N. 21 Policy Study
THRIVING ON UNCERTAINTY: COVID-19-RELATED OPPORTUNITIES FOR TERRORIST GROUPS
Abdelhak Bassou Johannes Claes Coordinator Kars de Bruijne Youssef Tobi Coordinator Sophie Mertens Eman Ragab Clara-Auguste Süß
N. 21 Policy Study
THRIVING ON UNCERTAINTY: COVID-19-RELATED OPPORTUNITIES FOR TERRORIST GROUPS
Abdelhak Bassou Coordinator Youssef Tobi Coordinator Johannes Claes Kars de Bruijne Sophie Mertens Eman Ragab Clara-Auguste Süß EuroMeSCo has become a benchmark for policy-oriented research on issues related to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, in particular economic development, security and migration. With 104 affiliated think tanks and institutions and about 500 experts from 29 different countries, the network has developed impactful tools for the benefit of its members and a larger community of stakeholders in the Euro- Mediterranean region.
Through a wide range of publications, surveys, events, training activities, audio- visual materials and a strong footprint on social media, the network reaches thousands of experts, think tankers, researchers, policy-makers and civil society and business stakeholders every year. While doing so, EuroMeSCo is strongly engaged in streamlining genuine joint research involving both European and Southern Mediterranean experts, encouraging exchanges between them and ultimately promoting Euro-Mediterranean integration. All the activities share an overall commitment to fostering youth participation and ensuring gender equality in the Euro-Mediterranean experts’ community.
EuroMesCo: Connecting the Dots is a project co-funded by the European Union (EU) and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) that is implemented in the framework of the EuroMeSCo network.
As part of this project, five Joint Study Groups are assembled each year to carry out evidence-based and policy-oriented research. The topics of the five study groups are defined through a thorough process of policy consultations designed to identify policy-relevant themes. Each Study Group involves a Coordinator and a team of authors who work towards the publication of a Policy Study which is printed, disseminated through different channels and events, and accompanied by audio-visual materials.
POLICY STUDY Published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean Peer Review Academic Peer Reviewer: anonymous Policy Peer Reviewer: Kamel Akrout, Chairman and Founder, Institute for Prospective and Advanced Strategic and Security Studies (IPASSS) Editing Karina Melkonian Design layout Maurin.studio Proofreading Neil Charlton Layout Núria Esparza Print ISSN 2462-4500 Digital ISSN 2462-4519 June 2021 Arabic version available
This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean. The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), founded in 1989, is a think and do tank specialised in Euro-Mediterranean relations. It provides policy-oriented and evidence-based research underpinned by a genuine Euromed multidimensional and inclusive approach.
The aim of the IEMed, in accordance with the principles of the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), is to stimulate reflection and action that contribute to mutual understanding, exchange and cooperation between the different Mediterranean countries, societies and cultures, and to promote the progressive construction of a space of peace and stability, shared prosperity and dialogue between cultures and civilisations in the Mediterranean.
The IEMed is a consortium comprising the Catalan Government, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, the European Union and Barcelona City Council. It also incorporates civil society through its Board of Trustees and its Advisory Council.
The Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) is a Moroccan think tank aiming to contribute to the improvement of economic and social public policies that challenge Morocco and the rest of Africa as integral parts of the Global South.
The PCNS pleads for an open, accountable and enterprising “new South” that defines its own narratives and mental maps around the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins, as part of a forward-looking relationship with the rest of the world. Through its analytical endeavours, the think tank aims to support the development of public policies in Africa and to give the floor to experts from the South. This stance is focused on dialogue and partnership, and aims to cultivate African expertise and excellence needed for the accurate analysis of African and global challenges and the suggestion of appropriate solutions.
As such, the PCNS brings together researchers, publishes their work and capitalises on a network of renowned partners, representative of different regions of the world. The PCNS hosts a series of gatherings of different formats and scales throughout the year, the most important being the annual international conferences “The Atlantic Dialogues” and “African Peace and Security Annual Conference” (APSACO). Policy Study Content
Executive Summary 8
Introduction 10 Abdelhak Bassou
COVID-19 in the Sahel: Litmus Test for State Capacity Rather Than Fuel for Extremists 16 Johannes Claes, Kars de Bruijne, Sophie Mertens
Recruitment Strategies of Terrorist Groups in the Mashreq Region Amidst COVID-19 40 Eman Ragab
The Pandemic and its Handling as Crisis Intensifiers? Taking Stock of Mobilisation, Terrorism and COVID- 19 in the Maghreb 60 Clara-Auguste Süß
List of acronyms and abbreviations 84 Executive Summary
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a cataclysmic impact on all aspects of the functioning of our world. The relevance of the possibility of the spread of a global virus with the spread of terrorism is not immediately obvious as it is difficult for a direct causal link to be scientifically established. However, taking into consideration how state responses and pre-existing socioeconomic grievances can be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic can lead to innovative findings on how terrorist groups have adapted and conducted their activities during the pandemic. Analysing how the response of states impacts socioeconomic grievances and how it interacts with terrorist activities, the authors have found that the pandemic has impacted the operational and ideological frameworks of terrorist groups in multiple ways. COVID-19 was interpreted as an opportunity to spread extremist propaganda and ideology. The pandemic was presented as an act of God, punishing the ungodly and weakening enemy governments. In terms of propaganda, this virus was presented as a soldier of Allah and was used for online recruitment strategies. Concerning the operational front, poor state responses to the pandemic may have reinforced the legitimacy of terrorist groups among populations as they were continuously used as arguments advancing the agenda of these groups in their areas of intervention. In the first chapter, poor state responses and their interactions with terrorists’ activity was analysed especially in the Sahel region where the longstanding fragilities of states have been exacerbated by the pandemic. However, at this stage, a clear correlation between COVID-19 and the increase of terrorist activity is yet to be established. This property of COVID-19 as a crisis intensifier is a strong argument in the last chapter focusing on the Maghreb region: taking into account the various databases and academic viewpoints, this chapter examines the link between the growing popular discontent of the populations of Maghreb countries and the surge of the COVID-19 pandemic. As in the Sahel region, a potent and clear connection between COVID-19 and a possible increase of terrorist activities was contested. The role of state responses and their effect on the surge of terrorist activity was also addressed, especially in the second chapter of this study: for instance, when examining the changing recruitment strategies of terrorist groups in the Mashreq region, strengthening the resilience of the state and society was the viable strategy for countering violent extremism. For the European Union (EU) to achieve this endeavour, this study argues that the EU’s efforts need to work on remediating the vulnerability of fragile groups within societies and to consider the core governance fragilities leading to the surge of terrorist activities in the regions covered, namely the Sahel, the Mashreq and the Maghreb.
Exploring the opportunities offered by COVID-19 to terrorist groups in these regions deepens the understanding of terrorist tactics and propaganda strategies. This enables the adoption of a more comprehensive approach with regards to responding to and assisting states on the ground. Policy recommendations derived from this study not only aim to mitigate and assess risks deriving from the
Policy Study n. 21 interlinkage between the turmoil caused by the virus and terrorism in the regions, but also focuses on state responses and the assessment of innovative and applicable ways of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in an uncertain and novel landscape. Indeed, this study does not solely focus on the capabilities of terrorist groups but also explores the different components of the interaction between the pandemic and terrorism. It thus proposes a wider range of recommendations that address both the challenge of mitigating the risks of terrorist activities but also, in the long term, the core factors that increase and encourage the spread of terrorist violence in the regions covered.
Main recommendations:
• Attention should be paid to redirecting existing funding towards COVID- 19 responses. Shrinking aid budgets in the medium term can have negative effects further down the line, especially when it concerns programming geared towards service provision in fragile areas.
• Urge European countries to launch on the national level large-scale awareness campaigns that explain how to report suspicious online recruitment related to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist groups, and the type of help and protection offered in return. For such campaigns to be effective they should be carried out in cooperation with all stakeholders including local mosques, Imams, Islamic centres, schools, universities, and hacker communities.
• Establish an effective cooperation strategy for the exchange of information and expertise between the countries of the region but also with the EU and the broader international level.
• Encourage an evidence-based approach when it comes to the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis intensifier.
• P/CVE needs to be understood not only as a mere security task but also requires broader efforts and joint solutions with regard to legal migration and sustainable economic growth.
• Dedicate financial support to encourage Iraqi and Syrian Sunni youths to launch small and micro-enterprises, especially in areas destroyed during the war on ISIS. Introduction
Abdelhak Bassou Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 11
Jihadist movements build their specific ments which wage asymmetric wars, strategy according to the operational the population is a primary target and possibilities offered by the field, the influencing public opinion is a major tactics that can be executed in view of objective. In these asymmetric wars the the training of these combatants, and population is the prize between the in- the logistical availabilities. There is, surgents (terrorist groups) and the gov- however, an almost unchanging aspect ernment institutions. Each party tries to operating in spite of the circumstances; engage it to have the population on its that is, the doctrine. Jihadist move- side (de Courrèges et al., 2010). Terror- ments, like all ideological schools, base ist propaganda techniques make it their actions on a normative and theor- possible to legitimise false ideas and etical corpus that allows them to ex- fallacious principles obtained by the plain to the public and their followers distortion of the true norms of religion, the correctness of their causes and jus- with the aim of expanding terrorist tifies the actions taken on the ground. doctrine; instilling a climate of fear This corpus of theories and norms is among opponents as a dissuasive tool; made up of a constant and immutable and highlighting the pull factors like core and of elements introduced ac- the appetite for violence and the ap- cording to each context. Does this peal to fight injustice, which attracts mean that the Jihadist doctrine is fixed people in the targeted circles – mainly and constant? While its core is, it is the youth. Terrorist groups have histori- continually and opportunely enriched cally exploited upheavals in the world by everything that Jihadist theorists to skilfully exploit them in their propa- find useful to enable the doctrine to ganda and recruitment efforts, as well meet the goal. This doctrine also obeys as to profit from crises, plagues or any- the laws of evolution despite the thing that weakens the institutions and steadfastness of an almost immutable governance structures. As stated in dogmatic core. Nothing is therefore Ragab’s chapter of this study, crises static in the Jihadist strategy, and the that weaken states and exhaust popu- declination of the global strategy into lations provide supporters of terrorist specific and adapted strategies does groups with the opportunity to present not concern only the operational side themselves as the saviours and the al- but also the doctrinal aspect. Jihadist ternative. strategies therefore do not only rely on invasion and operational actions on the As the world is facing an unpreced- ground. Narratives also have an in- ented global health, social and econ- fluence. The Jihadist doctrine is there- omic emergency as a result of the fore the umbilical cord that links all COVID-19 pandemic, it has been similar Jihadist groups, despite the dif- viewed by terrorist groups as a golden ferences that may exist in the environ- opportunity to strengthen the prin- ments in which they operate. It consists ciples of their respective doctrines and of a body of documents and speeches fuel the propaganda (Boussel, 2020). containing the beliefs, norms and prin- First, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda ciples that govern the existence of the and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq group. and Syria (ISIS), which seek to behave like a state and even to substitute the Propaganda can be seen as a vehicle state, have tried to seize the pandemic of doctrine. In insurrectionary move- to increase this strategy and to fill any 12 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
vacuums left by governance institu- plained the extremist point of view of tions. Indeed, these groups have not the pandemic and have given instruc- been reticent to point out the short- tions to their followers to guard against comings of governments in tackling the virus. However, these documents the pandemic, and to engage in exten- have not been limited to simply giving sive propaganda and disinformation prevention advice. Rather, they have campaigns, to strengthen their nar- conveyed elements of indoctrination. rative and increase their online span. The ISIS flyer entitled Legal Guidelines The virus has slowly become a global for Behaviour in Epidemics convinces test for almost all governments, put- readers that viruses are not contagious ting pressure on health infrastructure by themselves but by the will of God, and challenging state legitimacy and and one should rely only on God to be responses. The measures taken by saved from disease (Benraad, 2020). states to limit the spread of COVID-19 Other theologians and theorists of ex- have relied heavily on lockdowns that tremism, such as the Jordanian Islamic have forced millions of young people scholar Dr. Ahmad Al-Shahrouri, have to stay at home. This has reduced daily gone so far as to make Jihad an activity activities and in most cases the con- that purifies the body and protects it fined found an alternative activity on against pandemics. In addition, each in- the Internet to overcome the viciss- struction is accompanied by a word of itudes and boredom of lockdown. The the Prophet considered as the reference The increase in increase in time spent on the Internet of this instruction. This approach aims to time spent on due to the lockdown has increased the convince the target audience that Islam the Internet due to the lockdown chances of Jihadists attracting people had advanced long before the Western has increased to their sites. Radical groups have also world the ways to cure systemic dis- the chances of taken steps to ensure that COVID-19 eases, which in turn affirms the legality Jihadists does not steal their show in the media and legitimacy of orders, instructions attracting and have strived to be a part of and recommendations given as being in people to their COVID-19-related news. accordance with Sharia law. sites
Second, and in addition to trying to fill Plagues or catastrophes that have be- the gap, terrorist groups have tried to fallen the world have often been ex- feed their doctrinal system. The virtual plained through the centuries in the Jihad must be constantly nourished context of divine wrath and punish- and constitutes a system with two com- ment in some religious literature. How- ponents: the basic doctrine, made up ever, COVID-19 did not spare Muslims of dogmas, norms and principles and even some Jihadists who consider framed within a decontextualised and themselves as the most ardent be- biased interpretation of the prescrip- lievers in God. Jihadist theorists have tions of Islam; and current salient thus found themselves faced with the events that are exploited through in- challenge of explaining how a phe- terpretations that confirm these Jihad- nomenon that is supposed to punish ist doctrinal approaches. the enemies of Jihad also kills Jihadists, who as soldiers of God should normally From the first announcements confirm- be spared. ing the pandemic nature of COVID-19, terrorist groups have published declar- Three words largely represent this ations, articles and fatwas that have ex- idea in Jihadist literature: punishment
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 13
(Thaa’r), sanction (Qissas) and revenge study have adopted a particular re- (Intiqam). The effects of COVID-19 are gional scope related to the impact of therefore presented as a divine action, the global pandemic on terrorist activ- which intervenes to take revenge on ity while addressing the topic through the ungodly and make them pay for different levels of analysis: the first the atrocities they have inflicted on the chapter examines the impact of the children of the Islamic Ummah. At the evolving COVID-19 situation in the very beginning of the onset of the pan- Sahel region on both levels of extrem- demic in China, theorists of extremism ist violence and responses by local and blamed the country by labelling state authorities, by focusing on the COVID-19 as a divine revenge to pun- pre-existing conditions that were al- ish the Chinese for their treatment of ready in place prior to the outbreak of Muslim Uyghurs (Stalinsky, 2020). How- the pandemic specifically in Mali, Niger ever, when the pandemic spread, they and Burkina Faso. It then examines the had to correct their rhetoric to con- potential longer-term implications in sider that COVID-19 is both a retribu- terms of the appeal of extremist tion for the ungodly and Muslims who groups in this context. The second have deviated from God and the chapter discusses the strategies Prophet and also a trial by which God adopted by terrorist groups to recruit tests the faith of Muslims and their re- new members and followers during the silience in the face of adversity. COVID-19 pandemic, with specific focus on ISIS and its affiliated cells in The virus also serves the cause of rad- European societies and the Mashreq ical preachers, who believe that the region, particularly Iraq and Syria. It pandemic sheds light on the impor- also aims to highlight the “new” types tance of certain practices of radical of terrorism that ISIS has been urging Islam. The hygiene measures that have its followers to practise amidst COVID- been recommended to guard against 19. The last chapter of this study takes contamination are an opportunity for a similar approach of exploring extrem- Jihadists to call for conversion to Islam, ist dynamics on the ground and related a religion where ablution before the actors, state responses and policies, as five daily prayers is a hygiene measure well as the emerging socioeconomic already well established by Islam. consequences of the pandemic in the Maghreb region. Due to COVID-19 Against this background, this study and its accompanying insecurities and aims at examining the potential link be- travel restrictions, the study predomi- tween increasing threats of violence nantly relies on qualitative data from and terrorist activity and the spread of interviews with international experts COVID-19, and subsequently proposes and local stakeholders, as well as on a recommendations for the European broad range of primary and secondary Union to better understand and push sources, including academic publica- back terrorist groups’ activities amidst tions, policy papers and newspaper ar- the pandemic. The chapters in the ticles. 14 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
References
BENRAAD, M. (2020). Quand la propagande djihadiste s’empare de la crise sanitaire. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/ quand-la-propagande-djihadiste-sempare-de-la-crise-sanitaire-135886
BOUSSEL, P. (2020). Covid-19, le djihadisme au défi d’une pandémie. Fondation pour la Rrecherche Stratégique. Retrieved from https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/covid-19-djihadisme-defi-une- pandemie-2020
DE COURRÈGES, H., GERMAIN, E., & LE NEN, N. (2010). Principes de contre- insurrection. ECONOMICA.
STALINSKY, S. (2020). What Jihadists are saying about the coronavirus. A magazine describes the pathogen as ‘one of Allah’s soldiers.’ Another passes along CDC hygiene tips. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-jihadists-are-saying-about-the-coronavirus- 11586112043
Policy Study n. 21
COVID-19 in the Sahel: Litmus Test for State Capacity Rather Than Fuel for Extremists
Johannes Claes Research Fellow, Sahel Programme, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute Dr. Kars de Bruijne Senior Research Fellow, Sahel Programme, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute Sophie Mertens Intern, Sahel Programme, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute
Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 17
Introduction led to an increase in the short term. Moreover, the interaction between The link between the COVID-19 pan- COVID-19 and structural drivers of vi- demic and terrorism in the Sahel is far olent extremism is multifaceted, non- from obvious, yet all too often as- linear and in the Sahel largely absent. sumed. From March 2020 onwards, Hence, disease containment measures analysts speculated that the pandemic and extremist activity are so far unre- would create opportunities for Violent lated, even though effects might be- Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the come apparent later. Sahel. VEOs were expected to exploit governance vacuums as state security This chapter analyses the ongoing re- forces could have been forced to scale sponses to the COVID-19 outbreak in down their activities due to lockdowns the Sahel, focusing specifically on Mali, and the need to provide health ser- Niger and Burkina Faso. It focuses on vices, while foreign military forces, the the pre-existing conditions that were argument went, could be forced to already in place prior to the outbreak concentrate on troubles at home. of the pandemic, the state responses VEOs would then be able to expand in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, and their reach. the potential longer-term implications of the appeal of extremist groups in Moreover, it was believed that struc- this context. The study seeks to under- tural problems – already sponsoring vi- stand how the evolving COVID-19 situ- olence – would be adversely impacted ation in the three countries has by the pandemic. Economic griev- impacted both levels of extremist viol- ances, discontent with political orders ence and responses by local and state and harsh military responses to extrem- authorities. ism were drivers of violence prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. Many specu- This chapter is based on ongoing lated that COVID-19 would reinforce analysis by the Clingendael Institute of these drivers as states would increas- the situation in Mali, Niger and Burkina ingly use violence against civilians, Faso. It reviews the drivers of VEO re- muzzle opposition voices and benefit cruitment in the Sahel, and analyses from weak governance models that data from the Armed Conflict Location allow for corruption and elite capture. and Event Data Project (ACLED) on vi- This could in turn contribute to the fer- olence since the outbreak of the pan- tile grounds for recruitment of extrem- demic. It is also supported by a small ist groups throughout the Sahel. But number of interviews with experts that did COVID-19 indeed have this effect? work on governance and violent ex- Data analyses on the distribution and tremism in the Sahel. intensity of violence and evidence col- lected in the Sahel for the purpose of The first section presents a number of this chapter casts doubt on both predictions on the relations between claims. The reality is that supporting violent extremism and COVID-19. Then evidence is so far non-existent. Viol- a section follows on the spread of ence throughout the Sahel has con- COVID-19 in the Sahel. A third section tinued at a level that was already presents data analysis of ACLED. The extremely concerning prior to the out- final section explores the complicated break of the virus. COVID-19 has not relationship between root causes and 18 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
the spread of the pandemic. The piece munities by offering such basic ser- closes with recommendations for pol- vices, relying on the theory that the icy and programming. success of disruptive groups depends on their ability to exploit chaos. The Fears of COVID-19 further strain on government resources was seen as hampering states’ ability to fuelling extremist activity provide basic services to their popu- in the region lations, providing a good opportunity for VEOs to strengthen their local sup- As the first cases of COVID-19 started port by offering financial incentives, se- to appear in the Sahel while the virus curity and other basic services had a catastrophic impact on the Glo- (Coleman, 2020). Additionally, seg- bal North, several reports warned that ments of the population were said to VEOs could take advantage of COVID- be at risk of being further disen- 19 in the Sahel. These warnings came franchised in the event of state COVID- primarily against the backdrop of com- 19 measures enforcement that lack munication efforts by the leaderships respect for fundamental rights. As of extremist organisations, both in the Sahelian states rolled out containment Analysts argued Middle East and in West Africa, in measures that in some cases seemed that the link which the virus was portrayed as a pun- to point to a crackdown on civil lib- between ishment for crusader nations (Berlin- erties, analysts argued that the link be- political gozzi, 2020). As Süß argues in her tween political discontent and discontent and chapter of this study, such warnings extremism might backfire (De Bruijne extremism were also present in the Maghreb re- & Bisson, 2020). might backfire gion. It was argued that they could use it to strengthen their positions and in- Besides warnings about the exploita- crease violent attacks. Additionally, tion of states’ shortcomings, the pan- warnings emerged about the virus pro- demic was predicted to further stretch viding fertile ground for recruitment available security assets in the fight strategies of such organisations. The against the virus, and thereby poten- sections below provide an overview of tially weaken the capacity to respond the key arguments advanced at that to domestic security threats (Columbo time. & Harris, 2020). The argument about extremist groups’ opportunistic behav- As COVID-19 reached Sahelian capi- iour was advanced as a potential rea- tals, warnings were issued that the po- son to worry in light of the pandemic tential for VEOs to continue exploiting as groups might try to exploit disorder governance shortcomings would in- and carry out violent attacks or gain crease (Coleman, 2020). The inability of territory (Burkati, 2020; International Sahelian governments to provide basic Crisis Group, 2018 & 2020). Such a de- services such as healthcare and security velopment could have left Sahelian would likely deepen as resources were states more vulnerable to attacks. On shifting towards fighting COVID-19 in- such a basis, some predicted that invol- stead of providing basic healthcare ser- ving security forces to enforce curfews vices, which were already under strain and isolation measures would give in a pre-pandemic era. As a result, it room to VEOs to strengthen their posi- was assumed that VEOs would be able tions (Fletcher & Rouget, 2020). This to increase their influence in local com- could mean, as a result, that violent ac-
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 19
tions by VEOs would not be met with and their operation Takouba in Mali the necessary force to contain them have tried to maintain the scope of (Dahir, 2020). Reports that the Malian their operations, some noted that in army detachment deployed in the areas general their presence on the ground of Mopti and Tenenkou have aban- decreased (Diall, 2020). doned their positions since the begin- ning of the pandemic further fuelled Lastly, a concern voiced by some in the such concerns as it was believed that it wake of the spread of the virus was would allow VEOs to re-establish them- that VEOs in the Sahel could use the selves in some of those areas (Diall, pandemic as an opportunity to recruit 2020). In addition, some argued, the se- and radicalise fighters, based on ideo- curity disengagement could lead to the logical arguments. COVID-19’s spread targeting of critical COVID-19-related in- could potentially be exploited in a nar- frastructure (Asare-Bediako, 2020). rative where it was portrayed, the ar- gument goes, as a divine punishment A similar argument was raised in rela- against the West and all those who op- tion to the presence of foreign troops press Muslims (Burkati, 2020). State- in the Sahel. It was suggested that ments made by Al-Qaeda and the there could be a lower level of engage- so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ment due to the pandemic. Several (ISIS) in the Middle East were inter- think tanks warned about the risk of preted by some as a clear intention to such international disengagement utilise the turmoil created by the pan- (Coleman, 2020; Burchill, 2020; Col- demic to convince more people to join umbo & Harris, 2020). It was argued their ranks (Coleman, 2020). There was that countries that were providing sup- concern that VEOs in the Sahel could port and expertise might decide to follow this propaganda strategy and focus on their domestic priorities, leav- use COVID-19 to justify their cause ing Sahelian countries even more vul- (Columbo & Harris, 2020). nerable to VEOs. In a similar fashion, analysts pointed out that while peace- Several months after the outbreak of keeping missions and international the pandemic and the issuing of these counter-terrorism efforts adjusted to warnings, the emerging picture is COVID-19 containment measures, it rather that the early rhetoric of VEO could leave more space to VEOs to leadership has not brought about sig- carry out violent attacks and gain con- nificant changes on the ground in trol over resources (ACAPS, 2020; Edu- terms of COVID-19-induced shifts in Afful, 2020). When delays in the operational realities or VEOs’ recruit- deployment of troops and the altering ment strategies. The next section will of rotation schedules were announced, first look at the spread of the virus it was argued that they might throughout the region by focusing on negatively impact the fight against Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. After VEOs (Burkati, 2020). While inter- briefly introducing the numbers and national operations including the containment measures, the section will United Nations Multidimensional Inte- focus on how far these developments grated Stabilization Mission in Mali are relevant against the backdrop of (MINUSMA), Operation Barkhane, the the known drivers of VEO recruitment, regional G5 Sahel Joint Force, two as well as against the evolution of viol- European Union (EU) training missions ent incidents in 2020. 20 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
COVID-19 in the Sahel lower-than-expected infection rates is, nevertheless, clearly visible. Despite early fears about its potential to wreak havoc on the African conti- There are various reasons for lower nent, the COVID-19 pandemic spread numbers in the Sahel and West Africa: at a relatively slow pace throughout first, the age pyramid of many West Af- West Africa and the Sahel, especially rican countries shows a distribution op- when compared to its spread in the posite to many western countries, Global North. The number of infec- where elderly populations were signifi- tions and COVID-19-related deaths cantly affected by the early spread of remained relatively low (Worldometer, the virus. Second, a strong and early n.d.-a). It is clear that there are large public health response by countries variations across West African coun- mitigated its impact. Third, an experi- tries due to differing levels of testing ence with recent disease outbreaks capacity and tracing policies. While such as Ebola and Polio provided a this makes it hard to directly compare context in which such responses were countries within the region and to the more readily available (Dusoulier, 2020; Global North, the overall tendency of IFRC, 2020).
Table1. COVID-19 figures per country
Total cases Total deaths Cases/one Testing million capacity/one inhabitants million inhabitants Mali 8,203 339 398 7,083 tests Niger 4,656 167 188 3,096 tests Burkina Faso 11,426 134 538 No data available Source: Worldometer (n.d.-a).
The first cases of COVID-19 virus ap- per one million inhabitants (Worldom- peared in Mali, Niger and Burkina eter, n.d.-a). The first wave of the pan- Faso in the middle of March 2020. demic hit its highest numbers in May The following section will look at the and June with a total of 51 deaths in evolution of the numbers of the out- May and 916 recorded new cases in break as well as the current situation. June (Johns Hopkins University, n.d.- b). As of late 2020, early 2021, after a Numbers and policies long period of low cases being de- tected, numbers started rising again In Mali a total of 8,203 cases of and were much higher than during the COVID-19 and 339 deaths have been first wave. The month of December recorded since the beginning of the 2020, for instance, broke records with pandemic.1 This amounts to 398 cases 2,380 recorded new cases. These
1 Sources accessed and numbers as of 11 February 2021.
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 21
numbers are believed to underesti- COVID-19 hit the country in April with mate the true spread of the virus in the a record 692 new confirmed cases that country. While having an open testing month, and May followed with a record policy which includes asymptomatic of 32 deaths (Johns Hopkins University, patients (Our World in Data, n.d.), Mali n.d.-c; Worldometer, n.d.-b). In the fol- has a low testing rate of 7,083 tests per lowing months, the number of cases one million inhabitants (Worldometer, steadily fell to less than 10 cases a day n.d.-a). Such rates stand in sharp until the start of the second wave in contrast to countries in the Global November. A similar upsurge as ob- North, where rates are usually several served in neighbouring Mali is ongoing hundreds of thousands of tests per one in recent months with higher detected million inhabitants.2 infection rates than in spring. De- During the early cember 2020 saw a record 1,175 new stages of the During the early stages of the virus out- cases and 46 new deaths (Johns Hop- virus outbreak break in the country, Malian authorities kins University, n.d.-c). Despite an in the country, took drastic measures to prevent the open public testing policy (Our World Malian spread of the virus, including border, in Data, n.d.), these numbers are ex- authorities took school and university closures, as well pected to largely underestimate the drastic as restrictions on public gatherings of actual spread of the virus. Niger has a measures to prevent the over 10 people (Reuters COVID-19 testing capacity of 3,096 tests per one spread of the Tracker, n.d.-b; University of Oxford, million inhabitants, which is signifi- virus n.d.). Measures were significantly cantly lower than Mali (Worldometer, scaled down as the number of infec- n.d.-a). In reaction to the first wave of tions decreased over the summer the pandemic and in order to slow the (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, n.d.-b). In spread of the virus, authorities im- reaction to a higher case rate, Malian posed a stay-at-home requirement authorities announced a nationwide (University of Oxford, 2020-2021c), a state of emergency on 18 December restriction on public gatherings (Uni- 2020 accompanied by new measures versity of Oxford, 2020-2021b), as well including the closure of all bars, res- as border and school closures (Univer- taurants and nightclubs, and gather- sity of Oxford, 2020-2021d). Measures ings were limited to a maximum of 50 were lifted progressively in the follow- people.3 Big markets were to close at ing months with schools re-opening 6 pm and schools were announced to from June onwards and borders re- close for a minimum of two weeks opening with screening measures on (Jeune Afrique, n.d.). arrival since the beginning of August (University of Oxford, 2020-2021d). In Niger a total of 4,656 cases of Consecutive months only saw minor COVID-19 and 167 deaths have been changes being implemented, until recorded since the beginning of the major new measures were announced outbreak in the country, which equals mid-December 2020. In light of the 188 cases per one million inhabitants second wave with COVID-19 cases ris- (Johns Hopkins University, n.d.-c; Worl- ing since the beginning of December dometer, n.d.-a). The first wave of (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, n.d.-c),
2 Some examples include Spain (615,316), France (610,094) and Germany (433,132). 3 Declared until 26 June 2021. 22 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
authorities announced a new school tion. Since the beginning of August, ar- closure (Chahed, 2020), a ban on rivals into the country are subject to gatherings of over 50 people and clo- quarantine measures or screening on sure of all bars, night clubs and enter- arrival, and stay-at-home recommen- tainment venues until further notice dations were lifted in September (Uni- (IciNiger, 2020). versity of Oxford, 2020-2021c). Gatherings of over 50 people have At the time of writing, Burkina Faso been banned. Contrary to other coun- had recorded a total number of tries, Burkina Faso did not take new 11,426 COVID-19 cases and 134 deaths measures when facing an increase of since the start of the outbreak in March COVID-19 cases in September, nor 2020. The average number of cases since the exponential surge since De- per one million inhabitants in Burkina cember, giving the reported evolution Faso is 538 (Worldometer, n.d.-a). The of cases a different trend than in Niger country faced a first wave in March and Mali (Reuters COVID-19 Tracker, and April followed by an increase in n.d.-a). cases in September and October similar in numbers. The second wave Main observations brings the number of cases of COVID- 19 at the time of writing to record From this brief overview of dynamics, highs in the country. December saw a three conclusions can be drawn. First, record 3,821 new cases reported, al- the COVID-19 pandemic put an addi- though the number of deaths re- tional strain on already fragile public mained below the reported April health systems in the three countries threshold of 29 deaths (Johns Hop- under study. The impact, however, was kins University, n.d.-a). While Burkina limited to mostly urban areas and re- Faso offers an open testing policy, it mained nearly absent further afield. In can reasonably be expected that the such areas the cases recorded, including number of recorded COVID-19 cases in the ongoing second wave of infec- largely underestimates the real spread tions, remain below the scenarios that of the virus in the country (Jeune Af- were drawn at the onset of the pan- rique, n.d.). demic.
During the first wave of COVID-19 Second, major changes to service provi- cases in Burkina Faso, the authorities sion by state actors have remained required people not to leave their relatively limited. There has been some There is some homes and provided a couple of ex- but generally little diversion of large evidence that ceptions (University of Oxford, 2020- parts of state assets in a response ongoing 2021c), put internal movement against the COVID-19 outbreak. international development restrictions in place, restricted gather- project ings (University of Oxford, 2020- Third, there is some evidence that on- resources have 2021b) and closed schools (University going international development pro- been diverted of Oxford, 2020-2021a). Schools re- ject resources have been diverted away in order to opened in June and the stay-at-home away in order to respond to the virus respond to the requirements became a recommenda- outbreak.4 Such examples remain virus outbreak
4 Crisis Group has signalled such a case in the Mopti region of Mali (International Crisis Group, 2021).
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 23
anecdotal, however, and their oper- This question is addressed in two parts. ational implications are likely to remain The first part explores levels of political limited. Moreover, the institutional violence on the basis of ACLED data logic of many organisations (losing analysis. It finds that, despite the budget if one does not deplete re- multiple warnings about the potential sources) meant that reserved budgets for increasing VEO activity, there is were still spent – though later in the hardly any quantitative evidence for year.5 changes in the patterns of political dis- order. Overall levels of violence have Exploring data on the been and are still driven by factors not related to the pandemic. relation between VEO activity and COVID-19 The second part of this section ex- plores indirect patterns – does COVID- Although the impact of COVID-19 has 19 interact with structural drivers of been more limited than initially as- violence? The overall observation is sumed, the pandemic still constituted that there is presently also very little a major health crisis. So what has been evidence for the effect of COVID-19 on the effect of this crisis on violence in these drivers, although it might still be the region? too early to tell.
Figure1. VEO violence in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (January 2016-January 2021)
Source: ACLED (2016-2021).
5 Interviewed researchers pointed to this logic being used by some EU member states in their financial processing of COVID-19 on external aid budgets. Interview with Sahel researcher (personal communication, January 2021). 24 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
What quantitative data on uptrend in terms of armed clashes, at- political violence in the tacks and improvised explosive devices Sahel tells us by armed actors in Mali, Niger and Bur- kina Faso.7 Re-running the analysis to COVID-19 has not had a structural effect only include VEOs as violent actors does on levels of political violence in the not generate different dynamics. Hence, Sahel. Figure 1 presents ACLED data increasing violence in 2020 fits a long- from 2016 to early 2021 for political vi- term uptrend without clear outliers. olence in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.6 It is clear that there is a general multi-an- Figures 2a to 5b present types and per- nual – and thus predating COVID-19 – petrators/victims of political violence Figure 2a/b. Actor activity and types of violence (October 2019-January 2021)
Source: ACLED (2016-2021).
6 Definitions: Battles (armed clashes, non-state and government overtake territory), remote violence (air/drone strikes, remote explosives, shelling), violence against civilians (attack, sexual violence, abductions). Data only presents VEO activity. 7 The list of actors selected in the ACLED database: Ansaroul Islam, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, ISIS, Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin (JNIM), Katiba Macina. Such a confirmation of an existing longer-term trend is also observed by Süß in her chapter on the Maghreb.
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 25
around the first wave (March/April 2020) are unrelated to COVID-19 and are and second wave (November 2020-Ja- driven by endogenous conflict dy- nuary 2021) in all three countries. There namics. The largest change in political are some potential visible effects of activity levels took place in Mali, at the COVID-19 on political violence levels. end of November, beginning of De- However, upon closer inspection, as ar- cember, with a large drop in battles co- gued below, none of these effects are inciding with new COVID-19-induced really driven by the virus outbreak. restrictions on movement being imple- mented. However, the drop in violence During the first wave there were three was driven by a series of local peace small and temporary changes in pat- agreements between Fulani and Dogon terns of violence. In Mali, the number groups. In Niger, violence against civil- of battles went up from the end of ians increased slightly during the second March for about three weeks – most of wave, as did activity by non-state armed this activity was executed by VEOs, Ja- groups, but this development fitted a maat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin pattern from early September of in- (JNIM) in particular. However, the in- creased Islamic State in the Greater Sa- crease in activity was temporary and hara (ISGS) activity in the Tillabery confined to Mopti. In Mopti, it was local region. No change whatsoever to levels dynamics between Dogon and Fulani, of political violence can be observed in two ethnic groups present in the central Burkina Faso. Sahel, that drove increased JNIM activ- ity. In Burkina Faso, there was a major in- Hence, the trends from 2016 to 2021, crease in protests in the first week of as well as weekly levels of violence, March but this was before COVID-19 ac- show no noteworthy impact on the tually became a problem and restrictive number of registered incidents during measures were implemented. Finally, in the first and second COVID-19 waves early April 2020, Niger saw a small drop in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. As in violence against civilians and activities figure 3 shows, activity by groups as- by non-state actors. However, this drop, sociated with JNIM (e.g., Katiba which endured for just a few weeks, was Macina, Katiba Serma, Ansar Dine, Al confined to the Tillabery region and was Mourabitoune) and ISGS activity do a direct result of the French-led Oper- not vary with COVID-19. Hence, simi- ation Barkhane offensive that kicked off lar to Süß’s findings in this study for before the pandemic. violence in the Maghreb, COVID-19 has had no impact on the intensity, Very similar dynamics can be observed distribution and composition of politi- for the second wave; apparent anomalies cal violence in the Sahel. 26 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
Figure 3. Activity by VEOs (January 2019-January 2021)
Source: ACLED (2016-2021).
Did COVID-19 impact for self-fulfilment or prestige or ad- structural drivers of vancing religious arguments. The set of drivers requires context-specific analy- violence in the Sahel? sis that often needs to take place at a very local level in order to capture the The absence of significant immediate extent to which different drivers are at and longer-term effects might be ex- play in a given situation. The following plained by the ways in which VEOs op- section will outline these main drivers erate in the Sahel. They use a range of in the Sahel and briefly discuss the in- recruitment techniques to attract new, terplay with the virus outbreak. often young, individuals into their or- ganisations. Those range from socio- The effects of COVID-19 on economic arguments to tapping into local power structures and intercommunal or inter-ethnic cleav- local economies ages, filling in for state absence and protecting against violence from the Changes in local power structures are state, as well as catering to the need often a key driver of VEO recruitment.
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 27
Reports show that Ibrahim Malam also partially aided by the prospects of Dicko, the founder of the VEO Ansa- material gains and redistributive pol- roul Islam in Burkina Faso, used local icies for their new members (Thurston, frustrations and a sense of inequality 2020, p. 157). Furthermore, some indi- felt by young individuals due to their viduals are mainly motivated by self-in- low social status to gather support (Le terest, sometimes alongside other Roux, 2019, p. 4). In Mali, Katiba reasons, to join VEOs (Baldaro & Diall, Macina’s success at the local level has 2020, p. 76). Accounts from the 1980s been partly helped by young herders’ report that radical groups attracted rejection of local elites and by subvert- young individuals across West Africa by ing local power structures. Similarly, offering them social services and by the presence of local youths who felt being able to provide them with new excluded because of their lower social social statuses with more authority and status facilitated their recruitment responsibility (Ismail, 2013, p. 215). (Thurston, 2020, p. 157). This suggests that the recruitment rhetoric put for- More recently, Katiba Macina in Mali ward by VEOs tapped into their feeling was joined by individuals for personal of rejection and inequality. It leads reasons. Some were motivated by the some analysts to suggest that part of reasons outlined above, but others the appeal of VEOs may originate from joined following prison breaks believ- promises to restructure social order, an ing it was their best post-escape op- order in which some of the youths do tion (Thurston, 2020, p. 158). Young not believe anymore (Thurston, 2020, individuals also join armed groups to Given the p. 167). Given the pandemic’s relatively gain community recognition and re- pandemic’s low impact in the region, its effects on spect. A young man from an anti-gov- relatively low power structures have so far not be- ernment group in Timbuktu said, “My impact in the come apparent, if there are any at all. source of motivation is the support I region, its Peripheral areas further away from receive from my community for the effects on urban centres where most COVID-19 safeguarding of property and power cases were detected – areas where people” (Mercy Corps & Think Peace, structures have so far not VEOs often operate – are unlikely to 2017, p. 14). Economic hardship re- become feel any impact at all. sulting from the pandemic’s impacts apparent, if on local economies, remittances and there are any at Recruitment strategies based on econ- state finances might in principle have all omic arguments might see an impact, a longer-term bearing on economic as they often provide incentives for drivers of VEO recruitment. In addi- joining VEOs. For example, ISGS com- tion, analysts have argued that shrink- batants are encouraged to keep and ing economies in the Global North use the loot from attacks as they could have a negative impact on mili- please, distinguishing themselves from tary and development budgets that other groups like Katiba Macina that are used to finance operations and tend to centralise the management of programmes in the Sahel (International gained resources. The horizontal Crisis Group, 2021). However, as Süß mechanism of resource redistribution is also argues in her chapter on the a helpful recruitment argument for Maghreb, such links are far from ISGS (Baldaro & Diall, 2020, p. 77). Ad- causal, and interviewed Sahel experts ditionally, the second large wave of agree that to date such an impact has JNIM recruitment coalition in Mali was not manifested itself. 28 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
The effect of COVID-19 institutions such as schools in a bid to re- duce their service provision and rein- on exploiting community force the narrative of state grievances abandonment that the group promotes
(Le Roux, 2019, p. 4). Generally, a sense Intercommunal and inter-ethnic cleav- of grievance and limited confidence in Intercommunal ages and local grievances are exploited the government has been shown to be and inter-ethnic by VEOs to recruit fighters. Existing re- regionally correlated with a high level of cleavages and search based on interviews with custom- VEO recruitment (UNDP RBA, 2017, p. local grievances ary leaders in the region of Mopti, Mali, 68). A United Nations Development Pro- are exploited by confirmed this technique used by ISGS gramme report surveyed individuals VEOs to recruit (Baldaro & Diall, 2020, p. 76). Similarly, about their personal “tipping points” for fighters JNIM has used community-based tech- joining a VEO. 71% of respondents re- niques to exploit local tensions and turn ported “government action”, including local armed groups into allied groups “killing or arrest of a family member or (Nsaibia & Weiss, 2020, p. 10). Katiba friend” as the specific event that led Macina, for example, used the feeling of them to join a VEO (UNDP RBA, 2017, injustice experienced by many Fulani, p. 73). Similarly, Katiba Macina was especially herders, in the Mopti regions joined by many recruits looking for re- to expand its following (Thurston, 2020, venge and protection from Malian sol- p. 157; FIDH & AMDH, 2018, p. 28). Ad- diers or ethnic militias targeting them ditionally, Peul villagers and herders and their communities. Previous re- seeking “equitable justice” joined the search in Mali and other African contexts VEO (Thurston, 2020, p. 157). In Burkina show that individuals seeking protection Faso, VEOs have used comparable tech- and revenge from the consequences of niques by taking advantage of social the state absence or violence might ac- cleavages in northern and eastern re- count for the largest numbers of VEO re- gions. Responsibility for many deadly at- cruits (Thurston, 2020, pp. 157-58). tacks carried out by VEOs on religious sites or ethnic groups in the regions are VEOs use religious arguments to recruit not officially claimed. It is part of a strat- new members; references to Islam and egy to create confusion, fuel divisions its presumed precepts are used between communities and provoke re- throughout declarations made by VEO prisal from ethnic militias. The insecurity leaders (Baldaro & Diall, 2020, p. 71). they create allows them to recruit and However, religion is rarely the driving operate without too much opposition force leading to individuals joining (Lazarides, 2019, p. 3). VEOs, but rather an additional motiva- tion in addition to others (Mercy Corps VEOs are known to profit from state vi- & Think Peace, 2017, p. 16). Among olence and neglect. According to a others, religion is used as a powerful former member of the Ansaroul Islam tool for local recruitment and to group in Burkina Faso, the denigrating strengthen internal cohesion (Baldaro & actions of the security forces spurred the Diall, 2020, p. 71). In 2015, the second first armed attack of the group in 2016, wave of recruitment of Katiba Macina in which is widely considered as the birth Mali partly relied on religious arguments of Ansaroul Islam (Le Roux, 2019, p. 4). to attract new members (Thurston, Since then, the group targets state rep- 2020, p. 157). Religion has also been resentatives, security forces and public used in the past to gather the support
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 29
of communities by appealing to com- measures [against COVID-19]. Border mon values. For instance, in 2012 the closures are hard to enforce, state re- Movement for Unity and Jihad in West sources are limited and the way in which Africa (MUJWA) recruited in ultra-con- the pandemic was originally tackled did servative Salafi villages, particularly one not seem realistic. It was a problem be- named Kadji, close to Gao (Malo, 2013). cause they tried to control it” (personal A member of MUJWA from Gao ex- communication, December 2020). Indi- plicitly reported that the group “won cations that VEOs are increasingly pro- the confidence of the community filing themselves as service providers are through its message and the practice of scarce, since apart from sporadic Islam” (Mercy Corps & Think Peace, examples VEO actors are not systemati- 2017, p. 16). The rhetoric around the cally involved in the provision of health- pandemic being a punishment for non- care in the Sahel.8 While the effects on believers could theoretically be ad- service provision remain hard to identify, vanced as a sign of ideological it is clear that on an operational level not interpretation of the pandemic. It is very much has changed for VEO activity in unlikely, however, that its effects go the Sahel. The same trends continued to beyond rhetoric. Several experts inter- unfold despite the outbreak of the virus, viewed claimed that ideology plays only showing that overall the impact re- a secondary role and that the pandemic mained minimal if not non-existent. In- did not have significant impact on this terviewed experts note that areas most front (personal communication, De- affected by VEO activity are also those cember 2020, January 2021). areas least affected by the virus, which mainly spread in capitals and other While it has been argued that the larger cities and much less in rural or COVID-19 pandemic would have border areas (personal communication, allowed VEOs to exploit local griev- November 2020). ances, state violence and religious rhet- oric, none of these effects seem to be Conclusions present. Several researchers interviewed for this study concur that the actual im- and recommendations pact of the pandemic on extremist groups on the ground has been minimal, Is there a link between the COVID-19 if not non-existent beyond the few pandemic and violent extremism in the examples of rhetoric (personal com- Sahel? And if so, what are the implica- munication, November and December tions for policy-making on the multiple 2020, January 2021). One researcher crises that engulf the Sahel? confirmed that the pandemic as such has not become the problem that it was Right after the outbreak of the pan- projected to be by some but that it did demic, pundits speculated how a rapid lay bare many of the governance chal- spread of COVID-19 would aggravate lenges that Sahelian states are grappling political violence in the Sahel. Analysts with. “There are constraints for the claimed that the pandemic would create [Sahelian] governments to apply the opportunities for VEOs to exploit gov-
8 One researcher interviewed pointed out that VEOs have supported healthcare facilities logistically in the Menaka region in Mali. A report from the Tony Blair Foundation found the same for the Gao region (Munasinghe et al., 2020). 30 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
ernance vacuums – as states would be 2020/January 2021), there was no effect forced to retreat due to lockdowns and on overall levels of political violence nor the need to provide health services – on the activities of violent extremist ac- and multinational forces would concen- tors. Violence throughout the Sahel con- trate on troubles at home. It was widely tinued at a level that was already believed that VEOs would then expand extremely concerning prior to the out- their service provision and reach in vari- break of the virus. COVID-19 did not ous new localities. lead to its increase in the short term. Compared to other West African states, Moreover, other analysts argued that Sahelian societies experienced less re- many of the structural problems – al- pression by governance actors to riots ready main drivers for violence – would and protests and shrinking of the politi- be adversely impacted by the pan- cal space – which admittedly, partly demic. Key drivers of violence prior to stems from an already limited space be- Overall, political violence in the the COVID-19 outbreak, like economic cause of ongoing conflict. Overall, politi- Sahel is driven grievances, discontent with local gov- cal violence in the Sahel is driven by by dynamics ernance provision, harsh military re- dynamics that surpass major crises such that surpass sponses would likely be reinforced. as the outbreak of COVID-19. major crises Particularly as states would increasingly such as the use violence against civilians, muzzle op- Third, there has been no interaction be- outbreak of position voices and benefit from elite tween COVID-19 and many of the spe- COVID-19 capture in response to the COVID-19 cific drivers of violence in the Sahel. pandemic, VEOs would reap the fertile Interviews carried out for this research grounds for recruitment of extremist and ongoing research in the region on groups throughout the Sahel. As elab- VEOs unequivocally show that COVID- orated above, the evidence from field 19 has not affected local power imbal- research, and analysis of available data ances (e.g., generational), local inequality on political violence highlight that not and skewed resource management, one prediction has come to fruition and inter-ethnic tensions, state violence and a number of assumptions have proved neglect and religious appeals. In part, to be incorrect. this is because the COVID-19 pandemic is not a reality in many places, and in part First, COVID-19 outbreak levels re- because the root causes and drivers of mained at much lower levels than in violent extremism tend to be more im- the Global North. Although lower portant than a temporary health crisis, al- levels were partly a result of less test- beit very serious. ing, it is also the case that young Sahelian societies have proven to be Recommendations more resilient against the rapid out- break, acted quicker than various What policy recommendations can fol- European states to counter its impact low from a presumed effect of COVID- and had previous experience with re- 19 that did not materialise? sponding to outbreaks of contagious diseases that they fell back on. 1. Firstly, the disconnect between local Sahelian realities and the real ef- Second, even when COVID-19 did reach fects of the COVID-19 pandemic on high levels in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Global North risks pushing pol- Niger (March/April 2020 and December icy-makers into a policy-direction
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 31
that could be counterproductive. nouncement that the EU is invest- Whereas the focal points of devel- ing an additional €92 million to opment cooperation in the region strengthen the response against have had to come to grips with an COVID-19 in Burkina Faso, Maur- online reality, driven by a need to itania, Niger and Chad is a wel- protect employees, the foreign come development in that sponsored military operations have regard; continued relatively unhindered. b. The proposed “Team Europe” ap- Analysed data highlights no note- proach signals a willingness to act worthy change in the activity of for- coherently across different eign troops. However, the branches of the EU external pol- unintended effect is that a securi- icy machinery. Such an approach tised response to the Sahelian crises can be useful in a complex en- is strengthened,9 even though the vironment like the central Sahel, majority of analysts stress the need which is already a crossroads of to address root causes of the crises numerous external security and and compliment military activity with development interventions. How- sustained investments in inclusive ever, attention should be paid to development programming. What keeping the necessary emphasis risks aggravating this situation, is that on those parts of the approach the COVID-19 pandemic has already that lie at the heart of the issues led to serious reductions of country- pertaining to violent extremism in gross domestic product (GDP) in the the Sahel, including governance Global North and will lead to shrink- and local grievances that may be ing development budgets in 2021 fuelled by a securitised approach and likely beyond (as these budgets to the problem. The highlighted are usually set as % of GDP). This risks of overly skewing interven- further undercuts the necessary bal- tions towards security initiatives ance between military engagements are a particular reason for con- and actually addressing the root cern; causes of political violence in the c. Lastly, as the Sahel has become a Sahel. In that sense, the real and priority region for many EU long-term effects of COVID-19 on member states, importance political violence in the Sahel are yet should be given to long-term in- to play out and be fully understood. vestments that do not taper off as a. Donors should be wary of redirec- expected pressure on external ting existing funding towards budgets sets in over the coming COVID-19 responses, and should years. Opportunities exist to con- be aware that shrinking aid solidate the approach through budgets in the medium term can the funding earmarked for the have negative effects further region in the new Multiannual Fi- down the line, especially when it nancial Framework. concerns programming geared towards service provision in frag- 2. Secondly, an implication of the ile areas. The November an- above analysis is a need to isolate
9 Such a shift has also been pointed out by other analysts (International Crisis Group, 2021). 32 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
policy-making from the hypes and formation can serve as guidance controversies that accompany pol- for crisis modifiers and other icy interventions. The COVID-19 flexible financing tools are cru- pandemic is truly unprecedented cial if interventions that start off and it is understandable that pre- with limited information to feed dictions about its impact on VEOs into needs assessments are to were a form of “battling in the be successful. Being able to dark”. However, early doomsday redirect and challenge assump- scenarios reveal a disconnect be- tions continuously is a challeng- tween the international policy and ing but important component of think tank domain and the actual policy-making in the complex realities in Sahelian towns and vil- socioeconomic and security lages. As was the case during the landscape that is the Sahel. Ebola epidemic, where one of the main lessons was that local com- 3. Thirdly, and more generally, the munities were often better re- multiple crises in the Sahel prove sponders to the crises than the to be so deep and persistent that well-meaning outside support pro- even a major health crisis has had viders (De Bruijne & Bisson, 2020), hardly any effect on patterns of vi- the set of assumptions that in- olence. As this chapter illustrates, formed the initial COVID-19 policy political violence in the Sahel is The multiple discourse on the Sahel was based driven by deeply-rooted local crises in the on the experiences of the Global problems often linked to govern- Sahel prove to North rather than the Global ance issues that have been in the be so deep and South. From this, policy-makers making for decades. The absence persistent that can learn two lessons: of a clear link between the COVID- even a major health crisis has a. Discussions on the effects of 19 pandemic and patterns of ex- had hardly any crises but also policy-making tremist violence in the Sahel effect on more generally require more evi- means that these problems have patterns of dence-based information that is become autonomous deter- violence grounded in solid field research. minants of political violence upon Such research should offer much which even crises no longer have more attention to the percep- an effect. This is also clearly visible tions and views of people in the from the fact that various devel- Sahel. At a time of crisis, it is opment and security coordination easy to fall back on speculation mechanisms in the Sahel have had yet even more important to con- to cease operations and saw tinue to invest in solid data col- donor projects suspended. The lection; fact that severely limited oper- b. There is a continued and sus- ations have had no discernible ef- tained need for a sound evi- fect on violence at best is dence-based research to allow testimony to the tremendous ef- the explicit testing of assump- fort to continue programming tions, even when policies are al- under difficult conditions. At ready rolled out. It took months worst, however, it might mean that before the initial bleak scenarios present engagement was insuffi- were debunked which is too cient to address and solve the root long in a major crisis. Such in- causes of violence in the Sahel.
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 33
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Policy Study n. 21
Recruitment Strategies of Terrorist Groups in the Mashreq Region Amidst COVID-19
Dr. Eman Ragab Senior Researcher and Head of Security Research Unit, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 41
Introduction ability to survive the crisis by attracting new members to strengthen the organ- The unprecedented COVID-19 crisis isation and replenish shortfalls caused has pushed stories about terrorism into by the loss of many territories in Syria the shadow and motivated some pun- and Iraq. According to RAND Corpor- dits to claim that security institutions ation’s model of assessing the dynamic are preoccupied with pandemic pre- threat of terrorism, terrorist organisa- vention and relief, and dedicating tions need recruitment pools to main- fewer resources to countering terror- tain their capacity to carry out attacks ism (Byman & Amunson, 2020). Others (Cragin & Daly, 2004). Individuals are concluded that “the curve of inter- the backbone of any terrorist group to national terrorist attacks has indeed survive and operate over time. been flattened” (Barton, 2020). The purpose of this chapter is to ident- These claims do not explain how ter- ify the extremist discourse and com- rorists during 2020, the year of the munication tools employed by ISIS to pandemic, managed to carry out nu- reach out to new/old recruitment pools merous attacks in Europe, the Mash- not only in Syria and Iraq but also in req region and North Africa. For European societies. It also aims to example, on 3 November 2020 Aus- highlight the “new” types of terrorism tria witnessed a terrorist attack car- that ISIS is urging its followers to prac- ried out in the name of the so-called tise amidst COVID-19. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (BBC, 2020). Seven terrorist attacks To achieve that purpose, the analysis in took place in France and were carried the first part of this chapter is sup- out according to the French auth- ported by phone interviews carried out orities by “personal Jihadists” who by the author in November 2020 with had been radicalised online and were Iraqis living in areas liberated from ISIS armed with knives (Onishi et al., control and with Iraqi counter-terrorism 2020). In the Mashreq region, ISIS car- officials. Due to the pandemic and se- ried out 131 and 228 attacks in Syria curity situation in Syria, none of the and Iraq, respectively, during July- author’s attempts to interview Syrians September 2020 (Department of De- living in the country were successful. fence Office of Inspector General, However, the author took advantage of 2020b, p. 19, 23). In other words, the interviews carried out by the Ro- these terrorist attacks reveal that ter- java Information Centre in Syria with rorism remains a danger to national, residents of the al-Hol camp. The time- regional and global security despite frame employed in this chapter is the measures imposed by many gov- 2020, the year of the pandemic. ernments to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the second part of this chapter calls on the European Union Against this background, this chapter (EU) to review its policies and pro- examines how ISIS has been recruiting grammes towards countering ISIS and new members in Syria and Iraq during other terrorist groups, and suggests the COVID-19 crisis. The main argument policy recommendations that could is that the pandemic has demonstrated help weaken the recruitment capabil- the resilience of the organisation and its ities of ISIS in the future. 42 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
How has ISIS recruited The same assessment of ISIS capabilities is widely shared by many Iraqis living in during COVID-19? Salah al-Din and Diyala. A Sunni resident of Tikrit believes that “ISIS has lost 90% The extent to which ISIS is taking ad- of its capabilities since the end of its ter- vantage of the COVID-19 pandemic is ritorial ‘Caliphate’” (personal communi- a debated issue in many policy-mak- cation, November 7, 2020), while an Iraqi ing circles. In its May 2020 report, the counter-terrorism officer who took part International Crisis Group cited the in operations against ISIS believes that statement of a military official in the “ISIS is struggling for survival” (personal “Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS” communication, November 12, 2020). underestimating ISIS’ capabilities. The International Crisis Group asked However, that assessment of the organ- whether ISIS was recruiting. The isation’s capabilities does not help ex- answer of the military official was the plain how it is still capable of carrying following: “No. Are they putting out out a growing number of attacks in Syria a cool video that’s being put on the and Iraq. As illustrated in figure 1, the front page of the Daily Mirror? No. last quarter of 2020 witnessed an in- Are they able to raise money from crease in ISIS terrorist attacks in Syria taxes, oil wells, foreign donations? A and Iraq in comparison to the third little bit, but mostly no. So their quarter of the year (Department of De- strength has to be measured in those fence Office of Inspector General, terms” (Heller, 2020, p. 1). 2020c, pp. 14-16).
Figure 1. Total number of ISIS attacks in Syria and Iraq during the second half of 2020 (by quarter)
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the Department of Defence Office of Inspector General (2020b & 2020c).
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 43
In this context, this chapter argues that analyses the recruitment strategies examining how ISIS is taking advan- adopted by ISIS in Syria and Iraq dur- tage of the COVID-19 pandemic needs ing the pandemic. to be done with caution for two main reasons. Firstly, the crisis caused by Approaches COVID-19 is still developing in an un- predictable way, especially in Syria and to recruitment Iraq, which have been torn apart by armed conflicts for decades. Thus, any This chapter examines two aspects of conclusions related to the opportun- ISIS’ approach to recruitment during ities created by COVID-19 for ISIS in the pandemic (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006). these two countries are limited to the This includes the extremist discourse present chapter’s timeframe. The sec- employed by the organisation and how ond reason involves the fact that ISIS’ it builds on socioeconomic grievances capabilities in the Mashreq region are caused by the pandemic. not only defined by the eruption of the pandemic in February 2020, but also Since the eruption of COVID-19, ISIS by other developments the region wit- has developed a complex approach to nessed since the last quarter of 2019. communicate with its remnant This includes the killing of the ISIS members and to attract new followers founder and leader Abu Bakr al-Bagh- and believers in its cause. The first dadi and the ISIS spokesman Abu component of this approach is the ex- Hassan al-Muhajir in October 2019, tremist religious discourse it employs. the ongoing war in Syria, and the ISIS frames the pandemic as a “punish- deepening political and economic cri- ment” by God to the infidels and non- sis in Iraq. Accordingly, overestimat- believers (Al-Nabaa Magazine, 2020b). ing the importance of COVID-19 for These include the Americans, the Chi- the future of ISIS and ignoring other nese, the Shiites in Iraq and Iran, the developments leads to unbalanced as- West in general, and the Sunnis who sessments. do not follow its guidance and orders. ISIS’ messages underscore that this In light of the present cautious assess- “wrath of God” cannot be prevented ment, arguing that ISIS has been taking (Al-Nabaa Magazine, 2020e) while urg- advantage of COVID-19 to continue ing ISIS followers and members to recruiting new members does not “obey Allah’s command to avoid harm necessarily lead to the conclusion that to the soul and harm to others”, and to ISIS will be able to retain its territorial be careful not to become infected by control and recruit foreign fighters the virus or to transfer it to others. from around the world as it did during These messages also urge those who 2014 and 2015 (see figure 2). Instead, contracted the virus to seek medical it helps understand the resilience of help and call upon doctors to con- the organisation and how it is coping tribute to the protection of Muslims with the pandemic without losing the who may be infected with the COVID- cohort of its 20,000 to 25,000 rem- 19 virus (Al-Nabaa Magazine, 2020b, nants in Syria and Iraq (Hincks, 2020), p. 10). and by recruiting new groups of be- lievers in its cause who can turn into The second component of ISIS’s ap- fully functioning members at any time. proach explains the guiding principles Consequently, the following section of the organisation’s operations in Iraq 44 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
and Syria amidst the pandemic. ISIS ex- trol. This component also undermines plains that it is in a “war of attrition” the anti-ISIS campaigns that frame it as with its enemies in Iraq and Syria. Thus, a weak fragmented organisation, es- retaining territorial control through a pecially after the killing of Abu Bakr al- wide range of military attacks, known Baghdadi. as al-Tamkeen, is not feasible. Instead, its remnant members in Iraq and Syria The third component defines how should pursue two main goals: follow newly-interested individuals can join the “hit and run” pattern of attacks ISIS. Since 10 June 2014, ISIS had en- against the enemies (Al-Nabaa Maga- couraged new believers in its cause to zine, 2020f), and assist ISIS in releasing travel to Syria and Iraq to practise its ver- its members locked in the camps and sion of “Jihad”. This culminated in more prisons (Al-Nabaa Magazine, 2020c). than 25,000 foreign terrorist fighters This component is very important for originating from 81 countries. The lar- the image portrayed by ISIS among its gest number of them, as illustrated in members and followers as it demon- figure 2, originated from former Soviet strates the organisation’s capability of Republics, the Middle East and the surviving despite the loss of territories Maghreb, as well as Western Europe which were previously under its con- (Ragab, 2018, pp. 87-88).
Figure 2. ISIS foreign fighters by region of origin (2017)
Source: Ragab (2018).
Amidst COVID-19, ISIS has clearly As outlined in many issues of Al-Nabaa stated in Akhbar al-Muslimin, an ISIS- Magazine, ISIS is calling for the “sec- affiliated news website, that for anyone ond-line Jihad”, and the “media wanting to join its rank, travelling to Jihad” (El-Rassafy, 2012, pp. 21-24). Syria and Iraq, or carrying out attacks The role of these new members is ex- in their country is not required. Instead, plained through 24 points in a widely they can be recruited as a “second-line read Arabic book available in Akhbar soldier” (El-Rassafy, 2012, pp. 21-24). al-Muslimin, entitled Jihad for those
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 45
who did not attend the Jihad ( the pandemic following the rule “to ). This role includes shar- avoid harm to the soul and harm to ing information with ISIS on its en- others” (Al-Nabaa Magazine, 2020e). emies, collecting donations using On the other side, the nature of these bitcoins in support of ISIS members areas enables ISIS to move freely with- who practise the “first-line Jihad” on out being detected by anti-ISIS forces, the battlefield, and showing sympathy “evade informants, offer a stage for at- with ISIS on social media platforms. tacks on local forces, and block the enemy forces from entering these The “media The “media Jihad” supports ISIS by areas” (Department of Defence Office Jihad” supports using media tools and technologies. of Inspector General, 2020a, p. 24). ISIS by using ISIS explains that this type of Jihad media tools and should be practised with vigilance so It is worth mentioning that there is a technologies as not to be caught by its enemies. It lack of data on the level of infection urges “media Jihadists” to follow the among ISIS members in Syria and Iraq, needed security procedures published and on the number of cases where ISIS by the pro-ISIS cyber security group members provided healthcare or medi- Afaaq (Horizons Electronic Foundation) cation for residents in the rural areas to (El-Rassafy, 2012, pp. 21-24). recover from COVID-19. Instead, many reports outline that ISIS behaviour in The complex communication approach rural areas is aggressive and offensive. employed by ISIS justifies why it has It depopulates these areas of its resi- left the urban cities in Iraq to American dents by force and intimidation (Zelin troops, the Popular Mobilisation & Knights, 2020), and exerts pressure Forces, the Peshmerga and the Iraqi on leading communities and tribes to Security Forces (ISF). ISIS strongholds provide safe haven and to weaken its and operating zones in Iraq during the competitors (Abdulla, 2020). pandemic are becoming primarily rural and mountainous areas in Anbar, Regarding the grievances caused by the Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Diyala pandemic, including the increasing level and Baghdad provinces. ISIS members of unemployment and poverty (Al- move in small groups of five to 15 ter- Nabaa Magazine, 2020a), ISIS considers rorists using motorbikes (Department it to be a consequence of “God’s wrath” of Defence Office of Inspector Gen- that would further weaken its enemies eral, 2020b, p. 18). (Al-Nabaa Magazine, 2020d). Moreover, the organisation did not oppose the The remnants of ISIS in Syria are also measures adopted by the Iraqi and Sy- moving to rural areas in Dayr al-Zawr rian regimes as well as many countries in and Homs provinces, leaving the urban the Arab world to prevent the trans- cities to the Russian Armed Forces, the mission of the pandemic. For instance, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the ISIS did not call for disobedience follow- United States Armed Forces, and the ing the decision to close mosques and Assad regime. to ban congregational prayers imposed by many governments during the first Keeping distance and staying away half of 2020. Instead, it justified it as a from densely populated cities is on one necessity to “avoid causing harm to side the preventive measures ISIS oneself and to others” (Al-Nabaa Maga- adopted to protect its members from zine, 2020e). 46 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
Two reasons explain why the griev- Besides, ISIS in Syria is taking advantage ances created by COVID-19 are not of the ineffective counter-ISIS campaign used by ISIS to attract new followers. of the pro-Assad regime forces in Homs First, simply because if it does so it has and Dayr al-Zawr (Department of De- to offer a way of easing or solving fence Office of Inspector General, these grievances and this could be 2020b, p. 23). In Iraq, it is taking advan- beyond the organisation’s current ca- tage of the weakness of government pabilities. Also, it could require system- forces and the widening security gaps atic interactions with the residents of between the ISF and other local forces the rural areas that would expose its driven by the pandemic, especially in members to the virus. Kirkuk. The COVID-19 restrictions, ac- cording to an Iraqi counter-terrorism of- Second, ISIS has already taken advan- ficer, “led to postponing many ISIS has already tage of grievances caused by the struc- coordination meetings between ISF and taken advantage tural weakness of the state in Syria and local forces and the cancellation of raid of grievances Iraq since 2014. These grievances con- operations against ISIS” (personal com- caused by the tinue to provide the organisation with munication, November 12, 2020). structural the incubation environment that helps weakness of the its survival. According to an Iraqi citizen It is worth noting that the lack of coor- state in Syria and Iraq since who was living in Mosul during ISIS dination between these forces had been 2014 control, “the government security reported since 2018 by the Lead Inspec- forces in Mosul were corrupted, they tor General but “no formal mechanism mistreated the residents in the prov- has been implemented to eliminate the ince, stereotyped them as supporters security gap” (Department of Defence of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist en- Office of Inspector General, 2020b, p. tities, and forcibly collected money 21). An Iraqi counter-terrorism officer ex- from shops and city squares alSahat in plained further that the “new Iraqi gov- return for security.” He added, “for ernment is overwhelmed with political these reasons, the people of Mosul and economic issues” and is de-priori- sympathised with ISIS and portrayed it tising countering ISIS terrorism (personal as the saviour from government communication, November 12, 2020). forces” (personal communication, No- vember 7, 2020). New generation of ISIS
ISIS has continued using these same terrorists grievances in its discourse amidst COVID-19 to maintain the loyalty of its Based on the analysis of open-source members and sympathisers including data, three groups of potential new those in displacement camps and deten- ISIS members can be identified. tion facilities, and to attract new fol- lowers and members from many Sunni The first group are the civilians and communities. For instance, ISIS con- the families of ISIS terrorists in the siders the new Iraqi government, led by camps and prisons of Iraq and Syria. In Mustafa al-Kadhemy, as a continuation Iraq, 92 camps have been hosting in- of the sectarian policies that were initi- ternally displaced people since 2014, ated by the government of Nouri al- as well as families and relatives of ISIS Maliky that ruled Iraq during 2006-2014 members since 2017 (personal com- (Al-Ali, 2014). munication, November 12, 2020). The
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 47
camps are located in the Mosel, Tikrit, duct, dressing, and alHisba that used Anbar and Kurdistan provinces. The to be imposed in ISIS territories during Iraqi government also holds around 2014-2015 (Vianna de Azevedo, 2020). 19,000 ISIS members in its prisons ISIS also managed to convince female (DW, May 27, 2019). relatives of ISIS members to teach children about the ISIS cause and make In Syria, there are two main camps lo- them aware of their duty to fight ISIS cated on the Iraqi-Syrian border: al-Hol enemies once they are released from and Roj. Up until April 2020, the total the camps (Department of Defence Of- number of residents in the former was fice of Inspector General, 2020b, p. 66,000 women and children, and in the 16). For instance, Asma’a, a 12-year-old latter 4,000 women and children. In the Syrian girl living in the al-Hol camp, al-Hol camp, there were around 13,500 was taught the ISIS curriculum. She be- foreign terrorists while the rest were Sy- lieves that “her enemies are the SDF rians and Iraqis (International Crisis and anyone who does not convert to Group, 2020). Islam.” According to the interview documented by Rojava Information It is worth mentioning that until the end Centre (2019, p. 14), she “confirmed of 2019, a third camp in Ayn Issa, lo- her continued loyalty to the organisa- cated on the Syrian-Turkish border, was tion.” hosting 13,000 ISIS terrorists along with their families (Al Arabiya, October 14, This is an alarming development as it 2019). During the chaos created by the coincides with the tendency of auth- Turkish invasion of north-eastern Syria in orities managing these camps to re- December 2019, 750 ISIS members fled lease many of their Syrian and Iraqi the camp, after which it was evacuated residents for financial reasons. For (McKernan, 2019). example, the available daily budget to operate the al-Hol camp is around ISIS is relying on its members detained $730,000, which is not enough to erect in these camps to recruit women and new tents to meet the housing needs children residing in the same facilities. of the residents, or to meet their basic Fieldwork carried out by the Rojava In- daily heath needs, or to improve the in- formation Centre in Syria reveals that frastructure. Also, the authorities are the governors of those camps do not increasingly concerned with the proba- separate ISIS members from civilians bility of COVID-19 spreading in the and the families of ISIS members. This camps (Hurley, 2020). Accordingly, the leaves the latter vulnerable to ISIS re- authorities managing the camps in cruiters (Rojava Information Centre, Syria and Iraq are reaching out to tribes 2020). An Iraqi Sunni explained that and Mukhtars to conditionally release “ISIS members have been keen on the residents from the camps (Al Ara- brainwashing the minds of the children biya, 2020). that have grown up in the displacement camps” (personal communication, No- ISIS’ success in maintaining the loyalty vember 7, 2020). of its members living in the camps and recruiting new members from the in- Many media reports underline that ISIS carcerated women and children offers members in the al-Hol camp in particu- ISIS another tool to infiltrate the towns lar are imposing the same rules of con- and villages that they will return to 48 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
after leaving the camps. This risks the light of new realities for the ISIS in the creation of a new generation of fol- post-war period. The first reality is that lowers accepting ISIS extremist ideol- this segment of the population has to ogy and ready to act in support of the manage their lives out of the destruc- organisation. tion caused by the war against ISIS with limited or no support from the govern- The second group are the youths who ment. The second reality is that, follow- are still living in Iraq and Syria. Accord- ing the ISIS military defeat, the ing to the United Nations (UN), the government is incapable of solving the total number of Syrian youths living in- problems of unemployment and internal side the country until 2020 was 3.8 mil- displacement that are changing youths’ lion, representing 21% of the country’s lives. Most youths in both countries re- population (NRC, 2020). Youths in Iraq main displaced and unable to return to represent half of the total population. their hometowns, unable to “continue their education or to find a decent job Even though the mainstream opinion or to feel safe and secure” (NRC, 2020, among Sunnis in Iraq is “overwhel- pp. 13-14). Also, most of the areas liber- mingly negative” towards ISIS (Depart- ated from ISIS remain in ruins and have ment of Defence Office of Inspector high levels of unemployment and inse- General, 2020b, p. 16), the terrorist or- curity, and lack basic services. ganisation is nevertheless successfully recruiting from this group. One of the The Lead Inspector General’s report Iraqi Sunnis living in Salah al-Din men- documented that “in Syrian areas tioned that “in my village, ISIS man- under control of the Syrian regime and aged to recruit two to three new its Russian backers, the regime was fail- members shortly after its military de- ing to fix the lack of ‘basic human feat” (personal communication, No- requirements’ that allowed ISIS to rise vember 3, 2020). in the first place” (Department of De- fence Office of Inspector General, The vulnerability of Sunnis to ISIS dis- 2020a, p. 20). According to Marwan al- course deserves thorough research for Jibrara, the spokesman of the Council two main reasons. Firstly, the afore- of Sheikhs of Salah al-Din, “since 2016 mentioned grievances that ISIS took the Iraqi Parliament designated Mosul advantage of during 2014-15 remain as a destroyed city, but has not allo- unresolved and in many provinces cated any money yet for rebuilding the deepened. These include the discrimi- city.” He also mentioned that ISIS nation against Sunnis by the Iraqi gov- bombed 23 houses owned by his tribe ernment and the economic hardships but the government did not offer fair The relationship caused by the continuation of the compensation (personal communica- between Sunni armed conflicts in Syria that are wor- tion, November 7, 2020). youths and the sening the living conditions of Sunni governments in Syria and Iraq is youths in particular and blocking them Regarding unemployment, according being redefined from any opportunities to have a better to the World Bank data of September in light of new life. 2020, the unemployment rate among realities for the youths aged 15-24 was 25.17% in Iraq ISIS in the post- Secondly, the relationship between and 21.1% in Syria (World Bank, 2020). war period Sunni youths and the governments in These levels are higher than the unem- Syria and Iraq is being redefined in ployment rates two years before ISIS
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 49
controlled territories in both countries. in 2012 was 16.2% in Iraq and 20.5% in According to the World Bank, the rate Syria (World Bank, 2020).
Figure 3. Youth unemployment (% of total labor force ages 15-24) in Syria and Iraq (2009-2020)
Source: World Bank (2020).
In this context, Sunni youths perceive itself has a working relationship with its the government as too weak to defeat enemies. According to an Iraqi Sunni liv- ISIS without external help, and too weak ing in Salah al-Din, “ISIS had economic to deliver the basic services and to in- relations with the Popular Mobilisation corporate them as equal citizens to Forces and Iranian-backed Shiite Forces those in power. Consequently, this between 2014-15” even though it des- chapter argues that the attitudes and ignates them as enemies. According to views of Sunni youths towards ISIS might him, “ISIS managed to smuggle oil into shift, without necessarily turning them Iran with the help of these forces. It has into fully-fledged members. The weak- maintained this relationship until the ness of the government in controlling present time. For example, ISIS terrorists some of these provinces and of local se- move across areas using motorbikes curity forces defending these areas usually rented from Iranians or Shiites against ISIS could push youths to seek backed by Iran” (personal communica- the protection of ISIS in return for pro- tion, November 3, 2020). viding a haven for its members, or taking part in illicit commercial and economic The importance of financial drivers for activities of ISIS across the borders. Sunni youths to join ISIS was highlighted by Marwan al-Jibrara. He asserted that The main motivation for those young “ISIS is using money to recruit new people, in this case, could be the econ- members, especially youths suffering omic and financial benefits they can re- from economic hardships” (personal ceive from working with ISIS. Also, ISIS communication, November 7, 2020). 50 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
The third group is what the UN Sec- they deserve.” According to these retary-General António Guterres field studies, “ISIS appeared to offer called the “largely captive audience them an escape from a nation where confined at home” (UN Security being an equal citizen requires aban- Council, 2020). Due to the COVID-19 doning the dictates of one’s re- measures, this group of people are ligion” (Ben-Israel, 2018; Zakaria, spending long times online, losing 2015). their support network after the clo- sure of schools and universities, find- Such feelings could motivate some ing themselves more exposed to the young European Muslims to object to online platforms used by ISIS, be- these policies by joining ISIS as coming more familiar with the organ- “media Jihadists”, “second-line Ji- isation’s arguments and cause and in hadists”, or practise “personal Jihad” some cases sympathising with it. For in their countries using unsophis- instance, the United Kingdom’s ticated weapons as labelled by the Metropolitan Police Assistant Com- French authorities (Onishi et al., missioner Neil Basu has stated that 2020). There are a few relevant counter-terrorism networks have de- examples. For instance, in late Sep- tected that “children as young as 13 tember 2020, the French police de- are talking about committing acts of tained 29 people financially terrorism, against a backdrop of ris- contributing to ISIS through a crypto- ing extremism during the COVID-19 currency network. According to pandemic” (Grierson, 2020). media reports, “the network mostly operated via the purchase of crypto- The boundaries of this group tran- currency coupons whose references scend Syria and Iraq and enable the were given to Jihadist contacts in organisation to keep its global fea- Syria and then credited to bitcoin ac- ture by recruiting foreign members, counts” (France 24, September 29, among which are European Muslim 2020). citizens who are concerned about how European countries are manag- To reach out to these three groups ing the cases of foreign terrorist of potential members during the fighters locked in the camps in Syria pandemic, ISIS is using both in- and Iraq. Some of these citizens formation technology and face-to- blame their governments for leaving face communication. As was citizens in the camps “to die or to be mentioned in the introduction of this killed” because they are Muslims. policy study, propaganda is an es- These feelings have played an im- sential tool for terrorist organisa- portant role in motivating European tions to survive. This explains why Muslims to join ISIS during 2014-16. ISIS has diversified its online media Field research conducted during the platforms during the pandemic, be- same period concluded that “Euro- coming the most viral terrorist or- pean Muslims, especially of the sec- ganisation on the internet. Most of ond and the third generations, often these online platforms are on the feel that – despite governments’ in- dark web, which makes them se- clusive rhetoric – Western societies cured and inaccessible through have not offered them the full re- regular search engines such as spect and equality that they believe Google. Some examples of such on-
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 51
Terrorist and line platforms are Akhbar al-Musli- An increase in ISIS activities on Telegram chain bots that meen, Amaq, al-Nibras, al-anfal has also been observed during the period were suspended radio, and Nashr news channel on covered by this chapter. According to during the year Telegram. Moreover, during the pan- Telegram’s “ISIS Watch” (https://t.me/ 2020 amount to demic, ISIS launched the “Sadaqa- s/isiswatch), terrorist and chain bots that 313,723 Coins” campaign on the dark web to were suspended during the year 2020 compared to collect the needed fund to cover the amount to 313,723 compared to 176,290 176,290 in the year 2019, which expenses of ISIS terrorists in Syria, in the year 2019, which shows an increase shows an Iraq and abroad (Zero Trust, 2020). of 56.19%. increase of 56.19% Figure 4. Total number of terrorist bots and channels banned by ISIS Watch on Telegram (2019-2020)
Source: Compiled by Mr. Karim Ammar, National Security Expert and former Director General of the Security Pole for Countering Terrorism and Organized Crime at the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior, based on data from the ISIS Watch on Telegram (https://t.me/s/isiswatch). ISIS is also expanding the online libraries rarely done in Syria and Iraq because that publish its books, audio recordings of the risk of pandemic transmission. and videos that explain how to practise However, some of the ISIS remnant the new types of terrorism the organisa- members are meeting in person, tak- tion is calling for amidst COVID-19, in- ing advantage of wearing the masks cluding “second-line Jihad” and “media taking advantage of wearing the Jihad”. However, not all of these libraries masks, making it hard to be recogni- are created by ISIS; some of them are sed., making it hard to be recognised. publicly used for non-terrorist purposes like Those meetings are usually held in the Internet Archive (https://archive.org/). places the terrorists originally belong to, “where the family supply them and Regarding face-to-face communica- provide cover” (International Crisis tion, it has been observed that it is Group, 2019, p. 6). 52 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
Conclusions and Iraq is increasing for ISIS as many indi- viduals were either already indoctrinated recommendations with ISIS ideology prior to their incarcer- ation or have been radicalised during In July 2020, the EU published the EU their time locked up. Thereby, they do Security Union Strategy, which defines not require extra recruitment efforts. priorities and actions to manage the risk Thanks to the weak control of these fa- and threats that could weaken European cilities and deteriorating living con- security during the period 2020-25. Ac- ditions, a window of opportunity was cording to this strategy, terrorism re- opened for ISIS to engage with vulner- mains a “real and present danger” to able individuals to brainwash them into European security (EC, 2020a, p. 1). It joining the organisation or to be com- outlines policies and actions that need to mitted to its ideology. be taken on the national as well as EU level, while emphasising the linkage be- Under pressure created by overcrowding tween internal and external security. It and the COVID-19 pandemic, the auth- calls for “further steps to develop orities running these facilities are becom- counter-terrorism partnerships and coop- ing weaker and increasingly unable to eration with countries in the neighbour- prevent breakouts from the camps and hood and beyond” (EC, 2020b), and prisons. The new Iraqi government is considers them “essential to improve se- working on evacuating the camps and curity inside the EU” (EC, 2020a, p. 2). on releasing many of those in prisons, while the SDF in Syria is working on con- The growing capabilities of ISIS in Iraq ditioned release agreements with and Syria during the pandemic that Mokhtars and tribal leaders. The existing could threaten European security as out- evacuation plans could give room for for- lined in this chapter make these two eign terrorist fighters to occupy these fa- countries potential partners to the EU in cilities as they aim at releasing the countering ISIS threats to European se- Syrians and Iraqis in particular. curity. This development could put the EU This chapter argues that working on under pressure to adopt policy actions weakening ISIS capability to recruit new towards European foreign terrorist members and followers in Syria and Iraq fighters in Iraq and Syria in accordance requires strengthening the resilience of with the EU counter-terrorism agenda the state and society in these two coun- which calls the European Commission to tries. Achieving this endeavour requires “support Member States to step up ef- the EU to work on remediating the vul- forts towards ensuring the prosecution nerability of the three identified groups of foreign terrorist fighters by supporting in this chapter as potential pools for ISIS work to that end at local, national and in- recruitment as follows: ternational” at local, national and inter- national [levels]" (EC, 2020a, pp. 8-9). Residents in the camps and prisons In this context, the EU must adopt pol- icies to prevent or slow the evacuation The importance of freeing captured of those facilities, such as launching a bi- fighters, their families and other civilians lateral programme with the new Iraqi from the camps and prisons in Syria and government that aims at:
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 53
1. Developing a databank of those liv- Sunni youths ing in displacement camps and de- tained in prisons since the military Working on strengthening the resilience defeat of ISIS. of Sunni youths is crucial to weaken ISIS in Iraq and Syria. As mentioned pre- 2. Providing needed security, legal and viously, this section of the population in financial support to improve the ca- both countries is suffering the most from pacity of the government to control the weakness of state structures, and the those facilities. military defeat of ISIS is not making the living conditions better but rather worse. In the case of the SDF, so far the United States of America is the main western For this reason, the EU needs to work actor playing a role in this matter. Having beyond the financial assistance provided in mind the threats posed by the camps to the vulnerable and crisis affected Iraqi to European security, it is time for the families through the International Res- EU to start discussing what it can do to- cue Committee and other institutions wards these camps. One important issue (ECHO, 2018). which might be of interest to the EU is the establishment of an international se- The suggested policies for the EU in this curity regime to control al-Hol and Roj regard are the following: camps. The EU could sponsor that re- gime along with the United States of 1. Exert pressure on the new Iraqi gov- America and Russia. The Iraqi govern- ernment to launch a national pro- ment and the Syrian regime are two gramme to achieve social justice parties that would make such a regime during the period of post-military de- functional. feat of ISIS, offering special and con- venient compensations to Sunni The proposed international security re- youths. This pressure can be done gime would review the planned release through economic and financial of ISIS members and families, channel tools. the international fund to improve the liv- ing conditions in the camps, apply strict 2. Launch a bilateral political dialogue rules that prevent ISIS from controlling between the EU and the new Iraqi the minds of the residents in the camps, government that aims at opening and investigate where the residents of more opportunities for the Sunni Ayn Issa camp went after its evacuation. youths to be represented in the gov- ernment in comparison to their Shiite In this regime, the Iraqi government is and Kurd counterparts. proposed to be the authority designated to screen and prosecute the residents of 3. Launch a programme for reconstruc- the camp with the help of the EU. ting cities and provinces destroyed during the war against ISIS with a de- Also, the EU should work with the fined timeline and budget. This pro- Mokhtars and tribes in Iraq and Syria to gramme would encourage the establish local rehabilitation and de-rad- displaced youths to return to their icalisation programmes for families of areas of origin, and would improve ISIS members who fled the camps or their living conditions. It is important were officially released from them. for this programme to include capac- 54 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
ity-building efforts for local police in Consequently, weakening the online in- Removing the these cities, co-define with the Iraqi fluence of ISIS requires the EU to be content or government and local actors in each open to other actions that would help blocking or region the priorities of public ser- achieve cognitive immunisation of the shutting down a vices and infrastructure while build- European users of the online sphere. In platform used by ISIS is not a ing trust between them, and demine this regard, this chapter suggests the solution as this and remove explosive hazards. following: policy urged ISIS to open new 4. Dedicate financial funds to encour- 1. The EU needs to reach agreements platforms on the age Iraqi and Syrian Sunni youths to with the corporations controlling the dark web and to launch small and micro-enterprises, online sphere to flag all ISIS material post its radical especially in areas destroyed during posted on non-terrorism platforms. contents on the war on ISIS. Also, it is important to provide to the non-terrorism users tools to flag such contents by platforms Online audience themselves. These measures would turn the online users from being vic- This group, in comparison to the other tims of online terrorism content into two, remains undefined. The two main actors aware of how to respond to features among the online audience are such content. their increased embrace of the internet as a result of the COVID-19 restriction 2. Urge European countries to launch measures, and their potential for be- on the national level large-scale coming ISIS second-line terrorists or awareness campaigns that explain “media Jihadists”. how to report suspicious online re- cruitment related to ISIS, and clarify The EU counter-terrorism agenda calls the type of help and protection of- for controlling the online sphere through fered in return. For these campaigns “the adoption and implementation of to be effective, they should be car- the proposed Regulation on addressing ried out in cooperation with all stake- the dissemination of terrorist content holders including local mosques, online. It would allow Member States to Islamic centres, schools, universities ensure the swift removal of such content and hacker communities. and require companies to be more re- sponsive in preventing the abuse of their 3. Urge European countries to launch platforms for the dissemination of ter- on the national level large-scale cam- rorist content” (EC, 2020a, p. 6). paigns showcasing the cost of lost opportunities upon joining ISIS, and However, one of the lessons learned relate it to existing opportunities for from previous years is that removing the youths including employment op- content or blocking or shutting down a portunities, playing a role in the com- platform used by ISIS is not a solution as munity, and enjoying the support of this policy urged ISIS to open new plat- family and friends. forms on the dark web and to post its radical contents on non-terrorism plat- 4. Provide training to government secur- forms. Also, users are becoming keener ity personnel in European countries on using workarounds to skip or invali- on how to use the dark web to com- date any governmental control on the bat ISIS and other terrorist organisa- online sphere. tions in their own cyber domain.
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 55
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DW. (2019). 3000 ISIS members are to be executed in Iraq (in Arabic) [video]. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB% D8%A9-%D8%A2%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9% D8%B4%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9% 87%D9% 88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82- %D9%88%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-20-%D8%A3% D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B7- %D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85% D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9% 82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8% A7%D8%B2%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%
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88%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8% B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8% B5%D9%8A%D9%84/av-48919118
EL-RASSAFY, E. E. (2012). Jihad for those who did not attend the Jihad (in Arabic). AlFajr Media Center. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/ezu- din/page/n27/mode/2up
EUROPEAN CIVIL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS (ECHO). (2018). Rebuilding life in Iraq after ISIS thanks to cash-based assistance. Re- trieved from https://ec.europa.eu/echo/field-blogs/videos/rebuilding-life-iraq- after-isis-thanks-cash-based-assistance_en
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC). (2020a). Communication from the Commis- sion to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Euro- pean Economic and Social Comittee and the Committee of the Regions. A counter-terrorism agenda for the EU: anticipate, prevent, protect, respond. Re- trieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/pdf/ 09122020_communication_commission_european_parliament_the_council_eu_ agenda_counter_terrorism_po-2020-9031_com-2020_795_en.pdf
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC). (2020b). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Comittee and the Committee of the Regions on The EU Se- curity Union Strategy. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/qid=1596452256370&uri=CELEX:52020DC0605
FRANCE 24. (2020). France arrests 29 in anti-terror Syria financing sting. Re- trieved from https://www.france24.com/en/20200929-france-arrests-29-in-anti- terror-syria-financing-sting
GERWEHR, S., & DALY, S. (2006). Al-Qaida: terrorist selection and recruitment. In D. Kamien (Ed.), The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook (pp. 83). New York: McGraw-Hill.
GRIERSON, J. (2020). Children showing interest in extremism, says senior of- ficer. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk- news/2020/sep/ 23/children-interested-in-extremism-covid-says-neil-basu- counter-terrorism-officer
HELLER, S. (2020). When measuring ISIS’s “resurgence”, use the right stan- dard. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-penin- sula/iraq/when-measuring-isiss-resurgence-use-right-standard
HINCKS, J. (2020). With the world busy fighting COVID-19, could ISIS mount a resurgence? Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/5828630/isis-coronavirus/
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HURLEY, J. C. (2020). Coronavirus and ISIS: the challenge of repatriation from Al-Hol. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/ publications/2020/05/coronavirus-and-isis-challenge-repatriation-al-hol
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. (2019). Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria (Middle East Report N°207). Retrieved from https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/207-averting-an-isis-resurgence.pdf
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. (2020). Virus fears spread at camps for ISIS families in Syria’s north east. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/virus-fears-spread- camps-isis-families-syrias-north-east
MCKERNAN, B. (2019). At least 750 Isis affiliates escape Syria camp after Tur- kish shelling. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2019/oct/13/kurds-say-785-isis-affiliates-have-escaped-camp-after-tur- kish-shelling
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WORLD BANK. (2020). Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modelled ILO estimate)-Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZSend=2020&locations=IQ -SY&start=1991&view=chart
ZAKARIA, R. (2015). Women and Islamic militancy. Dissent Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/why-women-choose- isis-islamic-militancy
ZELIN, Y. A., & KNIGHTS, M. (2020). The Islamic State’s resurgence in the COVID era From defeat to renewal in Iraq and Syria (Policy Watch 3322). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-states-resurgence- covid-era-defeat-renewal-iraq-and-syria
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The Pandemic and its Handling as Crisis Intensifiers? Taking Stock of Mobilisation, Terrorism and COVID-19 in the Maghreb Clara-Auguste Süß Doctoral Researcher, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
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Introduction ist dynamics on the ground and re- lated actors, state responses and pol- A common argument about the COVID- icies, as well as the emerging 19 pandemic points to its impact as a socioeconomic consequences of the crisis intensifier.1 A recent report of the pandemic. (In what way) do terrorist Munich Security Conference even puts activities during the pandemic differ it as a “polypandemic” (Eisentraut et al., from those in previous years? How 2020), a term that seems to also prove have the governments handled the correct regarding Algeria, Libya, Mo- pandemic, and to what extent could rocco and Tunisia, where it has already that be connected to violent mobilisa- posed serious challenges to the respect- tion? What are the potential socio- ive national economies, healthcare sys- economic consequences of the tems and living conditions of its citizens, pandemic in terms of future radicalisa- just to name a few. Relatedly, an inten- tion and terrorist dynamics? Hence, the sification of pre-existing grievances chapter focuses not only on direct but and hardships due to the crisis, its con- also indirect links between terrorism sequences and governmental re- and COVID-19, and thus includes and sponses seems to be likely. Linked to considers both primary and secondary that and looking at overall Salafi-Jihad- impacts of the pandemic. By doing so, ist propaganda referring to the pan- the chapter argues in favour of widen- demic and the virus itself,2 one could ing the debate to not only focus on ter- assume that radicalisation and terrorist rorism itself but rather on the impact of violence may be on the rise in the the pandemic on radicalisation and the Maghreb. However, even if we might broader socio-political context. assume an effect on (increasing) popu- lar discontent with the political elite Due to the topicality of the events and arising opportunities exploited by and the resulting imperfect data situ- terrorist groups, actual empirical evi- ation, however, only a few effects are dence on the link between COVID-19, observable at the time of writing this terrorism and related mobilisation in study. Thus, in order to draw as plaus- the Maghreb states is still scarce. ible and multi-layered a picture as possible, the aim was to bring to- Based on several databases, academic gether as many arguments and as publications and press articles, as well much empirical material as possible. as experts’ assessments,3 this chapter Although many links are not likely to thus aims to examine this relationship take effect until a later date, this in more detail. In line with the broader chapter discusses a variety of poten- scope of the study, it explores extrem- tial mechanisms. While doing so, the
1 The author would like to thank the experts for their time and willingness to share their insights, as well as the reviewers for their effort and important suggestions. Many thanks also go to Julius Strunk for his valuable support in collecting, compiling and analysing quantitative data, to the members of PRIF’s research group “Radicalization”, Marie-Christine Roux, and Julius Dihstelhoff for their valuable feedback, as well as to Klara Sinha for literature research and proofreading. 2 See also the introduction and chapter by Ragab in this study for a more detailed assessment of this very question. 3 The author has conducted several online interviews with researchers and also integrated statements from (online) panel discussions on the very topic. All statements have been anonymised and mostly paraphrased. 62 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
chapter systematically compiles and on the ground. Consequently, it will as- analyses the existing empirical evidence, sess if there has been an actual increase and finally draws conclusions and policy in terrorist activities since the outbreak recommendations, particularly focusing of COVID-19 as we might expect look- on the role of the European Union (EU) ing at Jihadist propaganda. in pushing back these dynamics. The recommendations aim to implement Overall, terrorist activities and dynamics new but, first and foremost, to continue are far from new in the region, since Ji- existing policies at both the national and hadist groups have been active for dec- international level, among others point- ades in each of the four Maghreb states, ing to sustainable economic growth, but undoubtedly in varying intensity and strengthening the role of youths and re- power of impact. In the case of Mo- gional and international cooperation, for rocco, the Salafi movement became instance in the area of information ex- politicised after 2011 but was unable to change, as well as fighting hate speech win elections. Jihadist forces in the Quietist and extremists’ recruitment attempts country did not grow stronger; there has Salafism has been said to be online. Overall, the pandemic’s con- been no major terrorist attack in Mo- finding new sequences need to be met with a hol- rocco and a central Jihadist group has appeal, istic approach, the chapter argues. not settled until now (International Crisis especially Group, 2017; Masbah, 2021). According among Jihadism in the Maghreb to an expert (personal communication, socioeconomica- January 19, 2021), it is accurate to say lly marginalised prior to and during the that there are no structured organisa- youths for pandemic tions but rather loose terrorist cells that several years Moroccan security forces have continu- It has now been 10 years since the so- ously uncovered. In Algeria, the Salafi- called Arab uprisings partly initiated Jihadist movement had become major political changes in the region. As strongly divided into different groups in of now, looking at the Maghreb states, the course of the civil war of the 1990s, we are dealing with four very different but had proven to be of little political settings: from West to East, there is relevance in the 2000s. The most impor- monarchic Morocco, the parliamentary tant Jihadist group to date, Al-Qaeda in autocracy Algeria, democratic Tunisia the Islamic Maghreb, shifted its activities and, finally, war-prone Libya. This from northern Algeria to the Sahara (to chapter thus aims to shed light on the Mali) in the course of the regional topic in four very different contexts.4 In changes of 2011 (Werenfels, 2015) and order to do so, this first section will be weakened over time. Quietist Salafism,5 dedicated to an assumed direct link be- on the other hand, has been said to be tween terrorism, radicalisation and the finding new appeal, especially among COVID-19 pandemic and will thus take socioeconomically marginalised youths stock of the events and violent dynamics for several years (Boukhars, 2015). Ji-
4 Due to lack of reliable data and in order to ensure some degree of comparability, the chapter will not elaborate on Libya in such detail, since dynamics there are just so very different from those in the other three Maghreb states. It will, however, include at least anecdotal evidence on the Libyan case. 5 Quietist Salafists are said to “abstain from formal politics and reject violence, and advocate the spread and application of their strictly conservative theological orientation in society” (Boukhars, 2015).
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hadism and the rise of (violent) radical- much related to the foreign fighter as- isation, however, has been a major chal- pect, as the Maghreb states have been lenge in post-revolutionary Tunisia.6 said to be among the highest per capita Since 2011, various violent groups have of persons travelling abroad to fight in emerged perpetrating numerous at- previous years (Wehrey & Boukhars, tacks, and thousands of Tunisians have 2019, p. 140). While this raises questions left the country to fight abroad, for about the potential sources of funding, example in Libya or Syria. Furthermore, the effectiveness of border control and Tunisians have been playing a leading the entire departure process and logis- role in Jihadist networks in Europe or tics, it is undisputed that violent Islamist have been among the highest ranks of groups and their members in all four the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and countries maintain (strong) ties and con- Syria (ISIS) (Torelli, 2017; Zelin, 2020). nections to other groups and move- The dynamics in Libya, in turn, are com- ments, even beyond their national pletely different from those in the other borders. While the rise of ISIS (which has three Maghreb states. As put in a nut- been at its height in 2014/15) un- shell by Raineri et al. (2020, p. 7), “it is doubtedly led to an increase of terrorist hard to single out extreme and radical violence and radicalisation also in the views, as social and religious conserva- Maghreb region, Jihadist groups in the tism are widespread, while the pro- Maghreb have become weaker and longed crisis has somewhat normalized weaker in recent years, now being “at a the use of violence.” Focusing on Jihad- low point” (Bayrakdar et al., 2021)8 – but ist actors, ISIS maintains a designated Li- the underlying grievances remain. byan branch and has thus been one of the groups that are active on the This “low point” was confirmed by ex- country’s soil. Furthermore, it needs to perts stating that, except for the Libyan be acknowledged that the persistent case, radicalisation and the attractive- war will probably continue to provide ness of radical groups in the Maghreb various violent actors with possibilities to have been declining during the last act and grow, including Jihadist actors.7 years, pointing on the one hand to the collapse of ISIS’ caliphate (making travel- Generally, the Maghreb states witness ling abroad to fight less attractive) and what academics have dubbed an “inter- on the other to the successful imple- play and tension between the local and mentation and realisation of prevent- global” (Wehrey & Boukhars, 2019, ing and countering violent extremism p. 140). On the one hand, Jihadism (P/CVE) measures and programmes9 needs to be understood as a “highly lo- (personal communications, January 19 calized phenomenon”, but is also very and 20, 2021). Data from the Global Ter-
6 For a detailed analysis of Tunisian Jihadism prior to and after the revolution as well as Tunisians’ role in the global Jihadist movement(s), see Zelin (2020). 7 For a more detailed overview on Jihadist groups and counter-terrorism in the Maghreb, see Raineri et al. (2020) and Trauthig (2020) for the Libyan case. 8 Relatedly, one must also keep in mind that some Jihadist groups have (partly) shifted their activities to other theatres, such as the Sahel, sub-Saharan Africa as well as East Asia – which may be another plausible reason for their relative weakness in the Maghreb. 9 For more details on respective strategies and programmes in the Maghreb, as well as the role of the EU, see Raineri et al. (2020) and Letsch (2018, on Tunisia).
64 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
rorism Database (GTD)10 depicting the of radical or terrorist groups are certainly total number of terrorist incidents per not only reflected in the occurrence of year (figure 1) also generally supports terrorist incidents alone. When combin- this assessment, while at the same time ing the depicted rather constant devel- illustrating the very different context of opment on a low level – except for Libya resulting in a much higher level of Libya, where a decline is obvious – with (terrorist) violence from the outset. the experts’ assessments and overall lit- Overall, however, it needs to be stated erature on the region, a coherent picture that radicalisation and the attractiveness emerges.
Figure 1. Number of terrorist incidents (2010-2018)
Source: Global Terrorism Database, retrieved on 10 November 2020.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pan- to their purposes. Furthermore, they demic in (early) spring 2020 was quickly routinely use social media for mobilisa- accompanied by concerns of re- tion and recruitment, and tend to The influence of searchers and policy-makers about its spread their texts, audio or video files the COVID-19 possible impact on global terrorism and online. As pointed out by experts, the pandemic can violent extremism (see, e.g., Ackerman influence of the COVID-19 pandemic already be & Peterson, 2020; Cruickshank & can already be observed on a discursive observed on a discursive level, Rassler, 2020; Mullins, 2020; UN Security level, pointing to Jihadist propaganda pointing to Council, 2020). These concerns are and related ideological exploitation, at Jihadist rooted in the fact that such groups are least as far as the globally most domi- propaganda and generally known for their ability to nant groups are concerned. As ex- related quickly adapt to new socio-political con- plained in more detail in the ideological texts and make use of them according introduction of this study, both Al- exploitation
10 The GTD is an ongoing effort made by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and “documents more than 200,000 international and domestic terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide since 1970” and is based on media reporting (for further details, see https://start.umd.edu/research-projects/global-terrorism-database-gtd). It represents one of the “classics” and best known databases covering terrorist attacks. As with any database, the GTD comes with peculiarities concerning data collection, coding and underlying definitions that need to be taken into account and that one must be aware of (for a critical assessment, see Sheehan, 2012).
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Qaeda and ISIS have referred specifi- expedite the spread of extremism, es- cally to the virus and the global pan- pecially via the internet” (Sold & Süß, demic in their official propaganda 2020). Although it has yet to be proven outlets, for instance dubbing it “a sol- whether the ideological referral to the dier of Allah” (Boussel, 2020; Daymon, pandemic and the virus itself in propa- 2020).11 Due to the confinement and the ganda led to an increased popularity of accompanied “widespread clampdown the respective actors and rising radical- of public life, a major part of social inter- isation, this might represent the most di- action shifts to the virtual world” (Sold rect and at the same time most visible & Süß, 2020). This has been true also for effect of COVID-19 in the area of (turn- the Maghreb states. A large number of ing towards) violent extremism. citizens have been spending much more time at home and supposedly on social In contrast, when looking at the mere media and potentially been more ex- numbers displaying the dynamics and vi- posed to radical content online. This olent incidents in the Maghreb states, might be particularly evident for the the assumption about COVID-19 fuel- youth. Furthermore, “self-isolation is ling terrorism and violent extremism feared to possibly raise the individual does not seem to have come true, at vulnerability to extremist narratives and least for the time being (see figure 2).
Figure 2. Violent incidents by non-state actors regardless of their target as recorded by ACLED, including events depicting clashes between state and non- state actors (2019-2020)
For coding details, see ACLED, 2019; Raleigh et al., 2010. Source: ACLED Event data (2019-2020).
11 Relatedly, see the three components of ISIS’ recruitment during COVID-19 in the chapter by Ragab in this study. 66 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
Since GTD data encompassing the be confirmed for the Maghreb states year 2020 is not yet available by the (at least at present). time of writing,12 data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event However, there have been reports Data Project (ACLED) has been used about an alleged “terrorist plot” to take stock of the violent dynamics (MEMO Middle East Monitor, 2020) in on the ground in 2019 and 2020.13 Tunisia in spring 2020 that was said to The figure displays the number of vi- be initiated by a known terrorist that olent incidents by non-state actors re- had recently been released from gardless of their target, including prison at that time. By encouraging clashes between state and non-state sympathisers to cough and sneeze on actors.14 Hence, the ACLED database police personnel, the person con- presumably includes more events cerned is said to have used “his in- than the GTD. While it needs to be fluence to indoctrinate followers to kept in mind, consequently, that the try and spread the coronavirus among comparability of the two figures is security forces,” particularly targeting somewhat limited, they nevertheless those “who are under administrative represent a good basis for capturing control” (Jewers, 2020). Even though larger trends. Putting the particular- the plot was uncovered and pre- ities of the different datasets aside, it vented in time, it demonstrates the becomes apparent that the quantity potential of instrumentalising the of terrorist violence has not increased virus for terrorist purposes. dramatically but rather remained at approximately the same level. In line Another interesting aspect is the with the displayed statistics, experts question of legitimacy that notably have pointed out that the decline in refers to (violent) Islamist non-state terrorist attacks continued in 2020, actors performing governance func- regardless of the pandemic. Addi- tions and providing social service and tionally, COVID-19 could also induce healthcare to those in need. Re- a change regarding a different quality latedly, researchers have already of violence (e.g., different attack tar- pointed out that “Islamic charitable gets) – while for instance the Nether- organizations [in the Maghreb] are lands already experienced a blast on mobilizing to fill the many gaps not COVID-19 test centres in March 2021 addressed by the government […] that has been called an “attack” by providing food to families in need the police (Plevier, 2021), this cannot and helping with medical efforts by
12 Preliminary data is expected to be made available in the second half of 2021 at the earliest. 13 ACLED is a non-profit organisation and its database comprises “all reported political violence and protest events” (https://acleddata.com/about-acled/). Like the GTD, ACLED is also built on media articles, which at least ensures a roughly equal starting point for data collection. 14 “Non-state actors” comprise of the following entities: rebel groups, which are defined “as political organizations whose goal is to counter an established national governing regime by violent acts” (ACLED, 2019, p. 21); political militias, meaning “a more diverse set of violent actors, who are often created for a specific purpose or during a specific time period […] and for the furtherance of a political purpose by violence” (ACLED, 2019, p. 21), as well as identity militias, defined as “armed and violent groups organized around a collective, common feature including community, ethnicity, region, religion or, in exceptional cases, livelihood” (ACLED, 2019, p. 22).
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delivering masks to hospitals” tion and violence and, in this sense, to (Wehrey et al., 2020, p. 7) – this would effects on state resilience, crisis man- also be conceivable for violent Islam- agement and arising political oppor- ist actors and has been done in the tunities. Have governments taken past (e.g., Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia advantage of the crisis to restrict fun- was known for its extensive welfare damental freedoms? How might activities in the early 2010s, see Süß those state interventions be con- & Weipert-Fenner, 2021, p. 15). Yet, it nected to mobilisation and terrorism? still needs to be assessed how those Consequently, this subchapter aims at actors will cope with the expectations connecting rather general consider- and needs of their supporters and ations on the repression-mobilisation those in need, and to what extent this nexus to empirical evidence on the If measured might affect their legitimacy. As four countries of interest. solely in pointed out by the experts inter- numerical viewed, this will be particularly inter- Generally, the coronavirus started to terms, there is esting in settings where terrorist spread across the Maghreb states in no basis for assuming that groups already maintain territorial spring 2020, specifically through terrorist groups control, for instance in Libya. Never- March. Among others, table 1 depicts have theless, if measured solely in numeri- the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic successfully cal terms, there is no basis for in the region measured by the number started to take assuming that terrorist groups have of infections per one million inhabit- advantage of successfully started to take advantage ants. Based on this data, Tunisia is by the pandemic of the pandemic – which is why it is far the most affected by the virus, fol- necessary to shift the focus to more lowed by Libya, Morocco and, lastly, indirect implications for radicalisation Algeria. Of course, these figures and terrorism as will be done in the should be treated with caution. Often, following sections. sufficient COVID-19 tests have not been available, especially at the beginning of The Maghreb states’ the pandemic (similarly, Europe has massively expanded its test capacities in handling of the pandemic the course of time) and particularly for citizens located far away from major Research has shown that two of the cities, and/or when citizens have to most decisive drivers for radicalisa- shoulder the costs for tests themselves. tion and the engagement in (Jihadist) And again, in the Libyan case, there are violence are grievances of various additional data reliability problems. De- kinds, such as socioeconomic hard- spite these limitations, the data indicate ships – which will be discussed in some general trends. more detail in the next section – and interactions with the state, particu- The governments in Algeria, Morocco larly referring to repression and state and Tunisia quickly imposed several violence (see, e.g., Wehrey & Bouk- measures, “including suspending all hars, 2019, p. 140). In order to inves- travel, partially demobilizing the work- tigate the impact of the pandemic on force, closing mosques, using military the latter aspect, this section will thus and police forces to impose mandatory be devoted to state responses and confinement, shutting down schools policies addressing the pandemic, its and businesses, and banning public potential links to (future) radicalisa- gatherings” (Abouzzohour, 2020b, 68 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
p. 51). Besides, there have been re- system compared to Morocco and Al- ports about the deployment of robots geria (Abouzzohour, 2020a). In sum, enforcing the lockdown in Tunisia's and despite all those interventions, capital city of Tunis (Arab News, the pandemic poses a severe 2020). The Maghreb states are differ- health(care) challenge to all four ently equipped when it comes to the countries (for detailed studies of the efficacy and capability of its health- implemented measures and strin- care system. While Libya is already gencies, see Abouzzohour, 2020c; burdened due to the persistent con- Abouzzohour & Ben Mimoune, 2020; flict, Tunisia is said to have the best Bouoiyour et al., 2020).
Table1. COVID-19 figures per country
Total cases Total deaths Cases/one Testing million capacity/one inhabitants million inhabitants Algeria 129,976 3,497 2,916 5,179 Libya 186,567 3,132 26,816 149,127 Morocco 520,423 9,165 13,947 174,416 Tunisia 350,487 12,839 29,373 125,383
Source: Worldometer (n.d.), retrieved on 4 June 2021.
As is already deducible from the 2020; Rachidi, 2020; Saudi, 2020) as measures highlighted above, the well as to “silence dissent and remove COVID-19 pandemic has led to a rein- voices of the opposition they have forcement of police structures and sur- deemed a threat”, for instance by ar- veillance in Morocco, Tunisia and resting journalists and cracking down Algeria, experts state (personal com- on activists (Allouche, 2020). This is munication, January 19, 2021). This is true for Algeria and Morocco, but said to be most visible in the latter also for Tunisia, and it is a worrying case, where the emergence of the dynamic. Reactions of the civil society Hirak movement already led to such re- and protest movements remain to be inforcement, a dynamic that has now seen, but it is already becoming ap- intensified in the course of the pan- parent that particularly the youths are demic. Measured in terms of actual growing ever more frustrated, which state violence against civilians, how- is potentially and specifically exacer- ever, the year 2020 is not very different bated by the “lagging and inadequate The COVID-19 from the previous one (see figure 3). public services” (Fakir & Werenfels, pandemic has 2021, p. 4). Furthermore, those dyna- led to a reinforcement Nonetheless, there are reports about mics could possibly also promote radical- of police the governments using the pandemic isation. Research refers to this as structures and 15 to limit fundamental freedoms and “repression-mobilisation nexus”, which surveillance in mobilisation (Aissani, 2020; Cherif, entails some ambiguity. On the one Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, experts 15 State (non-)responses towards (protest) movements certainly can also take different forms, such state as “concession and ignoring” (Weipert-Fenner, 2021, p. 7).
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 69
Figure 3. Violence against civilians by state actors, including events recorded as remote violence by state actors as well as external military actors (e.g., mercenaries) as recorded by ACLED. Timespan: 1 January 2019 – 1 January 2021.
Source: ACLED Event data (2019-2020).
hand, growing repression (at least to and looting, but also by reports on a certain threshold) is said to have an es- police brutality (Al Jazeera, 2021; calating effect on mobilisation, pointing Amnesty International, 2021; Deut- to radicalisation of non-state actors. Yet, sche Welle, 2021), this topic will cer- on the other, it is only a decrease of re- tainly remain important. pression that is said to enable mobilisa- tion and the development of (protest) Another interesting aspect concerns movements (Della Porta, 1997, p. 122). the citizens’ basic trust in the govern- Thus, repression might affect people’s ment and political elite and the satis- behaviour in at least two different ways faction with COVID-19 policies. What (Della Porta, 2013, p. 67). While the fu- is the impact of the crisis on con- ture implications remain rather vague, fidence, which is often mentioned for growing popular discontent – even the Maghreb states, during the pan- more intensified by the absence of “ef- demic? As illustrated in figure 4 below, fective long-term solutions” (Fakir & trust in the government is the highest Werenfels, 2021, p. 6) for the economic in Morocco (52%) – Masbah and Aour- crisis – is undeniable. Anyway, with the raz (2020) confirm these assessments in renewed breakout of protests, for in- more detail – followed by Algeria stance in Tunisia – despite an im- (46%) and then, by a large margin, posed general confinement – around Tunisia (17%). This order is also con- the tenth anniversary of the begin- firmed for the other two survey cat- ning of the revolution that have been egories, namely satisfaction in the accompanied by acts of vandalism healthcare system and the evaluation 70 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
of the government’s performance dur- leased from prison across the Maghreb ing the COVID-19 pandemic. Interest- states, simply out of the certainly justi- ingly, the Tunisians’ satisfaction with fied concern that the virus would spread their government’s performance (58%) too quickly in the overcrowded prisons, is not much lower than in the other two which would result in a disaster (Bouk- countries (74% in Morocco and 65% in hayatia, 2020; Crétois & Kamel, 2020; Algeria). Remarkably, and in line with Reuters Staff, 2020). Looking back at the the general level of dissatisfaction and dynamics in Tunisia directly after the rev- mistrust, leaders of the Tunisian radical olution in 2011, there has been a gen- Salafist Hizb ut-Tahrir movement criti- eral amnesty setting many condemned cised the government “for not acting radicals free. Among others, this quickly to impose travel restrictions measure at that time paved the way for and close the country off, especially the relative success of extremists and from Italy and France” and “stated in a radicalisation in Tunisia by providing rad- social media recording, COVID-19’s ical Islamist preachers who were re- devastation has laid bare the weak- leased from prison, with the opportunity nesses of the Tunisian political, econ- to openly call for a violent struggle omic, and social system” (Wehrey et against the existing order. Even though al., 2020, p. 7). an interviewed expert agreed on the fact that the releases in spring 2020 Another containment measure re- were not related to terrorism conviction ceived a relatively large amount of and that those detainees would gen- media attention. In spring 2020, it was erally be separated from other detai- reported that many detainees were re- nees, a small uncertainty could remain.
Figure 4. Trust in and satisfaction with government performance in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia based on Arab Barometer data (Wave VI, part I, conducted from July to October 2020)
Note: Libya has been left out due to the lack of survey data. Source: Abufalgha (2020).
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 71
While the early release undoubtedly how terrorist groups in Libya fulfil represents a correct and comprehen- healthcare tasks and provide social ser- sible step in fighting the virus, the indi- vices in general. vidual experiences from imprisonment and possible contacts with radical actors In sum, and as of writing, there are more and ideas may nevertheless affect future questions than answers. On the one dynamics regarding violence and rad- hand, one could assume that while the icalisation. However, this challenge also governments’ attention lies in the con- arises completely independently from tainment of the pandemic and since the COVID-19 pandemic and this policy trans- and international activities have in particular. become more difficult and restricted than before, Jihadist groups in the Overall, terrorist groups and individuals Maghreb could possibly concentrate are of course affected by the imple- their (violent) activities even more on mented measures and policies just like the local context. This threat, however, other citizens. As mentioned above, Al- seems to be contained because of geria, Morocco and Tunisia have reacted their relative weakness. On the other relatively quickly and closed their hand, one interviewed expert stated borders to prevent the virus from that terrorism generally relies on atten- spreading any further. This restriction of tion and only fulfils its purpose if it at- the freedom of movement combined tracts as much attention for as long as with intensified surveillance may cer- possible. Cynically speaking, would an tainly limit the violent actors’ capabil- attack or related activities thus even be ities and pose a challenge particularly worth the risk and effort at the mo- for transnationally operating groups, ment? It would be interesting to find as pointed out by experts (e.g., per- out whether this might be a (better) ex- sonal communication, January 20, planation for the absence of the antici- 2021). In this respect, COVID-19-re- pated increase in terrorist activity lated measures have proven useful in during the pandemic. terms of counter-terrorism, being not entirely dissimilar from regular counter- Socioeconomic terrorism measures anyway. consequences of the Again, Libya is a special case given the pandemic: the “fertile ongoing war. Generally, the crisis man- ground” for agement and containment of the pan- demic has been and still is a huge radicalisation? challenge for the country, given “its li- Radicalisation mited resources and the internationally Overall, considering socioeconomic needs to be recognized government’s lack of control marginalisation and related hardships understood as a over the country” (Abouzzohour, 2020a). as one of the potential drivers for rad- highly complex Under these conditions, its “flawed pub- icalisation and the engagement in viol- and individual lic health response to the pandemic” ence or terrorism is far from new. process with and the “Libyan authorities’ abysmal Although radicalisation needs to be various factors track record in service provision and cri- understood as a highly complex and in- at play sis management” (Badi, 2020, p. 24) are dividual process with various factors at not surprising. For the question at stake, play, socioeconomic aspects such as it would be interesting to explore if and unemployment, personal wealth and 72 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
related (self-)perceptions and emotions four countries of interest. As pointed out may be contributing factors for radical- by the interviewed experts, the pan- isation, at least in some cases. This re- demic’s socioeconomic consequences in lationship, however, is far from being the Maghreb states might represent the as simple as the alleged equation most “real” challenge and most legit- “poverty = (rebellion or even) terror- imate question regarding the influence ism” – such direct links, sometimes of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism even associated with a causal notion, and radicalisation, and is yet one of the were already rejected in the early most difficult ones to assess for the time 2000s. Since then, academics have being. been focusing on more indirect rela- tionships. While we still lack precise data for the year 2020, it has already become Studies on the socioeconomic dimen- clear that the Maghreb’s economies sion of Islamist radicalisation in North have been hit hard by the lockdowns, Africa (for an overview, see Süß & Aak- the travel restrictions and the sub- hunzzada, 2019; Süß & Weipert-Fenner, sequent breakdown of (international) 2021) have already illustrated that socio- tourism as well as falling oil prices. economic factors might have an impact Recent estimations and forecasts pre- on different forms of radicalisation. dict a worsening of economic indica- Among others, they potentially play a tors such as the general economic role by paving the way for individual mo- growth rate (measured by gross do- tives for radicalisation or by contributing mestic product [GDP] per capita) and to the delegitimisation of the state, as unemployment rates (see table 2). For well as by providing opportunities for instance, in Tunisia, where economic non-state actors to recruit followers by growth and recovery have been a se- offering social services. Last but not vere challenge since 2011, GDP is least, (radical) Islamist actors also use said to diminish by 7% and is ex- this as a motif in their propaganda and pected to only recover partly in 2021 harness it for mobilisation and recruit- (for details on the Tunisian case, see ment purposes. Makni, 2020; Mousez, 2020; PNUD, 2020). Based on these general arguments, this section will once again shift the focus The pandemic’s potential economic im- from an immediate, direct impact of the pact on Morocco is also said to be great, COVID-19 pandemic to the possibly since “it is expected to affect all vital “fertile ground” that the pandemic pro- sectors such as tourism, industry, trade, vides for the terrorist groups to exploit.16 and finance”, and is even more bol- In this respect, it will discuss the “ele- stered by a predicted drought (Ama- phant in the room” and take a closer gour, 2020). Algeria’s economy, as in look at the broader context and emerg- Libya, is suffering due to falling oil prices ing socioeconomic consequences of the (Mechakra, 2020). Hence, although all pandemic, namely worsening national Maghreb states are and will be equally economies and unemployment in the affected by the economic crisis, also be-
16 Investigating this link certainly does not imply an assumed causal relationship. Rather, the aim is to elaborate on the possible long-term effects of the crisis and its impact on mobilisation (into violence).
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 73
Table 2. Socioeconomic indicators (2019-2021) Algeria Morocco Tunisia
2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021 GDP growth (annual %) 1 0.8 -5.5 3.2 2.2 -7.0 4.9 1.0 -7.0 4.0
Unemployment rate (%) 2 11.4 14.1 14.3 9.2 12.5 10.5 14.9 16.2 -
Notes: Data for 2020 and 2021 are projections, since numbers for 2020 are still based on estimations and those for 2021 are to be understood as forecasts. Libya is excluded due to missing and unreliable data. Sources: 1 IMF (2020, p. 58); 2IMF (2020, p. 58), World Bank estimates.
cause they all depend on global trade in (see UNDP et al., 2020 for the Moroc- some form, the challenges they are can case). While the full extent of the facing are quite different. To put it pandemic’s impact will only become briefly, “Morocco and Tunisia, whose apparent in the coming months and economies rely on tourism, will struggle years (personal communication, Janu- as travel restrictions persist. Hydrocar- ary 19, 2021), a major economic crisis bon-exporting Algeria and Libya will that may last for a longer period of suffer as oil prices drop” (Abouzzohour, time has already been predicted (Da- 2020a; for Libya see Rivlin, 2021). browski & Domínguez-Jiménez, 2021).
More generally, it does not come as a Despite social scientists usually shying surprise that the COVID-19 pandemic away from predictions, it does, in and its implications for (small) busi- sum, not seem far-fetched to state nesses, tourism and everyday life hits that Jihadists and radical groups in the Maghreb states hard. Fur- general could potentially benefit from thermore, the region has been strug- the severe socioeconomic crisis gling for years with severe emerging from the COVID-19 pan- socioeconomic challenges, such as demic. It may be common sense to high inequality and public spending consider socioeconomic hardships (Abouzzohour, 2020b, p. 51), large in- and marginalisation as one of the formal economies and high unem- possible backgrounds or drivers for ployment especially among the radicalisation and (the engagement youth, which is referred to as the in) terrorism, and as pointed out by “Achilles Heel of the Maghreb” (Zou- another chapter in this study (Claes et bir, 2017, p. 2). It is only natural that al.), recruitment strategies based on there are no reliable numbers for the such narratives could potentially be pandemic’s consequences for those effective. (Socioeconomic) marginal- working in the informal sector – com- isation often results in grievances and prising “more than half” of the total frustration and thus might take effect, labour force in Morocco, Algeria and in some cases, on the motivational Tunisia (Gallien, 2018, p. 3), in Libya level for engaging in violent extrem- maybe even more – who may be se- ism. For the radical groups, socio- verely affected by the confinement economic factors play a role when it 74 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
comes to the provision of services for Taking a closer look at mechanisms and their supporters and the local popu- drivers of radicalisation, this becomes lace (see, e.g., Süß & Weipert-Fenner, even more apparent. While radicalisa- 2021). On this basis, it seems only tion surely needs to be viewed as the logical that the pandemic is likely to highly complicated process that it is, drive these dynamics further. For the injustice and related (socioeconomic Injustice and time being, however, one can only and political) grievances as well as in- related speculate, and only time will tell how teractions with the state, first and fore- (socioeconomic strongly the circumstances will have most through repression, are both and political) affected national economies and re- acknowledged as crucial drivers for grievances as lated socioeconomic dynamics as well radicalisation. Relatedly, (violent) Salaf- well as as their role in radicalisation and ter- ism, and in this sense also radicalisa- interactions with the state, rorism on the ground. tion, have been accurately called “a first and portal into the frustrations of a youth foremost Conclusions and population” (Wehrey & Boukhars, through recommendations 2019, p. 142) in the Maghreb. As a repression, are consequence, the COVID-19 pandemic both The chapter has demonstrated that and its fallouts have not initiated any acknowledged there is so far only little proof of a di- truly new dynamics, but rather need to as crucial rect link between terrorism and the be considered as potential “intensi- drivers for radicalisation COVID-19 pandemic that goes fier[s] of drivers, rather than as a driver beyond the level of propaganda and in itself” (Connekt, 2020, p. 4) that fuel ideological referral. Widespread con- pre-existing grievances and pave the cerns about the pandemic leading to way for future radicalisation ten- an increase or a general change of dencies. tactics or intensity in terrorist violence in the Maghreb region have not ma- In order to address these challenges, terialised – at least for the time being actions need to be taken in at least two and taking stock of the events of (interconnected) areas: first, concern- 2020 for which data is available. More ing P/CVE and radicalisation, and sec- indirect relations that also take factors ond, regarding the reinforced such as the governments’ crisis man- socioeconomic challenges, in line with agement and related implemented the en gagement in development policies as well as the arising socio- coop eration and sustainable growth. economic consequences into ac- While the recommended policy count, however, reveal possible future measures address both the na tional influences on radicalisation and viol- and international level, it needs to be ent extremism. Hence, opportunities stated that inter national cooperation is for terrorist groups that have been the only possible way to effectively opened up by the pandemic are not face the combined challenge repre- necessarily immediate and obvious, sented by the COVID-19 pandemic but rather mediated, and might only and terrorism. Against this back- take full effect in the coming months ground, the follow ing recommenda- and years.17 tions can be formulated:
17 The chapter on the Sahel states in this study (authored by Claes et al.) comes to a similar conclusion, while arguing at the same time that extremist activity in the Sahel has been rather unaffected by COVID-19 until now.
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 75
1. Anti-terror efforts including in- implementation of a national strat- formation exchange in the Medi- egy to combat violent extremism terranean rightly have long been and prevent radicalisation. At the understood as a joint task requi- same time, law enforcement and ring cooperation on equal terms intelligence services should be (Council of the EU, 2020; TAP monitored (nationally and/or inter- News, 2021).18 This is absolutely nationally) to ensure citizens’ vital and the correct strategy both rights. Furthermore, strengthening from a scientific and a more prac- resilience at the local level and fos- tice-oriented perspective, since tering education by giving impor- transregional challenges such as tance to alarming school drop-out terrorism and radicalisation in turn rates seem to be promising ap- also require transregional efforts proaches. and solutions. Terrorist incidents in recent years have shown that the 3. Youths have a crucial role to play transnational exchange of radical in this respect, which is why the ideas and actors across the Medi- role of young people as agents of terranean is strong. Relatedly, the change should be recognised and Sahel-Maghreb (in)security nexus strengthened. Their key role in could become particularly impor- Maghreb societies regarding mo- tant in the future. To curb sources bilisation and processes of change of financing for terrorist groups, ef- has become clear again and again forts should be focused on the fight in the course of the last decade, against illicit trafficking of goods pointing to the Arab uprisings in and weapons in particular, but at 2010/11 or the Hirak protests in the same time keep “the social and Algeria, just to name two of the economic drivers of smuggling in many examples. Granting youths the COVID-19 environment” (Her- more responsibilities, providing bert & Gallien, 2020, p. 2) in mind. them with more opportunities and ensuring their inclusion in politics 2. More generally, and in order to in- and policies could help reduce sist on the effective implementa- frustrations and (perceived) margi- tion of United Nations (UN) nalisation. resolution 1373, which has re- cently been strengthened by a 4. Additionally, and while one of the statement by the UN Security key principles of the EU’s ap- Council (2021), public institutions proach in countering terrorism to and civil society organisations date, among others, already in- should be provided with the finan- cludes the “[m]isuse of the internet cial and organisational means to and new technologies for terrorist accomplish their mission. Re- purposes” (Council of the EU, latedly, but on a more national 2020), the online dimension of rad- level, civil society should be con- icalisation will certainly become even tinuously encouraged in the for- more important with ongoing lock- mulation, development and downs. It seems, therefore, all the
18 Relatedly, see Ragab’s chapter in this study for details on the EU Security Union Strategy. 76 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups
more important to thwart hate being the International Monetary speech on social networks, to de- Fund (IMF)’s “debt service relief to velop alternative and counter nar- member countries facing the econ- ratives and to strengthen P/CVE omic impact of the COVID-19 pan- efforts online, but also offline. In sum, demic” (IMF, 2021). However, it is not possible to respond using an looking at the case of Tunisia, al- exclusively national approach to though international financial insti- tackle these dynamics. Exchange of tutions “have toned down demands information and cooperation be- for structural reforms [, …] even tween the countries of the region, control of wage bills or certain but also with the EU and the broader energy subsidies deemed necessary international level should be pro- by the IMF appear to be politically moted and strengthened. highly sensitive, if not unfeasible” (Fakir & Werenfels, 2021, p. 5). 5. With regard to the pandemic’s so- cioeconomic consequences and 6. Lastly, future approaches must the probably upcoming economic better link these two areas, since crisis in the Maghreb, the EU’s re- the pandemic’s consequences sponse should first and foremost need to be met with a holistic ap- include a continuous willingness proach. P/CVE needs to be under- for sustained support. Experts stood not only as a mere security have made a strong point about task, but also requires broader ef- the necessity to continue existing forts and joint solutions with regard cooperation and engagement. to legal migration and sustainable Even though Europe’s attention economic growth. Existing cooper- and possibly also financial re- ation should thus be continued, if not sources might be more concen- enhanced – even if, and perhaps es- trated on its own local context, not pecially because, the COVID-19 pan- reducing economic support and demic entails interregional and investments in the Maghreb is said global consequences. We need to to be of crucial importance. foster interregional solidarity and Beneficial measures to counter the cooperation in these challenging economic crisis could be the sup- times, not only but also because port of companies in danger and the EU and the Maghreb, as its di- the provision of (temporary) finan- rect southern partner, are so cial solutions for securing people’s strongly connected geographically regular income. Furthermore, it and thus confronted with chal- should not be the time for re- lenges that may have reper- newed debts but for quick and un- cussions in the (near) future for bureaucratic support – an example both sides of the Mediterranean.
Policy Study n. 21 Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 77
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List of acronyms and abbreviations Thriving on Uncertainty: COVID-19-Related Opportunities for Terrorist Groups 85
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project EU European Union GDP gross domestic product GTD Global Terrorism Database ISF Iraqi Security Forces ISGS Islamic State in the Greater Sahara ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JNIM Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin P/CVE preventing and countering violent extremism SDF Syrian Democratic Forces VEO Violent Extremist Organization
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