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GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU France and the German Rearmament Problem 1945-1955

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GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU France and the German Rearmament Problem 1945-1955 GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU France and the German Rearmament Problem 1945-1955 in ROLF AHMANN, ADOLF M. BIRKE, AND MICHAEL HOWARD (eds.), The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918-1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 487-512 ISBN: 978 0 19 920503 5 The following PDF is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND licence. Anyone may freely read, download, distribute, and make the work available to the public in printed or electronic form provided that appropriate credit is given. However, no commercial use is allowed and the work may not be altered or transformed, or serve as the basis for a derivative work. The publication rights for this volume have formally reverted from Oxford University Press to the German Historical Institute London. All reasonable effort has been made to contact any further copyright holders in this volume. Any objections to this material being published online under open access should be addressed to the German Historical Institute London. DOI: 20 France and the German Rearmament Problem 1945-1955 GEORGES-HENRI SouTou The Fourth Republic was shaken by many crises, but none aroused as much passion as the debate on the European Defence Community. When in 1950, five years after the end of the war and occupation, the suggestion of German rearmament was put to the French, the whole nation was profoundly shocked. However, thanks to recent research, particularly by Pierre Guillen and Raymond Poidevin, we know that many people realized very early on that the Soviet threat made rearma- ment inevitable. Many of those who accepted this painful necessity nevertheless disputed the terms of rearmament. We must distinguish here between two things: opposition to rearmament and opposition to the European Defence Com- munity as such. Ultimately historians may be tempted to see the com- plexity of the situation and the contradictory feelings of the French as best reflected in a well-known joke of the time: the German army should be stronger than the Red Army but not as powerful as the Army of Luxemburg! In our view the subtleties of the contradictory lines taken by Paris in this matter can only be fully apreciated by linking this question to the more general one of France's German policy during those years, and starting the study from 1945. BACKGROUND PUBLIC OPINION The ambiguities and complexity of the French position are more easily understood if one follows the changes in public opinion. It has been said that: 'the draft treaty creating an G.-H. SouTou EDC did not at any time succeed in crystalizing a clear majority in public attitudes in France, on either one side or the other'. 1 On the one hand the attitude towards Germany was still clearly negative, even according to a survey carried out in July 1954.2 However, and this is an essential point, the fear and resentment felt towards Germany were counter- balanced by the fear inspired by the USSR. In June 1953 16 per cent of the French regarded Germany as the enemy, while 17 per cent thought it was the USSR; in July 1954 these figures were 22 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. Certainly there was a temptation to take a neutral position.4 But the majoritf of the French supported NATO and Western defence. Nevertheless they were hostile to German rearmament.6 Certainly the European army was accepted as the lesser evil by more than 40 per cent of the French (48 per cent in September 1952) as against 22 to 30 per cent, depending on the time. But a more detailed study revealed a deep division: those with the most clearly formed views were against and were in the majority in July 1954 (51 as against 48 per cent of those questioned claiming to have a firm position on the subject).8 So although the principle of Western defence was evidently accepted, the country was deeply divided on the EDC. It is not surprising that the decisions taken at the London Conference in September 1954 were clearly preferred to the EDC (35 against 8 per cent).9 Underlying public opinion had reached the same conclusion as most informed leaders 1 A. Girard andJ. Stoetzel, 'L'Opinion publique devant la CEO', in R. Aron and D. Lerner (eds.), La Querelle de la CED (Paris, 1956), 127-55. 2 Ibid. 152 f. (have confidence in signing a treaty with Germany: 25 %; no confidence: 43°/o; no view stated: 33%). 3 Ibid. 134. 4 Ibid. 132. (Oct. 1954: France, in case of war, should take the side of the United States: 22%; of the USSR: 2%; should not take sides: 53%). 5 Ibid. 149 (Mar. 1949: amongst informed people, 51% are in favour of signing the Atlantic Pact, 23°/o against). 6 Ibid. 138, 141 (in July 1954, 56% think that there is danger in rearming Germany). 7 Ibid. 139. 8 Ibid. 143. 9 Ibid. 154. France and German Rearmament Problem 489 (as we shall see): German rearmament was inevitable in the face of the Soviet threat, but it was preferable to have it within NATO rather than in an integrated European army, which would mean the disappearance of the French army but would not involve Great Britain and the United States closely enough in the security of France. 1945-1946: OFFICIAL NEUTRALITY AND ANTI-GERMANISM From 1944 to 1945 de Gaulle set out French policy for the immediate post-war period: the security of France would be guaranteed, essentially with the support of the USSR, by the control of a dismembered Reich, from which the Ruhr, the Rhineland, and the Saar would be removed. 10 This was the result de Gaulle would have liked to have seen from his trip to Moscow and the Franco-Soviet Pact of December 1944. And very logically the main objective of the military programme adopted by de Gaulle on 4 June 1945 for the postwar period was to ensure Germany's compliance with the future peace treaty. 11 In the nascent East-West conflict the official French position was to refuse to take sides. This was the stance taken by de Gaulle and maintained by the provisional government after his departure in January 1946; 12 certainly tripartism (that is, the alliance of Communists, Socialists, and MRP (Mouvement Republicain Populaire) Christian Democrats) and the Communist Party's presence in the government made any other choice impossible. It should not be thought that-in spite of all the reservations to be made-this was a purely formal, external position; it 10 This is a well-known aspect; G.-H. Soutou, 'La Politique fran~aise a l'egard de la Rhenanie, 1944-1947', in P. Huttenberger and H. Molitor (eds.) Franzosen und Deutsche am Rhein 1789-1918-1945 (Essen, 1989), 47-66. 11 Gen. P. Lassalle, 'Securite fran~aise face a l'Est dans l'immediat apres-guerre', Institut Charles de Gaulle, Institut du Temps Present (eds.), De Gaulle et la Nation face aux problemes de difense, 1945-191/D (Pion, 1983), 105-20 (111). Col. J. Delmas, 'De Gaulle, la defense nationale et les forces armees: projets et realites (1944- 1946)', Revue d'kistoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, 28, (1978), 7-24. 12 C. de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, 3 vols. (Paris, 1959), iii. 60-3 and 215-16. 49° G.-H. SouTou penetrated deep into the wheels of the political, adminis- trative, and military machine. In my opinion there were two reasons for this, beyond the memory of wartime solidarity with the Allies from East and West: first, of course, the importance of the Communist presence inside the govern- ment apparatus, secondly the fact that in 1946 France was not willing to give up the severely anti-German programme, a programme to which public opinion in particular was still very much attached. But the implementation of this pro- gramme required the consent of the three other occupying powers in the Reich, which prevented France taking sides between the Soviets and the Americans. 13 Here we may quote a memorandum on French military policy issued on 23 August 1946 by General Ely, then head of the military staff of the secretary of state for the armed forces. 14 Ely advocated neutrality, backed up by a political and military entente with the Soviets and Americans, with France taking sides as necessary against any power violating her territory. Clearly in this atmosphere of neutralism and against the background of a policy towards Germany unchanged since 1944, the German rearmament problem was simply not an issue: for one thing there could be no question of it, and for another awareness of the Soviet threat-which would later lead to acceptance of German rearmament-was not yet an element in public opinion and was certainly not one of the main forces in government policy. However, under the surface matters were more complex. From a very early stage some people were aware of the problem the USSR would later become, but they could not express this openly because of public opinion and also because of tripartism. They did, however, discreetly prepare the foundations for future developments. De Gaulle himself seems to have shifted: in 1944 he was very decided in looking to the Soviets for support, which led him to conclude the Franco-Soviet Pact of 10 December 1944, 15 and he was 13 Soutou, 'La Politique fram;;aise', 51-61. 14 Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre (SHAT), Fonds Ely, Carton 6, Dossier 2. 15 J. Laloy, Yalta (Paris, 1g88), 81-8. France and German Rearmament Problem 491 doubtless disappointed and worried by Stalin's refusal to ratify his programme for the dismemberment of Germany.
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