises his original conclusion regarding the viability of the modern nation-state; however, he does not disturb his central thesis quoted above, positing 20
Herz discusses "protection and security" rather Specifically in terms
of physical security. Thus Herz's formulation is more restricted than
Doob's, and represents a purer form of the "Security Hypothesis." It
might also be noted that Herz's thesis parallels Joseph Strayer's
analysis regarding the basis of the attachment of individuals to insti- 26 tutional structures. This would seem to provide some theoretical
support for Herz's specific hypothetical formulation.
However, even this independently supported and restricted for mulation remains consistent with the more general "Welfare Hypothesis"
defined above, and can still be considered a particular variant thereof.
This follows from the already stipulated reasoning that the quality of security is in fact a rewarding condition.
It is important to stipulate and emphasize the point of con nection if these two hypotheses regarding the genetic nature of political loyalty because these same hypotheses seem to encompass the observations and conclusions of most major studies of patriotism, nationalism, loyalty and supranationalism. Furthermore, it is important to observe that both of these interrelated hypotheses are subsumed within a broader theoretical proposition. This proposition says that the persistence or strengthening of a particular behavior pattern, such as an attitude of loyalty, involves the strengthening of the association of that behavior pattern with its stimulus or cue by the simultaneous or nearly simultaneous transmission of rewards to the behaving subject. a correlation between a territorial-political unit's ability to afford security and its ability to attract popular attachment,
^Cf. supra, p. 14. 21
This restates the central proposition of reinforcement theory, or S-R
learning theory.^ And the point I am suggesting, therefore, is that
political loyalty is amenable to explanation within this quite extensive
theoretical scheme.
Alternately stated, I am contending that political loyalty is a
habit pattern. This repeats the contention already made by Harold 28 Guetzkow. In effect the "welfare" and "security" hypotheses imply
this conceptualization of political loyalty. But this conceptualization
of loyalty represents a distinct analytic step, for it commits the
analyst to hypotheses and interpretations consistent with S-R learning
theory. Specifically, the acquisition, and maintenance, of loyalty is
assumed to involve the incidence of reward and its association with dis
tinct stimuli. These stimuli would relate to the political system to
which loyalty is being acquired.
This mode of analysis and interpretation has already been
employed to explain the acquisition of political loyalty on the part of
individuals and groups involved in political integration. Most notably
in this respect has been Karl Deutsch1s analysis of nationalism and his 2Q study of political integration in Europe and the North Atlantic area. v
27 'For a general introduction to S-R learning theory, cf. B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms (New York: Appleton, 1938); also Charles E. Osgood, "Behavior Theory and the Social Sciences," in Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. by Roland Young (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 217-44.
^Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties, p. 37.
^Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication; Karl W. Deutsch et_al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). Cf. also Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," in The Integration of 22
Henry Teune has also suggested this approach in a pair of essays on the learning of "integrative habits" and the process of political inte gration.-^
The specific learning principles employed by the above-cited authors to explain the acquisition of loyalty and political integration relate to the process of "operant conditioning." This process has been analyzed and explicated by B . F. Skinner.^ Briefly defined, operant conditioning refers to the sequential reinforcement of successive approximations of a final, desired response. The process, hence, requires that the subject generate and exhibit a particular response, for which he is subsequently rewarded, for learning, or the acquisition of habits, to occur. And this process refers both to the learning of new habits as well as imitative learning.
Originally this process was identified as pertaining to indi vidual behavior. But it has been extended to the explanation of social learning. This last term refers to the learning of habits by groups or human collectivities. The classic esposition of this attempt is Miller and Dollard's Social Learning and Imitation. ^ And, indeed, it is this
Political Communities, ed. by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 46-74; idem. "Trans action Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion," ibid., pp. 75-97; and idem, "The Price of Integration," ibid., pp. 143-78.
O A Henry Teune, "The Learning of Integrative Habits," and "Models in the Study of Political Integration," Jacob and Toscano, ibid., pp. 247-304. 31 Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms; also B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953).
3^Neal E. Miller and John Do 1 lard , Social Learning and Imi tation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). 23 particular work, as well as related ones, that Teune cites in his essays referred to above.
This approach has proved to be quite effective. Deutsch, as a
prominent instance, provides a well substantiated and quite compelling explanation for the differential assimilation patterns of exogenous 33 social groups. Deutsch also has attempted to extend this mode of analysis to the explanation of political integration in the cases of Q / England-Scotland (1707), Italy and Germany, 4 as well as in the attach ment of Vermont and Texas to the American Union.33 And Amitai Etzioni has employed this mode of analysis, albeit inexplicitly, to the unsuc- cesful attempts at political union in the cases of Egypt and Syria, and the Federation of the West Indies.3<*
The principles of operant conditioning may also be used to explain differential patterns of national identity, as well as inter nationalism, among national groups. In this connection it has been observed that, within national populations, groups of higher socio economic status have higher rates of identity both with fellow nationals not of their class, as well as with their fellow class members of other 37 nations. Parallel findings relating to exhibition of European
33Cf. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 159.
■^Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 49-50.
35Ibid., pp. 70-71.
^Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification; A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 123-53 (hereinafter referred to as Political Unification).
37Cf. Buchanan and Cantril, How Nations See Each Other, pp. 19-20. 24 identltive as well as explicitly supranational sentiments among popu lations of the six Common Market countries and Britain also exist.
Table 1 below shows the differences between the general public and the upper socioeconomic status groups in their degrees of support for their country's membership in a supranational Western European political federation. The survey the results of which are represented in this table was conducted in May, 1957 in the United Kingdom, the German
Federal Republic, France, and Italy. As can be seen in the table, in each of the four countries a higher percentage of the upper socio economic levels exhibits supranational sentiments than is the case with the general public, with a mean difference between the groups of 14 per cent.
Jacques-Rene Rabier reports similar patterns among the popu lations of Belgium, The Netherlands, as well as France, Italy, and West
Germany with respect to support for the general idea of European unifi cation.^®
A survey commissioned by the Press and Information Service of the European Communities, and conducted in the six Common Market countries in February and March of 1962 reveals findings consistent with those reported just above. Table 2 shows the higher levels of support for the unification of Europe on the part of the higher educated and higher income groups, representing the upper socioeconomic level, than
OQ f / / Jacques-Rene Rabier, L* Information des Europeens et 1*Inte gration de l 1Europe (Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Institut d'£tudes europSenes, 1965), pp. 49-51 (hereinafter referred to as L 1Information des Europeens). Cf. also Jacques-Rene Rabier, "The European Idea and National Public Opinion," Government and Opposition, II, No. 3 (Aprll-July, 1967), 443-54. 25
TABLE 1
DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT OF SUPRANATIONAL EUROPE BETWEEN GENERAL PUBLIC AND THE UPPER SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS OF FOUR WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Survey Question Posed: "Would you favor or oppose (survey country's) joining a political federation of Western Europe in which the final authority would lie with a central government rather than with the member countries?"
Percentage Indicating That They "Favor Joining"
UK W. Germany France Italy
Total population 31% (1,232) 48% (1,200) 35% (1,200) 41% (1,269)
Upper socio economic levels 35% ( 310) 64% ( 129) 54% ( 101) 58% ( 157)
Notes: The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of cases.
Source: Compiled from data reported in "Attitudes Toward European Union, the Common Market, and Euratom," Report #50, August 12, 1957, United States Information Agency, Research and Reference Service. TABLE 2
DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE BETWEEN HIGHER EDUCATED AND HIGHER INCOME GROUPS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN FOUR COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES
Survey Question Posed: "To what extent are you for or against efforts to unify Europe?"
Percentage Indicating That They Were "Very Much For"
West Germany Belgium Netherlands Italy France (N = 1,523) (Benelux N = 1,731) (Benelux N = 1,731) (N = 1,562) (N = 1,518) % % % % %
Higher educated 73 64 70 69 57
Higher income 61 45 69 63 44
Population mean 50 31 62 36 28
Source: Compiled from: Institut Francaise de 1*Opinion Publique, Bondages, XXV, No. 1 (1963), 27-28. * 27
Is the case with the general public. And a survey conducted in France
during April, 1968 shows the same pattern with respect to preference for
a supranational Europe. These data may be seen in Table 3 below.
This difference in level of support and type of commitment
between social elites and the general public is even evident at the
local level. Table 4 shows the difference between the two groups in the
general attitude toward the general concept of Europe in the small
French town of Sedan, near the Belgium border where, owing to a high
level of transnational activity, European sentiment is initially
high.39
These data just presented should substantiate, I would hope,
that differential patterns among national groups exist with respect to
types of national and transnational identity, through time, and at least
two distinct levels of society, the local and the national. The data
also distinguish two groups: those of high socioeconomic status and
those not of such status. My reference to elite and the general or
mass public refers respectively to these groups. The choice of these
two groups is not an arbitrary one. In the Buchanan and Cantril study
cited above, the analysts specifically identify wealth and education as
the major variables affecting "... sentiments of commonality abroad
on 7I should perhaps make explicit that I do not pretend that Sedan is typical of French towns, or even of French border towns. Aside from its ancient and peculiar history, Sedan is also distinctive because of the circumstances which caused it to gain national acknow ledgment twice in the last 100 years. On 2 September 1870 it was the site at which Napolean III capitulated to the Prussians and was taken prisoner. On 21 May 1940 it was at Sedan that the French defenses broke before the Nazi invasion. But I would argue that these experiences would tend to increase nationalistic sentiments. Thus, it remains a valid subject for the analysis of transnational sentiments. 28
TABLE 3
DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT FOR SUPRANATIONAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE UPPER SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN FRANCE
Percentage Indicating Preference for a Supranational Form of Political Organization for France 7o
Upper socioeconomic level 76
Total population 63
Source: Compiled from: Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "Les Francais et l 1Unification Politique de 1 'Europe, d'apres un Sondage de la Sofres," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. XXX, No. 3 (September, 1968), 145-70. The tabular data appear on p. 161.
N = 2,000. 29
TABLE 4
DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPE BETWEEN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN THE TOWN OF SEDAN, FRANCE IN 1963
Leaders and General Total Local Personalities Public Sample
Those declaring themselves to be "very favorable" 87% 67% 78%
Those declaring themselves to be "moderately favorable" 10% 27% 18%
Those declaring themselves to be "not at all favor able" and those refusing to respond 3% 6% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique, Sedan et 1*Europe: Etude Monographique Francaise (Paris: Institut Franyaise d'Opinion Publique, 1963), P • 65, The survey was conducted between March and June, 1963; the sample N = 200, repre senting 1% of the total population. 30 and at home,"^ And with respect particularly to Europe, Rabier has observed that education and Income are the most significant variables affecting transnational identification.^ And, as shall be demonstrated in chapter lv below, these two variables also prove to be the most sig nificant indicators of supranationallsm among Frenchmen.
Before presenting the data above, I said that the principles of operant conditioning may be used to explain differential patterns of political identity among national groups. I should now more spe cifically restate this to say that these principles suffice to explain higher degrees of national or transnational loyalty among members of higher socioeconomic status, The reasoning here is that this group is more frequently and intensely exposed to such identitive symbols, and that they are more frequently and more directly involved in national or tranenatlonal behavior as leaders or major participants. At the same time these people are more heavily and more generally rewarded with higher income and higher status. Thus it is highly probable that national or transnational loyalty habits would tend to be, albeit unconsciously, sequentially rewarded.
However, these principles at best only provide a negative explanation for lower identitive levels among the less advantaged group, It cannot explain the fact--also evident in the tables pre sented above--pf positive transnational identification on the part of the mass public. Nor, and much more critically, can it explain the fact, which will be substantiated and illustrated in chapter v below,
^^Buchanan and Cantril, How Nations See Each Other, p, 22,
^Rabier, L 1 Information des Buroplens. pp. 45-A8, 31
of the growth of transnational European sentiment--in fact, loyalty-- / 9 among the general public of France.
The question thus remains of how mass acquisition of political
loyalty habits can be explained. Carl Friedrich attempts to respond to
this question with a prediction that "... the formation of a European
patriotism will follow and not antedate the establishment of a Union, l n as it did in the United States and other federal systems." Joseph
Strayer and Hans Kohn, both referring to the development of European nation-states, also assert the prior necessity of the establishment of a formal political structure for the development of common political
loyalty on the part of the mass population.^
However, I have already referred to the fact that mass learning of supranational loyalty has occurred among Frenchmen, and this has occurred without the establishment of a formal, sovereign supra national European political structure. And with respect to Friedrich's contention, in his quotation above, that American patriotism only fol lowed the formation of the United States, reference may be made to
Richard Merritt's analysis of the American colonial press of the period
1735-1775, where he found the growth of American identity, not merely
^Donald Puchala comes to a contrary conclusion regarding such growth. Cf. Donald J. Puchala, "The Common Market and Political Federation in Western European Public Opinion," International Studies Quarterly. XIV, No. 1 (March, 1970), 49-50. I shall comment in detail with respect to this discrepancy in chapter v below. 43 Carl J, Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation? (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 170.
4^Cf. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe," pp. 19-24; and Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, pp. 15, 188, 191, and 475. 32 prior to the formation of the American Republic, but prior to the
/ American Revolution. So, the question of how mass acquisition of loyalty habits occurs still remains. Concerning himself directly with the problem of political integration, Amitai Etzioni does address him self to this particular question, although his response remains quite vague. I am referring here to Etzioni's concept of the "identitive power" which the elites who initiate and guide unification command.4**
Though Etzioni at one point defines identitive power abstractly in terms of commitments of members of a social collectivity to a set of values,47 he does refer in his analysis to the instrumentality specifically of the system elites in controlling this power. Hence, again albeit quite vague and unformulated, Etzioni does nevertheless suggest the role of elites in the process of the acquisition by the general public of new loyalty habits. This is a significant theoretical point.
Donald Puchala goes a bit further down the theoretical road. In discussing the process of regional integration Puchala not only recog nizes that the elite perform a distinct function, but he suggests rather specifically the role the elite do play:
International social assimilation during regional integration operates initially at elite levels of the integrating societies. Later, as mass populations read the cues of their own elites. International social assimilation continues until
^Richard L. Merritt, Symbols of American Community 1735-1775 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966),
46Cf. Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 58, 71-72, 94.
47Ibid.. p. 58. 33
whole populations are linked by bonds of mutual understanding and mutual confidence.^
So, Puchala is suggesting, even though he may not have expli
cated it, that the process of acquisition of transnational attitudes on
the part of a national population is a complex one. He suggests in
this connection that it is a two-phase process, with elite learning occurring in one phase, and mass learning occurring in a second phase.
And the specific role the elite perform in this process is that of models after which the mass population fashions its behavior.
A closely related process has been observed to exhibit the same dynamic pattern. I am here referring to the "two-step flow of communi cations" model identified by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet in their study of the 1940 U.S. Presidential campaign.^® The process referred to in this study is the acquisition by the mass public of normatively con ditioned political information relevant to the electoral contest. Here too the researchers found a functional division of roles among distinct social groups.
A special role in the network of personal relationships is played by the "opinion leaders." . . • 0 0 e noted that they engaged in political discussion much more than the rest of the respondents. But they reported that the formal media were more effective as sources of influence than personal relationships. This suggests that ideas often flow from radio and print to
48 Donald J. Puchala, "The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration," International Studies Quarterly. XII, No. 1 (March, 1968), 50. The underscoring is mine. /.q t7Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice; How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), first published in 1944 (hereinafter referred to as The People's Choice) . 34
the opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population.^0
Although the authors in this 1940 study found that the "opinion leaders," for the most part, shared the same status as the other respondents, a subsequent study on personal influence reported by
Katz and Lazarsfeld demonstrated that opinion leadership in public affairs generally does tend to come disproportionately from upper status categories .^2
Despite the instructiveness of the structural similarity of these two processes, they are distinct. Loyalty acquisition pertains to much more basic learning involving the subject's reorientation to several, quite significant objects, whereas political opinion acqui sition involves the reorientation, or orientation, to fewer and con siderably less significant objects. Thus two differences between these two processes, I would suggest, are that loyalty acquisition occurs much more slowly and that the acquired patterns are much more persistent.
Nevertheless, both processes are mass learning processes; hence, the structural similarity between the opinion process and the loyalty pro cess tends to strengthen the concept of a two-phase loyalty acquisition model.
But I am anticipating my interpretative argument detailed below.
Returning to the present discussion, I should make clear that the two- phase model only derives from a suggestion made by Puchala. It assumes
50Ibid., p. 151. 51Ibid., p. 155.
■^Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1955), pp. 272-73, 274, 284. 35
significantly more than Puchala offers, although he does allude to the
dynamic process assumed in a two-phase process model. However, after
making this pregnant suggestion, albeit, again, not as explicitly
stated, Puchala in the same article confesses-^ that he does not under
stand the specific linkage of mass with elite behavior. He is still
not confident of the manner in which mass learning occurs. I would here
suggest that Puchala's problem relates directly to his own restriction
to the principles of operant conditioning. I would further suggest that
there exists theoretical principles which sustain his suggested two-
phase process. The principles relate to the concept of "vicarious
learning" explicated by Bandura and Walters,^
Bandura and Walters, in introducing the concept of vicarious i learning, assert that operant-conditioning procedures cannot account for
all acquired behavior. "This is particularly true of behavior for which there is no reliable eliciting stimulus apart from the cues pro
vided by others as they exhibit the b e h a v i o r . "55 And what types of
behavior do the authors refer to as learned through cues? In referring
to the learning patterns of children the authors observe:
While playing with toys that stimulate imitation of adults, children frequently reproduce not only the appropriate adult- role behavior patterns but also characteristic or idiosyn cratic parental patterns or responses, including attitudes, mannerisms, gestures, and even voice inflections, which the
53puchala, "The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration," in a footnote on p. 52.
^Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters, Social Learning and Personality Development (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963).
-^Ibid., p . 3 . 36
parents have certainly never attempted directly to teach.
Hence, significantly for the application attempted here, attitudes are among those habits learnt vicariously. Bandura and Walters augment
their observation above with reports of experiments demonstrating the successful transmission of novel responses through modeling and imi tation. And Bandura and Walters, in referring to the models who elicit
the cues, state that "... models of high prestige are . . . more likely to serve as major sources of imitative b e h a v i o r ."57 Such models would be represented by the political, social, and economic elite of the integrating societies. The two authors also detail the principle of vicarious reinforcement involved in vicarious learning, and the learning sequence involved.-*® But the major point to be made here is that this theory of vicarious learning can satisfactorily explain mass acqui sition of political loyalty, despite the fact that the mass public has infrequent direct contact with supranational organizations or processes, and has a generally low level of knowledge about these. In this con nection it should also be recalled that in positing what I have referred to as the "Welfare Hypothesis," both Emerson and Doob indicated that it is the subjective perception of rewards that is instrumental in generating political loyalty.-*^ So, operant conditioning does not ade quately describe the acquisition process referred to here. Thus only a
Ibid., p. 48. The underscoring is mine.
57Ibid., pp. 10-11. 58Cf. ibid.. pp. 4, 55.
5^cf. Emerson, "Nation-Building in Africa," pp. 115-16; and Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundation, pp. 20, 117-18. 37
theory of the social acquisition of political loyalties which includes both the principles of operant conditioning and the principles of vicarious learning can adequately account for the facts. The acqui sition model suggested by this conclusion, and which has already been alluded to above, is a two-phase process of loyalty acquisition. I shall elaborate upon this model in chapter v below.
The Linkage between Political Loyalty and Political Integration
At this point I should like to turn to the third aspect of the concept of political loyalty. This refers to the linkage between loyalty habits, as essentially attitudinal behavior, and the actual pro cess of structuring and institutionalizing a new composite political system. Briefly restated, I should like to inquire into the linkage between political loyalty and political integration.
At the outset it should be appreciated that the problems associated with this inquiry are quite distinct from those related to the exploration of the nature of political loyalty per se. In ana lyzing political loyalty the pertinent subject is the human individual, or human group. In analyzing the linkage between political loyalty and political integration, however, the pertinent subject becomes a social or political system. This is so because political integration is here presumed to involve the decisions and actions of legitimate authorities in the participating social or political system.
And this distinction between the pertinent subjects of the two processes is critical in any attempt to propose hypotheses relating to the linkage between political loyalty and political integration. This 38
is so because any hypothesis positing a general relationship between two variables must always stipulate, explicitly or implicitly, that certain
specific conditions obtain. And for each case to be accounted for by
the hypothesis this same set of specific conditions must obtain, or any
discrepancy must be assumed to be insignificant.
Now, as I have stated just above, the theoretical analysis of
political loyalty involves the positing of hypotheses about the behavior
of human individuals, or human groups. In this case the stipulation of
specific conditions may be minimal because of the general similarity
among all humans of the relevant psychological and physiological
factors. But when analyzing the linkage between political loyalty and political integration the pertinent subject becomes the social or political system, the structure of which varies considerably from case
to case. So, since a general similarity of limiting conditions cannot be assumed, there must be an extensive explication of specific con ditions relevant to any hypothesis relating political loyalty and political Integration.
The initial problem of the heterogeneity of political systems can be rendered manageable by the ordering of the universe of such systems in a comprehensive, or practically comprehensive typology. Such a typology has been suggested by Almond and Powell.^® According to their typological scheme, all political systems may be classified along two scales, and cross-classified according to both scales. One scale represents the degree of secularization exhibited by a system, and the
^®In Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics : A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966). 39 second scale represents the degree of subsystem autonomy allowed.
Almond and Powell define secularization as the cultural analogue
to structural differentiation, involving the process decreasing in the role of traditional orientations in political behavior. Examples given of systems with low degrees of secularization include feudal systems, patrimonial systems, bureaucratic empires, as well as primitive bands.
Such systems also correspond to prenationalist systems. In such sys tems the link between the mass populace and the political decision makers is weak and indirect. Public attitudes as a whole have little effect on public policy. And the level of internal social integration is low. The merger of separate systems into new composite states could 61 occur, but here, to use Karl Deutsch's term, the process involved would be merely political amalgamation. Social integration and political loyalty are not involved in this process, and popular political attitudes have little effect on it.
In secularized or modern systems there is social identity with the state, and social integration. But the degree to which public political attitudes influence public policy still depends on the degree of subsystem autonomy permitted within the system. If the degree of autonomy of functionally relevant structures is low, then the flow of information, especially new information which would challenge the existent political structure, would be sharply curtailed. So, new political attitudes would less frequently form in the first place. But even if such attitudes were widely held, systems with low subsystem
^Cf. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. 40
autonomy would not allow efficient articulation between the public and
the political decision-makers. Thus public influence would be low, and
there would be a low correspondence between public attitudes and public
policy.
The only type, therefore, of system where public attitudes of
new political loyalty would have much effect on the development of pub
lic policy would be highly secularized systems with high subsystem
autonomy. Examples of such systems are the states of North and West
Europe, and North America. This of course includes France and the other
five Common Market members.
The restriction of analysis to this type of system excludes most
of the world's states, and most of the human population. However, this
restriction is necessary because the linkage of public attitudes to
public policy, especially to any degree of efficiency, requires the
existence of participant habits among a population. These habits are a
rather recent development in the course of political evolution, and as
yet are widespread among only a minority of the world's population.
Societies with low degrees of cultural secularization cannot even
generate political loyalty as I have defined the term. And to further
stipulate the requirement of high subsystem autonomy even further
reduces the minority referred to just above. So, given the nature of
the political integration process, only a small number of states are
presently potential participants in the process.
To identify more specifically the states which generate public
policies involving commitment and participation in international inte gration, additional factors must be considered. The most significant of 41
these is the political orientation of the political and social elite.
If the elite restrict their exposure to transnational symbols, find such
symbols nonrewarding or punishing, or find a national orientation highly
rewarding, transnational loyalty will not develop among its members, and
the process will not continue to the other members of the society, and
it will not continue to the point of public policy. Two prominent
examples of states in which the elite maintain national orientation are
Switzerland and the United States. But if the elite do develop a
transnational orientation, the process will continue, but the rate of
translation of public attitudes into public policy will still be affected by other factors. One such factor would be the constitutional arrangement of decision-making authority. The greater degree of inde pendence which political decision-makers enjoy from the interest articulation structure, the greater influence the orientation of these decision-makers will have on public policy. This, for example, seems to explain the greater European component in Dutch policy, with its parliamentary form of government, as compared to the policy of France, which maintains a strong presidency. Other factors which would slow the rate of translation are the degree of fragmentation of the interest articulation structure and the degree of ideological fragmentation.
To return to the case under investigation in this study, France meets all the major conditions for a strong correspondence between pub lic attitudes of transnational loyalty, and a transnationally oriented public policy. A dramatic illustration of this linkage in France is provided by the behavior of the French government during the course of the 1965 Common Market crisis. 42
By 1965 transnational European orientations were widespread among both the elite and mass public of France. Moreover, the major interest groups of France, especially those of an economic definition, rather faithfully articulated this orientation.^ However, especially after 1963, conspicuous reluctance about the course of European inte gration was evidenced by the French government. Then on 1 July 1965, the French government precipitated a major crisis by commencing a boy cott of the E.E.C. Council of Ministers. The ostensive rationale for this move was the need to protect French economic interests being threatened by the Common Market, especially in the area of agricul ture.^ However, the move was immediately denounced by French farm groups.®^ General de Gaulle countered on 9 September by escalating the
French argument. He skirted over the technical issues which occasioned the French break, and made a strong, general attack on the entire Common
Market system. He also said that the Rome Treaty itself was at fault, because of its inclusion of distinct supranational elements. This position was expanded and augmented on 20 October when Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville called for a "revision d*ensemble11 of the
^Helene Delorme, "Le Role de Forces Paysannes dans l1 Elabo ration de la Politique Agricole Commune," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, XIX, No. 2 (April, 1969), 356-91 (hereinafter referred to as "Le Rflle de Forces Paysannes").
^^The background and sequence of events relating to this crisis is rather well covered by Miriam Camps, in her European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966) (hereinafter referred to as European Unification in the Sixties) .
^Cf. Delorme, "Le R^le de Forces Paysannes." 43
Treaty.But the opposition stood firm. In fact, in the face of de Gaulle's attack on the Treaty, the president of France's major farm organization, the F.N.S.E.A., explicitly stated that in order for the
E.E.C. to function well "un certaine dose de supranationalite" was 66 necessary. Then
. . . criticism came from the Patronat, the trades unions, vir tually all political groups except the UNR, from most of the non-Gaullist press and from many influential Frenchmen who had not heretofore been publicly critical of General de Gaulle.67
By the eve of the Presidential election, the governmental position was visibly moderated. After failing to be elected on the first ballot, de Gaulle campaigned on television prior to the second ballot. In the one broadcast devoted to European affairs, the General's tone presented a sharp contrast to his statement of the previous
September. Although he repeated his opposition to supranationalism, de Gaulle stressed at length his commitment to the building of Europe, and his fervent hope that the Common Market would soon surmount its
"current trial."*’®
General de Gaulle was assumed to be bidding for M. Lecanuet's votes, and indications of a more cooperative French approach were regarded with considerable skepticism until after the voting was completed on December 19. However, after the re-election of General de Gaulle, the French government con tinued to show signs of being willing at least to talk with its- partners, and just before Christmas an official reply to the October communication from the Five was finally given to the
65Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, pp. 81-94.
66Delorme, "Le Role de Forces Paysannes," p. 378.
67caraps, European Unification in the Sixties, p. 96.
68ibid., pp. 99-100. 44
Italian Ambassador in Paris. Shortly thereafter it was announced that the Six would meet on January 17 and 18 at Luxembourg.**9
This meeting marked the end of the crisis. The point which must be observed here is that none of the French demands for treaty revision were granted. France re-entered under the same structural conditions which obtained at the time of her boycott. Yet the major issue as defined by President de Gaulle and his ministers was France's intol erance for the structural and legal framework provided by the Treaty of
Rome. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this episode is that internal factors must have been responsible for the shift in the position of the French government. And, as I have tried to demonstrate in the sequence of events sketched above, this internal factor most conspicuously was the contrasting attitude and preference of a majority of Frenchmen, as articulated through almost all the major interest groups, parties, and influential individuals. To be sure, in this instance the coincidence of the presidential election catalyzed the pro cess. But this simply served to put the process in relief. The point remains that France demonstrates a system in which there is a linkage between public attitudes and public policy.^® And this, in turn, demon strates the linkage between political loyalty and political integration.
The dynamics of this linkage will be elaborated upon in chapter v below.
69Ibid., pp. 100-01.
^Another and well-documented study which demonstrates the strong correspondence between public attides and government policy in France is Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds., France Defeats EDC (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957). CHAPTER III
FRANCE AND EUROPE
At the outset of the preceding chapter, I stated that a pre
requisite to the designation of appropriate empirical indicators of
political loyalty is a detailed, theoretically derived, definition of
the term. If the components of political loyalty are to be identified
from among empirical data it is also necessary that the particular,
culturally defined symbols of these theoretically derived concepts be
identified. Restated a bit more operationally, this involves the
translation of theoretically derived concepts into their phenomeno
logical representations among the particular population of investi
gation. This analytic process is, of course, especially required where
the actual data of analysis is itself phenomenological in form. Thus,
in an investigation such as the present one, in which public opinion
questionnaire responses are used as the data of analysis, a concomitant
prerequisite to the designation of appropriate empirical indicators of political loyalty is to identify the meaningful and relevant symbols of
the objects of political loyalty, along with the salience pattern in which these are arranged. To explain changes in salience or the pattern of orientation, other relevant factors will also have to be identified.
To identify and analyze, then, French transnational political
loyalty, the particular objects of transnational orientation pertinent to the French experience shall have to be Identified. I have already 45 46
defined^- political loyalty as a particular orientational pattern on the
part of individuals. And political loyalty is further defined as the
positively cathected orientation toward a social collectivity or a
society as a political system. This society qua political system,
furthermore may be already integrated politically or not. The second
set of objects of orientation of political loyalty are political insti
tutions with legally defined jurisdictional authority.
The first object of orientation, the social collectivity or
society as a political system subsumes orientation to a land, a geo graphic territory, as well as to its associated people. In this analysis of French transnational loyalty, the relevant social and geo graphical object is Europe. So, if it is to be asserted that Frenchmen orient themselves to Europe as a transnational society, it has to be first established that Europe is a significant, and meaningful, socio political symbol for Frenchmen.
The Symbol of Europe 2 Richard Mayne has demonstrated that the word "Europe" is quite ancient, having been in literary application since before the period of the Hellenic Empire. And although Its first application involved a local distinction between the Greek mainland and the Aegean islands, it still early acquired a broader social and political meaning. A contem porary description of the Battle of Tours, 732, used the word
^In the preceding chapter, pp. 7-15.
^Richard Mayne, The Community of Europe (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 29-30. 47
Europeenses (Europeans) to describe the ethnically and religiously
heterogeneous group of individuals which constituted Charles Martel's
fighting force. And an early and distinct political use of the tern
was in the description of Charlemagne as rex pater Europae and apex
Europae, respectively the father king of Europe and the head of 3 Europe.
Deliberate proposals for the unification of Europe also have a
long history. Moreover, they have seemed to exhibit a pattern. After
experiences of fragmentation and violence on the Continent, proposals
have issued forth calling for the unification of Europe. The earliest
such proposals were put forward during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, following the ecclesiastical fragmentation of Europe, and the
pattern of warfare that ensued in the fourteenth century. But these
proposals tended to be ecclesiastical in nature, generally calling for a
unitary organization (or 'reorganization') of Europe under ecclesi
astical auspices.^ After European culture and society became
increasingly secularized, and after the disastrous warfare of the first half of the seventeenth century, secular European federations and con
federations were proposed. The nationalist movement throughout Europe, which ensued the Napoleonic wars, forced the European idea into abeyance. But by the mid-nineteenth century, European proposals again started to be put forth. Perhaps the most significant of these was
Victor Hugo's advocacy of the organization of a "United States of
Europe" at a peace congress held in Paris in 1849, and, at several
3Ibid.. p. 31. 4Cf. ibid., pp. 36-37. 48 subsequent peace congresses.^ But this particular effort ended in a few years and it never did attract significant political support.
The first serious proposals with significant political support for the unification in the period after the Napoleonic Wars occurred after World War I.
It was only after World War I, in fact, that statesmen began seriously to study the possibility of unity in Europe— first in the League of Nations, and later, more specifically, in the proposals of Aristide Briand. Briand had been honorary President of Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan European Union, and when he became Prime Minister of France he was the first holder of that office to announce as part of his programme the founding "the United States of Europe."6
But these interwar efforts were abandoned with the arrival of the depression and the assumption of power by Hitler in Germany.
In the wake of World War II proposals for European unity were again launched. But this time the proposals were sponsored by a number of significant political leaders and received widespread support both within and outside of governments. The reasons for the success of
European effort in the post-World War II period include, among others, the change in the international political role of Europe and the exten sive destructiveness of the war. And the results have been impressive.
With the erection of such transnational organizations as the European
Economic Community, the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom, and the formation of the Western European Union, Europe has achieved a greater degree of political Integration since the fourteenth century, and probably the greatest social integration of all times.
^Kohn, The Age of Nationalism, p. 742.
^Mayne, The Community of Europe, p. 45. 49
But my purpose here was to attempt to establish that Europe is a significant and meaningful symbol for Frenchmen. 1 have shown that the symbol is a quite ancient one. And I have attempted to demonstrate
that Europe as a symbol of Continental political integration has had currency since the fourteenth century. But this has referred to activity generally in Europe, and does not refer specifically to French experience with the symbol. But even here, and I may even say
'especially here,1 there is strong evidence to indicate the general cur rency of the term among Frenchmen. In this connection, Frenchmen of high distinction and of high status have associated themselves with the symbol of Europe for a long time. In the last century Saint Simon,
Victor Hugo, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon had proclaimed and supported the idea of European unity.^ In the interwar period two French Prime
Ministers, Aristide Briand and Edouard Herriot, supported the idea when in office. I have mentioned above that Briand had been honorary presi dent of Coudenhove Kalergi's Pan-European Union. He also personally pursued this objective with conspicuous energy, including a personal appearance and appeal before the Geneva based League of Nations. And after World War II, the idea of European unity was ardently and con spicuously supported by major parties and by political leaders. Most notably among the former were le Mouvement republicajn populalre and
1*Union democratique et socjaliste de la Resistance; and most notably among the latter were Robert Schuman and Rene Plevan. Thus, I would argue, it can be assumed the symbol of Europe had attained both a significance and meaning among Frenchmen generally. Moreover,
^Ibid., p. 40. 50
returning to the concept of transnational loyalty, it can be assumed
that Frenchmen are capable of orienting themselves toward the concept of
Europe as the social component of a transnational political system,
representing both a geographic territory and a people.
The second set of objects I have identified as involved in
political behavior is constituted of political institutions with legally
defined jurisdictional authority. In the case of European loyalty the
relevant jurisdiction for the transnational institutions of orientation
is Europe. And the authority a person should be willing to invest in
such institutions would be the attributes of political authority and
sovereignty that are normally invested in national Institutions in the
case of national loyalty. I am referring here to the functionally spe
cific orientation toward the representations of legitimate political
authority. These representations would be policy-making powers, taxing
powers, and military security responsibilities and powers.
I have stated in the preceding chapter that the ability for
individuals to perceive functionally specific political objects is dependent upon the degree of secularization of their culture. The achievement of cultural secularization usually involves the decrease or elimination of traditional forms of authority. In the past 200 years, or so, this process has generally been accomplished by the growth of the ideology of nationalism. Certainly, this characterizes the French
Q experience. Thus, it may be assumed that Frenchmen are generally capable of functionally specific perception and that they normally
®Cf. Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States. Part II; and Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe," pp. 17-26, 24. 51 engage in functionally specific orientation patterns toward political objects.
Traditional National Values
Having established the basis for being able to assume the qualities among Frenchmen for political loyalty orientations, and having identified the pertinent objects for French transnational loyalty, specifically "Europe" and those powers normally attributed to integrated nation-states, it is now appropriate to identify other elements which would affect French transnational orientations. I am referring here to those orientational elements which define or particularize France in relation to the rest of Europe. These elements most prominently include perceptions of France's status and France's security position in Europe.
The conception of status which has most continuously and promi nently been associated with France, not only in her relationship to
Europe, but to the world, is a notion of cultural pre-eminence.
Originally the notion of pre-eminence may have been less abstract, and more materially based. Historically, France had early attained a leadership position in Europe. By the fourteenth century the kingdom of
France had become the most populous, the richest, and militarily the Q most powerful state in Europe. The France of King Louis XIV in the sixteenth century was still the most populous, richest, and most power ful state in Europe, and it had attained a widely recognized cultural pre-eminence. The French language was considered a cultured and
g Cf. Marie-Madeleine Martin, The Making of France (London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1951). This book was first published in French with the title Histoire de 1*Unite Fran^aise. 1948. 52 superior language by people throughout Europe, and it was used to indi cate learning and high status. Similarly, French customs and manners relating to social intercourse and diplomacy were emulated. With the rise in power and wealth of other European states, Britain, Russia,
Prussia, and then Germany, France lost the ability to claim pre-eminence on the basis of her physical attributes, but the claim was retained on the basis of her culture and her cultural responsibilities.
It is during this period, the period of the last 200 years, that the two elements of France’s conception of its world role which Stanley
Hoffmann has identified are most evident.*'® The first element is
France's "civilizing mission." It was with this self-appointed responsibility that Frenchmen fought to liberate the peoples of Europe at the time of the Napoleonic wars, as well as to bring "civilization" to the peoples of Africa and South-East Asia.*-*- The second element identified by Hoffmann is a Roman conception of national greatness.
This element of self-perception was expressed by the seeking and pos- 12 session of vast areas of colonial territory.
My purpose to this point has been to identify and broadly define the major status patterns associated with France. How this self conception of pre-eminence, of its possession of "une mission
^Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Com munity," in In Search of France, ed. by Hoffmann et a l . (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 1-117, 75-89.
*-*-Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States, pp. 48-58; and Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community."
l^cf. also Raymond Aron, France: Steadfast and Changing (Cam bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 147-48. 53
civilisatrice" and "grandeur,11 came to be expressed in the post-World
War II period and at the time at which the public opinion data was col
lected will be pursued below in this chapter. At this point my attempt
is to argue that the currency of symbols of French pre-eminence has been
so pervasive, historically and among contemporary Frenchmen, that it is
quite reasonable to assume that Frenchmen have been socialized to
incorporate elements of pre-eminence in their conception of France.
Along with her attempt to attain and preserve pre-eminence,
France, in common with other states, has had to be concerned with her
security. Prior to the nineteenth century this concern was a rather
generalized one with respect to the various neighboring states, and it
did not inhibit France from maintaining an offensive posture in Europe.
However, after the Napoleonic wars, having thereby had the demonstration
that "... French power was no longer sufficient to undertake a war of
conquest against the will of a European coalition,France assumed a
defensive posture in Europe. With the growth of Prussian power, and then
the integration of Germany under Prussian auspices, France's defensive
concerns became particularized with respect to Germany. The Prussian
invasion of France in 1870 confirmed French fears of Germany. The First
World War greatly increased these fears.
But the development of a fear of Germany in the last half of the
nineteenth century did not occasion an abstention from concern to main
tain pre-eminence or rank. In fact, it may have heightened such con
cern.
l^Simon Serfaty, France, de Gaulle and Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968), p. xi. 54
A crucial preoccupation, especially after 1871, was the con- cern for rank: France had to remain a major power. The Jlllrdj Republic achieved some of its greatest triumphs in this respect, since it maintained France in the race for colonial conquest as well as in European alliances. Since there could be no enjoy ment of rank without security, those alliances were of par ticular importance.^
And as the objects of French concern for rank became more extensive, in
the form of a large territorial empire, France's security concern like
wise expanded. So that although concern was at first for physical
security of France, it later became expanded to concern for security
for the colonial manifestation of France. This later was expanded to
concern for preserving less concrete manifestations of French status.
So the two concerns--for security and status--became more and more
closely interwoven. By the end of the nineteenth century, security for
France meant also security for France's rank.
World War II confirmed the worst security fears in France. And
because of the severity of her humiliation and destruction, her security
concerns became desperate. But at the same time, France found her
maneuverability restricted and her resources low. The first five post
war years may, I shall offer, be characterized as an attempt to recon
cile her desperate concerns with her poor resources and restricted
maneuverability. Two key components of French self-perception had been
severely affected by the war--her pretensions of rank and her felt need
for security. It shall be demonstrated below that European integration
as a French policy was first arrived at as a means to protect these two national values.
l^Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," p. 19. The Post-World War II Situation
The fall of France in June, 1940 was a severely humiliating
event. The defeat represented the failure of French policy to prevent
war in the first instance, and, far more importantly, it represented
the utter failure of French military strategy, despite the possession
of impressive quantities of materl/l. The defeat thus revealed the
profound weakness of France, both in terms of morale and her system of
government.^ This conclusion derived not merely from the defeat
itself, but also from its rapidity. French defenses were breached at
Sedan on 21 May 1940, only eleven days after the Germans first invaded
Holland. Paris fell only twenty-two days later, on 13 June. And the
armistice with Germany was signed nine days later on 22 June 1940. The
humiliation arising from this collapse was then compounded by' the German
occupation by Nazi SS troops.
Along with suffering this catastrophic defeat, France also only had a slight share in the common victory.^ The major reason for
France's small role, was American hesitancy to adequately supply the
Free French Forces in the last eight months of the war.^ But disre garding causes, the fact that, after a humiliating defeat and occu pation, France did not play a major role in her own liberation, also severely affected her traditional self-image. So, by 1945 the post liberation government, as well as most Frenchmen generally, perceived
^Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945," in In Search of France, ed. by Stanley Hoffmann et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 305-58, 322-24. 56
. . . the crumbling of much of the tradition— of confidence in diplomacy and in the army, of the mistaken belief that liberty could be taken for granted, even of the idea that France was a great nation of the first rank. ^
Hence, Frenchmen emerged from the war with their image of France's rank
severely threatened. This is one of the two main elements of France's
immediate post-war problem.
The second element was her inability to secure rank, and even to
attain basic security. Security for France in the immediate post-war
period meant the prevention of the reoccurrence of German aggression or
failing this, adequate defense against such aggression. In the minds of
French leaders in this period, this implied the maintenance of the war
time united nations alliance of the United States and the Soviet Union 1 9 with Britain and France. In practical terms this meant French
alliances with the other three wartime allies. In order to simul
taneously ensure her independence, which pertained directly to the
question of rank, France had especially to have an alliance with the 20 Soviet Union. This was accomplished with the signing of the French-
Soviet Treaty of Alliance on 10 December 1944. That this act did not
necessarily evidence a particular affinity for the Soviet Union, nor
that it was solely related to defense against Germany, can be rather
directly inferred from the following statement by French Foreign
Minister Georges Bidault in 1946:
^®Ibid., p. 331. The underscoring is mine.
■^■^Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France; Troubled Ally (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 9-11.
^Alfred Grosser, La IVe Republique; et sa Politique Exterieure (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1961), p. 224. 57
An alliance with the West? Of course. How could we do otherwise? But an alliance with the East, also*. We are interested in affairs which go beyond the West. France will never permit itself to be limited to the Western part of the world.*1
The Soviet alliance represented independence, in particular, of
the United States, upon which country France in actuality realized she was dependent. However, Soviet expansionist activities in Manchuria,
North Korea, Iran, Turkey, and Greece aroused anxiety among the leaders
of France and other western countries, and caused France to sign a
Treaty of alliance with Britain in Dunkirk on 10 March 1947.22 But although anxiety about Soviet intentions had increased by 1947, primary security concern was still with Germany. This is evidenced by the fact
that the Dunkirk alliance, as did the French-Soviet alliance, still singled out Germany as the potential aggressor.2^
Thus, until May, 1947 French post-war diplomacy was conducted to secure the two major values severely affected by the Second World
War. These were to attain security, meaning adequate defense against
Germany, and the reassumption of rank. Given France's weakened con dition, the latter value could be pursued by first achieving diplomatic independence. And given these goals and their practical meanings, the alliance system forged by France, with her playing a central position between the Soviets and the West, seemed the most appropriate means.
91 Furnis, France; Troubled Ally, p. 9.
22Cf. Jules Moch, "NATO in Retrospect," in NATO in the Seventies, ed. by Edwin H. Fedder (St. Louis: University of Missouri, Center for International Studies, 1970), pp. 1-12. 23 Serfaty, France, de Gaulle and Europe, p. 7; and Grosser, La IVe Republique; et sa politique extlrieure. p. 24. 58
But, to reiterate, this diplomacy assumed the continuation of at least a minimal degree of cooperativeness between the Soviet Union and the
West, But in May, 1947, when the Communists left the Ramadier govern ment, it became apparent that the Soviets were becoming intolerant of 0 / France's triangular alliance system. ^ It soon became further apparent that the Soviets were determined to engage in a bi-polarization of the world. After June, 1947, the Soviets strongly opposed the Marshall
Plan and French participation therein. The close coordination of the
French Communist Party with Soviet policy at this time increased the significance of this new course of Soviet policy for the French. And any persisting hopes of being able to maintain even a minimal cooperativeness with the Soviets crumbled with the revival of the Comin- form in September, 1947, and fell with the Czechoslovak coup on
24 February 1948.25
This evolution of post-war Soviet policy utterly undermined
French diplomacy. In the first instance, to France's already very limited resources and still weakened condition a second, major threat was added. In the second instance, this change in relationship of the
Soviet Union to France also denied an independent role for France and even more forceably imposed her dependence upon the United States. The effect on France of the deterioration of East-West relations has been described by Jean-Baptlste Duroselle:
2^Grosser, ibid., p. 224. 25 B. D. Graham, The French Socialists and Tripartisme. 1944-1947 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 264-65. Cf. also Moch, "NATO in Retrospect." 59
The Atlantic Pact and the nuclear shield of the United States could well be thought of as a bitter necessity and could give rise to a certain sourness toward the protector, but it was a necessity. To have need of economic aid, of protection, and of military aid, merely in order to survive and not even to resume one's "rank" was humiliating at a time when France was aspiring to the greatness of the past, but it was indeed the harsh lesson of facts.2®
So it should be appreciated that the great dependence of France upon the United States represented a significant problem for French leaders.
The problem, of course, was how to reduce the degree of dependence. It is my thesis here that the search for a solution to this problem, com pelled by aspirations to regain rank, led to the adoption of. a policy . of European integration. This interpretation is made by Stanley
Hoffmann:
With the demise of Vichy, the quest for rank became a vital imperative again, but the nationalism of the Resistance and the General de Gaulle was modified by their understanding of the impossibility for France to recapture "grandeur" outside a context of European solidarity, in an age dominated by extra-European giants.2^
But before being able to understand why the first French proposal for
European integration, the Schuman Plan, took the particular form that it did, another aspect of the French subjective security situation has to be stipulated. Reference here is to the genuine fear of Germany held by Frenchmen. The problem associated with this is that the United
States neither held such a fear, nor did it sympathize with the French subjective condition.
I have already cited evidence of French preoccupation with
26Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945," pp. 338-39.
2^Hoffman, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," pp. 54-55. 60
German potential aggression to the time of the signing of the Dunkirk
Alliance in Marchj 1947, Specifically X observed that in the two mili
tary alliances France had concluded to that time, the French-Soviet
Alliance and the Dunkirk Alliance, Germany had been singled out as the
potential aggressor. This French preoccupation persisted after the
Dunkirk Treaty, even through the mounting evidence of the Soviet break with the West in the summer and fall of 1947. Even as late as
February, 1948, the Revue de Defense Nationale published an article by
General Lecheres which continued to identify the security problem for
France in terms only of German potential aggression.
Now it is true that the Czech coup of the twenty-fourth of that month definitely established, for all but the Communists and a very
small group of neutralist intellectuals,^® that the Soviet Union was now also a threat, and a much more formidable one. And it is also true that in the five party Brussels Pact concluded a short time after, on
17 March 1948, although the preamble continues to refer to Germany, the ten articles of the treaty do not mention Germany. Rather they are addressed to collective action to respond to aggression by any source on
On any member. Thus it was not an anti-German alliance. 7 It was con cluded in the shadow of Soviet aggression and the fear of its extension.
Feeling the need to gain United States adherence to any defense system sufficient to counteract the Soviet threat, the Brussels Pact
28 Duroselle, "Change in French Foreign Policy Since 1945," p. 338.
29 / Grosser, La IVe Republique: et sa politique exterieure. p. 224. 61 partners, including France, met with the United States to achieve this
end in the months following the Brussels Pact. The fruit of these
efforts was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty by France, nine
other^® European states, and the United States, and Canada on
4 April 1949. This was an unambiguously counter-Soviet move. The
French government participated in its negotiations and drafting. And on
25 July 1949 the French National Assembly ratified the Atlantic Pact.
This period, one can retrospectively say, represents the apogee of
French concern with the Soviet threat.
But the major point I am attempting to establish in this section of my argument is that throughout the post-war period, including the period following the Czech coup, there was, among French leaders at least, a persisting fear of Germany. Strong evidence that this fear indeed existed thus derives from the fact that during the ratification debate in the National Assembly, continued concern about Germany was still expressed by a large proportion of the deputies. In fact a majority of the Assembly, with Germany quite clearly implied, approved 31 an amendment requiring the President to seek approval of the Assembly before agreeing to the inclusion of any other state. And before the debate was concluded, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman stated explicitly 32 that Germany would never be admitted. Thus, the fact of a
30 JVThese nine were: Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxem bourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and The United Kingdom. O 1 ■'•‘■To Article 10 of the treaty which provides for the attachment of other states.
Grosser, La IVe Republique, et sa politique exterieure. pp. 227-28. 62 persisting fear of Germany can be accepted.
French policy during this period, therefore, had a large German
component. So, in addition to seeking diplomatic and national "inde pendence,” and to reconstruct the French economy, French policy also
sought permanent control over Germany. This idea of "permanent con
trols" had a number of specific policy meanings. First it called for preventing the re-establishment of a centralized German state. Second, it called for the control of German heavy industry. And third, it called for preventing the re-establishment of a German army.
The prevention of the re-establishment of a centralized German state was attempted by maintenance of the occupation regime and by the separation of significant territories from Germany. But here the French were frustrated by opposition from all of her allies. By 1948,
£tQogether with other dreams of the Resistance, that of perma nent controls over Germany had already failed. The three major occupying powers rejected from the start French demands for the separation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland, and for com plete decentralization of Germany. . . . The Ango-American eagerness to rebuild West Germany as a bulwark against Soviet power in Europe had then defeated French attempts to postpone a centralized West German government.33
But if the French could reconcile themselves to the impossi bility of fragmenting the German territory or preventing the establish ment of a centralized German, that is, a West German, government, they considered their request for the international control of German heavy industry much more reasonable. After all, German heavy industry had been the basis of the German war machine. And as it became apparent
•^Paul A. Gagnon, France Since 1789 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 486. 63
that Germany would recover her political personality the need for con
trol of her industry became more urgent.
Particularly applied, German heavy industry referred to the coal
exploitation and steel manufacturing works in Germany. Geographically
this referred to the Ruhr and Saar territories of Germany. In 1947
France disposed of part of the problem by formally attaching the Saar
to itself by means of an economic union. The arrangement ultimately worked out with respect to the Saar left this German-speaking territory
politically autonomous, but economically controlled by France.
France could not similarly absorb the Ruhr. But in 1947 France
did propose a system of international control and Allied ownership of
the region's coal and steel industry. However, this proposal was not
accepted, in its original form, by Britain or the United States. There ensued negotiations between the Western Allies which ultimately found
France consenting to a compromise. The final agreement signed in
April, 1949 set up the International Authority for Ruhr, in which
Germany had a minority voice.
The Authority, however, was weak, and triply unpopular--with France, who wanted to strengthen it, with Great Britain and the United States, who doubted whether it was necessary, and with Germany, who disliked such unilateral application of con trol.34
So, because of British and United States lack of sympathy with the degree of control the French felt was necessary over the Ruhr, an unsatisfactory and unstable arrangement resulted. The French were initially unable to subject the Ruhr to unilateral French control. By
34Mayne, The Community of Europe, p. 88. 64
1949 It became apparent that the United States and Britain could not be
depended upon to achieve French goals in this area. The only available
policy alternative was a European centered policy. This, of course,
could not mean a return to the pre-war national competitive situation.
Rather it could only mean a policy of close cooperation among the states
of Europe. Thus, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the best
hope for French security from Germany was a policy of European union,
involving close cooperation between France and Germany. The point of
argument to be made here is that the foregoing does not support an
image of French European policy deriving from excessive altruism on the
part of French leaders of the time. Rather, the policy was being
arrived at as a distinctly instrumental device to realize a major French
national value--the attainment of physical security from Germany.
In fact the year 1949 witnessed the conjoining of other events
and conditions which practically produced a French European policy.
First, the new German government expressed considerable unhappiness
about the status of the Saar. This, in turn, inhibited the cultivation
of new, firm grounds for Franco-German cooperation, which was necessary
to work out the general security problem. This need became particularly
urgent after May, 1949, when the new Basic Law of West Germany came into
force. Germany was thereafter beginning to re-emerge as an independent party.
Although France, Britain, arid the United States still retained control of armaments, foreign affairs, and other matters, it was clear that eventually the German Federal Republic would have to be re-admitted to full status. At the time, for many people in France and elsewhere, this was a more revolutionary step than it seems today, when memories of the Nazis and of World War II are older and fainter . . . j and there was then 65
an even more obvious need to prevent the new Republic from playing the tempting role of an Eastern European third force.’5
In addition, there was the need to ensure the flow of United States
Marshall Aid funds. This implied Franco-German cooperation because the
United States, in the Economic Cooperation Act which authorized Marshall
Aid, actually required cooperation among the recipient states.
In response to this requirement, eighteen European states established the'Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in
April, 1948. But this organization very early restricted its function to a minimal degree of economic cooperation, and proved unable to be a vehicle for an independent European policy. France, in particular, was dissatisfied with the nature of the organization from its very beginning.
At the March, 1948, meeting of the Committee of European Eco nomic Cooperation, France sought to introduce a degree of "supranationality" into the future of O.E.E.C. by giving it a strong executive board with a Secretary-General empowered to take major policy decisions of his own accord; but this sug gestion, and the proposal for majority voting, met a cool reception from Great Britain, reluctant to give up the right of independent action, as well as from the Benelux countries, fearful of being overruled.3®
France, however, did fully participate in the OEEC, consistent with her desire to increase European economic cooperation, and to ensure the receipt of Marshall Aid. But the French leadership was desirous of closer cooperation than was afforded by the OEEC, and the French under stood this to be the wish of the United States Department of State.^7
Hence, a different and more "European" policy was implied.
35Ibid., pp. 86-87. 36Ibid., pp. 77-78. 37Ibid., p. 77. 66
Marshall Aid and closer economic cooperation were felt to be
necessary not merely to expedite European reconstruction, but also to 38 prevent a possible European economic crisis.
To the several elements just reviewed another must be added which rendered more specific the policy direction evolving at this time.
I am referring here to the rise of what Jean-Baptiste Duroselle calls
"a new generation" of French elites, a group to whom
. . . the concepts of rank, glory, and traditional power were considered secondary. . . . For these people the national goals— once security was attained--were economic expansion and European integration.^
The commitment of the "Europeans" among this group was sufficiently
strong to cause them to be impatient with the lack of movement toward
European unity on the part of the existing European organizations. This
impatience applied not only to the OEEC with its limited coordinative function, but also to the official political institution of a united
Europe, the Council of Europe, founded in Strasbourg on 5 May 1949.
Throughout the year after its founding the federalists, Including the
French members of this group, pressed for the assumption of at least a minimal federal authority on the part of the Council, In this effort they consistently failed, largely because of the opposition of the
British, unwilling at that time to relinquish any economic or social sovereignty. By the end of the first quarter of 1950, the French
3®Pierre Gerbet, "La Genese du Plan Schuman," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. VI, No. 3 (July-September, 1956), 525-53, 537.
■*®Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945," P. 337. 67
Europeans were disabused of the European potential of the Council of
Europe.
All of the elements, then, led to the bold initiative undertaken
by France in May, 1950 to set up the first truly supranational European
institution in modern history. The particular event was the announce
ment on 9 May by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of the French
government's proposal for the establishment of a transnational and
supranational Coal and Steel Community between France and Germany, as
well as other European states which would elect to participate in an
organization of this kind. This proposal, to which the European Eco
nomic Community or "Common Market" is its sequel, represented the first major step in the economic, social, and political integration of Western
% Europe. It received the immediate support of the German government, led
by Konrad Adenauer, and of the Italian government, led then by Alcide de
Gasperi. In less than a year's time a treaty was drawn up. This was
signed on 18 April 1951 by the six states which still constitute the membership of the European Common Market today, France, The German
Federal Republic, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The
treaty was ratified by all of its signatories by the summer of 1952, and
the first meeting of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) was held in Luxembourg on 10 August 1952. Since then, the enterprise of building Europe, in the sense of Robert Schuman who referred in that initial announcement to "the European federation which is indispensable to the maintenance of peace,has attracted the aspirations and has become the object of identity of widening circles of
^Mayne, The Community of Europe, p. 86. 68
Frenchmen who see "Europe" as an end to be achieved, and not merely as the instrument for some broader policy. However, the "Europe" launched by Schuman-, I repeat, was primarily, in the minds of all but a small portion of the French leadership, an instrumental device designed mainly to preserve and protect French national values. To emphasize this point I shall enumerate the principle events and circumstances discussed above and which stimulated the production of the Schuman proposal. By the beginning of 1950, the French leadership found itself with:
1. The need to find a more satisfactory and effective replace
ment for the International Authority for the Ruhr to con
trol the heavy industry of a Germany which had just
recovered her political personality;
2. The need to remove the irritating quality of the Saar's
status by putting the question in a more general context;
3. The need to find new grounds for Franco-German cooperation,
again especially in the light of the re-assumption by
Germany of her independence;
4. The need to integrate Germany into the Western World;
5. The need to do something to ensure the continued flow of
United States Marshall Aid;
6. The need to prevent a possible European economic crisis;
7. The need to find a more promising alternative to the OEEC
and the Council of Europe in the effort to build Europe;
and
8. The need to ensure a means of effective independent action
by France between the East and West, which would both 69
protect France's personality and help reduce dangerous
international tensions.
The Schuman Plan represented a package solution for all of these
needs. ^ But these are all distinctly national needs, relating directly
to the preservation and protection of a secure France, occupying her
accustomed international station. It is quite true that the Schuman
Plan represented an unconventional means to attain these ends, but,
then, the circumstances in which French leaders found themselves in the
post-World War II period were quite unconventional. But the point I am
attempting to establish here is that the Schuman Plan--this venture into
supranationalism, which, if successful, could only accomplish a
reduction of French sovereignty, and this first dramatic move in the
launching of a united Europe--was put forward, primarily, as an instru mental device designed to protect long-standing French national values.
It was designed to ensure security for France, and her attainment of the diplomatic independence which was a prerequisite to attainment of rank.
This point is a very important one because as I shall demonstrate specifically below in chapter iv, the present orientation pattern toward
European institution shaz'ed by a majority of Frenchmen is not consistent with this original motive. The present majority of Frenchmen view
European supranationalism as an enterprise which ought to be served by
France, rather than vice versa, and an enterprise to which it is appropriate that France relinquish some of her traditional attributes.
^ C f . Gerbet, "La Genese du Plan Schuman," p. 537; Serfaty, France, de Gaulle, and Europe, pp. 11, 25; Mayne, The Community of Europe, p. 88; Grosser, La IVe Republique; et sa Politique Extjtrieure, pp. 229-31; and Gagnon, France Since 1789. pp. 486-87. 70
There has been no negation of France in this process. Rather, the modern spirit is one of joint enterprise. Nevertheless there has been
an inversion of "means" and "ends" in the French-European experience.
This process is actually quite normal. But it must be understood to, in
turn, understand the patterns of orientation toward Europe exhibited by
Frenchmen in the 1960s.
Before attempting to conclude about the nature of French
European orientation, I should offer more evidence to help explain the
particular form which the French response, that is, the proposal of a
supranational community with jurisdiction over a basic sector of the participating states' economies.
I have already referred to the fact that the United States officially urged and supported cooperation among the E u r o p e a n ^ states.
This stance alone was an important factor, not only in giving direction, but more importantly, in providing support to the strong Europeans in
France as well as in the other states, thereby bolstering their influence in the policy-making councils. In this connection, Altiero
Spinelli, long-time European and present member of the Commission of the
European Community, has stated that " UJhis American posture promoting
European unit^J . 7 . has without doubt been the most Important card which the Europeans have held. . . ."^3 But, in addition, United States administration of this policy gave it even more specific direction.
^Serfaty, France, de Gaulle, and Europe, p. 54.
Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 18. Cf. also pp. 174-75. 71
When the Committee of European Economic Co-operation had first met in July, 1947, the American experts present, led by Under secretary William Clayton, had strongly urged the need not only for co-operation but for unity among the European participants. This aim was echoed in the policy statement of the United States' Economic Co-operation Act authorizing Marshall Aid, which recalled "the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers," and affirmed the belief "that similar advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe." These words suggested some thing more like a customs union in Europe than a simple agree ment to co-operate; and a former official of the U.S. State Department who was concerned with the matter has stated that it was "largely in response to American urging" that the Committee of European Economic Co-operation indeed discussed the possi bility of a European customs union.44
Another important factor in determining the specific French
response was the personal commitment of the French Foreign Minister,
Robert Schuman. Having experienced exile from his homeland of Lorraine
because of the Franco-Prussian War, and having lived in Metz in the
Lorraine, under German rule, and finally having been imprisoned by the
Germans during World War II, Robert Schuman was a Frenchman who per
sonally suffered as a consequence of Franco-German hostility and who
also personally felt an understanding of Germans. His experience, and his subjective interpretation of it, led him to assume a strong personal commitment to help build Franco-German cooperation and friendship. In
the post-World War II period, Schuman emerged as a strong European.
Bolstering this personal inclination was the fact that the
Catholic Church and the various Catholic parties were strongly in favor of European integration. Starting in 1948 Pope Pius XII and the Vatican
^Mayne, The Community of Europe, pp. 76-77. 72 were strongly in favor of increasing European integration.^ Although the French Church, because of division on the question among French
Catholics, did not take a correspondingly strong stand, the main
Catholic Party of France at that time, and the party of Robert Schuman, the M.R.P., was forthright in its position on increasing European inte gration.^ And to Schuman1s personal inclination and the position of the Vatican and of the Catholic parties must further be added the coin cidence that at the time of the formulation and proposition of the
Schuman Plan strong Catholic Europeans were at the head of the Italian and West German governments. It must be presumed that Robert Schuman was not unaffected by positions of Italy's Alcide de Gasperi and West
Germany's Konrad Adenauer when he was faced with the problem of fashioning an appropriate policy to deal with the major outstanding
French foreign policy needs and problems
As a final factor I make reference to a point made earlier about the lack of an extant feasible alternative to the Schuman Plan. The only already existing European organization professedly dedicated to
European unity was the Council of Europe. But this organization was
^Marcel Merle, "Les facteurs religieux de la politique exterieure francaise," in Forces Reliaieuses et Attitudes Politique dans la France Contemporajre, e d . by Ren£ Remond (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1965), pp. 311-38, 325-26 (hereinafter referred to as "Les facteurs religieux").
^Ibid. Cf. also Spinelli, The Eurocrats, pp. 174-75.
^Cf. Robert Rochefort, "Robert Schuman; 1'Homme d'une Politique," Revue de Defense Nationale. XXV (April, 1969), 667-77 (hereinafter referred to as "Robert Schuman"); also Furniss, France, Troubled Ally, p. 26. 73
unwieldy in size, and rendered ineffective for independent action by
British inhibitions,^®
So, consequent to this mix of positive and negative factors, the
French government in May, 1950 launched the first supranational step in
the building of Europe. But, I reiterate, in the minds of most French
leaders, the Schuman Plan was an instrumental device designed to secure
French security or independence or both. In fact the Chef de Cabinet of
Robert Schuman from November, 1947 to April, 1952, Robert Rochefort, has
stated^ that the Europeanism even of his former chief did not derive
from a commitment to European supranationalism, or even unity, per se, but rather out of a strong desire simply to bring together the French
and Germans in friendship to obviate the possibility of the recurrence of conflict.
Public support for the Schuman Plan developed shortly after its announcement.*^ But even at this level the original orientation toward
the European institutions and system set up under the Schuman Plan was also instrumental. Evidence that this was the case for both French elites and the general public, and that supranationality as a principle was not accepted, as late as 1954 is provided by the nature of the pub lic and parliamentary debate about the European Defense Community.
As I have stated above, one of the French foreign policy goals
^®Furniss, France; Troubled Ally, pp. 30-31; and Mayne, The Community of Europe, p . 83.
^Rochefort, "Robert Schuman."
^ G e o r g e s Goriely, "L'Opinion Publique et le Plan Schuman," Revue Francaise de Science Politique. Ill, No. 3 (July-September, 1953), 585-611. 74 with regard to Germany immediately after the war was to prevent the reconstitution of a German army. Until the Czech coup, the question of a German military role, of course, never arose. The coup, which made such a question logical as part of a general consideration of how to provide for the European defense against the Soviet Union, nonetheless inaugurated only abstract and hypothetical discussions of the idea."^
Even after the North Atlantic Treaty had been ratified, and although discreet but persistent discussions of the question of German rearmament began to occur in unofficial circles, no Western government officially
CO endorsed the idea. But the North Korean invasion of June, 1950 com pletely transformed the question. Now, fearing a parallel invasion in
Europe, the immediate construction of an effective anti-Soviet defense force was called for, especially by the United States and Britain. This very notion directly implied a German contribution. French spokesmen argued that France had no objections to German rearmament, provided that this occurred after the construction of a united Europe. But the building of such a Europe had just begun; therefore, the question of
German rearmament was premature. But United States pressure for the immediate rearmament of Germany was severe and persistent. It was in these unhappy circumstances, then, that French Premier Rene Plevan in
October, 1950 offered a plan which would meet the United States stipu lated European defense needs and protect French interests with respect to Germany,
51 Cf., e.g., an article by Maurice Duverger in Le Monde. November 27, 1948.
Furniss, France; Troubled Ally, p. 62. 75
The Plevan Plan proposed the creation of a European Defense
Community (EDC) among the six states involved in the Schuman Plan. A
supranational European Defense Ministry was to be set up, headed by a
European Defense Minister, who would control an integrated European
army. This army was to be made up of contingents from all of the par
ticipating countries, including therefore, German contingents. But
these units were to be led by an integrated officer corps; there were to
be no national officer corps associated with the European army. In this
fashion the French government was willing to concede, in contradiction
to its own policy goals, the creation of armed German military units,
but there would still be no Germany. It was also assumed that the per
niciousness of even these fragmented German units would be controlled by
their dilution in the greater European army.
But almost immediately, strong opposition began to develop in
France. This opposition continued to increase over the next four years
until the repeatedly amended and severely qualified treaty the proposal
had evolved into was given the coup de grace by the French National
Assembly in August, 1954. But why did this proposed sequel to the
Schuman Plan suffer such a different fate? I shall attempt to provide
the explanation by demonstrating how the same factors which guaranteed
the success of the Schuman Plan doomed the Plevan Plan.*^
The Schuman Plan gained widespread popular support because it was seen as an effective device to serve major French national goals.
The major concern in the public mind was the problem of security with
53 As the European Defense Community was alternately referred to. 76 regard to Germany. In this connection the Coal and Steel Community was seen to guarantee such security. The ECSC Treaty promised a peaceful
Germany; therefore, it was supported. ^ The EDC, on the other hand, appeared to ensure the very opposite. The main purpose, in the French public mind, of the Pleven Plan was to recreate a German army, or, at the very least, bring German troops back into existence. But this per ception was sufficient, because it was automatically interpreted to therefore constitute a danger for France.^ It should be emphasized that this equation was automatic on the part of a significant portion of the French public. For support of this assertion consult the data reproduced in Table 5 below. As can be seen, even the formula proposed as the Pleven Plan, the existence of German troops within a European army is still perceived as a danger by 37 per cent, while only 28 per cent deny this conclusion.^ This element remained the major unacceptable feature of the treaty. There were, to be sure, other factors which served to bring the German complaint in relief. Primary among these was the reduction of international tensions following the
Korean truce and the death of Stalin in 1953. But the significant observation to be retained was the persisting great fear of Germany.
-*^Cf. Alfred Grosser, "Germany and France: A Confrontation," in France Defeats EDC. ed. by Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 54-70. Cf. also Jean Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," ibid., p. 80. 55 Stoetzel, ibid.. pp. 80-85; also Grosser, La IVe Republique; et sa politique ext^rieure, p . 245. Eg For elite attitudes, cf. Furniss, France: Troubled Ally, p. 75; also Aron, France: Steadfast and Changing, p. 150. TABLE 5
FRENCH INTERPRETATION OF SEVERAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF - GERMAN REARMAMENT
October, 1950 April, 1951 May, 1953 June, 1953 7. % % %
German rearmament would augment France's security 20 18 would diminish 45 34 would have no influence 16 17 no opinion 19 31
The existence of German troops constitutes a danger for France 57 does not 25 no opinion 18
The existence of German troops within the Western army endangers the security of France 37 does not 28 no opinion 35
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Jean Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," in France Defeats EDC, ed. by Daniel L e m e r and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 82. 78
This fear conditioned the French outlook toward any European policy or proposed or existing institution.
The Plevan Plan was also opposed because it seemed to contravene other national goals as well. Andre Philip has demonstrated that
significant opposition came from the perception that the EDC would have C 7 harmful economic consequences.
In addition, the EDC was perceived to threaten France's inter national independence or neutrality. I have already attempted to demonstrate that this desire for Independence derived from the main tenance of a traditional pretension to international rank. By 1954 this traditional preoccupation still represented the foreign policy commit ment of a large section of Frenchmen, probably still a majority. See
Table 6 for data measuring the level of this orientation in
October, 1954. These people saw the EDC as committing France to an anti-Soviet system, thereby imposing the obligation upon France "... to connect her own self-defense to a cause that was not necessarily her own."-*®
Another expression of the pretension to rank was the retention of the colonial empire, the French Union. I have argued above that with the change in France and relative economic and military status during the nineteenth century, the French empire came to be the abstracted representation of French pre-eminence. In the period when the
Andre Philip, "The Interplay of Interests and Passions," in France Defeats EDC. ed. by Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 31-32.
5®Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," p. 90. Cf. also p . 70. 79
TABLE 6
DEGREE OF NEUTRALISM AMONG FRENCHMEN AS MEASURED BY A NATIONAL SAMPLE CONDUCTED IN OCTOBER, 1954
France should be at the present time
in the Western camp 37% in the Eastern camp 2 in neither of the camps 39 no opinion 22
Total 100%
In case of a war between the U.S. and the USSR, France should be
on the side of the U.S. 22% on the side of the USSR 2 neutral 53 no opinion 23
Total 100%
Source: Jean Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," in France Defeats EDC, ed. by Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 76. 80
humiliation France suffered in the Second World War was still strongly
felt, and during her continued economic and social weakness, an even
greater significance was invested in the French Union. This relates
directly to another major reason the EDC was opposed, especially by the
leadership. In 1954 France was still in conspicuously weak condition,
aggravated by governmental instability. Moreover, there was widespread
anxiety about the future of France. ^ In these circumstances, the EDC
did not appear constructively pertinent to the French situation.
Additionally, another quite important reason for opposition was the fear
that the EDC would lead to the breakup of the French Union. In this
connection, opposition was specifically to the supranational character
of the EDC.*^ The French Union was quintessentially a national enter
prise. Yet the supranational character of the EDC would tend to reduce
the national character of France. The perception was that this would
thereby threaten the continuation of the French Union. But it must be
recalled what the French Union itself was symbolic of, and it will then
be seen that opposition to supranationality was thus derived from a com mitment to the traditional value of French individual pre-eminence.
The point to be made here is that by the end of 1954 there still was no strong commitment to the principle of supranationality. Indeed,
it appears that there was significant opposition to this principle.
So, I have demonstrated that commitment to the principle of supranationality was not the motivating factor in 1950, with the
^Nathan Leites and Christian de la Malene, "Paris from EDC to WEU," World Politics. IX, No. 2 (January, 1957), 193-219, 199.
60Ibid., pp. 202-03. 81
launching of the Schuman Plan and the establishment of the first supra national European institutions. Rather, the major motivating char acteristic of the ECSC was its instrumentalism in the service of tra ditional French national values. These values, to reiterate, were the
demonstration of rank and the attainment of security with respect to
Germany. As has just been demonstrated above, this particular moti vation dictated rejection of the EDC, just as surely as it constituted support for the ECSC. Obviously, then, the shared features of the ECSC and the EDC, their common supranational character, was an insignificant, and to some extent, even a negative factor in the m'fhds of most French leaders and people.
A study conducted among French parliamentarians in the first quarter of 1958 finds this instrumentalism with respect to traditional 61 national values to still be strong. A Specifically it was found that
French leadership in early 1958 still looked upon the European enter prise as a means of augmenting French independence from the United
States.62
Yet ten years later a French national survey reveals a majority of French elites willing to replace the French army with a European army. Also 42 per cent of the general public consented to the propo sition, while only 36 per cent registered dissent. These data are dis played in Table 7 below. Certainly this evidences a different majority sentiment, a different orientation toward Europe, than was evidenced
^ L l o y d A. Free, Six Allies and a Neutral (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959), in particular, pp. 93-109.
62Ibid., p. 109. 82
TABLE 7
DEGREES OF SUPPORT FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMY WITH A EUROPEAN ARMY AMONG FRENCH SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS IN APRIL, 1968
In No Favor Opposed Opinion Total % % % %
Total Sample3 42 36 22 100
Higher Grade (Civil Service), Liberal Professions** 59 28 13 100 Small merchants, artisans 53 30 17 100 Salaried employees, Middle Grade (Civil Service 54 30 16 100 Workers 36 45 19 100 Farmers 34 33 33 100 Retired 37 34 29 100
Source: Compiled from: Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "Les Franyais et l1Unification Politique de 1'Europe, d'apres un Sondage de la Sofres," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, XXX, No. 3 (September, 1968), 145-70. The tabular data appear on p. 167.
aTotal Sample figures are interpreted to represent the French general public.
^Higher Grade (Civil Service) and Liberal Professions is inter preted to represent the French Elite.
N = 2,000. 83 63 during the EDC debate. Concern then was for the protection of French
national institutions, values, and attributes. Chief among these during
the debate was the French army, and the French Union. Because of the
concern the principle of supranationality was per se not supported, and
it was even opposed. Yet, as Table 8 below demonstrates this same
national survey found all French socioeconomic categories supporting an
explicitly supranational political organization for Europe by majorities
ranging from 51 per cent to 76 per cent. The mean for the entire sample
was 63 per cent. Thus, three-fourths of the French elites and almost
two-thirds of the general public endorsed the principle of supra
nationality in the spring of 1968.
But support of supranationality implies nonconcern with the pro
tection of traditional French national values, at least in the sense
these were understood at the advent of the twentieth century and yet in
the immediate post-World War II period, I shall not deny that Frenchmen may remain attached to a goal of French pre-eminence in some abstracted
sense. But what I am saying is that attachment to what Stanley Hoffmann
calls "a Roman conception of greatness"^ seems to have waned.
Attachment to the principle of supranationality is incompatible with an orientation toward Europe as simply a means to attain peculiarly
French values. Attachment to supranationalism implies, at the very
least, a willingness to participate in joint, transnational, efforts.
^^For corroborative findings, cf. Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 225.
^Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," p. 81. TABLE 8
DEGREE OF SUPPORT OF SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF EUROPE AMONG FRENCHMEN IN APRIL, 1968
Favor Supra No nationalism Opposed Opinion Total % % %
Total Sample3 63 20 1 7 100
Higher Grade (Civil Service), Liberal Professions 76 16 8 100 Small merchants, artisans 68 18 14 100 Salaried employees, Middle Grade (Civil Service) 73 20 7 100 Workers 61 24 15 100 Farmers 51 18 31 100 Retired 56 20 24 100
Source: Compiled from: Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "Les Franjais et 11 Unification Politique de I 1Europe d'apres un Sondage de la Sofres," Revue Frangaise de Science Politique, XXX, No. 3 (September, 1968), pp. 145-70. The tabular data appear on p. 161.
aTotal Sample figures are interpreted to represent the French general public.
^Higher Grade (Civil Service) and Liberal Professions is interpreted to represent the French Elite.
N = 2,000.
00 85
Accordingly, those exhibiting such attachment would no longer orient
themselves toward a France with an individual mission to attain its
appropriate rank and to strive therefore to realize the International
independence represented by neutralism.
Thus I have Identified two attitudinal populations in France.
I have just described some major characteristics of a group which has
attained a majority after 1960. This group may be referred to as the
French supranationalists. It distinguishes itself from the group which
had previously been in the majority and which held a more instru mentalist orientation toward Europe. This second group may, therefore,
be referred to as the traditionalist Europeans.
But how may this change in majority sentiment be explained? The
answer to this question involves the explanation of the change in majority status between the two groups. But, to answer this question,
in turn, it is first necessary to establish the existence and nature of
the groups identified above. My first reference to these groups was in
the assertion just previous that I have identified two attitudinal
populations in France. I simply refer by this term to the division of
responses to the several survey questions involving supranationalism
reported above, as well as to the dominant sentiment present at the time of the EDC debate, and which sentiment is not evidenced with majority status in surveys done twelve and fourteen years later. The divided responses, in themselves, evidence at least two populations of attitudes.
But corresponding groups within the physical population of
Europe and France have also been identified. Altiero Spinelli, for an 86 instant case, has distinguished between Federalists and Confederalists
in Europe. While the former are committed to the establishment of democratic and supranational political institution, the latter are com mitted to traditional national values.
They are seeking to recover, at a European level, the glory, power, and grandeur which European national states once had, or aspired to have, which were lost in the course of events during the last half century of European anarchy. Because the natural depositories of this glory are the old nation states, they cannot renounce the fundamental symbol of their status, which is sovereignty. Because we are living in a period when the political scene is dominated by colossi such as the United States and the Soviet Union, the European states, however, must join together in a league or a con federation in order to keep their position.^®
And Simon Serfaty has referred to these same two groups within France.
Corresponding to Spinelli's Federalists are Serfaty's Maximalists. This group seeks to expand the supranational character of the European Com munity. And corresponding to Spinelli's Confederalists are those
Serfaty refers to as Minimalists or Gaullists. This group has looked upon European integration as a means of promoting neutralism.
Throughout the fifties, the Gaullists opposed various measures of European unification. . . . Q 3 hey wanted European unity as an act of self-differentiation from the United States, whereas the maximalists of the Fourth Republic often regarded the nascent European community as part of a constantly evolving Atlantic Community.^
I have already associated the role of neutralism in the defeat of EDC in 1954. And I have suggested the historical opposition of neutralism to supranationalism. Stanley Hoffmann lends support to this
65 Spinelli, The Eurocrats, pp. 10-13.
66Ibid., p. 13.
^Serfaty, France, de Gaulle,.and Europe, pp. 134-35. interpretation by observing the evolution away from neutralism during
the same period that support for supranationalism has grown.Lerner
and Gorden have provided corroboration for this observation.^^ But
these authors have also described this phenomenon in a conceptual con
text relevant to its theoretical explanation. Specifically, they refer
to the current majority group which is supranationalist and pro-United
States, as opposed to neutralist as a new generation.7^ The sug
gestion, then, is that the distinction between attitudinal populations,
between the two orientational groups, is actually a distinction between
generations. In this connection it should be recalled that I referred7^-
to Duroselle's observation of the appearance of a "new generation" of 72 French elites at the time of the formulation of the Schuman Plan.
This generation was, at that time, distinctly European, and rather
unconcerned with the traditional concepts of rank and glory. The expla
nation for the growth of supranational sentiment, then, is that this
generation of Frenchmen grew in numbers until it reached majority
status. This status was attained in the late 1950s for the French
elite, and in the mid-1960s for the general public.
The reasons for the growth of this new generation, and the
decline of the more traditionally oriented generation, are rather
68 Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," p. 78.
^Lerner and Gorden, Euratlantica, pp. 5, 257-59.
70Ibid., p. 259. 710n p. 66.
7^Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945," p. 337. 88
evident. It can be immediately observed that in sharp contrast to the
situation in 1954, at the height of the EDC debate, there is, since
1963, no more French Union, a new and more stable economic situation,
and political stability. Thus, some of the main factors encouraging
neutralism have disappeared. Additionally and more far reaching, France
since the war has been in historically new circumstances. First, it is
dwarfed military by the two non-European superpowers; thus, it is no
longer the great power it has traditionally been and which status it
still enjoyed while the present older generation of Frenchmen were being
socialized. Second, France exists in a world at present in which she is obviously economically and militarily interdependent. This is the world situation in which the newer generation grew, and is growing, up.
Hence, since the mid-1960s there have been two, sequentially related, European orientational groups. One, which began to lose its majority status at the end of the 1950s has a more instrumental view toward the European enterprise, seeing it as a means to secure tra ditional French values by promoting neutralism and providing an arena for French leadership. Gaullism is the most coherent single expression of this orientation pattern.The second and newer group looks upon
Europe as the natural economic, social, and political context in which
France should participate for the mutual benefit of itself and other
Europeans. This group is in favor of supranational institutions and,
73Cf. Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," pp. 54-55; and Learner and Gorden, Euratlantica, p. 259.
7^Jean Neurohr, "Was ist Gaullismus?" Zeitschrift Fur Politik, XVI, No. 1 (1969), 11-25. 89
disabused of traditional concepts, tend to be opposed to neutralism and
in favor of close European-United States relations.
Before turning to the quantitative analytic findings in the next
chapter, one final, theoretically significant, point should be made
explicit. I have referred above to the fact that popular support for
European Integration developed only after the first stage, the Schuman
Plan, was proposed. Elsewhere I repeatedly referred to the fact that in
the growth of supranational sentiment, the increase in its support among
elites has always preceded an increase among the general public. The
point I wish to make explicit, then, is that the European integration movement was originally, and is still, an elite-led movement.^ This
fact, of course, accords to the "two-phase process of loyalty acqui
sition" model I have posited in chapter ii. I shall pursue this
theoretical point in the next two chapters.
^^Spinelli, The Euracrats. p. 7. CHAPTER IV
FRANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FINDINGS
The Analytic Method
The principal quantitative data employed in this study are pub
lic opinion questionnaire responses derived from a number of national surveys conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP).
These particular surveys were conducted over a five and one-half year period, from June, 1962 to January, 1968.^
The principal analysis, to be described in detail below, involved IFOP Surveys #4201, #7071, #A941, and #B401. These surveys were subjected to factor analysis, and constituted the source for the main findings. The other surveys provided data which were used to help corroborate and further define the main findings.
All the surveys were omnibus surveys conducted over the whole of metropolitan France. The samples were chosen on the basis of the stratified quota technique.
■^Here following is the list of the surveys, their identification numbers, and execution dates, which were used in the present investi gation : IFOP # Execution Date 4201 5 June 1962 7071 25 May 1965 10031 10 May 1966 A941 7 February 1967 B401 8 May 1967 B531 6 June 1967 C461 29 January 1968
90 91
The object of this study is an analysis of political loyalty.
Particularly, I am seeking to analyze French transnational loyalty.
Methodologically this involves the identification of its components.
Statistically this would be represented by the identification of a
pattern of variables which correlated with appropriate indicators of
transnational loyalty. Consistent with this end, the principal method
of statistical analysis deemed appropriate consisted of the factor
analysis and the simple intercorrelation matrix analysis of each set of
data, i.e., each survey, which contained an indicator of transnational
loyalty. The immediate object was to discover which other indicators
would cluster closely with the transnational indicator. Ideally the
transnational indicator would load highest on an extracted factor, and
thus define that factor. The procedure would then involve the identi
fication of the other indicators with significantly high loadings. This
group of indicators could then be interpreted to represent a distinct
variable cluster associated with transnational loyalty. The next step would involve the comparison of this cluster with other derived clusters
to determine if a consistent, discernible pattern exists.
This procedure was also followed where the transnational indi
cator loaded high on a factor, although, not having the top-ranking
factor loading, it did not itself define the factor. However, as will
be explicated below, somewhat greater reservations would be maintained with regard to such derived clusters. Because of the level of scaling
of the data employed, and the types of questions contained in the sur veys, factor analysis did not suffice to identify clusters associated with every transnational indicator. Thus the analysis also involved the 92 scanning of the intercorrelation matrix of each survey to identify all of the Indicators which significantly correlate with each transnational indicator. These sets of indicators were also interpreted to represent variable clusters, and were compared to other derived clusters.
A technical explanation of how the intercorrelation matrices were constructed and how the factor analysis was executed with the sur vey data is appropriate at this point. Because the survey data is largely in the form of nominal or frequency measurements, with at best’ only a few rank-order measurements, preliminary analysis and computation had to be completed. In particular, because a large proportion of the measurements were nominally scaled only coefficients of correlation which assume nominal scaling could be used. This in turn required that all indicators which were not already dichotomous be reduced to dichotomies. It was then decided to use the phi coefficient of contin- o gency to measure the degree of correlation between every pair of indi cators in each data set.
In making these statistical decisions I found myself in clear violation of a rule recently enunciated by Donald J. Puchala concerning the factor analysis of survey data.^ Puchala has written that survey
". . . data must be of at least ordinal level, . . ." However, in
Puchala's own analysis of surveys he did not always have measurements
*Cf. George A. Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 236-39. 3 Donald J. Puchala, "Factor Analysis in International Survey Research," in Western European Perspectives on International Affairs, ed. by Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 169. 93 which automatically accommodated themselves to ordinal scaling. Indeed, he has himself demonstrated4 how he has constrained survey measurements
to assume an ordinal scale. Moreover, with regard to the surveys with which I have been working, many of the measurements were originally dichotomous. One would be engaging in serious distortion to raise the
level of scaling for such measurements. Furthermore, I see no need to be unduly inhibited with dichotomously scaled data, for one still has available the use of the tetrachoric correlation (rt) and the phi coefficient of contingency specifically designed for this level of scaling. Also, both phi and rt approximate Pearson’s r in the par ticular case of dichotomous variables.** Thus without risking the exaggeration of measurements one may employ a coefficient appropriate to dichotomously scaled data and applicable to factor analysis.
It is still incumbent upon me to defend my choice of-the phi coefficient of contingency rather than the tetrachoric correlation
(rt). It has been argued that if nominally scaled data are to be factor analyzed rt should be used because the factor analytic procedure really assumes the use of Pearson's r, and rt more closely resembles r in the particular case of correlating dichotomous scales. In addition it is observed that rt assumes continuous variables, which is compatible with the factor analysis computation, whereas the phi coefficient assumes dis crete variables.
These two points are fully appreciated; however, the violation
4Ibid., pp. 169-70.
**Cf. Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education, pp. 238, 244. 94
of another key assumption of rfc by the survey data used in this study
has prohibited the use of rt. The assumption referred to is that both
variables be normally distributed. In the case of dichotomous variables
this means that in the 2 x 2 matrix representing the cross tabulation of
two dichotomous tables, the top two cells must contain between 40 per
cent and 60 per cent of all the cases. However, in reducing many of the
variables to dichotomies a cutting point quite unrelated to the median was in many cases chosen. This occurred in instances when only one of
four responses was coded positive, leaving the other three to fill the
second cell. Also in a number of cases even the questions of originally
dichotomous variables produced lopsided results. For an instance, the number of people who respond positively to the question of whether they
are generally in favor of the unification of Western Europe usually is not lower that 75 per cent. Thus a majority, or very large portion, of
the intercorrelation matrices have distributions which do not meet the requirements of rt. It is for this reason that the phi coefficient, which does not pose distribution limitations, was used.**
Computation of the phi coefficient of contingency was done by computer, utilizing a general cross-tabulation and statistical program originally developed at Northwestern University and entitled NUCROS.^
This program was revised at Memphis State University by addition of a subroutine to compute the phi coefficient. g To test my presumptions, the rt between every pair of variables was computed for one survey. As expected, the result yielded a large number of coefficients which were patently unreasonable.
^Cf. Kenneth Janda, Data Processing (Evanston, 111.: North western University Press, 1965), p. 159. 95
After the intercorrelations between every pair of variables in
each data set were computed, an intercorrelation matrix of these
coefficients was made. This matrix was, in turn, factor analyzed, with
the first five factors of the original factor matrix in each case sub
jected to orthogonal rotation.
The factor analysis was executed by computer, using the BMDO
3M-General Factor Analysis program. This program is part of the Bio
medical Computer Programs library written at the University of
California.®
As outlined above, the orthogonally rotated factors and the
intercorrelation matrices were then examined for cluster patterns asso
ciated with the transnational indicators.
In the computation of the phi coefficient, and thus in all sub
sequent computation, all "don't know" (DK) responses were excluded.
Findings
My analytic strategy consisted of searching for correlates to indicators of two "levels" of transnational commitment. I refer to the first and "lower" level of commitment as "diffuse transnationalism." I refer to the second and "higher" level as "supranationalism."
Operationally, diffuse transnationalism refers to a positive response to an essentially identically worded question in surveys #4201 and #B401, which may be translated as: "Generally speaking, are you for or against the unification of Western Europe?" To avoid suspicion that
O Cf. W. J. Dixon, ed., BMP: Biomedical Computer Programs, Uni versity of California Publications in Automatic Computation, No. 2 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). Cf. pp. 169-84 for BMD03M. consent to this loosely worded question may not involve commitment to
an explicitly political concept, it should be noted here that in survey
#4201 shortly after respondents were asked the above question, they
were asked whether they specifically approve a political union. The
correlation between both responses is positive and very high. It should
also perhaps be pointed out that notwithstanding the rather general
label I have given this level of orientation, it is directed at the
specific symbol of Europe. Thus, were it not for certain grander theo
retical aspirations maintained by the present analyst, the variable might more accurately have been labeled "diffuse Europeanism." But it
is here felt that so long as its referents in the present case are
clearly stipulated, the more general label may justifiably be main
tained .
Diffuse transnationalism is being distinguished from attitudes
specifically in favor of such proposals as a European army and central or federal European political institutions with authority to make a com mon foreign policy, to levy and expend tax monies, and to make other important decisions. It is to this level of transnational orientation that I apply the term "supranationalism."
Operationally, supranationalism refers to the designated responses to the following survey questions. I have designated the indicative response with the use of an asterisk (*):
(S. A941)9
"Do you think that France should participate in a united Europe
^The number in parentheses identifies the IFOP survey whence the question is taken. 97
in which foreign policy would be decided in common, or should France have a more independent foreign policy?"
(*) Foreign policy decided in common. ( ) Independent foreign policy. ( ) 1
(S. 4201)
"Are you for or against France taking part in a European union in which certain important political decisions would be made by a central authority rather than by each of the member countries?"
(*) For ( ) Against ( ) ?
(S. 7071)
"Do you believe that the personality and Interests of Europe would be better protected vis-a-vis the dominant powers by allowing the six member states of the Common Market to retain their individual sovereignty, or by uniting these states in a single federation of 160 million inhabitants?"
( ) States should retain their sovereignty. (*) States should unite into a single federation. ( ) *
(S. 7071)
"Are you in favor of the creation of a European army which would be the instrument of the policy defined by this authority Jdescribed in the preceding question^?"
(*) Yes C ) No ( ) ?
"Do you agree with the principle that the custom duties and a portion of the taxes that you already pay should support a federal budget covering purely community expenses, such as sub sidies to a European agricultural fund and the maintenance of federal defense forces?"
(*) Yes < ) No ( ) ? 98
I interpret each response to be an indicator of supranationalism.
I chose to proceed with the strategy of searching for correlates
to these two indicators because I felt I would, by comparing the
derivatives of each level of transnationalism, be able to Isolate the
elements of transnational loyalty from other expressions of trans
nationalism. My reasoning is as follows. Both diffuse transnationalism
and supranationalism indicate an orientation toward Europe, thus repre
senting a common defining characteristic of the arena, the orientation
patterns to which I am seeking to investigate. The diffuse trans
nationalism indicator, however, represents a lesser degree, therefore
'’lower" level, of personal commitment. It leaves the goal of any
implied commitment rather abstract, asking only the individual's
acceptance of some undefined "unification." Thus, a positive response
to this indicator does not call for the investment of significant
identitive values. The respondent does not necessarily orient himself
to Europe as a political system, with the cession of authority implied
in such an orientation.^® But this indicator is useful in an investi gation of transnational loyalty because it does share a common element,
that of a transnational orientation, and to the same geo-social region.
However, the diffuse transnationalism indicator does not permit orien tational specification further than transnationaliBm.
Supranationalism, on the other hand, does represent a more specific orientation. It also represents a greater degree, or "higher" level, of transnational commitment. An appropriate response to one, or
l®This concept of "political system" has been defined in chap. ii. 99
any combination, of the supranational indicators may be interpreted as
identification with legally defined European jurisdictional authority.
This represents the transfer of at least some attributes of sovereignty
from the nation-state to Europe. Hence, such a response represents
possession of a crucial defining characteristic of transnational political loyalty.
All, then, that is lacking before the supranational indicators may be interpreted as indicators of transnational loyalty is evidence
that these indicators reveal as well the concomitant identification with
the social component of Europe. For it will be recalled that political
loyalty has been defined^ as an orientation toward a society, both as a social collectivity and as a political system. An indicator that repre sented orientation toward both of these elements, then, would evidence the possession of transnational loyalty.
On the basis of intelligence gained from the numerous studies of the subject of European integration and French participation therein, my statistical analysis was initiated with the assumption that, surely the supranational level, and quite probably both levels of transnational orientation would include identification with the social component.
Indeed, European integration has practically always been presented as a social enterprise by the guiding French elite. The European Coal and
Steel Community was proposed by Robert Schuman as a means to eliminate
"the age-old opposition between France and Germany"^ and as the first step in the construction of a peaceful Europe. The social implications
H-In chap. ii, p. 9.
12 L Mayne, The Community of Europe, p. 86. 100
of the European Economic Community have been frequently made explicit
since the proposal of its draft treaty. So, my interpretations of the
probable meaning of the key concept "Europe" in the minds of the French
respondents seemed reasonable.
Analysis produced supportive evidence of this interpretation or
assumption. I shall shortly discuss in some detail the entire cluster
of common correlates to the two levels of transnational orientations,
but it is pertinent here to divulge that individuals who exhibit either
diffuse transnationalism or supranationalism also exhibit identification with other European peoples. The specific indicator here was com monality with Germans. Choice of this indicator should not need an
extensive defense. The Germans constitute the second major population
group, with France, in the Europe of the Six. In addition there is a
tradition of severe hostility between the French and the German peoples.
Thus, if Frenchmen could identify with Germans, it was felt that com monality with all Europeans could be assumed.
Returning to my argument, if the existence of the social element
in the transnational orientations could be assumed, as I have just indi
cated the evidence supports, then the only variable among the two levels of orientation would be commitment to the political element. Thus, I argued, the use of the indicators of the two levels of transnationalism would be an effective means to distinguish transnational loyalty from related attitudes, that is, lower levels of transnational orientation.
Hence, I would be able to clearly define the peculiar character of transnational loyalty.
Analysis revealed a cluster of common variables, components of 101
which I have referred to above. But much more significant was the
nature of the distinctive subject clusters associated with each level
of transnational orientation. I shall now describe the clusters in
turn. Then, after making a few brief remarks about the implications of
the subset components, I shall given an account of the interpretative
method through which I derived the clusters. Finally, I shall attempt
to provide a theoretical interpretation of the main points of difference
between the subset clusters and the implications thereof for the loyalty
acquisition process.
Pursuing the just outlined form of presentation, I shall now
commence description of the cluster of variables common to both levels
of transnational orientation. As I have mentioned above, all Frenchmen
who maintain a transnational European orientation also agree that
European political unification is either indispensable or desirable.
This is a shared variable in that it correlates significantly with both,
diffuse transnationalism and supranationalism. Other such shared variables are a pro-British sentiment, a favorable attitude toward West
Germans, and aspirations or expectations of a world power status for a
united Europe equivalent to that of the United States and the Soviet
Union. It has already been explained above that a favorable attitude
toward Germans, as operationalized below, in turn indicates a sense of commonality between Frenchmen and Germans and by inference with other
European peoples as well.
Operationally the attitude in favor of European political unifi cation is indicated by the responses to the following survey question.
I shall designate the indicative responses with an asterisk (*): 102
(S. 4201)
"Do you believe that for the six countries of the Common Market political unification is": (only one answer)
(*) Indispensable (*) Desirable ( ) Useless ( ) Dangerous ( ) 1
Pro-European Political Union thus equals "Indispensable" or "Desirable."
Pro-British sentiment refers operationally to the designated responses
to the following questions:
(S. 4201)
"England has asked to enter the Common Market. If she enters, which of three possibilities seems to you most likely?"
(*) England will be a loyal partner. (*) England will try to take the lead of the Common Market. ( ) England will try to make the Common Market a failure. ( ) ?
(S. 4201)
"Do you think that is is good or bad for France's interests that England belong to the Common Market?"
(*) Good for France's interests ( ) Bad ( ) ?
(S. B401)
"In your opinion, at the present time, is it consistent or con trary to French interests that Great Britain enter the Common Market?"
(*) Consistent ( ) Contrary ( ) ?
A favorable attitude toward West Germans or French-German com monality refers operationally to the below designated responses to the following questions: 103
(S. B401 and S. A941)
"In your opinion, are the fundamental interests of Europe and West Germany very close, rather close, rather different, or very different?"
(*) Very close (*) Rather close ( ) Rather different ( ) Very different C ) ?
(S. 7071)
"Do you judge yourself rather friendly to Germans, or rather hostile to Germans?"
(*) Rather friendly ( ) Rather hostile C ) ?
Finally, world power status aspirations refers operationally to
a positive response to the following question:
(S. 4201)
(*) Yes ( ) No ( ) 1
Although these variables are shared by Frenchmen of both levels
of transnational orientation, there appears to be a slight difference
between the strength of correlation of two of the variables among the
two orientational levels. More specifically, the pro-British and world power aspirations indicators tend to be more strongly correlated with diffuse transnationalism than with the indicators of supra
nationalism. But these differences should be considered mere tend
encies; they are not statistically significant.
Before displaying the operational indicators of each subset
cluster, I believe it would be helpful to identify the major distin guishing elements. 104
The area of sharpest contrast between the two subsets is that while individuals who maintain only the diffuse transnational orien
tation tend to be Gaullists and neutralist, in terns both of preferring
a European foreign policy independent of the United States and of
favoring the strengthening of ties with Eastern Europe, the adherents
of supranationalism are distinctly anti-Gaullist, and are equally dis
tinctly in favor of a united Europe in alliance with the United States.
Another area of difference between the two levels of trans national orientation is that University Education, Higher Income, and
Male Sex all correlate significantly higher with supranationalism than with diffuse transnationalism.
The last point of difference relates to a variable I refer to as Catholic Party preference. Although deliberately labeled as such, the variable does not operationally include all French parties which have been described as Catholic. Rather, as I shall demonstrate shortly below, the variable refers only to the two largest Catholic parties of post-war France: (1) Le Mouvement Republicain Populaire
(MRP), which after 1967 became Centre Democrate; and (2) l1Union pour la nouvelle Republique (UNR), which after 1967 became l1 Union des Demo- crates pour la Ve Republique (UDR). I chose to examine the behavior of this variable, operationalized in the manner I have just described, because of the intertwined and competing careers of these two parties.
The MRP was the largest party in France immediately after World War II, and was the largest Catholic party throughout the Fourth Republic. This was also the party of Robert Schuman and, consistent with this char acterization, was the most pronouncedly European of the French parties. 105
And the party did attempt to identify itself, especially in the early years, as the party of de Gaulle. But in 1958, the MRP was eclipsed by
the new, Gaullist UNR. The general interpretation which has been given
to this is that both parties appealed to the same traditionally Catholic constituencies. When the MRP seemed clearly to be the major Catholic party, these votes were accorded it. But with the return of
General Charles de Gaulle, and with his charisma associated with the new UNR, this party became the recipient of these votes. But the UNR, and its successor the UDR, has been pronouncedly the least European of the major parties, excepting, of course, the Communists. The question of interest to me then was what the position of this bloc of traditional
Catholic votes was with regard to Europe. On the one hand possible indicative facts are the widespread support given to the Schuman Plan and the transnational position of the Vatican referred to in the pre ceding chapter. On the other hand there is the tremendous support which was received by de Gaulle and the traditional conservatism of
French Catholics. This last fact would argue against the possession of strong transnational sympathies. It was, then, with this question of the role of the Catholic party preference that the variable was sub jected to investigation. In the event, the Catholic party preference was found to correlate significantly with diffuse transnationalism, and not with supranationalism. The meaning of this, however, is not very clear. But the fact that, as the variable was actually operationalized, the Gaullist party (UNR; UDR) constitutes a large proportion of the indicator might lead one to assume that Catholic party preference remains an attribute of the variable "Gaullism." The variable might 106 also reflect nonelite sentiment which would contrast it with the indi cators of elitism contained in the supranationalism subset cluster.
At this point I shall explicate the indicators of each of these two subset clusters.
Diffuse transnationalism
As I have indicated above the variables which cluster par ticularly with diffuse transnationalism are neutralism, Gaullism, and
Catholic Party preference. I shall, again, designate the indicative response with an asterisk (*).
Operationally, neutralism refers to positive responses to the following survey questions:
(#4201)
"Do you think that a unified Western Europe should have its own policies, independent from those of the United States?"
(*) Yes ( ) No ( ) ?
(#B401)
"With everything considered, are you for or against the attempt of the Western countries to make efforts to establish closer ties with East Europe?"
(*) For ( ) Against ( ) ?
Gaullism refers operationally to the designated responses to the following survey questions:
(#B401)
"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with General de Gaulle as President of the Republic?" 107
(*) Very satisfied (*) Rather satisfied ( ) Rather dissatisfied ( ) Very dissatisfied ( ) ?
(#B401)
"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the action of the government in the following sectors?"
(a) National education (b) Foreign policy (c) Agricultural problems (d) Social problems (e) Economic and financial problems
(*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied ( ) ?
The respondents answered each policy item separately; therefore, these
should be considered five indicators. The "government" referred to in
the policy questions was the government in office during May, 1967,
headed by Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, and serving under the Presi
dency of Charles de Gaulle. This has been popularly referred to as a
Gaullist government, and it has also been referred to as such by
political scientists writing professionally. To extend this, the
policies proposed by this government have also been referred to as
Gaullist policies. Thus approval of or satisfaction with policy actions
in the sectors listed in the above survey question can be construed as
Gaullist sympathies.
At this point I should comment with regard to the broader sense in which the term "Gaullism" was used near the end of the preceding chapter. I there made reference to Simon Serfaty's use of the term to designate the traditional and limited transnational European orientation 13 held by some Frenchmen, But Serafty was using the term to designate
a population grouping in France, In my quantitative analysis, however,
the variable name, Gaullism, is not used in Serfaty's sense. Rather
than as a population name, it refers to a specific attitude held by
individuals. I am here attempting to isolate support for Charles de
Gaulle and for the policies and ideas attributed to him. That Gaullism
may be thus understood as attachment to the personality of de Gaulle has 14 been specifically argued by Jean Neuohr. Authors writing of France 15 tend to use the term in this sense. The interpretative assumption
involved here is that, for individual Frenchmen generally, attitudes
toward the person of de Gaulle, and attitudes toward the policies of a
Gaullist government are confused. Support for this assumption may be
found in the fact that the first orthogonally rotated factor of Survey
#B401 found all of the policy questions and the question about satis
faction with de Gaulle clustering closely together, thus demonstrating
that all Indicate a single, common factor, or variable, which I have
referred to as "Gaullism." This is illustrated in Table 9 below.
The third variable distinctly associated with diffuse trans
nationalism is Catholic Party preference. This is to be understood in
*^Cf. Serfaty, France, de Gaulle, and Europe, pp. 134-35.
■^Neurohr, "Was 1st Gaullismus?" pp. 11-25.
15Cf. Roy C. Macridis, "France," in Modern Political Systems: Europe, ed, by Roy C. Macridis and Robert E. Ward (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 220; Henry W. Ehrmann, Politics in France (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 234-37. For an interpretation of Gaullism in other than a personalistic sense, cf. Rene Remond, The Right Wing in France; From 1815 to de Gaulle (Phila delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), pp. 366-84. TABLE 9
TOP NINE LOADINGS FOR IFOP #B401 ROTATED FACTOR #1 Gaullism Factor
Factor Indicators Loading
1. Economic and financial policy .659
2. Agricultural problems .634
3. Satisfaction with de Gaulle .634
4. Social problems .578
5. National education .535
6. Comparative eco sit: Germany .451
7. Foreign policy .399
8. Comparative eco sit: UK .398
9. Comparative eco sit: Italy .310
Notes: Loadings under .400 were not accepted for the interpre tation of this factor. The indicator referred to as "Comparative eco sit" are positive responses to requested comparative evaluations of the French economic situations, and that of West Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy, in turn. 110
distinction to preference for a party of the traditional Left in France.
Operationally, Catholic Party preference refers to identification with
one of the following party designations:
1. MRP
2. Centre Democrate
3. UNR
4. UDR
The parties of the traditional Left specifically include:
1. The Communist Party
2. The Socialists (SFIO)
3. The Radicals
4. The Federation of the Democratic and Socialistic Left
Other parties were not considered in this analysis. It should also be
stated that the lists are redundant, with four parties being represented
by two designations each. This relates to the fact that these desig
nations appear in a number of surveys, carried out at different times.
Supranationalism
The following five variables clustered with supranationalism:
1. Pro-United States attitude
2. Anti-Gaullism
3. High Income
4. Male Sex
5. University Education
Operationally, the first variable refers to the designated answer to the following survey question: Ill
(#A941)
"In your opinion, are the fundamental interests of France and the United States very close, rather close, rather different, or very different?"
(*) Very close (*) Rather close ( ) Rather different ( ) Very different ( ) ?
(#A941) ‘
"If you could choose the fashion in which the Atlantic defense was to be organized in the years to come which would you prefer?"
(1) An alliance of national armies, each under national command.
(2) An integrated European military force under a single command but independent of American forces.
(3) An integrated European military force under a single command but en liaison with American forces.
(4) An integrated Atlantic force in which both the European and American forces would be under a single command.
The choice of the third and fourth alternatives was interpreted to be an
indication of pro-United States sentiment. It should also be noted that
this is a rather specific question tapping not merely some abstract pro-
United States feeling but a clearly non- or anti-neutralist attitude
envisioning a united Europe in military alliance with the United States.
It has been this indicator that has allowed me to sharply contrast the
international political outlook of the supranationally oriented French man from his fellow national sharing only a diffuse transnational orien
tation.
Anti-Gaullism refers to a negative correlation of the Gaullism
indicators described above to the indicators of the supranationalism.
For reasons gone into in the detailed discussion of Survey #4201 112 below, a particular combination of responses to two closely related
questions was also interpreted as anti-Gaullism. The questions from
Survey #4201 are as follows:
"Do you consider General de Gaulle a firm supporter of the uni fication of Europe?"
( ) Yes (*) No ( ) ?
"Do you think that right now France is more of a brake or more of a motor in the creation of Europe?"
(*) Brake ( ) Motor ( ) ?
The combination of a negative response to the first question and the response of "Brake" to the second is interpreted to be indicative of an anti-Gaullist attitude.
The remaining three variables which cluster with supra nationalism have rather straightforward referents. High Income refers to having an annual income above the mean national annual income. Male
Sex requires no further explication. And University Education refers to the response "University or Graduate School" when asked what was the last school attended.
To summarize with respect to the variable clusters associated with each level of transnational I offer the following illustration: 113
Political Union SHARED Pro-British VARIABLES French-German Commonality World Power
Neutralism Pro-U.S. DISTINCTIVE Gaullism Anti-Gaullism VARIABLES Catholic Party University Education High Income Male
DIFFUSE TRANSNATIONALISM SUPRANATIONALISM
An initial conclusion to be drawn from this particular division
of correlates is that the two different levels of transnational commit
ment are not randomly distributed. Rather, the coincidence of the three
objective variables, University Education, High Income, and Male Sex,
with supranationalism seems to indicate a particular division in the
French population. More specifically, these objective variables seem to
indicate higher socioeconomic or elite status. Thus the division
between the two levels of transnational commitment corresponds to a
division between the elite and mass elements in French society. The
dynamic implications of the division for the loyalty acquisition process will be pursued following an account of the interpretative method for
the variable cluster derivation.
Interpretative Method
I had indicated prior to discussing the findings, that I had
used both factor analysis and simple intercorrelation matrix analysis
to interpret the data. I should now like to explain the role of each procedure in the general analysis of all the data. 114
Ideally I would have been able to restrict myself methodo
logically to factor analysis and the interpretation of factor loading
patterns for the several surveys. This happy state of affairs, however,
was not mine for at least two major reasons. First, the battery of
questions differed considerably from survey to survey. Thus, not all
of the variables were represented in a single survey. Rather they were
distributed over all four of the surveys I chose to intensively
analyze.^ This means that not all variables could have been repre
sented in a single cluster pattern. There could have been four dis
crepant loading patterns. The reduction of these discrepancies would
have had to involve other statistical methods.
Secondly, the surveys analyzed were omnibus surveys, which could
serve as indicators of transnationalism. This means that most questions
on every survey dealt with matters other than transnationalism. This
further means, in statistical terms, that in the case of two of the four
surveys which were factor analyzed transnationalism accounted for a
relatively small portion of the total variance for these surveys. Thus,
in Surveys B401 and A941 a transnational indicator did not define a
factor, by loading highest on it, nor did one load high on any factor.
In the other two surveys which were factor analyzed, 7071 and
4201, transnational indicators defined a factor in each and in each case
it was the first rotated factor, thereby accounting for the relatively
greatest amount of total variance in each survey. But even in a case when transnational indicators did define a factor, in Survey 7071, the
^These four were: IFOP Surveys #4201 (5 June 1962), #7071 (25 May 1965), #A941 (7 February 1967), and #B401 (8 May 1967). 115
factor did not cluster any indicators of independent variables. As may
be seen in Table 13 below, only the several indicators of supra-
nationalism had significant loadings. Thus, in this case factor
analysis alone is of severely limited utility in the identification of
significant independent correlates to transnationalism.
An additional problem arose in the interpretation of the factor
extracted in Survey 4201 which was defined by a transnational indicator.
As may be seen in Table 11, Survey 4201 contained indicators for both
levels of transnational orientation. But both diffuse transnationalism
and supranationalism are highly correlated to one another. In fact, the
latter is a subset of the former. Thus, they both load highly on the
same factor. Unfortunately, this does not allow for discriminate
analysis. So, these circumstances indicate that in the present analysis
factor analysis alone does not suffice for the identification of all of
the significant independent correlates of transnationalism. Nor does it
allow for discriminate analysis between the two levels of transnational
orientation.
This brings me to the role of simple intercorrelation matrix
analysis in the present study. By this term I refer to the examination
of intercorrelation matrices to identify correlation patterns of
various indicators. By scanning the column, or row, of the matrix, each
of which represents a single indicator and the coefficients of corre
lation of all other indicators with it, one can identify the indicators
that correlate highly, least high, and those which do not seem to cor relate. These indicators could then be ranked in terms of their degree of correlation to indicators heading the column. This ranking, then, 116
TABLE 10
IFOP #4201— JUNE, 1962 ORTHOGONALLY ROTATED FACTORS
Diffuse Anti- Transnational Gaul 1 ism Pro-UK (1) (2) (3)
High income -.009 .001 -.026 University education .063 .058 .079 A large commune .041 -.021 .045 Young age group -.068 -.057 .034 Catholic party .298 .062 .013 Europe most important problem .107 .019 .028 Favor European political union .690 .066 .060 UK would be loyal member .088 -.004 .730 Favor unification of Europe .730 -.044 .108 Favor supranational Europe .510 .263 .073 Position of Legislative Candidate .058 .080 .030 Difference: Eur. of states and integ. Eur, .229 .114 -.014 EEC is supranational .052 .001 -.001 NATO is supranational .057 .043 .006 Reinforce Europe of 6 .093 -.049 -.384 Eur. includes E. Europe -.035 -.170 .099 UK membership good for France .226 -.006 .723 Eur. should be independent of US .422 -. 196 .059 World power aspirations .580 -. 169 -.022 France is a brake -.041 .781 .077 de Gaulle is firm supporter of Europe .036 -.795 .039 Sex: male -.075 .061 -.093
Variance Explained .1202506 .0103360 .0003846
Notes: The operational definition for every variable is listed in the appendix, 117
TABLE 11
RANKED LOADING PATTERN FOR IFOP #4201 ROTATED FACTOR #1 Top 8 Loadings Diffuse Transnationalism
Factor Indicators Loading
1. Favor unification of Europe .730
2. Favor European political union .690
3. World power aspirations .580
4. Favor supranational Europe .510
5. Europe should be independent of US .422
6. Catholic party .298
7. Difference: Europe of states and integrated Europe .229
8. UK membership good for France .226 TABLE 12
IFOP #7071--25 MAY, 1965 ORTHOGONALLY ROTATED FACTORS
Supranationalism Gaullism Pro-German High Income (1) (2) (3) (4)
Satisfaction with de Gaulle .044 .729 .018 .057 Catholic party .014 .642 .099 .198 Eur. Community soon to occur .228 .021 .165 .035 States should relinquish sovereignty .430 -.194 -.014 .023 Eur. diplomacy and defense .661 -.024 -.011 -.021 European army .694 .058 .067 .074 Eur. tax power .586 .030 .194 .159 de Gaulle as first Eur. President -.105 .605 -.049 -.180 Unreserved pride in France -.043 .356 -.044 -.202 French-German commonality .029 -.029 .610 -.023 Friendly to Germans .128 -.010 .614 .143 TV -.029 .060 .032 .202 University education .065 -.091 .009 .446 High income .060 -.034 .086 .514 Male sex .029 -.231 .062 .133 Young age group -.035 .016 .001 -.030 Large commune .026 .003 .013 .268
Total Variance Explained .1816530 .0777499 .0004817 .0000195 119
TABLE 13
RANKED LOADING PATTERN FOR IFOP #7071 ROTATED FACTOR #1 Top 7 Loadings Supranationalism
Factor Indicators Loading
1 . European army .694
2 . European diplomacy and defense .661
3. European tax power .586
4. States should relinquish sovereignty .430
5. Eur. community soon to occur .228
6 . Friendly to Germans .128
7. de Gaulle as first European President -.105 120 could be interpreted as a cluster pattern. In this manner variable clusters associated with the two levels of transnationalism were derived from a simple analysis of the intercorrelation matrices constructed from the four surveys intensively analyzed.
Before identifying and explaining the specific criteria employed for interpreting the matrices and the factors, I should first like to distinguish the variable clusters derived from the scanning of corre lation matrices and those derived from factor analysis. These are dif ferent sorts of clusters owing primarily to the fact that the coefficients from which each derives each measure different things.
The factor loadings indicate the degree of correlation, and thus the degree of shared variance, between the indicator to which it is assigned and a latent factor. With respect to survey data consisting of responses to attitudinal questions, Fuchala has interpreted extracted factors to represent latent orientational structuresIf reference be again made to the loadings on the first orthogonally rotated factor in
Survey #4201, represented in Table 11 above, the latent structure may be interpreted to be precisely one of the dependent variables under investigation, diffuse transnationalism. But if it is assumed that the factor does represent diffuse transnationalism then it should be explicitly understood that it is to the latent structure that reference is made. Thus, the top loading indicator on that factor, the response I have identified above as the "indicator of diffuse transnationalism," is in this case not the sole or perfect indicator of this orientational pattern among Frenchmen. Rather, it shares its function with all the
l^Puchala, "Factor Analysis in International Survey Research." 121 other Indicators which display significant loadings o£ being one of the partial indicators of this phenomenon. Its distinctive characteristic
is that it is more indicative of the phenomenon than are any of the others. It owes this distinction to the fact that it has the highest coefficient of correlation with the latent structure, .730, and it
therefore explains a greater portion of the factor's variance than does any other indicator, about 53 per cent. But as this last figure illus trates, the diffuse transnationalism indicator still is only a partial indicator of the factor which is being interpreted as a perfect repre sentation of diffuse transnationalism. Thus, a variable cluster derived from factor analysis, and constituted of all indicators with significant loadings on the factor, are a group of indicators each of which explains what has been arbitrarily determined to be a significant portion of the variance of the latent structure.
This sort of cluster, then, may be distinctly contrasted with the variable cluster derived from the scanning of a correlation matrix.
In this latter type of cluster the indicators of transnational orien tation found among the survey questions are assumed, for purposes of analysis, to be the perfect indicators of the variable under analysis, and not merely as the better of a number of imperfect Indicators of the phenomenon. And the constituents of the cluster are those other indi cators which display a significant coefficient of correlation with an indicator of transnational orientation. So, the two types of clusters represent groups of variables which related to different indicators of transnationalism.
That these two types of clusters are different is clear. But 122
the significance of this difference is less easily determined. This
assessment depends upon a comparative evaluation of the two types of
indicators of transnationalism.
On the one hand, factor analysis identifies a latent factor,
orthogonally related to all other factors. In the case of the first
rotated factor extracted in Survey #4201, there is persuasive evidence
that the latent factor is a transnational orientational pattern among
the French population surveyed. The highest loading indicators provide
this evidence. But, it is the present writer's contention, it cannot be demonstrated that this latent factor is a better representation of diffuse transnationalism than the individual indicator selected from among the survey responses.
If the purpose of the present investigation were the identifi cation of independent orientational patterns among Frenchmen, the extracted factors would be definitive. But in fact the present investi gation seeks the identification of significant correlates of a previously determined orientational pattern. Under these circumstances, should factor analysis yield a factor which may be defined by indicators of the specific orientational pattern, then the factor may serve to demonstrate closely clustering, correlating variables. But this would not be a definitive, exclusive identification of such variables, and the use of individual coefficients of inter-variable correlation is not excluded.
With reference to the specific analysis conducted here it should also be added that there turned out to be no apparent contradictions between the two types of clusters derived. It thus may be assumed that 123
both methods, factor analysis and intercorrelation matrix scanning, were
complementary in the present instance.
I can now describe the specific analytic role performed by
factor analysis and matrix scanning, before going on to identify the
criteria of significance employed in interpreting the factor patterns
and intercorrelation matrices. Because of the limitations detailed
above of factor analysis in this present investigation, factor analysis was compelled to play a more restricted, if nonetheless essential, role.
While it could not identify all clustering variables, it nevertheless
did suggest some of these. This is true especially in the case of Sur vey #4201, although, as has been demonstrated above, it did not dis
tinguish the correlates of diffuse transnationalism from those of
supranationalism. In the case of Survey #7071, where there were several
indicators of a supranational orientation, factor analysis did suggest a ranking of these. Factor analysis also ordered many of the other indi cators present in each survey into a smaller number of factors. This, in turn, allowed for the substitutability of indicators which demon strated tendencies to cluster together. Thus, factor analysis served to prepare and augment a rather simple analysis of correlation patterns from the intercorrelation matrices.
In interpreting the factor loadings.on the extracted factor patterns I established the criterion that only those indicators with a factor loading of .400 or greater be considered significantly indicative of the pertinent factor. A product moment coefficient of .4 indicates that the variable to which this loading corresponds accounts for 16 per cent of the variance in the pertinent factor. In fractional terms this 124
is equivalent to greater than one-sixth. This figure tends to satisfy
the present analyst as adequate, retaining in his mind the ever present
knowledge that all such criteria are basically arbitrary. Although a
higher level would have been preferable it was felt that some tolerance
should be allowed for the crude nature of the data. And it also
evolved, as will be detailed below, that this criterion does allow the
discernment of distinct and consistent patterning.
Derivation; diffuse transnationalism
Using this criterion,- and observing the rank-order of factor
loadings on factor #1 of Survey #4201, illustrated in Table 11 above, it
can be seen that the indicators of a desire for a European Political
Union, World Power Aspirations, Supranationalism, and Neutralism all rank significantly after Diffuse Transnationalism which defines the
factor. Thus, all of these variables should be expected to be con stituents of the variable cluster for diffuse transnationalism. How ever, I have explained above that supranationalism should be separately analyzed; thus, it should be removed from the above test.
My reasoning for separating supranationalism was that it was a subset of diffuse transnationalism, and contained distinct and signifi cant characteristics. I have the following evidence to offer in sup port of awarding supranationalism this role. As can be seen in Table 14 below the distribution of responses to the two indicator questions shows that diffuse transnationalism enjoys a much larger population than does supranationalism. In addition, as will be seen in Table 15, the correlation between these two indicators is extremely significant, 125
TABLE 14
DISTRIBUTION FOR DIFFUSE TRANSNATIONALISM AND SUPRANATIONALISM--SURVEY #4201
Diffuse Transnatlonalism
"Generally speaking, are you for or against the unification of Western Europe?"
N %
For 111 64.4 Against 97 8.1 ? 330 27.5
Supranationalism
"Are you for or against France taking part in a European union in which certain important political decisions would be made by a central authority rather than by each of the member countries?"
N %
For 463 38.6 Against 322 26.8 ? 414 34.6 126
TABLE 15
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH DIFFUSE TRANSNATIONALISM INDICATOR IFOP #4201
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Chi Level of Square3 Significance
1. Favor European political union .54 220.177 p < .001 2 . Favor supranational Europe .42 100.718 p 4 - 0 0 1 3. World power aspirations .41 106.121 p 4 .001 4. Eur should be independent of US .31 58.034 p 4 .001 5. UK membership good for France .27 37.167 p < .001 6 . Difference: Eur of states and integ Europe .20 18.799 p 4 . 0 0 1 7. Catholic party preference .18 18.103 p < .001 8 . UK would be loyal member .15 14.321 p 4 .001 9. University education .09 7.295 P 4 . 0 1 1 0 . High income .08 4.358 P 4.05 1 1 . Large commune .07 4.766 p 4 .05 1 2 . Reinforce Europe of 6 .07 2.498 P 4 -20
aAlthough phi is a function of chi square, the ranking of chi square values does not always correspond to the phi rank because, owing to the varying proportion of nonresponses the N for each dyadic corre lation matrix is not always the same. 127
ranking second only to the European Political Union indicator. Thus
supranationalism can be safely interpreted as a subset of diffuse trans
nationalism. That it is a distinctive subset will be demonstrated
below.
The criterion established for interpreting the phi coefficient
1 ft relates to the fact that phi is a function of chi square. The
specific relationship is represented in the following formula:
where "N" represents the total number of cases distributed in the four
cells of the 2 x 2 matrix.
Because phi is thus related to chi square, the significance of
any phi value may be tested by calculating its chi square equivalence
and then referring to a chi square table with one degree of freedom.
Thus, using the table of critical values of chi square, I established
the .001 level of significance as the criterion of acceptability for a variable to be included in a cluster.
Now the .001 level of significance may be regarded as a quite high level. I justify it in part on the basis of the crude nature of
the data. However, I am also aware that I may be charged with the com mission of Type IX error. This refers to the error of denying corre
lation between variables which are "in fact" correlated.2® My retort is that this criterion did allow for consistent and meaningful
18 Cf. Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Edu cation. p. 237.
19Ibid., p. 239. 2®Ibid.. pp. 163-64. 128
patterning. My final defense is that in the event the criterion is too
restrictive, it may still be justified in that the findings of this
investigation are more apt to be challenged for what they assert rather
than what they fail to assert. In any event, a correlation significant
at the .001 level is more probable than one significant at the .01 or
.05 level.
Table 15 lists the top twelve ranking correlates of the diffuse
transnationalism indicators of Survey #4201. It also shows the corre
sponding chi square value for each value of phi, and it identifies the
level of significance of each. Of the twelve indicators listed the top
eight have coefficients significant at the .001 level. It is to be
observed that these eight include the four isolated by the diffuse
transnational factor extracted from these data, and discussed above.
One of the eight indicators, the sixth in the rank order, the per
ception of a difference between a Europe of States and an Integrated
Europe, does not relate to a significant independent variable, and thus
has been excluded from further analysis. This leaves three indicators
in addition to the four isolated by the factor analysis. Of these
three, two--
5. British membership would be good for French interests, and
8. Britain would be a loyal member,-- are Indicative of a single variable: Pro-British sentiment. The third
Indicator is Catholic Party preference.
Thus, the correlation ranking yields two additional correlates to diffuse transnationalism. Eliminating supranationalism as a 129
correlate, an analysis of Survey #4201 yields five correlates of diffuse
transnationalism. Listed in rough order of their degree of correlation,
they are:
Favor European Political Union World Power Aspirations Neutralism Pro-British Sentiment Catholic Party Preference
Before going on to the analysis of other surveys, it may be well
to reiterate a point made earlier about the difference between the two
types of statistics just analyzed. The discrepancy between the number
of correlates yielded by each statistic does not indicate an error.
Rather, it is to be borne in mind that two different types of asso
ciation are represented here. One pertains to a latent factor, which
is independent of all other extracted factors. The other pertains to
the indicative response designated from among the survey questions.
This difference, and all it implies, remains, although the assumption has been made here that both the latent factor and the designated response are equally valid indicators of the variable under investi gation. It is only the imposition of this assumption that allows the equal treatment of both types of correlates.
Returning now to the analysis of the individual surveys, it should be recalled that five correlates with diffuse transnationalism have thus far been identified. These five derive from the interpre tation of correlation patterns with the first factor and the diffuse transnationalism indicator in Survey #4201. One other survey contained an indicator of the level of transnational orientation. This is Survey
#B401. 130
The factor analysis of Survey #B401 did not yield a factor
defined by the transnational indicator of that survey. Nor did the
indicator of diffuse transnationalism load significantly on any of the
five orthogonally rotated factors extracted. However, the phi rank of
correlates to this indicator did reveal a pattern not inconsistent with
that derived from Survey #4201 above. This ranking may be seen in
Table 16 below.
It may be observed that eight indicators correlate signifi
cantly with the indicator for diffuse transnationalism. Among these
eight are indicators for two variables derived from the 4201 data.
These are the two indicators, ranking fourth and seventh, of Pro-British
Sentiment; and the indicator, ranking second, for Neutralism. Owing to
the inclusion of questions in Survey #B401 which were not contained in
Survey #B201, the phi ranking of B401 indicators also contains two additional correlates of diffuse transnationalism which may be con sidered independent variables. These are the indicator for Pro-German
Attitude, ranking fifth, and the indicator of Gaullism, ranking sixth.
The interpretation of the response expressing satisfaction with de Gaulle as President as an indicator of Gaullism has been explained above. To reiterate, it involves the interpretation of the first ortho gonally rotated factor of Survey #B401. The indicators loading sig nificantly on this factor are shown in rank order in Table 9 above. As can be seen thereon, satisfaction with de Gaulle clusters with satis faction with governmental policies in four broad areas. It is therefore here concluded that the response expressing satisfaction with de Gaulle as President is indicative of more than satisfaction merely with the 131
TABLE 16
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH DIFFUSE TRANSNATIONALISM INDICATOR IFOP #B401
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Chi Level of Square Significance
1. Non-US investments in France .18 27.261 p 4 .001 2 , W. Eur ties with E. Eur .18 33.504 p < .001 3. US investments .17 28.157 p ^ .001 4. Favor British entry into EEC . 16 28.864 p < . 0 0 1 5. W. German and French interests are close .16 28.892 p < .001 6 . Satisfied with de Gaulle as President .15 26.066 p < .001 7. British entry is good for French interests .13 16.248 P < .001 8 . French integrative current strengthened .12 13.628 p < .001 9. Satisfied: agricultural policy .10 7.162 P < .01 10. US and French interests are close .08 6.864 P < .01 11. Satisfied: eco and financial policy .08 5.527 P C .02 12. University education .07 6.311 p < .02 13. Satisfied: foreign policy .06 3.664 p <.10 132
person of de Gaulle, but rather with a wide range of policies resulting
from a particular type of government which may be labeled Gaullism.
Of the three remaining significant indicators, the two relating
to foreign investments in France appear to refer to another, closely
related dependent variable. These questions did not appear in the
other surveys, and their interpretation is not altogether clear. They
were therefore excluded from further interpretation. Finally, the tenth
ranking indicator, representing agreement that the "integrative current"
in France had strengthened during the preceding year, was deemed too
vague to interpret specifically. It was thus ignored from further
analysis.
Thus, after analysis of Surveys #4201 and B401 with respect to
the correlates of diffuse transnationalism, indicators of the following
seven significant independent variables were found to correlate to that
level of transnational orientation:
Favor European Political Union Pro-British Sentiment Pro-W. German Attitude World Power Aspirations Neutralism Gaullism Catholic Party
Derivation: supranationalism
Having completed discussing the interpretation of diffuse trans
nationalism, I now turn to the analysis of suprnationalism. This
involves further consideration of Survey #4201 owing to the presence of
an indicator of supranationalism also among those data. At this point, however, analysis involves the cutting edge of this variable to see which other variables it seems to separate. The phi ranking of 133
correlates to the supranationalism indicator is shown in Table 17
below.
As can be seen, seven indicators have coefficients significant
at the .001 level. Among these, and ranking first, is the diffuse
transnationalism indicator, which is being analyzed separately. The
next three ranking indicators represent
Favor European Political Union World Power Aspirations Pro-British Sentiment
These three were also among the correlates of the diffuse trans
nationalism indicator. These, then, may be assumed to^be constituents
of a common variable cluster for both levels of transnational orien
tation.
In light of the criteria employed for inclusion of other variables in the clusters of either or both levels of transnational
orientation I should perhaps indicate the reasons for including the
indicator representing favorable sentiment for the formation of a
European political union. This variable does not, at all, seem to be
independent in the sense that it may be considered a causative agent of
transnational political orientation. Contrariwise, and as has been alluded earlier, the indicator is significant precisely because it is not independent of the transnational variables. Rather, its signifi cance lies in the fact that it quite unambiguously asserts that the transnational orientations here being investigated are political orien tations . This may also indicate why this variable should be among the shared cluster. 134
TABLE 17
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH SUPRANATIONALISM INDICATOR IFOP #4201
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Chi Level of Square Significance
1 . Favor unification of Europe .42 100.718 p < .001 2 . Favor European political union .40 113.715 p <.001 3. World power aspiration .22 28.783 p < .001 4. UK membership good for France .22 23.481 p < .001 5. Consider de Gaulle supporter of Eur -.20 22.233 p < .001 6. Believe France is hindering Eur .18 15.032 p < .001 7. Would consider Eur position of Leg. Cand. .16 14.571 p < .001 8. Catholic party .14 10.664 P < -01 9. Difference: Eur of states and Integ Eur .14 8.911 p < . 0 1 10. University education .11 9.936 p <.01 11. Eur should be independent of US .11 6.844 p < .01 12. Eur is salient issue .10 9.192 p Z..o i 13. Large commune .08 5.613 p < .02 14. High income .06 2.191 p < .20 135
The other two shared variables, World Power Aspirations and
pro-British Sentiment clearly appear to be attitudes distinct from
transnational political orientation per se.
Below these three shared correlates, Table 17 reveals three
indicators which significantly correlate with supranationalism, but
which did not correlate significantly with diffuse transnationalism.
Two of these indicators, those ranking fifth and sixth may further be
considered as representing a common attitude, which I shall call "anti-
Gaullism." These indicators have been operationalized above.^ The
first indicator is the question in which the respondent considered
General de Gaulle a "firm supporter" of Europe. It is to be noted in
Table 17 that the coefficient assigned to this indicator is negative.
It is therefore the negative response which correlates here with supra
nationalism. The second indicator refers to a question asking whether
France may be characterized as a "brake" or a "motor" in the creation
of Europe. A positive response refers to the response of "brake." It
is this response which also correlates with supranationalism, as can be
seen in Table 17.
If reference be made to Table 10 above it can also be seen that
these same two responses load highly on factor #2 of Survey #4201. In
fact these are the only two significantly loading indicators on that
factor. The highest loading indicator is the denial that de Gaulle is a
firm supporter of Europe, with a loading of -.795. And the second sig nificant Indicator is the characterization of France as a "brake," with
a loading of .781. Furthermore, in the phi matrix of Survey #4201, the
2lCf. pp. 106-09. 136
coefficient between these two indicators is the highest coefficient in 22 the entire matrix, with a value of -.65. Thus, this combination of
responses seems to indicate that de Gaulle is being identified with an
anti-Europe posture on the part of France. With the fact of majori-
tarian sentiment in favor of the political unification of Europe, I have
interpreted this characterization of de Gaulle as an essentially
negative one. I have further assumed that the reference is not to
de Gaulle as a person, but to a system of policies he represents.
Hence, X come to the final interpretation that this combination of
responses is indicative of anti-Gaullism. I should add that I do not
feel that this is quite as strong an indicator of anti-Gaullism as a negative reply to the question of whether one is satisfied with de Gaulle as President, or to a rejection of Gaullist policies. And, if cor roboration of the anti-Gaullist factor as a correlate specifically to supranationalism were not forthcoming in the form of these more direct indicators, I could not sustain this correlate on the strength alone of the 4201 finding. But as shall be seen, ample corroboration that anti-
Gaullism is a characteristic peculiar to the supranational level of orientation is forthcoming.
The last significant correlate on Table 17 is the respondent claim that the position of a legislative candidate of Europe would be considered in the decision of whether to vote for him. Interpreting its correlation pattern evidenced by the phi matrix, this response seems to be a function of both an award of salience to the European question, and
22 AilThe negative sign indicates a negative response to the de Gaulle question. 137 one's knowledge about European affairs. It thus did not qualify as a
clearly independent and distinctive attitude, and was therefore excluded
from further analytic consideration.
With this completion of analysis of the Survey #4201 data, some evidence emerges to sustain the theses that the two levels of trans national orientation cluster distinct variables. Initially, three shared variables were identified. But an analysis of the phi correlates of the supranational indicator revealed the peculiar affinity of anti-
Gaullism to supranationalism. Equally significant, neither neutralism nor Catholic Party preference, which displayed significant coefficients on the phi ranking to the diffuse transnationalism indicator, displayed significant correlation to supranationalism. There is thus evidence among these data that the two levels of transnational orientation are distinctive. This finding was not evident in the factor analysis results generated from these same data. But this simply reiterates the utility explained above for both analytic methods.
The supranationalism indicator question in Survey #A941 was similarly worded to the 4201 question. But a different battery of questions accompanied this survey. The 4201 question asked the respondent whether he favored France's membership in a European Union where certain important decisions would be made by a central governing body rather than by each of the member countries. The A941 question more specifically asks whether France ought to participate in a Europe in which a common foreign policy for all member nations would be decided. Both deal with the transfer of a key attribute of political sovereignty from France to an encompassing European authority. 138
Factor analysis of Survey #A941 yielded no factor defined by
the supranationalism indicator not did the indicator load signific-
cantly on any factor. The phi rank of indicators in correlation with
the indicator, which is demonstrated in Table 18 below, did, however,
demonstrate patterning consistent with the 4201 findings. Specifically,
none of the variables identified earlier as clustering with diffuse
transnationalism displayed significant coefficients with the supra
nationalism indicator. Moreover, the one variable which separately
correlated with the supranationalism indicator in Survey #4201 again
displays this trait in the A941 data. Reference is here made to the
negative coefficient of the second ranking indicator in Table 18, the
indicator of Gaullism. This has above been interpreted to mean that
anti-Gaullism is the correlate of supranationalism in Survey #A941.
This, thus reinforces the parallel finding in the 4201 data.
Of the four remaining significant indicators, three more may be
interpreted as distinct correlates of supranationalism. The top ranking
indicator, regarding a preference for United States participation in a
coordinated or unified North Atlantic defense structure, and the third
ranking indicator, representing the perception that French and United
States fundamental interests are close, have been interpreted above23
as both representatives of a common variable--pro-United States
attitude. Two indicators of a common variable, both significant at the
.001 level seems supportive of the assertion that this variable is a correlate of supranationalism. Additionally, the fact that an identical indicator to one of the above two did not significantly correlate with
23Cf. p. Ill, supra. 139
TABLE 18
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH SUPRANATIONALISM INDICATOR IFOP #A94l
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Chi Level of Square Significance
1 . Atlantic defense structure .13 19.634 p <.001 2 . Satisfied with de Gaulle as Pres -.12 18.340 p <.001 3. US and French interests are close .12 17.771 p £.001 4. W. German and French interests are close .11 12.246 p <.001 5. University education .10 12.285 p < .001 6 . Favor govt foreign policy .10 9.992 P <-01 7. France should improve ties with E. Eur .07 4.500 P <*05 8 . NATO is necessary against Soviet .06 4.055 P < . 0 5 9. High income .06 4.020 P £.05 1 0 . Satisfied with US influence in Eur .05 3.377 P <.10 11. Satisfied with US influence in NATO ,05 2.084 p < .20 0 / the indicator of diffuse transnationalism in the B401 data ^ seems to
support the assignment of a distinctive status of this variable with
25 supranationalism.
The fifth ranking indicator in Table 18, representing University
Education, also seems distinctly related to supranationalism. Again,
this conclusion is drawn in part from the observation that this variable
did not correlate significantly with the diffuse indicator in Survey 26 #B401, However, it may be observed that University Education also did
not display a significant coefficient with supranationalism in Survey 27 #4201. The resolution of this apparent conflict will have to await
discussion of the Survey #7071 data.
Finally, there is the third ranking indicator, the perception
of close French-West German fundamental interests, which represents a
pro-German attitude. It should be recalled that this variable also
correlated with the diffuse indicator in Survey #B401. This is evi
dence that this is a shared variable.
Hence, I have thus far derived the following patterning of variables:
2 ^Cf. Table 16, supra. 25 JIn a study of student attitudes conducted in January and February of 1962, Michelat and Thomas found a positive correlation between attitudes of anti-Americanism and French nationalism. This would seem to lend support to my finding of the association of pro- United States attitude and supranationalism. Cf. Guy Michelat and Jean-Pierre Hubert Thomas, Dimensions du Nationalism (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1966). — — — — — — —
2 ^Cf. Table 16, supra.
27Cf. Table 17, supra. 141
Political Union SHARED VARIABLES Pro-British Pro-German World Power
Neutralism DIFFUSE Gaullism TRANSNATIONALISM Catholic Party
Pro-U.S. Anti-Gaullism University Education
The fourth, and last, survey which was intensively analyzed was
IFOP Survey #7071 of 25 May 1965. The unique characteristic of this survey, as I have mentioned earlier, is that it has a plurality of supranationalism indicators. Specifically, the survey contained four questions which refer to a transnational system, or a specific structure, in possession of attributes traditionally associated with independent and sovereign nation-states. I have presented the four indicator questions earlier in this chapter28 in the display of the operational indicators of supranationalism. To recapitulate, the #7071 indicators measure the respondents' willingness to (1) relinquish national sovereignty, (2) extend diplomatic and defense authority to European institutions, (3) authorize the establishment of a European army, and
(4) authorize the extension of European federal taxing powers. I shall refer below to these four indicators respectively as:
1. Relinquishment of Sovereignty 2. European Diplomacy and Defense 3. European Army 4. Principle of Federal Tax
280n pp. 96-97. 142
As I had indicated in my operationalisation of supranationalism,
any of the #7071 responses referred to just above would serve as a valid
indicator. The factor analysis of Survey #7071 also provided sta
tistical evidence to bolster the authority of this last assertion by
demonstrating the interrelationship of the four indicators. In this
connection, reference may be made to the loading pattern on the first orthogonally rotated factor of Survey #7071. This pattern is demon
strated in Tables 16 and 17, on pages 131 and 134 above. The ranked
loading pattern given in Table 17 clearly demonstrates that the four
indicators cluster closely together. They all define a common factor, which I refer to as Supranationalism. No other indicators load signifi cantly on the factor, indicating a high degree of purity in its major dimensions. On the other hand, the nonloading of any other indicators prohibits the identification of any other significant independent variables which cluster with supranationalism. For this purpose reference will have to be made to the rank-order of phi coefficients on each supranationalism indicator.
The order of ranking on the supranationalism factor was used to dictate the order of investigation of the indicators. However, as will be soon apparent, the sequence of investigation turned out to be unim portant.
The top loading indicator on factor #1 was European Army.
Table 19 below shows the phi rank-order of correlates. Five indicators have coefficients at the .001 level of significance. But three of these, the top ranking three, are the other supranational indicators of the data set. This leaves two other indicators. However, the fourth 143
TABLE 19
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH SUPRANATIONALISM INDICATOR: EUROPEAN ARMY IFOP #7071
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Chi Level of Square Significance
1. European diplomacy and defense .48 190.566 p < .001 2 . Principle of federal tax .46 200.756 p < .001 3. Relinquishment of sovereignty .28 74.630 p < .001 4. Eur community soon to occur .18 36.787 p < .001 5. Friendly to Germans .11 11,130 p < .001 6 . High income .10 10.712 P 4.01 7. Catholic party .08 4.289 P 4.05 8. French-German commonality .07 4.756 P 4 - 0 5 9. Satisfaction with de Gaulle as Pres. .06 3.506 P 4 -10 1 0 . University education .06 3.785 p 4. 1° 144 ranking indicator is not clearly distinct from or independent of the
supranational indicators. It is a somewhat ambiguous indicator of an
unspecified transnational orientation. The specific wording of the question from which it derives is as follows:
European Community Soon to Occur
"Do you think that it would be possible to create a European Community which groups together people of different culture and language: today, in a few years, later, never?"
(*) Today (*) In a few years ( ) Later ( ) Never ( ) ?
Given the broad focus of the question, I did not designate it as indicative of a particular level, or even type, of transnational orien tation. However, given its obvious transnational focus, it was assumed that it would display a positive correlation with each supranational indicator. In fact, it does correlate significantly and positively with each supranational indicator, as shall be seen in the successive tables below. And having detailed its limitations, I shall dispense with any further analytic consideration of this particular indicator.
Hence, of the original five significant correlates to European
Army, only one is left. And this one, the fifth ranking indicator, is among those indicators which were earlier defined as the operational indicators of a pro-German attitude. This tends to further corroborate the findings of Surveys #B401 and #A941, that the pro-German attitude is a shared variable for both levels of transnational orientation.
The second highest loading indicator on the supranationalism factor of Survey #7071 was European Diplomacy and Defense. The 145
rank-order of correlates is illustrated in Table 20 below. However,
this list of correlates proves to be unenlightening with respect to the
search for other distinct variables which cluster with supranationalism.
Only four indicators correlate significantly with European Diplomacy and
Defense. The top three are the other three supranationalism indicators.
And the fourth is the unspecific transnationalism indicator discussed
above.
TABLE 20
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH SUPRANATIONALISM INDICATOR: EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND DEFENSE IFOP #7071
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Phi Level of Square Significance
1 . European army .47 190.566 p < .001 2 . Principle of federal tax .33 88.997 p < .001 3. Relinquishment of sovereignty .30 79.818 p < .001 4. Eur community soon to occur .13 15.595 p < . 0 0 1 5. Large commune .07 4.935 P <-05 6 . Friendly to Germans .07 3.636 p < .10
The next supranationalism indicator to be further investigated
is the Principle of Federal Tax. Of these eight, four (the first, second, fourth, and fifth) are the other transnational indicators. This leaves four significant indicators.
The third ranking indicator is that of the pro-German attitude.
This lends still further support to the inclusion of the variable among the cluster of variables with a transnational political orientation, and specifically as a variable shared by both levels analytically 146
TABLE 21
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH SUPRANATIONALISM INDICATOR: PRINCIPLE OF FEDERAL TAX IFOP #7071
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Chi Level of Square Significance
1 . European army .46 200.756 p < .001 2 . European diplomacy and defense .33 88.997 p < .001 3. Friendly to Germans .25 52.335 p < . 0 0 1 4. Eur community soon to occur .18 36.151 p < .001 5. Relinquishment of sovereignty .18 29.347 p < .001 6 . Favor de Gaulle for first Eur Pres. -.12 12.124 p <..001 7. University education .12 14.940 p < .001 8 . High income .11 12.680 p < . 0 0 1 9. French-German commonality .07 4.850 p <.05 1 0 . Catholic party .06 2.498 P £-20 147 isolated in this analysis.
The sixth ranking correlate of the Principle of Federal Tax is an indicator which interpreted as representing Gaullism, and which cor relates negatively to the supranationalism indicator. Thus, the findings of Surveys #4201 and #A941 are supported in identifying anti-
Gaullism as a correlate particularly of supranationalism.
Since the indicator is not among the original operationali zations of Gaullism given earlier, it is incumbent upon me to explain how I might interpret it as an indicator of Gaullism. The specific question from which the indicator derives is worded as follows:
Favor de Gaulle for first European President
"If you had to choose the first European President, which among the five following persons would you pick?"
( ) Adenauer (*) de Gaulle ( ) Mansholt ( ) Saragat ( ) Spaak ( ) ?
The choice of "de Gaulle" was considered a positive response.
All others were considered a negative response.
Among these five, two have a long-standing, intimate association with European integrative efforts. These are ex-Premier Paul Henri
Spaak and Dr. Sicco Mansholt. Two others, Saragat as President of Italy and Adenauer as Chancellor of the German Federal Republic were con sistent supporters of European integrative efforts, although their
"European" role was more limited. Alone among the five listed above is an unambiguous national leader, who cannot be considered a supporter of
European integration. In fact, Charles de Gaulle repeatedly pronounced 148
himself opposed to European integration per se, and instead pointedly
limited his support of "Europe of States." I therefore interpreted the
choice of the French President to be more reflective of an attitude in
favor of de Gaulle rather than "Europe."
I further assumed, again, that the commitment was not to the
person of de Gaulle, rather that it was a "Gaullist" conception of
politics. In this connection reference should be made to Table 22
below, showing the ranked loadings on factor #2 of #7071.
TABLE 22
RANKED LOADING PATTERN FOR IFOP #7071 ROTATED FACTOR #2 Top 6 Loadings Gaullism
Factor Indicator Loading
1. Satisfied with de Gaulle as President .729 2. Catholic party .642 3. Favor de Gaulle for 1st European President .604 4. Unreserved pride in France .356 5. Male sex -.231 6 . Eur states relinquish sovereignty -.194
It is to be observed that only three Indicators load significantly on
this factor which I have labeled "Gaullism." The top loading indicator, consistent with the factor's label, is the primary designated indicator of Gaullism, specifically the response indicating satisfaction with de Gaulle as President. Loading second in Catholic Party preference.
And third is the indicator presently under discussion, de Gaulle as first European President. This loading pattern indicates that this 149
Indicator is at least partially definitive of the general system of
attitudes here referred to as Gaullism. And it is in this sense that I
interpret the indicator in the phi rank list of correlates to the
supranationalism indicator, the Principle of Federal Tax.
The remaining two correlates of this indicator are University
Education and High Income. It may be recalled from the discussion of
the A941 data set that there was some question as to whether University
Education should be included in the Supranationalism cluster. A941
indicated that this was the case, while 4201 indicated conflictingly,
that it did not correlate significantly. B401 provided evidence that
University Education was not a correlate of diffuse transnationalism.
The finding of the phi rank of correlates to the supranationalism indi
cator, the Principle of Federal Tax, seems to put the weight of evidence on the side of including University Education as a particular correlate of supranationalism.
High Income is the last significant correlate of the Principle of Federal Tax. If reference be made to Table 23 below, it can be seen that High Income and University Education cluster together in a single factor. The correlation of these two variables is a familiar phenomenon in Western societies. So, if there is evidence to support the inclusion of University Education among the correlates of Supranationalism, it should be a fairly safe assumption that High Income ought to also be included. This reveals some of the reasoning behind the decision to include High Income, although it displays a significant phi coefficient only in the phi ranking presently being discussed. 150
TABLE 23
RANKED LOADING PATTERN FOR IFOP #7071 ROTATED FACTOR #4 Top 6 Loadings High Income
Factor Indicator Loading
1. High income .514 2. University education .446 3. Large commune .268 4. Unreserved pride in France -.202 5. T.V. .202 6 . Catholic party .198
Finally, the fourth supranationalism indicator of Survey #7071
is the response entitled Relinquishment of Sovereignty. The phi rank
of correlates to this indicator may be seen in Table 24 below. Seven
indicators correlate significantly with the supranational indicator.
The fifth ranking phi coefficient is associated to Catholic Party
preference, which correlates negatively to the supranational indicator.
However, owing to the large number of responses which did not fall into
the designated categories of this indicator, and were thus counted as
nonresponses, the N was unusually low for this indicator and the chi
square equivalence proved to be below the .01 significance level.
Of the seven significant factors, four, again, were the other
transnational indicators of the data set. The sixth ranking indicator was one which represents unreserved pride in the French nation, or a strong nationalistic or chauvinistic attitude. This indicator cor related negatively in the present case, demonstrating that people with a supranational orientation tend to qualify their nationalistic pride. 151
TABLE 24
RANK ORDER OF CORRELATES WITH SUPRANATIONALISM INDICATOR: RELINQUISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY IFOP #7071
Chi Square Rank Indicator Phi Chi Level of Square Significance
1. Europlean diplomacy and defense .31 79.818 p < .001 2 . European army .28 74.630 p < .001 3. Principle of federal tax .18 29.347 p < .001 4. Favor de Gaulle for first Eur Pres - .13 14.766 p < .001 5. Catholic party -.13 9.327 p < .0 1 a 6 . Unreserved pride in France -.12 15.700 p < . 0 0 1 7. Eur community soon to occur .11 13.658 p < . 0 0 1 8 . Male sex .10 11.756 P <.001 9. Satisfied with de Gaulle as Pres -.08 6.270 p <..02 1 0 . French-German commonality .05 2.290 P <.20
aAlthough phi is a function of chi square, the precise relation ship being 0 = X the ranking of chi square values does not always correspond to the phi rank because, owing to the varying proposition of nonresponses, the N for each dyadic correlation matrix is not always the same. 152
However, this indicator occurs uniquely in the phi rank order of
Relinquishment of Sovereignty. Moreover, it did not load highly on
factor #2, Gaullism,29 not did it demonstrate a significant relationship
to any other variable previously considered. Thus, it was excluded from
further consideration in the present analysis.
Of the two remaining significant indicators, one is the Gaullist
indicator which again correlates negatively here. This lends a bit more
support for the inclusion of antl-Gaullism among the correlates of
supranationalism.
Finally, the eighth ranking indicator is the one for Male Sex.
I have decided to include this variable among the correlates of supra
nationalism although this is the only instance in which it displays a
significant coefficient. My reasoning, relying partly on non-
statistical elements in this case, involves the interpretation of two
sets of observations. First, Male Sex never correlated negatively with
any other supranational indicator. Rather it tended to show positive
tendencies to the other supranational indicators,2® although it did not
correlate significantly. On the other hand, Male Sex tended to show
negative tendencies on the Diffuse Transnationalism Factor of Survey
#4201,^1 and on the Gaullism factors of Surveys #A941 and #B401. Thus,
finally recalling the high level of significance chosen to evaluate the
phi coefficients, I decided that the overall weight of evidence
2 9 Cf. Table 12, p. 118.
3 0 Ibid.
3 1 Cf. Table 11, p. 117. 153 suggested the inclusion of the Male Sex among the correlates of supra nationalism.
An overview of the findings the derivation of which I have just described is given in Table 25 below. In Table 26 I have reproduced the two sets of variables first presented on page 113 above. The effort in this section has been to substantiate the assertion of the existence of two distinct clusters or sets of variables, which correspond to two different levels of transnational political orientation.
Initial Implications 32 Earlier in this chapter I suggested an initial conclusion which may be drawn from the components of the subset clusters in that the division between Frenchmen who share a diffuse transnational orien tation and those who share a supranational orientation corresponds to the division between elite and mass members of French society. This initial conclusion derives from an interpretation of the correlation patterns of the three objective variables alone. Reference is here made to University Education, High Income, and Male Sex. However, the other components of the subset clusters imply more particular characteristics about the population groupings thus far distinguished as elite and mass.
More specifically, the correlation of Neutralism and Gaullism with dif fuse transnationalism further implies that this level of trans nationalism represents a qualitatively different type of orientation toward Europe. The significance of this point is that such a dis tinction has generally not been acknowledged by analysts of European
320n p. 113. TABLE 25
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
Transnational Indicators
B401 4201 4201 A941 7071 7071 7071 Variable Sets Variables Trans- Trans- Supra Supra Eur Fed Relinq. nat'l nat'l Army Tax Sov.
Political Union X X Shared Set Pro-British X X X Pro-W. German X XXX World Power X X
Diffuse Neutralism X X Transnationalism n ^ -n v Catholic Party X
Pro-U.S. X Anti-Gaullism X X X X Supranationalism University Education X X High Income X Male Sex X 155
TABUS 26
TRANSNATIONAL ORIENTATION VARIABLE SETS
Political Union SHARED Pro-British VARIABLES Pro-German World Power
Neutralism Pro-U.S. DISTINCTIVE Gaullism Anti-Gaullism VARIABLES Catholic Party University Education High Income Male Sex
DIFFUSE TRANSNATIONALISM SUPRANATIONALISM 156 political integration.^ Rather, the interpretation of survey data has been that while there is substantial support for the general idea of
Western European integration, this support tends to diminish when the question becomes more specific. But to reiterate, the findings here indicate that the distinction is not merely one of degree, but of a qualitative difference between two types of support. And if the evo lution of French trahsnationalism sketched in the preceding chapter be recalled, it should be recognized that the diffuse transnationalism cluster exhibits the characteristics of the traditionalistic, instru mentalist orientation toward Europe.
Thus, the findings imply the existence in France of two
■^Reference is here made to: Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); Haas, "International Inte gration: The European and the Universal Process," pp. 366-92; Haas, Beyond the Nation-State; Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supra national Unification," The American Political Science Review. LVI, No. 4 (December, 1962); Amitai Etzioni, "European Unification: A Strategy of Change," World Politics, XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963); Etzioni, Political Unification; Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication; Deutsch et al.. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; Deutsch, "Com munication Theory and Political Integration"; Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion"; Deutsch, "The Price of Integration"; Deutsch et a l ., France, Germany and the Western Alliance; Ronald Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?" The American Political Science Review. LXI, No. 1 (March, 1967), 91-105; Jacques Rene Rabier, Analyse de l'Enquete en Cours sur la Jeunesse Europeene (Stras bourg: Centre europeene experimental de la jeunesse, Conseil de 1 'Europe, 1969); Rabier, "The European Idea and National Public Opinion," p]D. 443-54; Rabier, L*Information des Europeens; Rabier, Jacques-Rene, L'Opinion Publique et 1 'Europe: Essai/ d1Inventaire des Connaissances et des Lacunes (Bruxelles: University Libre de Bruxelles, 1966); Puchala, "The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration," pp. 38-64. Exceptions to this trend, as has been observed in chap. iii supra, are: Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945," pp. 305-58; and Lerner and Gorden, Euratlantica. population groupings, each sharing a qualitatively different and chronologically related transnational orientation. That the two popu lation groupings, the elite and mass, are quite obviously also functionally related leads into a discussion of the theoretical impli cation of the findings pursued in the following chapter. CHAPTER V
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS— AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE FINDINGS
The Transnational Loyalty Acquisition Process
The object at this point is to explicate some theoretical impli
cations of the findings described in the preceding chapter. I should
like to accomplish this by interpreting the findings in conjunction with
the theoretical model developed in chapter ii. To recapitulate, the
supranational orientation was found to actually represent the specific attitude of supranational European political loyalty, per se. This is so because, besides extending the traditional attributes of political sovereignty to the European level, it also contained the social element of identification with a respective European society. It was also found
that, although supranational loyalty was distributed less frequently
than the more diffuse transnational orientation, it nevertheless was distributed in a distinct pattern. Specifically, supranational loyalty was found to occur more frequently among individuals who also shared the characteristics of high income, high level of formal education, and male sex. These characteristics, of course, define the elite. These findings, then corroborate the data presented in chapter ii^ showing the
^■Specifically on pp. 23-29.
158 159 general pattern throughout France and Europe of a higher level of supra national identification among higher in socioeconomic status members.
9 This patterning has been observed by a number of analysts, and I have demonstrated in chapter ii that it is easily explained by the principles 3 of operant conditioning. But what cannot be explained by these prin ciples is the possession of these attitudes by nonelites, members of the mass public. Table 27 below demonstrates the distribution of an indi cator of transnational loyalty by income and level of formal education.
TABLE 27
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPRANATIONALISM BY INCOME AND BY LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION— SURVEY #4201
Income Level of Formal Education Low High No University University
0 CO 3 For 56.2% 62.6% 57.3% 80.0% cd c o •H £ Against 43.8% 37.4% 4 2 .6% 2 0 .0% Su cu N = 429 N - 182 N*= 731 N = 50 3 cn
Here it can be seen that although almost 63 per cent of those whose income is above the national mean assent to the proposition that there ought to be a central decision-making authority for important decisions, yet 56 per cent of those whose income is below the mean likewise assent.
Who I have already identified in chap. ii, specifically on pp. 23-29.
3 Cf. chap. ii, pp. 22-23, 30. 160
The same fact is also manifest with respect to individuals with formal
education below the university level. Here too a significant percentage
of nonelites exhibit a supranational attitude.
But although explanation for this phenomenon is not afforded by
the principles of classic learning theory, the factor analytic findings
discussed above themselves suggest an explanatory model. The two atti
tudes peculiar to the diffuse transnationalism cluster are neutralism
and Gaullism. These attitudes, as I have identified them in chapter iii
above, are distinctly traditionalistic ones. I have argued and
attempted to demonstrate that neutralism was an attempt in the immediate
post-war period by the French leadership to attain diplomatic inde
pendence for France. It was felt that this was a logical first step,
under the strained and confining circumstances of that period, for
France to assert her national individuality and her pre-eminence. And
this was the assertion of a long-standing and strong national goal.
Gaullism, likewise, represents the desire to reassert the
grandeur of France. Concern here is with national rank. As neutralism
became less and less feasible in the face of the Soviet threat to Europe
after 1947, the more diffuse expression of traditional French national
values became more widely used. The epitome of such usage occurred while General de Gaulle actually served as President. But even here,
its expression was more powerful during the first half of his presidency
and distinctly waned during the last few years.
So, it may be held that neutralism and Gaullism are traditional
attitudes. However, these were found to cluster with an orientation of
transnationalism, albeit diffuse. But the explanation here is that this 161
orientation, which first became popularly c'istributed only after World
War II, does not represent a goal or value, traditional or otherwise.
Rather, it represents the means chosen, under the pressing circumstances
of the early post-war period, to realize the still dominant traditional
values. Transnationalism, I reiterate, was originally an instrumental
device to attain other, specifically the traditional, goals and values.
It should, however, be nevertheless also recalled that this
instrumental orientation is also a distinctly political orientation.
Its political nature was argued from the beginning by the leadership.
It did and does represent a willingness to involve France in a new
European political structure. So, although I argue that attitudes of
neutralism and Gaullism coexist only with an instrumental transnational
orientation, I do not deny that the transnational perspective represents
a basic re-orientation for Frenchmen.
Furthermore, for France, the transnational orientation came to correspond with an actual situation. France was operating in con junction with transnational institutions. This correspondence resulted
in large part from the generation of transnational attitudes by the
French leadership in connection with the proposition and formulation of policies which ultimately materialized in actually functioning trans national institutions. These have composed a new economic-political context which have produced certain, mostly economic, results which some portions of French society have felt themselves dependent upon.
Expectations became geared to the transnational context. And these felt dependencies and expectations in turn reinforced the transnational con text because of the democratic practices in France. Reference is here 162 made to the fact that widespread transnational attitudes ultimately translate into French policy. This relationship has been rather force fully demonstrated in the events and evolution of the 1965 crisis recounted in chapter ii where popular reaction brought about a signifi cant modification of policy by a government which was basically hostile to extensive transnationalism. The sum attitudinal effect, therefore, of the materialization of transnationalism is to make the peculiarly national traditional values irrelevant. This occurs despite the fact that the transnational orientation was originally appropriated as an instrumental device for the realization of these traditional values.
In my factor analytic findings, the attitudinal condition of the absence of, or even opposition to, traditional values correlates to a supranational orientation. This orientation for Frenchmen has in turn been demonstrated to represent actual transnational European loyalty.
So, a sequence seems to be implied wherein after individuals become detached from the traditional values, they adopt a greater degree of personal transnational commitment which is represented by transnational loyalty. It should here be added that this inference assumes a certain functional relationship between elites and mass, eacH of which group corresponds with a different level of orientation in the findings presently being interpreted. I will pursue this particular assumption below. But the main point here is that the two transnational orien tation patterns may be interpreted to be temporally related with the diffuse orientation being the precedent condition to the more specific attitude of transnational loyalty.
I should digress here briefly to a theoretically relevant point. 163
It cannot be demonstrated that the movement in France, and Europe
generally, toward supranationalism, is "inevitable." I do not believe
that any manner of mechanistic determination of supranationalism can be
found. Evolution could have gone, and could still go, in any direction.
This includes evolution toward extreme nationalism. But, I am arguing,
if there is a movement toward supranationalism, no matter how arbitrary
its origins, and which recruits elites, than an orientational pattern of diffuse transnationalism is capable of acting as a predisposition
toward supranationalism. And I will add the point that, given the par
ticular post-war French circumstances, including its political struc
ture, diffuse transnationalism is in fact a predisposition to supra nationalism.
But to return to my line of argument, I have just posited the existence of a temporal relationship between the two levels of trans national orientation. Now, I will further argue, once this temporal dimension is applied, the dynamics of the transnational loyalty acquisition process is implied by my findings. Hence, the diffuse orientation becomes the earlier stage of commitment to, or the predis position for, the more specific commitment to symbols of supranational sovereignty. It can therefore be concluded that if the elite more fre quently evidence the later, supranational orientation, then the elite have gone through the learning process earlier than the mass public.
So, mass learning occurs subsequent to elite learning.
The mechanism of this process is not immediately apparent from the factor and correlation matrix analytic findings. But, it should be 164
recalled,^ Donald Puchala and Amitai Etzioni, separately, suggest the
process of mass acquisition. Etzioni has suggested the concept of
"identitive power" with which elites may initiate a more general inte
grative process,^ Puchala, slightly more explicitly, suggests what I
have characterized as a two-phase learning process, with elite learning
in the prior phase and mass learning in the subsequent phase.^ This
model of the societal learning process predicts that there would be a
convergence of mass and elite attitudes through time. More par
ticularly, it would predict that in a dynamic situation of increasing
degrees of elite transnational loyalty, there would be a parallel
increase among the mass population through time. Convergence would
ultimately occur when elite learning slows or stops.
In an article published subsequent to the one cited just above,
Puchala examines western Europe survey findings to determine whether
any growth in supranational sentiments has occurred.^ Comparing 1962
and 1957 results for West Germany, Italy, as well as France, he con
cludes that in that five-year period "... there were no really notable
changes in the level of support for supranational federation among the
Q mass population over time." This conclusion, of course applies
^In chap. ii, pp. 32-33.
**Cf. Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 58, 71-72, 94.
^Puchala, "The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration," pp. 38-64, 50.
^Puchala, "The Common Market and Political Federation in Western European Public Opinion," pp. 32-59.
®Ibid., p. 49. Italics in the original. 165 particularly for France as well, and Puchala cites the following figures
from which he derives his conclusion:
TABLE 28
PER CENT FRENCHMEN WHO FAVOR SUPRANATIONAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION
Group 1957 1962
Total population 37 40
Upper status 59 57
Source: Donald J. Puchala, "The Common Market and Political Federation in Western European Public Opinion," International Studies Quarterly, XIV, No. 1 (March, 1970), 32-59. The tabular data appear on p. 50.
It Is, of course, quite reasonable to conclude that these data do not evidence growth in supranational sentiment. But Puchala goes further. He argues that in fact no growth has occurred, and he further argues that growth in supranationalism is unrelated to growth in the lower level transnational commitment represented by the Common Market.
Hence a consistent and universal trend in rising support for the Common Market coincided between 1957 and 1962 with a variety of upward moving and downward moving trends in approval for political federation among different ideological groups. This suggests that any impact the Common Market may have had in generating support for federation was far from universal or, what is more likely, that the Common Market had no impact at all upon trends in support for federation.9
Puchala hypothesized that there would be an "attitudinal spillover" of support for the Common Market to support for supranationalism. He found
9Ibid., p. 52. 166 none, and concluded that the process does not occur. Puchala also
observes that "... favor for integration beyond the economic sector was more frequently voiced at upper status levels than within respective
total populations." But he goes on to add that
. . . favor for limiting integration to the economic sector was also frequently voiced at upper status levels. The data there fore reflect intra-elite debate rather than consensus on the issue of extending the scope of regional integration.
Puchala thus concludes that there has been no growth of supra nationalism among the mass populations, and he denies the instrumen
tality of elite attitude acquisition in the mass learning process. How ever, it should also be added that Puchala does exhibit concern about the possible inadequacy of his examination. "It might be pushing history a bit to expect much attitude change in only five years.
My contention is that Puchala*s premonition is justified, that his conclusion is based on a much too restricted analysis, and that if the analysis were extended by six years past 1962, a rather distinct growth trend for supranationalism can be perceived. The pertinent data
I refer to is displayed in Table 29 and Figure 1 below.
The specific indicators of supranationalism among the five sur veys vary slightly, but comport closely with the indicators identified in the factor and correlation matrix analysis described in the preceding chapter. It may, in this connection, be recalled that the first ortho gonally rotated factor extracted from Survey #7071 was interpreted to represent the latent attitude of supranationalism. Table 13 on page 119 lists the four significant loadings on that factor. These four are a
10Ibid., p. 56. U Ibid,, p. 58. 167
TABLE 29
PER CENT SUPPORTING SUPRANATIONALISM AMONG THE TOTAL POPULATION AND THE ELITE IN FRANCE, 1957 TO 1968
May June Fe b . Fe b . Apr. Datea 1957 1962 1964 1967 1968
Total N (1 ,2 0 0 ) (1,307) (971) (1,644) (2 ,0 0 0 )
Total Population 35 40 46 56 63
Eliteb 54 50 54 71 76
aThe May, 1957, and June, 1962, surveys are, respectively, USIA International Surveys XX9 and XX14, both executed in France by Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique (I.F.O.P.). The February, 1964, survey is International Survey XX16, also executed by I.F.O.P. The February, 1967, survey is I.F.O.P. Survey A941. The April, 1968, survey was executed by Sofres, and its results were published as Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "Les Francais et 1'Unification Politique de l'Europe, d'apres un Sondage de la Sofres," Revue Fran- ^aise de Science Politique. XXX, No. 3 (September, 1968), 145-70. The pertinent data appear in a table on p . 161.
bThe "elite" were operationalized to mean individuals coded in socioeconomic category "A" in Survey XX9 and XX14. For Survey XX16 "elite" represents individuals coded in "upper and upper middle" socioeconomic category. In Survey A941 "elite" represents those individuals coded in the top 3 income categories. And in the Sofres survey "elite" represents those individuals coded as "cadres superieurs, professions llberales" in the code for occupation of the head of household. Per Centum 20 25 40 45 10 50 55 15 30 35 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 0 5 955 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 195556 urntoaimTed 1957-1968 Trend: Supranationalism IUE 1 FIGURE Year
66 67 68 Elite✓ 9 70 69 Mass 168 169
positive response to the proposal for (1) a European army, for
(2) central European authority for diplomacy and defense policy, for
(3) a central European taxing power, and a positive response to the pro
posal that (4) the individual European states should relinquish their
sovereignty and form a federation. This factor then closely clusters
orientations toward rather specific supranational symbols as well as a
more diffuse attitude favoring the principle of supranational political
organization. All four indicators tap the same latent attitude which I
have offered can safely be referred to as supranationalism. And this
attitude has been demonstrated to represent transnational loyalty. The
supranationalism orientation displayed in Table 29 just above is repre
sented by three different wordings. The first three surveys, XX9, XX14,
and XX16, have a single, identical indicator. It reads:
'•Would you favor or oppose France joining a political federation of Western Europe in which the final authority (le pouvior de decision) would be a central government (un gouvernement commun) rather than with the governments of the member countries?"
Supranationalism was interpreted to be represented by a preference for
the former alternative.
And, although not specific to policy areas, the Sofres survey more specifically phrases the question asked by the first three surveys.
In this case respondents were asked to indicate their preference from among the following three alternative forms of European political structure:
1. There would be no European government, and the governments of all the countries would meet regularly to attempt to adopt a common policy.
2. There would be a European government which would concern itself with the more important questions, and each country 170
would retain its own government to deal with particular problems.
3. There would be a European government which would deal with all questions, and the member states would no longer have their own separate governments.
Supranationalism was interpreted to be represented by preference for
either the second or third alternative. The percentage figure in
Table 29 for the Sofres survey represents the combined totals for these
two categories.
The Sofres indicator, then, represents a willingness to relin
quish some or all national sovereignty. The USIA surveys, XX9, XX14,
and XX16, contain an indicator for the willingness to relinquish at
least some national sovereignty. And the IFOP #A941 survey indicator
represents a more specific willingness to relinquish sovereignty in the
foreign policy area, which may be alternatively represented by the terms
diplomacy and defense policy. It can therefore be seen that all three
indicators represented in Table 29 above represent orientations compre
hended by the Survey #7071 first factor cluster. But it has already
been shown that the four main components of this cluster all represent
the single latent attitude of supranationalism. Thus, I feel safe in
claiming that although the data displayed in Table 29 derive from three
differently worded indicators, the data nevertheless all relate to a
single orientational pattern, which I refer to as supranationalism.
Alternately stated, the data represent the temporal dimensions of a
single trend--the growth of a single identifiable attitude.
Figure 1 above represents this trend in graphic form. As should
be readily apparent, mass and elite attitudes show a parallel tendency.
And by looking at the trend past 1962, it should also be apparent that 171
Puchala’s verdict of no growth is not sustained. In fact, continuing
my reference to the graph, the mass tendency between 1957 and 1964 seems
to be a convergence toward elite levels of supranationalism. After
1964, however, the growth of elite supranationalism seems to have
accelerated rather sharply. But during this period, mass attitudes have
tended to parallel the elite rate of growth.
In addition to conflicting with Puchala’s findings, my findings also seem to contradict the findings recently reported by Karl Deutsch 1 9 and Lewis Edinger. After analyzing indicators of what these authors call "structural integration"^ for a ten-year period prior to 1963,
Edinger and Deutsch conclude that "(tjhe movement toward structural
European unification since 1957 has been largely halted or very much slowed down."^4 Because these authors examine indicators of actual behavior rather than political attitudes it is uncertain whether their findings collide with my findings or not. And it should also be pointed out that the Deutsch-Edinger conclusion has been severely questioned by other analysts. In this connection, J. Zvi Namenwirth and Thomas L.
Brewer, analyzing some of the same data analyzed by Deutsch and Edinger, come to the rather opposite conclusion that "there has not only been a change in the nature of the European concern with integration but that
12 Karl W. Deutsch et a l ., France, Germany and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967) (hereinafter referred to as France, Germany and the Western Alliance) .
l^Cf. ibid.. p. 235, for their definition.
l4Ibid.. p. 298; also cf. p. 235. 172
this change implies in turn a greater extent of European inte
gration. . . .
Carl J. Friedrich also takes issue with the Deutsch-Edinger con
clusion by offering a different interpretation of the same data.And 17 Ronald Inglehart challenges the Deutsch-Edinger conclusion with an
alternative intepretation of the discrepancy between elite and mass
European behavior. Here Inglehart addresses himself directly to the
Deutsch-Edinger findings that the trend of transactional flow between
1958 and 1963, after corrected for the increase in general prosperity,
does not evidence an acceleration.
Does the fact that these changes have been accompanied by rising prosperity mean that "integration" has not been taking place? I would argue that the chief significance of these j^ransactlona^trends lies not in the extent to which they have produced "structural integration" in the sense in which Deutsch defines it, but in the degree to which they reshape the political aspirations of the major groups in the s o c i e t y . 18
Inglehart then explicates his counterinterpretation:
One might hazard the guess that Deutsch*s conclusions may have been unduly influenced by the study of top-level decision making. It is at precisely this level that European inte grative activity has been most effectively blocked since 1958. . . . In broader spheres of European society, I would argue, the process of Integration has been going on.19
15j. Zvi Namenwirth and Thomas L. Brewer, "Elite Editorial Com ment on the European and Atlantic Communities in Four Countries," in A Computer Approach to Content Analysis, ed. by Philip J. Stone et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.T.T. Press, 1966), pp. 401-27. The above quo tation on pp. 423-24. Italics in the original. For the Deutsch-Edinger conclusion pertinent to the same content analytic data, cf. Deutsch et a l ., France. Germany and the Western Alliance, p. 244.
l^Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation? p. 36.
l^Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?" pp. 91-105.
16Ibid., p. 103. 19Ibid.. p. 105. 173
Thus, to recapitulate, my findings contravene the findings of Puchala,
and Deutsch and Edinger. But I feel that I have amply demonstrated
Puchala's finding to be premature by both updating his indicators and
bringing to bear independent evidence in the form of my factor analysis
and intercorrelation matrix findings. X feel that I have also demon
strated that my findings are also not disturbed by the more ambitious
multifaceted analysis offered by Deutsch and Edinger. This for two
reasons. First, because of the ambiguity of their major analytic con
cepts it is not certain whether Deutsch and Edinger refer to the same
phenomenon 1 address myself to. Second, because of the theoretical
weakness of the, Deutsch-Edinger analysis, there is a basis to question
the validity of their findings, and this is especially so in the face of
the powerfully substantiated challenges referred to just above.
Now to summarize my findings, the mass and elite supranational
trends for the period between 1957 and 1968, demonstrated in Figure 1
above, show consecutive converging and parallel patterns. These trend
data, therefore, tend to sustain the model of the political loyalty
acquisition process suggested by the factor and correlation matrix
analytic findings. More specifically, the combined evidence sustains
the thesis that loyalty acquisition occurs in a two-phase process.
Elite learning of political loyalty occurs in the first phase, and is
accomplished by the direct learning process of operant conditioning.
Mass learning then occurs, in the second phase, and is accomplished by vicarious learning of elite cues.
It should perhaps here be added that the process need not be conceived as a homogeneous national two-phase sequence, although, of 174
course, it may and such a sequence is all that has been indicated by the
data. Rather, the loyalty acquisition process may be more particularly
conceptualized as a set of sequential dyadic processes. Thus, national
elites may give cues to community leaders, these community leaders, in
turn, may serve as models for the base population. The data displayed
in Table 4, of chapter ii showing a generally higher level of trans
national orientation in Sedan as compared with France generally may be
interpreted as evidence in support of the sequential dyad process. In
this case the Sedanese general public evidently took their cues from
their own community leaders, because its level of orientation is about
as high as the entire French elite. However, this evidence cannot
generate much confidence because of the lack of strict comparability
between indicator questions used in the Sedan survey and in the national
surveys.
The process I have just described above consisted of two dyadic
sequences. Actual investigation may reveal three or more. But it
should be added that this suggested modular complication has been
derived by inference from the basic two-phase process model. It is only
the later that has been derived from the data. My suggested elaboration
is offered only to indicate a possible course of the future development of the two-phase model.
Returning now to the conclusions about the general loyalty acquisition process, another characteristic which seems to be indicated by the French experience analyzed in this study is that the learning occurs gradually and incrementally. By gradually I mean both that it occurs over a number of years, probably taking considerably more than a 175
generation, at least as much a3 thirty-five or more years for 75 per
cent of the mass population to adopt a single new orientational pattern,
and that the pattern of change is rather continuous, with few pre
cipitous swings. By incremental I mean that the learning occurs in
increasing approximate stages. The first orientational pattern adopted
is a diffuse one. Subsequently the objects of orientation become more
specific. And as the specificity increases, a greater degree of commit ment is also assumed by the individual.
And a third characteristic indicated by the present analysis is
that the process also involves unlearning. Thus, along with the incre mentation of more specific components which serve to specify and define
the originally diffuse objects of orientation, there is the extinction of certain old habit patterns. So, in the French case, such traditional attitudes as anti-Germanism and neutralism had to be unlearned before adoption of supranational loyalty.
The Process of International Political Integration
In chapter ii, I have demonstrated that the linkage between political loyalty and political integration consisted of the ability of mass attitudes, if sufficiently frequently distributed, to be translated into public policy in highly secularized political systems which are also characterized by a high degree of subsystem autonomy. I have already stated that France is such a system. But it still remains to stipulate the integrative process in greater detail, and in light of the two-phase nature of the loyalty acquisition process.
Aspects of the integrative process may be discerned from events 176 which have already been discussed; however, I have not identified these yet as such. The 1965 Common Market crisis, discussed in part 3 of
chapter ii, demonstrates how French elites, including national group
leaders as well as party and political leaders, were influenced by the new and beneficial European structural situation to exhibit behavior
toward transnationalism and supranationalism. The new European struc
tural situation, in turn, was the result of parliamentary and govern mental decisions increasing French participation in transnational
European institutions. And it has been demonstrated that the parties and groups which were responsible for the parliamentary and governmental decisions were themselves preceded and influenced by widespread popular attitudes favoring transnational policies. In this connection Georges
Goriely has described public opinion behavior shortly after the proposal of the Schuman Plan:
It can be said that on the Continent more or less, general public opinion was in advance of the parties with regard to the European questions: One is, in effect, struck by the fact that the European idea interested the vast strata of opinion (even if these were not always clearly conscious of what the idea signified or Implied) when the militants and even the party leaders completely ignored the problem, appearing com pletely paralyzed when they were confronted with it and remained attached to the traditional questions of national policy.^®
Of course, subsequently the majority parties were brought about to sup porting the idea. The point here is the sequence of prior mass assumption of transnational attitudes, and subsequent party response.
And finally it is to be recalled that the entire transnational European integration movement in France was initiated by elites.
^Gori^ly, "L1Opinion Publique de la Plan Schuman," pp. 585-611. 177
To recapitulate, in an ordered fashion, the interaction sequence
just gone through, action is initiated by the elites which then
influences mass attitudes. Mass attitudes then affect party positions,
which, in turn, results in supportive decisions on the part of the
National Assembly and the government for French participation in trans
national European institutions. This results in a changed transnational
structural situation which, as it is perceived and experienced as a
beneficial development, produces supportive attitudes and actions by the
elite. This, then, restarts the cycle.
What I have just described is a cycle or looped sequence of
mutual causal interactions. Moreover, the loop is so structured as to
amplify an initial effect. Thus, elite support for transnational action
ultimately results in elite support for further transnational action.
This particular type of interaction process has been identified and - 21 analyzed by Magoroh Maruyama, He refers to this particular process
as "morphogenesis" or a "deviation-amplifying mutual causal process."
Figure 2 below illustrates this process. In interpreting this
diagram, the arrows indicate the direction of influence. Thus elite
action leads to mass action, which, in turn, results in party action.
The signs attached to each arrow indicate the direction of change.
Here, a plus (+) sign indicates that the changes occur in the same
^Magoroh Maruyama, "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation- Amplifying Causal Processes," American Scientist. LV, No. 2 (June, 1963), 164-79. This type of process has also been identified and discussed by Karl W. Deutsch, in his The Nerves of Government; Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), esp. chap. xi, pp. 182-99. But in this instance I am using Maruyama's method of modeling the process, and I am, therefore, using his terminology. 178
(B) Mass Action
v.+(C) Party Action (A) Elites Action
* „(F) Benefits Derived Formulated
(G) Pluralizatlon of Elites
■(E) European Structural Situation Alters
Fig. 2.--The International Integration Process 179
direction--that the direction of the just previous change is main
tained— but that this change is not necessarily a positive one. To
illustrate this, the diagram indicates that responsive changes in the
European structural situation increases the pluralization of elites.
This pluralization, then, decreases further elite initiatives or
actions. The decreased elite action then results in decreased mass
action.
The integrative process I have discussed above and identified
as morphogenetic is represented by the loop A-B-C-D-E-F-A. It is
morphogenetic because, as I have said just above, it is so structured
as to amplify an initial effect. Hence, if elite action is the initial
effect, which increases mass action, which results in further policy
formulation, which produces structural change, which increases benefits,
the ultimate effect is to increase elite action. By means of a loop of
uniformly positively influenced mutual causal interactions an initial
deviation from the status quo results in a further change. My con
tention here is that this process describes the integrative movement--
the development of supranationalism— in France to date. The integrative process involves the loyalty acquisition process as an integral com ponent. A relatively modest initiative in 1950 had led in fifteen years to the development of a transnational system of considerable com plexity and with the ability of exercising strong internal influence in
France, as was evidenced during the 1965 crisis.
The process requires an "initial kick," to use Maruyama*s metaphor, of a certain minimal magnitude. This was represented, in the
French case, by the proposal and initial reception of the Schuman Plan. 180
But once this was administered, the process acquired its own 22 inertia.
However, I should immediately add that I do not believe the
process to be quite as simple as the discussion to this point seems to
imply. If reference be made again to Figure 2, it will be seen that
there are actually two loops diagrammed. The morphogenetic or
deviation-amplifying process thus far discussed is represented by loop
A-B-C-D-E-F-A. The second loop indicated, A-B-C-D-E-G-A, however, has
a different dynamics.
I am here suggesting that as the transnational European struc
tural situation becomes more complex it generates an increasingly
pluralistic elite structure. This pluralistic structure consequently
dilutes the signals given to the mass population because of internal
countervailing influences. Thus, an increase in structural complexity
produces an increased pluralistic elite. This, in turn, results in
decreased elite action, which then reduces mass action, which reduces
party action, which decreases policy formulations, which then decreases
the rate of structural alteration. This, in turn, decreases the rate
of elite pluralization, which, then, given the change in the vector
sign, increases elite action. The cycle then loops to reduce elite
action which produces a subsequent loop resulting in increased elite
Figure 2 indicates, as I am attempting to suggest, that both loops operate simultaneously. Mechanically, this derives from the fact that two lines of influence emerge from factor (E), the complication of the structural situation. The two lines of influence then merge in factor (A), elite action. I would now suggest that there is a time factor built into the integrative process. This relates to my sug gestion that the relative influence between the two loops varies through time. And this would derive from the fact that factor (B), plurali zation of elites, and, therefore, the influence of this factor, is additive. Moreover, in time, this factor (G) becomes the dominant factor acting upon elite action. Thus, I am saying that the integrative process has a built-in element which ultimately transforms its dynamics from morphogenesis to morphostasis. The morphogenetic process starts to slow immediately, because of the immediate increase of elite pluralization. But the slowing increases at something like a geometric rate. When elite pluralization does become dominant, the transnational system becomes a stable system. On a different plane, I would offer, this seems to recapitulate the nation-building process, which for France occurred several centuries previous. But before concluding I should make explicit that this model of 182 the International integrative process does not represent analytic con clusions. Rather, it should be understood as a suggested mode of pro ceeding. The model as it stands is conspicuously simplistic. I have not, for an instance, assigned a role specifically to intermediate groups other than political parties. Of course these may be subsumed under the concept of elite. So, I have attempted to represent the entire process. Its deficiency is that it thus far remains simplistic. It must be complicated considerably in the direction of empirical reality before it would be able to render more specific predictions or explanations. But my purpose here is only to propose a general model in order to complete a discussion of a dynamically precedent process, that of loyalty acquisition. It is the concept of loyalty that I have sought to analyze. The particular focus in the instance of this study is on transnational loyalty. The data is French. But loyalty, of course, is a factor in politics. To understand a factor, it must be understood in its dynamic context. The dynamic context for French transnational loyalty is the European integration process. It was therefore incumbent upon me to attem'pt to demonstrate the linkage between transnational loyalty and international integration. But the object of analysis in this study remains political loyalty. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION: POLITICAL LOYALTY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION What I hope to have demonstrated is that there has been an increase in transnational sentiment generally in France since the mid- 1950s. There has also been specifically an increase in transnational loyalty. This represents the transnational orientation among a majority of Frenchmen since about 1966. A majority among elites was attained at about 1957. Individuals with transnational European loyalty, which may also be referred to as supranationalism, tend to be pro-United States and anti-Gaullist, with all that the latter implies about French rank and grandeur. This represents a significant change from what was the domi nant attitude in the early 1950s. Then the dominant sentiment was for neutralism and was much concerned with French sovereign prerogatives. And the majority was not committed to the principle of supranationalism. There still exists in France individuals who share an attitude pattern of concern for traditional French national values, a preference for neutralism, and only a diffuse, nonsupranational, orientation toward Europe. This group is now a minority, and it exists largely at the mass level of the French population. The supranational pattern, on the other hand, is overrepresented among elites. The dynamics implied by this 183 184 distinction is that the diffuse transnational pattern is being phased out, and that it is being replaced by the supranational pattern. But because of the morphostatic consequences of the increased structural complication of the transnational European system, expressed most con spicuously in the generation of leadership elements with increased "vested interests" in the evolving status quo, I would expect supra national sentiment to continue to grow at an increasingly slower rate. The policy implication of this evolution is that it promises future French governments to be decreasingly renitent toward the United States and toward United States-European involvement. The propsect of a North Atlantic Community should persist. But, and this is yet speculative, the introverted energies being expended by Europeans to increase transnational European social and political commonality will tend to accent the distinctiveness of Western Europe as compared to North America. And, I should add, I include Britain as part of Western Europe in this generalization. So, although it should persist, the notion of an "Atlantic Community" will not be able to attain substantiation beyond a loose cooperative framework in the period of the next generation or so. Theoretically, I hope to have demonstrated the utility of a behavioral theory of loyalty acquisition. By behavioral I mean a theory expressed ultimately in terms of individual human behavior. Moreover, I hope to have offered, albeit yet preliminary, such a theory. If political systems are to be conceptualized in genuinely behavioral terms, then it shall be seen that such systems, accordingly restated, are orientational and Interaction patterns. Physical action 185 is subsequent to perception. Interaction patterns are dependent upon orientational patterns. If it is thus appreciated that loyalty, behaviorally conceptualized, represents the basic components of social orientational patterns, then it should be seen that the study of the concept of loyalty is far more instrumental than merely aiding in the explanation of French integration into Western Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, c.e. Loyalty relates to system change. Politics, and its analysis, has ever been concerned with system change, negatively or positively. Thus, I hope to have contributed con structively, despite how small, or even substantively erroneous, to a basic theoretical development in the field of political science. APPENDIX OPERATIONAL INDICATORS AND INTERCORRELATION MATRICES 186 FORMAT FOR LISTING OF INDICATORS The operational indicators are listed by the IFOP survey with which each is associated. The surveys are listed in chronological order of their execution. The number identifying each indicator question corresponds with the indicator numbers along the margins of the intercorrelation matrix for each survey. The name of each indicator is underscored. The associated survey question is given directly below each name, and is enclosed in quotation marks. The indicative response is indicated by the use of an asterisk (*). A response designated by a minus sign (-) was one which was excluded from analysis. 187 188 IFOP #4201 (5 June 1962) Operational Indicators 1. High Income "Here is a table of monthly incomes (SHOW THE CARD). We would like to know at what level you would place yourself, counting all sources of income in your family such as wages, family welfare benefits, pensions, dividends, interest, etc." 1 2 3 4 5 6* 7* 8* 10* 11* 0- (The mean national income falls between 5 and 6 on the scale used.) 2. University Education "What was the last school that you attended as a student? What kind of a school was it?" C ) Primary () Upper primary () Secondary () Trade school or business college (*) University (-) No schooling 3. Large Commune Size of commune: ( ) Less than 2,000 people ( ) From 2 to 5,000 ( ) From 5 to 20,000 (*) From 20 to 100,000 (*) More than 100,000 4. Young Age Group Age (*) 20 to 34 ( ) 35 to 49 ( ) 50 to 64 ( ) 65 and over 189 5. Catholic Party preference "Which political party do you feel closest to among the fol lowing?" Radicals French Algeria SFIO MRP French Communist Party PSU UNR Poujadists Independents (The parties designated with a minus (-) sign were not included in the analysis.) 6 . Europe Most Important Problem "What Is right now for France the most important problem, among the following?" Agricultural questions Europe Social problems Algeria World peace ? 7. Favor European Political Union "Do you believe that for the six countries of the Common Market, political unification is: (*) Indispensable (*) Desirable ( ) Useless ( ) Dangerous (-) ? 8 . UK Would be Loyal Member "England has asked to belong to the Common Market. If it belongs, which of these three possibilities seems to you most likely?" (*) England will be a loyal partner (*) England will try to take the lead of the Common Market ( ) England will try to make the Common Market a failure <-) ? 190 9. Favor Unification of Europe "Are you, in general, for or against a unification of Western Europe?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? 10. Favor Supranational Europe "Are you for or against France taking part in a European union in which certain important political decisions would be made by a central authority rather than by each of the member countries?" (*) For ( ) Against (-) ? 11. Position of Legislative Candidate "If general elections were held, would you consider the position of the candidate on the European problem to determine your vote7" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? 12. Difference; Europe of states and Integrated Europe "Do you think that there is a noticeable difference between a Europe of States and an integrated Europe?" (*) Yes ( ) No <-) 1 13. EEC is Supranational "From what you know, is the Common Market a supranational organi zation?" (*) Yes C ) No <-) ? 191 14. NATO Is Supranational (The same question) "What about NATO?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? 15. Reinforce Europe of Six "For the unification of Europe, is it better first to reinforce the Europe of the six Common Market countries, or to enlarge the European Union right away by including other countries?" (*) First to reinforce the Europe of the six ( ) To enlarge right away (-) Respondent is not for unification of Europe (-) ? 16. Europe Includes East Europe '•Would you be in favor of the European Union including some countries of Eastern Europe?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? 17. UK Membership Good for France "Do you think that it is good or bad for France's interests for England to belong to the Common Market?" (*) Good ( ) Bad (-) ? 18. Europe Should be Independent of U.S. "Do you think that a unified Western Europe should have its own policies, independent from those of the United States7" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? 192 19. World Power Aspirations "Do you think that a unified Europe could constitute a third world power on the same level as the United States and the Soviet Union?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? 20. France Is a Brake "Do you think that right now France is more of a brake or more of a motor in the creation of Europe?" (*) Brake ( ) Motor (-) 1 21. de Gaulle is Firm Supporter of Europe "Do you consider General de Gaulle a firm supporter of the unifi cation of Europe?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? 22. Sex (*) Male ( ) Female 193 IFOP #4201 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 .24 3 .12 .10 1 ro 4 .03 .00 b 5 .02 .06 .01 .02 6 .09 .12 -.00 .02 .08 I o 7 -.02 .06 h - l -.05 .23 .09 8 -.00 .08 .06 .08 .08 .03 .09 9 + .08 .09 .07 -.06 .18 .07 .54 .15 10 + .06 .11 .08 -.03 .14 .10 .40 .02 -.42 11 + .10 .07 .04 -.05 .01 .09 .08 .02 .00 .16 t ro 12 + .05 .04 .09 o .11 .08 .12 .04 .20 .14 .24 0 1 1 .02 o 13 .03 .03 U 1 -.04 .07 .00 .01 .04 -.04 14 + .01 -.01 .02 -.09 -.04 -.02 .01 -.01 .01 .00 .04 15 + .03 -.01 -.02 .06 .03 -.02 .04 - .21 .06 -.05 -.06 1 16 + .01 - .02 1 .02 .01 -.23 * o h - -.00 .02 .01 .04 .09 + .02 17 .13 .05 -.02 .07 .09 .19 .57 .27 .22 .07 .02 .01 18 .04 -.04 .08 .07 .15 .12 .31 .11 .05 .00 o CO 19 .06 .05 -.03 .16 .32 .06 .41 .22 - .00 20 + .02 -.02 .07 -.02 .03 .00 -.01 .06 -.06 .18 .07 21 ■ o -.02 -.07 .06 .00 -.05 .00 -.00 .06 -.20 -.06 CM O 22 + .01 .08 1 -.05 -.06 .07 -.08 -.08 -.06 -.01 .04 194 IFOP #4201 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX--Continued 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 -.05 14 -.00 .24 1 1 o 15 t— - .02 -.01 16 .04 -.03 .05 -.17 17 .05 -.04 .01 -.26 .04 18 .14 -.08 .07 -.03 .04 .11 19 .16 -.01 .02 .08 .05 .12 .44 00 0 1 1 1 O 20 .11 -.06 .00 .04 -.10 o ID 21 -.13 .05 -.06 .03 .13 .05 .10 .12 -.65 22 .04 .01 -.01 -.01 .05 -.06 -.02 .01 -.02 195 IFOP #7071 (25 May 1965) Operational Indicators 1. Satisfaction with de Gaulle "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with General de Gaulle as President of the Republic: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?" (*) Very satisfied (*) Somewhat satisfied ( ) Somewhat dissatisfied ( ) Very dissatisfied (-) ? 2. Catholic Party Preference "If legislative elections to return representatives were to take place at this time, among the candidates belonging to the following political groups, which one would have the best chance to get your vote?" MRP Communist Party Independent Republicans (Giscard's tendency) National Center of Independents (Pinay's tendency) UNR/UDT SFIO Radicals ? (The responses designated by a minus sign (-) were excluded from analysis.) 3. European (social) Community Soon to Occur "Do you think it would be possible to create a European Community grouping people of different languages and cultures: today, in a few years, later, never?" (*) Today (*) In a few years ( ) Later ( ) Never ( ) ? States Should Relinquish Sovereignty "Do you believe that the personality and interests of Europe would be better protected vis-a-vis the dominant powers by allowing the six member states of the Common Market to retain their individual sovereignty, or by uniting these states in a single federation of 160 million inhabitants?" ( ) States should retain their sovereignty (*) States should unite in a single federation (-) 1 European Diplomatic and Defense Authority "Do you think that the European institutions should have authority in charge of Diplomacy and Defense to which the member states would delegate their powers in these matters?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) 1 European Army "Are you in favor of the creation of a European Army which would be the instrument of the policy defined by this authority described in the preceding question?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? European Tax Power "Do you agree with the principle that the custom duties and a portion of the taxes that you already pay should support a federal budget covering purely community expenses, such as subsidies to a European agricultural fund and the maintenance of federal defense forces?" (*) Yes ( ) No (-) ? de Gaulle as First European President "If you had to choose the first European President, which of the following five persons would you pick as your first choice, as your second choice?" + 197 Adenauer de Gaulle ManshoIt Saragat Spaak ? + (Only the respondent's first choice was analyzed.) 9. Unreserved Pride in France "Are you proud to be French?" (*) Yes, without reservation ( ) Yes, with some reservations ( ) Not much (-) ? 10. French-German Commonality "Here is a type of scale on which the 100 mark corresponds to the opinion: 'The Germans and the French are related peoples; it is , only the language which is different; the character is the same,' The zero (0) mark corresponds to the opinion: 'The Germans and the French are completely different; there is nothing in common.' Where would you locate your personal opinion?" 100- 90* 80* 70* 60* 50* 40 30 20 10 0 (The 100 response was not analyzed.) 11. Friendly to Germans "Would you judge yourself rather friendly to Germans or rather hostile toward Germans?" (*) P.ather friendly ( ) Rather hostile (-) 1 12. TV "Is there a television in your home?" (*) Yes ( ) No 198 13, University Education "The last school you attended as a pupil or student, at which level was it?" Primary Upper primary Secondary Trade school or business college University No schooling 14. High Income '•We wish to analyze the results of this study in connection with the family income of the persons we have interviewed. Here is a scale of monthly income (A CARD IS GIVEN). We wish to know which level you would put yourself, counting the total income of your household, such as wages, family allowances, pensions, and other revenue. 5* 6* 7* 8* 0“ (The scale is constructed so that the approximate mean national income falls at its midpoint.) 15. Male Sex (*) Male ( ) Female 16. Young Age Group (*) 20 to 34 years ( ) 35 to 49 years ( ) 50 to 64 years ( ) 65 + years 17. Large Commune Size of Commune: ( ) Less than 20,000 inhabitants (*) 20 to 100,000 inhabitants (*) More than 100,000 inhabitants (*) Paris metropolitan area 199 IFOP #7071 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 .506 3 .038 -.013 4 •.080 - .127 .115 5 .017 - .044 .131 .309 6 .058 .083 .185 .284 .475 7 .055 .064 .185 .181 .330 .456 8 .458 .280 -.008 -.131 - .056 -.043 -.117 9 .253 .124 .073 -.123 -.024 -.016 -.028 .279 10 .008 .004 .126 .030 .052 .074 .075 -.013 .000 11 .020 .106 .110 .052 .071 .114 .249 -.079 -.108 12 .064 .046 .071 .010 -.021 .042 -.002 .021 .006 13 .023 .009 .040 .051 .034 .058 .116 -.126 -.103 14 .013 .074 .074 .050 .056 .102 .111 -.100 -.085 15 ,139 -.124 .032 .105 -.017 .051 .028 -.166 -.051 16 .013 .001 -.017 -.029 -.013 -.031 -.048 .017 -.009 17 .044 -.010 .034 .016 .073 .010 .052 -.004 -.043 200 IFOP #7071 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX--Continued 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 .389 12 .029 .030 13 .014 .063 - .014 14 .080 .116 .183 .263 15 .036 .074 .026 .106 .064 16 .017 .016 -.056 .023 -.030 -.045 17 .015 .061 .053 .095 .174 .030 201 IFOP #A941 (7 February 1967) Operational Indicators 1. Catholic Party preference "If elections were held today and you had to choose among the fol lowing candidates (SHOW THE CARD), could you tell me the letter corresponding to the candidate who would have the best chance of getting your vote?" ( ) (F) COMMUNIST candidate ( ) (R) FEDERATION OF THE LEFT candidate (*) (B) "Ve REPUBLIC" candidate (*) (S) CENTER DEMOCRAT candidate (-) ? 2. Satisfied with de Gaulle as President "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with General de Gaulle as Presi dent of the Republic: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, some what dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?" (*) Very satisfied (*) Somewhat satisfied ( ) Somewhat dissatisfied ( ) Very dissatisfied (-) ? (The following is the common question for the next five indicative responses.) "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the action of the govern ment in the following areas": 3. Favor Government Education Policy "National Education" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) 7 4. Favor Government Foreign Policy "The Foreign Policy of France" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 202 5. Favor government Agricultural Policy "Agricultural Problems" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 6. Favor Government Social Policy "Social Problems" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 7. Favor Government and Economic and Financial Policy "Economic and Financial Problems" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 8. U.S. and French Interests are Close "In your opinion, are the fundamental interests of France and the United States very close, somewhat close, somewhat different, very different?" (*) Very close (*) Somewhat close ( ) Somewhat different ( ) Very different (-) 7 9. Soviet and French Interests are Close "And the fundamental interests of France and the USSR?" (*) Very close (*) Somewhat close ( ) Somewhat different ( ) Very different (-) 7 10. W. German and French Interests are Close "And the fundamental interests of France and West Germany?" 203 (*) Very close (*) Somewhat close ( ) Somewhat different ( ) Very different <-> 1 11. Supranationalism (Foreign Policy) "Do you think that France should participate in a united Europe in which foreign policy would be decided in common, or should France have a more independent foreign policy?" (*) Foreign policy decided in common ( ) Independent foreign policy (-> ? 12. France Should Improve Ties with Eastern Europe ,fWould you, yourself, say that France should make more efforts to strenghten ties with the countries of eastern Europe, make fewer efforts, or is this not of any importance?" (*) More efforts ( ) Fewer efforts (-) Not of importance (-) ? 13. NATO Is Necessary Against Soviets "Some people say that the USSR does not represent a serious mili tary danger for West Europe and that, consequently, NATO is unnecessary. Others say to the contrary that NATO is always nec essary for the security of West Europe. Which of these two opinions is closer to your own?" ( ) NATO is- unnecessary (*) NATO is always necessary ( ) (I never thought that NATO was necessary.) (-> ? 14. NATO Is Important Political Organization "Without considering the military aspect of NATO, what do you think of NATO as a political organization? Do you think that in the years to come NATO will be a political organization of great importance, of medium importance, or of little or no importance?11 (*) Great importance ( ) Medium ( ) Little or none (-) ? 204 15. Satisfied with U.S. Influence in NATO "At the present time, do you think that United States' influence in NATO is too great, too little, or just proper?" ( ) Too great (*) Too little (*) Just proper (-) ? 16. U.S. Linked Atlantic Defense "If you could choose the fashion in which the Atlantic defense was to be organized in the years to come, which would you prefer?" () 1. An alliance of national armies, each under national command. () 2. An integrated European military force under a single com mand but independent of American forces. (*) 3. An integrated European military force under a single com mand, but en liaison with American forces. (*) 4. An integrated Atlantic force in which both the European and American forces would be under a single command. 17. Satisfied with U.S. Influence in Europe "Do you think that the United States at the present time occupies itself too much, too little, or just enough with European problems?" ( ) Too much (*) Too little (*) Just enough (-) ? 18. University Education "What was the last school that you attended as a student? What kind of a school was it?" ( ) Primary ( ) Upper Primary ( ) Secondary ( ) Trade School or Business College (*) University (-) No schooling 19. High Income "Here is a table of monthly incomes (SHOW THE CARD). We would like to know at what level you would place yourself, counting all 205 sources of income in your family such as wages, family welfare benefits, pensions, dividends, interest, etc." 1 2 3 4 5* 6* 7* *8 0~ (The scale is constructed so that the approximate mean national income falls at its midpoint.) 20. Sex (*) Male () Female Young Age Group (*) 20 (*) 21 to 24 ( ) 25 to 29 ( ) 30 to 34 ( ) 35 to 39 ( ) 40 to 44 ( ) 45 to 49 ( ) 50 to 54 ( ) 55 to 59 ( ) 60 to 64 ( ) 65 to 69 ( ) 70 and over Laree Commune Size of Commune: ( ) Rural commune ( ) Less than 20,000 people (*) 20,000 to 100,000 (*) More than 100,000 (*) Paris metropolitan area 206 IFOP #A94l INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 .54 3 .31 .38 4 .13 .32 .18 5 .29 .36 .31 .15 6 .34 .41 .37 .15 .33 7 .32 .41 .22 .24 .32 .36 8 .08 .01 .02 -.10 -.01 .09 .05 9 -.08 -.01 .01 .16 -.01 -.01 .02 .18 10 .09 -.01 -.06 .06 .05 -.00 .11 .18 .23 r-t 0 1 i 1 o o -j 11 -.04 -.12 -.13 10 -.03 .12 -.01 .11 12 -.06 .03 -.04 .18 .03 .03 .04 -.05 .16 .14 .07 13 .16 .14 .08 -.11 .03 .15 .09 .14 -.09 .02 .06 i 14 .10 .04 -.03 -.12 o .09 .00 .04 -.00 -.04 -.04 CM O 15 .14 .08 .10 -.11 .05 . 1 1 I .20 -.04 -.05 .05 *4* 0 16 .06 -.03 -.05 -.16 -.06 .96 1 .19 -.05 .11 .13 17 .12 .07 .04 -.06 .09 .12 .05 .17 -.12 .03 .05 -.01 i 18 .00 -.19 -.09 .02 o .04 .06 -.08 .10 .10 i—l 0 0 1 19 .05 -.01 1 .09 -.07 -.03 .06 .08 .08 .06 20 -.12 -.15 -.09 -.04 -.03 -.09 .01 .05 .06 .04 .04 O iH 21 .05 .01 -.02 -.00 1 -.02 .01 .06 .04 .01 -.03 o CO 22 1 -.04 -.14 -.02 .13 .10 -.01 .04 -.04 -.02 .01 207 IFOP #A941 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX--Continued 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 .15 14 -.08 .29 15 -.13 .31 .14 16 -.08 .20 .04 .22 17 -.08 .23 .05 .37 .28 18 .00 .05 -.07 -.05 .10 .04 19 .00 .00 -.07 -.08 .02 .02 .23 20 .07 -.13 -.08 - .15 .00 -.03 .14 .02 CM O 21 .00 - .01 .00 .05 .10 .07 .18 -.04 I 22 -.02 .01 -.03 -.06 .05 -.03 -.14 .22 -.01 208 IFOP #B401 (8 May 1967) Operational Indicators 1. Favor British Entry into EEC "Do you personally favor or oppose Great Britain's entry into the Common Market?" (*) Very favorable (*) Somewhat favorable ( ) Somewhat opposed ( ) Very opposed (-) ? 2. British Entry is Good for French Interests "In your opinion, at this time is Great Britain's entry into the Common Market in conformance with or contrary to France's interests?" (*) Conform ( ) Contrary (-) ? (The following is the common question for the next three indi cative responses.) "As you see it at the present time, is the economic situation of France better, not as good, or neither the one nor the other than that of": 3. Comparative Economic Situation: Germany "West Germany" (*) Better ( ) Not as good (-) Neither one nor the other <-) ? 4. Comparative Economic Situation: UK "Great Britain" (*) Better ( ) Not as good (-) Neither the one nor the other (-) ? > 209 5. Comparative Economic Situation; Italy "Italy" (*) Better ( ) Not as good (-) Neither the one nor the other (-) ? (The following is the common question for the next three indi cative responses.) "Compared with the French political system, would you say that the German political system functions better, about the same, or less well? And what about Great Britain's system? And what about Italy1s ?" 6. Comparative Political Situation: Germany "West Germany" (*) Better (*) About the same ( ) Not as well (-) ? 7. Comparative Political Situation: UK "Great Britain" (*) Better (*) About the same ( ) Not as well C-) ? 8. Comparative Political Situation: Italy "Italy" (*) Better (*) About the same ( ) Not as well (-) ? "Here are five areas pertaining to the government's request for full powers. (SHOW THE CARD.) For each of these, could you tell me whether it involves a problem that personally concerns you very much, a little, or not at all?" 210 9. Concerned with Adaptation of Industry to EEC "The adaptation of French industry to international competition within the framework of the Common Market": (*) Very much ( ) Little ( ) Not at all (-) 1 10. Concerned with Full Employment "Full Employment and working conditions, the guarantee given to unemployed workers": (*) Very much ( ) Little ( ) Not at all (-) ? 1 1 . Concerned with Fair Share for Workers "The participation of the workers in the fruits of economic development": (*) Very much C ) Little ( ) Not at all <-) ? 12. Concerned with Financial Stability of Social Security "The financial equilibrium of Social Security": (*) Very much ( ) Little ( ) Not at all (-) ? 13 . Concerned with Modernization "Modernization and the reconversion of the sectors or regions in difficulty": (*) Very much ( ) Little ( ) Not at all (-) ? (The following is the common question for the next five indicative responses.) 211 "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the action of the govern ment in the following areas?" 14. Favor Government Education Policy "National Education" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 15. Favor Government Foreign Policy "The Foreign Policy of France" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 16. Favor Government Agricultural Policy "Agricultural Problems" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 1 7 . Favor Government Social Policy "Social Problems" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied (-) ? 1 8 . Favor Government Economic and Financial Policy "Economic and Financial Problems" (*) Satisfied ( ) Dissatisfied C-) ? 19. Satisfaction with de Gaulle "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with General de Gaulle as Presi dent of the Republic: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?" 212 (*) Very satisfied (*) Somewhat satisfied ( ) Somewhat dissatisfied ( ) Very dissatisfied (-) ? 20. U.S. and French Interests are Close "In your opinion, are the fundamental interests of France and the United States very close, somewhat close, somewhat different, very different?" (*) Very close (*) Somewhat close ( ) Somewhat different ( ) Very different (-) ? 21. Soviet and French Interests are Close "And the fundamental interests of France and the USSR?" (*) Very close (*) Somewhat close ( ) Somewhat different ( ) Very different (-) ? 22. W. German and French Interests are Close "And the fundamental Interests of France and West Germany?" (*) Very close (*) Somewhat close ( ) Somewhat different ( ) Very different ( ) ? 23. Diffuse Transnationalism (Favor European Unification) "Generally speaking, are you in favor or opposed to the unification of Western Europe?" (*) Favor ( ) Opposed (-) ? 24. Desire Europe Independent of U.S. "If there were an integrated Europe, would you prefer that it be 213 independent of the United States or that it have close ties with the United States?" 25. Integrative Current in France Stronger "Would you say that in France the current in favor of European integration was strengthened, weakened, or did It stay the same during the last year?" (*) Strengthened ( ) Weakened ( ) Stayed the same (-) ? 26. U.S.--French Ties Were Strengthened "Regarding the adhesion in France to the principle of a close asso ciation with the United States, has this been strengthened, weakened, or has remained the same?" (-) S treng thene d (*) Weakened ( ) Stayed the same (-) ? 27. Favor Western Europe Ties with Eastern Europe "Everything considered, are you for or against countries of the West making efforts to establish closer ties with East Europe?" (*) For ( ) Against (-) ? 28. Favor Nuclear Test Ban "As you may know, the United States, the USSR and other countries are now considering an accord which would prohibit the manufacture of nuclear arms by countries which do not already have these. Do you think that such an accord would be a good or bad thing for France?" (*) Good ( ) Bad (-) ? 29. Consider U.S. Investments in France Beneficial "Everything considered, do you think that American investments in France are beneficial or detrimental for our country?" 214 (*) Beneficial ( ) Detrimental C-) ? 30. Consider Non-U.S. Investments in France Beneficial "And the investments of other foreign countries?" (*) Beneficial ( ) Detrimental <-) ? 31. Favor Reduction of U.S. Forces in Europe "During last year, the question was considered whether the United States ought to appreciably reduce the number of American soldiers stationed in West Europe. Personally, would you favor such a reduction, would you be opposed, or do you not attach importance to this question?" (*) Favor ( ) Oppose (-) Not important (-) ? 32. Possesses TV TV (*) Yes ( ) No 33. University Education "What was the last school that you attended as a student? What kind of a school was it?" ( ) Primary ( ) Upper Primary ( ) Secondary ( ) Trade School or Business College (*) University (-) No schooling 34. High Income "Here is a table of monthly incomes (SHOW THE CARD). We would like to know at what level you would place yourself, counting all sources of income in your family such as wages, family welfare benefits, pensions, dividends, interest, etc." 215 1 2 3 4 5* 6* 7* 8* 0" (The scale is constructed so that the approximate mean national income falls at its midpoint.) 35. Sex (*) Male ( ) Female 36. Young Age Group Age (*) 20 to 24 () 25 to 29 () 30 to 34 () 35 to 39 () 40 to 44 () 45 to 49 () 50 to 54 () 55 to 59 () 60 to 64 () 65 to 69 () 70 to 74 () 75 and over Large Commune Size of Commune: ( ) Rural commune ( ) Les s than 20, 000 people (*) 20, 000 to 100 ,000 (*) More than 100 ,000 (*) Paris metropolitan area IFOP #B401 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX PART I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 .689 3 .063 .090 4 .001 .042 .195 5 .047 .045 .084 .483 6 .016 -.002 -.014 .012 -.076 7 .032 -.057 -.017 -.033 t .030 .418 8 .013 -.028 -.169 -.098 -.112 .375 .454 9 .032 -.057 -.068 -.024 -.064 .023 -.060 -.022 10 .001 -.044 -.008 -.106 .009 .020 -.077 -.018 .313 11 .024 -.012 -.002 -.070 -.034 .033 -.037 -.055 .327 12 .010 .017 -.106 -.026 .013 -.003 -.034 .049 .178 216 IFOP #B401 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX--Continued PART II 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 .007 -.011 -.062 -.149 -.063 .047 - .666 -.012 .298 .418 .388 .317 14 - ,006 .069 .247 .107 .037 .069 .055 .024 -.096 -.123 -.058 -.136 15 .021 -.009 .171 .122 .060 .098 .023 .009 -.046 -.060 .015 -.051 16 .059 .047 .298 .164 .105 .061 .070 -.107 -.019 -.072 -.018 -.075 17 .008 .048 .208 .117 .079 .065 .007 -.030 -.054 -.134 -.059 -.105 18 .074 .033 .280 .188 .192 .017 .023 -.063 -.058 -.115 -.051 -.079 19 .071 .065 .297 .205 .140 .103 .075 .016 -.026 -.130 -.015 -.073 o 1 20 .093 .108 -.067 -.062 « .045 -.026 -.008 -.023 -.091 -.101 -.057 21 .059 .010 .028 -.030 -.034 .027 .008 .041 .035 -.004 .024 .001 22 .050 .067 -.067 .040 .044 .050 .025 .070 -.009 -.014 -.009 -.011 23 .164 .133 .053 .009 .048 .046 .008 .042 -.033 -.016 .002 -.012 24 -.128 -.119 -.029 -.006 -.029 .024 .064 .072 -.007 .023 .051 .009 217 IFOP #B401 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX— Continued PART III 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 25 .050 .086 .078 .061 .065 -.046 -.044 -.061 .014 -.009 -.006 .046 26 .017 -.063 -.030 .012 .063 -.045 -.034 .012 .019 .062 .001 .056 27 .095 .071 .026 .001 .003 -.002 -.062 .026 .043 -.005 .009 .014 28 .130 .128 -.073 -.048 -.004 -.050 -.033 .007 -.000 -.082 -.090 -.050 29 .072 .079 .010 -.015 .021 .025 -.097 .021 -.047 -.074 -.068 -.069 30 .070 .080 .022 .010 .026 -.015 -.084 .002 .048 -.054 -.030 -.026 31 -.036 -.075 .011 -.019 -.016 .062 .103 .064 -.008 .002 -.020 .029 32 .021 .002 .017 .028 .012 .012 .022 -.008 .032 .002 .019 .015 - i p o 00 33 .008 -.022 -.112 .028 -.001 -.050 -.102 • .161 .015 .019 -.000 34 -.008 -.019 -.135 .052 .042 .006 -.023 .030 .109 .056 .063 .031 35 -.052 -.070 -.101 -.057 -.020 -.043 -.024 .050 .109 -.009 .024 .002 36 .027 -.003 -.004 -.026 .009 -.068 -.104 -.018 -.036 .085 .041 .008 37 -.008 .006 .064 .169 .146 -.064 .067 -.088 .046 .084 .093 .038 218 IFOP #B401 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX— Continued PART IV 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 13 14 -.088 15 -.055 .220 16 -.054 .366 .230 17 , -.078 .383 .124 .432 18 -.088 .345 .238 .452 .483 19 .073 .406 .333 .355 .360 .449 20 -.022 .026 -.062 .058 .055 .048 .062 21 .009 -.011 .120 .095 -.040 .019 .032 .195 22 -.020 .074 .152 .116 .035 .064 .133 .147 .236 23 -.022 .026 .060 .097 .048 .075 .145 .079 .008 24 -.020 -.092 .113 -.018 -.113 -.053 -.057 -.235 .020 219 IFOP #B401 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX— Continued PART V 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 .005 .103 .030 .100 .078 .132 .102 -.012 -.009 .120 .117 -.037 26 .007 -.097 -.029 -.084 -.089 -.071 -.073 -.178 .029 -.017 .053 .152 27 .009 -.010 .077 .017 -.008 .044 -.002 -.011 .082 .031 .175 .008 28 -.071 -.092 -.008 -.085 -.117 -.078 -.128 .112 .044 .006 .074 .044 29 -.028 .106 -.041 .125 .059 .074 .087 .233 -.096 .079 .173 -.255 30 .006 .103 .023 .111 .050 .096 .105 .090 .016 .150 .182 -.119 31 -.018 -.012 .156 .014 -.049 -.018 .005 -.147 .067 .028 .024 .221 32 .018 .020 -.022 .136 .010 -.024 -.010 -.059 -.008 -.024 -.018 .023 33 .035 -.119 .006 .085 -.033 .030 -.005 .067 -.031 .129 .070 .031 34 .035 -.129 .007 .012 -.035 .023 -.045 .034 -.097 .056 .039 -.001 35 .034 -.092 -.072 .056 -.061 .030 -.084 -.006 .087 .078 -.026 .018 36 .047 -.014 -.019 -.058 -.046 -.054 -.048 -.028 -.052 -.064 -.035 -.032 37 -.053 -.030 .044 .190 -.038 .019 .022 .013 .034 .045 .022 .060 220 IFOP #B401 INTERCORRELATION (PHI) MATRIX--Continued PART VI 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 25 26 .154 27 .002 -.000 28 -.071 -.025 .056 29 .059 -.105 .015 .080 30 .088 -.048 .087 .063 .735 31 .019 .133 .034 .010 -.187 -.039 32 -.062 .012 -.038 -.027 -.068 -.019 -.001 33 .071 .052 .003 .042 .120 .145 -.073 .028 34 .043 .062 -.021 .028 .042 .089 -.054 .218 .260 35 .038 .032 .026 -.038 -.006 .016 -.002 .016 .116 -.007 36 .017 .031 .011 -.084 .125 .058 -.065 -.084 .069 -.009 -.030 37 .044 .048 .011 .026 -.014 .040 .010 .178 .109 .264 -.035 -.000 221 BIBLIOGRAPHY SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Akzin, Benjamin. State and Nation. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964. Aron, Raymond. Prance: Steadfast and Changing. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. Ball, M. Margaret. NATO and the European Union Movement. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. Bandura, Albert, and Walters, Richard H. Social Learning and Per sonality Development. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963. Buchanan, William, and Cantril, Hadley. How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion. Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1953. Camps, Miriam. European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Carter, W, Horsfall. Speaking European. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966. Deutsch, Karl W. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Com munication and Control. New York: Free Press of Glencoej- 1963. ______. Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966. ______i Burrell; Kann; Lee; Lichterman; Llndgren; Loewenheim; and Van Wagenen. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. ______; and Folz, William J., eds. Nation-Building. New York: Atherton Press, 1963. ______; Edinger, Lewis J.; Macridis, Roy C.; and Merritt, Richard L. France, Germany and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite 223 224 Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Doob, Leonard W. Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Etzioni, Amitai. Political Unification; A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965. Studies in Social Change. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966. Fedder, Edwin H., ed. NATO in the Seventies. St. Louis: University of Missouri, Center for International Studies, 1970. Fisher, Sydney Nettleton, ed. France and the European Community. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Free, Lloyd A. Six Allies and a Neutral: A Study of the International Outlooks of Political Leaders in the United States, Britain, France. West Germany. Italy. Japan and India. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959. Friedrich, Carl J. Europe: An Amergent Nation? New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Furniss, Edgar S., Jr. France; Troubled Ally. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960. Gagnon, Paul A. France Since 1789. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Graham, B. D. The French Socialists and Tripartisme. 1944-1947. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. Grodzins, Morton. The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriots and Treason, Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956, Grosser, Alfred. La IVe Republique; et sa politique exterieure. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1961. Guetzkow, Harold. Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Prob lem in International Organization. Publication No. 4 of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions. Princeton: Prini.eton University Press, 1955. Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political. Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958. ______. Beyond the Nation-State. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Uni versity Press, 1964. 225 Hoffmann, Stanley; Kindelberger, Charles P.; Wylie, Laurence; Pitts, Jesse R.; Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste; and Goguel, Francois. In Search of France. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. Institut Fran^ais d*Opinion Publique. Sedan et 1 'Europe: Etude Mono- graphique Francaise. Paris: Institut Franjiais d'Opinion Pub lique, 1963. Jacob, Philip E., and Toscano, James V., eds., The Integration of Political Communities. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964. Katz, Elihu, and Lazarsfeld, Paul F. Personal Influence. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1955. Kohn, Hans. Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956. ______. The Idea of Nationalism. New York: Macmillan Co., 1961. ______. Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1967. _____ . The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Kohnstamm, Max. The European Community and its Role in the World. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1963. Lacour-Gayet, Robert. La France Au XXe Siecle. New York: Dryden Press, 1954. Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Berelson, Bernard; and Gaudet, Hazel. The People's Choice; How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Cam paign. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. First published in 1944. Lerner, Daniel, and Aron, Raymond, eds. France Defeats EB C . New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. ;______> and Gorden, Morton. Euratlantica; Changing Perspectives of the European Elites. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969. Lindberg, Leon N. The Political Dynamics of European Economic Inte gration. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963. ______, and Scheingold, Stuart A. Europe's Would-Be Polity; Patterns of Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 226 Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963. ______. The First New Nation. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967. Luethy, Herbert. France Against Herself. New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1955. MacRae, Duncan, Jr. Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946-1958. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Mannheim, Karl. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952. Marcus, John T. Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. Martin, Marie-Madeleine. The Making of France. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1951. First published in French, with the title: Histoire de 1'unite^ Franyaise, 1948. Mayne, Richard. The Community of Europe. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1963. Merritt, Richard L. Symbols of American Community 1735-1775. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Michelat, Guy, and Thomas, Jean-Pierre Hubert. Dimensions Du Nationalism. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966. Preface by Raoul Girardet. Miller, Neal E., and Dollard, John. Social Learning and Imitation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. Moraze, Charles. The French and the Republic. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958. Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. New York: Free Press, 1951. ______> flnd Shils, Edward A., eds. Toward a General Theory of Action. Harper Torchbook. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Pierard, Louis. Histoire de la Beige. Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1948. Rabier, Jacques-Rene. L*Information des Europeens et 1'Integration de 1'Europe. Brussels: University Libre de Bruxelles, 1965. 227 . L'Opinion Publique et I'Europe: Essai d'Inventaire des Connaissances et des Lacunes, Brussels: Universite' Libre de Bruxelles, 1966. ______. Analyse de l'Enqu£te en Cours sur la Jeunesse Europeene. Strasbourg: Centre europSene experimental de la jeunesse, Conseil de I'Europe, 1969. / / Remond, Rene, ed. Forces Rellgleuses et Attitudes Polltlques Dans la France Contemporaine■ Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1965. ______. The Right Wing in France; From 1815 to de Gaulle. Phila delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966. Royce, Josiah. The Philosophy of Loyalty. New York: Macmillan Co., 1908. Serfaty, Simon. France, de Gaulle, and Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the Third Republic; An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969. Skinner, B. F. Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Splnelli, Altiero. The Eurocrats. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Stone, Philip J.; Dunphy, Dexter C.; Smith, Marshall S.; and Ogilvie, Daniel M.; with associates. The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966. Young, Roland, ed. Approaches to the Study of Politics■ Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1958. Articles Camps, Miriam. "Hat die europaische Idee noch eine Zukunft?" Europa Archiv, XXIII, No. 14 (July 25, 1968), 495-507. Delorme, Helene. "Le Role Des Forces Paysannes dans 1*Elaboration de la Politique Agricole Commune." Revue Francaise de Science Politique. XIX, No. 2 (April, 1969), 356-91. Dupeux, Georges. "Citizen Participation in Political Life: France." International Social Science Journal, UNESCO, XII, No. 1 (1960), 40-52. 228 Etzioni, Amitai. "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification." The American Political Science Review, LVI, No. 4 (December, 1962), 927-35. ______. "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level." The American Journal of Sociology. LXVIII, No. 4 (January, 1963), 407-21. ______. "European Unification; A Strategy of Change." World Politics, XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963), 32-51. Gerbet, Pierre. "La Genlse du Plan Schuman: Des Origines a la declaration du 9 mai 1950." Revue Francaise de Science Politique, VI, No. 3 (July-September, 1956), 525-53. Goriely, Georges. "L'Opinion Publique et le Plan Schuman." Revue Francaise de Science Politique. Ill, No. 3 (July- September, 1953), 585-611. Hass, Ernst B. "The Challenge of Regionalism." International Organi zation, XII (1958), 440-58. ______. "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process." International Organization, XV, No. 3 (Summer, 1961), 366-92. Inglehart, Ronald. "An End to European Integration?" The American Political Science Review. LXI, No. 1 (March, 1967), 91-105. Leites, Nathan, and de la Malone, Christian. "Paris from EDC to WEU." World Politics. IX, No. 2 (January, 1957), 193-219. Maruyama, Magoroh. "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes." American Scientist, LV, No. 2 (June, 1963), 164-79. Neurohr, Jean. "Was ist Gaullismus?" Zeltschrift Fur Politik, XVI, No. 1 (1969), 11-25. Puchala, Donald J. "The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration." International Studies Quarterly. XII, No. 1 (March, 1968), 38-64. ______. "The Common Market and Political Federation in Western European Public Opinion." International Studies Quarterly. XIV, No. 1 (March, 1970), 32-59. Rabier, Jacques-Rene. "The European Idea and National Public Opinion." Government and Opposition. II, No. 3 (April-July, 1967), 443-54. Rochefort, Robert. "Robert Schuman; 1'Homme d'une Politique." Revue de Defense Nationale, XXV (April, 1969), 667-77. Unpublished Literature Crittenden, John Allen. "The Relationship of Age to Political Party Identification." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, I960. Inglehart, Ronald F. "The Socialization of 'Europeans': Nation Building in Western Europe." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967.