European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 2019
© European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 2019. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of individual photos, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. This publication and more information on Europol are available on the Internet. ISBN 978-92-95209-76-3 www.europol.europa.eu DOI 10.2813/788404 QL-AJ-19-001-EN-N 04 06 08 Foreword Trends Executive summary 10 28 General overview Jihadist terrorism
Terrorist attacks and arrests Terrorist attacks and suspects Terrorist and violent extremist activities arrested in the EU
Convictions and penalties Terrorist propaganda
Travel for terrorist purposes Contents Terrorist situation outside the EU
53 56 Ethno-nationalist and Left-wing and separatist terrorism anarchist terrorism
60 63 Right-wing terrorism Single-issue terrorism
annexes
A1 Amendments in National Legislation on Terrorism in 2018 65
Overview of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2018 per EU 68 A2 Member State and per affiliation
A3 Arrests in 2018 per EU Member State and per affiliation 69
A4 Convictions and penalties 71
A5 Europol counter terrorism activities 74
A6 Methodology 78
A7 Acronyms 80 Foreword TESAT 2019 societies they live in. live they societies the to harm tactics terrorist to use networks and cells of individuals, commitment and intent of level the illustrates which afact substances, biological and chemical deploy and produce to attempts included latter The substantially. increased plots terrorist jihadist of disrupted number the however, time, year. same At the last attacks terrorist jihadist seven we suffered EU, the in attacks terrorist ten perpetrated jihadists 2017 in Whereas tendencies. ideological of all to terrorism regard with significantly dropped EU the in of victims number the and attacks of number the before, year to the Compared danger. in life his putting was he that Trèbes in knowing attacker an by taken hostage a for himself exchanged who Beltrame, Arnaud Colonel late to the tribute We special pay ones. loved and families their with are thoughts Our safe. communities their to keep trying 2018 while in EU the in acts terrorist in lives their lost officers police three that saddened particularly I am aims. political for violence to use of attempts face the in values and citizens our to protect we are if vigilant to remain We need hatred. spread and societies our to divide also but maim and to kill aim only not Terrorists confrontation. of means justified a as violence consider increasingly orientation of diverging extremists that indicate (EU) Union the across European forterrorists attack-planning right-wing of suspected arrests numerous and Italy in extremist aright-wing by attack terrorist one addition, In more. many injured and people thirteen of atotal killed Strasbourg and Liège Paris, Trèbes, in those like jihadists by perpetrated attacks Horrific States. Member EU in to security threat a major to constitute continued 2018,In terrorism among others, terrorist groups have groups terrorist others, among Afghanistan, Mali, Libya, Syria, like countries In prevalent. become has violence Europe, outside of locations number agrowing in Unfortunately, intimidation or fear of violence. without life public in participate and rights their exercise can they that trust can citizens where thrive only can freedom and Equality security. of level ahigh with societies in living of good precious the to conserve responsibility shared of the part her assume must and arole to play needs everyone that realisation general a is There ofways cooperation. creative and new have established separately largely to work used that authorities and private organisations 2014, public since witnessed has Europe that violence terrorist in surge the with Faced Europe. in violence in decrease to the contributed have substantially terrorism counter to organisations society civil and companies private authorities, public enforcement, security services, law of efforts the that confident Iam above, of the light the In of a world religion. representative as behaviour criminal interpreting terrorist propaganda and by fuel readily people some which Islam, from of athreat perception the on prey violence, to justify a bid in extremists, right-wing and others; are plotting alone or conspiring with diverging motivation and allegiance of actors multiple milieu, jihadist the Within complex. more become has situation the year. anything, If this earlier of IS defeat military the despite diminished, not has thus, terrorism, from threat of the level The 4 foreword 5
gained influence to an extent that they rival therefore, must be based on facts the state, whose authority in many cases has before reaching conclusions. I am already been undermined by particularistic proud to say that the EU Terrorism policies, weak structures and corruption. Citizens Situation and Trend Report (TE- of these countries are exposed to existential SAT) has provided verified facts threats to their lives and property based on on terrorism in Europe since 2006. their belonging to particular communities or The report has been accepted as adhering to particular practices or beliefs. The a benchmark in discussions about perpetuation of these crises has proven to have EU counterterrorism policies and an impact on Europe, be it through the creation academic studies. It is my privilege to of new grievances or prejudice among different hereby hand over the 2019 edition of communities in Europe, discrediting international the TE-SAT to the public. efforts at crisis resolution through diplomacy or In doing so, I would like to thank providing space for destructive ideologies and the EU Member States and third terrorist networks to prosper. parties for their contributions to the As the line between online and offline TE-SAT 2018. In addition, the work communities becomes increasingly blurred, of the members of the Advisory terrorist propaganda preying on human Board, consisting of the ‘troika’ suffering abroad reaches audiences in Europe to (Presidencies of the Council of the unprecedented extents, inciting some to act and EU, namely Austria, Romania, and driving others to embrace extremist views on the Finland); France; Spain; Eurojust; the opposite end. EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and the Office of the EU In Europe, the feeling of insecurity that terrorists Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has try to create must be of the greatest concern to been indispensable for the 2019 us because it has the potential to undermine the edition of the TE-SAT. We are grateful cohesion of our societies. Increasing polarisation for their continued engagement in and the rise of extremist views is a concern ensuring the quality of the document. for EU Member States. The public debate about sensitive phenomena like terrorism, Finally, the somewhat technical discussions on terrorism and counterterrorism should not make us forget that terrorism affects real people. I, therefore, want to close this foreword with a thought for the victims of terrorist violence.
Catherine De Bolle Executive Director of Europol trends 6
Trends
Thirteen people were killed in terrorist attacks in the EU in 2018 – a decrease compared to 2017. All the attacks were jihadist in nature and committed 01. by individuals acting alone.
In addition to the seven completed attacks, EU Member States reported 16 foiled jihadist terrorist plots, illustrating the effectiveness of counter terrorism efforts. The significant number of thwarted attacks and the so-called Islamic State’s (IS) continued intent to perpetrate attacks outside conflict zones indicate 02. that the threat level across the EU remains high.
Three terrorist plots involving CBRN materials were disrupted in the EU in 2018. A general increase of CBRN terrorist propaganda, tutorials 03. and threats was observed.
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks in the EU continued to greatly outnumber other types of terrorist attacks. 04.
The number of arrests linked to right-wing terrorism remained relatively low but increased for the third year in a row. Right-wing extremists prey on fears of perceived attempts to Islamicise 05. society and loss of national identity. The violent right-wing extremist scene is very heterogeneous across EU Member States. trends 7
With regard to terrorism trials concluded in 2018, jihadist terrorism convictions remained the highest in number; but there was a noted increase in left- 06. wing and right-wing terrorism convictions.
The number of European foreign terrorist fighters travelling, or attempting to travel to conflict zones was very low. The focus of jihadist networks in EU Member States has shifted towards carrying out activities in the EU. 07.
The number of individuals returning to the EU also remained very low. Hundreds of European citizens – including women and minors, mainly of a very young age – remain in detention in the Iraqi and Syrian conflict zone. While minors are 08. essentially victims, there are concerns among EU Member States that they have been exposed to indoctrination and training in former IS territories and may pose a potential future threat.
There is continued concern that individuals with a criminal background, including those currently imprisoned, are vulnerable to indoctrination and might engage in terrorism. 09.
IS succeeded in maintaining an online presence largely thanks to unofficial supporter networks and pro-IS media outlets. Pro-IS and pro-al- 10. Qaeda channels promoted the use of alternative platforms and open source technologies.
Outside Europe, al-Qaeda continued to exert power and influence in conflict areas, partly at the expense of IS affiliates. Al-Qaeda affiliates exploited political grievances at local and international level, including in messages directed 11. at European audiences. executive summary 8
Executive summary
In 2018, all fatalities from Completed jihadist attacks The situation in Europe with terrorism were the result of were carried out using firearms regard to jihadist terrorism jihadist attacks: 13 people lost and unsophisticated, readily continued to be influenced their lives. In addition, 46 people available weapons (e.g. knives). by external developments. were injured in jihadist attacks. The diminished sophistication Ungoverned spaces in conflict This is a considerable decrease in the preparation and execution areas, including Afghanistan, compared to 2017, when ten of jihadist terrorist attacks Libya, the Sahel region, Syria and attacks killed 62 people. In 2018, contributed to a lower number Yemen provide opportunities EU Member States reported of casualties in completed for jihadist groups to establish 16 thwarted jihadist terrorist attacks. Several disrupted control over territories that can plots, a fact that indicates both terrorist plots included the later turn into safe havens. The continued high terrorist activity attempted production and use year 2018 saw a decrease in and illustrates the effectiveness of explosives and chemical/ the activities of the so-called of counter terrorism efforts. biological materials. There was Islamic State (IS) affiliates in a also an increase in the use of number of regions outside the pyrotechnic mixtures to produce EU. EU Member States assessed improvised explosive devices that IS’ diminishing territorial (IED) in jihadist plots. Three control is likely to be replaced All jihadist terrorist attacks were terrorist plots involving CBRN by increased al-Qaeda efforts committed by individuals acting materials were disrupted in 2018 to reclaim power and influence alone and targeted civilians and in the EU. A general increase in the area. Al-Qaeda’s strategy symbols of authority. Often the of CBRN terrorist propaganda, relied on building alliances with motivation of the perpetrator tutorials and threats was local tribes while exploiting and the links to other radicalised observed. political grievances at local and individuals or terrorist groups international level, including in remained unclear. Mental Europe. health issues contributed to the complexity of the phenomenon. executive summary 9
The military defeat of IS in Iraq The number of European foreign As in previous years, ethno- and Syria had a significant terrorist fighters travelling, or nationalist and separatist impact on the group’s digital attempting to travel to the Iraqi terrorist attacks in the EU capabilities. In parallel, the and Syrian conflict zone in 2018 greatly outnumbered other types coherence of IS narratives was very low. Cases of traveling of terrorist attacks in 2018. was compromised by the to alternative areas of conflict The number of left-wing and group’s inability to internally were reported, although current right-wing attacks and arrests unify its ideological positions. numbers also appear to be very remained relatively low and was Nevertheless, IS succeeded in low. Rather than attempting to limited to a small number of maintaining an online presence travel to the conflict zone, the countries. However, the number largely thanks to unofficial focus of jihadist networks in of arrests linked to right-wing supporter networks and pro- EU Member States has shifted terrorism, while remaining IS media outlets. Both IS and towards carrying out activities in relatively low, continued to al-Qaeda continued to seek the EU – both online and offline. increase strongly, effectively out new online vectors for their Jihadists continued to be inspired doubling for the second year propaganda. In particular, they by IS propaganda but also in a row. Right-wing extremists promoted the use of alternative consumed propaganda produced exploit fears of perceived platforms and open source by other groups claiming to attempts to Islamicise society technologies. defend Islam against a global and grievances linked to an attack, including al-Qaeda. alleged loss of national identity. The violent right-wing extremist scene is very heterogeneous on the national level and among EU While IS online propaganda Member States. remained technologically The number of individuals advanced, and hackers returning to the EU remained very appeared to be knowledgeable low, with hundreds of European in encrypted communication citizens remaining in detention tools, the group’s cyber-attack in Iraq and Syria. All men and Hawala banking continued to capabilities and techniques some women are believed to be an important instrument in were rudimentary. In addition, have received weapons training, terrorism financing. The misuse no other terrorist group with a with men also acquiring combat of credit systems, non-profit demonstrated capacity to carry experience. While minors are and charity organisations, and out effective cyber-attacks essentially victims, there are small-scale business ventures in emerged in 2018. concerns among EU Member fundraising for terrorism remain States that they have been a matter of concern. exposed to indoctrination and training in former IS territories, and may pose a potential future Despite the degradation of IS’ threat. The abuse of migration organisational structures, the With regard to terrorism trials flows by terrorists to enter the EU group maintains the intent to concluded in 2018, jihadist does not seem to be systematic. conduct attacks outside conflict terrorism convictions remained zones, potentially using former the highest in number; members and individuals nevertheless, there was also a inspired by propaganda. There is noted increase in left-wing and a continued risk that individuals right-wing terrorism convictions. with criminal background, including those currently imprisoned, are vulnerable to indoctrination and might engage in terrorism. general overview 10
1/ General overview general overview 11
Terrorist attacks and arrests
Attacks and arrests by EU Member State in 2018.
1 7
3
60 273 4 49 2
1 166 2 59 2 1 1
35 30 310 2 2
14 13 56
11 52
7 22
total 129 1 056 general overview 12
Attacks
In 2018, a total of 129 foiled, failed The United Kingdom1 (UK) experienced the highest number of attacks in total (60), followed by France, Italy, Spain, and completed attacks were reported Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and Sweden2. by EU Member States. 1 Of the attacks reported by the UK, 56 were acts of security-related incidents in Northern Ireland, including one attack on national security targets. 2 For detailed information, see Annex 2.
Failed, foiled or completed attacks in the EU per affiliation/Member State in 2018.
Terror attacks by affiliation
Etno-nationalist and separatist Jihadist Left-wing Right-wing 83 24 19 Not specifiedSingle-issue
UK France Spain NL DE BE SE Italy Greece 60 30 11 4 2 1 1 13 7
Terror attacks by Member State general overview 13
The total number of attacks decreased Overall, attacks specified as ethno-nationalist and separatist continued to represent the largest after a sharp spike in 2017, primarily proportion. As in previous years, the countries reporting terrorist attacks linked to separatist because of the decrease in reported terrorism were the UK (56), France (20) and Spain (7). separatist-related incidents.
Terrorist attacks in the EU by affiliation, 2015-2018.
211 205 Number of attacks total 142 129
2015 2016 2017 2018
Jihadist 17 13 33 24
Left-wing 13 27 24 19
Right-wing 9 1 5 1
Etno-nationalist 65 99 137 83 and separatist
Single-issue 1
Non 107 2 6 1 specified general overview 14
In 2018, the number of foiled, failed and completed jihadist terrorist attacks decreased significantly compared to 2017, from 33 to 24.
This number includes 16 incidents reported by France (7), the UK (3), the In 2018, 13 victims died Netherlands (2), Germany (2), Italy (1) and Sweden (1) as foiled terrorist plots. Notably, for the second year in a row, the number of reported foiled terrorist attacks as a result of terrorist outnumbered the completed attacks. attacks and 53 people were injured. Similar Similarly to 2017, Greece, Italy and Spain were the targets of attacks carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorists. One right-wing attack was noted by Italy. to previous years, all reported fatalities and the vast majority of casualties were caused by jihadist terrorists.
Jihadist terrorist attacks 2017-2018
2017 2018
In terms of weaponry, the use of firearms and explosives continued to prevail, in particular completed 10 7 in separatist and anarchist-affiliated attacks.
failed 12 1
Civilians, private businesses and public institutions were among the most frequent targets. foiled 11 16
total general overview 15
Arrests
In 2018, 1 056 individuals were arrested in the EU on suspicion of Similar to the trend observed terrorism-related offences, with the highest number of arrestees in France (310) and in the UK (2733). The number slightly decreased in previous years, most arrests compared to 2017 but remained close to the average of recent years. in 2018 were related to jihadist
3 The number excludes 148 arrests made in Northern Ireland. terrorism (511 out of 1056).
1 219 Arrests in the EU for terrorism-related 1 077 1 056 offences, 1 002 2015-2018
Total
Jihadist 687 718 705 511
2015 2016 2017 2018
France Belgium Arrests in the EU 310 166 for terrorism-related offences by Member State in 2018
Germany Italy 59 56 Total 1 056
United Kingdom 273 Spain Austria 52 35
Sweden Greece 22 7 Netherlands 49 Denmark 3 Czechia 2 Poland 2 Bulgaria Slovenia 2 Romania 2 14 Luxembourg 1 Slovakia 1 general overview 16
The number of arrests related to left-wing and right-wing terrorism remained comparatively low, however the number of right-wing terrorist arrests continued to increase for the third consecutive year.
Arrests in the EU 67 for right-/left-wing terrorism-related offences, 2015-2018 44 Right-wing 36 34 Left-wing 31
20 11 12
2015 2016 2017 2018
In 2018, most arrests were made The average age of those arrested The majority of arrestees were on suspicion of preparing or was 33, with almost half of the EU citizens, with female suspects attempting to commit a terrorist suspects being younger than more likely to possess EU act; membership of a terrorist 30, and 22 % older than 40. As in citizenship. In most cases, the group, including while being previous years, the suspects were country of birth was the same as abroad; and financing terrorism. predominantly male. that of citizenship. general overview 17
Terrorist and violent extremist activities
Financing of terrorism
The majority of terrorist acts economic sanctions. This manner of committed in 2018 required conducting business, ethnic-oriented minimal or no financing and were and based on trust, is a suitable unsophisticated in their preparation Hawala banking continued channel to move and provide finances and execution. The perpetrators to be an important for terrorist purposes. Nevertheless, themselves were able to provide the an important note has to be made funds for such attacks in various instrument in the – the underground banking is ways, without leaving traces. financing of terrorism profit-oriented. The connections and the possibility for support from Whenever external funding is needed, ‘underground banking’ to terrorist diverse methods are employed, organisations is undoubtedly an from the basic to the highly Terrorists continued using important aspect, but not the complex. Funds may be generated non-profit organisations main purpose of existence of the by terrorist organisations from to raise funds for terrorist ‘underground’ financial system. illegal activities, e.g. extortion and the smuggling of migrants. Many purposes from Muslim A number of investigations in the terrorist organisations, however, have communities EU Member States demonstrated legitimate businesses from which the how the issues of money laundering, proceeds are diverted to terrorism human trafficking and migrant purposes. Small-scale business smuggling and terrorism financing ventures are also assessed to be used for participating in a ‘Kampanya’ interlinked. Italy, for example, reported for the financing of terrorism. Terrorist (fundraising campaign). The money the arrests of four individuals in funding has also occurred through collected is believed to having been 2018 on suspicion of transferring loans and credit which are not paid used to finance the functioning of the money to Syria, originating both from back. many PKK media and the functioning spontaneous donations of Syrian individuals living in various European Terrorist groups have been observed of the organisation, the purchase countries and from proceeds to use charities and fundraising of equipment to support the PKK generated by smuggling of migrants organisations to extract funds from military camps, the purchase of from the Middle East to Northern communities under the umbrella weapons for the guerrillas and also Europe. Part of the money involved of humanitarian aid, for instance, the organisation of attacks on Turkish was to be used to fund a terrorist to support families and orphans of territory. organisation affiliated to al-Qaeda killed fighters, and to build mosques Money transfer systems such as operating in Syria. and wells. Furthermore, non-profit hawala4 continue to be an important organisations may be used for money instrument in terrorism financing. Both surface- and dark-web sites are laundering. The core of the ‘underground used to request online donations, including virtual currencies. The The Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan banking’ systems is the specifics most common crypto currency (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is of the financial and interpersonal appears to be Bitcoin. One example known to collect money in Europe relationships and is highly adaptable of fundraising campaigns through the from membership fees, the sale of to conditions of conflicts/war and dark-web is the one done via Sadaqa publications, public events (concerts, Coins, a crowdsourcing project that etc.) and annual fundraising 4 Hawala is an informal method of money transfer allegedly supports jihadist groups in campaigns. Belgium reports the based on trust and honour, operating outside the traditional banking system, whereby money is paid Syria. Since the areas in Africa, the sentencing in 2018 of four individuals to a network of brokers (known as a hawaldars). general overview 18
Middle East or the Caucasus region to and malfunctions of IEDs with which the funds have been remitted TATP charges)5 appeared to have may be under control of terrorist accelerated these developments. groups, it is difficult to assess where In parallel, an increased use of the funds really end up. pyrotechnic mixtures (mainly fireworks) – obtained legally or, Explosives more often, illegally – was observed in jihadist terrorist attacks and The key threat in Europe related to plots. In order to reduce availability the unlawful use of explosives in and misuse of illegal pyrotechnics, the form of bomb attacks continued international law enforcement to emanate from groups or lone operations in 2018 targeted and actors linked to jihadist terrorism. successfully disrupted complex Even though 2018 did not witness organised crime groups (OCGs) a completed jihadist bomb attack, dealing with the illegal production and information collected during sale of pyrotechnics across the EU6. investigations into a considerable number of disrupted terrorist plots Notably, attempts to use IEDs in revealed plans and preparatory acts to combination with chemical or utilise this type of weapons. However, biological toxins were observed in in 2018, the number of jihadist 2018, something that has long been bomb attacks and plots decreased promoted in jihadist propaganda and compared to 2017. IED-making manuals.
Homemade explosives (HMEs) were In most cases, knowledge transfer still used in most known explosive- with regard to HME and IED related incidents linked to jihadist production was facilitated by the terrorism. Regarding the type of use of online, often encrypted, Most explosives in HMEs, a shift from the previously social networks and forums. While there were still cases of targeted incidents linked to jihadist predominant use of triacetone triperoxide (TATP) to a broader range instructions or remote assistance by terrorism were homemade of HMEs was noted – in particular, virtual advisors on encrypted social low explosives such as black powder, platforms, an increasing trend of chlorate mixtures and fertilisers- collecting bomb-making knowledge The use of low explosives based mixtures. from readily available online open sources (for example, pyrotechnic and pyrotechnic mixtures Control measures have made and explosive enthusiast sites and procurement of precursors for the increased forums) was noted. production of TATP increasingly difficult. In 2018, there were The explosive-related jihadist plots indications of attempts to use in 2018 were aimed at soft targets alternative explosive precursors for and mass gathering locations (public its manufacture. In addition, some events, shopping areas, bars and investigations indicated the use of clubs, etc.). TATP in combination with other types of explosive materials, in order to 5 For example, the explosion of the HME laboratory in Alcanar, Spain, August 2017; and the above- enhance the power and lethal effects ground Parsons Green Underground station of the improvised explosive devices bombing in London, UK, September 2017. (IEDs). Failures in using TATP by 6 See, for example, Eurojust and Europol joint press terrorists in the second half of 2017 release “International cooperation disrupts illegal fireworks network”, 6 December 2018, http:// (incidents during TATP manufacture www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/ Pages/2018/2018-12-06.aspx. general overview 19
In contrast, targets chosen by anarchist extremist groups were Chemical, mostly state, financial, military, or law biological, enforcement targets. For example, Three terrorist plots there was an incident in Italy where radiological and involving CBRN materials police first responders attending a crime scene of an explosion were nuclear (CBRN) were disrupted in 2018 in targeted with a secondary victim- the EU operated IED. IEDs used in anarchist In 2018, three incidents involving attacks were made from an array the use of chemical, biological, of readily available materials. As in radioactive or other nuclear (CBRN) A general increase previous years, in 2018 the anarchist materials were reported in the EU. In of CBRN terrorist groups utilised simple improvised May 2018, an Egyptian national was incendiary devices (IIDs) filled with arrested in France on suspicion of propaganda, tutorials and flammable liquids or IEDs filled with preparing a terrorist attack. At his threats was observed easily accessible explosive materials, apartment in Paris, black powder such as pyrotechnic mixtures (flash extracted from pyrotechnics and powder or black powder). several tutorials explaining how to In November, in Sardinia (Italy) a make an IED and how to use ricin to Lebanese citizen was arrested for the The attack methodologies and commit a terrorist attack were found. preparation of a chemical-biological capabilities used by Dissident plot. His aim was to produce a Republican (DR) groups in Northern In June, a terrorist plot using ricin mixture of lethal poisons in order to Ireland (UK) vary across the groups. was uncovered in Cologne (Germany). contaminate drinking water. The case Many attacks involved firearms or Police found a large number of castor was linked to the arrest of another small IEDs such as pipe bombs, but beans and a quantity of already individual in Lebanon suspected of they also deployed larger and/or produced ricin in an apartment of a planning to poison the water supply of potentially more destructive devices Tunisian citizen. The suspect who was the Lebanese Armed Forces. Despite such as vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) allegedly inspired by IS, was planning the high toxicity of the substances and explosively formed projectiles to combine the ricin with explosives, involved, to date these have not been (EFPs). ball bearings and bladed weapons. In the context of the investigation his associated with any terrorist attack. wife was also arrested. general overview 20
Online discussions of planning CBRN attacks increased in 2018. As in previous years, intentions to use CBRN materials were expressed Cyber-attack tools mainly by jihadists. Closed forums and techniques used were used to propose possible modi operandi, share instructions to by terrorists remained produce and disperse various agents limited and to identify high-profile targets. However, the technical information was not always accurate. IS sympathisers In July and August 2018, IS-linked successfully carried out group al-Abd al-Faqir Media (AF defacements and low- Media) launched a campaign titled Bio-Terror via Telegram promoting level hacks the use of biological weapons. A number of videos, posters and infographics contained instructions, albeit inaccurate, for manufacturing biological agents and providing instructions on how to obtain and deploy the microorganisms7.
The barrier for gaining knowledge on the use of CBRN weapons has decreased. The handling and containment of biological agents, which used to be a major challenge, has become more feasible. Dual- use equipment and materials (e.g. laboratory kits or home cleaning products) are easily accessible. In The convergence of cyber and terrorism 2018, the procurement of biological There has been much concern IS sympathisers have successfully toxins, such as abrin and ricin, and speculation over the past few carried out a small number of through online and underground years that terrorists could turn to defacements and low-level hacks marketplaces continued to be a trend. launching cyber-attacks against and in March 2018, IS supporters There were no reports of terrorist use critical infrastructure. However, attempted to come up with an of radioactive isotopes or nuclear while the so-called Islamic State alternative to Facebook. Dubbed material in 2018. (IS) online propaganda appears the Muslim’s Network, it was made technologically advanced and available in Arabic, English and their hackers may be well versed in French. However, the platform was encrypted communication tools, their not an in-house development but had cyber-attack tools and techniques been purchased online for a small remain rudimentary. They still amount of money. purchase domain-hosting services, 7 The information contained in the Bio-Terror video downloading software and renting released during this campaign about the production botnets for distributed denial-of- of deadly microorganisms – petalominium – was very basic and with several mistakes indicating service (DDoS) attacks rather than poor knowledge of microbiology. The information developing their own cyber weapons. provided was therefore considered not enough to weaponise the microorganisms concerned. general overview 21
Convictions and penalties
Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2016, 2017 and 2018, as reported to Eurojust*.
653 580 565
2016 2017 2018
* The data for previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.
In 2018, 17 EU Member In 2018, France was the Member State as compared to 2017 (66) and 2016 that reported the highest number (53). The practice in some countries, States reported a total of individuals in concluded court such as Belgium, France and the of 653 individuals proceedings for terrorist offences Netherlands, to render sentences in (141), followed by Spain (120), the UK absentia continued with respect to who were convicted or (115) and Belgium (80)10. In Greece, defendants who were believed to be in acquitted of terrorist ten individuals were tried more than conflict zones or were claimed to have once during the year in different died but were not officially declared offences8. This number terrorism proceedings. As a result, the dead. Some individuals sentenced total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorist offences in 2018 had is higher than the for terrorism-related offences in 2018 previously been convicted of terrorism numbers reported over was 664. or other offences in the same Member State or abroad. the past two years9. Some of the defendants who appeared before courts in the EU Member States were minors at 8 Eurojust received contributions containing the time of trial and/or when the information on terrorism-related court decisions offences were committed. The in 2018 from the following EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, number of female defendants judged Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, in 2018 (94) continued to increase Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. If a verdict pronounced in 2018 was appealed and the appeal was concluded 10 before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only The UK contribution includes proceedings on on the latest/final verdict. offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism-related. 9 Please refer to Annex 4 for additional information Similar to previous years, the UK data for 2018 on the numbers mentioned in this section. refers only to convictions. general overview 22
Some of the verdicts reported in 2018 network recruiting and sending injured. The two were found guilty of are final while others are pending fighters to join jihadist terrorist attempted assassination and illegal judicial remedy, as appeals have been organisations abroad. The network possession of firearms, both in a submitted11. had facilitated the integration of terrorist context. foreign fighters into al-Qaeda in A prison sentence of six years was the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Type of terrorism ordered by the District Court of Movement for Oneness and Jihad Rotterdam in the case of a Dutch In 2018 the majority (399) of verdicts in West Africa (MOJWA), Jabhat foreign fighter, who had joined IS in the EU Member States concerned al-Nusra and IS, in Mali, Libya, Iraq and is believed to still be in Syria. jihadist terrorism confirming a trend and Syria. It had members in Spain, 12 The man, tried in absentia, was that started in 2015 . Similar to Belgium, Luxembourg, Turkey, Tunisia, found guilty of participation in a the previous years, a large part of Libya, Mali, France and Morocco, terrorist organisation. He left for the verdicts for jihadist terrorism all performing different functions, Syria in November 2013 and has concerned offences related to so- including recruitment, document been recognised in several videos called Islamic State (IS); however, forgery, financing, facilitators in the from the conflict zone. The Dutch persons linked to al-Qaeda (AQ), the destination country and smugglers. authorities also received information Taleban, Al-Shabaab or Hezbollah The court convicted all six defendants from the US Department of Defense were also tried in 2018. of terrorist offences. The leader that an IS registration form in his of the network was found guilty of Courts in France, Belgium and Spain name had been found in October 2015 directing and promoting a terrorist rendered the highest number of in Syria. The court considered the organisation, with a mitigating verdicts concerning jihadist terrorism form authentic. The defendant had circumstance for confessing the in 2018 (123, 76 and 68 respectively). been informed of the upcoming court crime and was ordered to serve eight Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Slovenia and hearings via Facebook Messenger. years of imprisonment, followed by Sweden reported only verdicts for He had informed the police of his probation for seven years. Four of jihadist terrorism in 2018. intention to return to the Netherlands, his co-defendants were convicted of Six defendants appeared before the which was the reason why a hearing belonging to a terrorist organisation Audiencia Nacional (National High had been postponed to allow him to and received a six-year sentence Court) in Spain for their alleged be present. Following news in the each and a probation period of five involvement in a major terrorist media that the defendant had died in years upon release. The four had battle, a journalist published an article also confessed to the crime. The claiming he had received an open sixth defendant was sentenced to 11 According to Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of letter from the defendant addressed five years’ imprisonment, followed 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information to the judge. The letter claimed and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, by a probation period of five years, the information to be submitted to Eurojust is in that, together with his fiancée, he after the court found him guilty relation to final convictions. Due to the specifics had staged his own death to ensure of reporting, some EU Member States submit of collaboration with a terrorist information on final decisions only, while other EU his safe trip to the Turkish border. organisation. Member States also report on not final decisions. It stated further that he would not The data provided by the UK did not distinguish between final decisions and decisions pending The main living suspect of the 2015 be able to come back for the court judicial remedy. As reported, all convictions in the Paris attacks was sentenced to 20 hearing but would definitely do so if UK are effective from the moment of their being pronounced, even if an appeal is made. years of imprisonment, and a fine he were convicted and need to appear of EUR 6 000 by the Court of First before the Court of Appeal. The 12 The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not Instance of Brussels for terrorist court concluded that the defendant included in the numbers in this section. offences unrelated to the attacks. had clearly revoked his right to be The same penalty was handed to his present at the first instance trial. co-defendant. Both men had been When considering the severity of the arrested in Brussels on 15 March penalty, the court did not take into 2016 following a shoot-out with the account the fact that the defendant police, which had left four officers had left for Syria in a period when general overview 23
As in 2017, left-wing terrorism cases were brought before the courts in Czechia, Greece and Spain in 2018. The greatest increase was seen in Greece, where 33 verdicts were handed down, as compared to 17 in 2017. The number of decisions includes those in which the defendants were acquitted. One less had been known about IS and Belgium, France, Germany and Czech case heard by the High Court the caliphate had not been declared. Spain) reported cases of separatist in Prague was brought against two Furthermore, it considered it an terrorism in 2018. Courts in Spain men and three women, accused of aggravating circumstance that the tried the largest number of individuals preparing a bomb attack on a train in defendant had been with IS in a period charged with such offences (40). In Czechia. These alleged offences were when the terrorist organisation had March 2018, for example, the Spanish charged as preparation of a terrorist committed an increased number of National Court handed a prison attack and categorised as left-wing attacks. sentence of almost six years to an terrorism. The defendants were Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) member acquitted. The majority (64) of the female with several previous terrorism defendants were tried for jihadist Germany and the Netherlands convictions. The man was found terrorist offences, which also reported verdicts for right-wing guilty of participation in a terrorist presents an increase compared to terrorist offences and the total organisation. He left Spain after 2017 (42). The Court of First Instance number of reported verdicts increased serving his sentence for a previous of West Flanders, Bruges division, in from four in 2017 to 22 in 2018. In conviction. He settled in France from Belgium heard the case of a young Germany, for instance, the Higher where he made contacts with ETA. He woman charged with participation Regional Court of Dresden heard the received false documents and a car in the activities of a terrorist group. case of seven men and one woman registration plate and was instructed The court re-qualified the conduct accused to have formed part of the to leave for London, where he was as spreading or making otherwise extremist right group Gruppe Freital hosted by another ETA member. In public of a message with the purpose (Freital Group) since July 2015. January 2014 the Spanish authorities of inciting a terrorist offence. In The group’s objective was to attack issued a European Arrest Warrant particular, the charges referred to asylum seeker accommodation, and in his name. He was arrested in making propaganda for IS via the apartments, offices and vehicles of its the UK in February 2016 together internet, maintaining contacts with political opponents. Group members with another ETA member and was fighters in the conflict zone and had been accused of committing later surrendered to the Spanish providing moral and financial support a series of bomb attacks in 2015, authorities. to French nationals suspected of including on the vehicle of a left-wing terrorist offences. All activities had The Higher Regional Court of Celle politician and a left-wing party office, been carried out over the internet. in Germany found one Turkish on a refugee camp and an asylum The court found that the defendant national guilty of membership in centre. The charges against them had been extremely active online and a foreign terrorist organisation included leadership or membership had uploaded content, directly and and sentenced him to 18 months’ in a terrorist organisation, multiple indirectly, inciting the commission imprisonment. The court found that attempted murders and grievous of terrorist acts, including bomb the man had belonged to the PKK and bodily harm. The court found all eight attacks. The court found her guilty played a leading role in the terrorist defendants guilty and sentenced and ordered her to serve four years in organisation’s structures in the seven of them to prison terms of prison, of which two on probation, and Lohne-Dinklage area between August five to ten years, and one to a youth to pay a fine of € 2000. 2014 and October 2016. The man sentence of four years. had also acted as a co-leader for the Five EU Member States (Austria, region of Oldenburg. general overview 24
Type of offences
As in previous years, a large number The man stated that he performed the of Parliament in London and was of criminal cases concluded in 2018 attack on behalf of IS. assisted by her mother. Her sister concerned participation in (the was also convicted of planning to In June 2018, the Varsinais-Suomi activities of) a terrorist group. A commit another attack close to the District Court sentenced the smaller number of the defendants British Museum in London. She was perpetrator of a terrorist attack in 2018 were tried for glorification of sentenced in August to a life term, in Turku, Finland, in August 2017 terrorism and humiliation of victims with a minimum of 13 years to be to a cumulative sentence of life of terrorism, recruitment and (self- served. She had married an IS fighter imprisonment for killing two people ) training for terrorist purposes, online and had planned to join him and injuring eight others. The financing of terrorism, travel to a in Syria before being stopped by defendant was further liable to pay zone controlled by a terrorist group, the security service. The mother is damages to the victims. The court instigation to commit terrorist acts, believed to have played a major role found that the defendant had acted in etc. or for attempting to commit such in radicalising her daughters. A fourth the name of IS and that the murders crimes. In some cases, terrorism young woman was also found guilty and attempted murders had been charges were filed in parallel with of possessing information about committed with terrorist intent. The charges for other offences, e.g. terrorist acts. defendant had intended to cause murder, manufacture, supply and serious fear among the population Judgments in 2018 continued to possession of explosives or weapons, and perceived himself as a promoter address the use of social media and migrant smuggling, aggravated of IS’s cause. He also prepared for various other online platforms to damage to property, and forgery of the attack by sharing a manifest that spread terrorist content, glorify and official documents. expressed the ideological and political incite the commission of terrorist In 2018, several cases concerned background and objectives of IS, as acts. In Spain, the National Court the preparation or the commission well as aspirations to promote its heard the case of a Moroccan national of recent terrorist attacks in goals, with discussion forums on the charged with self-indoctrination. On Europe. In Sweden, for example, Telegram instant messaging service. several occasions through the Amaq Stockholm District Court in June news Agency, the defendant accessed Life imprisonment, with a minimum 2018 sentenced an Uzbek national propaganda which had been created of 16 years to be served, and a prison to life imprisonment for committing and spread by IS. The defendant’s term of six years and nine months terrorist crimes. The defendant, a radicalisation process was further were ordered by the Central Criminal 40-year old male, stole a lorry to boosted by regularly accessing Court of England and Wales to a mow down pedestrians in the centre the website Muslim News, which mother and a daughter who belonged of Stockholm on 7 April 2017. The contained a depository of numerous to the first female terrorist cell in the incident led to the death of five audio files and roughly 5 000 videos UK. The daughter had planned to individuals; ten others were injured. with radical jihadist content. The carry out a knife attack close House general overview 25
defendant admitted to carrying out executions. The young man regularly Facebook and once contact with the these acts. The court handed down a looked up IS videos, supported their person was satisfactory, they would prison sentence of two years and two actions online, placed IS propaganda use WhatsApp to continue with months. on the internet and visited websites indoctrination. This process prompted about suicide terrorist attacks. In the recruitment of at least three young In Italy, the Milan Assize Court found March, he was found guilty and people of Moroccan nationality. The one person guilty of membership sentenced to youth detention of six defendants were sentenced between of a terrorist organisation and months and 181 days, part of which four and seven years imprisonment. disseminating, via an app and on the was suspended. internet, material inciting or provoking The Spanish National Court found the commission of terrorist acts. The The female defendants in 2018 were another woman guilty of collaboration court sentenced the man to serve 28 tried for leading a terrorist group, with a terrorist organisation and months in prison after it considered it preparing to commit terrorist acts, sentenced her to two years in prison. proven that he had publicly instigated participating in or collaborating with She had prepared to leave for Syria others to commit terrorist offences. a terrorist organisation, financing to marry a man who was presumably The court found that he had praised terrorism, glorification of terrorism, a member of IS. The defendant tried and fostered anti-democratic spreading messages inciting to to help him come back to the EU by feelings and religious hatred, and commit a terrorist offence, among providing a false passport. glorifiedjihad and martyrdom. He had other types of offences. In 2018, courts in several EU Member used multiple Facebook profiles to In Spain, four defendants appeared States handled cases against promote terrorist ideology and tools before the National Court charged defendants who were under legal to pursue the goals of conquest and with indoctrination and recruitment of age at the time the offences were expansion of IS. The court considered supporters to a terrorist organisation. committed. In Germany, the Higher the use of IT and electronic means The group was led by a woman Regional Court of Hamburg sentenced of communication an aggravating who started the recruitment and three Syrian nationals to years-long circumstance. indoctrination of other women in imprisonment for membership in a In the Netherlands, a teenager 2014 with the intention to reach Syria foreign terrorist organisation (IS) and appeared before Rotterdam District to join IS. She was planning to marry (attempted) document forgery. The Court charged with participation in one of the other defendants and first defendant was sentenced to six the terrorist organisations IS and the travel with him to Syria. Moreover, and a half years imprisonment. The United Cyber Caliphate (UCC). The she maintained a close relationship other two were minors at the time of court heard that between November with the other woman in the group the offence and as such received a 2016 and June 2017 he had made whose task also concerned the juvenile penalty of three and a half and distributed videos on instruction recruitment of supporters as well years each. The court found that the from the UCC, as well as other videos as the management of WhatsApp three had been part of an IS ‘sleeper inciting armed (jihadist) fighting. The groups. To indoctrinate and recruit cell’. The terrorist organisation videos also contained also images of of supporters, they first used had arranged for them to travel to general overview 26
Germany with fake passports, cash offences in 2018. In some cases, The lowest prison sentence ordered and mobile phones in 2015 and defendants were acquitted of terrorist by courts in the EU Member States awaited orders for an attack. offences but convicted of other in 2018 was three months and offences, such as drug trafficking and the highest was 535 years. Two An Austrian court sentenced a document fraud14. such penalties of 535 years of 16-year-old minor to ten months imprisonment were given to two ETA imprisonment with a probationary Similar to 2017, all prosecutions members in Spain, who placed an period of three years. The minor, who for right-wing terrorist offences in explosive device in a busy Madrid is a Serbian national, was indicted 2018 resulted in convictions. The street. Many people were injured for membership in a terrorist and percentage of convictions among the and material seriously damaged as a criminal organisation, as well as for verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2018 result. the endorsement of terrorist offences. remained very high (89 %, the same The crimes were committed by as in 2017). The conviction rate for More than half (59 %) of the penalties actively participating in chat groups separatist terrorist offences remained handed down with guilty verdicts in disseminating jihadist propaganda the same as in 2017 (71 %), while 2018 were of imprisonment of up to and setting up plans to travel to Syria that for left-wing offences decreased five years, which presents a slight in order to join IS. slightly (from 72 % in 2017 to 70 % in decrease compared to 2017 (61 %), 2018)15. while sentences of ten and more years of imprisonment increased Convictions and Penalties from 12 % in 2017 to 15 % in 2018. In several cases in Austria, Finland, acquittals The average prison sentence for Germany, Sweden and the UK the terrorist offences in the EU in 2018 In 2018, seven EU Member States courts ordered life sentences for the was seven years, which is higher reported that all terrorism verdicts committed terrorist offences. than in 2016 and 2017 (five years)16. had resulted in convictions, while It should, however, be taken into others reported both convictions and consideration that the severity of the acquittals13. Successful prosecutions 14 Eurojust considers it one verdict if an individual is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within penalty in each case would depend on resulting only in convictions were the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist the respective offence and specific concluded in Bulgaria, Denmark, offence and acquitted of another offence. If an individual is acquitted of a terrorist offence and circumstances and cannot serve any Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, convicted of another offence, the verdict is included comparative purposes. In addition, in Slovenia and Sweden; whereas in the overview as acquittal of terrorism. some EU Member States the average 15 France, Germany and Greece had a The data provided by the UK was not broken sentence is calculated on the basis very low percentage of acquittals down by type of terrorism and is therefore not used to calculate the conviction rate. of one conviction, while in others it securing convictions for the vast 16 For the purpose of the calculation of the average is based on a considerably higher majority of those tried for terrorist prison sentence, penalties exceeding 40 years of number of convictions. imprisonment and life sentences were counted as 40 years. In the cases where the court ordered a Similar to 2017, the highest average minimum number of years of the life sentence to be 13 2018 data for the UK refers only to convictions served, the sentence was included in the overview prison sentence was ordered for and is not included in the numbers in this section. with the minimum number of years indicated. general overview 27
left-wing terrorist offences and Austria 4 increased from ten to 16 years. The average prison term for separatist and right-wing terrorist offences increased from four to eight and six Belgium 5 years respectively. As in the past two years, the average prison sentence for Average* sentences (excluding jihadist terrorist offences remained Bulgaria 3 non-prison penalties) per 17 five years . Member State in 2018, as In some cases, in addition to the reported to Eurojust. Czechia 3 prison terms ordered by the court, the Average sentence in years convicted individuals were subjected to mandatory psychotherapy, Denmark 3 or admitted in a mental health institution. Furthermore, additional penalties included fines, restrictions on exercising certain civil rights France 5 or working in certain sectors (e.g. education), travel bans, expulsion from the national territory, fixed Germany 5 probationary period upon release, etc. In France, most of those convicted were entered into the national judicial database for terrorist offences and in the UK, terrorist offenders were subjected to counter terrorism Greece 16 registration. In some cases, juvenile penalties were given or the sentence was partially or fully suspended. In other cases, the sentencing or the execution of the prison sentence was Hungary 4 postponed upon certain conditions, or the penalty was still to be determined by the judge at the time of reporting. Italy 6 In the cases when courts in the EU Membr States did not impose a prison term, they ordered other penalties, Lithuania 2 such as community service, fines, referral orders in case of minor offenders, etc. Netherlands 4
17 The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not Slovenia 3 included in the overview.
Spain 8 * The average sentence in Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovenia is based on one conviction in each country. In Finland and Sweden, only one penalty of life imprisonment was ordered by the national courts and is therefore not included in the overview. United Kingdom 7 jihadist terrorism 28
2/ Jihadist terrorism 718 687 705 511 395
201 jihadist terrorism 201 201 201 2018 29
Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism in EU Member States in 2018.
7 3 45
17 1 43
35 273 2
14
40 29 2
Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism from 2014 to 2018.
718 687 705 511 395
201 201 201 201 2018
7 3 45
17 1 43
35 273 2
14
40 29 2 jihadist terrorism 30
Terrorist attacks and suspects arrested in the EU
In 2018, there were seven completed In 2018, a total number of 51119 jihadist terrorist attacks: three in individuals were arrested on suspicion France, two in the Netherlands, one of offences related to jihadist Seven completed jihadist in Belgium and one in the UK; one terrorism. Most arrests occurred in terrorist attacks were jihadist attack failed in Spain. In France, the UK and Belgium, followed addition, another 16 incidents were by the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, carried out and one attack reported as foiled jihadist terrorist in descending order. More than half of failed in five EU Member plots. A total of 13 people were killed the suspects, both men and women, and 46 injured in jihadist attacks in were arrested on suspicion of being a States. Sixteen jihadist 2018. The casualties included 12 member of a terrorist group, including plots were successfully police officers, three of whom were while abroad, and participation in thwarted killed. attack planning and preparation. France, the Netherlands and the EU and non-EU citizens were almost UK witnessed the highest number equally represented among jihadist Thirteen people were of attacks and the highest rate of arrestees and attack perpetrators. killed and 46 injured in successfully foiled terrorist plots. Among this population, non-EU-born France, Germany and Italy reported individuals were slightly prevailing. jihadist attacks in 2018 disrupted terrorist plots involving the The average age of attackers was attempted use of chemical and/or 26, while the individuals arrested for 18 All completed jihadist biological materials . terrorist offences were older, with the average age being 32. The attackers The completed and failed jihadist terrorist attacks in 2018 were all male. Women accounted for attacks were mostly carried out 22% of arrestees suspected of jihadist were perpetrated by lone using knives and firearms, and terrorism, as compared to 16 % in 2017 predominantly targeted civilians. actors and 26 % in 2016.20 All attack plots involving the use of explosives were disrupted.
The majority of the perpetrators were acting or were planning to act alone. However, several foiled terrorist plots, including two in the Netherlands, were prepared by individuals acting in a group.
19 See Annex 3. 20 These figures are calculated excluding data 18 See chapter Chemical, biological, radiological and contributed by the UK and partially Belgium, which nuclear (CBRN). are not broken down to type of terrorism. jihadist terrorism 31
The following is an overview of the COMPLETED JIHADIST TERRORIST ATTACKS in 2018, four of which were claimed by the so-called Islamic State (IS):
On 23 March, a 26-year-old Moroccan male hijacked a car in Carcassonne 23 MARCH (France), killing the passenger and wounding the driver. Later, he shot CARCASSONE and wounded four police officers nearby military barracks, and attacked FRANCE a supermarket in Trèbes, where he killed two civilians, injured several others and held the customers hostage. A lieutenant colonel of the French National Gendarmerie, who exchanged himself for a hostage, was shot and stabbed by the perpetrator and died later from his injuries. The special task force of the French National Gendarmerie killed the attacker. IS claimed in an Amaq News release that he was ‘a soldier of IS’;
On 5 May, a man stabbed and seriously injured three people in The Hague (the Netherlands) before being shot and arrested by police. The authorities 5 MAY later assessed that he had a terrorist motive; THE HAGUE THE NETHERLANDS
On 12 May, a 20-year-old French citizen of Chechen origin armed with a knife killed one person and injured several more in Paris (France), before being shot dead by police. IS claimed responsibility for the attack through Amaq News affirming that the attacker was ‘a soldier of IS’, and released a 12 MAY video of the attacker pledging allegiance to IS; PARIS FRANCE
On 29 May, a 31-year-old man who was released from prison on parole the day before, stabbed two female police officers and took one of their guns in Liège (Belgium). He used the handgun to shoot and kill both officers and the passenger of a car, and to wound four other police officers when exiting the school building where he had briefly held a woman hostage. The attacker was killed by police, and the following day IS claimed 29 MAY responsibility for the attack through Amaq News. The perpetrator had LIÈGE converted to Islam and had been radicalised to violence while serving a BELGIUM sentence for drug offences; jihadist terrorism 32
On 31 August, a 19-year-old Afghan national who had applied for asylum in Germany stabbed and severely wounded two American tourists in the Amsterdam central railway station (the Netherlands), before being 31 AUGUST shot and arrested by police. The authorities later assessed that he had a AMSTERDAM terrorist motive; THE NETHERLANDS
On 11 December, a 29-year-old French national of Algerian descent armed with a gun and a knife killed five people and injured others in an attack near Strasbourg Christmas market (France). He was wounded by police before fleeing the scene. After a two-day search, the perpetrator was 11 DECEMBER killed in Strasbourg and IS claimed that the perpetrator was an ‘IS soldier’ STRASBOURG through an Amaq News statement on 13 December. Several people were arrested in connection with the attack, including the individual who FRANCE allegedly supplied the attacker with a firearm;
31 DECEMBER MANCHESTER UK On 31 December, a 25-year-old man of Somali origin armed with a kitchen knife stabbed and injured three people including a police officer at Victoria station in Manchester (UK). The attacker was arrested, and the authorities later assessed that he had a terrorist motive.
In addition, Spain reported an incident in the EU is at least partly the result maintain relations in loose networks in 2018 as a failed attack: on 20 of effective intelligence and law or small unstructured groups, and may August, a 29-year-old Algerian male enforcement operations, illustrated receive material and/or moral support entered a police station in Barcelona by the relatively high number of from like-minded individuals. It is (Spain) wielding a knife and reportedly reported foiled attacks. In September not always self-evident whether the shouting ‘Allahu akbar’ (God is 2018, for example, the Netherlands individual is a dedicated jihadist acting great). He was shot and killed after successfully thwarted a major attack on radical beliefs, or someone who he attempted to stab a police officer. involving seven men who had reached suffers from mental health issues. For The incident occurred three days an advanced stage in their planning. instance, neither the motivation nor after the anniversary of the attacks in Three of the suspects had previously the trigger for the stabbing of three Barcelona and Cambrils in 2017 and been arrested for attempting to travel people in The Hague (the Netherlands) around the time of the Islamic feast of abroad as foreign terrorist fighters on 5 May was immediately clear. Eid al-Adha. (FTFs). The perpetrator was known to police due to his prior behaviour, but the EU Member States also reported All attacks completed in 2018 were prosecution concluded, based upon that 16 terrorist plots were foiled. perpetrated by lone actors and not by his own statements and recorded The decrease in the number of groups. Lone actors, however, seldom conversations, that the man had a completed jihadist terrorist attacks act in total isolation. They often jihadist motive for his attack. jihadist terrorism 33
A number of violent incidents in ideology, the presence of extremist in the number of prisoners showing 2018 used modi operandi promoted individuals with links to jihadist support for IS. Threats to prison by terrorists but were ultimately terrorist organisations, and the guards, provocations and disrespect judged not to have been carried potential of returning FTFs from the to female prison staff and non- out by terrorists. For example, in conflict areas in Iraq and Syria. observant Muslim prisoners were the August a car drove into pedestrians most common ways to express such Terrorist networks continue to be and cyclists and then crashed into support. detected in Europe, including in a security barrier just outside the prison. In October 2018, 25 inmates IS was under intense pressure and, Houses of Parliament in London were identified in 17 different prisons at the time of writing, had lost almost (UK). Three people were injured in all over Spain belonging to a jihadist all of the territory it once controlled the incident. The case was originally network. The network was composed in Iraq and Syria. The group’s ability regarded as terrorism due to the of prisoners with prior records for to direct external attacks against the location, methodology and alleged jihadist terrorism-related crimes West appears to be greatly reduced targeting of civilians and police and of inmates convicted of other due to the consequent attrition of officers, but later assessed to be criminal offences, who presumably personnel and reduction in resources. a criminal act without a terrorist became radicalised in prison. The However, despite the lack of capacity, motive. The driver was charged with members of the network ranged the IS core maintains the intent to attempted murder. from one individual linked to the conduct such operations and might In 2018, as in previous years, the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid rely on former members, including majority of EU Member States did not to returned and frustrated foreign those currently imprisoned, and report any jihadist terrorist attacks. fighters, including converts. Italy sympathisers based in Europe. Nevertheless, these same EU Member reported that radicalisation in prisons States were aware of the potential remains a matter of concern. Inside threats emanating from the increase the Italian prisons in 2018, there in numbers of adherents to jihadist was reportedly a further increase jihadist terrorism 34
Terrorist propaganda
each province consisting of a number province produced propaganda on a IS media in 2018 of regions. Videos began featuring regular basis. While it focused heavily The physical caliphate was a these new epithets alongside the on local conflict, it also released a central propaganda tool of IS. previous titles. However, this only number of videos in 2018 suggesting The organisation’s slogan Baqiya lasted for a couple of weeks before the region as a new haven for those wa tatamaddad (‘remaining and the new titles were dropped and wishing to join IS but who are ‘unable expanding’) combined with successful propaganda reverted to the use of the to emigrate to Iraq and Syria’. One of military advances in previous years previous labels. Similarly, IS Hawran these videos, titled ‘The land of God is convinced thousands to emigrate to province – established in July 2018 wide’ and released in March, purported the lands of the caliphate. The military in southern Syria – produced a very to document IS’ authority over defeat of IS in Iraq Syria denied limited number of propaganda items territories in Jawzjan (Afghanistan). the group one of its most potent and ceased that same month. The implication is that the utopian idea propaganda assets. of the caliphate still holds potential There is also a certain amount of in Afghanistan. This message was IS’ current situation has had a confusion as to the actual number of underscored in the video’s use of significant impact on its digital IS provinces worldwide. One example languages: while most of the narration capabilities: propaganda produced is that of the IS East Asia province was in Arabic, fighters also delivered by official IS media outlets has visibly which released its first propaganda messages in Dari, Pashto and Uzbek. declined. The only publication that item in May 2018. While East Asia continued to be issued on a regular was recognised as an IS province Nevertheless, the various shifts and basis was the official Arabic weekly in al-Naba’ in late July 2018, it was inconsistencies in IS propaganda in newsletter al-Naba’ (The News). subsequently downgraded to a region 2018 reflect the overall collapse of in subsequent issues, before again the claimed caliphate, previously the The group’s shrinking capabilities on being referred to as a province in central pillar of its project. However, the ground have significantly affected August. this collapse combined with the its strategic planning. This was evident group’s battlefield attrition did not stop in its failure to implement a planned One of the few regions where IS the group’s online sympathisers from remapping of its provinces. In July appears to be growing in strength continuing to proclaim their support 2018, IS attempted to re-brand its and capability is in Afghanistan and for the group. propaganda to portray Iraq and Syria Pakistan, as its Khorasan province is as consisting of just two provinces: becoming an increasingly prominent Wilayat al-Sham (Levant province) and actor in the Afghan conflict. In contrast Wilayat al-Iraq (Iraq province), with to other IS branches, the Khorasan jihadist terrorism 35
aimed to showcase IS’ proficiency, Re-mediatisation the utilisation of the same graphics A lack of IS propaganda from the and special effects from one video battlefield resulted in re-mediatisation A lack of IS propaganda to the next illustrated the dwindling and was accompanied by a capabilities of the organisation. mushrooming of pro-IS media outlets from the battlefield Despite the shrinking of its physical and supporter-generated productions resulted in re- footprint, the group continued to The spin-off media outlets aimed to mediatisation and was galvanise a significant amount of project the image of an IS franchise accompanied by a online supporters. A flurry of new media outlets burgeoned in the wake IS leaders issued a total of three mushrooming of pro- of IS’ loss of territory and there was speeches in 2018: one was delivered a noted increase in 2018 in SGC by the group’s caliph Abubakr al- IS media outlets and publications that were not officially Baghdadi on the occasion of the supporter-generated linked to any terrorist organisation but celebration of Eid al-Adha on 22 productions which were obviously sympathetic to August 2018 and two by the group’s IS. official spokesperson Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir. The spin-off media outlets On social media, posters were the most recurrent type of SGC visual The low number of speeches is aimed to project the propaganda and covered a wide range not in itself unusual (neither the image of an IS franchise of topics, including doctrinal texts and group’s elusive leader nor its current the familiar apotheosis of martyrdom. spokesperson has delivered more The most significant group of SGC than two speeches a year since posters called for lone-actor attacks 2015). Nevertheless, this has meant to debunk the idea that it was losing and featured Western landmarks that IS sympathisers have been the ability to mount major military alongside exhortative quotes by IS forced to resort to recycling older operations. IS official media and leaders. The posters were produced material to produce their supporter- sympathetic media outlets latched on in an array of languages and featured generated content (SGC). In fact, to the event and drew inspiration for varying levels of refinement. the most notable speeches used for their propaganda from it for weeks SGC purposes in 2018 date back to SGC experienced an uptick of activity afterwards. 2016 and were delivered by former over certain periods (e.g. during IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad Another audio-visual production which the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia; al-Adnani. This contrasts heavily with attempted to highlight IS’ capabilities Christmas and New Year holidays; al-Qaeda – both core and affiliates was the video series entitled ‘Harvest and the gilets jaunes protests in – who issued topical speeches on a of the soldiers’. The series consisted France), making them more visible regular basis. of detailed statistics and information in mainstream media. It is worth regarding the types and the results highlighting that the threats relating The year 2018 also saw a decrease in of operations conducted by IS over a to the World Cup and the gilets jaunes the number of IS videos featuring high- given week. Released in Arabic and were posted on media platforms production values and high-definition English by the al-Hayat Media Center, supportive of the IS rather than in drone footage of the battlefields. the first episode in the series appeared official statements or speeches by Official IS videos featured little beyond in early August 2018 and continued the group. It is therefore difficult to ruined towns and occasional forays to be issued for the remainder of ascertain whether they resulted from a into enemy territory. However, the the year21. While the production concerted decision by senior members group’s attack on Iranian forces during of the group or if they were instead a a national military parade in Ahvaz spontaneous effort by propagandists. (Iran) on 22 September 2018 provided 21 The 25th episode on 17 January 2019 was the last Discussions on Telegram later claimed IS with the opportunity to attempt to appear in the series. jihadist terrorism 36
that IS had distanced itself from the exchanged insults and refutations World Cup threats, which did not IS struggles to online, with the former arguing that materialise, highlighting an issue of unify its ideological the IS Media Department is too radical command-and-control within the IS in its approach to issues such as media network. position takfir, and the latter accusing al-Wafa’ and al-Turath al-‘Ilmi of being spies IS propagandists The need to appear united is even and calling into question their support more crucial in the light of a long- for the caliphate. standing ideological dispute – strive to project an The overall result was an energetic between the lesser and more radical media campaign increasingly idea of unity members of IS – that is currently divorced from realities on the ground. raging online. The debate on the The loss of a coherent narrative in the Conscious of their disjointed concept of takfir(the act of declaring light of the organisation’s territorial appearance, the SGC outlets showed other Muslims unbelievers), which had losses, its weakened branding and an increasing awareness of the need come to the fore in official IS media waning credibility underscored a to appear united and aimed to project and had ostensibly been settled in general state of confusion in the the image of an IS franchise. With this 2017 in favour of the less radical ranks of IS and a lack of cogency in its in mind, they were careful to produce position22, continued in 2018 and arguments. propaganda that carried the hallmarks extended to SGC outlets. The online of IS and mimic the group’s official dispute in 2018 pitted the central IS braggadocio. The need to appear as a Media Department, which appears to An al-Qaeda monolithic bloc and less like disparate have returned to its radical stance, groups also led to joint campaigns on against two more ‘moderate’ media resurgence? Telegram, including #Answer_the_call foundations formerly supportive IS’ loss of significant territory in and #Remaining_steadfast, in which of IS: al-Wafa’ and al-Turath al- Iraq and Syria stands in contrast to the various pro-IS outlets produced ‘Ilmi. Supporters of the two camps publications under a common al-Qaeda’s lack of major change over hashtag. the same period. While IS dominated 22 The disagreements date to May 2017 when IS headlines, al-Qaeda has focused on Another joint project is the unofficial issued a controversial memo which set out its new stance on takfir. The memo argued that takfir consolidating its influence in both Youth of the Caliphate magazine, of is a foundation of the Islamic faith. In practical existing and new theatres. As a result, which three issues were released terms, this would mean that even if a Muslim it has succeeded in subsuming a in 2018. The magazine is managed committed no sin him or herself, he or she could be denounced as a disbeliever for failing to condemn number of franchises in a global by a consortium of pro-IS media other alleged sinners. The memo also included movement that runs from North-West outlets (the Ashhad Media Company, an opinion on the issue of ‘excuse of ignorance’, roughly equivalent to the legal principle ignorantia Africa to South Asia. Furthermore, the Sunni Shield Foundation and juris non excusat. While the long-held IS position despite boasting a less diversified al-Saqri Corporation for Military had been that ignorance of a religious obligation – such as refraining from declaring Muslims who online infrastructure than its rival, Sciences) and is headed by the al- take part in elections unbelievers – was held to be al-Qaeda’s propaganda output has Abd al-Faqir Foundation. Youth of the excusable, the new memo rejected ignorance as an excuse. As a result, not only did the memo cast remained constant. Caliphate promotes publications from doubt on whether Sunni Muslims worldwide could other IS-supportive media outlets, be considered true Muslims, but some of IS’ own Al-Qaeda sets itself apart from IS in leaders and members could be declared unbelievers its discourse and presents itself as including Asawirti Media, the Khattab under the terms delineated in the ruling. In Media Foundation, al-Battar Media, addition, the debate also included discussion of a level-headed pragmatic group that other religious concepts that supported IS ideology, seeks redress for the people. The al-Bushrayat and al-Adiyat Media including al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty to Muslims and Production Company. The magazine disavowal of polytheists) and nawaqid al-Islam or organisation is currently focusing nullifiers of Islam (sets of conditions with which all more on local concerns as opposed to even encourages individual readers to Muslims must comply, e.g. not to ally with infidels send in their own SGC contributions against Muslims). The ruling was quick to spark global jihad and couches its speeches for publication. controversy among IS followers and deepened in the context of political realism. Al- the already existing debate on the issue. Some of IS’ senior ideologues objected to this definition of Qaeda has also successfully gained takfir. See also Europol, TE-SAT 2018, p. 33. jihadist terrorism 37
productions and their message Al-Qaeda affiliates projected an overriding sense of unity are gaining strength and complementarity – indeed they Despite boasting a appeared to share media resources – in the Sahel JNIM concentrated on the belligerent less diversified online content, while AQIM had greater Ayman al-Zawahiri, the nominal head infrastructure, al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the ideological of al-Qaeda, mentioned West Africa content. An important point on the propaganda output has several times in his most recent belligerent narrative is that al-Qaeda speeches. He even devoted two remained constant visibly attempted to differentiate itself videos over the course of one week from IS by not including scenes of in March 2018 to the topic of jihad beheadings in its propaganda. Al-Qaeda sets itself apart in Africa and took the opportunity to In stark contrast to IS, AQIM and JNIM from IS in its discourse call for an uprising against ‘Western occupying powers in the region’. attempted to reach out to Western and presents itself as a civilians to explain their position. Al-Qaeda’s affiliates in West Africa, Propaganda produced by the two level-headed pragmatic most notably al-Qaeda in the Islamic al-Qaeda affiliates stressed that their Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama’at Nusrat group with legitimate targets for attack were the Western al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, ‘group military contingents stationed in the political and socio- in support of Islam and Muslims’), region and not civilians. A case in economic grievances also issued a wave of threats against point is the discourse put forward Western interests in the region. Two by a French female hostage held by of the most common leitmotifs in JNIM since late 2016, who appeared AQIM and JNIM’s speeches are the in three videos produced by their leverage by giving more space to local redistribution of resources and the official mouthpiece al-Zallaqa Media affiliates and recognising the added need to resist Western hegemony. in 2018. She spoke of the respectful value of coalescing power from the Both groups railed against the treatment she had received from grassroots level. ‘colonially installed governments’ and her captors and described them as ‘surrogate regimes’ who allowed their Al-Qaeda also takes a more nuanced ‘trustworthy’. In contrast, she accused patrons largely unfettered access approach in its diatribes against the French government of obstructing to local resources and served the the West, although – like IS – it also her release. While hostage taking interests of foreign powers ahead of conflates the terms ‘crusaders’, was a recurring theme in JNIM’s their own citizens. ‘Christians’ and ‘Westerners’. productions, the group stressed that However, al-Qaeda focuses more Al-Qaeda also stressed the the hostages were taken as ‘just substantially on what it describes as paramountcy of the region’s Islamic retribution’, the suggestion being that Western governments’ iniquitous and identity and its own role as a Western citizens would no longer be predatory policies and less on the revolutionary exemplar for the umma targeted, should these foreign powers degeneracy and anathematisation of (global Muslim community). It pointed stop their interventions in the region. Western culture as a whole. to an alleged Western conspiracy Similarly, in a speech released against Islam and accused the West in late December 2018, AQIM’s of harbouring plots and designs to leader exploited the French gilets subordinate, humiliate and undermine jaunes protests to denounce what Islamic institutions and culture. he described as France’s neo- The West in general – and France colonialism and to appeal to the wider in particular – was presented as an French public. He evoked a growing occupying force corrupting Islam. dichotomy between a ‘corrupt While AQIM and JNIM presented French elite’ and the majority of the similar narratives in their audio-visual French population and drew parallels jihadist terrorism 38
between the plight of the protesters Iba’ News as an unbiased and credible and that of the ‘victims of French media outlet. Indeed, Iba’ News, first Common aims and colonialism’. He described the costly issued in June 2018, resembles a ambitions military involvement of France in Mali, mainstream newspaper in content Libya, Central Africa and other African and style and covers foreign policy While jihadist discourse targets countries as the root cause of current issues and Syrian social issues. In Westerners in general, a number socio-economic issues that prompted contrast to IS’ weekly al-Naba’, Iba’ of states are singled out: France, the gilets jaunes movement. News contains no religious doctrinal the UK and the USA. These three texts. One clue to its ideological countries in particular are vilified for Al-Qaeda offshoots leanings is the derogatory designation their perceived negative role in the of IS as khawarij24. Its desire to Israeli-Palestinian conflict and are and branches in present itself as a mainstream media generally accused of harbouring neo- outlet led Iba’ News to denounce the imperialist ambitions in the Middle Syria continue to Google Play Store in September 2018 East and Africa. These accusations for taking down its mobile phone are levelled by supporters of both IS cause confusion application. and al-Qaeda. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, ‘Levant Another relevant armed group France, in particular, was the focus for Liberation Committee’), whose operating in Idlib is Tanzim Hurras a plethora of jihadist organisations main component Jabhat Fath al- al-Din (THD, ‘guardians of the religion in 2018. Media outlets supportive of Sham publically split from al-Qaeda organisation’), a splinter group IS and al-Qaeda targeted France (and in 201623, became the dominant from HTS and widely believed to French interests) both for attacks jihadist force in Syria in 2018. HTS be al-Qaeda’s new affiliate in Syria, and what appears to be recruitment distanced itself from the international although it has not yet been officially purposes. Al-Qaeda’s senior terrorist group brand in a statement accepted by the al-Qaeda senior leadership, as well as AQIM and JNIM, in June 2018 and condemned its leadership. THD subsumed a number accused France of plundering Muslim terror designation by the US State of smaller jihadist factions and made countries’ resources and of refusing Department. The statement also new military alliances with others. to let go of its former colonies. JNIM stressed that HTS posed no threat to THD also focused on developing its also claimed France was seeking to countries outside Syria. own brand. In addition to using Sham create a turf war in the region. HTS In 2018, HTS focused on proving its al-Ribat Media as its official outlet, also accused France of duplicitously state-building capabilities in a bid to the group launched the first issue claiming to defend human rights in position itself as a negotiating partner of al-Falah magazine in late October Syria while supporting the Syrian on the Syrian scene. In particular, it 2018. Al-Falah offers political analysis regime. utilised its two media outlets (Amjad interspersed with religious advice, In terms of French-language Media and the Iba’ News Agency political implementation of Islamic propaganda, al-Kifah continued which, while it has not been officially law and technical guidance with to provide French translations of linked to HTS, clearly acted as its regard to anonymity and security. The al-Qaeda productions, while the mouthpiece) to document its ability magazine also aims to stress that al- Centre Médiatique an-Nur and the to exert effective administrative Qaeda remains a robust organisation. online magazine Mediaction – first control over the north-western Idlib released in February 2018 – catered governorate, one of the last armed to IS francophone supporters. The opposition strongholds in Syria. official HTS outlet Amjad provided HTS continued to push back against French subtitles to a number of its all attempts to designate the videos in what appears to be a bid to rally French-speaking supporters. organisation as a terrorist threat and, 24 The Khawarij were a group that rebelled against However, the Amjad videos bore no with this in mind, attempted to market the fourth caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib during the first century of Islam. The movement is known in Sunni direct link to France and neither was and Shi’i circles for their extreme dogma (for France designated by HTS as a target 23 For developments since 2016, see Europol, TE-SAT example, with regard to excommunicating other 2018, p. 37. Muslims). for attacks. jihadist terrorism 39
There were also attempts to revive In this context, pro-IS Telegram English-language publications in channels reiterated the importance support of IS. In February 2018, for of ‘media jihad’ and urged supporters example, Ahlut-Tawhid launched a to join ‘invasion and publishing’ new magazine titled From Dabiq to brigades. This was followed by a Rome. Although it claimed to have noticeable increase in pro-IS media no organisational ties to any group outlets specialising in providing and was generally restrained in tone instructions on cyber and operational (with the first issue dedicated to the security. The most prominent of discussion of religious concepts such these were al-Saqri Corporation as apostasy, disbelief and respect for Military Sciences, Horizons of shari’a regulations), the magazine Electronic Foundation and the United contains a News Recap section that Cyber Caliphate. Given the relative provides a collection of updates on IS scarcity of official IS instructional developments on the field. However, guides in English, these unofficial but overall the newsletter was amateurish increasingly specialised media outlets in comparison to IS’ former English were attempting to fill a perceived language flagship magazines Dabiq gap. They also provided advice on and Rumiyah. Similarly, the Halummu how to avoid account deletion, with News Agency, which has in the past suggestions including using channel provided English translations of IS names that cannot be associated with propaganda items, resurfaced on IS. Channel administrators were also Telegram on 17 December 2018 as increasingly creating several versions well as on alternative platforms. of the same channel, allowing them to swiftly rebound from account IS and al-Qaeda suspensions. Similarly, IS-affiliated websites that act as repositories continued to for the organisation’s propaganda responded to recurrent suspensions experiment with by creating new domain names and re-emerging at new locations from online platforms backup copies. In addition to the territorial losses Furthermore, pro-IS and pro-al-Qaeda inflicted on IS, 2018 took its toll Telegram channels advertised the on the group’s digital presence. use of alternative platforms relying In response to intensified and on blockchain or peer-to-peer coordinated take-downs in 2018 by technology, e.g. Rocket.Chat and law enforcement and social media ZeroNet. However, jihadist activities platforms – including Telegram – IS on these platforms failed to gain supporters doubled their efforts to traction in 2018. As a result, Telegram remain relevant online and continued remained the platform of choice for to seek out new online vectors for both al-Qaeda and IS sympathisers. their propaganda. Despite frequent This attempted shift indicates jihadist deletions of content, the group and its groups’ awareness of and willingness supporters persisted in publishing on to exploit new technologies. a wide array of media and file-sharing sites. jihadist terrorism 40
Travel for terrorist purposes
Since the beginning of the conflict, fighting in jihadist conflict zones in approximately 5 000 individuals from Iraq and Syria, it has since shifted the EU have travelled to join fighting towards activities in the EU related The number of European groups in Iraq and Syria. Belgium, to spreading the jihadist message – foreign terrorist fighters France, Germany and the UK are the both online and offline. The jihadist major EU source countries. At the end movement in the Netherlands, for travelling or attempting to of 2018, the number of EU citizens example, is now many times larger travel to the conflict zone still in the region appeared to amount than it was before the war in Syria. to less than 2000 – with France25 and In this context, it is notable that the continued to decline and the UK having the highest numbers, Netherlands foiled an extensive was very low around 710 and 345, respectively. terrorism plot in the latter part of 2018. The suspects – three of whom More than 1 000 individuals are had been arrested in previous years believed to be dead, and although Foreign terrorist fighters for trying to travel abroad to fight – accurate figures were not available were seeking to carry out twin vehicle- were reported to have at the time of writing, a large number borne improvised explosive device appeared to have been taken prisoner travelled to alternative (VBIED, or car bomb) and gun attacks. or detained in Iraq and Syria. Some theatres of conflict but in were reportedly being held in Kurdish low numbers camps (including women and minors) Travel of women or by the Iraqi authorities; others were detained in Turkey. According to and minors Spain, some former foreign terrorist The absolute number of women that fighters (FTFs) were able to settle in have travelled/remain in the conflict Turkey. zones is relatively low for most EU Member States. France appears to Continuing decline have a high number: 33 % of 1324 individuals who travelled from France in travelling FTFs since 2012 were women. Compared to previous years, the Already in 2016, EU Member States number of EU FTFs travelling to the identified women as posing not Iraq and Syria conflict zone in 2018 only a threat concerning facilitation, was very low. There were also some recruitment, financing and attempted journeys – for example, propaganda production but also one individual was prevented from as potential attackers and fighters. leaving Austria twice; and Spain Several plots involving women were reported two individuals that foiled by police in Europe in recent succeeded in travelling. years. During the latter part of 2017, IS promoted a more active role for The European jihadist movement is women in combat zones. currently in a process of reorientation. While in previous years the focus The Netherlands also observed that had been on travelling to and by the end of 2018 at least 145 minors with a connection to the Netherlands were living in the conflict zone in Iraq 25 The breakdown of this figure still in situ from France includes 355 men, 301 women and 55 minors and Syria. More than half of them are of more than 13 years old. below the age of four and were mostly jihadist terrorism 41
born there. In addition, there are at travelled to alternative theatres of from the region and police found least 30 minors with a connection to conflict. several weapons and components the Netherlands living somewhere to build explosives among his Austria assessed that, with IS’ decline in the region outside the conflict belongings. This person left Spain in in Iraq and Syria, North Caucasians zone. As previously stated France the first trimester of 2017, presumably – who constituted 40 % of their FTFs has at least 55 minors over the age with the aim of joining IS in Iraq – increasingly returned to their former of 13 in Iraq and Syria. Switzerland and Syria, but was unsuccessful – focus of fighting against Russia. also mentioned the presence of prompting his travel to the Philippines Interestingly, Austria also stated that approximately 20 children (younger in October. at least two North Caucasian fighters than 12) among the jihadist travellers travelled to the conflict area in Eastern France reported that 39 individuals in conflict zones that have links to Ukraine – where they were fighting on were localised in a ‘third country’ (at Switzerland. the Ukrainian side. present unknown) after a stay in the While they are essentially victims, Iraq/Syria zone. Moreover, Ireland, Two countries – Germany and Spain – there are concerns among EU Member Italy and the UK observed that a reported on one subject each that had States that minors who have been number of FTFs travelled to Libya/ travelled to the Philippines, located exposed to indoctrination and training North Africa. In Italy’s case, the in a region where IS has ambitions to in former IS territories, may pose a suspects travelled there for training develop. Of specific note, in July 2018, potential future threat. with IS and then returned to Italy. a German-Moroccan national blew himself up at a checkpoint in Lamitan Conversely, Sweden reported that Travel to other on the island of Basilan, killing 15 there was no information indicating people; IS claimed responsibility for that Swedish members of IS or destinations the attack. The suicide bomber is other jihadist organisations have Jihadists who were unable to reach believed to have already left for the relocated from Syria to other conflict IS territory in Iraq and Syria may Philippines in October 2017 where zones. Their returnees have not been have been directed to IS’ branch or he reportedly joined an ‘IS-friendly’ connected to a confirmed plot and affiliate groups instead. As illustrated faction of the former Abu Sayyaf. most have returned to their former above, there also remains a high risk This was the first suicide attack in the cities, neighbourhoods and groups of that aspirant travellers, unable to Philippines carried out by a German friends, and have taken up activities join IS become frustrated and turn national. Also in the Philippines, they were involved in before travelling. their focus to conducting attacks in an FTF from Spain was arrested in Sweden pointed out that almost all their home countries. Albeit current January 2018 in Maluso, Basilan. their returnees travelled back using numbers appear to be relatively small, At the time of his arrest, he was their own travel documents. FTFs have been reported to have accompanied by a known terrorist jihadist terrorism 42
detained and expelled five FTFs who Returnees and were citizens of Russia, primarily from routes the North Caucasian Republics and Uzbekistan. In 2018, the number of Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, countries such as Austria, Women and minors are amongst FTFs returning from the Belgium, Finland, France and Italy26 those that have returned. Bosnia and Iraq and Syria conflict Herzegovina, for example, reported have seen a return rate of between zone remained very low approximately 20 % and 30 %. The three adults returned to their territory Netherlands and Spain have noted from Syria (two women with three young male children and one man). In roughly 18 % have returned; and Combat training, Germany and the UK appear to have another example, Belgium reported experienced the highest proportions that in December 2018, the process experience and of their FTFs returning – around 33 % to repatriate six minors and their two international contacts of and 45 % respectively. widowed mothers in a camp in Syria was pending. returnees remain a matter Those that have returned garner of concern kudos with like-minded individuals. The pressure of migrant flows Their training and experience – such towards the EU stabilised in 2018, as handling weapons and explosives but the continuation of the use of Terrorist use of the – makes them exceptionally smuggling routes, mainly through dangerous. Furthermore, EU Member the Western Mediterranean Sea and migrant flow has been States’ ongoing concern is that Western Balkan countries, remained observed, but it is not a matter of concern from a counter- these individuals can perpetuate deemed systematic and strengthen their networks both terrorism perspective. As previously nationally and internationally. reported, terrorist use of the migrant flow has been observed, but it is not Turkey continued to be the main hub deemed systematic. However, future for FTF travel. However, its increased clandestine use of this modi operandi law enforcement activity also likely by FTFs cannot be ruled out. contributed to stemming the flow of travellers. Confirmed overall figures Specifically, Italy reported that in of EU FTFs held in Turkey, Iraq and 2018 jihadists linked to the Iraq and Syria are not currently available. For Syria IS branch or individuals from a number of countries, the collection ‘radical Libyan environments’ were and verification of information on their able to reach their shores, infiltrating citizens’ fate remains a challenge. the irregular immigration flows. An example illustrating this concerned Routes to and from Iraq and Syria arrests carried out in April (in Naples) do not appear to have markedly and June 2018 (in Bari) of two asylum changed. The Western Balkans seekers from The Gambia who had and EU countries such as Bulgaria, previously illegally entered via Sicily. Hungary and Romania were again They had pledged allegiance to IS used as transit countries. Romania, and had been sent by the group after for example, reported that the number being trained in Libya to commit of cases continued its downward an attack against a crowd using a direction since the previous year (in vehicle. keeping with the European trend). Also of interest, in 2018 Moldova
26 Italy stated that they have 28 returnees to Europe, with only 12 returning to Italy. jihadist terrorism 43
Terrorist situation outside the EU* *This section is largely based on open sources, complemented by Europol in-house knowledge.
Several EU Member with the organisation had come to light at the time of writing. The IS States expressed newsletter al-Naba’, referring to the concern about Melbourne attack, acknowledged that most lone actors had not actually developments in conflict met IS leaders or members, received zones outside the EU, ideological or military training or financial support. The attackers were including Afghanistan, solely inspired by IS acts, propaganda Iraq, Libya and Syria and and ideology. having a negative impact In 2018, despite IS calls for people Americas and in the USA to take advantage of the on the security situation country’s firearms laws to acquire Australia weapons and perpetrate attacks, IS inside the EU. Military Lone actor attacks claimed by IS took did not claim any violent incidents in setbacks of terrorist place in 2018 in Canada and Australia. the USA as having been perpetrated In Canada, a 29-year-old Canadian of by its members. organisations in these Pakistani origin armed with a firearm In Bogotá (Colombia), in March 2018 killed an 18-year-old woman and regions might motivate a Cuban citizen, who had entered a 10-year-old girl on a busy street Colombia illegally, was arrested on their members to take in Toronto on 22 July 2018. The suspicion of planning attacks on assailant, who according to his family retaliatory action in American and Cuban embassy staff had suffered from mental health and high-ranking Fuerzas Armadas Europe. problems since his childhood, was Revolcionarias Colombianas (FARC, killed by police. Three days later, IS Colombian Revolutionary Armed claimed responsibility for the attack Forces) members. The suspect, through its Amaq News outlet. who denied being a Muslim, was In Australia, a Somali citizen drove a reportedly in contact with Libyan car into shop fronts in Melbourne on 9 extremists via Telegram who provided November 2018, exited and attacked advice on IED manufacturing and passers-by with a knife, killing one target selection and appealed to him person. He was killed by police. The to dedicate the attack to IS. attack was claimed by IS through an Amaq News statement, but no links jihadist terrorism 44
al-Adha, by five young males aged Russia, Caucasus between 11 and 17. The incidents and Central Asia included a knife attack on a police station and a car ramming targeting a Russia reported that in 2018, 37 police checkpoint, in which four of the terrorist cells were dismantled on attackers were killed. The third attack its territory and 28 acts of terrorism was an attempted suicide bombing, prevented at different stages of which the perpetrator survived. Amaq preparation or execution. During News released a video featuring the the reporting period, 65 terrorists attackers pledging allegiance to IS. including 10 group leaders were killed and 166 recruiters identified. Austria reported a restructuring Western Balkans More than 60 Russian and foreign among sympathisers and activists citizens were prevented from of the al-Qaeda-aligned Caucasus Western Balkans countries reported entering armed conflict zones Emirate and IS’ Caucasus province. that radicalised communities, to participate in the activities of This was connected to the death of some comprising returnees from international terrorist organisations. a leading jihadist in November 2017 the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria According to Russia, several cases in Tbilisi (Georgia). He had been existed on their territories and of the attempted use of unmanned granted political asylum in Austria were engaged in recruitment and aerial vehicles (UAVs, i. e. drones) and had been part of a Europe-wide propaganda activities, but terrorist carrying explosive devices were network of Chechen expatriates activities were rarely observed. noted. for several years. The impact of this restructuring had not become In Montenegro, the jihadist apparent at the time of writing. community mostly includes returnees from Syria. Its members form a On 29 July 2018, a terrorist attack in closely knit community and carry out Tajikistan targeted a group of tourists propaganda activities with the aim to cycling in the Danghara District. The recruit new supporters. In February attackers drove a car into the group 2018, an explosive device was thrown and then stabbed the cyclists, killing at the US embassy in Podgorica, but two American citizens, one Dutch and its explosion caused no casualties. one Swiss citizen; and wounding a The attacker committed suicide by Dutch and a Swiss citizen. The attack exploding a second device on himself. was claimed by IS through an Amaq News and a formal IS statement. In In Chechnya (Russia), three addition, a video released by Amaq coordinated attacks targeting News two days after the attack security forces – all of whom showed the five attackers pledging survived – were carried out on 20 allegiance to IS. August 2018, a day ahead of Eid
Turkey IS did not carry out any attacks in Turkey in 2018, despite repeated threats and calls for its supporters to do so. In addition to the threat of terrorist attacks, Turkey also reported that members of the Syrian opposition living in Turkey, in particular journalists, were targets of assassination. jihadist terrorism 45
Iraq and Syria previously declared its provinces. Except for the Kurdish-held north- In Syria, IS continued losing territory eastern part of its territory, Syria in 2018 and, by the end of the year, witnessed the rapid expansion was reduced to small pockets of land of Syrian regime control in 2018, along the lower Euphrates valley near eventually limiting the territory held by the Iraqi border. It was estimated that the armed opposition to the region of several thousand IS fighters, including Idlib and small portions of Aleppo and European FTFs, were concentrated in Hama governorates. Despite being this area. declared de-escalation zones in the Astana talks in July 2017, the Syrian Large numbers of IS members were groups took control of the region regime and its allied militias advanced taken prisoners in 2018, including of Afrin from Yekineyen Parastina on several rebel-held pockets, starting many women and minors. Some Gel (YPG, Peopleá Protection Units) with eastern Ghuta near Damascus in detainees were suspected of militias. In this area, the Arab armed March. Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), committing atrocities, such as two opposition groups were organised, which had controlled the area, was UK nationals alleged to have been with Turkish support, to form an entity allowed to evacuate to the Idlib region. members of a notorious IS execution referred to as the Syrian National Similarly, in June 2018, an offensive cell. They were reportedly captured Army (al-Jaysh al-Watani al-Suri), was launched against opposition-held by Syrian-Kurdish fighters close to the whose stated aim has been to free areas in southern Syria. The remaining Iraqi border in late January 2018. The Syria from the Syrian regime, IS and opposition forces, which had already cell of four individuals is said to have the YPG/PKK. The Syrian National been fighting IS-linked factions in been responsible for killing at least 27 Army is nominally linked to the Syrian the area, surrendered to the regime Western hostages. Interim Government, which is based in by mid-July 2018. As a result, Syrian Turkey. Also during 2018, IS continued regime forces came in direct contact their activities in areas outside with IS-linked factions in the region, Turkey tried to replicate this approach their territorial control, perpetrating including Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid in the rest of the opposition- attacks sometimes after extensive (‘Khalid bin al-Walid army’). These held territory in northern Syria by surveillance activities. For example, on factions reacted by officialising their supporting the unification of the 25 July, IS claimed responsibility for link to IS. On 10 July, a suicide attack remnants of the Free Syrian Army a suicide attack followed by firearm in the area was claimed under the under the umbrella of a National assaults that killed over 200 people name of IS Hawran province, which Liberation Front (al-Jabha al- in al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, ceased activities in late July 2018. Wataniyya lil-Tahrir) in late May which at the time was already under 2018. The National Liberation Front In September 2018, the Syrian regime Syrian regime control. IS attacks also welcomed the Sochi agreement of seemed to prepare an offensive targeted members of rival jihadist 17 September 2018 but stated that against rebel-held territories in groups, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham they would not hand over weapons or northern Syria around Idlib. This (HTS, ‘Levant Liberation Committee’) territory. leaders in Idlib in July 2018. On the was prevented by a 17 September Turkish efforts at uniting the other hand, armed opposition groups agreement concluded in Sochi military factions of the Syrian armed in northern Syria reported that they between Russia, Iran and Turkey, opposition under the leadership detained IS members or dismantled which stipulated the creation of a of the Syrian Interim Government IS cells, who had been involved in demilitarised zone along the frontline coincided with the attempt to planting IEDs and kidnapping for around Idlib, from which ‘radical’ legitimise territorial rule by HTS ransom in different areas around Idlib. rebels, including Jabhat al-Nusra, would be required to withdraw by mid- through the creation of a Syrian In mid-July 2018, IS radically October 2018. The withdrawal would Salvation Government (Hukumat simplified its system of territorial be monitored by joint Russian-Turkish al-Inqadh), which was formed in entities, regrouping all Syrian forces. Idlib region by a ‘General Syrian provinces into a ‘Levant province’ Congress establishment board’ in Turkey consolidated its influence (wilayat al-Sham) and all Iraqi early November 2017. Nominally in northern Syria in 2018. The provinces into an ‘Iraq province’ independent, its activities are strongly neighbouring country launched (wilayat al-Iraq). The apparent aim was characterised by the influence of Operation Olive Branch in early 2018, to mitigate the reputational damage of HTS, for example in the application of during which Turkish troops supported being evicted from areas that IS had Islamic punishments. by Syrian Arab armed opposition jihadist terrorism 46
In mid-February, two opponents Despite publicly cutting ties with the other al-Qaeda elements in Syria, as of HTS, the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic al-Qaeda leadership, HTS continued to it is assessed that the leadership is Movement and the Nur al-Din al-Zinki harbour al-Qaeda veterans in territory likely to be loyal to wider al-Qaeda Movement merged under the new it controls in northwestern Syria. objectives. name Jabhat Tahrir Suriya (‘Syrian In addition, 2018 witnessed a re- In addition to al-Qaeda loyalists, liberation front’). At the time of the structuring of jihadist currents beyond THD is likely also to contain former creation of HTS, the Ahrar al-Sham HTS in Syria. In early February 2018, IS members. Reportedly, significant Islamic Movement had merged with Jabhat Ansar al-Din, a non-aligned numbers of IS fighters arrived in Idlib many groups opposing the former’s jihadist group and one of the founding province in 2018, joining a variety creation. The Nur al-Din al-Zinki members of HTS, re-established of jihadist groups, such as Ansar al- Movement had initially joined HTS but itself as an independent group. In Tawhid (‘supporters of monotheism’), seceded from it in late July 2017 in late February 2018, several smaller which emerged in March 2018 and protest of HTS’ hostility towards Ahrar groups of former HTS members loyal entered short-lived cooperation with al-Sham. The creation of Jabhat Tahrir to the al-Qaeda leadership created THD in April under the title Hilf Nusrat Suriya was followed by an immediate a new entity, Tanzim Hurras al-Din al-Islam (‘Islam support alliance’). attack on its forces by HTS. Several (THD, ‘guardians of the religion mediation attempts between the organisation’). The group has been In mid-October, several jihadist groups could not prevent violence dominated by prominent former groups opposed to HTS’ position from breaking out at several points members of Jahbat al-Nusra and al- on the Sochi agreement, including in 2018. In early August 2018, Jabhat Qaeda veterans, who were opposed Jabhat Ansar al-Islam, THD, Jama’at Tahrir Suriya and other factions joined to the severance of ties with al- Ansar al-Islam and, probably, Ansar al-Jabhat al-Wataniyya lil-Tahrir. Qaeda in 2016, when Jabhat al-Nusra al-Tawhid, established a joint platform, renamed into Jabhat Fath al-Sham the Wa-harrid al-Mu’minin Operations The conflict between HTS and or left the organisation after Jabhat Room (‘And encourage the believers’ Jabhat Tahrir Suriya also concerns Fath al-Sham merged in HTS in early operations room). This formation the status of foreign fighters in the 2017. In 2018, THD focused on the tried to maintain a low profile and stay enclave. The Turkistan Islamic Party, local conflict, based on the media neutral in the conflict between the Nur for example, stated repeatedly that statements the group has released al-Din al-Zinki Movement and HTS. it remained neutral in the conflict. detailing military action against In mid-November, HTS publicly the regime. It is likely however that denied rumours about the existence THD will hold stronger aspirations of divisions between nationalities to conduct external attacks than among its members.
police chief passed in Alexandria, Egypt killing two policemen. The attack In Egypt, President Abdel Fattah was not claimed; Egyptian state al-Sisi, who ousted President media attributed it to the Muslim Muhammad Mursi in 2013 and was Brotherhood. elected president for the first time IS Sinai province warned the Egyptian in 2014, was confirmed in office in army to stay away from Sinai and presidential elections from 26 to 28 threatened attacks in Cairo in a video March 2018. published on 23 March 2018. In response to the attack on a Sufi On 2 November, seven people mosque in late November 2017, Also in February 2018, IS published were killed in a firearms attack on President al-Sisi declared that a video in which it warned Egyptians a bus carrying pilgrims to a Coptic stability would be restored in the Sinai against voting and urged Islamists to monastery in al-Minya province Peninsula within a period of three attack security forces and leaders. approx. 250 km south of Cairo. IS months. In early February 2018, the claimed responsibility for the attack Egyptian government announced a Two days before the presidential via its Amaq News outlet and a massive military campaign against elections, on 24 March, a bomb statement from IS Egypt province. terrorists on the Sinai. planted under a car exploded Commenting on the attack, al-Naba’ when the vehicle of the local jihadist terrorism 47
advised Muslims to stay away from Despite the high numbers of AQAP churches, army and police facilities, Arabian Peninsula fighters, however, the group’s foreign embassies and places The humanitarian crisis in Yemen, wing specialising in attacks on frequented by ‘Crusader’ nationals. A labelled by the United Nations (UN) Western targets has reportedly been similar attack had taken place in the as the most severe worldwide, was significantly reduced in recent years, region in May 201727. further exacerbated by the on-going probably as a result of both military conflict between the Huthi rebels action targeting its members and the Three Vietnamese and one Egyptian and the internationally recognised competition with local IS affiliates. were killed in a roadside bomb attack government headed by Abdu Rabbo As a result, in 2018, the threat from on a tourist bus near the pyramids of Mansur al-Hadi. A Saudi-led military AQAP to Western interests seemed Giza on 28 December 2018. According alliance named ‘Decisive Storm’ has diminished. Its broad local base, to the Egyptian interior ministry, the supported the al-Hadi government however, might allow the group to following day, 40 suspected terrorists since 2015, while the Huthi rebels quickly mobilise forces to replenish were killed in coordinated raids on allegedly have received increasing its international wing should the three locations in Giza and northern military support from Iran since 2014. leadership assess it opportune. Sinai. They were suspected of Due to the foreign interventions, the planning a series of attacks on public conflict, which was initially triggered institutions, touristic sites, security mainly by local grievances, has been forces and churches. increasingly perceived as a sectarian confrontation between Sunni and Shi’i forces for hegemony in the region.
In 2018, the advance of al-Hadi government-linked fighters supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as part of the Saudi-led coalition, on the Huthi-held Red Sea coastal city of al-Hudayda (Hodeida) threatened to disrupt the humanitarian aid flow In addition, AQAP remained capable into the country. In December, an of inspiring lone actor attacks agreement negotiated by the UN worldwide. Whilst propaganda between the Yemeni government and output was very limited in 2018, the Huthis was signed in Stockholm, there remains a significant volume stipulating among other items the de- of historic English-language material militarisation of al-Hudayda. available online, including 17 issues of the group’s Inspire magazine. In the shadows of the civil war, These include incitement aimed at al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Westerners and practical guidance for (AQAP) maintained a presence, in lone actor operations. particular in the southern and eastern parts of Yemen. In mid-2018, the In contrast to AQAP, IS affiliates in group reportedly had between 6 000 Yemen were said to count not more and 7 000 members. The group’s than a couple of hundred fighters activities in 2018 were mainly focused in 2018 and to be located in roughly on internal activities, fighting at similar areas as AQAP. In July, IS the same time the Huthi rebels, the clashed with AQAP in al-Bayda’ Yemeni government and the forces governorate, reportedly after an AQAP of the Saudi-led coalition. AQAP convoy was shot at an IS checkpoint. continued trying to win support from In a statement released in early local tribes and recruit their members. August, AQAP explained that IS had Its self-proclaimed role in the fight violated an agreement that would 27 Another suicide attack on a church north of against the Huthis has allowed AQAP allow safe passage through each Cairo was thwarted on 11 August 2018, when the to create alliances with local tribes perpetrator reportedly was intercepted on his way other’s checkpoints. to the planned attack location. In 2019, a bomb and win support in southern Yemen, hidden in a bag in front of a church in the Nasr City in particular since the Huthis took district of Cairo on 5 January 2019 exploded during defusing, killing the bomb expert. control of Sana’a in 2015. jihadist terrorism 48
Army (LNA) militia under Khalifa North Africa Haftar, nominally reporting to the In Morocco, two women aged 24 and government of the Tobruk-based 28 from Denmark and Norway were House of Representatives and its assassinated on 17 December 2018 government in al-Bayda’. In 2018, four while on a hiking tour near a popular major militias shared the control of tourist spot. A video circulating on Tripoli, thereby securing access to social media showed the killing of resources and assets officially under one of the women. In another video, GNA control and excluding competing four alleged perpetrators of the militias from outside the capital. assassination pledged allegiance to In September, allied militias from IS. One of the individuals declared Tarhuna, Misrata and Zintan tried on 2 May, the National Oil Corporation they were about to act in response to to enter the city, leading to violent on 10 September and the foreign the call of the IS leader and in support confrontations, which killed more than ministry on 25 December. In the east of IS fighters in Hajin, an enclave then one hundred people and displaced of the country, a VBIED attack in still under IS control in Syria. IS did thousands. The Tarhuna militia took Benghazi on 25 May was said by IS to not formally claim responsibility for control of the international airport28. have been perpetrated by a ‘lone wolf’ the killing. In recent years, in several of the ‘caliphate’. In southern Libya, Khalifa Haftar’s stated aim has been instances, terrorist cells related to IS on 23 November, an attack claimed to take control of Tripoli and his LNA have been dismantled in Morocco. In by IS on a police station in Tazirbu in has expanded its control significantly contrast, the influence ofal-Qaeda territory held by LNA forces killed nine south and west in recent years29. The in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has people. Ten others were abducted; at LNA is composed of regular troops decreased. least six of them were executed some but also tribal militias and religiously days later. In Tunisia, the Uqba bin Nafi’ Battalion, motivated fighters. Rumours about AQIM’s branch in the country, claimed Haftar’s health in early 2018 sparked Italy reported that there is a risk responsibility for a double IED attack fears that a change in the LNA that terrorists infiltrate the illegal on Tunisian soldiers on patrol on 4 leadership might compromise its immigration flows, in particular those October 2018 in Kasserine, in which coherence and escalate political and from Tunisia. Crossings from Tunisia one soldier was killed. After a first military competition in the east of the often include safe delivery at the explosion targeting the patrol vehicle, country. Italian coast that goes unnoticed by a second explosion occurred when authorities. Furthermore, Italy pointed Libya’s uncontrolled south has other soldiers had gathered around to the threat of infiltration of terrorists become an increasingly important the damaged vehicle. Also in Tunisia, into Europe from Libya with the aim to factor in the destabilisation of the a Tunisian woman aged 29 detonated carry out terrorist attacks in Europe. whole Sahara region and continued an explosive device attached to her to be used by AQIM, which has built body, on 29 October 2018, in the relations with local tribes and IS proximity of police officers in the affiliates as a safe haven. centre of Tunis, killing herself and injuring 20 people. The perpetrator Since their expulsion from Sirte in was known to have radicalised, but 2016, IS affiliates have remained her motivation has remained unclear. active and, in 2018, perpetrated The attack, the first suicide attack in significant attacks in all parts of the Tunisia committed by a woman, was country. These included several large- not claimed. scale attacks in Tripoli, such as on the High National Elections Commission In Libya, the security situation continued to be gravely affected by the political split of the country: the 28 Another attempt to gain influence in Tripoli by violent means led to a renewed outbreak of violence western part centred around the in late January 2019. nominal capital Tripoli is the seat 29 In January 2019, the LNA launched a large-scale of the internationally recognised attack on the Fezzan region in southern Libya. The Government of National Accord campaign was officially motivated by the need to strike terrorist groups operating in the region, but (GNA), while the eastern part is reportedly also aimed to take control of the main controlled by the Libyan National areas of oil production, which thus far were under the control of the GNA. jihadist terrorism 49
JNIM showed increasing capabilities West Africa to carry out complex attacks in 2018. Despite regional and international For example, an attack combining efforts aimed to stabilise the region, bombings and armed assault on 14 terrorist violence escalated in multiple April 2018 targeted an international locations of the region in 2018. In military camp near the airport of addition, it was noted that terrorist Timbuktu, Mali, killing one MINUSMA groups, criminals and local militias soldier. The attackers used vehicles in the Sahel region, while pursuing and uniforms in UN and Malian diverging goals, exchange expertise in military colours. JNIM claimed that attack modi operandi and explosives. the attack was in response to French operations and strongly rejected the targets of a terrorist attack using a In 2018, the security situation in Mali allegation by the French commander car bomb and assault weapons by at continued deteriorating. Terrorist of Operation Barkhane that a woman least eight heavily armed militants attacks targeted local regional and was among the attackers while wearing army uniforms. In addition to international forces. Local forces acknowledging the non-combatant the attackers, eight people were killed. included the Malian military and contribution of women to the struggle. JNIM claimed credit for the attack, the Mécanisme Opérationnel de alleging that it was in retaliation Coordination (MOC), a mixed force Amid widespread violence, Ibrahim of French airstrikes in February. It consisting of Malian military forces Boubacar Keita was re-elected as warned the Burkinabe government and tribal militias that cooperate president of Mali in August 2018. to cease its cooperation with the G5 under an UN-brokered peace deal. Hundreds of voting centres in the Sahel. Regional forces deployed in Mali northern and central regions, however, consist of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, remained closed. The elections were In Burkina Faso, terrorist attacks which has been established in early used by JNIM to question the political increased drastically in 2018, mainly 2017 by Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauretania and economic independence of Mali in the northern and eastern part of and Burkina Faso with support from from France, granted 50 years earlier, the country. Many were the work of Western donors, including the EU, accusing France of continuing to a jihadist group known as Ansar al- to combat terrorism, organised exploit Mali. Blaming democracy Islam (Ansaroul Islam, ‘supporters of crime and human trafficking. On the for all ills in Malian society, the Islam’), believed to be the Burkinabe international level are the French organisation advocated Islamic shura offshoot of Ansar al-Din in Mali. The military Operation Barkhane and (consultation), the redistribution founder of Ansar al-Islam, who died the UN Multidimensional Integrated of resources and the resistance of in mid-2017 and was replaced by his Stabilisation Mission in Mali Western hegemony as solutions. brother, was a close ally of the leader (MINUSMA). The group accused France of killing of the Macina Liberation Movement in innocent people in Mali with the aim Mali. The predominant terrorist entity of breaking the increasing resistance in Mali and surrounding countries The faction of al-Murabitun that to its alleged neo-colonial project. On remained Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam refused to align with AQIM in 2015 and 29 July 2018, a day before the first wal-Muslimin (JNIM, ‘group in support has since been known as the Islamic round of the presidential elections, of Islam and Muslims’). This jihadist State in the Greater Sahara (ISGA) a bomb attack targeted a French umbrella organisation was created in remained active in the border region military and MINUSMA base in Kidal March 2017 and comprises AQIM’s between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso province. JNIM claimed responsibility Sahara branch, Ansar al-Din (Ansar in 2018, clashing mainly with Tuareg and vowed not to rest until the last Dine, ‘supporters of the religion’), al- militias supporting the government French soldier had left Mali and Murabitun and the Fulani-dominated in Mali and military forces in Niger. Islamic law was implemented. Macina Liberation Front30. In early The group has also been accused November 2018, the head of the JNIM also targeted other G5 of multiple kidnappings for ransom, Macina Liberation Front appeared for Sahel countries in an attempt to indicating the close interconnection the first time in a video speech flanked coerce them into abandoning their between crime and terrorism in the by his fellow JNIM leaders, calling on engagement. On 2 March 2018, the region. For example, on 12 April, the the Fulani population in West Africa first anniversary of the announcement group claimed the abduction of a to join JNIM and threatening French of JNIM’s establishment, the French school teacher in northern Burkina forces in Mali. embassy, a French cultural centre Faso, threatening with death any and the Burkinabe army general staff teacher using French in class. Despite 30 Europol, TE-SAT 2018, p. 39. in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, were its pledge of allegiance to IS in May jihadist terrorism 50
2015, which was disseminated a Largely geographically separated— mastermind of the 2011 attack year later through Amaq News, the only potentially overlapping in on the UN headquarters in Abuja, faction’s claims and videos have not south-central Borno—the two factions who reportedly also was behind been published through a dedicated competed through their propaganda the recognition of the faction by IS. IS media office or official IS channels. productions, in which both claimed to According to local media reports, Nur According to news reports, ISGA also be part of IS. In videos published in was killed on 21 August 2018 by his occasionally cooperated with Ansar 2018, IS West Africa province showed own fighters, allegedly because they al-Islam in Burkina Faso. A Romanian how the areas controlled by it in the thought him to be too compromising, citizen, kidnapped in April 2015 by Lake Chad region provided local as for example when releasing a the faction that was to become ISGA, residents with security and prosperity, large number of abducted school remained in captivity in 2018. Also which the group claimed was the girls in March 2018 without apparent in 2018, a German aid worker and reason for the global enemies of concessions from the Nigerian an Italian priest were kidnapped in Islam to attack it. The Shekau faction government31. In late February, more western Niger in April and September, published videos that used the IS label than 100 girls had been abducted in respectively. followed by the group’s formal name a raid by IS West Africa province on a adopted in 2015, Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna girls’ boarding school in Dapchi, Yobe In Nigeria, the jihadist militias jointly lil-Da’wa wal-Jihad (‘group of Sunni state. known as Boko Haram (Hausa for people for preaching and jihad’). A ‘Western education is unlawful [in This possible change in leadership topic emphasised by the Shekau Islam]’) continued operating in the seems to have resulted in an increase faction was the implementation of the north-eastern Borno and Yobe states in violent activities by IS West shari’a. IS West Africa province videos as well as neighbouring Cameroon, Africa province. The group attacked consistently used Arabic language Chad and Niger in 2018. Large-scale Nigerian military bases on several or subtitles and were in line with the attacks against a variety of civilian occasions between September and style and quality of IS videos from and military targets were carried out the end of the year. For example, on other regions. By contrast, Abubakar by all factions. For example, on 3 18 November, at least 40 Nigerian Shekau, in a video speech allegedly January 2018, a suicide bombing in soldiers were killed in an attack recorded in July 2018, spoke in Hausa a mosque during morning prayer in on a military base in Metele, Borno without Arabic subtitles, suggesting Gamboru, Borno state near the border state, claimed by IS West Africa that his intended audience was local. with Cameroon, killed more than ten province. On 28 December, IS West Whereas it was not always possible people. On Easter Sunday, 1 April Africa province seized the fishing to attribute specific attacks to a 2018, unidentified fighters attempted town of Baga. The attackers burnt particular faction with certainty, in to enter the capital of Borno state, down a naval base on the shores general, IS West Africa province Maiduguri. After being repelled by of Lake Chad and took weapons focused on military targets, whereas military forces, they attacked nearby from a military camp. In addition, in the Shekau faction is notorious for villages, killing at least 25 civilians September and October, respectively, targeting civilians and, in particular, and one soldier. In addition, the the group released videos showing using female suicide bombers. practice observed in 2017 of using the killing of two midwives working young women as suicide bombers IS West Africa province came under for the International Committee of continued in 2018. In one occurrence military pressure in 2018. According the Red Cross (ICRC), who had been on 30 March, four teenage girls to Nigerian military sources, several abducted in March in Rann, Borno detonated themselves near Maiduguri, hundreds of fighters surrendered to State. The group declared that the killing an additional woman. authorities in Niger and Nigeria. In Nigerian government had refused to early January, hundreds of people meet its demands. The split between the two major held captive on islands in Lake factions of Boko Haram, which Chad were able to flee to Monguno, occurred in August 2016, continued in reportedly as a result of military 2018. The faction that was recognised strikes against the militia. by the IS leadership as the group’s ‘West Africa province’ continued to IS West Africa province has nominally be active in the Lake Chad region and been headed by Abu Mus’ab al- along the border between Nigeria and Barnawi, a son of Boko Haram founder Niger. The Boko Haram faction led by Muhammad Yusuf. The actual leader 31 Hamza Idris and Ibrahim Sawab, ‘Factional Boko Haram leader Mamman Nur killed by own fighters’, Abubakar Shekau subsisted mainly of the faction, however, was said Daily Trust, 14 September 2018, https://www. in the border region with Cameroon. to be Mamman Nur, the suspected dailytrust.com.ng/factional-boko-haram-leader- mamman-nur-killed-by-own-fighters.html. jihadist terrorism 51
Somali interior and security ministries Somalia and East killed 20 people. Many of the attacks Africa combined suicide bombings and armed assault. In Somalia, Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin (HSM, ‘mujahid youth On 1 October, HSM claimed movement’), a formal member of al- responsibility for a VBIED attack on an Qaeda, despite an intensive campaign EU armoured convoy carrying Italian of airstrikes targeting it, maintained military trainers in Mogadishu, killing its control over large stretches of two civilians. land outside urban centres in the HSM attacks also caused high south-west of the country. It financed numbers of civilian deaths. On 9 attacks in neighbouring countries, its activities by taxing and extorting November, for example, VBIED in particular those contributing to local populations and businesses explosions killed 53 people in AMISOM. In the latter case, such in territories under its control and Mogadishu. Two explosions occurred attacks aimed to exert pressure beyond, including in Mogadishu. The at a junction and a third near the on governments to withdraw their continuing food crisis in Somalia was Somalia Criminal Investigation troops from Somalia. In addition, further aggravated by HSM’s refusal Division and a hotel. The fourth HSM sought new recruits and solicit to cooperate with humanitarian explosion happened when emergency funding by escalating tensions agencies. People suspected of services arrived at the location. The resulting from local grievances. such cooperation were accused of attackers reportedly wore uniforms. Kenya, for example, suffered several espionage. In territories under its assassinations in Muslim-majority In 2018, tensions between HSM and control, HSM is said to have forced regions along the coast and in an IS affiliate, led by Abdulqader parents to hand over their children for the northeast bordering Somalia, Mu’min and said to be composed indoctrination and military training. the targets of which were mostly of about 200 fighters continued, The group continued meting out harsh individuals identified with Kenya’s with IS trying to extract funds punishments to local residents under political system, such as members from businesses already extorted the pretence of implementing Islamic of the Christian community and by HSM. In mid-December 2018, law. teachers. In contrast, since the the situation escalated into open 2015 attack on a Garissa University HSM carried out a multitude of violence. On 16 December, IS in College, HSM had not perpetrated a large-scale attacks predominantly on Somalia claimed responsibility for major terrorist attack in the Kenyan Somali security forces and forces of killing 14 HSM fighters in the north- highlands. This changed in 2019 with the African Union Mission in Somalia eastern Puntland region, alleging that the attack on a hotel in Nairobi on 15 (AMISOM) across the country. In the latter were preparing to attack January32. Mogadishu, political institutions were it. In response, HSM accused IS of the predominant targets, including creating dissension among jihadists the Somali presidential palace, which in the country and ordered its fighters was attacked on 23 February and 14 to eliminate the ‘disease’ of IS in 32 On 15 January 2019, a terrorist attack combining July, killing at least 45 and 25 people, Somalia. explosive devices and firearms targeted a hotel respectively. On 7 July, an HSM complex in Nairobi, Kenya. The attackers detonated HSM-linked networks continued an IED at the parking lot and carried out a suicide attack on the compound housing the bombing at the hotel reception area. HSM claimed perpetrating small-scale terrorist responsibility for the attack. jihadist terrorism 52
opened fire after a meeting with US which alleged that 60 people had South Asia military. In its claim of responsibility, been killed and that French nationals Afghanistan continued to experience the Taleban stated that both the were among the wounded. massive violence in 2018 with Afghan and US officials had been IS Khorasan province also continued numbers of civilian casualties the targets of the attack. As a result targeting Shi’is and other Muslim increasing, compared to 2017. On of the assassination, elections in communities. On 3 August, two 20 January 2018, for example, an Kandahar were postponed by a week. suicide bombers wearing burqas armed attack was committed on In 2018, the Taleban continued attacked a Shi’i mosque in Gardez, the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. attempting to establish themselves Paktia province, killing at least 39 The perpetrators were said to be six as political actors. In a statement people. On 15 August, a suicide armed Taleban fighters who were released in mid-August, they urged bomber attacked Shi’i university killed by Afghan security forces. A direct negotiations with the USA, students in Kabul, killing 34 people. statement claiming responsibility for thereby bypassing the Afghan On 20 November, at least 50 people the attack was issued on the official government, to achieve a withdrawal were killed, when a suicide attacker homepage of the Taleban. The attack of US troops from Afghanistan. detonated his bomb amid a religious claimed the lives of more than 30 gathering marking the birthday of people, including one German citizen. In June, the Taleban announced a Prophet Muhammad in Kabul. No three-day ceasefire on the occasion of Parliamentary elections, originally group claimed responsibility for the Eid al-Fitr, after a unilateral ceasefire scheduled for October 2016 and latter attack. for the period had been declared by initially postponed to 7 July 2018, the Afghan government. An offer by In addition, a self-proclaimed IS were finally held on 20 October. the Afghan government to prolong Khorasan province commander Security concerns and political the ceasefire, however, was rejected. in Jawzjan province in western disputes prevented the elections from On 16 June, a VBIED detonated in Afghanistan, who had pledged taking place in some parts of the Nangarhar province at a gathering allegiance to IS in 2015 after being country. that comprised Taleban and Afghan expelled by the Taleban, managed forces, killing at least 20 people. The to defend his faction’s control over attack was claimed by IS Khorasan two districts in the province despite province through an Amaq News several attempts by local Taleban statement. forces to evict them in early 2018. The IS commander was killed on 5 April IS Khorasan province continued in an airstrike in neighbouring Faryab to hold some territory in the province. His faction, which was said eastern Nangarhar province on to contain 300 to 400 fighters, was the border with Pakistan, where it at first able to find a replacement had emerged publicly in 2015. The but was eventually eliminated by the group also claimed responsibility Taleban in early August 2018 after a for a substantial number of large- month of fighting. scale attacks in urban areas across In the run-up to the elections, the country in 2018. Most of these the Taleban reportedly killed 10 attacks targeted civilians, including an candidates running for parliament attack on a voter registration centre and carried out multiple attacks in Kabul on 22 April, which killed at on election rallies and candidates. least 57 people; two coordinated For example, on 17 October, a suicide attacks in Kabul on 30 April, candidate was assassinated when killing at least 29 people, including ten a bomb hidden in a sofa detonated journalists; an explosive and firearm in his campaign office. The Taleban attack on a midwife training centre in warned teachers and students not to Jalalabad on 30 July; and a suicide participate in elections or allow their attack on 5 September on a sports schools to be used as polling centres. club in Kabul, which killed 26 people, On 18 October, the heads of Kandahar among others. On 15 July, a suicide police and intelligence were killed in attack targeting Rural Development an insider attack, when a bodyguard Ministry staff was claimed by IS, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 53
3/ Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism
The number of attacks by ethno- attacks, albeit with hampered nationalist and separatist terrorists capability compared to previous in the European Union (EU) declined years. The attacks involved firearms Ethno-nationalist and significantly from 137 in 2017 to or improvised explosive devices separatist terrorist 83 in 2018. As for previous years, (IEDs), such as pipe bombs, but the attacks occurred exclusively in use of larger and potentially more attacks occurred France, Spain and the UK. In addition, destructive devices was not observed exclusively in France, law enforcement agencies in six EU in 2018. Police, corrections officers Member States arrested a total of and members of the armed forces Spain and the UK 30 individuals on charges related remained primary targets. However, to ethno-nationalist and separatist there was just one actual attack Dissident Republican terrorist activity. against police in 2018, using firearms. groups continued to pose Members of DR groups continued UK – Dissident to be involved in organised criminal a significant threat in activities, including drug dealing, Republican (DR) 33 Northern Ireland extortion, fuel laundering and groups murder. DR groups also sought to exert control in their own Separatist terrorist In 2018, Dissident Republican (DR) communities by continuing to commit activity in Spain remained groups continued to pose a significant extremely violent paramilitary-style threat to security in Northern Ireland. attacks. at low levels The threat principally emanated from the New Irish Republican Army Spain – Euskadi ta (NIRA), the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Arm na Poblachta (ANP, Askatasuna (ETA) Army of the Republic) and Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH, Warriors of Ireland) and Resistencia which split into two factions. All groups remained opposed to the Galega current peace process and continued Separatist terrorist activity in Spain to be firmly committed to the use of remained at low levels in 2018, violence to achieve their objective of a following a declining course since united Ireland.
DR groups maintained their access 33 to a range of firearms and explosives ‘Fuel laundering’ is removing the dye from low- price dyed fuel and selling it illegally at the higher and kept planning and executing price of undyed fuel. ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 54
2013. Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, In 2018, the situation in Turkey and Basque Fatherland and Liberty) has Partiya Karkeren Syria—in particular the Turkish not committed any terrorist attacks Kurdistan (PKK) intervention in Afrin, Syria at the since August 2009 and in May 2018 beginning of the year—impacted it released a statement in which it In 2018, no terrorist attacks by the Kurdish activism in Europe, resulting announced its decision to disband Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, in a number of protest events. and dismantle all its structures. Kurdistan Workers’ Party) were These were largely peaceful, despite Spanish authorities, however, reported in the EU. Nevertheless, some sporadic clashes with Turkish continued to carry out operations a number of EU Member States counter-protesters. Tensions between against the group. In 2018, three pointed out that the PKK maintained Kurds and nationalist Turks in the EU weapons and explosives caches were an apparatus in Europe, which generally increased. In Germany, there discovered and an investigation into provided logistical and financial was a significant rise in the number documents received from France support to Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG, of offences against Turkish facilities led to the solving of 300 cases of People’s Defense Forces) and carried (associations, mosques, shops etc.). ETA-related attacks. In contrast, out propaganda and recruitment In March 2018, a mosque in Lauffen, Resistencia Galega maintained its activities. In early 2018 for example, Baden-Württemberg, was subject to commitment to armed struggle to two individuals were convicted of an arson attack and six PKK-affiliated achieve its ends in 2018. The group, being leading members of PKK individuals were arrested on suspicion however, has not committed terrorist structures in Germany. of being involved. Websites linked to attacks since October 2014 and its the PKK described the attack as an To sustain the organisation running, leadership remained under pressure act of vengeance for Afrin. PKK members and sympathisers to avoid arrest. in the EU raised funds through In this context, ties between left-wing In 2018, violent separatist activism in the annual kampanya (fundraising extremist and Kurdish organisations Spain mainly manifested itself in the campaign) and collecting grew stronger in several European form of street violence, predominantly membership fees, selling publications countries, reinforcing existing against communication and and extorting Kurdish business solidarity between the groups. It was transportation infrastructure. While owners. In this context, a Belgian reported that groups and individuals this caused minor damage, no court convicted four people in 2018 of of the far left-wing scene joined the casualties were reported. The main participating in a kampanya. Turkish Kurdish activists in their protests. perpetrator of these attacks was authorities also reported that PKK the Ernai group, which is related to members were involved in various ETA and has links to Basque radical forms of serious organised crime left-wing parties. The aims of Ernai and particularly in drug smuggling and the linked parties remained the and dealing, migrant smuggling, establishment of an independent trafficking in human beings and Basque state and total amnesty for money laundering. imprisoned ETA members. ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 55
Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 2014-2018.
168 154
137
99 84 83 67 65 30 30
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in EU Member States in 2018.
UK France Spain
56 Not 20 2 7 20 specified
Germany Italy Netherlands
2 2 1 left-wing and anarchist terrorism 56 4/ Left-wing and anarchist terrorism
online expressions of solidarity. The Terrorist attacks Internet remained the main platform and suspects for claiming responsibility, spreading Left-wing and anarchist propaganda and attempting to terrorist attacks were arrested internationalise their scope. Despite their ideology’s limited public appeal, In 2018, a total of 19 completed, failed reported exclusively by the number of adherents of anarchist and foiled attacks related to left-wing extremism appears to have remained Greece, Italy and Spain and anarchist terrorism occurred in stable. the European Union (EU) – a slight decrease for the second consecutive In Greece, no notable change in The use of IEDs with low year (27 in 2016, 24 in 2017). The the frequency and intensity of the risk of apprehension was number of arrests remained on the anarchist terrorist activity occurred preferred same level (36 in 2017, 34 in 2018). in 2018. Anarchist militants carried All attacks and the vast majority of out six attacks and a total of 20 arrests were reported by Greece, individuals were arrested. Nineteen of The number of adherents Italy and Spain. The three countries the arrestees were involved in a ring continued to be the epicentre of left- that financially supported imprisoned of anarchist extremism wing and anarchist terrorist activity in members of terrorist groups: they appears to have remained the EU. used fake identity cards to perform transactions via money transfer value stable As in previous years, terrorist systems and, thus, provide the funds groups active in the aforementioned to the recipients. countries exclusively belonged to the Anarchists justified their anarchist sphere and demonstrated The six attacks that occurred in 2018 violent acts by referring to similar ideological and operational in Greece were carried out against a range of targets including the police, police activities, solidarity traits. Anarchist terrorists mainly used improvised explosive devices the judiciary and the media. On 26 with imprisoned terrorists, (IEDs) in attacks with a low risk of February, for example, the previously political and societal apprehension. They continued to unknown Enoples Epanastatikes select their targets among those they Dynameis (Armed Revolutionary issues traditionally consider as enemies, Forces) group attacked a police such as the police, the judiciary, the station in Athens with a hand grenade, (far) right-wing parties and the media. causing the injury of a passer-by. The current political agenda, such as Judicial authorities were targeted the issue of migration, also played a on two occasions: on 24 March role in their target selection. members of the Kiklos Assimetrou Mitropolitikou Polemou/Federazione In 2018, there appeared to be no direct Anarchica Informale – Fronte contact or operational coordination Rivoluzionario Internazionale (Circle between anarchist terrorists in of Asymmetric Metropolitan Warfare/ Greece, Italy and Spain, apart from left-wing and anarchist terrorism 57
Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorism from 2014 to 2018. 67
54
36 34 31 27 24 19
13 13
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Informal Anarchist Federation – Anarchist Federation/International Other anarchist terrorist groups in International Revolutionary Front) Revolutionary Front) is considered Italy targeted premises belonging to placed an IED outside the premises of to be the most dangerous group. parties and groups from the right and the Athens Public Prosecution Office; It is infamous for its campaigns far right of the political spectrum. This and on 13 November, an IED that did against Italian and foreign targets, was reportedly due to the position not explode was placed by unknown predominantly using IEDs, including of these parties on the issue of perpetrators in a motorcycle that victim-operated IEDs (VOIED, e.g. migration. On 20 February, unknown was parked outside the residence of parcel bombs). It pursues an anarchist perpetrators threw two improvised a high-ranking prosecutor in Athens. agenda with a view to internationalise incendiary devices (IIDs) – in this case Members of Omada Laikon Agoniston its activity and its members tend to Molotov cocktails – at the entrance (Group of Popular Fighters) used an claim responsibility for the attacks of the office of the right-leaning IED to attack the headquarters of a TV using various ‘cell’ names. For group Azione Universitaria. A group station in Athens and damaged the example, the Haris Hatzimihelakis calling itself Brigata Belgrado Pedrini façade of the building. Of note was Cell/ black international (1881/2018)34 claimed responsibility for the attack also the explosion outside a church in claimed responsibility for an attack on by posting a message online. On 13 central Athens on 27 December that the headquarters of the Lega political October, a rudimentary IED caused resulted in the injury of two people party in Villorba (near Treviso) on damage to the façade of the offices and for which the Individualidades 12 August 2018. The perpetrators of the Lega political party in Ala (near Teniendo a lo Salvaje (Individuals apparently attempted to cause Trento). Although no group claimed Tending to the Wild) group claimed fatalities among the police by placing responsibility for the attack, the responsibility with a text published on two IEDs, one of which was scheduled modus operandi pointed to anarchist the Internet. to explode after the arrival of the first militants based in Trento. On 7 May, responding officers. An arson attack an IED exploded at the entrance of the In Italy, anarchist terrorist groups and damaging the entrance of the robotics building of the CasaPound far-right individuals continued their activities laboratories of the Italian Technology political party in Trento. No group following known patterns. The 10 Institute on 24 December 2018 was claimed responsibility for the attack. attacks that occurred in 2018 were claimed in the name of the FAI/FRI consistent with the modi operandi In Spain, left-wing and anarchist Immediate Action Group. and intensity seen over the previous terrorist activity remained low in five years. TheFederazione Anarchica 2018, a fact reflected in the number Informale/ Fronte Rivoluzionario of both attacks and arrests. Three 34 Haris Hatzimihelakis is a convicted member of the Internazionale (FAI/FRI, Informal Greek anarchist terrorist group Conspiracy Cells of arson attacks were attributed to left- Fire/ FAI/FRI. left-wing and anarchist terrorism 58
Greece Italy Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in EU Member States in 2018. 6 20 10 8
Spain France
3 3 3
wing and anarchist militant groups or Marxist-Leninist Devrimci Halk the anarchist movement continued individuals, all of which were carried Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, to be more violent than those of the out against private companies. In Revolutionary People’s Liberation extreme left-wing and pose a threat to addition, the three arrests carried out Party-Front) retained their intent and the public order of several EU Member by the Spanish authorities were related capability to carry out violent attacks. States. Their activity was consistent to left-wing terrorist activity outside In 2018, authorities in Turkey arrested with trends observed across Europe. Spain, in execution of international numerous DHKP-C members and Namely, they formed unstructured arrest warrants. seized large amounts of explosives groups operating in and around and weapons in a number of police specific urban areas; participated The Syrian issue remained relevant to operations. DHKP-C members in rallies and protests during which the extreme left-wing and anarchist remained present in several EU they attempted violent acts; collected milieu. The conflict has in the past countries to provide logistical support funds for imprisoned like-minded attracted a small number of European for operations on Turkish soil and/or people; and occasionally carried out left-wing and anarchist extremists to avoid being arrested in their home attacks using IIDs. who travelled to the country in order country. In Spain, for example, two to fight alongside Kurdish militias. The Anarchists justified their violent acts individuals were arrested in execution impact of their participation in combat by referring to typical themes of their of international arrest warrants issued activities on EU security has yet to be ideology, such as police activities, by Turkey on charges related to their assessed. In Slovakia and Czechia, squat evictions and solidarity with participation in DHKP-C. left-wing and anarchist extremists imprisoned terrorists. Trending staged demonstrations outside political and societal issues were also the premises of Turkish diplomatic Violent extremist used as pretexts for launching attacks. missions in protest against Turkish Migration continued to be central in policies in northern Syria. activities the anarchist rhetoric, in particular in In 2018, no significant change conjunction with the rivalry between Left-wing terrorist groups in the occurred regarding the violent anarchists and the far right. In this EU appear to have ceased their activities of left-wing and anarchist context, left-wing and anarchist operational activities. In Turkey, extremists. Groups and individuals of extremists tended to become more however, groups such as the left-wing and anarchist terrorism 59
violent when confronted with right- of the left-wing and anarchist Left-wing and anarchist extremists wing extremists in counter-protests movement. Several police officers in the EU also sought out high- and rallies. were injured and numerous protesters profile events with extensive media were arrested in the course of the coverage. In September 2018, for In addition to targeting members clearing. In addition, an increase in instance, they staged attacks against of the far right, anarchists also the number of criminal offences, such the police during the Summit of EU attacked law enforcement premises as arson and damage, was recorded Heads of State and Government in and personnel; banks and other in the country and is believed to be Salzburg (Austria). Furthermore, financial institutions; public linked to the specific police operation. a number of protests took place property; and private businesses. in Brussels (Belgium) during EU The attacks largely occurred during Left-wing and anarchist extremists summits. large demonstrations and rallies, in made use of the Hambacher Forst as which anarchist extremists used the a setting for international networking. crowd as a cover in order to carry Dutch activists, for example, visited out violent acts. These included the area in March 2018 and received throwing Molotov cocktails and ideological and operational training. stones as well as physical assaults Furthermore, members of the violent against the police. In France, left-wing anti-fascist movement were reported and anarchist extremists exploited to be cooperating in the Nordic the fact that police forces were countries, with Swedish, Norwegian concentrated in Paris due to the gilets and Danish activists coordinating jaunes protests and carried out violent activities in Sweden. Likewise, Greek activities in provincial cities with left-wing and anarchist extremist smaller police presence. In Germany, groups and individuals continued a number of violent incidents to interact extensively with the occurred when law enforcement international anarchist community cleared the Hambacher Forst forest and maintained links with members of area that was occupied by members other organisations outside Greece. right-wing terrorism 60
5/ Right-wing terrorism
Despite the increase of extreme While the vast majority of right- right-wing sentiments across Europe, wing extremist groups across the only one right-wing terrorist attack EU have not resorted to violence, The right-wing extremism in the EU was reported in 2018. In they nevertheless help entrench a scene varies significantly Italy, a man carried out a shooting climate of fear and animosity against spree on 3 February in Macerata. minority groups. Such a climate, between and within EU During the attack, which lasted for built on xenophobia, anti-Semitic, Member States two hours, he wounded six people Islamophobic and anti-immigration whom he thought were Africans. The sentiments, may lower the threshold suspect was charged with multiple for some radicalised individuals to One right-wing terrorist counts of attempted murder. The use violence against persons and attack was reported in incident occurred after the murder of property of minority groups. an Italian teenager, in connection with The right-wing extremism scene 2018 in the EU which three Nigerian suspects were varies significantly between and arrested. In 2017, the perpetrator had within EU Member States. Factions run unsuccessfully for local elections include National Socialist and neo- Escalation of extreme for the anti-migrant Lega Norte Nazi groups, revisionist individuals (Northern League). right-wing sentiments and groups, racist and anti-Semitic across Europe resulted in A total of 44 people were arrested groups and skinhead and right-wing increase of arrests in Czechia, France, Germany, Italy extremist hooligan groups. In Czechia, and the Netherlands on suspicion for example, the right-wing extremist of offences related to right-wing scene is mainly represented by the terrorism. Attack preparation and Generace Identity (Generation of attempts to commit a terrorist act Identity) movement and the newly were the most frequently reported established Národni a sociálni offences. Additionally, 15 individuals fronta (National and Social Front). were charged in Slovakia with right- Paramilitary groups and so-called wing extremist (RWE) activities. The home-defence groups were also suspects created a formal group active in Czechia, but their activities called Felvideki Harcosok (Hungarian were in decline. for ‘Upland Warriors’) and displayed The right-wing extremist scene modified fascist symbols during in Germany is characterised by sports events on flags, banners and a high affinity for weapons and tattoos. The group expressed hatred explosives and is composed of neo- towards ethnical minorities via social Nazi elements, Kameradschaften media. (comradeships), loose networks right-wing terrorism 61
Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for right-wing terrorism from 2014 to 2018.
44
34
20
12 11 9 5 0 1 1
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
of right-wing extremists from Migration is also a major theme for attacks in 2018. Some groups appear different sub-cultures, the so- Italian right-wing extremist groups. to have gained enough confidence called ‘intellectual right’ and right- The presence of refugee centres in to organise demonstrations in wing populist/extremist political Italy and the influx of immigrants fuels traditionally left-wing cities such as parties. Notable examples include right-wing extremism in the country. Amsterdam and Nijmegen, increasing the Revolution Chemnitz group and the likelihood of clashes with far-left In the Netherlands, perceived the Reichsbürgerbewegung (Reich counter-demonstrators. Islamisation of the country and Citizens movement). Issues related loss of Dutch identity are important The Netherlands reported that to immigration policies and offences drivers for right-wing extremists. some Dutch groups, e.g. Pegida, allegedly committed by migrants Known groups include Pegida maintain relationships with partner repeatedly mobilised significant (from the German Patriotische organisations in Belgium, Germany numbers of people from the right- Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des and the UK and participate in each wing spectrum. On 26 August 2018, Abendlandes, Patriotic Europeans other’s demonstrations. Similar a German national was fatally against the Islamisation of the international contacts between stabbed during violent clashes in Occident), Voorpost (Forepost) right-wing extremists are also seen Chemnitz, Saxony. A Syrian and an and Rechts in verzet (Right-Wing elsewhere in the EU. The Austrian Iraqi national, both asylum seekers, Resistance). However, the right-wing Identitäre Bewegung (Identitarian were arrested as a result. In reaction extremist scene in the Netherlands Movement) collaborated with its to the stabbing, demonstrations and is fragmented and has remained counterparts in Europe with the vigils were held in Chemnitz, Saxony relatively small, with only one group, aim of countering their perceived and throughout Germany. Two weeks the anti-Semitic and anti-democratic Islamisation of the Western world. later, a group of at least 15 right- Erkenbrand, reported to have In the same way, Polish right-wing wing extremists, including members increased membership numbers in extremist groups are focused on of the Revolution Chemnitz group, 2018. developing contacts with peer groups attacked several individuals from a abroad. In Portugal, Blood and Honour, migrant background. In February 2018 Right-wing extremists in the Portugal Hammer Skins and the a Reichsbürger fired several shots Netherlands increasingly encouraged recently emerged neo-Nazi political at an accommodation for asylum and glorified violence against Muslims party Nova Ordem Social (New Social seekers in Kaiserslautern and put up and the government and the majority Order) are active at both national and considerable resistance at his arrest, of protests and demonstrations international levels. Moreover, the injuring two police officers. targeted mosques. However, there right-wing extremist music scene in have been no reports of violent right-wing terrorism 62
Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism in EU Czechia France Member States in 2018.
1 32
Germany Italy Netherlands
8 1 2
various EU Member States attracted a loosely formed alt-right movement. being involved in the commission, followers from across the EU and The majority of activism in support preparation and instigation of terrorist beyond. of these ideas is legal and Internet- acts. More recently, in December based. 2018, a 17-year-old linked to the In Sweden, the right-wing Sonnenkrieg Division36 pleaded extremist organisation Nordiska A number of right-wing extremists guilty to two counts of encouraging Motståndsrörelsen (NMR, Nordic were convicted in Sweden of terrorism. Resistance Movement) remained the ideologically motivated crimes, mainly most prevalent organisation in the physical assault, property damage, Switzerland reported that right- milieu. It is a pan-Nordic movement illegal possession of narcotics and wing extremists maintain a low and has affiliates in Denmark, Finland offences against the Knives Act35. profile in the country and that very and Norway, although the NMR’s There are also reported ties between few incidents have been recorded main base and leadership is located the right-wing extremist scene and (potentially due to under-reporting). in Sweden. Since 2015, the NMR has outlaw motorcycle gangs, which in In Greece, the main targets of right- pursued political ambitions and in turn are involved in organised crime in wing extremists were anarchist/ September 2018 fielded candidates Sweden. anti-authoritarian individuals and for the Swedish general elections. The UK also reported high levels groups. In 2018, modi operandi The organisation failed to gain any of rhetoric promoting violence included the use of low-impact seats on the national, regional or and terrorist tactics in right-wing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) local level. During the past few years, extremist circles. The last two and improvised incendiary devices individuals outside the traditional years have seen a shift to right-wing (IIDs) against premises associated right-wing extremist scene who share extremist groups attracting a much with individuals with leftist/anarchist a common xenophobic ideology – younger demographic. In September ideologies. whilst not committing ideologically 2018, two 15-year-olds, who were motivated crimes – have become assessed to hold right-wing extremist more prevalent in Swedish society. views, were arrested on suspicion of This has manifested itself, inter alia, in the increased popularity of alternative 35 36 online news sites and the formation of Swedish law prohibits the carrying of knives in Assessed to follow a similar ideology to the far- public areas. right group National Action (UK). single-issue terrorism 63
6/Single-issue terrorism
In 2018, one attack was decentralised groups without classified as single-issue strong cohesion. More terrorism in the European dynamic actions included Union (EU). It targeted a the blocking of access to For 2018 the first single- butcher’s shop in Athens buildings or infrastructure issue terrorist attack in (Greece) in late December. (e.g. animal farms or mines); The attack was perpetrated freeing animals; and threats the EU since 2014 was with the use of an improvised against land owners. In reported incendiary device (IID) and the UK, the animal rights an animal-rights extremist movement also targeted group named Mavroprasini supermarkets supplying Single-issue activism Midenistes (Black- meat and dairy products, continued to be largely green Nihilists) claimed clothing chains using fur and responsibility for the attack. leather and travel agencies limited to online This was the first single-issue involved in the transportation campaigns and non- terrorist attack reported in the of animals. In addition, a EU since 2014. number of minor violent acts violent demonstrations by occurred in 2018, mainly The threat from single- decentralised groups involving criminal damage to issue activism continued butcher shops and abattoirs, to be predominantly wind turbines and private related to animal rights businesses involved in and environmentalism infrastructure construction. and was largely limited to online campaigns and non- violent demonstrations by annexes 64
Annexes annexes 65 annex 1 Amendments to National Legislation on Terrorism in 2018
Section 1 on offences committed Austria with terrorist intent was broadened Lithuania On 1 October 2018 a number of to include a provision on aggravated Amendments to Articles 250, 250 provisions, which align the Austrian damage to data, aggravated and 252 of the Lithuanian Criminal legislation with the requirements interference with communications Code were changed by the Law of the of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of and aggravated interference with a Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) of the European Parliament and of data system (Paragraph 4). These the Republic of Lithuania No. XIII- the Council of 15 March 2017 on offences will be punished by an 1682. These amendments entered combating terrorism and replacing imprisonment sentence of four into force on 12 December 2018. Council Framework Decision months to seven years. A new Section Most importantly, Article 250 (2) 2002/475/JHA and amending Council 1a was included on offences involving was reworded and a new fragment Decision 2005/671/JHA, came into the production, purchase, possession concerning electronic data was force. Most notably, the criminal and other listed activities related to added. offence of ‘travelling for purpose of radiological weapons committed A new paragraph, Paragraph 75, terrorism’ was introduced as Section with terrorist intent. These offences concerning information promoting or 278g of the Austrian Criminal Code. will be punished by an imprisonment inciting terrorist crimes was added Furthermore, a number of cybercrime sentence of four months to eight to Article 2 of the Law on Provision offences were added to the list of years. Other provisions were, of Information to the Public. Parts of possible terrorist offences in Section consequently, modified to reflect Article 19 (1) concerning information 278c of the Austrian Criminal Code. these amendments. not to be published were rephrased. The maximum punishment for all The provision on training for the Changes were also introduced in varieties of the offence ‘membership commission of a terrorist offence Articles 22, 31 and 33, to make in a terrorist association’ was set at (Section 4b) was amended with the reference to a relation with organised 15 years of imprisonment. Finally, a criminalisation of self-studies. The criminal groups in the past. specific group of victims of terrorist restrictions on the offender and attacks was established and invested Changes were further made to the destination in the provision on with rights slightly exceeding the the Law on Public Procurement travelling for the purpose to commit usual victim rights in the Austrian Conducted in the Area of Defence and a terrorist offence (Section 5b), Code of Criminal Procedure. Security. Article 34, which concerns were abolished. As a result, it is the conditions under which suppliers’ now an offence to travel to another participation in procurement is Finland country with terrorist intent. It is also restricted and forbidden, was criminalised to return or to travel to A number of amendments were changed to include persons who in Finland with terrorist intent. made to Chapter 34a of the Criminal the last five years were convicted for Code of Finland, which concerns A new Section 5c was introduced a terrorist crime or a crime related to terrorist offences. All amendments which criminalises the promotion terrorist activity. were required by the Directive (EU) of travelling for the purpose to Article 26 of the Law on Management 2017/541 of the European Parliament commit a terrorist offence. Such Companies of Collective Investment and of the Council of 15 March 2017 offences are subject to a fine or a Undertakings Tailored for on combating terrorism and replacing term of imprisonment up to one Professional Investors was amended Council Framework Decision year. Financing of such promotion to include the possibility to prevent a 2002/475/JHA and amending Council was criminalised with amendments person who violated the Law on the Decision 2005/671/JHA. The main made to the provision on financing of Prevention of Money Laundering and amendments, which entered into terrorism (Section 5). force on 15 November 2018, include Terrorist Financing and was given the following: an administrative penalty (or other measure of influence) within less than annexes 66
three years, from being a member which establishes the grounds and 24 hours, with an additional retention of the management or supervisory the procedure for applying measures period of 24 hours for persons body of such undertakings. Similarly, of influence, now indicates that such suspected of crimes against the amendments were made to Article 12 measures shall be applied in the security of the State, terrorism or of the Law on Collective Investment event that a management company or financing of terrorism, before being Undertakings for Informed Investors, investment company fails to comply brought before an investigating judge. which concerns the acquisition, with the requirements of the Law on Article 65 of the CCP was amended transfer of qualified statutory the Prevention of Money Laundering to allow house searches at capital and (or) voting rights and and Terrorist Financing. any time of the day or night for requirements for owners of qualified Amendments were also made terrorist or terrorist financing share of statutory capital and (or) to the Law on the Protection of offences and crimes against the voting rights. Objects of Importance to Ensuring security of the State; for all other With regard to the Law on the National Security. Persons related to offences, and except where there Prevention of Money Laundering and international terrorist organisations is an in flagranti situation (en cas Terrorist Financing, changes were (Article 11) and persons who have d’infraction flagrante), searches made to Articles 2 and 14 (Enhanced participated in the activities of a can only be conducted upon order customer due diligence), changing terrorist organisation or a terrorist of an investigating judge between the former reference to ‘politically group (Article 17) are considered no 6:30 and 24:00. Two new sections exposed natural persons’ to ‘politically to be in compliance with interests (Livre premier, Titre II, Chapitre XI vulnerable (affected) persons’. Further of national security or may not hold et XII) were introduced to allow the changes were introduced to Articles the positions specified in the ‘List of judicial police to use a pseudonym in 2, 15 and 25 of the same law. Positions’. electronic communications.
Article 33 of the Law on Finally, changes were introduced Administration of Taxes, was changed in the Decision ‘On Implementation Slovakia to include a reference to the Law on of the Law on Radiation Protection’ As of 1 July 2018, a new definition the Prevention of Money Laundering (section 1.3) and in the Schedule for of terrorism was introduced in the and Terrorist Financing regarding the the Procedure of Establishing Threat Slovak Criminal Code. The previous notion of the ‘beneficiary of benefit’. Level of a Terror Act, Announcement definition was redrafted and new A new paragraph to Article 12 of the Thereof and Readiness (sections 2, provisions on terrorism-related Law on State-Guaranteed Legal Aid 10, 11 and annex 1). acts were added. Such acts include was added to include the victims participation in terrorist activities, of criminal acts of terrorism to the Luxembourg terrorism financing and travelling for ‘Persons Eligible for Secondary Legal the purpose of terrorism, for which Through the Law of 27 June 2018, Aid Regardless of the Property and specific definitions were laid down. Income’. Articles 10 (‘Loyalty to the amendments were made to the Code State of Lithuania’) and Article 59 of Criminal Procedure (CCP), to the Terrorism-related definitions can now (‘Compensation in cases of death Law of 30 May 2005 on the protection be found in Sections 419 (Terrorist or health impairment of an officer or of private life in the field of electronic Attack), 419b (Certain Forms of cadet’) of the Internal Service Statute communications and to the Law Participation in Terrorism), 419c of the Republic of Lithuania were of 27 February 2011 on electronic (Terrorism financing) and 419d (Travel reworded. Article 10 now provides that communications networks and for the Purpose of Terrorism) of the those who ‘participate or participated services. Criminal Code. in activities of terrorist organisation Article 39(1) of the CCP was modified or terrorist group […]’ shall be deemed to include a possibility to extend (with disloyal. Article 171 (1) of the Law on the authorisation of an investigating Collective Investment Undertakings, judge) the initial retention period of annexes 67
2002/475/JHA and amending Council ›› Part 3 (sections 52 to 65) contains Sweden Decision 2005/671/JHA and the general provisions supporting By amendments in Swedish Additional Protocol to the Council of Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, including legislation, which entered in to force Europe Convention on the Prevention definitions. The Act also has 3 on 1 September 2018, there has been of Terrorism. Schedules. a widening of the scope of several Schedule 1 makes further provision criminal statutes in the area of United Kingdom about regulations which impose trade terrorism. The new legislation implies sanctions. Schedule 2 makes further inter alia the following. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (SAMLA) 2018 provision about regulations for the The provision in Section 3 of the Act achieved Royal Ascent on 23rd March purposes of anti-money laundering on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist 2018. It will enable the UK to continue and counter-terrorist financing and Offences (2003:148), the Terrorist to implement UN sanctions regimes relates to section 49 in Part 2 and Offences Act – which states which and to use sanctions to meet national schedule 3 makes consequential acts constitute terrorist offences security and foreign policy objectives. amendments to other legislation. under certain Circumstances under This will allow anti-money laundering Currently sections 1 – 48, 50 – 65 Section 2 of the same Act – was and counter-terrorist financing and Schedule 1 and 3 are in force. expanded to essentially also cover measures to be kept up to date, help The following provisions are not yet gross breach of data. to protect the security and prosperity in force and will be given effect at a The penal provision in the of the UK and continue to align the UK later date; Recruitment Act on training was with international standards. › Section 49, which enables expanded and a special criminal › It provides a framework for allowing, Ministers to make regulations liability was introduced for ‘self-study’. where appropriate, sanctions about money laundering and A penal provision on travel in Section currently implemented through the terrorist financing. 5b of the Recruitment Act was EU to take effect in the UK. This › Section 51, which requires the expanded to also cover travel to includes counter-terrorism sanctions. › Secretary of State to provide all countries of citizenship (not Sweden). It also provides for the UK to exercise sanctions powers autonomously, reasonable assistance to the The penal provisions on financing of replacing the powers contained in the Governments of British Overseas terrorism were expanded to cover not Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. Territories to enable them to only financing of particularly serious establish publicly accessible crime, but also financing of complicity SAMLA is currently divided into three registers of beneficial ownership in particularly serious crime or parts: of companies and, no later than attempts, preparation or conspiracy ›› Part 1 (sections 1 – 48) provides 31 December 2020, prepare a to commit such crime. powers to create sanctions draft Order in Council requiring the Government of any such Territory Finally, the new legislation also regimes and contains procedures that has not introduced such a implies that jurisdiction was expanded relating to the review of sanctions. register to do so. in certain cases. ›› Part 2 (sections 49 to 51) provides › Schedule 2, which provides The purpose of the legislation is to powers to create anti-money › further detail on the scope of the ensure that Sweden has legislation laundering and counter-terrorist regulations that can be made under consistent with the Directive (EU) financing regulations and contains section 49. 2017/541 Directive (EU) 2017/541 provisions relating to registers of the European Parliament and of of beneficial owners of overseas the Council of 15 March 2017 on entities and beneficial owners of combating terrorism and replacing companies registered in British Council Framework Decision Overseas Territories. annexes 68 annex 2 Overview of the foiled, failed and completed attacks in 2018 per EU Member State and per affiliation
This annex contains statistical information on the terrorist attacks (foiled, failed and completed) in 2018 in the EU as reported to Europol. It highlights key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years.
Ethno- Jihadist Left-wing Right-wing nationalist Single-issue Member State Not specified Total terrorism terrorism terrorism and separatist terrorism terrorism
Belgium 1 - - - - - 1
France 10 - - 20 - - 30
Germany 2 - - - - - 2
Greece - 6 - - 1 - 7
Italy 1 10 1 - - 1 13 Netherlands 4 - - - - 4 4
Spain 1 3 - 7 - - 11
Sweden 1 - - - - - 1
United Kingdom 4 - - 56 - - 60
Total 24 19 1 83 1 1 129
›› In 2018, nine EU Member States reported terrorist ›› France (7), Germany (2), Italy (1), the Netherlands attacks in 2018. The total number of the attacks (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (3) reported successfully decreased after a sharp spike in 2017 (205); disrupted jihadist terrorist plots; ›› 13 victims died as a result of terrorist attacks and 53 ›› The Netherlands reported jihadist attacks after a long people were injured (in 2017, 68 and 844 respectively); period of having been unaffected by the phenomenon. Notable decrease in jihadist attacks in the UK (14 in ›› Terrorist attacks specified as ethno-nationalist 2017, 4 in 2018); and separatist37 continued to represent the largest proportion (more than 60 %), however declined ›› The number of left-wing affiliated terrorist attacks significantly compared to 2017 (137); continued to slightly decrease for the third consecutive year (from 27 in 2016, to 24 in 2017 and 19 in 2018). ›› The number of foiled, failed and completed jihadist Three countries remain the epicentre of left-wing and terrorist attacks decreased compared to 2017, from 33 anarchist terrorist activity in the EU; to 24. The number of reported foiled terrorist attacks considerably outnumbered the completed attacks (16 ›› A decrease in completed right-wing attacks compared out of 24); to 2017 (previous year five right-wing attacks were reported by the UK); ›› The first single-issue terrorist attack in the EU since 37 56 attacks reported by the UK were acts of security-related incidents in 2014 was reported. Northern Ireland. annexes 69 annex 3 Arrests in 2018 per EU Member State and per affiliation
This annex contains statistical information on terrorist arrests in 2018 in the EU as reported to Europol. It highlights key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years.
Ethno- Jihadist Right-wing Left-wing nationalist Singe-issue Member State Not specified Total terrorism terrorism terrorism and separatist terrorism terrorism
Austria 35 - - - - - 35
Belgium 17 - - - - 149 166*
Bulgaria 14 - - - - - 14
Czechia - 1 - - 1 - 2
Denmark 3 - - - - - 3
France 273 32 3 2 - - 310
Germany 43 8 - 5 - 3 59
Greece 2 - 20 - - - 22
Italy 40 1 8 2 - 5 56
Luxembourg 1 - - - - - 1
The Netherlands 45 2 - 1 - 1 49
Poland - - - - - 2 2
Slovakia - - - - 1 - 1
Slovenia - - - - 1 1 2
Spain 29 - 3 20 - - 52
Sweden 7 - - - - - 7
Romania 2 - - - - - 2
United Kingdom - - - - - 273 273**
Total 511 44 34 30 3 434 1056
*17 arrests were contributed by Belgium in line with TE-SAT methodology. 149 arrests were contributed with no affiliation specified; however, the majority were related to jihadist terrorist activities. A total number of terrorist arrests in Belgium is 166. **The UK contributed 273 arrests were not disaggregated by type of terrorism, and do not include 148 arrests made in Northern Ireland. annexes 70
›› In 2018, 18 EU Member States reported a total of 1056 ›› The number of arrests for left-wing terrorist offences individuals arrested for terrorism-related offences. remained on the same level ( 36 in 2017), similar to the Compared to previous year, the overall number of arrests for separatist terrorist offences (30 in 2017); arrestees remained highest in France and in the UK (in ›› The number of individuals arrested in relation to right- 2017, 411 and 412 respectively out of 1219 individuals wing terrorist offences continued to increase for the third arrested); consecutive year (12 in 2016, 20 in 2017, 44 in 2018). ›› Most arrests were made on suspicion of preparing or attempting to commit a terrorist act; and a membership of a terrorist group, including while being abroad; also terrorism financing; ›› Similar to 2017, arrests for jihadist terrorism represented the largest proportion of the total arrests for terrorism- related offences in the EU (705 out of 1219 in 2017); annexes 71 annex 4 Convictions and penalties
This annex contains statistical information on the concluded court Member State 2016 2017 2018 proceedings for terrorist offences Austria 26 18 36 in 2018 as reported to Eurojust. It highlights some key figures and, where Belgium 136 85 80 relevant, compares those with the Bulgaria - - 1 figures for previous years. Czechia - 8 7 Denmark 8 4 6 Estonia 2 2 - Finland 4 2 1 table / Number of individuals in France 66 120 141 concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences per EU Member State Germany 30 34 57 in 2016, 201738and 201839, as reported Greece 3 19 22 to Eurojust Hungary 2 - 3 Italy 11 23 15 38 The data for the previous years corresponds to the Lithuania 1 2 10 data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports. 39 Eurojust received contributions containing The Netherlands 42 46 37 information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2018 from the following EU Member States: Austria, Poland - 4 - Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Portugal 1 1 - Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. If a verdict pronounced in 2018 was appealed and Slovenia 1 - 1 the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only on the latest/final verdict. Spain 154 69 120 Sweden 4 3 1
United Kingdom 89 125 115
Total 580 565 653
›› In 2018, 17 EU Member States reported a total of 653 ›› In 2018 there were 94 female defendants in the individuals who were convicted or acquitted of terrorist concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences, offences. Nine of those individuals appeared twice which is an increase compared to 2017 (66 female before the court in Greece in 2018 in the framework defendants). of different criminal proceedings and one appeared ›› France reported the highest number of individuals in three times. As a result, the total number of verdicts concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences (141), pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2018 was followed by Spain (120), the UK (115) and Belgium (80)40. 664.
40 The UK contribution includes proceedings on offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism related. Similar to previous years, the UK data for 2018 refers only to convictions. annexes 72
table / Number of verdicts in 2018 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust.
Ethno-nationalist Jihadist Left-wing Right-wing Member State and separatist Not specified Total terrorism terrorism terrorism terrorism Austria 35 1 - - - 36 Belgium 76 4 - - - 80 Bulgaria 1 - - - - 1 Czechia 1 - 5 - 1 7 Denmark 5 - - - 1 6 Finland 1 - - - - 1 France 123 18 - - - 141 Germany 38 2 - 17 - 57 Greece - - 33 - - 33 Hungary 2 - - - 1 3 Italy 15 - - - - 15 Lithuania - - - - 10 10 The Netherlands 32 - - 5 - 37 Slovenia 1 - - - - 1 Spain 68 40 8 - 4 120 Sweden 1 - - - - 1 United Kingdom* - - - - 115 115
Total 399 65 46 22 132 664
* The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore marked as ‘Not specified’ and not included in the numbers below.
›› In 2018 the vast majority (399) of verdicts in the EU terrorism cases resulting in eight and five verdicts, Member States were pronounced in relation to jihadist respectively. terrorist offences confirming a trend that started in ›› The number of verdicts for separatist terrorist offences 2015. increased compared to 2017 (65 in 2018 compared to 49 ›› Courts in France, Belgium and Spain rendered the in 2017). As in previous years, the majority of separatist highest number of verdicts concerning jihadist terrorism terrorism cases were adjudicated in Spain. in 2018 (123, 76 and 68 respectively). Bulgaria, Finland, ›› The majority (64) of the female defendants were tried Italy, Slovenia and Sweden reported only verdicts for for jihadist terrorist offences, which also presents an jihadist terrorism in 2018. increase compared to 2017 (42). ›› Convictions for right-wing terrorist offences (22) ›› Similar to 2017, the highest average prison sentence was increased in 2018 compared to 2017 (4). In 2018 such ordered for left-wing terrorist offences and increased convictions were handed down in Germany (17) and the from ten to sixteen years. The average prison term for Netherlands (5). separatist and right-wing terrorist offences increased ›› A higher number of verdicts were also issued for left- from four to eight and six years respectively. As in the wing terrorist offences (46 in 2018 as compared to 36 past two years, the average prison sentence for jihadist in 2017). The majority of them were reported by Greece terrorist offences remained five years. (33); courts in Spain and Czechia also heard left-wing annexes 73
table / Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per EU Member State in 2018, as reported to Eurojust.
Member State Convictions Acquittals Total Acquittals In %
Austria 27 9 36 25%
Belgium 68 12 80 15%
Bulgaria 1 - 1 0%
Czechia 1 6 7 86%
Denmark 6 - 6 0%
Finland 1 - 1 0%
France 136 5 141 4%
Germany 55 2 57 4%
Greece 31 2 33 6%
Italy 15 - 15 0%
Lithuania 10 - 10 0%
The Netherlands 32 5 37 14%
Slovenia 1 - 1 0%
Spain 85 35 120 29%
Sweden 1 - 1 0%
United Kingdom* 115 - 115 -
* The UK data for 2018 refers only to convictions and is not included in the calculations of percentages.
›› No acquittals for terrorist offences were pronounced ›› Similar to 2017, all prosecutions for right-wing terrorist in the concluded court proceedings in eight of the offences in 2018 resulted in convictions. The percentage EU Member States that reported verdicts for terrorist of convictions among the verdicts for jihadist terrorism offences in 2018. Successful prosecutions resulting in 2018 remained very high (89 %, same as in 2017). only in convictions were concluded in Bulgaria, The conviction rate for separatist terrorist offences Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia remained the same as in 2017 (71 %, while that for left- and Sweden; also France, Germany and Greece had very wing offences decreased slightly (from 72 % in 2017 to low percentage of acquittals securing convictions for 70 % in 2018)42. the vast majority of those tried for terrorist offences in 201841.
offence and convicted of another offence, the verdict is included in the overview as acquittal of terrorism. 41 Eurojust considers it one verdict if an individual is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist offence 42 The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is and acquitted of another offence. If an individual is acquitted of a terrorist therefore not used to calculate the conviction rate. annexes 74
annex 5 Europol counter terrorism activities
the authority and direction of the by cross-checking live operational First-line European Council. It builds further on data with the already available data investigative the already existing tools and counter at Europol, quickly bringing financial terrorism networks of Europol, but leads to light and by analysing all support: the includes a number of new features. available investigative details to These aim at enhancing the counter assist in compiling a structured European Counter terrorism capabilities and at better picture of the terrorist network. facilitating information exchange If a major terrorist event were to Terrorism Centre among counter terrorism authorities, occur, the ECTC can contribute to Recent developments that include to bring cross-border cooperation in a coordinated response. Different the completed terrorist attacks this field to a new level. teams are available for this purpose, often combined with counter and a substantial number of failed The ECTC is designed as a central terrorism experts temporarily and foiled attacks, combined with hub in the EU in the fight against seconded from EU Member States, the existence of large numbers of terrorism. In fact, it is the single point depending on the nature of the event. potentially violent jihadist extremists in the EU where counter terrorism in the EU, indicate that the terrorist operational information from law To provide direct operational threat towards the EU is high. Despite enforcement from all EU Member support and to also contribute to the setback of IS in Iraq and Syria the States, but also from third parties, a coordinated response if major severity of the threat in the EU may is brought together for analytical terrorist attacks or threats were to even increase, in relation to returning purposes. Specialised teams of occur, the ECTC applies a scalable foreign terrorist fighters and their counter terrorism analysts and approach where other teams can be children and wives who may all pose a experts work on this information to activated depending on the need. The danger to the security of EU Member construct the wider EU perspective Europol Emergency Response Team States, but also as this setback could on counter terrorism phenomena (EMRT) is an example of this. This mean that IS will focus even more on for both operational and strategic team comprises Europol experts and the West. Addressing the challenges goals. To ensure efficient information analysts with relevant backgrounds and making full use of the available exchange, the ECTC benefits from and experience to support emerging Counter Terrorism opportunities an excellent network of counter investigations on a 24/7 basis. is key to countering terrorism terrorism officers throughout the EU effectively. and beyond.
To ensure an effective response to the The principal task of the ECTC is to constantly changing developments provide operational support upon EU in terrorism, the European Counter Member States’ request for ongoing Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was investigations. The ECTC can assist established at Europol, under annexes 75
for operational analytical support Europol Information with the EU Member States and Information System non-EU partners. As a result, the exchange: SIENA number of data categories that are One of Europol’s core databases permitted to be stored and processed In an organisation like Europol, is the Europol Information System is broader than in the EIS (within with its main focus on information (EIS). Through this system, EU the counter terrorism AWF, there is exchange, the secure and swift Member States directly share and focused analysis on certain counter transmission of data is essential, retrieve information, including on terrorism phenomena). Existing especially when it comes to counter suspects, means of communication, and emerging terrorist phenomena terrorism data. Information from a financial accounts and firearms, etc. are handled within separate files, Member State must reach Europol connected with serious and organised known as Analysis Projects (APs). and vice versa, without the risk crime and terrorism. In these highly secure environments of interception. To facilitate this information exchange, the Secure The EIS offers first-line investigative the information is collected, cross- Information Exchange Network support, as this reference system matched and analysed. This is done Application (SIENA) was designed allows EU Member States to quickly by dedicated teams of counter and has been in use for a number of identify whether or not information terrorism analysts and counter years by EU Member States, Europol relevant to them is available in one of terrorism experts. Within counter and third parties that have operational the EU Member States or with non-EU terrorism, a major AP is the topic of cooperation agreements with countries or organisations. ‘travellers’, which deals with foreign terrorist fighters. The amount of data Europol. In case of a positive hit, more on foreign terrorist fighters within the A dedicated area has been created information may then be requested AP Travellers increased substantially within SIENA especially for counter through the contributor’s Europol in 2018 as a result of the concerted terrorism authorities. This means National Unit. efforts of EU Member States with the that counter terrorism authorities At the end of 2018, the EIS held assistance of Europol. now have the possibility to send information on 63 353 individuals In December 2017, the ECTC opened information directly to Europol or linked to terrorism (the vast majority a new AP on Core International other counter terrorism authorities. linked to the foreign terrorist fighter Crimes which is related to war Until recently, countries could only (FTFs) phenomenon), provided by 34 crimes, crimes against humanity and use SIENA to send their contributions different contributors. genocide43. on terrorism to Europol indirectly, through the Europol National Unit Further in-depth The ECTC uses an integrated and Liaison Bureau. The extended approach meaning that data inserted infrastructure now also allows analysis: Counter in one system is automatically cross- counter terrorism authorities from checked against all other databases different countries to directly Terrorism Analysis at Europol to close intelligence gaps. exchange information among In addition, regular manual checks are themselves, with optional involvement Work File and carried out. of Europol. Involvement of Europol is Analytical Projects recommended to avoid that possible links to other EU Member States and For a more in-depth analysis, 43 The AP on Core International Crimes works third partners remain undiscovered, the ECTC works with the counter together closely with the Genocide Network, as well as to identify potential terrorism analysis work file (AWF). also known as the European Union Network for Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes links between organised crime and This file provides the framework Against Humanity and War Crimes, hosted by terrorism. Eurojust. annexes 76
In practice, this means that every competent authorities (from EU counter terrorism officer in the Terrorism Member States and non-EU countries) EU Member States can check the Finance Tracking and liaising, assisting and jointly EIS from their own computers and promoting activities and training with directly send information to, or Programme the European Commission and other receive information from, the Analysis relevant international organisations in The ECTC uses a number of tools to Projects. The options described these areas of expertise. help detect the financing of terrorism, for sharing information are at the one of the best known is the Terrorist The European Explosive Ordnance discretion of the Member State. Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP). Disposal (EOD) Units Network, with The TFTP was established following its EOD and CBRN expert working European Union an EU-US agreement adopted by the groups continues to be facilitated European Parliament in 2010. and actively supported by Europol. Internet Referral This network is one of the main Relevant information obtained achievements stemming from the EU Unit through the TFTP is provided by Action Plan on Enhancing the Security the US Department of the Treasury The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU of Explosives. IRU) coordinates EU efforts to tackle to Europol, competent authorities A new platform for the European access to online terrorist propaganda of EU Member States and Eurojust Explosives Ordnance Units Network and delivering operational support either spontaneously by the US, or on the Europol Platform of Experts to high profile CT cases. The unit upon request, pursuant to Article (EPE) has become the main is developing an agile operational 9 or Article 10 of the Agreement communication channel enabling support model, in order to further respectively, with the aim of already more than 300 European enhance ECTC rapid response to combating terrorism and terrorist bomb technicians and CBRN experts terrorist attacks and expand the EU financing. to swiftly, efficiently and directly law enforcement toolbox, especially TFTP has proven to be a valuable tool share knowledge, best practices and in niche technical capabilities. The EU in terrorism-related investigations, technical information on recent cases IRU keeps abreast with the innovation it enhances the ability to map out and incidents. employed by terrorist groups to terrorist networks, often by filling exploit the online environment, in missing links in an investigative The bomb-making process, potential for the purpose of disseminating chain. It is used to track terrorist recipes for the harmful use of terrorist propaganda, recruitment money flows, allowing authorities to explosives precursors, as well as to terrorist organisations and the identify and locate operatives and potential new threats using CBRN planning and execution of terrorist their financiers and assists in broader materials, are monitored daily and attacks. By the end of 2018, the EU efforts to uncover terrorist cells. cross-checked by Europol’s ECTC IRU supported 222 operations and experts. Information is shared with delivered 339 operational products. It Chemical, experts and relevant units within also assessed in total 87 819 pieces the EU Member States and non-EU of content, which triggered 85 477 biological, countries. decisions for referral, with a success Europol assessments, strategic rate of removal of 84.85 % since it radiological reports and expertise are also timely was setup in July 2015. and nuclear and in detecting security gaps and feeding the EU Policy Cycle through effective explosives cooperation with the European Commission. Europol is a key partner in the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and In October 2017, the European Nuclear (CBRN) and Explosives field, Commission issued a new Action Plan working together with the national to enhance preparedness against annexes 77
CBRN security risks, enhancing generating added value to all shared use those flows of refugees to enter Europol’s role as a key player in CBRN CT cases, acting as a force multiplier Europe unnoticed, but it is indisputable security. to individual counter-terrorism efforts that some terrorists have entered the by EU Member States and Third EU posing as a refugee44, as was seen The ECTC – Strategy CBRN and Parties. in the Paris attacks of 13 November Explosives Team also assists EU 2015. Member States operationally, both with counter terrorism and serious Team of rotating To counter this threat, Europol has and organised crime investigations. recently approved the recruitment This includes having Europol staff Guest Officers of up to 200 counter terrorist and appointed as court experts. at immigration other investigators for deployment to migration hotspots in Greece and Italy. The Counter hotspots European Terrorism Joint Europol provided support to Italy and Greece by deploying short-term Cybercrime Centre Liaison Team Seconded National Experts (Guest Officers) at hotspots on the eastern Launched in January 2013 the The Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Aegean islands and in southern Italy. European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) Team (CT JLT) was established by Up to 50 of these Guest Officers delivers high-level technical, analytical the EU Member States to improve the are deployed on rotation in order to and digital forensic expertise to speed and quality of CT cooperation. strengthen the security checks on support investigations by EU Member It functions as a platform for the swift the inward migration flow, in order States and non-EU countries in cases exchange of operational information to identify suspected terrorists and of convergence of cyber and terrorism. and actionable intelligence among criminals, thus providing additional dedicated counter terrorism experts security checks. and analysts from the EU Member 44 States, associated non-EU countries There is no concrete evidence that Europol, Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited, 2016. and Europol. The CT JLT facilitates terrorist travellers systematically annexes 78 annex 6 Methodology
The TE-SAT was established in the representatives from France and Decision 2005/671/JHA, which all EU aftermath of the 11 September 2001 Spain, EU Intelligence Analysis Centre Member States have implemented in attacks in the USA, as a reporting (INTCEN), Eurojust, the office of the their national legislation. This Directive mechanism from the Terrorism EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator (EU specifies that terrorist offences are Working Party (TWP) of the Council of CTC), and Europol staff. intentional acts which, given their the EU to the European Parliament. In nature or context, may seriously For the preparation of this report, 2006 Europol replaced the TWP. The damage a country or an international Europol collected qualitative and methodology for producing this annual organisation when committed with quantitative data on terrorist offences report was developed by Europol and the aim of: seriously intimidating in the EU and data on arrests of people endorsed by the Justice and Home a population, or unduly compelling suspected of involvement in those Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June a government or international offences, provided or confirmed by 2006. organisation to perform or abstain EU Member States. Similar data were from performing an act, or seriously The content of the TE-SAT is based on collected, when available, of offences destabilising or destroying the information supplied by EU Member in which EU interests were affected fundamental political, constitutional, States, some non-EU countries and outside of the EU. As in previous years, economic or social structures the partner organisation Eurojust, as Eurojust collected data on the number of a country or an international well as information gained from open of court proceedings in each Member organisation. sources. State, the number of individuals in concluded court proceedings, the In cases in which the wording of In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 number of convictions and acquittals, Directive 2017/541 leaves room (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is produced the type of terrorism, the gender of for interpretation, the TE-SAT annually to provide an overview of defendants, the penalties imposed, 2019 respects EU Member States’ the terrorism phenomenon in the EU, as well as the type of verdicts – final definitions of terrorist offences on from a law enforcement perspective. or pending judicial remedy. Eurojust their territories. At times, it can be It seeks to record basic facts and contributed data on convictions difficult to assess whether a criminal assemble figures regarding terrorist and penalties for terrorist offences event should be regarded as an act of attacks and arrests in the EU. The in EU Member States and relevant terrorism or as an act of extremism. report also aims to present trends and amendments in national legislation on Contrary to terrorism, not all forms new developments identified from the terrorism. of extremism sanction the use of information available to Europol. violence. Nevertheless, extremism Included as arrests are those judicial The TE-SAT is a situation report which as a phenomenon may be related arrests warranted by a prosecutor describes and analyses the outward to terrorism and exhibit similar or investigating judge, whereby a manifestations of terrorism, i.e. behavioural patterns. Therefore, person is detained for questioning on terrorist attacks and activities. It does the TE-SAT 2019 mentions criminal suspicion of committing a criminal not seek to analyse the root causes acts with the potential to seriously offence for which detention is of terrorism, neither does it attempt destabilise or destroy the fundamental permitted by national law. The fact to assess the impact or effectiveness political, constitutional, economic that the person may subsequently be of counter-terrorism policies and or social structures of a country, provisionally released or placed under law enforcement measures taken, when they were reported by the EU house arrest does not impact the although it can serve to illustrate some Member States as extremism, in an calculation of the number of arrests. of these. effort to provide a clearer picture of The definition of the term terrorist the phenomenon and its relation to This edition of the TE-SAT has been offences is indicated in the Directive terrorism. However, these cases were produced by Europol in consultation (EU) 2017/541 Directive (EU) 2017/541 not considered in the statistical data with the TE-SAT Advisory Board, of the European Parliament and of of this report, which exclusively reflect composed of representatives of the the Council of 15 March 2017 on incidents reported as terrorism by EU past, present and future Presidencies combating terrorism and replacing Member States. of the Council of the EU, i.e. Austria, Council Framework Decision Romania and Finland (the ‘troika’), The EU Council Decision of 20 2002/475/JHA and amending Council along with permanent members, September 2005 (2005/671/ JHA), annexes 79
on the exchange of information and based on the ideology or goals they Left-wing and anarchist terrorism cooperation concerning terrorist espouse should not be confused with Left-wing terrorist groups seek to offences, obliges EU Member States motivating factors and the paths to replace the entire political, social to collect all relevant information radicalisation. The underlying causes and economic system of a state by concerning and resulting from criminal that lead people to radicalisation introducing a communist or socialist investigations conducted by their and terrorism must be sought in the structure and a classless society. Their law enforcement authorities with surroundings (structural factors) ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. A respect to terrorist offences and sets and personal interpretations sub-category of left-wing extremism is out the conditions under which this (psychological factors) of the anarchist terrorism which promotes a information should be sent to Europol. individual. The choice of categories revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti- Europol processed the data and the used in the TE-SAT reflects the current authoritarian agenda. Examples of left- results were cross-checked with situation in the EU as reported by EU wing terrorist groups are the Italian the EU Member States. In cases of Member States. The categories are Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) and the divergences or gaps, the results were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Greek Revolutionary Organisation 17 corrected, complemented and then Jihadist November. validated by the EU Member States. Jihadist terrorist acts are those that Ethno-nationalism and separatism Eurojust also collected data on are committed out of a mind-set prosecutions and convictions for Ethno-nationalist and separatist that rejects democracy on religious terrorist offences on the basis of terrorist groups are motivated by grounds and uses the historical the aforementioned EU Council nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. comparison with the crusades of Decision. The data used in this report Separatist groups seek to carve out the Middle Ages to describe current concerns relevant court decisions a state for themselves from a larger situations, in which it is believed and legislation amendments in 2018. country or annex territory from one that Sunni Islam is facing a crusader Due to the specifics of reporting, country to that of another. Left- or alliance composed of Shi’is, Christians Member States submit information right-wing ideological elements are not and Jews. on both final and non-final decisions. uncommon in these types of groups. Therefore, reference is also made Right-wing The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the to those decisions pending judicial Basque ETA and the Kurdish PKK Right-wing terrorist organisations remedy. Verdicts from 2018 on which organisations fall into this category. seek to change the entire political, an appeal is pending are included social and economic system on an Single-issue in the reporting as pending judicial extremist right-wing model. A core remedy. In cases where a verdict Single-issue extremist groups aim to concept in right-wing extremism is pronounced in 2018 was appealed change a specific policy or practice, supremacism or the idea that a certain and the appeal was concluded before as opposed to replacing the whole group of people sharing a common the end of the year, Eurojust counted political, social and economic system element (nation, race, culture, etc.) is the proceeding as one. Eurojust’s in a society. The groups within this superior to all other people. Seeing contribution was verified with the EU category are usually concerned themselves in a supreme position, Member States that provided relevant with animal rights, environmental the particular group considers it is data. protection, anti-abortion campaigns, their natural right to rule over the rest etc. Examples of groups in this Types of terrorism of the population. Racist behaviour, category are the Earth Liberation Front authoritarianism, xenophobia and The TE-SAT categorises terrorist (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front hostility to immigration are commonly organisations by their source of (ALF). found attitudes in right-wing motivation. However, many groups extremists. Right-wing terrorism refers have a mixture of motivating to the use of terrorist violence by ideologies, although usually one right-wing groups. Variants of right- ideology or motivation dominates. It wing extremist groups are the neo- is worth noting that a categorisation Nazi, neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist of individuals and terrorist groups formations. annexes 80 annex 7 Acronyms
AF al-Abd al-Faqir JHA Justice and Home Affairs ALF Animal Liberation Front JNIM Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Group in support of Islam and Muslims AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia LNA Libyan National Army ANP Arm na Poblachta, Army of the Republic MINUSMA The United Nations Multidimensional AP Analysis Project Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb MOJWA Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa AWF Analysis work file NIRA New Irish Republican Army CBRN chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear NMR Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen Nordic Resistance Movement CIRA Continuity Irish Republican Army CT JLT Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team ONH Óglaigh ná h’Éireann Warriors of Ireland DDoS Distributed Denial of Service Pegida Patriotische Europäer gegen die DHKP-C Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi Islamisierung des Abendlandes Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/ Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation Front of the Occident DR Dissident Republican PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan EC3 European Cybercrime Centre Kurdistan Workers’ Party ECTC European Counter Terrorism Centre RWE Right-wing extremists SAMLA Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering EFP explosively formed projectile Act EIS Europol Information System SIENA Secure Information Exchange Network ELF Earth Liberation Front Application EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal TATP triacetone triperoxide EPE Europol Platform of Experts TE-SAT European Union Terrorism Situation and ETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna Trend Report Basque Fatherland and Liberty TFTP Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme EU European Union THD Tanzim Hurras al-Din Guardians of the religion organisation EU INTCEN EU Intelligence Analysis Centre TWP Terrorism Working Party FAI/FRI Federazione Anarchica Informale/Fronte Rivoluzionario Internazionale UAV unmanned aerial vehicle FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de UCC United Cyber Caliphate Colombian UN United Nations Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces SGC supporter-generated content FTF foreign terrorist fighter VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive GNA Informal Anarchist Federation/International device Revolutionary Front VOIED victim-operated improvised explosive HME Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin device Group in support of Islam and Muslims YPG Yekineyen Parastina Gel HPG Kosovo Force People’s Protection Units HSM The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali HTS Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen Nordic Resistance Movement ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IED improvised explosive device IID improvised incendiary device IS so-called Islamic State ISGA Islamic State in the Greater Sahara PHOTO CREDITS
Europol: pages 5, 74 and 77.
Shutterstock: pages 18, 19, 22, 24, 26, 33, 34, 36, 38, 54 and 59. ISBN 978-92-95209-76-3 DOI 10.2813/788404 QL-AJ-19-001-EN-N
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