“Politics, Ballyhoo, and Controversy”: the Allied Clandestine Services, Resistance, and the Rivalries in Occupied France
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
“Politics, Ballyhoo, and Controversy”: The Allied Clandestine Services, Resistance, and the Rivalries in Occupied France By Ronald J. Lienhardt History Departmental Undergraduate Honors Thesis University of Colorado at Boulder April 8, 2014 Thesis Advisor: Dr. Martha Hanna Department of History Defense Committee: Dr. John Willis Department of History Dr. Michael Radelet Department of Sociology 1 Song of the Partisans By Maurice Druon Friend, can you hear The Flight of the ravens Over our plains? Friend, can you hear The muffled cry of our country In chains? Ah! Partisans, Workers and peasants, The alert has sounded. This evening the enemy Will learn the price of blood And of tears.1 1 Claude Chambard, The Maquis: A History of the French Resistance Movement (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. , 1976), vii. 2 Table of Contents Abstract---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 Chapter 1: Impending War, the fall of France, and the Foundations of Resistance---------------------8 France’s Initiative becomes outdated: The Maginot Line-------------------------------------------------------11 Failures to Adapt to the Progress of War: The Invasion and the fall of France----------------------------14 Collaboration and Life Under Occupation-------------------------------------------------------------------------20 Organization of the Resistance ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------29 Jean Moulin, Charles de Gaulle and the first attempt at a Unified Resistance------------------------------32 Chapter 2: The Search for the “Ivy League PhD who could win a Bar Fight”----------------------------39 Formation of the British SOE-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------39 Virginia Hall: An American sent to France by London--------------------------------------------------------------------------45 Formation of the OSS----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------54 Virginia Hall’s return to France with the OSS-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------59 Chapter 3: Maquisards and the Allied Clandestine Services------------------------------------------------------62 Defending the merits of Sabotage over Bombings in Preparation for the Invasion-------------------------70 Different Processes to achieve Different Goals: The Long Road to Unity-----------------------------------73 Aftermath of Operation Torch: A Tenuous Unity in the Resistance is formed-----------------------------76 Preparing the “Human Terrain” for the Allied Invasion of France-------------------------------------------80 Operation Overlord and the Resistance in Action----------------------------------------------------------------85 Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------94 Bibliography------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------97 Images Figure 1 France under German Occupation------------------------------------------------------------------------20 Figure 2 The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire-------------------------------------------------------53 Figure 3 Memorandum Regarding Virginia Hall’s Distinguished Service Cross---------------------------61 3 Abstract Many popular conceptions of World War II portray irreconcilable dichotomies such as democracy and fascism, Allies and Axis Powers, or victims and aggressors. However, due to alliances and entanglements that occurred years before the first shots were fired in anger, traditional historiography has demonstrated that the divisions between belligerents and internal to the allies were far more convoluted. In France, the reality was that the nation was neither united in their goal of liberation nor in their politics before the Germans invaded on 10 May 1940. Consequently, inclinations to resistance or collaboration were evident in the deeply divided political atmosphere of France in the 1930s, and persisted into the war years, thus creating a perplexing environment for the Allies to liberate. As this thesis will demonstrate, even the Resistance was deeply divided between the conservative (but not fascist) Gaullists and the Communists, between those who resisted from within France and those who organized resistance from outside, and between those whose first objective was the liberation of France and those whose primary objective was the political transformation of post-war France. By examining the many divisions within the Resistance and the concurrent development of the Allied clandestine services, this thesis will also illustrate the many different obstacles that stood between the Allies and their goal of exploiting the Resistance in advance of Operation Overlord. The result of this examination will be to demonstrate that the Allied clandestine services’ concerted effort to work with the Maquis over their Free French and Communist counterparts was the best decision based on both the Allied strategy and the stability of France after its liberation. 4 Introduction “What is most striking about the French under the occupation is not how heroic or villainous they were but how imaginative, creative and resourceful they were in pursuit of a better life.”2 -Robert Gildea, author of Marianne in Chains: Daily Life in the Heart of France During the German Occupation During World War II, France was occupied by one of history’s most brutal militaries and led by a collaborationist government that replicated the brutality of the Nazis in order to maintain power within their own borders. Despite this, those willing to resist the occupation were always a minority, and those who made pleasantries with the Germans in order to maintain a sense of normalcy and security were rarely true collaborators. Consequently, the belief popularized in the 1970s that “France was a nation of collaborators who stood by indifferently as tens of thousands of Jews were deported to Nazi death camps” did not reflect the reality of the times.3 Instead, while there were indeed collaborators who sought to appease their masters and expose the Resistance, the majority of France recognized that they could not simultaneously defeat the Germans while overthrowing Vichy, so they did what was necessary to preserve their way of life and that of their families and communities. Likewise, the legacy of the Resistance specifically, and France in general, belies the myth fostered by Charles de Gaulle in the summer of 1944: that of a France united in the cause of liberation. Indeed the reality in France after their surrender in 1940 was a sense of shock that anesthetized most French men and women to concerns outside of their villages. Therefore, the increasingly dire food shortages and demand for work made it so that those who partook in bold 2 Alan Riding, "Survivors, Not Heroes or Villains, In Occupied France." The New York Times, August 13, 2003, Books of the Times section. 3 Ibid. 5 acts of collaboration or resistance merely brought further stress on their communities while rarely improving their lot in life. As for those who chose to resist, there was no point in seeking victory over only one of their enemies. After all, to overthrow Vichy would mean that the Nazis would just install a more brutal regime in their place, and it was impossible to overthrow the Nazis while leaving their collaborationist government in place. As a consequence, it was realized that by harassing all targets of opportunity, be they German or Vichy personnel or infrastructure, the Resistance hoped to simultaneously impact the daily operations of the Nazis while delegitimizing Vichy by making it obvious that they were not supported. By first describing Rod Kedward’s, Julian Jackson’s, and Ian Ousby’s scholarship on the pre-war political atmosphere of France, this thesis will reveal the partisanship that would persist through the war and answer why the Resistance never truly unified. Furthermore, this thesis will attempt to answer what the Allied clandestine services sought to accomplish through the description of their respective formations, missions, and goals to be accomplished through their work with the Resistance, as well as the unique personnel selected for such missions. Lastly, this thesis seeks to answer the question of how the Allied clandestine services sought to limit the discord within France while maximizing the effects of the Resistance in advance of the Allied invasion of Normandy. By doing so, it will become clear why the Maquis Resistance fighters were the Allies’ answer to accomplishing such a daunting task while ensuring the stability of the post-war French state. Corroboration of this investigation’s claims will come through the analysis of primary sources written by political leaders, members of the Allied clandestine services, and participants in various Resistance groups. By the end, this thesis will demonstrate that the Nazi occupation 6 was not the magical ointment that would cure internal divisions and unite France against a common enemy because the rifts within France that had existed before the war also persisted through it,