ha-c

GROUP R0BAROH. Group IX

SubJ«ot%

"OPERATIONS OP THE 65th O.A.O. WITH THE FRENCH XVII ARMY ."

By

Willla-a F, Marquat captain O.A.C.(DOL) I I Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 15 May, 1935

j MEMORANDUM FOR: The Directorf aeoond Year Glass, The Oommand and General Staff bohool, ^ort L#avenworth# dUBJBOT: Operations of the 65th Artillery, C*A.C, with tho XVII Corps.

1. PAPERS ACUOMPAN11.,G: i 1. A Bibliography for this study. 2. tracing of a map showing the operations of the French XVII Corps and a diagranatio repre« sentation of the operations of the 65th ArtiL lery, in this action• I note: Other than tha tthe 65th Artillery C.A.C. i actually participated in this engagement, there is little j j Information available from official sources• borne of the j dLata presented is from personal records which necea&arily are uncorroborated* Reference is made to such personal records when used in this document. II THE STUDY PRESENTED*— Operations of the 65th Artillery, O.A.C. with the XVII Corps (French) during the period 7 to 25 October 1918. III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT. Forces t XVII French Army corps: Fro15tmh Colonialeft tol righDivisiont , drench 10th Colonial , French

(X) A29 - PP 2 and 3 SIA - Chap V, Part 5 AAEC - pp 293-295 incl. 33EAEF - pp 5 and 6 H33D - P 5 * Pagea of this document are not numbered.

Page 26 DI (Prenoh) 18 DI {Prenoh) 58th ^ 29th Division ( U.S.) 33rd Division, less detachments (U.S.) Artillery: 158th Field Artillery Brigade lattaohed) 65th Artillery O.A.O., lest 3rd Battalion (U.S.) (2) Operations:

On Ootober 8thf the American First Army attaohed troops to the XVII French Army Corps for operations on the east bank of the MEUSE RIVER (3) No advance had been made during the early Argonne Offensives on the right bank of the river while the ad­ vanoe on the left side of the MEUSE has made a big salient in the German lines* This gave the Germans on the heights east of the J'DUSE RIVER an advantageous position from which to fire into the right flank of the advancing United States forces, and, as the attack progressed, exposed the linds of com­ munications of the American troops to attack from the right flank and rear (4). Thoa was the tactical purpose of the combined Franco-American effort to remove this menace* The strategical objective of the operation was to increase the fighting front for the purpose of oonsuming and absorbing the maximum number of German troops (5) ) Ltr AWCHS p. 2 (3) HAEF, p. 308 ReXA, p. 60 AAEC, p 293-295 ^4) HAEF, p 308 A29» PP 1 and 2 AAEC, p 293-295 (5) RelA, p. 60

Page 2. The attaok was direoted at the vital pivot of the san lino on the Western Front and the Germans maintained a !i large number of divisions In this teotor until the Armistioe [6), thus making the offort a glorious strategioal suooess. The 15IU and 10th irpenoh Colonial Division* did not participate in the advanoe 17) but performed a Riding mission only* Hanoe the aotual advanoe was made by the 26th and 18th 7renoh Divisions and the 29th and 33rd American

Divisions9 the latter advancing astride the MEUSB RIVER ill a hazardous attack* Based on a comparative strength consideration of and Amerioan units, the effort was two thirds Amerioan, although it was commanded by General Henri Claudel of the Frenoh Army (8) The Q-ermans had forseen a oombined Franco-American effort in the VERDUN SECTOR ever since the ST. MIHIEL drive. The Allies knew this and as a oonsequenoe they were concerned, with accomplishing surprise as to WHERE, on this front, the main effort was to be launched* Captured German documents indicated that the high command was convinced that the main Allied effort in the VERDUN SECTOR would be Made east of the MEUSE RIVER, and elaborate defensive works were established to stop a drive on this front* (9) The Allied attack west of the MEUSE RIVER on 29 September had caused the Germans to rush troops to that side of the (6) RelA, p. 60 (7) H33D, p 104 A29, PP 3 and 4 (8) RelA p. 60 TO 33DAEP, p 5 SIA, Qhap V, Part 5 (9) SIA,Chap V, Part 5 AAEC , pp 293-295 A29, pp 1 and 2. Page 3# River• UJ) This was indloated by the failure of the 9t?Mn artillery to lay down lte oustomary counter- preparation fire until more than a half hour after the attaok Jumped off* Later, however, the Hermans rushed

troops into the seotorf as lndloated by the tenacious resistance put up after the 9th• In the initial attaok by the two Amerioan Divisions the part played by the 108th Engineers (US) and the 108th Field Signal Battalion (US) was noteworthy* (11) There is a dearth of information of the part played by Army Artillery in the attack, the 65th being an Army Artillery unit (12)* None of the reports of divisions engaged in the operation indloate the presence of | o rassistance rendered by, the heavy mobile gunl of the Army Artillery*

2. Progress of the attack: Tuesday, October 8th. At 5 AM the attack of the XVII French Army Corps began• There was no preliminary artillery preparation (13) As indicated before the troops in line from right to left were: 26th and ?.8th French Divisions, attacking ina direction approximately north-northeast and the 29th and 33rd U*S* Divisions, attacking approximately due north. The 58th Bi*igade of the 29th Division, on the east bank, oonsiated of the 115th Infantry, 116th Infantry (10) A29, pp 1 and 2 (11) H33D, 104- 105. XHtylP. p 5. (12) Lfcr.AWOHS, 2 (13) H33d, 104 A29, pp 1 and 3

Page 112th Nfcohine Gun Battalion, supported by the 158th Field Artillery Brigade, released to the 29th Division from the V Oorps (US) on 2 Ootober, in addition to the organic divisional artillery» (14). The 33rd Division, on the west bank, consisted of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 132nd Infantry; 2d Battalion, 131st Infantry; Companies A and D 124th Maohine Ghm Battalion, in addition to organic field artillery* (15) The Frenoh divisions started the attack with the 56th Brigade, pushing forward at 5 AM* The 1st and 2d Battalions, 132d Infantry were not advanoed from the southern edge of the Bois de Forges until 9:00 All* (16) The terrain over wfcioh the attack was launched can be estimated as follows: ( 17) From VACHERAUVTLUE, on the east bank of the MEUSE, the heights extended some 22 kilometers to the north, out by a series of streams and ridges running east and west over which the attack must pass. The cajrture of these heights was essential to further advance west of the MEUSE* l German defenses consisted or a series of positions frofa BRABANTER itellung, a parallel of observation, back to KREIMHELDE St el lung, on the cross ridge. This was the last German line. The main battle position extended across the VOLKER and HAGEN Stellungs through MALBROUCH HILL. North of BRABANTER the heights were covered by woods making defense easy and attack hazardous* The MEUSE RIVER was unrordable and the oanal which paralleled it was dry from SAM01WEUX to the north. Below A29,P3 (15) 33DAEP, p 5 H33fl, 106 (16) A29, p 3 H33D, 106 33CAEP,p 5 (17) A29 , p t H33D, 106 SAMOCWEUX the oanal had to be bridged* There were two main river roads north from VERDUN, one last and one Neat or the river. (18) The XVII French Uorpu line ran through SAMQGNBUX due east (19J* On the west bank tne line from R8GNBVIIUB to VILNOSNUS was held by the 33rd Division while on the east the 59th Brigade took posit ion r (tP)« The 53th brigade troops had made a night march or kilometers and were placed in assault positions north or 8AK0GNEUX. (21) The direction or attack or the 50th brigade was due north and, since the MfiUSK KIVttR runs northwestf a gap was opened oome tiae arter the attack was launched, on the east side of the river• ( 22) This gap was filled by two battalions of the 132d Infantry, whioh crossed the river on bridges at BRABANT, built by the engineers under heavy fire. Due to the fact that the attack came aa a surprise the early advance of the 58th Brigade, 29th Division, was rapid and no serious blocking of the effort was felt until the line reached the CONSENVOYE woods. Fifteen hundred prisoners and some machine guns and artillery were oaptured during this advance ( 23). The 18th French Division experienced difficulty as early as 10:15 AM in the FOIS de HAUMONT and had lost contact with the 58th Brigade on its left* The 58th Brigade reached MALBROUCK and the southern edge of Bois de BRABANT* "~ 8)) Mapp . EWM 119)) Map. EW EWM 20) A29,pp t and 3. ff K539,1O9, 5 (21) A29, p 3. (22) A29, pp 2 and 3 H33Dt107. (23) A29t P 3 The attack of the American units was made undar the

orders of the 18th French Division (24)# At MALBROUCK the enemy resistance in front of the 58th Brigade stiffened but the oomraander desired to push forward immediately (25) Since this position was the backbone of t>)* (German entrenohed position the American commander realised the nec*0f Ity tier pushing forward and securing thi J vital areae However, having reaohed its initial objective the unit was directed to stop until contact could be gained on t he flanks» Aftvr a strenuous crossing of the M2U8B, the units of the 33rd Division came under heavy flank machine gun fire from in rear of the advancing 58th Brigade line. This they reduced and pushed on against constantly tightening resistance• (26)« Grossing of the MEU8B was accomplished on two bridges constructed by the 108th Engineers, one, 120 feet long in 12 feet of water at BRABANT and one, 156 feet long in 16 feet of water at CONSENVOYEf At 3JOO PM orders were issued for the reserve Battalion of the 33rd to advance on Bols de CHAUMB. The advance started at 4:00 PM and progressed to the south* ern edge of the objective by dark whore it dug in*

The line of the American units at dark 8 October ran entirely on the east bank of the MEUSE, from the south edge of B0I3 de CHAUME - across western edge of the BOIS de CONSENVOXE" north of MALBROUCI and through the BOIS de BRABANT to the RAVIN de WALONSEVAUX,thence bent southward (24) A29, p 3 H33D, 106 (25) A29, p 6 (26) H33D.1O7 33DAEP, p 5

Page through the ORMONT 7BRME f the observation post south of the BOIS de ORMONT and the northern edge of the Bols d'HAUMCJNT, turned easttslightly north to the northwestern corner of Bois des OAURSS, through Cote 329 to t he wood of La WAVRILLE northeast of BEAUMONT. (27) Tho 66th American Division had olosed up to the MEUSft on the west bank (28)*

Wednesday, 9 October. The 33d Division troops oontinued the advance but the 53th brigade wide no advance,thus creating a gap on the right of the 33rd Division• The 33rd advanced initially to the objective, the road SIVR3C~sur-lflBU8E to VILIE NUEVE FARM but a powerful counterattack by German troops drove the right flank back to TRANCHES du CABLE, immediately south of the BOISt.de CRAUMB* (29)« More v e inf or cement a from the 33d Diviaioni, consisting of the 3rd. Battalion and Machine (fun Company* 129th Infantry, and Company B, 122 Machine GEun Ogapany, were rushed to the east bank under cover of darkness to be used in the launching of an attack on the morning of 10 October* (30) At tte close of 9 October the X9II Gorps line ran as follows? Point 500 meter* south of 8IVRY sur MEUSE-along the northern edge of BOIS de OHAUME ~ through the BOIS B0US30IS - tho BOIS de MOLIEVILLS - the FEJRMB dORMONT ­ northern edge of the BOIB d^UMQNT - northwestern edge of 9013 des CAURE3 - along southern edge of BOIS de OHAMPNBUVJILLB through the DAUPHIN work - Cote 351 to the northeastern

corner of BOIS lea F03SESf boyond BEAUMONT• (31) (27) H33DI 108 A29* P 3 33DAS5 p 5 (28) H33D, 109 (29) H33D, 115 33DAEP. p 5 A29,P 3 (30) 33DABPtp 5 (31) «33Dt 115 A29fP 3 Thursday, 10 to Monday 14 (inclusive) October. On 10 Ootober the attack of the 58th Brigade (US) was renewed (31) ofcill operating under the French 18th Division. *h# 113 Infantry (US) of the 57th Brigade, which had been in reserve, was turned over to the 18th French Division (32) Results of the day were: (33) 33d Division regained ground lost on the 9th. 29th Division advanced against heavy oMf and held the BOIS de BOSSIS 18th Division, French, was held up in the BOIS de ORMONT. 26th Division,French, advanced slightly in the BOIS de CAURES- Positions in vicinity of La WAVRILLE ware consolidated On 1& October the pdptrolipf"the 58th Brigade passed to the 29th Division, but the 113th Infantry remained under the French 18th Division (34) * From the 11th to the 14th stiff resistance was encountered along the entire line, particularly In the BOIS de BOSSIS and near MOLLEVILLB FERME The lines wavered back and forth but no substantial fcains were made. During the night 11-12 October the 10 DIC, French Colonial, relieved the 26th French Division on the right of the line (35) but both unite remained in action* On IX Ootober the 18th Division progressed slightly in the west and southern edges of the BOiS df0Rlfi0NT» The 33d US Division had no important action other than withstand­ ing heavy bombardment,gas and air attack and the 29th US Division made preparations for assault against MOLLEVILLE FERME. The 26th and 10th French Divisions made little progress (36)

M| ^^0 IBM B^fe flM flBi QBV Atf ^BB 4Mb QBV #^B) B^B ^BV ^^M ^BA ^BB. AA ^^a ^^A ^BB> ^M» ^^B BA* ^^M ^^B ^^m ^^m B^B ^BA fl (31) A29, p 3 (34) ,p 4 (32) A29, p 3 (35 SI A, <3hap V* Part 5 (33) A29, p 3 and 4 H334, 129-130 SIA,£arb f, chap V (36) 3SA,Qhap V* part 5 33DAEF,P 6 H33d, 131-132 H33D, 118-119 Page ! The 13th Ootober was characterised by preparations for action all along the lino and little gains or lo«**8, although the ciennan1 fires continued to be heavy* Artillery activity on both side'* was lnoreased«(36)« Flans were made to reduce the rosistanoe at MOLLEVIIJL*! FERME on the 14th but lat<>r the time was postponed until the l£th and the 14th was spent in further artillery duals and infantry preparations. 137) The left bank of the MEU8E was held by depleted troopaj of the 65th Brigade, moat of which had been sent to the east bank for reinforcements• Period Tuesday 15 October to Tuesday 22 October.

On 15 October the 29th Division troops { 58th Brigade) attacked strong points north of the clearing of MOLLEVILLE PKE with the 18th French D|vlsion assisting on theifcfcgxt ant 33d U*S» assisting on the left* ( 38 ) During the previous night the 65 and 66 executed a mutual relief9 the 65th taking up the attack on the east bank of the UfiEUSE and the 66th on the left bank* (39) At dark the line passed through the BOIS de CHAUME on Its northern edge- along the parallel about 1 kilometer north of the toOLLEVTLLE FERME - Meridian 26 - south through BOIS BUIirRY - where it Joined tho line originally held* (40} Ootober 16 saw the determined assaults of the American troops break the backbone of the German resistance around fcOUEVILLE BERKE (41) The 29th US Division continued the attack on the M0L1EVILLE FERME with the 33rd assisting on the left* (36) H33d, 135. (Am STA vw ; (37) H33D, 136 to 138 Inol. «?£ 151 3IA, Chap V, part 5 ^ X ) §IA, (38) %t?JU r, Part 5 "»»• »»* A293 i p 5 **&y •& 2 H33^! 147 to 151 Inol. (39) H33D, 147. The saddle of the GRANDE MONTAGNB was captured and "•M-j ?.04th Infantry (26th US Division) under the 18th ^ranc.x Division gained a seoure foothold on the northeast edge of B0I8 d'HAUMONT oausing the enemy to evacuate a large part of the line -- about 400 meters, east of the HAUMONT-FLABAS road. (42) Thereafter the operations of the XVII Prenoh Army 0?rps consisted of gradually pushing the German foroes off their final positions and securing heights which had been in possession of the enemy for the past four years(43) ihe threat to the right flank of the main Allied foroes had been removed. The 15th Division, French Colonial, relieved the 33rd Division (US) astride the MEUSE on the night 20-21 October (44). The (ierman foroes held portions of the pivot on the east of the line until the general withdrawal In the main Argonne Offensive after November 1. The 29th Division (US) was relieved on October 28-29 by the 79th Division (U3j) (45). 3. The 65th Artillery OAC. The 65th Artillery, OAC. wae an American heavy mobjile artillery organization consisting of the regular headquartjero, Headquarters Company, Supply Company and three battalions of two batteries oaoh. (42) SIA, Ohap 7, Part 5 A29, P 5 H53D, 152 to 154,Inol. (43) H53D, 155 to ITS*1 lnol A29, 5 and 6 3 , pp 5 and 6 SIA. Ohap V, Parb 5 (44) 1&L Ohap V, Parb 5. 171-172. (45) Jit, Chap V, Part 5 A29, P 6

Page : 1. The 65th Artillery, C.A.G*, less the 3rd Battalion, was attaohed to the XVII Frenoh Army Corps from Ootober 5, 1918 ( G~3, S*0* Bo* 368, October 5$ 1918) to Ootober S?,1918 (f-3 1st Army S.O. No. 479, Ootober 23,1918j (46) The regiment waa equipped with 9*2 Inoh British siege howitzers* It was the only American unit to fire this oaliber gun during the war* Essentially a siege gun, the materiel was deglgned to be eaplmet In a close-up defiladed position for the reduction of land forfcs but the 65th regiment operated this type or artillery as ordinary mobile heavy ordnance* The howitzers were transported In four loads* eaoh drawn by a oaterpillar tractor* The first battalion of the 65th Artillery left V#rdun on October 27th and arrived at LANCON on October 28th, a distance of 40 ndles by road, indicating that the weight of the piece did not interfere with its mobility* (4f) It was a matter of frequent comment among the British technical personnel with the equipment* that the Americans had converted the siege gun. into a highly mobile weapon* The type of artillery was well qualified as Array Artillery, except for the fact that the Mark I and Mark II howitzers used by the 65th Artillery, 1st and 2d Battalions had a short extreme range. The maximum range for the Mark II, with which the 2nd Battalion was equipped, was 13084 yards. (48)*

46) Ltr* AWCKi, 2. jJY) M ii • it 48) Pain.9*2

Page J2 * The 1st Battalion was in action on the east bank of the MEUSJE RiVEH during the attacks or 7 and 8 October (49) and from a position in the BOiS de FOROffiS on October 23. The 2nd Battalion took position on the left bank of the MtfuSn; on October 7 and remained in position until 19 October (50) Later aotion on 21-25 October of tula

battalion and the aotion oi October 23, mentioned abovet ror the 1st Battalion, were not under command or the XVIX French Army Oorps but directly under United spates Army command* The 65th Artillery OAC was originally assigned

as Army Artillery$ iPirst Army# attaohed to the I Array Corps First Army (51) Records of individuals of the 6 5th Artillery C.A»Ct

indloate that on October 8# filing opened at 5*00 A*M» the same hour that the initial attack started on its way* As Indicated previously in this document, there is little indication that the operations of the regiment were in any manner coordinated with the advance after the start of the attaok. To the personal knowledge of the writer, who was at the battery positions of Battery A in this engagement, the pieoes wors fired on sohedule at previously designated .targets, inhere was no laiaoon with the infantry and no aerial obaeztvation of the firings• Battery A fired from 5*00 AM until 9'.4O A«H« and again In the afternoon* On the 9th of October, a 90 minute bombardment began at 8;30 AU# Two 20 minute bombardment* were fired at 2 and 5-o'clock P*M« All firing was map firing. (52) Ltr.AffOMt, 2 50 Ltr.AWCHS. 2 51 Ltr.AWOHS, 2 52 WDW7M

Page :3 Although the battery moved to the east bank of the ! river following its participation in the first two days cf the attack, its targets were on the west bank, irrom the 10t|h to the 20th the 1st Battalion was not in action. During the advance of 92-23 October, the main targets of the 4'irst Battalion were strong paints and enemy position^ and artillery in BOIS de ETRAYE, BOIS de BELLEU and BOIS de MONTAGNE. (53) Targets of the 2d Battalion are not known and could not be determined in the time available. However, an exhauejt ive search has been made of official records for detailed information of the participation of the 65th Artillery (CAC)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM.

The function of army artillery is essentially counterbabtery and interdiction, missions for which the 9»2 bowitsers of the 65th Artillery CAC were well adapted. IH other words the mission of the heavy guns is to prevent the enemy from massing men or materiel against our advancing infantry in the attack. As the infantry advances beyond the range of its own light pieces which are then displaced

by eschelon, reducing the volume of direct supporting firef the important* of the longer range weapons which a re still capable of supporting the advance, becomes vastly more im­ portant, ttuoh support, however, is only effectire to the extent that there is adequate laiaoon between the infantry and the heavy artillery. Of course direct lines to supporting heavy artillerfr would entail too great maintenance activities ae the distance between the guns and the advanoing troops increased, but it is not impracticable to maintain oontaot through regular artillery channels. ^ _th° *°*1°1' ^a°«*"*i» the advance of the infantL Page WDWFM* was slowed down and on some fronts definitely stopped after after the 10th. The resistance in the vicinity or MOLLEVILLE tWSMM continued to be felt until toward the end or OGTQBER*

Yet the records show that the 65th Artillery 9CAC, units were silent after the totond day of the attack until the First Battalion was displaced forward for t he attack of 23 October* The 9*2 howitaer fires a 290 pound projectile carrying an explosive charge of 21 pounds 4 ounces• There were six­ teen or such howitzers available for use in this action* The pieces are capable or sustained fire at a rate or tee round every two minutes and it is personal knowledge to the writer that ammunition was plentiful • A concentration of the proportions or which this materiel was capable could have done a great deal to dislodge the resistance which was holding up and causing heavy cas­ ualties among the advancing American troops* Records oi the action Indicate that organic artillery

was used to the fullest extentf but it is difficult to realise why advantage was not taken 01 tne superior blasting power 01 the attached army artillery* Their use did not Involve displacement since the major advance was well within the extreme range of the howitzers and the traverse of the pieces, a total of 60 degrees, was sufficient to permit shifting concentrations over a great part of the front being attacked by the American units* Later in the action the First Battalion was displaced to positions on the west bank «g the MEUSS RIVER, from which positions both the first and second battalions oould deliver a terrlfio flanking fire into the German defensive positions on the strong terrain around BOIS de MONTAGNE, B0I3 de ETRAXjE and B0I3 HELLEU*

15 IV. OONOLUSIC 5 OP THE AUTHOR*

That, in the action of the XVII French Army Corps, on the east bank of the MEUSE RIVER beginning 8 October, 1918, the high command failed to employ the mas0 of the 65th Artillery, CAO. in an efficient manner in order to influence the aotion and support the infantry after the first two days of the offensive* jtfiat, in this action a close laiason between the attaoking infantry and the 65th Artillery, GAC, through the proper artillery channels, did not exist* That close laia son and observed fire are essential to the proper conduct of reinforcing artillery fire of all calibers•

V • RECOlvIMENDATIONS • That further study of this adtion be made to develop the probable effects of displacing the entire 65th Artillery CAC, less one battalion, early after the opening attack, to the west bank of the MEUSE RIVER in order to support the attack on the east bank. This study to be made to develop the possibilities of a taotioal employ­ ment of reinforcing artillery whereby it is r apidly dis­ placed on the flanks of and parallel to the main effort in order to support that effort by flanking fire*

Pa;;# 16» BIBLIOGRAPHY.

3IA; "Summary of Operations, First Army, IBP, August 9 to November 11, 1918.** C & G.S.S. file. A29: "Activities of the 29th Division, AEF. during the Per­ iod of its Attachment to the XVII French Army Corps*** Document- Lecture by the Commanding General, 29th Division at MONTIGNY-eur-AUBE. CARI: "Chief of Artillery, Report of the First Army AEF.H Part IV (a) pp 34 only. HAEF: "History of the Shipley Thomas, p 308 only. RB1A. "Report of the First Army AEF- Organization and Operations August 10,1918-Ootober 15,1918, by John J. Pershing; after that date by Lieut. General Hunter Liggett. AAEC."The American Army in the European Conflict.11 De Ghambrun and Deltorenches • M 33DAEF."Thirty-third Dtvision, AEF by Major Ofneral George Fell Jr. H33D. H The History of the 33rd Division*1 by Lieut. Colonel **. L. Kuidekoper. TO • Tables of Organization of American and French Divisions during the European War-- 0. &. 0-. S.S. file. Pam 9*2. MPamphlet-9*2 howitzer, Description and Operation. Personal file of Gapt. W.F.Marquat.

Ltr. AWCHS. Letter, Army War College Historical Section. Appended hereto. WD. WFM. War Diary, Capt. W.F.ltorquat. Pfreonal File.

"The Command of the rirst American Army in the Meuse- Argonne, October 16-November 11, 1918, by Major C^ener)­ al hunter Liggett, USA Retired. Document, CGS3 file* Negative. ••Lecture delivered by Major Qeneral W.3. MoNair, USA Chief of Army Artillery, tflrst Army, on Deo«mber 23, 1918 at First Army Headquarters, Bar-sur-Aube,• Negative. ••Explanation and Execution of Plans for Artillery for St. Mihlel and Meuse Argonne Operations to November 11,1918** Negative. CGSS file. ^Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery to the Secre­ tary of War for the fiscal lear 1918-1919** Negative. Map BWM- Tracing of Map of Bast and West Marne Sectors.

Page 17* 0Ol£v(AT!U & GENERAL SfAFP SCHOOL ^ Port Leavenworth, Kansas January 9# 1933.

Subject: Historical Data: (XVII Pranoh Army corps and 65th Artillery OAC in the Argonne Offensive)

1. As my part in a group research study at this school I have been assigned the subject of covering the operations of the 65th Artillery, CAC in operations in conjunction with the XVII Pirenoh Army Oo:?ps in the Argonne between 8 and 11 October and 23*26 October, 1918* 2. The historical data on this subject in the school library is limited, scarcely any mention being available of the 65th Artillery 3* I am interested in knowing details of the operations of the XVII French Army Corps on both sides of the MMWUt KTHR on the dates mentioned and the participation of the 65th Artillery ( 1st and 2d Battalions) in those operations. 4. I would appreciate it greatly if you could supply me with some information on this subject. I promise to handle such matter as you may send me with extreme care and Judgment*

William P. Marq Captain C.A.C*

421-1 Kearney Avenue Port Leavenworth, Kansas• 4th tad. ; RRP/few C. ft G. S. So, Ft. U»T«iworttx, Kan**, j«n« 25, 198&V- To Captain Wllilaa F. Marqu**, Coast Artillery Corps (D.O.L.). lot Ind» HTAsNHE Historical Section, Army War College, January 19, 1933 - To The Adjutant General (through the Commandant, A.W.C*) The records available to this Section show that the 65th Artillery (C.A,C»), leas the 3rd Battalion, ma attached to the XVII French Army Corp* from October 5, 1918 (0-3, let Army, S.O. No* 368, October 5f 1918) to October 13, 1918 (G~5, 1st Army, S»0. No. 479, October 23, 1918). ­ The following are extracts from the Regimental Returns for the month of October 1918: "The Regimental Headquarters, HeadquarterA and Supply Companies at Anzerllle-en-Argonna, Franoe, during entire month* First Battalion was in action on the east bank of the Meuse, north of Verdun, October 7 and 8, 1918, and at Bois de Forges, October 23, 1918* The Battalion left Verdun on October 27, 1918, arrived at Lane onf October 28, 1918; movement covering about fortyjailea* Second Battalion was in action on the left bank of the Meuse, north of Verdun, October 7 to 19, 1918, and from October 21 to 25, 1918* Battery C left Verdun October 26, 1918, arrived Flevilla, France, October 27, 1918. Battery D left Verdun October 25, 1918, arriving at Fleville, Franoe, October 27, 1918* The Third Battalion was stationed at Muasey-sur-Marne, France, up to October 25, 1918, performing the usual garrison duties and receiving instructions* Changed station, leaving Mussey­ sur-Marne October £5, 1918, arriving at Rosiers-en-Haye October £7, 1918. Left Roaiers-*n-Hayt October 28, 1918, arriving at Autrevilla (Meurthe-en-Mosolle) same date* Entire regiment, except 3d Battalion, attached 1st Army Corps, 1st Army* Third Battalion assigned to VI Corps, 2nd Army, as Corps Artillery**1 Other returns for Headquarters Company, October, 1918* "Headquarters Company in aotion Argonne (Bold de Hesse) Dombasle, France, September 26 to October 6, 1918* North of Verdun (East bank of Meuse), October 8-12, 1918 (Strayes), October 12*21, 1918. North of Verdun (West bank of Meuse, Bois de Forges), October 21-26, 1918," Return for Battery A» October, 1918• "Participated in battle on east bank of Meuse, north of Verdun, France, October 7-8, 1918» and Bois de Forges, France, October 23, 1918• Left Verdun, Ootober 27, 1918, arrived at Lanoon, France, October 28, 1918."

- 2 ­ Beturn for Battery B, Ootober, 1918. ••Battery took pert in offensive of October 7-6, 1918, operating east bank of the MeUse, north of Verdun, Frenoe, and offensive of October 23, 1918 in the Bois de Forges* In both offensives battery was attached to the XVII Frenoh Army Corps* Battery left the Bois de Hesse at 8*00 P. M., October 4, 1918, arriving in Verdun, Franoe, the morning of the 5th. The Battery left Verdun, October 28, 1918, and arrived in La no on the day.*

For the Chief:

G. C. BENSON Major, Cav* (DOL) Seoretary*

2nd Ind. Army War College , January 19, 1933 - To The Adjutant General* 'or the Commandant:

KERR T. RIOOS Colonel, Cav* (DOL) Exeoutive Offioer.

AG 370.2 (l-G-33) Mi so, (Returns) 3d Ind. War Dppartment, A+G.O** January 23, 1933 - To the Commandant, The Ccnnand and Gene f Fort Leavenworth, Kansas* CO or to

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