u.s. Army Field Center and ~chool Monograph Series

OPERATION DESERT STORM AND BEYOND

MODERNIZING THE FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE 1990s .

BY

BOYD L. DASTRUP

Command Historian's Office

United States Field Artillery Center and School

Fort Sill,

2005 11

Boyd L. Dastrup . I Boyd L.Dastrup, a native of Ogden, Utab, received his B.S. from Weber State College, M.A,I] from Utab State University, and Ph.D. from Kansas State University and is currently th~I Command Historian for the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill. He has writteJ The U.S. Anny Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History (1982), CrusadJ ] in Nuremberg: Occupation, 1945-1949 (1985), King of Battle: A Branch History d the U.S. Anny's Field Artillery (1992, 1993), Modemizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991 (1994,2003), and The FieldAnillery: History and Sourcebook (1994). He has also writtel articles in A Guide to the Sources of Military History (1998), The Oxford Companion.to American Military History (1999), and Professional Military Education in thl United States: A Historical Dictionary (2000) and served as a subject matter 'expert for the History Channel on Danger Missions: Forward Observation (2001) and for the Discovery Channel on Artillery Strikes (2005). iii

u.s. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER AND SCHOOL

Major General David C. Ralston Commanding General

ColonelJames M. MacDonald Assistant Commandant

Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup Command Historian

u.S. Army Field Artillery Center and SchoolMonograph Series

Library of Congress Card Catalog Number: iv

PREFACE

To stay abreast of the rearmed and impressive Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military forO 1 and thelethality of modern weapons employed in the Arab- Israeli War of October 1973, thl ] U.S. Army and the Field Artillery pursued a comprehensive modernization effort in thl 1970s and 1980s. DUring those years, they revamped training, rewrote doctrine, launchd I developmental programs for new weapons and equipment, and reformed force structure b~ I made modernizing light forces for deploying in support of worldwide contingencies a lo~ I priority. Although this modernization positioned the Army for a high-intensity conflict iJ Europe against the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat, it left the Army ill-prepared for loW' intensity conflicts throughout the world. As the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat was declining late in the 1980s and as the risk of lOW-intensity, regional crises were simultaneously increasing, the United StateS dispatched military forces into Southwest Asia as part of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. By doing this, the United States intended to prevent further Iraqi aggression and protect American interests i~ the region. Although both operations were resounding successes, Operation Desert Storn: validated the wide-ranging modernization of the Army's heavy forces during the preceding two decades and simultaneously confirmed known field artillery materiel deficiencies that required correcting through further modernization. Working in concert, the lessons of the , the end of the Cold War, and the escalating risk of regional crises generated greater interest in developing a strategically deployable and digitized Army that could fight across the spectrum of conflict anywhere i~ the world. Although they encountered declining financial and personnel resources as the United States reduced its military spending and force structure to shift funding priority from military to domestic programs with the demise of the Soviet threat, the Army and the Field Artillery still modernized its weapons and equipment. They modified their Cold Wat emphasis on buying new weapon systems and equipment for extending the life of existing systems by choosing to improve their capabilities through the application of advanced technology, especially information technology. In some instances, however, purchasing a new weapon system offered the only means of modernizing. As this modernization effort began prodUcing substantive results by the end of the ' 1990s, General Eric K. Shinseki who became the Chief of Staff of the Army in June 1999 introduced his Transformation of the Army vision. Critical of the Army's existing force structure as revealed by the difficulty of the Task Force Hawk deployment to Kosovo in 1999, General Shinseki stressed that the Army had to improve its strategic mobility by equipping itself with systems possessing the robustness of heavy systems of the Cold War and the strategic deployability oflight systems. The Transformation of the Army, therefore, made an explicit break with the ongoing modernization endeavor with its emphasis upon light and heavy forces and moved modernization in an entirely new direction. This study tells the story of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery in the 1990s beginning with the Gulf War and ending with General Shinseki's Transformation of the Army vision of 1999. Although the Field Artillery worked to develop strategically deployable weapons and equipment for the twenty-first century, fighting the high-intensity conflict still remained the priority through most of the decade even though the Cold War had ended with the c?ll~~se of the Soviet- Warsaw Pact threat. The Transformation of the Army changed those pnontles ~ v

by causing some field artillery systems under development to be abandoned arid others to be redesigned to meet the requirements of a new world of low- to mid-intensity conflicts and the need to respond rapidly with military force. Iwould like to thank former commandants of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, General (Retired) Fred F.Marty and Major General David P. Valcourt who were ~articipants in the modernization effort of the 1990s for reading the ,manuscript and making ~nsightful comments. I would also like to thank John Yager for his thoughts. They were Invaluable. Any errors in fact are mine.

Boyd L. Dastrup Fort Sill, Oklahoma vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS USAFACS PAGE iii Preface iv Table of Contents k vi .v I: Chapter One: The Collision of Armed Forces in the Desert 1 E I Chapter Two: Adjusting to A New but Still Dangerous World 23 \J List of Acronyms f 55 \J Select Bibliography 57 1 Index t c 61 ij. r ILLUSTRA TIONS a 1. AT ACMS Launching a Missile c 2. HIMARS 3. A Multiple-Launch Rocket System in Action

Cover Photograph: The MI09A6 (Paladin) 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer

All photographs are courtesy of the Field Artillery Magazine. CHAPTER ONE

THE COLLISION OF ARMED FORCES IN THE DESERT

Just as the extensive modernization endeavor that had been started in the 1970s to ~eepthe U.S. Army abreast of the numerically superi9r. and wen-equipped, Soviet-led :'"arsaw Pact threat and the lethality of the modern battlefield as demonstrated by the Arab-' 1 sraeli War of October 1973 was reaching fruition, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. ~esponding to Iraqi aggression, the United States and United Nations initiated Operation )~sert Shield in August 1990 to defend Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack and to force Iraq's ~lthdrawal from Kuwait.' Over a period of seven months, the U.S. Army deployed more than lYehundred thousand active and reserve component soldiers, their equipment, and their ;veaponsto Southwest Asia as part of a massive coalition military buildup.2 After Saddam Hussein failed to withdraw his forces from Kuwait by the 15 January 1991deadline established by President George H. Bush and supported by Congress and the Jnited Nations, coalition military forces launched Operation Desert Storm to drive Iraq out' )f Kuwait. A determined air campaign began on 17 January 1991 when eight AH-64 \pache attack helicopters of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) destroyed two Iraqi .~darfacilities with Hellfire laser-guided missiles to permit allied bombers to penetrate Iraqi lIr space more easily. Lasting through 23 February 1991, the air campaign systematically ~rippled Iraqi war-making capabilities by demolishing critical targets and neutralizing

------IFor extensive discussion on the modernization of the 1970s and 1980s see Paul H. ]erbert, Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of r:;'M 100-5, Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army ~ . --?nunand and General Staff College, 1988), John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to 1lrLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. \nny Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1984), John L. Romjue, The Army )/ Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the ~ --onunand Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army ~ --enter of Military History, 1997), Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The ~hirlwind War: The in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm ,Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995), Robert H. Scales, rr.,ed., Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the 2hief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), and Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991 (Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, 1994, reprinted by :heU.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003). 2Thirty-six nations participated in the coalition by committing ground, air, or naval forces. Of the thirty-six nations, the Arab allies (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates), the United Kingdom, France, and the United States contributed the most military forces. Turkey moved about 125,000 forces along its borders to deter a possible Iraqi attack. See Henry o. Malone, ed., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1992), p. 5, and "Forces Committed," Military Review, Sep 91, pp. 80-81, for details on the composition of the coalition forces. 2

Republican Guard units and other ground units? While the air campaign of January and February 1991 was shaping the battlefield for the ground war to follow, coalition ground forces prepared for combat. Over a period of three weeks beginning on 17 January 1991, the Army shifted two and approximately sixty-five thousand armored and support vehicles from defensive positions in eastern Saudi Arabia to a forward assembly area west of Hafar al Batin. This massive buildup put the Army in an excellent position for an aggressive offensive against Iraqi forces that were arrayed on the battlefield in three distinct echelons along the Soviet model. The fIrst echelon consisted of fifteen poorly trained, ill-disciplined, ineptly-led, and eclectically-equipped infantry divisions that stretched from the Persian Gulf Coast about two hundred miles inland. Behind these infantry divisions stood the second echelon of six regular armored divisions equipped with second-line Soviet armament and Third World systems that hampered command and control and logistical support. These divisions had the mission of conducting division-level counterattacks against any allied penetration. Forming the greatest threat, Republican Guard units composed the third echelon. Originally, an elite palace guard of two , the Republican Guards had grown to twenty-eight combat brigades by 1990 and possessed the most modem equipment of the Iraqi ground forces. Deployed well to the north, the Guard units were situated to serve as a strategic counterattack force and could be quickly withdrawn to Iraq if necessary to prevent their destruction.4 Throughout the air cal?paign, the buildup, and the shifting of forces, Army elements engaged Iraqi forces to deny the enemy information on the redistribution of allied forces and to protect friendly aircraft from hostile air defense sites. For example, on 17 January 1991 A Battery, 6-27th Field Artillery was moving westward along Tapline Road, a busy two-lane highway, without anticipating any combat action on its way to its tactical assembly area as part of the VII U.S. Corps movement. Around 1620 hours that day the battery received an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) fire mission to destroy surface-to-air missile sites in support of B-52 bombing raids. Several hours later after all of the essential coordination had been completed between the Army and the Air Force to ensure that friendly aircraft would not be in the flight path of an ATACMS that required a flight arc of approximately eighty thousand feet to reach a range of one hundred kilometers, the battery launched two missiles at 0042 hours on 18 January 1991 that destroyed two surface-to-air missile sites. Later that day, the same battery fired six more ATACMS to neutralize other surface-to-air missiles sites. These missions made A Battery, 6-27th Field Artillery the fIrst VII U.S. Corps

3Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 36-40, 108, 169-96, 214-36; Malone, ed., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 7-8; Scales, ed., Certain Victory, pp. 391- 93; Department of the Army (DA), Historical Summaryfor Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, p. 24; Schubert and Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, p. 268. 4Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 3, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC); Robert H. Scales, Jr., Firepower in Limited War, rev.ed., (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1995), pp. 246-56; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, p. 24. 3

I 5 ! unit to fire in anger since World War 11. , Over the next month, Army field artillery participated in other combat actions to pave the way for the ground war. During that time, field artillery units conducted numerous

i "shoot and scoot" raids to destroy high-payoff targets, such as surface-to-surface or surface-

I to-air missile sites, and to reduce the risk to friendly forces. The VII U.S. Corps and XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps frequently moved field artillery units into hostile territory where they I I could easily range high-payoff targets. Upon reaching hostile territory, the designated fuing batteries would unleash a few salvos and then immediately change positions to avoid enemy . field artillery fire, while a "silent battery" would remain ready to deliver fires on any enemy field artillery that dared to engage the raiding force. If such fire was not required, the" silent battery" would frre at the high-payoff target and depart quickly. When it became evident that Iraqi field artillery could not find them, the raiding batteries stayed in position and even closed their range to deliver killing fires on enemy forward positions, field artillery 6 emplacements, command posts, air defense facilities, and supply depots. On 13 February 1991 Band C Batteries, I-27th Field Artillery, a Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) unit assigned to the 42nd Field Artillery that supported the 1st Cavalry, 1st Infantry (Mechanized), and 3rd Armored Divisions during Operation Desert Storm, and A Battery, 21st Field Artillery (MLRS), 1st Cavalry Division participated in a typical field artillery raid under the control of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. During darkness, the three MLRS batteries lit up the night sky when they fired rockets on targets that had been generated from intelligence and targeting assets of the VII U.S. Corps and 1st Cavalry Division. At ranges of twenty-one to thirty kilometers, they engaged twenty-four 7 targets with almost three hundred rockets in less than five minutes. This action, in the words of the VII U.S. Corps, gave the batteries "valuable experience firing under combat 8 conditions" and prepared them for ground combat action to follow. Once the preparations that included field artillery raids and cross-border patrols into no-man's land and the buildup had been completed, the ground war opened on 24 February 1991. That day, American and Allied ground forces attacked along a line that stretched from the Persian Gulf westward about three hundred miles into the desert with the major thrusts coming on the flanks and a feint occurring in the center. On the extreme left flank of the line, the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps, composed of the 6th French Light Division, 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment,

5Report from A Btry, 6-27 FA, subj: Persian Gulf War, Oct 90-Apr 91, p. 2, HRDC; Memorandum for Maj Gen Raphael J. Hallada, subj: Diamond Brigade Desert Storm Comments and Results, 23 May 91, HRDC; Scales, Firepower in Limited War, p. 260 6Schubert and Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, pp. 164-65. 7Maj Mark S. Jensen, "MLRS in Operation Desert Storm," Field A rtillery Magazine, Aug 91, pp. 30-33; Memorandum for Cdr, 42nd Field Artillery Brigade, subj: History, 17 Mar 91, HRDC; Report, subj: 42nd Field Artillery Brigade Battle History, undated, HRDC; Memorandum, subj: 1-27 FA Operations in South West Asia, 5 Jun 91, p. 14, HRDC; Report, subj: Focusing Combat Power: The Role of the FA Brigade, 24 Mar 91, unpaginated, HRDC; Report, subj: Jayhawk, undated, p. 5, HRDC. 8Ibid. 4

and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and commanded by Lieutenant General Gary E. Luck, invaded deep into Iraq to isolate the enemy and to prevent reinforcements and reached the Euphrates River Valley within days after the offensive had started. Deployed on the right of the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps, the VII U.S. Corps, consisting of the 1st Armored Division, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st British Armored Division and led by Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., executed a massive wheeling maneuver north and east to encircle Iraqi forces and moved into a blocking position along the highway connecting Al Basrah and Kuwait City on 27 February 1991. In the meantime, the Joint Forces Command North composed of Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi Arabian military forces on the right of VII U.S. Corps and in the center of the Allied line pushed beyond the Kuwaiti-Saudi border barriers towards Wadi al Batin to deceive the enemy into believing that a frontal assault was underway and then turned eastward. To the right of the Joint Forces Command North on the extreme Allied right flank stood the U.S. Marines Central Command and the Joint Forces Command East respectively. As the Allies threatened amphibious landings along the coast, the 1st Brigade (Tiger) from the Army's 2nd Armored Division, the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions of the U.S. Marines Central Command, and Saudi forces from the Joint Forces Command East crossed the eastern part of Kuwait's southern border and drove towards Kuwait City. Within one hundred hours of the initial attacks on 24 February 1991, Allied ground forces, employing aggressive combined arms operations, routed Iraqi military forces and liberated Kuwait, causing the Allied coalition to halt all offensive operations on 28 February 1991 to end the war.9 Although it was a short war, Operation Desert Storm tested the impact of the Army's modernization effort. Doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel (DOTLM) designed during the 1970s and 1980s for combat against Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces produced a competent and well-equipped army as the Gulf War revealed. 10 In July 1991 just a few months after the fighting had ended, the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, issued "emerging observations" on field artillery doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel during the Gulf War in a report to the Director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 11 Despite a significant Iraqi advantage in the number of field artillery pieces, many of which had superior ranges to American field artillery, the Army's Field Artillery system of systems (target acquisition; command, control, communications, and computers; support and

9Friedman, Desert Victory, pp. 108, 169-96,214-36; Malone, ed., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 7-8; Schubert and Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, pp. 166-67, 173-205; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, pp. 24-25. lOScales, ed. Certain Victory, pp. 382-84; Malone, ed., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p. 67; Schubert and Kraus, ed., The Whirlwind War, pp. 201-05. . s/ 11Memorandum for Director of Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Ju191; Briefing, subj: Desert Storm Emerging Results, undated, HRDC. 5 sustainment; and weapons and munitions) furnished overpowering fire superiority with massed fITes, took away the enemy's ability to locate targets beyond the forWard line of troops, employed devastating fires to silence all of the enemy's field artillery and other indirect fire systems that ventured to fire, provided timely close support to maneuver commanders to allow them to move their forces with a minimum disruption from enemy fires, and cleared routes for friendly aircraft by engaging known and suspected anti-aircraft 12 sites. ' According to the Field Artillery School, Operation Desert Storm clearly underscored the value of the doctrine of massed fires. In an article published in Field Artillery Magazine in April 1991, David A. Rolston who had given up.command of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery in December 1990 after two years in command to become the Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School in January 1991 evaluated the impact of massed fires on enemy troops and equipment. He wrote, "Training prior to the deployment and the operation itself reinforced that the Army should not" dilute fire support by 'nickel and diming' the effort with fires on small and relatively insignificant targets. Hit the high-payoff targets with massed fires."l3 After the war Brigadier General (Retired) Paul F. Pearson who had served in various key positions in the Field Artillery School in the 1970s and General (Retired) Glenn K. Otis, the former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), concurred with Colonel Rolston's assessment. General Pearson and General Otis wrote that the massive use of field artillery fires paved the way for the rapid victory.14 The Americans and Allies employed fire support from field artillery "in Desert Storm to the maximum in order to minimize the number of effective enemy units that our soldiers in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles had to take on at close range." 15 In after action reports maneuver commanders expressed the similar thoughts about massed fITes. Writing the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada (1987-1991), about the breaching operation of the VII U.S. Corps on 24 February 1991, the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, Major General Thomas G. Rhame, related on 15 May 1991: The performance of the Field Artillery in combat has caused all of us to remember what we had perhaps forgotten, namely its incredible destructive power and shock effect. The preparation fires I witnessed prior to our assault

12Emailwith atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dee 03, p. 9, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, CALL, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Ju191, pp. 1- 2, HRDC. See Creighton W. Abrams, "The Gulf War and European Artillery," Journal of the Royal Artillery, Autumn 01, pp. 41-44, for the insights from a former field artillery commander in Operation Desert Storm about combat operations. l3Col David Rolston, "Victory Artillery in Operation Desert Shield," Field Artillery Magazine, Apr 91, p. 4. 14BrigGen (Ret) Paul F. Pearson and Gen (Ret) Glenn K. Otis, "Desert Storm Fire Support: Classic AirLand Battle Operations," Landpower Essay Series, AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, Jun 91, HRDC. IS/bid. 6

on the breachline was (sic) the most incredible sight I have seen in 27 years of service. The firepower generated by my DIVARTY [division artillery], the 42d, 75th and 142nd FA Bdes [brigades] and the artillery of the 1st British Armoured Division was truly awesome .... 16 General Rhame's thoughts about the impact of massed fires were understandable. Notwithstanding Urgent Fury of 1983 against the insurgents in Grenada and Just Cause of 1989 in Panama against Manual Noriega and his followers, the Army's last extensive fighting experience came in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s where fire support was generally decentralized at the battery level. To furnish fires for a particular maneuver unit's area of operations and to provide the maximum area coverage, the Army often sited a battery with its supported infantry battalion on a fire base within range of another fire base for mutual fire support. With a few exceptions this dispersed battlefield organization precluded massing fire on a target from a battalion of three batteries let alone a division artillery. Given this combat experience and the inability to replicate massed fires in peacetime training exercises at the Combat Training Centers, few Army officers, including Rhame, had ever witnessed massed fires until Operation Desert Storm and never really understood their influence before the war.17 Perhaps, the strongest endorsement about this impressive display of massed fires of 24 February 1991 came from the Commander of the VII U.S. Corps Artillery, Brigadier General Creighton Abrams, Jr., and the Commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Coronel Michael L. Dodson. In support of the VII U.S. Corps assault, General Abrams allocated the 42nd, 75th, and 142nd Field Artillery Brigades, two division , and ten MLRS batteries to create a Soviet-style attack at the breach area. General Abrams positioned approximately twenty-two artillery pieces for each kilometer of the attack zone. Prior to the attack, more than 350 field artillery pieces f!fed 11,000 rounds and 414 MLRS rockets in a field artillery preparation of thirty minutes. Besides crushing Iraqi morale, this massed fire destroyed 50 tanks, 139 armored personnel carriers, and 152 18 field artillery pieces. Accurate and deadly massed field artillery fires crushed the enemy, destroyed its will to fight, and permitted the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) to roll 19 virtually unopposed through the breach area. As the assault force moved forward to conduct the breach, there was no break in field artillery fire between the preparation and the fires in support of the movement. 20

16Memorandum for Maj Gen Raphael J. Hallada, Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Operation Desert Storm Thoughts, 15 May 91, HRDC. 17Ibid.; Maj Gen David E. Ott, Field Artillery: 1954-1973 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1975), pp. 38-49. 18Scales, ed., Certain Victory, p. 226. 19Memorandum for Maj Gen Rapael J. Hallada, CG, USAFACFS, subj: Diamond Brigade Desert Storm Comments and Results, 23 May 91, p. 13, HRDC; Cpt Richard A. Needham and Maj Russell Graves, "100 Hours with Light TACFIRE," Field Artillery ;JMagazine, Oct 91, pp. 30-33. 20Memorandum for Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery, subj: None, 25 Mar 91, HRDC. Colonel Dodson added his thoughts on the shock of massed fires that day. Reflecting. he reported in a memorandum on 25 March 1991 to the Commanding General of the VII U.S. Corps, General Franks, "This is likely the first time in military history that an artillery preparation for a deliberate breaching operation has been so comprehensive that not one soldier lost his life during the operation. ,,21 After noting that mass and speed characterized his division's field artillery actions throughout the brief war and the breaching operation in particular. Colonel Dodson addressed the real impact of fire support. He pointed out. "Following our artillery fires. not a single round of [enemy] artil1ery counterfrre was received. ,,22 As the 1st Armored Division Artillery observed after the war, massed fires against enemy indirect fire systems and close support of friendly maneuver forces reflected the VII U.S. Corps commander's intent. In numerous warfighter seminars and training exercises conducted prior to the war. commanders emphasized the key role of frrepower in defeating the enemy. "Pound them to jelly with frre support and then roll over them with maneuver" formed the core of their thinking?3 Command post exercises drilled battering the objective with fire support from air interdiction. close air support. attack helicopters. and field artillery 24 and following up with aggressive maneuver assaults. Headquarters. XVIll Airborne Corps artillery provided an equally compelling example of massed fires. After relative inactivity overnight. the corps renewed its attack early in the morning of 25 February 1991 with the 18th Field Artillery Brigade and the 6- 27th Field Artillery firing ten brigade volleys on a series of enemy targets, including field artillery. "The brilliant MLRS fires lit the sky and invigorated our soldiers as much as it disheartened the enemy," the corps artillery operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel PatrickC. Sweeney. reported.25 This firing broke the spirit of the enemy resistance. Interrogated Ira~i prisoners of war. when they were asked why they had surrendered. pled. "no more rockets." 6 One captured enemy officer also related the impact of the field artillery fires that day. He stated that his battery fued a mission and that only moments later dual-purpose improved conventional munition bomblets rained down on his position, destroying most of his weapons and killing two thirds of his soldiers. He then shared. "The remainder of his soldiers immediately deserted their guns.,,27 One day later on 26 February 1991, the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade commanded by Colonel Morris J. Boyd described another example of massing fires in the VII Corps sector. "~C?: advance continued at a brisk pace through the day meeting with only scattered.

21Ibid. 22Ibid. 23Memorandum with Appendices for Director (Dir), Fire Support and Combined Anus Operations Department (FSCAOD). subj: USAFAS Historical Document. 2 Ju191. Appendix 1, HRDC. 24Ibid. 25Memorandum for Record, subj: Chronicle of XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery Activity during Operation Desert Storm, 2 May 1991, p. 9, HRDC. 26Ibid. 27Ibid. 8

generally uncoordinated resistance," Colonel Boyd and Randy Mitchell, an assistant 28 operations officer for the brigade, wrote. At dusk the situation abruptly changed. The 3rd Armored Division, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) smashed headlong into elements of three Iraqi armored units. "In a furious night battle that followed the Brigade found its assets heavily committed," Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell reported?9 The brigade's 3-20th Field Artillery and the 2-29th Field Artillery massed fires from their self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers continuously in support of the self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers of the 2-82nd Field Artillery, the 4-82nd Field Artillery, and 2-3rd Field Artillery of the 3rd Armored Division, while the brigade's I-27th Field Artillery, a MLRS unit, provided rocket fires in a general support role. By dawn of27 February 1991, the triple punch of close air, accurate and timely massed field artillery fITes, and aggressive maneuver broke the back of the Iraqi forces in the VII U.S. Corps sector.30 An after action report of the 2-17thField Artillery of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade commanded by Colonel Floyd T. Banks and attached to the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps expressed comparable thoughts about massed fire. On the evening of 27 February 1991, the 2-18th Field Artillery and the 2-17th Field Artillery of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade and the 3-27th Field Artillery of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery received an emergency fire mission from the division's lead brigade that was receiving incoming fire from the Hamurabi Republican Guard Force Command (RGFC). The three field artillery mass~d fires on elements of the Hamurabi RGFC and caused enemy resistance to collapse.31 The operations officer of the 2-18th Field Artillery, Captain Alfred K. Grey II, furnished an even more descriptive account of that particular fight. As his unit was moving north in support of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the division's lead elements began receiving incoming fITefrom the Hamurabi Republican Guards, forcing the division to respond. "We were the first unit in the 212th Brigade ... to engage the target," Captain Grey 32 recalled. He elucidated, "Within 2 minutes and 10 seconds, we occupied hasty frring positions and fired our first volley. Our fITes,massed with 2/17 FA and 3/27 FA on enemy armor and infantry positions caused mass casualties and a collapse of enemy resistance. ,,33 MLRS rockets, eight-inch howitzer rounds, and 155-mm. howitzer rounds wiped out the enemy forces. 34 Articles written by other Operation Desert Storm participants in the Field Artillery Magazine reached the same conclusion about the consequence of massed fires. In August 1991 Major Mark S. Jensen of the I-27th Field Artillery of the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade

28Report, subj: Focusing Combat Power, 13 Apr 91, p. 8, HRDC. 29Ibid. 30Ibid. 31Memorandum for Cdr, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, subj: Chronicle of2-18 FA Activity During Operation Desert Storm, 17 Jun 91, part of Memorandum for G3, III Corps Artillery, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 20 Jun 91, HRDC. 1'. 32Ibid. 33Ibid. 34Ibid. 9 said that his battalion repeatedly massed MLRS rockets on enemy formations in support of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), or the 3rd35 Armored Division to defeat the enemy decisively during the course of the ground war. Major Kenneth P. Graves of the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps artillery that had the 1-201st Field Artillery of the West Virginia , the 1-181st Field Artillery of the Tennessee Army National Guard, and the 1-623rd Field Artillery of the Kentucky36 Army National Guard as subordinate units also reaffirmed the effect of massed fires. In the October 1991 edition of Field Artillery Magazine, Major Graves narrated, "On the final day [of the war], the 18th and 212th FA [Field Artillery] Brigades and the 24th Infantry Division Artillery massed nine battalions in a devastating early morning preparation to destroy the Hammurabi RGFC Armored Division. ,,37In light of these critiques and others, the Field Artillery School confidently briefed senior field artillery officers at a training seminar after the war "that massed fues are devastating. ,,38 As field artillery officers explained in after action reports, massed fires provided counterfire and close support in Operation Desert Storm in accordance with accepted doctrine. Developed by Major General David E. Ott while he was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 1973 to 1976 and codified in Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations (1976) as a vital part of the modernization effort to make the Army more effective in a high-intensity war in Europe, fire support doctrine gave a single individual the authority to manage all field artillery fires in a corps. The force commander had the prerogative of employing corps and division artillery in the more important battle __counterfire to neutralize or suppress enemy indirect fire systems or close support to minimize friendly casualties by furnishing effective and responsive fues to the designated maneuver commander -- depending upon the circumstances. The new fire support doctrine centralized command and control of field artillery fires more than previously, permitted field artillery resources to be directed more effectively than in the past against the gravest threat, and ended the confusing practice of dividing counterbattery work 39 among the corps, the division, and even the direct support battalion. In October 1991 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Fred F. Marty (1991-1993), published an article in Field Artillery Magazine after personally reviewing after action reports about the effectiveness of counterfire in the Gulf War. Firefinder radars rapidly identified targets and sent the data digitally or verbally to the guns.4o Cannon and MLRS assets then silenced Iraqi artillery by delivering "convincing" fires. Other field artillery officers made similar assessments about counterfue. In July 1991 the 1st Armored Division Artillery related, "In particular, we relied on the MLRS as

35Jensen, "MLRS in Operation Desert Storm," pp. 30-34. 36Maj Kenneth P. Graves, "Steel Rain -- XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery in Desert Storm," Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 91, pp. 49-56; "Field Artillery Commanders and Sergeants Major," Field Artillery Magazine, Dec 91, pp. 29-32. 37Graves, "Steel Rain," p. 52. 38Briefing, subj: Desert Storm Emerging Results, undated, HRDC. 39Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, pp. 4-5. 4~arty, "FA on Target in the Storm," p. 1. 10

the primary counterfire weapon system and in this role we were able to effectively silence all enemy artillery that frred at us. ,,41The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) likewise reported, "Artillery gunnery ... synchronized delivery of fires and effectively denied the enemy the freedom to maneuver while protecting the Victory Division's capability to do so [with counterfrre]. ,,42In a brief report on 13 April 1991, Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell of the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade assigned to XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps noted that the brigade found its assets heavily engaged in a furious night battle on 26 February 1991. During the battle, the brigade's field artillery battalions provided "rocket fires against the Iraqi [maneuver and field artillery] formations. Iraqi's (sic) came to refer to these devastatlng. roc k et b arrages as'Ir onR. mn.",43 One week later, the intelligence officer for the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade wrote further about that particular battle. He clarified, "On the night of 26 Feb 91, the Tawakalna Mech was destroyed by the 3ad [Armored Division]. 42d FA [Field Artillery] fired in support of the battle and effectively suppressed or destroyed at least 60 tubes of artillery based on the estimated amount the enemy had in the area. ,,44The officer then added, "The fact that the AH-64s received little AAA [antiaircraft artillery] or ADA [air defense artillery] ... again indicates artillery success .... An EPW [enemy prisoner of war] captured in the area, wounded with MLRS shrapnel, stated, 'Please stop the iron rain. ",45The intelligence officer concluded, "The absence of enemy artillery ... throughout the war indicates the effectiveness of US artillery. _... Friendly direct fire units were never hampered by enemy artillery throughout the war. ,,46 Meanwhile, other field artillery officers reflected on counterfire. The Commander of the 210th Field Artillery Brigade attached to VII U.S. Corps, Colonel Garrett D. Bourne, wrote in an after action report on 1 April 1991, "On 26 February 1991 ... C/4-27 FA received many counterfire targets from the Q-37 radars. MLRS proved to be indispensable in engaging the enemy out to great distances, allowing the maneuver units to become decisively engaged. ,,47Briefing participants of the Field Artillery Conference in March 1992 at the Field Artillery School, the Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, quoted from a 212th Field Artillery Brigade report about the significance of counterfrre. On 26 February 1991 a Firefinder Q-36

41Memorandum for Dir, FSCAOD, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 2 Jul 91, HRDC. 42Memorandum for GS, 24th ID (M), subj: Historical Narrative of the 24 Divarty Actions in Operation Desert Storm, undated, HRDC. 43Report, subj: 42nd Field Artillery Brigade: Operation Desert Storm, 13 Apr 91, p. 8, HRDC. 44Memorandum for Record, subj; Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine, Tactics, and Techniques, 20 Apr 91, HRDC. 45Ibid. 46Ibid. 47Memorandum for VII (U.S.) Corps Artillery, G-3 Operations, subj: Summary of Significant Events for the 210th Field Artillery Brigade during Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991 to 10 March 1991, 1 Apr 91, HRDC. 11 radar of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade located enemy field artillery. Imm~diately, three battalions responded with dual-purpose improved munitions to neutralize the enemy's field artillery.48 Along the same lines the 1st Armored Division Artillery discussed counterfire's compelling contribution to the war. It recorded, "In its first combat test, the MLRS performed superlatively .... In particular, we relied on the MLRS as the primary counterfire weapon system and in this role we were able to effectively silence all enemy artillery that fired against US.,,49Fighting as part of VII U.S. Corps, the division's field artillery fired a 15 minute preparation of 192 MLRS rockets and 720 155-mm. rounds against 24 targets on 26 February 1991. When VII U.S. Corps subsequently attacked, 1st Armored Division Artillery and other field artillery units repeatedly shifted fires to engage enemy field artillery to permit the maneuver forces to advance. On the afternoon of 27 February 1991 in one counterfire engagement, the 1st Armored Division's field artillery fired 288 MLRS rockets and 480 eight-inch rounds at 21 enemy field artillery positions in two hours. On the average, American counterfire engaged enemy field artillery of the Medinah Division of the Republican Guard Army within six minutes after the enemy guns had been acquired by a Firefinder Q-36 or Q-37 radar that day. Battle damage assessment after the war credited field artillery units with destroying seventy enemy field artillery tubes or their crews during 'this particular counterfire fight. 50 In the meantime, the 3rd Armored Division's field artillery and reinforcing field artillery repeatedly massed counterfire on 26 February 1991. Supporting the 3rd Armored Division's second brigade, the 4-82nd Field Artillery and the 3-20th Field Artillery of the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade engaged enemy bunker complexes early in the evening to permit the maneuver arms to continue their advance with minimal resistance. Later, a Q-36 radar acquired active enemy indirect fire systems that were subsequently destroyed by counterfire from the division's field artillery. Shortly after this action, a Q-36 radar located more enemy field artillery, and "three battalions, the 2-3 FA, 2-29 FA, and 1-27 FA [all from the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade], massed fires to silence the enemy artillery.,,51 On 31 March 1992 at a Field Artillery Conference at the Field Artillery School, General McCaffery and the 212th Field Artillery Brigade underscored the overriding significance of counterfire on the ground war. General McCaffery said, "First priority of FA [field artillery] is to win the counterfire battle.,,52The 212th Field Artillery Brigade pointed

48Briefing, subj: Operation Desert Storm: Looking into the Future, 31 Mar 92, HRDC. 49Memorandum for Dir, FSCAOD, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 2 Ju191, HRDC. 5~emorandum with Appendices for Dir, FSCAOD, subj: USAFAS Historical Report, 2 Ju191, Appendix 1, HRDC. 513rd Armored Division Artillery, Historical Summary, Operation Desert Storm, Phases III, IV, and V (24-28 Feb 91), HRDC. Also see Memorandum for Dir, FSCAOD, USAFAS, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 15 Ju191, HRDC, for additional information on unit assignment. 52Briefing, subj: Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future, 31 Mar 92, HRDC. 12

out, "On 26 Feb 91, Iraqi D-30 howitzers frred adjusting rounds at TF [Task Force] 4-64 AR [Armored]. 2-17 FA's Q36 was in position. Three battalions responded with DPICM [dual- purpose improved conventional munition] to the acquisition. We did not experience the power of artillery -- They did. ,,53 After reviewing after action reports, the Field Artillery School concurred with General McCaffery's and the 212th Field Artillery Brigade's conclusions about the efficacy of counterfrre. In a supportive appraisal of counterfrre doctrine, the school noted, "The most important lesson here is that an aggressive proactive CB [counterbattery] policy pays tremendous dividends. ,,54The school then noted, "The Firefinder family of radars was invaluable in detecting targets [indirect frre systems] and adjusting fire onto hostile positions [field artillery].,,55 As decisive as counterfrre was, shifting massed frres around the battlefield to furnish close support to the maneuver arms also played a pivotal role and reinforced the importance of the fire support team (FIST) created in the 1970s to coordinate close air support, naval gunfire, mortars, and field artillery for the maneuver commander. If it functioned as intended, close support supplied by the FIST would provide the maneuver commander with frre support when and where he needed it. Along with counterfire, proactive and responsive close support would permit the friendly maneuver forces to make contact with the less effective enemy forces.56 Many field artillery officers observed frrsthand the impact of close support. In a draft article on the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's operations during the war, Major John Klemencic and Captain John Thomson discussed the unit's fire support plan in detail as part of the VII U.S. Corps' offensive. Prior to the war, the regimental commander outlined attacking with two cavalry squadrons abreast and one ground squadron in reserve. The squadrons would be led by the regiment's aviation squadron that would attempt to stay about twenty kilometers ahead of the main body. The commander wanted to locate the enemy at the greatest distance possible with aviation and then to attack with close air support. When the regiment moved in closer, he intended to engage the enemy with MLRS, then cannon, and then direct fire weapons. On 24-26 February 1991 the regiment's field artillery repeatedly shifted massed frres to hit dismounted infantry and attack Iraqi field artillery after it had been acquired by Q-37 radars. During the battles of those days which included the Battle for 73 Basting where the 6-41st Field Artillery of the 210th Field Artillery Brigade shot over seven hundred rounds at enemy targets in a direct support role to the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the commander of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment followed his plan of engagement for the most part. He fought the close fight with cannon and direct fire weapons and employed MLRS and close air support to fight the deep

53Ibid. 54Report, subj: Artillery Lessons of the Gulf War, undated, unpaginated, HRDC. 55Report, subj: The Rattle in the Storm, undated, in Memorandum for Dir, FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 Jul 91, HRDC. f~ 55Ibid. 56Briefing, subj: Operation Desert Storm, Looking into the Future, 31 Mar 92, HRDC; Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, pp. 6-7. 13 battle. Reflecting upon its overall combat action in the Gulf, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's unit history applauded friendly field artillery for furnishing responsive and effective close support. 57 On the morning of 26 February 1991, the 1st Armoredpivision underVII U.S. Corps experienced the same kind of close fire support. The division approached Al Busayyah and then turned towards the Medinah Division of the Republican Guards situated about one hundred kilometers to the east. As the division closed within fifty kilometers of the Medinah's main position, the division's intelligence (G-2) officer identified an enemy blocking position and sent the information to the division's field artillery that then struck with MLRS rockets. The same intelligence officer later picked up a second blocking position approximately fifteen kilometers after the frrst. Again, the division's field artillery bombarded the enemy with MLRS rockets. Specifically, the 4-27th Field Artillery in support of the 1st Armored Division recorded in an after action report about massing fires on numerous occasions on 26 and 27 February 1991 in support of the maneuver forces. With support from 8-inch and 155-mm. self-propelled howitzers, massed MLRS fires, called "Firestrike" by the battalion, attacked sixty-five annored vehicles on 27 Febmary 1991 and neutralized about fifty percent of them as attested by Apache helicopters58 that attacked the vehicles afterwards and saw twenty-five to thirty of them burning. The 3-20th Field Artillery of the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade described comparable action on 26 February 1991. After linking up with the 3rdArmored Division andreceiving a reinforcing mission to support the division's 4-82nd Field Artillery, the 3-20th Field Artillery moved east towards Iraqipositions. Once the division had made contact with the enemy, it stopped and called for field artillery fires. In support of the division's field artillery, the 3- 20th Field Artillery opened up fire from its self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers. Following this attack of over one thousand rounds, close air support from A-10s and attack helicopters hit the enemy. 59 As might be expected, other field artillery officers furnished similar appraisalsabout the effectiveness of close support. The 2-29th Field Artillery Battalion of the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade recounted providing many battalion massed fires on the evening of 26 February 1991 in support of the 3rd Armored Division in the vn U.S. Corps sector. Following the war, the 2-29th Field Artillery recorded, "The battle raged throughout the

57 j John Klemencic and Cpt John Thomson, "Fire Support for the Corps Covering Ma Force: A Desert Storm Perspective," undated, draft article, pp. 4-11, HRDC; Report, subj: Second Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1990-1991, pp. 1-6, HRDC; Memorandum with End for Cdr, subj: 210th Field Artillery Brigade's Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned, 17 Jun 91, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: Historical Narrative of 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment's Role in the Campaign to Liberate Kuwait, 23-28 February 1991, 3 Mar 91, HRDC. 58Memorandumfor FSCAOD, subj: USAF AS Historical Report, 2 Jul 91, HRDC; Memorandum for 42 FA Brigade, subj: 4-27 FA Battle Report, 24 Feb-04 Mar 91, in Memorandum for Dir, FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 Jul 91, HRDC. 59Report, subj: The Rattle in the Storm, undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Dir, FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 Jul 91, HRDC. ~eport, subj: Combat Historical Summary, undated, HRDc 61Memorandum for G3, 24th Infantry Division, subj: Historical Narrative of 2 DivArty Actions in Operation Desert Storm, undated, HRDC. J 62Memorandum for Commander, USAFAS, subj: 210th Field Artillery Brigade'l Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned, 17 lun 91, HRDC. 63Report, subj: A/6-27 FA Persian Gulf War, Oct 90-Apr 91, p. 14, HRDC. 64Ibid. 65Marty, "FA On Target in the Storm," p. 1. 66USAFAS, Field Artillery Desert Facts, p. 2, HRDC. 15

l05-mm., and 155-mm., and eight-inch rounds.67 ReUecting upon this contribution from a ~aneuver commander's perspective, General McCaffrey wrote, "All of us appreciate the .re~endous contribution of the artillery. Our enormous success was due, in large part to the ~lllery. The success of your counterfire limited our casualties. ,,68 On another occasion on 1March 1992, General McCaffrey said, "Field Artillery is the dominant combat force on the battlefield. Commanders must understand how to plan, synchronize, and deliver its firepower.,,69 '. Although General McCaffrey and other Army officers praised the Field Artillery for itsImpressive performance in Desert Storm 210th Field Artillery Brigade wisely cautioned agalnst . such unabashed exuberance. In a memorandum' to General Hallada on 17 June 1991, theunit recorded, "The success of the 210th FA [Field Artillery] BDE [brigade] in this war 7as phenomenal. The soldiers were justifiably proud of their accomplishments. But let's not orget that combined arms tactics and doctrine really won the war .... Outstanding fire SUpportexecution was the culmination of strenuous training with the maneuver unit. ,,70 J) As counterfire and close support with massed fires suggested during Operation esert Storm, the Army's field artillery had fundamentally sound doctrine and performed Well.The integration of target acquisition systems; command, control, communications, and C?mputer systems; support and sustainment systems; and munitions and weapon systems SIlencedenemy field artillery and indirect fire systems and permitted the maneuver arms to advance relatively unscathed. Such a performance in Operation Desert Storm validated fire SUpport doctrine contained in Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support for Combined Arms ~~rations (1983), that was the Field Artillery's capstone "how-to-fight" manual and the 71 aSICreference for fire support planning and coordination. J) Although it highlighted existing strengths with fire support doctrine, Operation esert Storm concurrently reinforced the pre-war concerns held by many field artillery Officersabout equipment and weapon deficiencies. Many field artillery systems lacked the 72 speed, mobility, and ranges required for the modernbattlefield. Of the major field artillery systems, the M981 FIST vehicle received the most trenChant criticism from field artillerymen. During the Gulf War, the M981 lacked sufficient tnobility to stay abreast of the fa~ter M 1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley fighting vehicle and ------67Memorandum with Encls for Cmdt, USAF AS, subj: Desert Storm Rounds Fired, 20 Aug 91, HRDC. 68USAFAS, Field Artillery Desert Facts, p. 3, HRDC. 69Briefing, subj: Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future, 31 Mar 92, HRDC. 7~emorandum with Encl for Cdr, USAFAS, subj: 210th Field Artillery Brigade's Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned, 17 Jun 91, HRDC. 7lDastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, p. 3. 72Memorandum to Officer in Charge (OIC), Weapons Systems Combat Performance Assessment Team, Army Material Command Forward, subj : Summary of Trends, Observations and Soldier Recommendations on Weapon Systems Combat Performance, 1 May 91, p. 31, ODS MPRI File Box, HRDC; John L. Romjue,AmericanArmy Doctrinefor the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine, Command, 1997), p. 65...... 1 16 I

therefore validated pre-war concerns.73 In their draft. article about fire support dU~ I Operation Desert Storm, Major KIemencic and Captain Thomson wrote, "The FISTY [Fl, Vehicle] ... is slow and unreliable. The [2nd Armored Cavalry] Regimental Command and the SqUadf.on Commander were cognizant of this problem and stressed not running J and leaving the fire supporters.,,74 . .

On 2 July 1991 the 1st Armored Division Artillery addressed the same issue. 1 commented, "The [M98 I] ... is based on the old M 113 family of vehicles and is not suitab! for keeping up with the current M I Abrams and M2I3 Bradley fleet of maneuver vehicles.! supports.. In the future, ,,75 we need a fire support vehicle that can move as fast as the maneuver unitsII..

Along the same line the Ist Cavalry Division Artillery wrote about its experien , C with the vehicle during the war. It explained, "During Desert Shield training and actIJl, combat operations, the FISTV could not physically keep up with the sleeker MI and ~ even When they slowed down their pace signiflcantly."7 The offensive orientation ~ Operation Desert Storm built around AirLand Battle's doctrine of speed and maneu" clearly reinforced the obsolescence of the FISTV and the need for a Bradley-based FlSl vehicle as advocated by the former Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Majd General Donald R. Keith (1976-1977), as early as 1976-1977.77 I Likewise, the war demonstrated the limited mobility of the Fireflnder Q_36 and Q-3 radars, the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFlRE), the M 198 towed 155-mm. howitzd used by the Army and the Marine Corps, and the M109A2IA3 155-mm. self-propellel howitzer. Mounted on old five-ton trucks, Fireflnder radars and TACFIRE had difflculti~ keeping up with the maneuver arms. To overcome this limitation, some field artillery uni~ loaded their TACFIRE shelters, Fireflnder radar shelters, and generators on Heavy Expandel Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMMTs) to give them better cross country mobility and mo~ speed. Also, in some instances, M109A2IA3 units could not support task forces becaus~ they could not stay abreast of the faster maneuver forces, while the M198 was slow te d'IISP ace, 78

73Brieflng, subj: Operation Desert Storm, Looking into the Future, 31 Mar 92 HRDC. I 74Klemencic and Thomson, "Fire Support for the Corps Coveting Force," p. 6, HRDC. I 75Memorandum with Encls for Dir, FSCAOD, USAF AS, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 2 Jul 91, Appendix 5, HRDC. I 76Memorandum with Encls for Brig Gen Franks, Asst Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 27 Jun 91, Encl 2, HRDC; Memorandum with Encls fot Cmdt, USAF AS, subj: Ist Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned, 14 Au8 91, HRDC. Note: Both documents have the quote. See 77 Footnote Above; Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, pp. 7-8. Email 78 with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dee 03, pp. 35-36, HRDC; Report. subj: 3rd Armored Division Artillery After Action Review Comments, undated, HRDC; Memorandum for CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, subj: Operation Desert Storm After Actio~ Report, 22 Mar 91, HRDC; Memorandum for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: 1st Cavalry DiViSiO~1 The range inferiority of the Army's field artillery in relation to Iraqi field artillery

I ~ls~alarmed many field artillery officers and soldiers. Although the MLRS performed well :~nIts first combat test and was accurate and lethal, the system lacke~ s~~cien~ range.7~In i~ct, Colonel Vollney B. Corn, Jr. who commanded the 1st Armored DIVISionartIllery dunng I peration Desert Storm and Captain Richard A. Lacquemont who was the assistant Ioperations officer of the 1st Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm outlined the ! Consequencesof the MLRS's range of thirty kilometers. Four Iraqi cannon systems and two 1l1l~ltiplerocket launcher systems had longer rangers than MLRS. "In the hands of a better I traInedand more intelligent foe, these [Iraqi] systems could have made it extremely difficult I for Us in the counterartillery (sic) battle," they related in an article in Field Artillery 80 i Magazine in October 1991. I In June 1991 the 210th Field Artillery Brigade made a similar observation about the I MLRS. It reported, "During the VII (U.S.) Corps' offensive covering force operations, 2 "~CR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] air scouts often identified high payoff targets at ranges I eYondthe current MLRS range. These targets were often engaged by CASIAI [close air ~l!P~ortJairinterdiction] or helicopters when sorties were available and weather permitted. ,,81 . ;. V~e:,of this example and their experiences with MLRS, commanders from the 1st Cavalry . IVlslonArtillery, the 1st Armored Division Artillery, the 21OthField Artillery Brigade, and ~LRS units recommended extending the system's range from thirty kilometers to fifty kilometers to provide standoff capabilities that would be critical for success and to stay abreast of likely improvements in international field artillery systems. With a range of tWenty-three kilometers, the M109A2/A3 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer was also easily O~trangedby conventional and extended-range munitions fired by Iraqi cannon artillery. To elllninate this stark imbalance, future cannons required ranges of forty kilometers with Conventional munitions and fifty kilometers with extended-range munitions. Without rocket andcannon field artillery systems with longer ranges than the enemy's indirect fire systems, standoff capabilities would be sacrificed; and counterfire would be seriously compromised. 82

------Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned, 14 Aug 91, HRDC; Report, subj: Desert Shield/Storms Lessons Learned, undated, HRDC; Memorandum for OIC, Weapon Systems Combat Performance Team, Army Material Command Forward, subj: Summary of Trends, Observations and Soldier Recommendations on Weapon Systems Combat Performance, 1 May 91, p. 33, ODS MPRI File Box, HRDC. 79ColVollney B. Corn, Jr., and Cpt Richard A. Lacquemont, "Silver Bullets," Field A.rtillery Magazine, Oct 91, p. 10. 80Ibid., p. II. 81Memorandum for Cdr, USAFAS, subj: 210th FA Brigade's Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned, 17 Jun 91, HRDC. 82Memorandum for OIC, Weapon Systems Combat Performance Assessment Team, Army Material Command Forward, subj: Summary of Trends, Observations and Soldier Itecommendations on Weapon Systems Combat Performance, 1 May 91, p. 36, ODS MPRI Bile Box, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, USAFAS, subj: 210th FA Brigade's Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned, 17 Jun 91, HRDC; Memorandum for Dir, BSCAOD, USAFAS, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 2 Ju191, HRDC; Memorandum

I L 18

Besides the recognition of the requirement for longer ranges, another significaJ lesson of Operation Desert Storm focused on the need for more fuepower. Given tIl importance of MLRS, a battery of nine launchers in the division could be overworked if nd simply overwhelmed by the demands of supporting the entire division and could not depenl upon having the corps. artillery's MLRS battalion available when it was needed. 11 eliminate this problem some field artillery officers with Combat experience in the GillfW~ favored equipping division artillery with a 'battalion of twenty-seven MLRS launchers ~ replace the battery of nine MLRS launchers. This would increase firepower, permit rotatilll fire missions among a greater number of MLRS launchers, and allow 'conductini mamtenance. an d' restmg t h e crew. 83 . In addition to increasing the number of MLRS launchers in the division, some fie!O artillery commanders wanted more cannon artillery in the division. For example, till commander of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery, Colonel Dodson, advocated making l\I'~ additional cannon battalions organic to the division.. This would give the divisio~ commander five cannon battalions (120 cannons) and sufficient fire support to conduci "most operations without further augmentation. ,,84 .' Field artillery officers with experience at the corps also espoused more canno O artillery as the commander of the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade, Colonel Boyd, urged. In:Jll insightful memorandum he wrote, "We can make up for a shortage of artillery by focusinl what you do have at the right place and right time, but it isn't easy. ,,85More field artilleri would make providing fire support easier.86 While it was the overwhelming munition of choice for commanders and wa! devastatingly effective, the dud rate of DPICM also raised serious concerns.87 During the war, unexploded DPICM bomblets from cannon and MLRS systems formed hazardoU! minefields and created a significant battlefield hazard for friendly maneuver forceS, especiall y in soft sand. For example, a MLRS fue mission of twelve rockets, each containing, 644 bomblets with an allowable dud rate of 2.5 percent, would produce a minefield of abo , ul two hundred armed and deadly destructive munitions. DPICM dud minefields hindereD movement, compelled maneuver forces to alter their routes, and led to some injuries anD' for Cmdt, USAF AS, subj: Ist Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned, 14 Aug 91, HRDC; Com and Lacquemont, "Silver Bullets," Oct 91, pp. 11-12. Ibid 83 ., p. 12; Interview, Dastrup with Brig Gen Howard 1. von Kaenel, former 82no, Airborne Division Artillery Commander, 28 and 31 Aug 92, HRDC; Memorandum fof, Cmdt, subj: 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned, 14 Aug 91. HRDC. I 84Memorandum for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Artillery for the Heavy Division, 5 Sep 9I. HRDC. 85Memorandum for Record, subj: Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine, Tactics, and Techni~ues, 20 Apr 91, HRDC. 6Ibid. 87Memorandum for Cdr, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), subj: AAR Comments, Operation Desert Storm, 15Mar 91, HRDC; Report, subj: Artillery Lessons of the Gulf War, , undated, HRDC. PJ

deaths to friendly forces.88 In an after action report, Colonel Boyd a~d Captajn Mitchell e~Plicit1yexplained the conundrum. "DPICM showed itself to be a 'two-edge sword.' While thISmunition was very effective against enemy targets, there were at times large numbers of ~neXPloded'bomb lets' left littering the area that maneuver (and subsequently support units) ad to cross," they noted.89 . As critical as a decreased DPICM dud' rate, increased firepower, and improved mobility were, Operation Desert Storm revealed another significant deficiency. Wire conununications tied existing field artillery systems together to limit their freedom of . movement. Based upon the growing significance of smart, precision, and wide-area ~Unitions that would increase the vulnerability of all combat systems throughout the attlefield, future field artillery systems required the ability to operate autonomously and to move freely without being tethered to wire communications. Shoot and scoot capabilities, 90 el1lergingwith MLRS, were required for all field artillery weapons systems. Another technological problem also shed light on a limitation of the Total Army ~oncept and its implementation. Prior to the war, Army National Guard field artillery units acked TACFIRE and had to rely upon manual tactical and technical fire direction methods that were slow and subject to human error. As Captain RichardA. Needham and Major. Russell Graves of the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade of the Arkansas Army National Guard eXplainedafter the war, "Until mobilization, the brigade had strictly manual TOCs [tactical Operational centers]. Rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, with the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 3d Armored Cavalry ~egiment (ACR) had uncovered a serious flaw in the Army's Total Force concept. Manual .OCs don't have a place in the digital realm. Heavy TACFIRE-equipped units don't have the hl1leor assets to interface with manual TOCs. ,,91 S To be sure, Captain Needham and MajorGraves touched upon an important issue. Ome of the modernization of the 1970s and 1980s had not yet reached the reserve components as part of the Total A,rmy concept. In this particular instance, Army National Guard field artillery units still employed manual technical and tactical fIfe direction methods Onthe eve of Operation Desert Storm and had to search frantically for Light TACFIRE sYstemsbefore deploying to the Gulf to give them automated fire direction capabilities and the ability to function as a team with active component field artillery units equipped with TACFIRE. Even though the contractor found sufficient numbers of Light TACFIRE to ------88Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 40, HRDC; Report, subj: 42nd Field Artillery Brigade Desert Shield/Storms Lessons Learned, undated, HRDC; Memorandum with Ends for Dir, FSCAOD, subj: USAFAS Historical Report, 2 Jul 91, appendix 8, HRDC. The hazard of unexploded DPICM was previously known to exist when firing it into soft snow. 89Report; subj: Focusing Combat Power, p. 6, 13 Apr 91, HRDC. 90Ltrwith atch, Dastrup to Maj Gen Fred Marty, 10 Sep 03, p. 41, HRDC; Email with ateh, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 41, HRDC; Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, p. 65. 91CptRichard A. Needham and Maj Russell Graves, "100 Hours with Light l'ACFIRE," Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 91, pp. 30-31. b 20

. properequip Army training. National92 Guard field artillery units, the rushed fielding schedules hindered

Although Operation Desert Storm highlighted this particular deficiency in the Total Army, it also corroborated the magnitude of the reforms of the past twenty years and generated lessons to guide future developments. Based upon combat operations, active and reserve component field artillery units confirmed the Validity of AirLand Battle fire siIppo~ doctrine by providing effective and responsive massed fires in the form of counterfire and, close support, while the performance of new systems, such as MLRS and ATACMS" reaffirmed the wisdom of the aggressive acquisition programs of the 1970s and'l980s. I Nevertheless, combat operations also underscored notable materiel deficiencies thai, required correcting. To prevent being outranged by enemy field artillery in the future as they had been in the Gulf War, field artillery cannon, rocket, and missile weapon systems needed greater ranges. Of equal importance, field artillery systems required better mobility and speed to stay abreast of the maneuver arms and the capability of operating autonomously to avoid fire from enemy indirect fire systems, while the dud rate of DPICM had to be reduced I to an acceptable level. To ensure firepower superiority on the future battlefield, modernization had to continue and eliminate any existing equipment deficiencies.

92/bid.; Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 42, HRDC. l 21

ATACMS Launching a Missile, courtesy Field Artillery Magazine 22

HIMARS, courtesy Field Artillery Magazine CHAPTER TWO

ADJUSTING TO A NEW BUT STILL DANGEROUS WORLD

Late in the 1980s, the U.S. Army anticipated that military funding and personnel ~tr~ngthwould decline gradually in the coming decade as they had been doing since the .eIghtof the military buildup in 1985 during the Reagan Administration and that they would ~t1uencethe pace of modernization. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of ennany, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991, however, demolished the Cornerstoneof American foreign policy of defending Western Europe from a Soviet Union andWarsaw Pact military invasion, shattered the need for stationing a large military force ~ere, and undermined the rationale for maintaining a large military establishment to guard

I .S.national security. This unexpected and sudden end of the Cold War prompted Congress ,toslash the military's budget and personnel strength precipitously in the 1990s and caused I~heU.S.military to develop a new strategy to reflect the current and the future domestic and ~temational political environment and the proliferation of advanced weapon technology. I Orthe Army the new international order meant implementing the lessons of the Gulf War' ,againstthe backdrop of an uncertain military threat and declining funding and personnel strength. IS Published in January 1992 by the United States military leadership, the New Military 't trategy shaped American defense policy to fit the geopolitical scenario of the times and the 'toreseeable future. The strategy shifted the emphasis from the forward-deployed and the lorward-defense of large combat forces in Europe of the Cold War years to the projection of

I andcombat power from the continental United States to regional hot spots throughout the

I\Vorld, the maintenance of a smaller forward presence, strategic mobility, and the Participation in humanitarian and multilateral peacetime operations. Basically, a new era l \Vasemerging; and the Army had to adjust. B While the Army relocated many of its forces from overseas stations, especially in

i Urope, to the continental United States as part of the New Military Strategy and still lllaintained some forward-deploye~ forces in certain parts of the world, Congress sharply cut ,the military's budget and personnel strength? Although the size of the Army's budget and """"------lGen Carl E. Vuono, "Change, Continuity, and the Future of the Field Artillery," F'ieldArtillery Magazine, Jun 91, pp. 6-10; Gen John W. Foss, "AirLand Battle-Future," ~I7nY, Feb 91, p. 20; Briefing, subj: Challenges for the Field Artillery, 26 Apr 90, Historical esearch and Document Collection (HRDC); Draft Trends and Implications for the U.S. Army's Future AirLand Battle, 30 Jan 91, pp. 1-3, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Fire Support and A.irLandBattle Future, 12 Feb 91, HRDC; U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Vol 2, Annex G, Ian 93, p. G-7, HRDC; 1991 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) A.nnual Command History (ACH), p. 6; 1992 TRADOC ACH, p. 3; The Army ~odemization Plan, Vol I, Jan 93, pp. 2-3, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1995, pp. 8, 18, HRDC. 2Department of the Army (DA), Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992,p. 14; ~A, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, p. 42; U.S. Army Posture Statement for FIscal Year 1999, pp. 2,4, Posture Statement File, HRDC; Statement on the Posture of the 24

personnel strength had been contracting steadily since the mid-1980s with a tempoO ~ interruption during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm of 1990-19;f massive force structure reductions hit the service in the 1990s. From five corps, eight ~ active divisions, and ten reserve component (Army National Guard and Army Resef\; divisions in 1989, the Army shrunk over a period of eight years to four corps, ten acv~.1 divisions, and eight Army N ati~nal GUard.9ivisions, reduced its personnel streng~h.in ~uro from 215,000 to 65,000 soldIers, and closed over seven hundred installations In continental United States and overseas. However, personnel cuts continued. Through 19~ voluntary early transition, voluntary separation incentive, special separation bene I reduction-in-force actions, selective early retirement, and other programs decreased J active Army's personnel strength from 770,000 to 480,000 and its reserve compone~, personnel strength from 770,000 to 560,000. At the completion of the immense downsizl~ that included drastically decreasing the size of the Army's civilian workforce from 403,0) in 1989 to 225,000 in 199? through reduction- in-force actions and voluntary early retire~ ,

authority,3 the Army and Its reserve components were the smallest that they had been SIP, 1941. . I As a key element of the enormous reduction, the Army reallocated its comb combat support, and combat service support units among the active force and its res e1 components to create better balance and to retain its fighting capabilities. While the 4 National Guard had forty-four percent of the combat forces, thirty-one percent of the com I support, and twenty-five percent of the combat service support in 1990, the Army Rese: had fifty-three per~ent of the combat support and combat service support and a small POrt1.~ of combat fo~ces. Based upon the October 1993 Active and Reserve Component Sen~1 Leaders Off sIte Agreement, the Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, announced a maJ. restructuring plan for the Army's reserve components. Under the provisions of the plan, ~ Army would realign the preponderance of its reserve component combat capabilities to ~ Army National Guard to balance its forces better and move the bulk of the combat suppl and combat service support to the Army Reserve. Beginning in 1994 and continuing ill 1997, approximately fifty combat units moved from the Army Reserve to the Army N atiollJ~

U.S. Army for Fiscal Year 1997 (Extract), pp. 12-13, HRDC; The Army Modernization PI Ian 93, p. 3; "Field A~llery ~n~ts WOrIdwid~,,, l!ieldArtillery Magazine, Dee 89, pullo1 "Active Army and Manne Umts IIIOCONUS, FleldArtillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 99, p. 2 3U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000, pp. 19-21, Posture Stateme j File, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1999, pp. x, 4-5, 42, Poswl Statement File, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, p. 2, Post~ Statement File, HRDC; Statement on the Posture of the U.S. Army for Fiscal Year 19~ (Extract), pp. 4-6, Posture Statement File, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Yea! 1990 and 1991, pp. 31-37; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1987, p. 11; Dr Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, p. 47; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal yjeJ 1992, pp,. 116-35; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, pp. 42-43. Maj Gen William F. Ward, "Performance in Panama Underscores Readiness," A. Magazine, Oct 90, pp. 104-13; Maj Gen Donald Burdick, "An Essential Element ofNation~ Strategy," Army Magazine, Oct 90, pp. 116-21. 25

~ ' JUard,while over one hundred reserve component combat support and combat service ~pport units transferred from the Army National Guard to the Army Reserve. By the time at the revamping had been completed in 1997, the Army National Guard had fifty-five )ercentof the combat units, forty-six percent of the combat support, and twerity-five percent ~fthe combat service support. The Army Reserve had twenty percent

i As rmght be expected, the Field Artillery felt the Impact of thIS far-reachIng restructuring. Recognizing that constrained budgets would leave the active Army with bSUfficient field artillery, the Army Science Board of 1995 examined the Army National 'huard's existing general support and direct support field artillery missions to determine if ~ ey should be adjusted. During Operation Desert Storm, the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade ~f the Arkansas Army National Guard, the 196th Field Artillery Brigade of the Tennessee (\nny National Guard, and other Army National Guard field artillery units furnished bffectivegeneral support fires after a short training period prior to deploying to the Gulf and I ad the ability of maintaining proficiency with this mission in their thirty-nine days of ,annualtraining. In comparison, retaining competence with the direct support mission that ~as more complicated would be difficult within the allotted annual training time. Such IClrcumstancesprompted the Army Science Board of 1995 to recommend abolishing the 6 reserve component's direct support mission but retaining its general support mission. N' Recognizing the validity of the recommendation and desiring to utilize Army I a~lonal Guard resources more extensively and effectively, the Army reordered its field ,att1llerymissions. In 1990 the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve had fifty-two iPerCentof the Army's direct suppo:rt and general support field artillery. By 1996 the Army \~eserve no longer had any field artillery. At the end of the decade when the restructuring \\Vascompleted, the Army National Guard had sixty-three percent of the Army's general jSUPPortfield artillery and lost its direct support mission completely, leaving the active IC()~ponentwith the direct support mission. Realigning much of the general support field l~nery into the Army National Guard meant that generally one of every two field artillery Ibngades supporting a heavy division was Guard in 2000. In the light units three cannon I attalions and one MLRS battalion of the XVIII Airborne Corps provided the only active i~~I!lPonentsupport for all four light divisions (the 10th Mountain Division, the 25th Infantry j IVision,the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 10ist Airborne Division), two light separate

11------rI 5U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1997 (Extract), pp. 7-8, Posture \Statement File, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000, p. 18, Posture IStatement File, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, p. 83; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, pp. 71-72. . ('. 6John J. Todd and Lt Col James M. Holt, "Army Science Board Study: How Much ~B~eldArtillery is Enough?" Field Artillery Magazine, Jun 95, pp. 20-25; Maj Gen Randall L. lUgby, "Fires for Division XXI," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 95, p. 3 . 26 ! brigades, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.? i:cb To give the Guard the capability of performing its general support missid f, effectively, the Army had to modernize the service's field artillery weapon systems. EV~c before the restructuring field' artillery missions started, the Army decided in 1992 to conve/ Army National Guard MilO eight-inch self-propelled howitzer units to Multiple-LaunC,l ~ Rocket System (MLRS) units through Congressionally-mandated procurement and the e"~: launchers created by the drawdown of the active force. As the Commandant of the Fie~1t Artillery School, Major General Fred F. Marty (1991-1993), explained in his article on ~ ( state-of-the-branch in November-December 1992 edition of the Field Artillery Magazin~, if MLRS battalion provided up to forty percent more firepower than an eight -inch howilZI 8 battalion with significantly fewer personnel. By the end of the 1990s, the Army h8, I converted most of the Army National Guard from MIlO to MLRS units. Those Guard unif,: that still had eight-inch self-propelled howitzers were scheduled for conversion early in tlJ., twenty-first century. Upon completion of the conversions, the MHO would be totaJl:~ removed from the active and reserve components' inventories.9 . To upgrade reserve and active component field artillery units, the Army also madeI1 deliberate decision in 1996 to accept risk. It proposed reducing the number of M109A : (Paladin) 155~~. s7lf-prop~lled howitzers in the active heavy division from seventy t~o~!1 I fifty four begmnmg m the nnd-1990s based upon the planned introduction of the futuns I Crusader self-propelled I55-mm. howitzer, the precision Search-and- Destroy AnnJJ Munition (SADARM), the MLRS M270AI launcher, and MLRS Smart Tactical Rock, I (MSTAR) in the near future to modernize further Army National Guard field artillery. Jl!, I decreasing the number of howitzers in the heavy division, the Army planned to abandon tVI, existing cannon battalion of three eight-gun batteries (3x8 force structure) that had beel,I

?Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dee 03, p. 50, HRDC; Maj G) Randall L. Rigby, "3x6-2x9 MLRS Transition," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 96, pP 18-21; Rigby, "Fires for Division XXI," p. 3; Todd and Holt, "Army Science Board Study,! pp. 20-25; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000, p. 18, Posture Statement File, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1997 (Extract), Posture Statement File 1 HRDC; Burdick, "An Essential Element of National Strategy," p. 118; Briefing, subj: Seniol Field Artillery Advisors Council, 1995, HRDC; 1999U.S. Army Field Artillery Center all~ Fort Sill (USAFACFS) ACH, pp. 51-57; 2000 USAF ACFS ACH, pp. 50-56; Cpt Lawrenc/ T. Hall, Jr., and Cpt Michael A. Sharp, "The MLRS New Equipment Training Detachments:j Extending the Standards," (draft article), HRDC; Cpt Lawrence T. Hall and Cpt Michael Ai

Sharp, "MLRS NET for the ARNG," FieldArtillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 96, pp. 44-45; 2001

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 39-40. 1I 8Maj Gen Fred F. Marty, "State-of-the-Branch 1992," FieldArtillery Magazine, Nov'

Dec 92, p. 1; Brig Gen William C. Bilo, "A Decisive Victory for Strategic Victory," FielJ Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 1995, p. 22; 1995 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. Hall l 9 and Sharp, "The MLRS New Equipment Training Detachments: Extending thi Standards," (draft article), HRDC; Hall and Sharp, "MLRS NET for the ARNG," pp. 44-45: 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 39-40; Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p,1 113, HRDC. I I

\ 27 reatedin the 1980s to counter a Soviet ground force for a cannon battali~n of three six-gun atteries (3x6 force structure); The extra Paladin howitzers gained by adopting the new )tce structure would be transferred to the Army National Guard to eliminate all of its bsolete M109A2/A3 self-propelled 155-mm: howitzers and some M109AS- self-propelled 55-mm. howitzers and to give it a fleet of more modem M109A6 and M109ASlO self- ropelled 155-mm. howitzers to complement the MLRS systems being fielded. • To compensate for the loss of 155-mm. self-propelled howitzers in th~ active and :serve components, the Army opted to increase the number ofMLRS launchers In the heavy ,lvision.. Based upon the paramount lesson from the Gulf War of the need for more ltepower as expressed by many division commanders, the Field Artillery School submitted a Ilanto the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, as early as the summer

I~ 1992 to double the number of MLRS launchers in the heavy division from nine to 19hteenby creating a MLRS battalion of two batteries of nine launchers each (2x9 force tructure). General Sullivan approved the concept, but funding and manpower constraints lrevented implementation at the time. 11 . . Prompted by the Legal Mix VII study of 1993 and the Army Science Board Study :ompletedin November 1995 that reinforced the requirement for more firepower, the Army lnnounced a major field artillery force structure initiative in June 1996. The Army intended oadd a second MLRS battery in the heavy division beginning 2000. This would increase the 12 lUmberof MLRS launchers in the battalion from nine to eighteen. . , Even before the new organization could be implemented, the Army decided to estructure the division's MLRS resources over a period of several years by creating a )attalion of three batteries of six launchers each (3x6 force structure). This action would llake MLRS batteries leaner, reduce the size of the battery's battlefield footprint and ~gistical requirements, but retain the same number of launchers in the battalion to preserve Itepower.13 ------lORigby, "3x6-2x9 MLRS Transition," pp. 18-21; Briefing, subj: AC/RC ~ebalancing and TAA-11 Field Artillery Allocation Rules, 26 Aug 03, HRDC; Rigby, "1996 ~nior Fire Support Conference: I;ocusing Fires for Force XXI," Field Artillery Magazine, aY-Jun 96, p. 18. ~ llMaj Gen Randal1 L. Rigby, "3x6 Cannon-2x9 MLRS Transition," Field Artillery . agazine, Sep-Oct 96, p. 18. 12Maj Gen Randall L. Rigby, "FA State of the Branch 1996," Field Artillery ~agaZine, Nov-Dec 96, p. 4. 13Information Paper, subj: MLRS, undated, in MLRS File, HRDC; PM 6-60, MLRS Operations, 23 Apr 96, MLRS File, HRDC; Table of Organization and Equipment, 23 Apr 99;Maj Gen Leo J. Baxter, "Meeting the Future: State of the Field Artillery 1998," Field 4.rtilleryMagazine, Nov-Dec 98, pp. 1-6. "Transition," Field Artillery Alagazine, Sep-Oct 96, pp. 18-21; Maj Gen Randall L. Rigby, "Mapping the Future: FA State of the Branch 1996,"Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 96, pp. 1-6; 1999 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-61; It Col Richard R. McPhee, "The Divisional MLRS Battalion in the DAWE," Field Artillery Magazine, May-Jun 98, pp. 38-40; Fact Sheet, subj: M270 MLRS Self-Propelled loaderlLaunchers, undated, Force XXI File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: M270 MLRS Se1f- 28

Similarly, the Army revamped its M198 towed 155-rnm. howitzer units in the activl component and the reserve component. It reduced the number of M198s in the battaliO~i from twenty-four to eighteen by converting from the 3x8 force structure to the 3x6 for~ structure. This freed up some'Ml98s that were then used to replace the worst guns a11 permitted the Army to send them to the depots.14 . 0 The restructuring of the 1990s signific~ntly reshaped the Field Artillery. At the e11 of the decade, the branch had fewer active and reserve component field artillery units than ~, the beginning. While the Army National Guard gained much of the general support artillerY/ the Army Reserve lost all of its field artillery. To ensure that the Army National GUal, could furnish responsive and effective fires and was a viable part of the Total Army, tbl, Army started equipping it .with th~ MLR~ and the Paladin. As the director of the Director8~ of Combat Developments In the FIeld Artl1lery School, Colonel Edward G. Anderson III, a11 General Marty had accurately projected in 1991, the reforms of the 1990s made'the ArrI1) and the Field Artillery leaner and meaner. 15 In the midst of reducing the size and revamping the composition of its forces, tbl, Army faced the imperative of rewriting doctrine to keep it in harmony wit4 the intemation~, scene, especially in Europe, and modernizing its weapons and equipment. Based upon tbll Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks of the early 1980s and the growing politid fragmentation of Eastern Europe, the AirLand Battle-Future studies of 1987-1990 outlin~ an umbrella concept for fighting throughout the world and a heavy concept for fighting iV, Europe with an emphasis on deep, destructive fires and a linear front. Interestingly, the verl political events that were driving the AirLand Battle-Future studies soon rendered. the1J1 obsolete. The Conventional Forces Reduction Treaty of November 1990 spelled an end to the applicability of the AirLand Battle-Future studies and to large military forces in Europf by bringing an end to the military buildup of the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treatj, Organization (NATO). As a result of the treaty, smaller military forces would defend !bl, same amount of territory as the larger armies had done in the past to abolish NATO'II continuous strategic front against the Warsaw Pact threat. This situation would unavoidablJ, lead to gaps in the line and a non-linear battlefield and would necessitate developing ne~ warfightIng. d octnne. . 16

Propelled LoaderlLaunchers, undated, Force XXI File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: M210, MLRS Self-Propelled LoaderlLaunchers, undated, Force XXI File, HRDC; Informatiol, Paper, subj: MLRS, undated, in MLRS File, HRDC; PM 6-60, MLRS Operations, 23 Ap!. 96, MLRS File, HRDC; Table of Organization and Equipment, 23 Apr 99; Briefing, sub] ACIRC Rebalanc~ng and TA~-11 Field ~ille~ Allocation Rules, 26 Aug 03, HRDC. 'I 14Email WIthatch, sub]: Manuscnpt ReVIew, 8 Dec 03, p. 54, HRDC. 15Interview, Dastrup with Chris Klein, 29 Jan 97, HRDC; Msg, Chris Klein to Dastrup, subj: 3x612x9 Transition, 28 Feb 97, HRDC; Msg, DA to Cdr, FORSCOM, et al,. subj: Modernization of Field Artillery Force Structure, 241705Z Jun 96, HRDC; Briefing, subj: 3x6 Cannon and 2x9 MLRS Transition, Jan 97,HRDC. 16U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CFE Negotiation on Conventional Arm Forces in Europe, 1989, pp. 1-2, HRDC; U.S. Army, A Strategic Force for the 19905 and Beyond, Jan 90, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and StudieS

J 29

o Understanding the imperative of adapting to changing politi~al conditions, the Chief f Staff of the Army, General Carl E. Vuono, and the CommandIng General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General John W. Foss, concurred about t~e urgent need to revise Army doctrine to reflect future international conditions and sImUltaneously urged abandoning AirLand Battle doctrine design~d for fighting an echeloned threat on a linear front for a new warfighting doctrine. Looking into the future, ~enera1 Vu~no s.tressed destroying the enemy forces rather than holdin~ land as the Army ad emphasIzed In the past and also perceived the emergence of a non-lInear front. Along thesame lines, General Foss explained in his notional warfighting concept of 1990 that long- range intelligence systems would detect enemy forces and that long-range precision fires fromfire support systems would coverthe gaps created by the smaller forces, would destroy the enemy force on the non-linear battlefield, and would set the conditions for decisive ope. 17 .. . .. ratIons. Once the enemy had been sufficiently decimated through long-range preCISIon fires, the maneuver arms would attack. With support from indirect and direct fires, they WOUldassault the enemy's flanks and rear to avoid devastating frontal assaults. Out of GeneralFoss' concept, extensive and heated discussions throughout the Army, conferences, ~d O~eration Desert Storm lessons learned emerged TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand Operauons, August 1991, that served as the basis for revising Field Manual (FM) 100-5, 18 perations, the Army's chief warfighting manual.

------bivision, Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), 23 Feb 90, HRDC; U.S. Army Field ~llery School (USAF AS), Conventional Forces-Europe Reductions, Initial Overview and ~ e Field Artillery Perspective, 18 Sep 89, pp. 5-10, HRDC; USAF AS, Fighting at Parity in ost-CFE Europe, undated, HRDC; 1999 TRADOC ACH, pp. 32-34; 1990 USAFACFS ~CH, pp. 176-78; John L. Romjue, American Anny Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort ouroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996), ~' 21-27. Romjue's book discusses in detail the transition from AirLand Battle to AirLand perations between 1991 and 1993. Note: Twenty-two members of NATO and the fonner 'Vv.arsawPact signed the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty in November 1990 after the dISsolution of the Warsaw Pact and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. II 17Fact Sheet, subj: AirLand Battle Future, 16 Apr 90, HRDC; Foss, "AirLand Battle- ~ture," pp. 20-21; C. William Rittenhouse, "Fire Support on the Non-Linear Battlefield: ~ne Shape of Things to Come," Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 90, p. 36; USAFAS, ~onventional Forces-Europe Force Reductions, 18 Sep 89, pp. 10-12, HRDC; TRADOC amphlet 525-5, Airland Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond, 1Aug 91, p. 1, HRDC; 1990 USAFACFS AHR, p. 178;Romjue, American Army Doctrine/or the Post-Cold War, pp. 21-27. 18Fact Sheet, subj: AirLand Battle Future, 16 Apr 90, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 15 Apr 90, HRDC; Rittenhouse, "Fire Support on the ~on-Linear Battlefield," Oct 90, pp. 36-37; Foss, "AirLand Battle-Future," pp. 20-21; ~riefing, subj: Challenges for the Field Artillery, 26 Apr 90, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Fire SUpportand AirLand Battle-Future, 12 Feb 91, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, DCD, 11 Feb 91, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, J\irLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Airland Battle for the Strategic Army of 30

AirLand Operations doctrine, published in FM 100-5 of June 1993, under wel leadership of the Commanding General of mADOC, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr'l emphasized depth and simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the battle space ~I permitted no sanctuary for the enemy, non-linear maneuver warfare, and decisive arm1, operations. as part of ajoint, combined, an~ int~r~gency te~. 19Long-range operational f~ from the different branches of the country s Jrnhtary servIces would destroy the enemy all I minimize friendly casualties. Following this, tactical fire support from air-, land-, or seil based deli~ery systems would s~pport.the man.euver forces' att~~k on the enemy's flanks all I' rear to aVOIdfrontal assaults wIth theIr attendIng battle of attntlon.20 , From the Field Artillery School's perspective, AirLand Operations as it was emergiJili presented a revised role for corps artillery. According to AirLand Battle fire support doc~O: through early 1990, the corps commander fought the deep battle with the Lance gulde~ missile and tactical air, functioned mainly as an allocator of assets, and employed his tiel I artillery brigades to reinforce division artillery.21 I ' AirLand Operations changed this. As part of a joint forces command, the corP, commander would retain control of his MLRS and Army Tactical Missile Syst~~1 (ATACMS) units and would assign them specific targets to attack with overwhel~1 firepower at ranges up to two hundred kilometers to hold all the enemy's functions at nS~1 Conducted by the corps commander, long-range operational precision fires from MLRS'I ATACMS, and indirect fire s~stems under development would become the major killers 0: the battlefield. They would diSrupt, delay, degrade, or divert enemy capabilities and wool set the conditions for future battles. Once the long-range, operational fires had sufficienUY destroyed the enemy, the maneuver divisions with their field artillery battalions assisted bl corps artillery providing tactical indirect fires would attack the enemy's flanks and rear to

the 1990s and Beyond, 1 Aug 91, p. 1, HRDC; 1990 USAF ACFS Annual Historical Revie11 (AHR), pp. 178-79; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Draft AirLand OperatioWi Concept Paper, undated, HRDC; 1990 USAFACFS AHR, p. 178; 1991 TRADOC ACH, Pl'1 57- 58; Romjue, American Anny Doctrine for the Post -Cold War, pp. 61-70. " Col 19 John W. Reitz, "A Fire Supporter's Guide to PM 100-5," Field Artillef! Magazine, Dec 93, pp. 10-15; Romjue, American Anny Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, pp/ 35,37,96-112; PM 100-5, Operations, lun 93. 20pactSheet, subj: AirLand Battle Future, 16 Apr 90, HRDC; Foss, "AirLand Battle'J Future," p. 24; Briefing,subj: Challenges for the Field Artillery, 26 Apr 90, HRDCI TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLaJI/, Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond, 1 Aug 91, pp. 16-25, HRDC; Rei~, "A Fire Supporter's Guide to PM 100-5," pp. 10-15; PM 100-5, Operations, Jun 93, pp. 6- 1 7-14. 1 i 21Ltrwith atch, Dastrup to Maj Gen Fred Marty, 10 Sep 03, p. 59, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Fire Support and AirLand Battle-Future, 12 Feb 91, HRDC; Rittenhouse, "The Shape of Things to Come," p. 38; C. William Rittenhouse, "Operation FireStrike," FieldArtilletY Magazine, Feb 91, pp. 33-37; Interview, Dastrup with Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studie~l Division, DCD, 11 Feb 91, HRDC. 31 aChievetactical objectives.22 W Unlike AirLand Battle with its focus on fighting a high-intensity conflict against the arsaw Pact, AirLand Operations reflected the change in the threat and recognized the end ?f the Cold War. Besides fighting across anoperational continuum to support national Interestsand American allies, the Army would operate as the land component of air, land, :'d sea power i~ joint, combined, and interagency operations and ha~ to .consi~er re?ional A: eats more se~ously than before. Equally important, the force proJ~ctIon ~nentatlon of IrLand OperatIons stressed the need for versatile, deployable, strategIc mobtle, lethal, and eXpansibleforces with the ability to respond rapidly in a crisis with a mix of active and reserve component forces.23 I Within a year of the publication ofFM 100-5, AirLand Operations (1993), the Army ~unched its Force XXI effort to develop doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment for e twenty-first century and to modernize even more. On 1 August 1994 TRADOC ~lished a new edition of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, entitled Military Operations: Force d I Operations. Building upon FM 100-5 of 1993, the pamphlet called for a globally eployable Army unmatched in modem doctrine, training, and equipment with the ability to sUCceedinthe widest variety of major and minor security challenges and promoted doctrinal Change..In fact, General Franks saw the pamphlet as the first step towards new doctrine that 24 Wouldbe formalized late in the 1990s as a continuation of FM 100-5 of 1993. d. . Using the pamphlet as a foundation, TRADOC started revising doc~ne again at the ~recbon of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer. On 25 October 1995 d,eC~mmanding General of TRADOC, General William W. Hartzog, published a program lrecbve for developing new doctrine for Force XXI. He explained that the new doctrine ~OUldbuild on FM 100-5 of 1993 and aimed at the integration of peace operations, Utnanitarian assistance operations, power projection operations, and other military ~erations short of general war into the body of operational doctrine. At the same time eneral Hartzog placed a greater emphasis on joint, interagency, and combined aspects of ~ar and the integration of information technology at all levels of command than previously. C 1997 the School of Advanced Military Studies at the u.S. Command and General Staff Ollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, produced the final draft of the new field manual that el11PhasizedGeneral Hartzog's desired Qrientation. However, debates over terms and the COntentofthe manual continued into 1999 and forced a major rewrite to be done that year. '------S 22Ltr with atch, Dastrup to Marty, 10 Sep 03, p. 60, HRDC; Rittenhouse, "Fire 3upport on a Non-Linear Battlefield," pp. 37-38; Rittenhouse, "Operation Firestrike," pp. 33- 7; Leighton L. Duitsman, "Army TACMS," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 91, pp. 38- ~1;Interview, Dastrup with Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, DCD, 11 Feb 1,ERnC; Briefing, subj: Fire Support and AirLand Battle-Future, 12 Feb 91, HRDC; Maj ;.en Fred F. Marty, "Deep Operations," Field Artillery Magazine, Apr 93, pp. 1-2; Reitz, "A Ire SU~f0rter's Guide to FM 100-5," pp. 10-15. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 1 Aug 91, pp. 1-9; 1991 TRADOC ACH, pp. 57-58; J992 TRADOC ACH, pp. 31-35; 1993 TRADOC ACH, pp. 23-30; FM 100-5, Operations, Un93, EP. 1-4- 1-5; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, p. 42. . 4Romjue, American Army Doctrinefor the Post-Cold War, pp. 139-41. 32

I The Army redesignated PM 100-5 as PM 3.0, Operations, in 2000 to keep it parallel to ~ei joint force publications numbering system and approved it on 14 June 2001 as OffiCl~1 doctrine.25 Looking into the future, the.Field Artillery School also saw the need to rewrite filii support doctrine to keep it consistent with PM 3.0. Like the Army, the Field Artiller1 School envisioned a non-linear and non-contiguous battlefield. To win on that battlefield i we, joint force or combined arms commander would require effective fire support but should noli have to worry about its origins. For the Field Artillery School, this meant providing robo~ fires platforms with the ability of conducting technical fire direction, revolutionizing we methods of distributing fires, tailoring the force to meet the threat, and designing ne~ support organizations and battle staff processes. Essentially, the school had to adjos'i existing fire support operations and organizations with their roots in the first part of WI, twentieth century to a new paradigm of effects-based frres.26 As one field artillery officcl, articulated, "Current digital operations are just the old way of executing frre SUpPO~i operations, but now we sometimes plan and execute with computers .... We have refine I and digitized ... [fire support]; but, at its base, it has changed little since the early 20tl century. ,,27 , The school believed that twenty-flfSt century fires would require sensor linkages to' much broader range .of on-demand e~fects through a centralized effects coordination ce~

The cell would be hnked to a multitude of sensors and effects providers, such as fieldI

artillery, naval gunfire, close air support, precision munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, aJ1 ! even satellites, and would demand consolidating existing frre support elements. InAugu~1 1999 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin (1999', 200 I), outlined his vision of the effects coordination cell and renamed it the fires effects, coordination cell (FECC).28 Besides proViding the same functions as the frre suppo~1 element, the cell would introduce new functions. Upon becoming operational early in wll twent~-first ce~tury, the fires. effects coordination cell would conduct informa~ogl operatIOns, furnish deep operatIOns that were formerly provided by the deep operatIOIVI

FM 25 3.0, Operations, 14 Iun 2001; Interview, Dastrup with B. Bielinski, Doctrinl! Branch, WIDD, USAFAS, 20 Iun 99, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Bielinski, 1 Feb (JO,I HRDC; Email with atch, subj: Trip Report from Semi-Annual Army Doctrine ConferencC" 26 May 99, HRDC; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Bielinski, 6 Feb 01, HRDC;I Information Paper, subj: New Numbering System for Fire Support and Field ArtillerY,. Manuals, 26 Jun 00, HRDC. 26Brig Gen Toney Stricklin, "Fires: The Cutting Edge for the 21st Century," FieM, Artillery Magazine, May-Iun 98, pp. 22-23; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Gregory A. PaIkS" Task Force 2000, USAFAS, 30 Mar 99, HRDC; Briefing, subj: The Effects CoordinatioO, Cell, 24 Mar 99, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Futures Fires Command and Control concepti' Experimentation Program, 24 Mar 99, HRDC. 27Msgwith atch, subj: ECC Info Requested, 23 Mar 99, HRDC. , 28Interview, Dastrup with Lt Col Peter R. Baker, Task Force 2000, USAF AS, 23 ~BI, 00, HRDC; "Medium-weight Units to Take Advantage of Effects-based Operations," Insldt . the Army, 10 Apr 00, pp. 6-8, HRDC. 33 coordination cell at the corps, provide close support, and coordinate non-lethal effects using electronic warfare and non-lethal munitions. These last functions were formerly beyond the 29 PUrviewof the fire support element at the brigade. As doctrine for the Army as a whole and fire support evolved, the Army outlined llloreof its Force XXI vision in 1994. Force XXI would be a methodical process to move ~heArmy from an industrial-age force to an information-age force with the ability to Illlplement the AirLand Operations doctrine and to serve as a force projection army. Focusing on doctrine, organization, training, leader development, materiel, soldiers, and SUstainment,Force XXI would provide the nation with a ground force with the capability of cOnd .. . "f fl. t 30 Uctlng SImultaneous and seamless operations across the spectrum 0 con IC. Using the Force XXI process, the Army devised three axes to reach the objective force. One axis would transform the institutional Army or the TRADOC service schools. Another, commonly called Joint Venture, would reshape the operational Army into a force ?rojection force, while the third would integrate information-age technologies into the Institutional and operational forces. Through the employment of computers and other advanced information technology, TRADOC planned to revolutionize the Army's Operational force with the capabilities of real-time information and improved situational aWareness where commanders and soldiers would know the location of all friendly and enemy forces on the battlefield.31 Training XXI, the training axis of Force XXI, outlined revolutionizing training and ~du~ationto reduce the size, cost, and length of institutional training. As the Chief of Army raIning XXI Division, Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate in the Field Artillery School, Lieutenant Colonel Clyde W. Ellis, explained in January 1996, Training )(XI would ensure the inclusion of training in every phase of Force XXI development and WOUldunitemany ongoing training efforts into a coherent plan to produce trained soldiers ~nd combat-ready units.32 Eight major initiatives comprised the effort: the Total Army chool System, Clusters and Satellites, Classroom" XXI, Distance Learning, iUtomationlDigitization, Training Development, Diagnostics, and Advanced Training trategies.Although constrained budgets forced the Clusters and Satellites initiative tobe

""------~9Interview, Dastrup with Baker, 23 Mar 00. 30DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, p. 63 311994 TRADOC ACH, pp. 17-18; "Force XXI: A Revolution and Evolution in Military Affairs," Army Link News, 17 Jul 96, Force XXI File, HRDC; Lt Gen Paul E. Menoher, Jr., "Force XXI: Redesigning the Army through Warfighting Experiments," Military Intelligence, 1996, Force XXI File, HRDC; Lt Col Clyde Ellis, "Army Training )(XI," draft article, pp. 1-2, HRDC; TRADOC Warrior XXI Campaign Plan (Extract), Nov 95, pp. 1-2, HRDC; TRADOC, Wamet XXI Action Plan (Extract), Jan 96, p. 2, HRDC; l'RADOC, Warfighter 'XXI Campaign Plan (Extract), 1995, p. 2, HRDC; Col David C. \Voite and Lt Col Clyde W. Ellis, "Army Training XXI," Field A rtillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 96, pp. 8-10. 32Interview, Dastrup with Lt Col Clyde W. Ellis, Chief, Army Training XXI' DiVision,WIDD, USAFAS, 26 Jan 96, HRDC. . 34

dropped, the other initiatives remained an indispensable partof revolutionizing trainin~.j i ,I . . Recognizing the increased roll of the reserve components, the need to standar4 training for the active and reserve components, the constrained resources for both, and ~ , potential of computers, General Sullivan directed TRADOC in 1992 to develop the Toll Army School System(renamed The Army School System in 1999) of fully accredited.aII integrated active component and reserve component schools that would furnish standard1~ 1I . individual training and education for the Total Army. 34Upon becoming fully operational II 1997, The Army School System provided training through a network of schools spread 0"1 seven geographical regions in the continental United States, simultaneously abolished WI. three parallel school systems of the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and active ArrIlJ , that had characterized training for decades and had propagated separate training standar~,i , reduced the number of reserve component schools from 209 in 1992 to 133 schools in 199i' saved money, and exploited distance learning .that was based upon advance I communications35 technology to disseminate individual and unit training when and whe~ , required. Advanced technology abolished the traditional distance learning methods OJ , delivering individual and unit training through correspondence courses by employing W' • Internet and computer. 36 , Led by TRADOC in association with other Army major commands, Joint Ventufl , meanwhile, outlined modernizing the mechanized forces through the Force XXI process ..f , sust.ain the. capabilities of th~ current force, to minimize the cost of .operating agJP , eqUIpment III an era of constrailled budgets, and to develop a force projectIOn Army, FofC1 , XXI built upon the digitization experiments of the Battle Laboratories created by Gener~ Franks in 1992 to develop new warfighting concepts and capabilities using compuld, ' simulations and to determine the next step in modernization. As TRADOC's Baldi, Laborat~ries' ~ork indicated, digitization or the us: of computers seemed t~ be the way.~ : modernIze. WIth the work of the Battle Laboratones serving as a foundallon, Force Xi . ,therefore would leverage information technology through a series of advanced WarfightiP ~ I 33TRADOC, Warrior XXI Campaign Plan (Extract), Nov 95, pp. 3, 7, 8-32, HRDO < Ellis, "Army Training XXI," draft article, pp. 5-7, HRDC. , I j :M-rRADOC, TASS Oplan-2 (Extract), 1 Jan 95, p. iv, HRDC; Fact Sheet, sub) TASS, 28 Apr 94, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: TASS, 6 Nov 97, TASS File, HRDC. ! I 35Fact Sheet, subj: TASS Update, 9 Feb 96, HRDC; Memorandum for se'l Distribution, subj: Accreditation ofT ASS School Battalions in Region C, 9 Nov 94, HRDg , Fact Sheet, subj: TASS, 7 Nov 97, TASS File, HRDC; 1998 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 28-31] U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000, p. 50, Posture Statement File, HRDy : Fact Sheet, subj: TASS, 6 Nov 97, TASS File, HRDC; 1998 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 28-3° , 1994 TRADOC ACH, pp. 46-48. I 1 361995 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 41-55; 1996 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 31-53; 199'" USAFACFS ACH, pp. 17-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 24-25; Mark Hanna, "Task Ford : XXI: The Army's Digital Experiment," Strategic Forum, Ju197, Force XXI File, HRDC I 2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 29; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, pp. 5, 67-68.] 1994 TRADoc ACH, pp. 46-48; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000, pp. 5(/, : 51, Posture Statement File, HRDC. l 35 eXperiments,ranging from small-scale efforts in a particular functional area to large-scale efforts.37 .' A series of advanced warfighting experiments during the last years of the 1990s C~nvincinglydemonstrated improved force effectiveness provided by the tactical Internet ~ at Was an integrated system of computers, radios, satellite terminals, software, and other Ihrnformationtechnologies, that gave the. Army the ability to pass infotmation rapidly ~ oughout the force horizontally and vertically, and that supplied ..near real-time ~nformation. In addition, the experiments illustrated the ability of digital technology to ~ncreasethe lethality, survivability, and operating tempo of ground forces; pointed out the Illlperativeof developing digital systems further; and led to the final advanced warfighting experiment to test the Division XXI design that would leverage information and c0l1Ununications technology to provide situational awareness and increase combat 38 effectiveness and that would be fifteen percent smaller in size than the current division. Conducted at Fort Hood in November 1997 using the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment culminated the multi- Yearexperimentation effort for the heavy forces by evaluating a conceptual digitized ~echanized division. Every divisional 'platform was equipped with a computer that was thnkedtothe tactical Internet. As the experiment clearly demonstrated, digitization permitted .e commander to see where friendly and enemy units were on the battlefield for enhanced SItuationalawareness, allowed the division to cover the battle space of a current corps, and enabled reducing the. number of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and per~onnel without saCrificinglethality and survivability.39 Based upon the success of Division XXI Advanced "'------B" 37U.S.Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, pp. 24-25, Posture Statement DIe, HRDC; 1992 TRADOC ACH, pp. 79-82; 1993 TRADOC ACH, pp. 92-94; 1992 SAFACFS ACH, pp. 102-06; Ltr with atch, Dastrup to Marty, 10 Sep 03, HRDC. U 38 1995 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 97-100; 1996 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95; 1997 v~AFACFS ACH, p. 56; Msg, subj: TF2000 Command History, 7 Feb 97, HRDC; Maj A. l~ce C. Weaver, "Fires in AWE Focused Dispatch: A Step Toward Task Force XXI," Field crtlllery Magazine, Mar-Apr 96, pp. 38-40; Briefing, subj: Force XXI, undated, HRDC; Lt t\01 Theodore S. Russell, Jr., and Maj Harold H. Worrell, Jr., "Focus on Light Force XXI: B',\VE Warrior Focus," Field Artillery Magazine, May-Jun 96, pp. 36-39; Task Force XXI C1nalReport, Executive Summary, Oct 97, pp. 2-3, HRDC; Col Thomas R. Goedkoop and 7Pt Barry E. Venable, "Task Force XXI: An Overview," Military Review, Mar-Apr 97, p. 1; "TRADOC Commander Reveals Some Results of Recent Force XXI AWE," Army Link ~e\Vs, 8 Oct 97, Force XXI File, HRDC; Hanna, "Task Force XXI;" U.S. Army Posture statement for Fiscal Year 2001, pp. 24-25, Posture Statement File, HRDC; DA, Historical u'11lmaryforFiscal Year 1996, p. 4. 2 392000USAFA<;:FS ACH, pp. 89-91; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year D~O~,.pp. 24-25, Posture Statement File, HRDC; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: IVlslonXXI AWE and First Digital Division Fielding Taskers, 22 Apr 97, HRDC; Briefing, SUbj:Improving the Interim Division Design: Adjusting for Task Force XXI, undated, ~C; Briefing, subj: Fires: The Cutting Edge, undated, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Task Force .

000 in Support of AWE, Feb 98, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Henry J. Hestert Jr., 36

, ) Warfighting Experiment, General Reimer mandated fielding and testing the first operatioDj Division XXI digitized division (4th Infantry, Division) by 2001. Subsequently, the AfllI~,e, would convert its other mechanized divisions to the Division XXI design during the fi 81 decade of the twenty-first century.~O. C

Acknowledging the focus of the Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experime~t W t 1997 on the heavy division, the Army recognized the imperative of modernizing its h8Ifl forces for contingency operations and force projection. Prompted b,y this reality,' th,e AfllI!" decided in I998 to look at its light units with the goal of digitizing them and formed tI Rapid Force Projection Initiative Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. BaS upon the success of these demonstrations, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantt1 participated in the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment in Septe11lbI 2000 conducted by'the Joint Forces Command to test ways of improving contingency fOrG 41 capabilities. Although the final results of the experiment were still pending at the end J(Jl 2000 and although the digitization of the light forces was less mature than the heavy fofIe effort, te,ntative c,onclusions suggested that digitization improved situational awareness at1~'U enhanced lethality and versatility in light forces as they did with the heavy forces.42 tI Reflecting upon the Force XXI effort as it was unfolding, the COlIlIl1andantof n Field Artillery School, Major General Randall L. Rigby (1995-1997), who later served ° 8 the Army general staff, discussed the importance and the rationale for digitizing the AnJl L In the September-October 1996 edition of Field Artillery Magazine, General Rigby wroll~I "The value of digitization [automation] is its speed, reliability and interoperability.1bc t characteristics will permit us to acquire, exchange and employ battlefield informationi f I h more effectively and efficiently throughout the force. ,,43Information supremacy through ~ ~ digitization of command, control, and communication systems formed the core of the FOfjlC tI ------b and Maj Dean Mengel, Task Force 2000, 30 Jan 98, HRDC; Memorandum for Maj ~I; Mengel, subj: 1997 USAFACFS ACH, 12 Feb 98, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Division l AWE Insights, undated, in Senior Fire Support Conference Packet, 9-13 Feb 98, HRDI "Division AWE Will Be Basis for 21st Century Fighting Force," Army Link News, 28 OJ, 97, Force XXI File, HRDC; Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Fiscal Year 199, Annual Report (Extract), Battlefield Digitization: Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade aPl Below, and the Tactical Internet, Force XXI File, HRDC.l t 402001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal yell 2001, p£. 24-25, Posture Statement File, HRDC. ,g lEmail msg with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 73, HRDC; 20~ USAFACFS ACH, pp. 82-83; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal year 2001, p. 2 l Posture Statement File, HRDC. See FN 40 in the 2000 USAF ACFS ACH for a complcl , listing of documents. l~ 41-RADOC System Manager (TSM), All Source Analysis System, News Letter, O~ 00, HRDC; TSM, All Source Analysis System, News Letter, Jan 01, HRDC; U.S. ArtJ1~ Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, p. 25, Posture Statement File, HRDC. ) 43Maj Gen Randall L. Rigby, "AFATDS: Learning to Interoperate--Not Iu} Interface," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 96, p. 1. I 37

44 (XI Joint Venture initiative and would permit the Army to dominate future battlefields. . , As the Field Artillery School noted, dominating future, battlefields also rested upon 45 :qUlppingtheforce with appropriate weapons and equipment. Unfortunately, existing fire :UPPortsystems -- target acquisition; weapons and munitions; command, control, and ~~unications; and support -- had been designed for fighting in Europe,again~t t,heSoviet \l1J.onand the Warsaw Pact and supported the heavy forces. AddreSSIng' thIS Issue, the l1ny and the Field Artillery concluded in January 1993: .. .\ While today's fire support systems are impressive, the requirement to keep pace in a changing world requires that we modernize continually. It is a given that the futlire field artillery force will be smaller. For it to remain effective, it must be more lethal with better systems and munitions,. more r survivable, and more deployable [than Cold War era systems].46 )0 accomplish this, the Field Artillery had to eliminate the deficiencies identified during ,Peration Desert Storm and. had to apply information technologies. Confronted by ~nstrained budgets that appeared to be a constant factor for the near future and an uncertain eat, the Field Artillery, however, could not develop new weapons designed for a particular Ureatand therefore shifted its focus from simply introducing new systems as the basis for ~od~mizing. The branch designed a two-pronged approach of improving existing lervlceableplatforms and systems by applying information-age technologies and developing ,Otallynewsystems only where existing systems could not be upgraded sufficiently to meet ~ture needs. Developing capabilities and procuring new systems, such as 'the Advanced leld Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the Crusader self-propelled 155-mm. 10\Vitzer,theMLRS Family of Munitions, became the heart of the modernization effort. If ~odemization were done competently, it would create a power-projection force with the ~pabilities of winning an information-age war, conducting precision fIfes, and dominating e rnaneuver battle.47 The Field Artillery School astutely explained in 1993, "The future )attlefield will place new demands on the fire support system. The requirement to achieve ~ndforce dominance with minimum losses places increasing emphasis on the use of fires to efeat the enemy. ,,48 From the Field Artillery's perspective, the requirement to conduct precision fires and '------. ~1994 TRADOC ACH, p. 132; Rigby, "AFATDS: Learning to Interoperate--NotJust ;te~ace,,, p. 1; Col Raymond T. Odierno and Maj Thomas L. Swingle, "AFATDS: 19ltlZingFighting with Fires," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 96, pp. 12-14. ) 45MajGen Fred F. Marty, "State-of-the-Branch 1992," FieldArtillery Magazine, Dec 2, Pp. 1-3. .... 46U.S.Army Modernization Plan, Vol II, Annex G, Jan 93, G27, Modernization Plan ~lle,HRDC. ) 47Emailmsg with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 75, HRDC; U.S Army .OstureStatement for FY95, p. 84, Posture Statement File, HRDC; 1991 USAFACFS ACH, ~.184;U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Vol II, Annex G, Jan 93, pp. G2-G6, Modernization IanFile, HRDC; 994 TRADOC ACH, pp. 136-38. -l 48U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Jan 93, Vol II, G16, Modernization Plan File, tl{DC. 38

to dominate the maneuver battle placed a conspicuous onus on target acquisition systeIUSJ . locate targets with greater accuracy at greater ranges than ever before. Introduced in th~ lad. 1970s and early 1980s, the ANffPQ- 37 mortar locating radar and the ANrrPQ- 36 arttUCl. locating radar, commonly called Firefinder radars, detected targets at longer ranges than 49 tbj predecessors of the 1960s could. Acknowledging that the Q-36 and Q_37 radars we~~t.t . large and heavy and required increased mobility and ranges, among othercritical capabili~{ . to support AirLand Battle, the Army developed a 'plan in 1984 to mount the Q-36 radar, II shelter, and its generator on a five-ton truck for improved tactical mobility. The plan ~J specified. adding electronic e~an~em~nts later to create the ob~eetive system.with the ablllj of detecting targets up to tlurty-slXkilometers and the capacIty of processmg fifty to OIJ hundred targets per minute. To meet the needs of the light forces that were growing rn?J . important, the Army subsequently decided in 1988 to mount the improved radar on a tr~11 for tow,ing by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) to give the F1e1I, Artillery a second version of the enhanced Q_36.50 . In view of the increasing emphasis on strategic deployability, the Army at Genc~ Hallada's recommendation eliminated the five-ton truck version late in 1990 and PlaCj priority and funding on developing the trailer variant, known as the Q-36 Version Seven, improve strateg,ic mobility for the heavy and light forces. The Army completed fielding II Q-36 Version Seven in 1994, enhanced the system with electronic upgrades to make it the 36 Version Eight or the objective system with capabilities of communicating on a digitize, , battlefield required by the Force XXI effort, and started fielding it in 1999.51

4~act Sheet, subj: ANfTPQ-37 Firefinder Weapon Locating System, undat1 Firefinder File, HRDC; "Eyes for the King of Battle," http://www.infoage.org/ffsilvC! HTML, Firefinder File, HRDC; 1986 USAF ACFS Annual Historical Review (AHR), pp. 8 S 91. , 5tFact Sheet, subj: Firefinder II Radars, 12 Nov 87, HRDC; Fact Sheet, su~ Firefinder Radar, 31 Dee 87, HRDC; Disposition Form, subj: Trip Report _FF Blk II Desi I Review, 13 Aug 87, HRDC; Disposition Form, subj: Trip Report _ DesignlInprogrCl Review Firefinder Block II, 5 Oct 87, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder ProdoI, Improvement Program, 4 Aug 88, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj David F.McFarfC

TSM Target Acquisition, 7 Feb 89, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Distribution of FirefindJ I ANtrPQ-37 Radars, 16 Sep 88, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Improvement ProgratJl: 22 Nov 87, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Improvement Program, 13 Sep 89, ~ Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, 22 Feb 90, HRDC; Fa ~ Sheet, subj: Firefinder Block lIB Material Change, 20 Nov 89, HRDC; Fact Sheet, su~ Firefinder Block lIB Configuration Decision, 25 Oct 89, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefind I Improvement Program, 13 Sep 89, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Impact ofFY90 Budget Cuts OJ Firefinder Block II, 21 Sep 89, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Q-36 Improveme (Block II), 20 Aug 91, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Q-36 Improvement Progr~J (Block II), 14 Ian 92, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Targ Acquisition, 5 Feb 02, HRDC. dl 51Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update," Field Artillery Magazine, D j 90, p. 53; Input to the Commanding General's Monthly Update to TRADOC, 15 Feb 9[ 39

Meanwhile, the Army identified the need in 1990 to replace the Q-37 that was based ~pon 1970s technology. Although the Army decided to improve the Q-37 through a non- evelopmental upgrade as an interim solution to locate rockets and field artillery at longer ~angesthan previously, the ANffPQ-47 would be the objective system and offer significant Illlprovements over the Q-37. Upon being fielded early in the first decade of the twenty-frrst ~entury, the Q-47 would provide better tactical and strategic mobility; would furnish Illl?roved accuracy, would double the detection range to sixty kilometers with cannon artIllery,would furnish targeting capabilities of one hundred kilometers for rocket artillery ~d three hundred kilometers for missile artillery, would satisfy' the requirements for the 52 dIgitizedbattlefield and AirLandOperations, and would replace all Q_37s. 4 As the Army and Field Artillery worked on fielding a modernized Q-36 and a new Q- .7 for counterfire missions and long-range precision strike capabilities, they also had to ~lllprovetarget acquisition for close support to the maneuver arms. As anticipated by many bIe1dartilleryofficers in the 1980s, the M981 Fire Support Team Vehicle (FISTV) employed Ythe Fire Support Team (FIST) reaffirmed its inability to keep up with the maneuver arms ~at Wereequipped with the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle during Operation esert Storm. Once funding had become available and once the Cavalry and Infantry had received their Bradley fighting vehicles, the Field Artillery started getting the Bradley A2 Operation Desert Storm (ODS) vehicle, an improved version of the Bradley A2 employed in

'------. ~C; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition", 7 Mar 91, HRDC; Iact ~heet, subj:Firefinder Radar Product Improvement Programs, 23 Jun 95, HRDC; sntervIew,Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, 11 Mar 96, HRDC; Fact nh~et, subj: Firefinder Radars, ANffPQ-36 and 37,21 Feb 95, HRDC; Memorandum for IntIgGen Dean R. Ertwine, subj: Suspension of Q36(V)8 Fielding, 7 Ian 99, HRDC; terview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, Firefinder Program Manager, TSM Target Acquisition, 17 Feb 99, HRDC; Intervi,ew, Dastrup with Gordon Wehri, Chief, Target ~cqUiSition Branch, Materiel, Requirements, and Integration Division, Directorate of B.OtnbatDevelopments (DCD), 6 Mar 00, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder, 21 Jan 99, trefinder File, HRDC. 52Fact Sheet, subj: ATACS/COBRA Program, 3 Sep 91, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: A!ACS, 14 Jan 92, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: ATACS, 3 Sep 91, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup ~Ith Ron Anderson, Firefinder Project Manager, DCD, 17 Feb 99, HRDC; 1996 SAFACFS ACH, pp. 146-47; 1997 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; Interview, Dastrup with Gordon Wehri, Chief, Target Acquisition Branch, DCD, 6 Mar 00, HRDC; Operational ~equirements Document for the ANffPQ-47 Firefinder Radar, Nov 99, HRDC; Fact Sheet, ~t Firefinder ANffPQ-47 (formerly AN'!'PC?--37P3I ~lock II), un~ated, Firefinder File, ..~tUJC; Fact Sheet, subj: ANffPQ-37 FrrefInder ArtIllery LocatIng Radar, undated, Btrefinder File, HRDC; Maj Gen Leo Baxter, "Meeting the Future: State of Field Artillery 1998,"Field A rtillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 98, pp. 1-6. The replacement system for the Q-37 ~ent through several different names: the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System ~ 1990-1991, the Advanced Firefinder System in 1992, the Firefinder ANffPQ-3 7 Block II e-planned Product Improvement Program in 1993, the ANffPQ-37 Block II in 1996, and. the ANffPQ -47 in 1998. 40

Operation Desert Stonn, to replace the M981. To make the Bradley A2 ODS suitable for {Ire support missions, the Anny added a FIST mission package to it and started fielding it to we heavy forces in 2000 as the M7 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) Vehicle.53 With digitization being inherent with Force XXI, the Army had to modernize ~e,l BFIST even more. In 1995 the Army announced a plan to upgrade the BFIST to furnlSb information superiority and to defeat the projected threat in the twenty-first century. InitiaIll, designated the BFIST M7Al but later renamed the BFIST A3 (A3 BFIST) in 1999, ~el modernization effort would add a fire support mission package to the Bradley A2A3 chasstll that was a major component of the Army's digitization initiative for the twenty.fJ!SlI century. 54 . To improve the lasing capabilities of the Combat Observation Lasing Team in heavY! and light forces, in the meantime, the Army initiated action. Through 1997 the co~b~ Observation Lasing Team used the M981 FISTV. Designed for heavy and mechanIze forces, the vehicle presented a unique signature in the light forces that used HMMWVs as, their scout vehicles. In response to this striking discrepancy for the light forces, the u.S'1 Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved a change to the Fire SUPPO~I Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of April 1997 written by the Field ArtillerY School to leverage fire support vehicle technology for the heavy and light forces. In wel document the school retained the BFIST for the heavy forces and urged developing a vehicle with BFIST capabilities for the light forces by integrating a BFIST mission package onto " HMMWV chassis, known as the Striker and later as the Knight after 2002 to avoid confusio~ with the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams being formed. This system would provide we Combat Observation Lasing Team for heavy and light forces with unprecedented mobilitY, flexibility, and stealth. Scheduled for fielding early in the twenty-first century, we, StrikerlKnight for the light forces would be less noticeable because it would present 3 common signature, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, would lower operatiol 1 costs for the Combat Observation Lasing Team, and would be employed by heavy and ligbl forces.55

Fact 53 Sheet, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle System, 9 Aug 02, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 9 Aug 02, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle Upgrade, 26 Mar 02, BFIST File, HRDC; ScoO Gourley, "M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle," Anny, Ju12002, pp. 51-52. I Fact 54 Sheet, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle (M2A3), 26 Nov 01, BFIST FiIe,! HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: BFIST Upgrade, 26 Mar 02, BFIST File, HRDC; Gourley, "M11 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle," pp. 51-52; Fact Sheet, subj: MA2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems, 9 Aug 02, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: The A3,1 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, BFIST File, HRDC; Email, subj: BFIST/Striker, 27 Feb 02, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Robert S. Hribar, Material and Training IntegratiO~i Division, FDIC, 19 Feb 02, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Bradley Program Overview, 5-7 Jtl~. 01, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: BFIST, 2002, HRDC; Memo, subj: None, undated, HRDC; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 141-43. 2000 55 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 144-45; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; DA, Procurement Programs (Extract), FY 2003 Budget Estimatel'1 ~ ...... - ...... ~~~~~c_. . __ • __ . ._._. --

41 h Modernization also involved improving cannon, rocket, and missile systems for the eavy and light forces. During the 1990s, the Field Artillery adopted the MI09A6 (Paladin) self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer "to replace the MI09A2/A3 self-propelled 155-mm. ~?Witzerand devoted extensive time and effort on designing and developing the Advanced leld Artillery System self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, designated the Crusader in December 1994, and the Lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer with digitized command and COntrolcapabilities, upgrading the M119 towed 105-mm. howitzer, and introducing the High M:ObilityArtillery Rocket System (HIMARS), an improved MLRS M270 launcher, and a longer range and more accurate ATACMS. The Army and Field Artillery intended these Weaponsystems along with an improved dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) bomb let, smart munitions, such as the Search-and- Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM), and better fuses to reduce the dud rate of Operation Desert Storm to ensure fire SUpportsuperiority, to support AirLand Operations with deep precision strikes, to fight on the digitized battlefield, and to take the branch into the twenty-first century.56 As the Field Artillery entered the 1990s, it had already started modernizing its ~annon artillery in anticipation of the future battlefield. Recognizing the limitations of the l09A2/A3 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, the Army initiated action in the mid-1980s to replace it. Although the MI09A2/A3 would have better range and increased ammunition carrying capabilities than earlier MI09 models upon the completion of modifications in 1984, the Army still required a new system of howitzers, ammunition vehicles, and Commandand control vehicles. According to the Enhanced Self-Propelled Artillery Weapon Study (ESPAWS) of 1979, field artillery weapon systems had to be capable of continuous operations and possess high rates of fire to support emerging AirLand Battle doctrine. New cannon systems also had to generate greater firepower at reduced personnel costs and ~equiredmore speed to keep up with the new armored vehicles (Abrams tank and Bradley 57 Infantry fighting vehicle) scheduled for fielding in the 1980s. Although costs compelled the Army to abandon fielding a totally new self-propelled ISS-mm. howitzer to supplant the MI09, the ESPAWS Study's stark recommendations generated action to modernize the MI09 once again to support AirLand Battle and be in

"'------Beb 02, p. 396; Maj Gen Michael D. Maples, "2002 State of the Field Artillery," Field A.rtilleryMagazine, Nov-Dec 02, p. 4; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Neil J. Hamill, Material 1{equirements and Integration Division, DCD, 17 Feb 98, HRDC; "BFIST in on the Way," F'ieldArtillery Magazine, May-Jun 97, p. 45; Msg, subj: Answers to Questions, 18 Feb 98, lIRDC; "StrikerlReconnaissance Team," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 96, p. 38. 56"Name-that-Howitzer: Crusader, a Knight for the 21st Century," Field Artillery Magazine, Dec 94, p. 3. To minimize confusion, the new 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer \\rillbe called the Crusader. 57MajRoger A. Rains, "Readiness: The Field Artillery Takes Aim," Anny, Mar 85, p.41; Lt Col (Ret) Browder A. Willis, "HELP for the MI09 Self-Propelled Howitzer," Field A.rtillery Journal, May-Jun 83, pp. 35-37; Decision Coordinating Paper, 155-mm SP 1I0witzer (HIP), Nov 89, pp. 2-3, HRDC; Briefing, subj: 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer Improvement Program, undated, HRDC; Col (Ret) Anthony Pokorny, "Take the Tech," Field" A..rtilleryJournal, Sep-Oct 84, p. 21; Briefing, subj: Fire Support, Jan 88, HRDC. 42

service through the 1990s. Following upon the recommendations of the ESP AWS StudJ, U.S, Anny Materiel Command and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (1RADOC ' jointly launched the Howitzer Extended Life Program (HELP) in 1981 to upgrade ~ • M109A2/A3 with a focus on improving reliability and adding nuclear, biological, aJI, chemical protection as mandated by Congress.58 1 Notwithstanding this decision to move ahead with the HELP howitzer, several grouP.' continued examining the state offield artillery weapon systems and delivered insightful b~,I discouraging comments about the HELP howitzer. The Mission Element Needs Stateme~I' of December 1980 concluded that the M 109A2/A3's ability to respond rapidly was slO\Ve/' down by the use of the aiming cirCle, wire communications, voice communications, aJl : centralized fire direction computation procedures and that the weapon system lacke 1 I protection for the .crew and urged improving the MI09 beyond the proposed HELr enhancements. Subsequently, the Fire Support Mission Area Analysis of 1981 found t1JI ' M109 even with HELP enhancements to have grave shortcomings in responsivenesi . tenninal effects, reliability, availability, and maintainability, while the Division Suppoi , Weapon System Study (DSWS) of 1980-1983 found the HELP howitzer to lack-sufficienl, ~ mobility for the future battlefield. To eliminate these prominent deficiencies and others thd ' l the HELP howitzer program failed to address and to carry the Field Artillery into the 19905 DSWS outlined three options to improve the Anny's self-propelled cannon systems. 'f/JI,1 : Anny could adopt a totally new howitzer, acquire the SP70 Self-propelled 155-nJIIl : Howitzer being developed cooperatively by the United Kingdom, Italy, and the FedeJ '

Republic of Germany, or field an improved version of the HELP howitzer.59 1

After considering the options, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Maxwell F' 1 Thunnan, announced his decision. He rejected acquiring a new howitzer and purchasing WI

SP70 because both options were too expensive and chose to upgrade the M109A2/AJ 1 through the Howitzer Improvement Program (HIP) howitzer initiative. The fourth in a serle'l ] of improvements to the original MI09 fielded in the 1960s, the IDP howitzer would be 'i I follow-on howitzer to the HELP howitzer. The HIP program outlined upgrading WI, ' M 109A2I A3 by inclUding HELP's enhancements and addressing the deficiencies outlined bY. ' the various studies to introduce a howitzer with the ability of furnishing close, continuoul fire support and improved mobility to stay abreast of maneuver arms. The HIP howitzel would also have the ability of emplacing rapidly, firing a few rounds, and then displaciul . quickly to avoid hostile counterfire. With the realization that the HELP and HIP howitz~ ] developmental programs were concurrent and costly, General Thurman decided I~ I November 1984 to combine the two. Only one howitzer-- the HIP __would be developed :

58DivisionSupport Weapon System (DSWS) Main Report (SINOFORN WNINTEL~ l ] extract, Jul 83, pp. 4-16, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Decision Coordinating Pape!, : 155-mm. SP Howitzer (IDP), Nov 89, pp. 3, 5-6, HRDC; Willis, "HELP for the M109 Self. I Propelled Howitzer," pp. 35-37; "HELP Program Continues," Field Artillery Joumal, Jau. ] Feb 83,g. 47; 1991 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 216-18. DSWS Main Report (SINOFORNWNINTEL), extract, IuI83, pp. 4-2, 4-16, 4-11, material used is unclassified, HRDC; 1991 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 217-18; 1992 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 133-34. 43

andfielded. Based upon this decision, the HIP howitzer developed quickly into a high acquisition priority within the Field Artillery.6o. ' . . After seven years of development and testing, the Army started fielding HIP howitzer In~d-1993. With its advanced technology the HIP, renamed the Paladin in 1990~allowed taking the officers off the gun line and putting noncommissioned officers in charge of the gUnline. As the system's final test and operational evaluation demonstrated, the Paladin iiOsse~se?the capabi~ity ~f.operating autonomously in disp~rse? ~perati?~s and recei~ing a re IlUsslon, computIng flnng data, selecting and taking up Its flnng pOSItIon,automatIcally Unl?ckingand pointing its cannon, and firing and moving out without any external technical a~Slstance. Such characteristics permitted firing the first round from the move in less than ~Ixt~seconds to give the system a "shoot-and-scoot" capability to protect the crew from OShiecounterbattery fire and to provide better responsiveness than the MI09A2/A3 that tOokup to eleven minutes to respond to call to fire while on the move. The Paladin also had apressurized crew compartment to guard against ballistic, nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, a maximum speed of thirty-five miles-per-hour to give it the ability to keep up with ~heAbrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle, and secure digital and voice communications. 61 uch characteristics furnished the Paladin with revolutionary advances over older MI09s. As the Field Artillery and Army fielded the Paladin, they worked on the next- ~eneration 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer. Recognizing that the HIP howitzer was an Interim solution, General Thurman directed the Army in November 1984 to begin work on thenext-generation self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer that would take advantage of quantum ~echnologicaladvances to improve availability, range, rate of fire, ammunition lethality, and attlefield mobility.62 The end of the Cold War, Operation Desert Storm lessons learned, budget reductions, ~d Congressional and Department of Defense guidance prompted the Army to reevaluate its ~.eav~ Force Modernization Program that listed the Block III Tank, the Future Infantry 19htIngVehicle, and the Combat Mobility Vehicle as procurement priorities ahead of the new self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer and had stalled serious progress with introducing a new self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer.63 Besides renaming the program the Armored

""'"'------1\ 6oBoyd L. Dastrup, Modemizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991 (Fort Sill, OK: D.S. llny Field Artillery Center and School, 1993, and reprinted by The U.S. Army Center of ~~litary History, 2003), pp. 19-20; See footnote 30 on page 83 for complete listing of PfImary source documents; 1991 USAFACFS ACH, p. 219. 6lFact Sheet, subj: MI09A6 Paladin Self-propelled Howitzer, undated, HRDC; Fact ~heet: subj: Paladin Self-propelled howitz~r, MI09~6, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, .subj: aladln, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, sub]: PaladIn 155-mm. Self-propelled HOWItzer, ~Udated, HRDe; Fact Sheet, subj: M109A6 Paladin Self-propelled Howitzer, undated, R.nc; 1992 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 131-41; 1993 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 125-36; 2003 ~SAFACFS ACH, p. 8';Lt Col Kerry J. Loudenslager and Cpt Ryan J. LaPorte, "Paladin latoon Operations versus Battery Operations," FieldArtillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 2001, pp. 16-19. 62Briefing, subj: Advanced Field Artillery System, 9 Apr 86, HRDC. 63DA,Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1986, p. 40; 1989 USAFACFS ACH~pp. 'M . J Systems MOdernization Program and emphasizing the introduction of technolog!c,t advanced annored systems rather than making evolutionary improvements to eXIs'j systems as the focus had been, the Army recognized the urgency of introducing an impro , 155-rnm. self-propen. ed howitzer" made Crusader and its resupply vehicle the lead Pf(~ectj 30 October 1991, and deferred further development on the other weapons systems. , Although the new self-propelled howitzer would be a world-class cannon syste, . capable of fighting on a digitized battlefield,would close the range gap between Ameri', and foreign systems, and would provide the mobility and survivability needed to keep Pj with fast-moving maneuver operations, among other capabilities, the system faced.criti challenges from detractors as it. was being developed. Beginning early in 1995 lav' continuing over the next several years, opponents questioned the rationale for the new sel propelled howitzer. They urged adopting the German PzH2000 155-mm. self-propell howitzer already in production as a viable alternative and as a cost-saving measure in an J of declining Army budgets. Although the PzH2000 was a sound system, the Army, suppo~ by the Undersecretary of Defense, Dr. Paul G. Kaminiski, repeatedly insisted through I 1996 the German howitzer's failure to satis?, the required criteria, resisted adopting it, II! found support from an unexpected source.6 ,

151-52; 1991 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 231-32; Briefing, subj: Advanced Field Artille System, 9 Apr 86, HRDC; Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, subj: Armored systeJ, Modernization Program, 5 Dee 91, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with John Spicer, TS Cannon, 8 Jan 92, HRDC; "Advanced Howitzer Gains the Top Spot Among Army's Plann 1 Armored V~hicles,': Anned Forces Journal International, Feb 92, p. 46; Briefing, su~ Advanced FIeld Amllery System, 9 Apr 86, HRDC; Memorandum for Chief, Concepts a; Studies Division, DCD, USAFAS, subj: Heavy Forces Family of Vehicles, 25 Apr 8 HRDC; Memorandum, subj: Final Draft Umbrella Operational and Organizational Plan ~ Heavy Force Family of Vehicles, 7 May 85, HRDC; 1986 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 65-li. , Disposition Form, subj: Armored Family of Vehicles, formerly Heavy Forces Family, Vehicles, 8 Aug 85, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Armored Family of Vehicles, 13 Aug 8I HRDC; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Armored Family of Vehicles Task For)! Phase I Study Report, 20 Nov 87, HRDC. '

64Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, subj: Armored Systems Modernizati I Program, 5 Dec 91, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with John Spicer, TSM Cannon, 8 Jan 9) HRDC; "Advanced Howitzer Gains the Top Spot Among the Army's Planned Armor, Vehicles," p. 46; Memorandum for Assistance Secretary of Army for Researet Development, and Acquisition, subj: Executive Summary of the Revised Armored Syst~ Modernization-Future Acquisition Strategy, undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, V'l Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center, subj: Results of PM, Preliminary Design Review and Entry into Phase II of Contract DAAA21-91-C00038, ( Apr 92, HRDC; Memorandum, subj: Armored Systems Modernization, 11 Ju191, HRD Stephen K. Conver, "From the Army Acquisition Executive," Army Research, DeVe!opme, and Acquisition Bulletin, Jul-Aug 92, p. 57; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 19 and 1991, pp. 11,83. ,

651996 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 112-16; U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Vol II, Anne1 l I 45

In 1996-1997 the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the Crusader program ~todetermineits status and the availability of viable alternatives. GAO concluded in a report 1of6 June 1997, "No existing artillery system met all of the Crusader requirements. ,,66 I As the Army and Field Artillery opposed adopting the PzH2000 and received outside ~endorsementof a new self-propelled howitzer, work on Crusader and its resupply vehicle Illlovedforward.67 Besides being suited to the digitized battlefield, the fifty-five ton Crusader l\VoUldoperatecompletely autonomously, fire up to ten rounds a minute at ranges in excess lOffortykilometers, and travel at speeds over forty-eight kilometers per hour cross country landsixty-seven kilometers per hour on a hard surface road. The Crusader would be lacCompaniedby a fifty-five ton resupply vehicle designed to keep the howitzer supplied with lammunition, fuel, and other supplies in forward positions so that it would not have to be I~Ul1edoutof combat to rearm, refuel, and resupply. These performance capabilities would lki"'arf the Paladin's four rounds a minute rate of fIre and cross country speed of twenty-seven I~lometers per hour and speed of fIfty-six kilometers per hour on hard surface roads. Ie oreover, a single Crusader would cover the same area a5~ four Paladins, while two I rusaders would engage targets at the same rate as a six-howitzer Paladin battery.68

i 1 Meanwhile, the Army and the Field Artillery School explored adopting a new towed 155-mm. howitzer to replace the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Through most of the i 9~Os,the M198 satisfied the Army. The howitzer had a range of thirty kilometers and IWelghedfifteen thousand pounds to make it the lightest towed 155-mm. howitzer in the l\Vorldthatwas capable of reaching that range and met the Army's needs for a general support ,~eapon in the light division. When the United States shifted its military strategy from orward-deployed forces in Europe to force projection early in the 1990s, lightweight ,\Veaponsassumed a greater importance. They offered greater strategic and tactical mobility than heavier weapons.69 I Shortcomings of the M198 during Operation Desert Storm, particularly its limited ,Strategic deployability, tactical mobility, and lengthy displacement time in the desert Prompted the Army and the Marine Corps to look for a new towed 155-mm. howitzer. In October 1993 the two services signed a memorandum of agreement to replace the M 198 with ~------C,Jan 93, pp. GI8-GI9, Modernization File, HRDC. Also seeFNs 60-71, pp. 112-16, 1996 USAFACFS ACH. ' 66GAO Report, subj: Army Armored Systems, 6 Jun' 97, pp. 10-13, HRDC. . 671998 USAFACFS ACH, p. 116; Briefing, subj: Crusader: The Army XXI f;'t.repowerRevolution, 2 Feb 99, HRDC; Msg with Encls, subj: Meeting with Gen (R) Itlscassi, 2 Oct 97, HRDC. This message contains the letters that General Baxter sent to lllembers of the National Defense Panel explaining the revolutionary status of the Crusader, trying to win their support and prevent funding reductions. 68Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 85, HRDC; Fact Sheet, SUbj:Crusader, 15 Aug '02, Crusader File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Crusader 155mm Self- Propelled Howitzer, 15 Aug 02, Crusader File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Crusader Advanced f;'ieldArtillery' System, undated, Crusader File, HRDC. D 69Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 86, HRDC; Interview, astrup with Steve Johnson, TSM Cannon, 10 Mar 94, HRDC. . 46 J a lightweight towed 155-rnm. howitzer with a maximum weight of nine thousand pounds a range of thirty kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles.70 Although a joint prograrol produce the Lightweight 155-mm. Towed Howitzer, also called the XM777, emerged outJ the effort, a fundamental differenc;e between the two services' needs stood out. The MarlJ Corps had an immediate requirement for a towed 155-rnm. howitzer to supplant the Ml~, and the aging MIDI, a 1930s vintage towed I05-mm. howitzer, and planned to field tb 'Lightweight 155 without digital capabilities and to digitize the weapon system after fieldill." Whereasthe Army intended to adopt a fully digitized Lightweight 155.71 , Although congressional funding restrictions and the push by the Army to develop new towed 105-mm. howitzer threatened to kill the Lightweight 155 during the latter ye~ of the 1990s, developmental work moved forward.72 Unveiled at Picatinney Arsenal, Ne Jersey, in June 2000, the Lightweight 155 held out great promise. The howitzer's reduc~ size and weight allowed two howitzers to fit into one C-130 aircraft. Additionally, ~ howitzer could be emplaced in three minutes or less, could be displaced in two minutes I less, could fire faster than the Ml98, had a range of thirty kilometers, could shoot traditi?I1 munitions and the fire-and- forget precision projectile, the Excalibur Extended- Range G~d IJ Projectile under development, and was easier to manhandle. Upon fielding; the ExCallb projectile would carryDPICM with an improved fuse to reduce the dud rate, the Search-anJ Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM), or the Unitary Munition to give the Field Artillet unprecedented flexibility with a single projectile.73 . I More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization package distinguished tb

7~mail with atch, subj: ManuscriptReview, 8 Dec 03, p. 86, HRDC; Intervie j Dastrup with Johnson, 10 Mar 94; Memorandum of Agreement between the Department J the Army, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Developme~ and the U.S. Marine Corps, Combat Development Command, Oct 93, HRDC; USAFA;' Program and Project Summary Sheets, 1 Feb 94, pp. 1-1 _ 1-2, HRDC. 71Interview, Dastrup with Johnson, 21 Feb 96, HRDC. , 72Interview, Dastrup with John Yager, TSM Cannon, 7 Mar 00, HRDC; Email wi atch, subj: LW155, 16 Mar 00, HRDC; "Controversy over the Lightweight HowitZJi Continues with GAO Report," Inside the Army, 7 Aug 00, pp. 1, 11, 12, HRDC. 73Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 88, HRDC; Intervie , Dastrup with John Yager, TSM Cannon, 16 Feb 01, HRDC;John Yager, "New Lightweigb 155mm Towed Howitzer Unveiled," Fon Sill Cannoneer, 27 Jun 00, pp. la, 2a, HRDC "U.S. Artillery Program Takes Delivery of Guns," Defense News, 17 Jul 00, p. 10, HRD~ Fact Sheet, subj: XM777 LW 155 Howitzer, undated, HRDC; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, P1, 94-95. In Fiscal Year 2001 the Army and Congress failed to fund SADARM. WI tenninated SADARM production and basically ended the program. In 2001 the Ann! started exploring using the German Smart 155 and the Bonus 155 developed by Bofors ~ Sweden because they were in production and reliable as replacements for SADARM. ~ further negated the need for SADARM. See 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81. That same ye3l! the Army decided to field ouly the unitary Excalibur because unitary produced low collater', damage that was critical in urban warfare, while DPICM caused collateral damage frod unexploded bomblets. See 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 47

Army'sversion of the Lightweight 155 from the M198. As the Army explained, the package ~OU~dgivethe howitzer onboard digital capabilities like those associated with self-propelled , OWltzers,such as the Paladin and the futuristic Crusader, would make the Lightweight 155 ~Uperiortothe M 198 upon fielding in 2005,and would make itfit with the emerging digital attlefield of the twenty-first century.74 I Meanwhile, the Army upgraded itsMI19 towed 105-mrn. howitzer. Fielded between 989 and 1996 to replace the venerable M102 towed 10S-mm. howitzer introduced in the

i 1960s, the Ml19 demonstrated maintenance and operational problems that required Correcting. Largely thro~gh the efforts of the 82nd Airborne Division, the Army introduced theHowitzer Light Artillery System Improvement Program in 1998 to reduce maintenance Problemsand to improve the M 119 to make it more suitable for power projection missions of the 82nd Airborne Division.75 . Power projection and Operation Desert Storm also highlighted the need to introduce the High Mobility Artillery. Rocket System (HIMARS) and to modernize MLRS and J\~ ACMS. During the early 1980s, the 9th Infantry Division documented the requirement for ~ lIght multiple rocket launcher for the light forces, but the Army and the Field Artillery chool failed to take any interest in it and continued focusing on the heavy forces. As the concern about the projection of contingency forces to respond to worldwide crises grew as the Cold War began waning at the end of the 1980s, the Army's and the Field Artillery School's attitudes about a deployable multiple rocket launcher to support,the light forces 76 llloved from indifference to enthusiasm. Understanding the inherent limitations of tactical air support, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, and corps artillery and the need for mobile counterfire for light forces, the Field77 Artillery School finally acknowledged the drawbacks ofMLRS and the need for H1MARS. ------74Email atch, subj: LW155, 1 Mar 01, HRDC; Andrew Koch, "General Dynamics to Develop TAD System," Jane's Defense Weekly, 27 Sep 00; p. 8, HRDC; Email, subj: LW 1~5 Info, 16 Feb 01, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: TAD, undated, HRDC; "The XM777 ~Ightweight I55-mrn. Howitzer," Anny, Oct 00. pp. 303-04, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with ager, 16 Feb 01, HRDC; Yager, "New Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer Unveiled," Pp. la, 2a, HRDC; "Controversy Over LIghtweight Howitzer Continues with GAO Report," Pp. 1, 11, 12, HRDC; Email msg with atch, subj: LW155, 7 Mar 02, HRDC; Interview, Dastrop with Yager, 1 Feb 02, HRDC; Briefing, subj: LW 155 Howitzer and TAD, 10ct01, lIRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TSM Cannon, 4 Feb 02, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Yager, 1 Feb 02, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: LW 155,6 Feb 02, lIRDC; Email, subj: Program Manager, 6 Feb 02, HRDC. 75Email withatch.subj:ManuscriptReview.8Dec03.p.112. HRDC; 2002 tJSAFACFS ACH, pp. 69-70. 76Draft White Paper, U.S. Army Missile Command, Advanced Systems Concept Office, subj: Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System, 17 Jan 90, HRDC. 77Draft White Paper, subj: Light Artillery Rocket System, 19 Mar 90, HRDC; Operational and Organizational Plan for the H1MARS, 21 Dec 90, HRDC; Memorandum for edr, TRADOC, subj: Final Draft Operational and Organizational Plan for HIMARS, 1 Aug 90,HRDC. 48 l The MLRS's weight restricted its strategic mobility and reinforced the requirement for a li~ deployable mUltiple rocket launcher to support the light forces in low- to mid-inten~I(. conflicts and heavy forces for a limited period of time until MLRS launchers could arnVi, On 10 April 1990 General Hallada,wrote General Foss, "I intend to develop a requirement ~

this July [199.0] for a light w. eightMLRS, wheeled or tracked, that is deployable on a C13~ but which retains the munitions flexibility of the current system [MLRS].,,78 ~ , , Soon, events in Southwest Asia pressured'the Army to fund HIMARS. In Operati Desert Shield of 1990, the Army flew MLRS launchers from Fort Sill and Fort Bragg, NoJ! Carolina, to provide long-range fires for the initial units in . This was costly in te~ of the number of aircraft required. EqUally important, the launchers did not arrive with ~' initial forces. "Had fighting begun immediately, the corps would have had no long ran~/] rocket artillery fires,79 " the XVIII Airborne Corps observed in a message to Forces Colllffillll in September 1991. Given the strategic mobility limitations of MLRS, long-range fiI:i rt s.uppo for8o the corps could be tenuous in power projection missions in the future witho~ HIMARS. ~ Although finding the funds to develop HIMARS proved to be challenging throug] most of the 1990s, the Army and the Field Artillery School pushed acquisition forward wid' prototypes being developed by the end of the decade. After the successful Rapid F01 Projection Initiative Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration with four HIMAIt,] prototypes in mid-1998 at Fort Bragg had been completed, Lieutenant Colonel Donald ~i Gentry and Major Cullen G. Barabato of the 3-27th Field Artillery of the XVIII AirboI1\' Corps wrote, "HIMARS is a significant leap forward in fire support for early entry and lig!1

forces. Light force commanders Who must deploy to undeveloped areas soon will have tb/1 firepower normally associated with heavier forces with the fielding ofHIMARS early in ~' twenty- first century. ,,81The Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps, LieutenaJI General William F. Kernan, expressed similar thoughts in an interview upon noting',' "HIMARS is paramount to our SUccessand survivability.,,82 I' As the need for deploying for worldwide contingency operations grew mOl" significant as the twentieth. century drew to a close, the require~ent for lightweight; mobil, firepower grew exponentially. Enhanced firepower for hghtforces would IIn rov, p survivability; and HIMARS with its digital capabilities would furnish the requisit firepower. In view of this, the Army approved an accelerated HIMARS developmen~.j

Msg 78 , Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: MLRS for Contingency Forces, 101900Z Apr 90, HRDC. 79Msg, Cdr, XVIII Airborne Corps, to Cdr, Forces Command (FORSCOM), sUbJ • Requirement for HIMARS in XVIII Corps, 161900Z Sep 91, HRDC. j 80Ibid.; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, FORSCOM, subj: Requirement for HIMARS jj XVIII Airborne Corps, 061200Z Nov 91, HRDC. j Lt 81 Col Donald E. Gentry and Maj Cullen G. Barbato, "HIMARS: Firepower fO Early Entry Forces," Field Artillery MagaZine, Ian-Feb 99, p. 19. II 82Interview, Patrecia S. Hollis with Lt Gen William F. Kernan, Field Artilleri Magazine, Ian-Feb 99, p. 3. I 49 83 Programwith the goal of equipping the first unit by 2005. I Meanwhile, two critical factors generated the drive to modernize the MLRS M270 auncher. Early in 1990, the Army realized that the M270 was growing obsolete with its electronicparts becoming more expensive and difficult to obtain by the twenty-frrst century. 1'0 combat the growing obsolescence, the Army initiated the Improved Fire Control Systems ~rogramin 1992 to replace existing electronic systems and to provide the growth potential Or future munitions. Subsequently, the analysis of Operation Desert Storm demonstrated theneed for a more responsive and survivable MLRS launcher to engage highly mobile ~gets, such as mobile rocket launchers. This led to the Improved Launcher84 Mechanical Ystemprogram in 1995 'to decrease the launcher's aiming and loading time. For a couple of years, the Improved Fire Control System and the Improved Launcher Mechanical System modification's were two separate programs. As a result of the integrated test program initiative, the Army combined the two programs in 1997 to produce the M270Al for fighting on the digitized battlefield with fielding early in the twenty-first ~ntury. The M270Al would shoot the entire family of MLRS munitions, including the ~tended-Range MLRS Rocket, the Guided MLRS rocket, and the Unitary MLRS rocket ~l1hits three different fuse capabilities. The prOXimityfuse capability would pennit a large burstover the target, while the point -detonating fuse capability would reduce the size of the f Urstto minimize collateral damage, a serious concern during the Gulf War. The time-delay tusecapability would allow the rocket to penetrate certain types of structures or targets and hen detonate the rocket. 85 Even before serious work on the M270Al had begun, an urgent need led to a parallel ~pgrade effort with the M270 launcher. In 1993 the Army detennined that the ATACMS lock IA would receive its Global Positioning System (GPS) initialization data directly from the launcher. Although the M270Al would have that capability, the ATACMS Block IA Wouldbe introduced in 1998 before the launcher could be fielded. In view of this, the Army Opted to upgrade the M270 launcher by incorporating GPS capabilities to create the ~------83Information Paper, subj: HIMARS, 27 Feb 02, HIMARS File, HRDC; Information ~aper, subj: HIMARS, 2001, HIMARS File, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: HIMARS, 23 nee 99, HIMARS File, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: HIMARS, 2000, HIMARS File, RnC;-2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 130. .. 84Interview with atch, Dastrup with Maj Patrick J. Sutherland, TSM RAMS, 24 Feb ~, HRDC; Fiscal Year (FY) 99 Annual Report (Extract), Director of Operational Test and valuation, subj: MLRS M270Al Launcher, HRDC. 851997USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; Fact Sheet, subj: MLRS Launcher Improvements, 1998, HRDC; "M270Al Production to Begin," MLRS Dispatch, Third Quarter 1998, p. 5, lIRDc; Report (Summary), Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, subj: MLRS !\1270Al Launcher, 12,Feb 99, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Sutherland, 24 Feb 00, lIRDC; Email with atch, subj: MLRS, 13 Mar 00, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Jeff ~roysland, TSM RAMS, 2 Mar 00, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Rockets, 6 Mar 00, lIRDC; Memorandum for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 1999 USAFACFS ACH, 29Mar 00, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Froysland, 21 Feb 01, HRDC; Email with atch, . SUbj: MLRS Input for 2000 Annual Command History, 22 Feb 01, HRDC 50

Improved Positioning Determining System launcher with the ability of fIring the ATACM'J' Block IA and began fIelding the launcher early in 1998.86 I . As the Army worked to modernize the MLRS launcher, it also initiated action J' improve ATACMS, also known as ATACMS Block I. Based upon their experience /' Operation Desert Storm in 1991, commanders, their staffs, and users visualized the need {Ol • a longerrange ATACMS. Some insisted that the current range was inadequate and restrictC : the number of targets that could be engaged. With engineering changes the system co~11r achieve twice or more the range of the current, battle-tested ATACMS Block I to glV!j commanders more flexibility to attack deep targets, to compensate for availability ShOrtfa1~ with tactical air caused by other priorities, weather, and darkness, and to attack targets mO) 87 quickly than tactical air could. ATACMS Block lA, as the improved system Wi I designated in 1994, would have a range of seventy to three hundred kilometers, would ha~l : increased accuracy byemP.loYing a GPS navigational system, and would be fielded early l . the twenty-first century. 88 . l . As it worked on the ATACMS lA, the Army initiated work on ATACMS Block J,I and IIA that would have longer ranges than ATACMS Block I and IA and soon coupled!bl : ATACMS IIA with the Brilliant Anti-armor (BAT) submunition, a precision munitiooj : initially intended to engage and destroy armored forces. When budget reductions end4 : development on the Tri-Service Standoff Missile in 1993, the Army decided to Us/I . 89 ATACMS Block IIA to carry BAT. Although the original justifIcation for BAT ha~ I disappeared with the end of the Cold War, the Army explained in 1994, "The greate#1 potential threat to US Forces is that posed by armored and motorized forces. These highiJ I mobile armored maneuver forces, supported by armed helicopters, are expected to purSl111i battlefIeld objecti ves using numerical force superiority, speed, and penetration,,,90 The Arn1J ' also noted its inadequate capability to attack armored vehicles and surface-to-surface missile 1 . launchers beyond the range of close combat weapons and the urgent need for aliil : autonomous, terminal homing submunition to defeat moving and stationary targets in !bel. second echelon of the threat array. Upon fIelding in the twenty-fIrst century, ATACMS . I Block IIA with BAT would address those needs.91. . As planned, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) woulDi1 ' replace the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFlRE) of the 1980s and would tie the field, . artillery system of systems together by improving Command, control, and communicationS. .

1997 86 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84; "2-18 CertifIed on ~LRS IPDS Use,:' ~0SI . Dispatch, Second Quarter 1998, p. 4, HRDC; Fact Sheet, sub]: Improved POSItIonIng Determining System Launcher, 1998, HRDC. 871995 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 130-31. bid 88/ ., p. 130; Fact Sheet, subj: ATACMS, 1998, HRDC; Interview, with Maj Jay1 Hilliard, TSM RAMS, 5 Feb 99, HRDC; Report (Summary), Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, subj: ATACMS Block lA, 12 Feb 99, HRDC. 89Ibid.; 1995 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 108-10. 90Integrated Logistics Support Plan for the BAT Submunition, Jul 94, pp. 1-2. HRDC. 91Ibid. 51

After a decade of work on the hardware and software that was fraught with many developmental delays, the Army settled on introducing AFATDS software incrementally in versions with each building on the previous to get the software to the field sooner rather than 92 Waitingfor the objective software to be completed in the future. On 27 April -1990 the Army signed the full-scale development contract with Magnavox for version one (later named AFATDS 96) software. Fielded in 1996-1997, AFATDS 96 provided initial functionality at all echelons of fire support from the corps to platoon level, and integrated field artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, and close air support into planning and execution functions.93 . To accommodate' growing requirements the Army revamped the AFATDS software fIelding schedule in 1996. It chose to field version two in three different variations as t\FATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99 in 1997, 1998, and 1999 respectively and field Versionthree as the objective system in 2000 as AFATDS 00. Fielded in 1998 after software developmental delays, AFATDS 97 furnished corps and echelons-above corps functionality, lllodified MLRS/ ATACMS command and control. processes, and enabled field artillery94 COmmandersto plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before. SUbsequently, developmental problems caused the Army to field AFATDS 98 in 2000 and 2001 and to reschedule AFA TDS 99 fielding into 2001 and AFATDS 00, renamed AFATDS yersion seven in 2000 to match the Army Battlefield Control System numbering system, for Initial testing to 2002.95 , Meanwhile, the Army introduced the Initial Fire Support Automation System (IFSAS) as an interim system until AFATDS could be fielded. The Army fielded IFSAS to the active component and the Army National Guard in the 1990s. For the Guard, IFSAS automated its fire support for the first time.96 In the midst of this far-reaching Force XXI modernization effort to implement the lessons of Operation Desert Storm Army wide, to carry the Field Artillery into the twenty- first century, and to give the branch the ability to fight on a digitized battlefield, the Army's lllodemization priorities suddenly shifted'. Upon becoming the Chief of Staff of the Army in June 1999, General Erik K. Shinseki expressed the need for the Army to eliminate the deficiencies underscored by the Task Force Hawk deployment to Kosovo early in 1999. The Army's heavy forces were too heavy, took too long to deploy, and were too difficult to lllaneu~er in areas of the world where they might have to deploy; while Army's light forces

------922000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 149-50. 93/bid., pp. 150-51. 94/bid., pp. 151-52; Information Paper, AFATDS, 2000, HRDC. 95Email with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 98, HRDC; 2000 tJSAFACFS ACH, pp. 153-55; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with William Sailers, Dep Dir, l'SM FATDS, 20 Feb 02, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: AFATDS, 5 Mar 02, HRDC; Maj ltichard H. Owens, "ARNG Fielding AFATDS," Field Artillery Magazine; Jan-Feb 02, p. 21; Point Paper, subj: AFATDS, 2001, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: AFATDS, undated, BRoC. 961994 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 200-15. 52

were too light and lacked staying power and lethality.97 General.. Shinseki astutely observe,0 l in Iune 1999, "[The] Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agiJe,I with a smaller logistical footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, ~~I : tactically mobile. ,,98As he later clarified, General Shinseki wanted to erase the distinCtlOl between the heavy and light forces and to build a totally new force structure for futufl1' warfare around combat systems with the survivability of the Abrams tank and the BradleY,l I fighting vehicle but with the strategic mobility ofIight systems to permit the Army to deploY,I an independen~ c.o~bat b?g~de anywh~~e in the world within 96 hours, a division within 1201 : hours, and 5 dIVISIonsWIthIn30 days. ,. Unveiled in October 1999 and built upon the thinking of the previous four month~I' General Shinseki's Transformation of the Army vision outlined maintaining a Legacy Force : of existing systems to maintain current capabilities While transforming the rest of the AnnY!i in a series of steps beginning with creating an Initial Force, then an Interim Force, and, . finally the Objective Force of medium-weight systems with the capabilities of heavy and • light forces. This vision had critical implications for the Field Artillery. 100 Late in 1999, th i . e, Army terminated the MSTAR and ATACMS Block IIA programs to help fundfotming thei I medium-weight brigades and procuring appropriate weapon systems, made the ATACMS . Block II th,e carrier for BAT, and even contemplated discontinuing the Crusader because 1I , many senior Army officers found it to be too heavy. 101 I With support from General Shinseki Who liked the Crusader's capabilities and its l resupply vehicle, disliked their collective weight of over one hundred tons, and wanted theJJ1 ' to be an integral member of the Army's dominant maneuver force, the Army restructured the 1

Email 97 with atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dee 03, p. 3, HRDC; Email with atcb'l ; subj: Transformation Activities in Congress, 14 Feb 00, HRDC; Briefing, subj: . Transformation Campaign Plan, 19 Ian 00, HRDC; The Brigade Combat Teartl l Organizational and Operational Concept, 6 Ian 00, p. 4, HRDC; Intent of the Chief of staff, . Army, 23 Iun 99, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CSA Expands on Presentation tol Association of the United States Army (AUSA) in Oct, 1Feb 00, HRDC; Email, subj: Initial,l Bde--Historical Reporting, 22 Dee 99, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Transformation Campaigo Plan, 19 Ian 00, HRDC. See Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 Sep 01, HRDC, fori background on the Transformation of the Army and military forces. 98Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army, 23 lun 99, HRDC. 9~mail with ateh, subj: CSA Expands on Presentation to AUSA in Oct, 1Feb 00, HRDC; "Army Announces Vision for the Future," U.S. Army News Release, 12 Oct 99, HRDC; 1999 USAFACFS ACH, p. 63.

100 Army Announces Vision for the Future," U.S. Army News Release, 12 Oct 99, HRDC; Vision Statement, 23 lun 99, HRDC; CSA R~marks at Dwight D. Eisenhower Luncheon, AUSA, 22 Oct 02, p. 5, CSA Remarks File, HRDC. 10IEmail with ateh, subj: Crusader, 5 Ian 00, HRDC; Email with ateh, subj: Special Report, 4 Ian 00, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Stephen Hitz, TSM Cannon, 7 Mat 00, HRDC; "Secretary of the Army Says Crusader Still Viable," Army Link News, 15 No" 99, HRDC; U.S Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, p. 30, Posture Statement File, HRDC. 53

Crusader program in December 1999. The Army reduced the weight of the howitzer and its resUpply vehicle to make them more strategically deployable without losing their' key Performance parameters. In view of this, the Army intended to field the lighter Crusader and theM270Al MLRS launcher to the Legacy Force of modernized heavy forces that-had been organized and equipped during the Cold War. Even though most of the Legacy Force, later renamed the Current Force, would be Paladin and M270 MLRS launcher 'based, it would guarantee near-term capabilities by returning selected systems to like-new conditions (recapitalization) and by introducing new systems to guarantee near-term fighting capabilities, while Transformation of the Army's Interim and Objective Forces were being developed. The Paladin, for example, would be kept a viable system through gradual Upgrading. Likewise, many of the heavy, older M270 MLRS launchers. would be replaced 102 by the lighter, the more deployable HIMARS. In comparison, the Lightweight 155, HIMARS, and AFATDS developmental ~rogramsdid not require revamping to satisfy General Shinseki's vision of the future. With Itsstrong emphasis on deployability, the Transformation of the Army made the Lightweight 155 and HIMARS part of the Interim Force to complement the interim armored vehicle being developed, while the Objective Force would be designed around the multi-functional Future Combat System. This meant that the Lightweight 155 andHIMARS would eVentually be phased out of the inventory along with the Crusader and Cold War vintage sYstems. In contrast, the stress on digitization that was a critical aspect of the transformation 103 effort ensured a place for AFATDS in the long-term. . The Transformation of the Army completely altered the direction of field artillery ll1odernization. If General Shinseki's vision were fully implemented, the Army would be composed of medium-weight systems with strategic deployability and the attributes of heavy armored systems reminiscent of the Cold War. The Field Artillery's system of systems Wouldremain in the Transformation of the Army, but it would not focus on fighting on a Cold War battlefield with strategic deploy ability being a minor consideration as it had been ------102Emaiiwith atch, subj: Manuscript Review, 8 Dec 03, p. 102, HRDC; Briefing, SUbj:Recapitalization of the Legacy Force, 17 Oct 00, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Army l'ransformation, 17 Oct 00, HRDC; 2001 Army Modernization Plan (Extract), Executive Summary, pp. 11, 24, HRDC; Testimony, General Shinseki before Senate Armed Services COmmittee, 10 Jul 01, HRDC: Information Paper, subj: CSA Remarks at AUSA Seminar, 8 Nov 01, HRDC: Brig Gen William F. Engel, "Transforming Fires for the Objective Force," F'ieldArtillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 01, pp. 9-13; Email with atch, subj: Crusader, 1 Mar 00, lIRDC; Email with atch, subj: Crusader,S Mar 00, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: Future of lIeavy Systems, 6 Jan 00, HRDC; Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, FY99 Annual Report (Extract), subj: Crusader, HRDC; Maj Donald L. Barnett, "Crusader Target Weight: 38 to 42 Tons," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 00, pp. 34-36; Fact Sheet, subj: Crusader 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer, USA, 15 Aug 02, Crusader File, HRDC. 1031999 USAFACFS ACH, p. 67; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-79; 2001 lrSAFACFS ACH, pp. 55-65; Email with atch, subj: LegIntObj2, 1 Apr 02, HRDC; Briefing, subj: None, 12 Oct 01, HRDC; Interim Division Organizational and Operational. Plan, Feb 01, pp. 4, 10, 23, 25, HRDC. 54 the case in the 1980s and 1990s. Strategically deployable, survivable, and lethal field artillery systems would be the wave of the future.

Multiple-Launch Rocket System in Action courtesy Field Artillery Magazine 55 LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery AAR After Action Review AC Assistant Commandant J\.I)A Air Defense Artillery ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment AlIR Annual Historical Review AI Air Interdiction J\FATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System ARNG Army National Guard ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System ADSA Association of the United States Army BAT Brilliant Anti-armor Submunition BDB Brigade BFIST Bradley Fi~e Support Team CALL Center for Lessons Learned CAS Close Air Support CB Counterbattery Den Directorate of Combat Developments DIVARTY Division Artillery DOTLM Doctrine, Organization, Training Leadership, and Materiel DPICM Dual-purpose Improved Conventional Munition Dsws Division Support Weapon System Study BSPAWS Enhanced Self-propelled Artillery Weapon Study GAO General Accounting Office GPS Global Positioning System FA Field Artillery FArns Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems FEcc Fires Effects Coordination Cell FIST Fire Support Team FISTV ' Fire Support Team Vehicle PM Field Manual FORSCOM Forces Command By Fiscal Year liE High Explosive lIELP Howitzer Extended Life Program lIEMMT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck lIlMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System lIlP Howitzer Improvement Program lIMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle lIRDc Historical Research and Document Collection IFSAS Initial Fire Support Automation System MLRS Multiple-Launch Rocket System 56

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NET' New Equipment Training NTC National Training Center ODS Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm OIC Officer in Charge RAMS , Rockets and Missiles Systems RGFC Republican Guard Force Command SADARM Search-and-Destroy Armor Munition SPLLS Self-propelled Loader/Launcher TACFIRE Tactical Fire Direction System TF TaskForce TOC Tactical Operation Center TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TSM TRADOC System Manager US United States USAFACFS United States Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill USAFACS United States Field Artillery Center and School' USAFAS United States Army Field Artillery School WIDD Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate 57

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography only contains the books and articles used during research. For l1lessages,fact sheets, information papers, reports, and other comparable documents, please seethe footnotes.

BOOKS

Dastrup, Boyd L. Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991. Fort Sill, OK: Office of the Command Historian, 1994, reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, D 2003. .' epartment of the Army, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991. ,---. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992. ' ~. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996. ,,' l1edman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. . lIerbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988. ~alone, Henry 0., ed. TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A ll. Preliminary Study. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1992. Omjue, John L. American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War. Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996. ,---. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973- 1982. Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1984. ,---. The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1997. Scales, Robert H. Jr., ed. Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993. '''___. Firepower in Limited War. Novato, CA: Presido Press~ 1995. SchUbert,Frank L. and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995. SWain,Richard M. Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994. United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Annual Command History/Annual Historical Review, 1986-2000. United States Army Field Artillery School, Annual Historical Supplements, 1975, 1979, and 1983. United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. Annual Command History, 1991- 1994. 58

ARTICLES

Abrams, Creighton W. "The Gulf War and European Artillery," Journal of the RoyJ Artillery, Autumn 2001, p. 41. "Active Army and Marine Units in OCONUS," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 1999,P' 21. _ , "Advanced Howitzer Gains the Top Spot Among Army's Planned Armored Vehicles, Armed Forces Journal International, Feb 1992, p. 46. Anderson, Col E.G. "Reshaping the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Jun 1991,P' 11.

Barnett, Maj Do.nald L. "Crusader Target Weigh.t: 38 to 42 Tons," F.ieldArtillery MagaZine;,.. Mar-Apr 2000, p. 34. Baxter, Maj Gen Leo J. "Meeting the Future: State of the Field Artillery 1998," Fiel Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 1998, p. 1. Bilo, Brig Gen William C. "A Decisive Victory for Strategic Victory," Field Artillef) Magazine, Mar-Apr 1995, p. 22. ,. Burdick, Maj Gen Donald. "An Essential Element of National Strategy," Army Magazine, Oct 1990, p. 116. "Controversy over the Lightweight Howitzer Continues with GAO Report," Inside the AnnY, 7 Aug 2000, p. 1. Conver, Stephen K. "From the Army Acquisition Executive," Army Research, Development, and Acquisition Bulletin, Jul-Aug 1992, p. 11. Com, Col Vollney B., Jr., and Cpt Richard A. Lacquemont. "Silver Bullets," FieldArtillerY Magazine, Oct 1991, p. 10. Duitsman, Leighton L. "Army TACMS," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1991, p. 38. "Field Artillery Commanders," Field Artillery Magazine, Dee 1991, pullout. "Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update," Field Artillery Magazine, Dee 1990, p. 53. "Field Artillery Units Worldwide," Field Artillery Magazine, Dee 1989, pullout. "Forces Committed," Military Review, Sep 1991, p. 80. Foss, Gen John W. "AirLand Battle-Future," Army Magazine, Feb 1991, p. 20. Gentry, Lt Col Donald E. and Maj Cullen G. Barbato. "HIMARS: Firepower for Early Entt1 Forces," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1999, p. 19.

Goedkoop, Col Thomas R. and Cpt Barry E. Venable. "Task Force XXI: An Overview, " Military Review, Mar-Apr 1997, p. 71. Gourley, Scott. "M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle," Army Magazine, Ju12002, p. 51, Graves, Maj Kenneth P. "Steel Rain: XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery in Desert Storm," Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, p. 49. Hall, Cpt Lawrence T., Jr., and Cpt Michael A. Sharp. "MLRS NET for the ARNG," Field l Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 1996, p. 44. Hester, Cpt Henry M., Jr. "Digitization in Task Force XXI, "Field Artillery Magazine, Sep' Oct 1996, p. 38. Jensen, Maj Mark S. "MLRS in Operation Desert Storm," Field Artillery Magazine, AUg 1991, p. 30. Koch, Andrew. "General Dynamics to Develop TAD System" Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 l

1 59

M Sep 2000, p. 8. . arty, Maj Gen Fred F. "FA on Target in the Storm," Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 199i, p. 1. ___ . "State-of-the-Branch Address," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 1991, p. 2. ~. "State-of-the-Branch 1992," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 1992, p.l. McPhee, Lt Col Richard R. "The Divisional MLRS Battalion in the DAWE, "'FieldArtillery " Magazine, May-Jun 1998, p. 38. .' }v1270A1 Production to Begin," MLRS Dispatch, Third Quarter, 1998, p. 5. Name-that-Howitzer: Crusader, A Knight for the 21st Century," Field A rtillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 1994, p. 3. Needham, Cpt Richard A. and Maj Russell Graves. "100 Hours with Light TACFIRE," Field

I Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, p. 30. Odierno, Col Raymond T. andMaj Thomas L. Swingle. nAPA IDS: Digitizing Fighting with I Fires," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 1996, p. 12. Owens, Maj Richard H. "ARNG Fielding AFATDS," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 2002, p. 21. ~earson, Brig Gen (Ret) Paul F. and Gen (Ret) Glenn K. Otis. "Desert Storm Fire Support: Classic Airland Battle Operations," Landpower Essay Series, AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, Jun 1991. l{eitz,Col John W. "A Fire Supporter's Guide to PM 100-5," Field Artillery Magazine, Dec 1993, p. 10. 1{igby,Maj Gen Randall L. "AFATDS: Learning to Interoperate -- Not Just Interface," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 1996, p. 1. ,---. "Fires for Division XXI: State of the Branch 1995," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov- Dec 1995, p. 1. ,---. "Mapping the Future: FA State of the Branch, 1996," FieldArtillery Magazine, Nov- Dec 1996, p. 1. ,---. "3x6-2x9 MLRS Transition," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 1996, p. 18. ~ttenhouse, C. William. "Fire Support on the Non-Linear Battlefield: The Shape of Things to Come," Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1990, p. 36. ____ . "Operation Firestrike," Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1991, p. 33. l{olston, ,Col David. "Victory Artillery in Operation Desert Storm," Field Artillery Magazine, Apr 1991, p. 4. . ltussell, Lt Col Theodore S., Jr., and Maj Harold H. Worrell, Jr. "Focus on Light Force XXI: AWE Warrior Focus," Field Artillery Magazine, May-Jun 1996, p. 36. Stricklin, Brig Gen Toney. "Fires: The Cutting Edge for the 21st Century," Field Artillery Magazine, May-Jun 1998, p. 22. liTheXM777 Lightweight 155-mm. Howitzer," Army Magazine, Oct 2000, p. 303. lOdd, John J. and LtCol James M. Holt. "Army Science Board Study: How Much Field Artillery is Enough?" Field Artillery Magazine, Jun 1995, p. 20. "D.S. Artillery Programs Takes Delivery of Guns," Defense News, 17 Ju12000, p. 10. Vuono, Gen Carl E. "Change, Continuity, and the Future of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Jun 1991, p. 6. Ward, Maj Gen William F. "Performance in Panama Underscores Readiness," Army Magazine, Oct 1990, p. 104. . 60

Weaver, Maj Vince C. "Fires in AWE Focused Dispatch: A Step Toward Task Force XXI,,I Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 1996, p. 38. White, Col David C. and Lt ColClyde W. Ellis. "Army Training XXI," Field ArtillerY Magazine, Mar-Apr 1996, p. 8. Wroth, Maj Mark B. "Legal Mix VII: Directions for the Field Artillery," Field ArtillerY Magazine, Dec 1991, p. 42. . Yager, John. "New Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer Unveiled," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 27 Jun 2000, p. 1a. 61

INDEX

A

Abrams, Brig Gen Creighton, Jr., 6 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, 37, 50,51, 53 t\irLand Battle, 20, 29, 30, 31 t\irLand Battle-Future, 28 t\irLand Operations, 30, 31 Anderson, Col Edward G., 28 Arab-Israeli War of 1973, 1 . ArmyNational Guard, 24, 25, 26, 28, 34 ArmyReserve, 24, 25, 34 Army Science Board, 27 , ArmyTactical Missile System, 2, 14,20, 30,41,49,50,52 Aspin, Secretary of Defense Les, 24 .

B narbato, Maj Cullen G., 48 ~ourne, Col Garrett D., 10 ~oyd, Col Morris J., 7, 8, 10, 18 ~radley Fire Support TeamVehic1e, 39,40 ~rilliant Anti-armor Munition, 50, 52 ~ush, President George H., 1

'C

Conventional Forces Reduction Treaty of 1990, 28 Com, Col Vollney B., Jr., 17 Corps ' VII U.S. Corps, 2, 3,4, 6,11, 13, 14, 17 XVIII Airborne Corps, 3, 7, 9, 25,48

D DiVisions 1st Cavalry Division, 3, 8, 16, 17 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 3, 7, 8, 18 1st Armored Division, 7, 9,11,13,16,17 2nd Armored Division, 4 3rd Armored Division, 3, 7, 8, 11 10th Mountain Division, 25, 36 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 8, 9, 10, 14 25th Infantry Division, 25 62

. 82nd Airborne Division, 26 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1 Divisions (U.S. Marines) 1st Marine Division, 4 2nd Marine Division, 4 Division Support Weapon System Study, 42 Division XXI, 35, 36 Dodson, Col Michael L., 6, 7, 18 Dual-purpose Improved Conventional Munition, 18, 19, 20,41,46

E

Effects Coordination Cell, 32 Ellis, Lt Col Clyde W., 33 Enhanced Self-Propelled Artillery Weapon Study, 41

F

Field Artillery brigades 18th Field Artillery Brigade, 7 42nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 18 75th Field Artillery Brigade, 5, 6, 14 142nd Field Artillery Brigade 5,6, 19 196th Field Artillery Brigade, 25 210th Field Artillery Brigade, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17 212th Field Artillery Brigade, 8, 10, 11 Field Artillery regiments I-27th Field Artillery, 3, 8, 11 2-3rd Field Artillery, 11 2-17th Field Artillery, 8 2-29th Field Artillery, 8, 11, 13 2-82nd Field Artillery, 8 3-20th Field Artillery, 8, 11, 13 4-27th Field Artillery, 10, 13 4-82nd Field Artillery, 11, 13 6-27th Field Artillery, 2, 7 6-41st Field Artillery, 12 Field Artillery School,4, 5, 10, 12, 30, 32, 37,47 Fires Effects Coordination Cell, 32 Force Structure 3x8,27,28 3x6, 27, 28 2x9,27 Force XXI, 31, 33, 38,40,51 Foss, Gen John W., 29,47 63

Pranks,Gen Frederick M., Jr., 4, 6, 30

G

GeneralAccounting Office, 44, 45 Gentry,Lt Col Donald E., 48 Graves,Maj Kenneth P., 9 Graves,Maj Russell, 19 Grey,Cpt AlfredK., 8 GUlfWar, 4,20

H

~allada, Maj Gen Raphael J., 5, 14,47,48 ~artzog, Gen William W., 31 ~ !UghMobility Artillery Rocket System, 41, 47, 48, 53 ~Owitzers . Crusader 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer, 37,43,44, 52 MI09A2/A3 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer, 16, 17,27,41,42,43 M109A6 (Paladin) 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer, 28, 43 MIlO 8-inch Towed Howitzer, 26 M119 105-mm. Towed Howitzer, 41 M198 155-mm. Towed Howitzer, 16, 28, 45, 46 Lightweight 155-mm. Towed HowitzerlXM777, 45, 46, 47, 53 ~owitzer Extended Life Program, 41, 42 . ~owitzer Improvement Program, 42, 43

mitial Fire Support Automation System, 51

J

rensen, Maj Mark S., 8 rOintVenture, 33

K

~aminiski, Undersecretary of Defense Dr. Paul G., 44 \.eith, Maj Gen Donald R., 16 ~eman, Lt Gen William F., 48 Gemenic, Maj John, 12, 15

L 64

Lacquemont, Cpt Richard A., 17 Legal Mix VII, 27 Light Tactical Fire Direction System, 19 Luck, Lt Gen Gary E., 3

M

Marty, Maj Gen Fred F., 9, 14, 26, 28 McCaffrey, Maj Gen Barry R., 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 Mitchell, Cpt Randy, 7, 8, 10, 18 M 113 Fire Support Vehicle, 16 M981 Fire Support Team Vehicle, 15, 16,39,40 Multiple-Launch Rocket System, 6,11,14,17,18,20,26,27,28,30,47,48,49,53 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, 28

N

Needham, Cpt Richard A., 19 New Military Strategy, 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 28

o Operation Desert Shield, 1,24,48 Operation Desert Storm, 4, 6, 8, 9,14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25, 29,43,45,48, 49, 50 Otis, Gen Glenn K., 5 Ott, Maj Gen David E., 9

p

Pearson, Brig Gen (Ret) Paul F., 5

R

Radars Q-36, 10, 11, 16,38,39 Q-37, 10, 12, 16,38,39 Q-47,39 Regiments 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3, 7, 12, 16 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 19 Reimer, Gen Dennis J., 31, 36 Republican Guards, 1, 2, 8, 11 Rhame, Maj Gen Thomas G., 5, 6 Rigby, Maj Gen Randall L., 36 65 l{olston, Col David, 5 s

Search-and-Destroy-Armor Munition, 26,41,46 Shinseki, Gen Eric K., 51, 52, 53 SovietUnion, 23, 37 Stricklin, Maj Gen Toney, 32 StrykerlKnight Combat Observation Lasing Vehicle, 40 SUllivan,Gen Gordon R., 27, 34 . Sweeney, Lt Col Patrick C., 7

T tactical Fire Direction System, 16, 19, 50 I'homson, Cpt John, 12, 15 I'hurman, Gen Maxwell R., 42 total Army School System/The Army School System, 34 townsend, Col Ronald E., 14 training XXI, 33 transformation of the Army, 52, 53 u

1nited Nations, 1 v

Vuono, Gen Carl E., 29 ,w

~arsaw Pact, 23, 28, 31, 37