Right-Wing Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Europe – an Overview

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Right-Wing Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Europe – an Overview Seventh meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol – video conference, 28 and 29 September 2020 Memo: Right-wing violent extremism and terrorism in Europe – an overview I. Background In October 2019 the Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed to work on four priority issues, namely creating a better situational overview, continuing to develop and share good practices for strengthening the prevention, detection and addressing of violent extremism and terrorism, addressing the spread of unlawful right-wing extremist content online and offline and cooperating with key third countries. At the present time there is no EU-wide uniform definition of violent right-wing extremism and terrorism. The present legal position is that Europol assists member states in combating right- wing extremism and terrorism, particularly by promoting analytical capacity and exchanges of information through the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). Member states also use the Europol analysis project Dolphin for providing relevant data on right-wing extremism and terrorism. Operational meetings are also held on various areas of activity. In addition, the Europol Information System (EIS) remains available to provide instant information and highlight international aspects of criminal police cases. II. The present situation According to the latest EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, dated 23 June 2020, three EU member states provided information on a total of six right-wing terrorist attacks in the EU in 2019. One of these was completed (United Kingdom), one failed (Lithuania) and four were foiled (three in the UK and one in Poland). Germany, the report states, also reported two attacks carried out by right-wing extremists, but these were not classifiable as terrorism in German law. All of the perpetrators were motivated by extreme right-wing ideology, were male and were nationals of the countries in which the attacks were carried out or planned. Violent right-wing extremists maintained international links, which was reflected in their participation in concerts and demonstrations in various EU member states. Online communication, according to the report, has also strengthened links between right-wing extremist individuals. Several member states, such as Belgium, France, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, also reported the emergence of paramilitary groups that focus on a perceived threat from Islam and immigration and see it as the role of the state to protect the population from these. One of the common components of the otherwise heterogeneous ideology of violent right-wing extremists was a belief in the superiority of the ‘white race’, which would have to fight a ‘race war’. This confrontation, said the report, was regarded as unavoidable if success were to be achieved in halting the alleged conspiracy of the ‘system’ to replace white populations through mass immigration. To propagate their ideology, right-wing extremists were using websites, online discussion forums and pseudo-news sites. 18 September 2020 Seventh meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol – video conference, 28 and 29 September 2020 Page 2 Europol also sees a considerable risk of radicalisation in non-violent extreme right-wing movements such as the Identitarian Movement, because they encourage hatred and inspire lone actors to carry out acts of violence. III. Developments in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic In May 2020, Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, stated in a report that the pandemic was being used by right-wing extremists for the pursuit of their political goals. The insecurity and fear generated by the pandemic could also encourage new forms of violent activism or even terrorism, associated with conspiracy theories, concern about perceived overstepping of governmental powers and technophobia. He considered it paradoxical that right-wing extremists criticised delays in taking action to prevent the spread of the virus yet rejected the imposed restrictions as an attack on personal liberty and as a covert means of exercising more control over the population. They attributed the spread of the virus to open borders and ‘lax’ governmental migration policies. Conspiracy theories, which asserted that the Chinese, US or Israeli Government had deliberately created and spread the virus, were being widely circulated. In addition, the report stated, the present situation had been exploited to stigmatise minority groups and spread disinformation. It referred to cases in which right-wing extremists promoted the use of the virus as an easily accessible ‘weapon’, encouraging their followers to spread it deliberately among their ‘enemies’. They had also taken advantage of the risks associated with lockdown to carry out cyberattacks. Because of the need to spend longer periods at home and the consequent social isolation, people were spending far more time online than usual, which increased the potential impact of disinformation and extremist propaganda. The crisis, said Mr de Kerchove, was also regarded as an opportunity to instigate a ‘race war’. The notion that indiscriminate violence on a large scale should be unleashed to bring about social change through this ‘warfare’ seemed more credible and appealing at a time when a huge health crisis was raging. IV. Outlook The German Presidency of the Council regards the fight against violent right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism as a priority. Accordingly, a political debate on this subject is on the agenda for the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in December 2020. .
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