ha-c GROUP R0BAROH. Group IX SubJ«ot% "OPERATIONS OP THE 65th ARTILLERY O.A.O. WITH THE FRENCH XVII ARMY CORPS." By Willla-a F, Marquat captain O.A.C.(DOL) I I Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 15 May, 1935 j MEMORANDUM FOR: The Directorf aeoond Year Glass, The Oommand and General Staff bohool, ^ort L#avenworth# dUBJBOT: Operations of the 65th Artillery, C*A.C, with tho XVII French Army Corps. 1. PAPERS ACUOMPAN11.,G: i 1. A Bibliography for this study. 2. tracing of a map showing the operations of the French XVII Corps and a diagranatio repre« sentation of the operations of the 65th ArtiL lery, in this action• I note: Other than tha tthe 65th Artillery C.A.C. i actually participated in this engagement, there is little j j Information available from official sources• borne of the j dLata presented is from personal records which necea&arily are uncorroborated* Reference is made to such personal records when used in this document. II THE STUDY PRESENTED*— Operations of the 65th Artillery, O.A.C. with the XVII Corps (French) during the period 7 to 25 October 1918. III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT. Forces t XVII French Army corps: Fro15tmh Colonialeft tol righDivisiont , drench 10th Colonial Division, French (X) A29 - PP 2 and 3 SIA - Chap V, Part 5 AAEC - pp 293-295 incl. 33EAEF - pp 5 and 6 H33D - P 5 * Pagea of this document are not numbered. Page 26 DI (Prenoh) 18 DI {Prenoh) 58th Brigade^ 29th Division ( U.S.) 33rd Division, less detachments (U.S.) Artillery: 158th Field Artillery Brigade lattaohed) 65th Artillery O.A.O., lest 3rd Battalion (U.S.) (2) Operations: On Ootober 8thf the American First Army attaohed troops to the XVII French Army Corps for operations on the east bank of the MEUSE RIVER (3) No advance had been made during the early Argonne Offensives on the right bank of the river while the ad­ vanoe on the left side of the MEUSE has made a big salient in the German lines* This gave the Germans on the heights east of the J'DUSE RIVER an advantageous position from which to fire into the right flank of the advancing United States forces, and, as the attack progressed, exposed the linds of com­ munications of the American troops to attack from the right flank and rear (4). Thoa was the tactical purpose of the combined Franco-American effort to remove this menace* The strategical objective of the operation was to increase the fighting front for the purpose of oonsuming and absorbing the maximum number of German troops (5) ) Ltr AWCHS p. 2 (3) HAEF, p. 308 ReXA, p. 60 AAEC, p 293-295 ^4) HAEF, p 308 A29» PP 1 and 2 AAEC, p 293-295 (5) RelA, p. 60 Page 2. The attaok was direoted at the vital pivot of the san lino on the Western Front and the Germans maintained a !i large number of divisions In this teotor until the Armistioe [6), thus making the offort a glorious strategioal suooess. The 15IU and 10th irpenoh Colonial Division* did not participate in the advanoe 17) but performed a Riding mission only* Hanoe the aotual advanoe was made by the 26th and 18th 7renoh Divisions and the 29th and 33rd American Divisions9 the latter advancing astride the MEUSB RIVER ill a hazardous attack* Based on a comparative strength consideration of and Amerioan units, the effort was two thirds Amerioan, although it was commanded by General Henri Claudel of the Frenoh Army (8) The Q-ermans had forseen a oombined Franco-American effort in the VERDUN SECTOR ever since the ST. MIHIEL drive. The Allies knew this and as a oonsequenoe they were concerned, with accomplishing surprise as to WHERE, on this front, the main effort was to be launched* Captured German documents indicated that the high command was convinced that the main Allied effort in the VERDUN SECTOR would be Made east of the MEUSE RIVER, and elaborate defensive works were established to stop a drive on this front* (9) The Allied attack west of the MEUSE RIVER on 29 September had caused the Germans to rush troops to that side of the (6) RelA, p. 60 (7) H33D, p 104 A29, PP 3 and 4 (8) RelA p. 60 TO 33DAEP, p 5 SIA, Qhap V, Part 5 (9) SIA,Chap V, Part 5 AAEC , pp 293-295 A29, pp 1 and 2. Page 3# River• UJ) This was indloated by the failure of the 9t?Mn artillery to lay down lte oustomary counter- preparation fire until more than a half hour after the attaok Jumped off* Later, however, the Hermans rushed troops into the seotorf as lndloated by the tenacious resistance put up after the 9th• In the initial attaok by the two Amerioan Divisions the part played by the 108th Engineers (US) and the 108th Field Signal Battalion (US) was noteworthy* (11) There is a dearth of information of the part played by Army Artillery in the attack, the 65th being an Army Artillery unit (12)* None of the reports of divisions engaged in the operation indloate the presence of | o rassistance rendered by, the heavy mobile gunl of the Army Artillery* 2. Progress of the attack: Tuesday, October 8th. At 5 AM the attack of the XVII French Army Corps began• There was no preliminary artillery preparation (13) As indicated before the troops in line from right to left were: 26th and ?.8th French Divisions, attacking ina direction approximately north-northeast and the 29th and 33rd U*S* Divisions, attacking approximately due north. The 58th Bi*igade of the 29th Division, on the east bank, oonsiated of the 115th Infantry, 116th Infantry (10) A29, pp 1 and 2 (11) H33D, 104- 105. XHtylP. p 5. (12) Lfcr.AWOHS, 2 (13) H33d, 104 A29, pp 1 and 3 Page 112th Nfcohine Gun Battalion, supported by the 158th Field Artillery Brigade, released to the 29th Division from the V Oorps (US) on 2 Ootober, in addition to the organic divisional artillery» (14). The 33rd Division, on the west bank, consisted of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 132nd Infantry; 2d Battalion, 131st Infantry; Companies A and D 124th Maohine Ghm Battalion, in addition to organic field artillery* (15) The Frenoh divisions started the attack with the 56th Brigade, pushing forward at 5 AM* The 1st and 2d Battalions, 132d Infantry were not advanoed from the southern edge of the Bois de Forges until 9:00 All* (16) The terrain over wfcioh the attack was launched can be estimated as follows: ( 17) From VACHERAUVTLUE, on the east bank of the MEUSE, the heights extended some 22 kilometers to the north, out by a series of streams and ridges running east and west over which the attack must pass. The cajrture of these heights was essential to further advance west of the MEUSE* l German defenses consisted or a series of positions frofa BRABANTER itellung, a parallel of observation, back to KREIMHELDE St el lung, on the cross ridge. This was the last German line. The main battle position extended across the VOLKER and HAGEN Stellungs through MALBROUCH HILL. North of BRABANTER the heights were covered by woods making defense easy and attack hazardous* The MEUSE RIVER was unrordable and the oanal which paralleled it was dry from SAM01WEUX to the north. Below A29,P3 (15) 33DAEP, p 5 H33fl, 106 (16) A29, p 3 H33D, 106 33CAEP,p 5 (17) A29 , p t H33D, 106 SAMOCWEUX the oanal had to be bridged* There were two main river roads north from VERDUN, one last and one Neat or the river. (18) The XVII French Uorpu line ran through SAMQGNBUX due east (19J* On the west bank tne line from R8GNBVIIUB to VILNOSNUS was held by the 33rd Division while on the east the 59th Brigade took posit ion r (tP)« The 53th brigade troops had made a night march or kilometers and were placed in assault positions north or 8AK0GNEUX. (21) The direction or attack or the 50th brigade was due north and, since the MfiUSK KIVttR runs northwestf a gap was opened oome tiae arter the attack was launched, on the east side of the river• ( 22) This gap was filled by two battalions of the 132d Infantry, whioh crossed the river on bridges at BRABANT, built by the engineers under heavy fire. Due to the fact that the attack came aa a surprise the early advance of the 58th Brigade, 29th Division, was rapid and no serious blocking of the effort was felt until the line reached the CONSENVOYE woods. Fifteen hundred prisoners and some machine guns and artillery were oaptured during this advance ( 23). The 18th French Division experienced difficulty as early as 10:15 AM in the FOIS de HAUMONT and had lost contact with the 58th Brigade on its left* The 58th Brigade reached MALBROUCK and the southern edge of Bois de BRABANT* "~ 8)) Mapp . EWM 119)) Map. EW EWM 20) A29,pp t and 3. ff K539,1O9, 5 (21) A29, p 3. (22) A29, pp 2 and 3 H33Dt107. (23) A29t P 3 The attack of the American units was made undar the orders of the 18th French Division (24)# At MALBROUCK the enemy resistance in front of the 58th Brigade stiffened but the oomraander desired to push forward immediately (25) Since this position was the backbone of t>)* (German entrenohed position the American commander realised the nec*0f Ity tier pushing forward and securing thi J vital areae However, having reaohed its initial objective the unit was directed to stop until contact could be gained on t he flanks» Aftvr a strenuous crossing of the M2U8B, the units of the 33rd Division came under heavy flank machine gun fire from in rear of the advancing 58th Brigade line.