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Home , Behavioral contagion, Cultural nationalism, Groupthink, Nationalism, Notes on Nationalism, Patriotism

NOTES

1. National and Patriotic Feeling

1. "The tendency of man to prefer the familiar to the unfamiliar is universal. Even those who search for new experiences and delight on the exotic seek reassurance in the familiar and the habitual. As the world is presently organized, the familiar and the habitual are principally equated with the national, sometimes directly, sometimes through the further identification of family and with .... The familiar , the familiar food, the familiar humour, the familiar interpersonal responses-including, as Kipling wrote, the familiar lies-all are affectionately related to nation" (Grodzins, 1956:22). 2. The formation of was not identical in all societies. In some cases, the socioeconomic were determining; in others, the wish to liberate the country from the foreign ruler played the dominant role; at times, the formation of new nations and nation-states was one of the consequences of the breakup of the great , and so on (cf. Smith, 1991:43-70). 3. Horowitz (1985:55) attempts to solve many puzzles of ethnicity and , including multiple , by regarding "ethnic affiliations as being lo• cated along a continuum of ways in which people organize and categorize themselves. At one end there is voluntary membership; at the other, membership given at birth. We like to think of birth and choice as mutually exclusive principles of membership, but all institutions are infused with components of both." The fact is that, in any society, it is very hard to strike and maintain a balance between these two principles. The more so because different groups within society, and at different times, tip the balance either in favor of the birth or the choice principle. 4. Nationalists, as a rule, point out the importance of the common ethnic descent and shared . Following this line of reasoning, Kellas (1991:51-2) makes a distinction between ethnic (the nationalism of ethnic groups who define their nation in exclusive terms, mainly on the basis of common descent) and social nationalism (the nationalism of a nation that defines itself by social ties and culture rather than by common descent). 5. Thisfundarnental tension between primordial and civil sentiments Geertz (1963:10) articulated as follows: "It is this crystallization of a direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments-this 'longing not to belong to any other group'-that gives to the problem variously called , parochial• ism, , and so on, a more ominous and deeply threatening quality 197 198 NOTES

than most of the other, also very serious and intractable, problems the states face." And Hutchinson (1994:194), for his part, states that "the intrinsic tension between ethnic identifications, which are necessarily exclusive and hierarchal, and the commitment to -equality has created problems of stability both for communist and liberal-democratic states in modem which are not ethnically homogenous. It is chastening to note that even in societies (, the USA, Australia) with a relatively weak historical sense and without mythic claims to 'primordial' , foundation myths are associated with a specific ethnic core and with patterns of power and exclusion, and cannot be easily manipulated." Is there any way to overcome this basic conflict between ethnic and national identification, between primordial and civil sentiments? Foon (1986) contends that these two sorts of sentiments are not automatically exclusive of each other. According to this author, this critical perspective stresses five neglected possi• bilities: (1) nonethnic in the , (2) nonpolitical intent in the expression of ethnic identity, (3) ethnic identity that does not involve sentiments of group superiority, (4) the priority of national over ethnic identification if and only when they clash on primary allegiance issue, and (5) the partially situational nature of identification. 6. Stagner (1936:14) dubs the same occurrence cultural schizophrenia. "For exam• ple, Jews in America want to be seen as loyal , not as foreigners, but they also want to preserve group identity and a distinctive culture .... • ese immigrants want to be fully accepted as Americans but they ask to be educated in their own language and to retain their own customs with regard to food and living patterns." 7. According to the dominant principle underlying nationalism, Francis distin• guishes two : demotic and . The former is congruent with Smith's territorial principle, and the latter with Smith's genealogical (ethnic) principle (Smith, 1991:123). Like Smith, Francis (1976:108) considers inherently unstable all organizations resting on these two prin• ciples, which virtually means that the majority of extant states are inherently unstable. "As long as the nation-state itself is not replaced by a type of political power structure that would be more in keeping with the requirements of industrial society, the most promising device for minimizing perpetual unrest, violent oppression, or secessionistic and separatistic movements may be seen in the recognition of all major ethnic units found within the state population as corporations after the manner of nationalities coupled with a rather generous federalism. Yet even the multi-ethnic nation-state, representing a political fed• eration of nationalities, cannot achieve more than a labile equilibrium."

2. What Is Nationalism?

1. Nationalism as a term was mentioned for the first time in 1409 at Leipzig University. It was not before the end of the eighteenth century that it began to NOTES 199

be used in the sense of national egoism. (d. Hyslop, B., 1934, in 1789 According to the General Cahiers, and Kemilainen, A., 1964, Problems Concerning the Word, Concept and Classification). 2. Many scholars who have dealt with nationalism share the idea that nationalism is but a modern form of the human tendency to congregate and to submit to a social entity that is dominant, that is most important, at a given epoch. Thus Hertz (1944:292) points out that nationalism is "certainly but one expression of human instinct and not a bit more natural and more 'latent' than tribalism, clannishness .... Yet it is nationalism, far more than any other expression of human gregariousness, which has come to the fore in modern times." Geertz (1963:106-7) stresses that "the grouping under a common rubric" such as tribalism, parochialism, communalism, nationalism, etc., is not simply adventitious. "These phenomena are in some way similar." Shafer (1980) made the same point: "Group and community sentiments are as old as humankind; nationalism is a late modern, powerful, and pervasive variant." Hayes (1968:12), for his part, contends that "modern nationalism signifies a more or less purposeful effort to revive primitive tribalism on an enlarged and more artificial scale." Yet Gellner (1983:138) argues that nationalism is "a distinctive species of , and one which becomes pervasive and dominant only under certain social conditions, which in fact prevail in the modern world, and nowhere else." Cobban (1969:106-7) states that while " to the community in which for the time being are enshrined the highest aspirations is a perennial quality, the object of that loyalty varied widely from age to age. There is little to suggest that the combination of cultural and political in the idea of the is the last, or that is the highest, of those mortal gods to which men have sometimes paid undue adoration." According to Kedourie (1960:72), "patriotism, affection for one's own coun• try, or one's group, loyalty to its institution, and zeal for its defense, is a sentiment known among all kinds of men; so is , which is dislike of the stranger, the outsider, and reluctance to admit him into one's own group. Neither senti• ment depends on a particular and neither asserts a particular doctrine of the state or of the individual's relation to it. Nationalism does both; it is a comprehensive doctrine which leads to a distinctive style of .... If confusion exists, it is because nationalist doctrine has annexed these univer• sally held sentiments to the service of a specific anthropology and metaphysic." Pfaff (1993:196) observes that ethnic and communal conflict, and racial, religious, or linguistic rivalry and struggle exist for reasons having nothing originally to do with nation states, and concludes: "Nationalism is an expression of the primordial attachments of an individual to a group, possessing both positive and destructive powers, and this is a phenomenon which existed long before the group to which such passionate loyalty was attached became the modern nation-state." Garvin (1993:64-5), pointing to the continuities between modern national• isms and older of identitty, stresses that these older tradi- 200 NOTES

tions have a "life of their own and can dictate the form of the succeeding nationalist identity in many important ways, or even take it over .... Modem ... 'sit on top' of older traditions or collective systems .... " And Walzer (1995:331-2) concludes, along the same lines, that tribalism, that is, "the committment of individuals and groups to their own , culture and identity, is a permanent feature of human social life," and its destruction "lies beyond the reach of any repressive power." Yet parochialism, which has been bred by tribalism, "is similarly permanent. It can't be overcome; it has to be accommodated, and therefore the crucial universal principle is that it must always be accommodated: not only my parochialism, but yours as well, and his and hers in their tum." 3. It was Nairn (1981:348) who first said that nationalism can be pictured as the old Roman god, Janus. Nairn contends that it is, essentially, groundless to draw a distinction between "healthy" and "degenerate" sorts of nationalism, because "the substance of nationalism as such is always morally, politically, humanly ambiguous." "Without for a moment," writes Nairn (1981:347--8), "denying that these moral and political distinctions are justified, and indeed obvious, one is none the less forced to point out that the theoretical dimension attaching to them is quite mistaken. The distinctions do not imply the existence of two brands of nationalism, one healthy and one morbid. The point is, as the most elementary comparative analysis will show, that all nationalism is both healthy and morbid. Both and regress are inscribed in its genetic code from the start. This a structural fact about it. And it is a fact to which there are no exceptions: in this sense, it is an exact (not a rhetorical) statement about nationalism to say that it is by nature ambivalent." Griffin (1993:150) calls schizoid this ambiguous nature of nationalism, its capacity for "double thinking, and at times to act both as an enlightened Dr Jekyll and a sociopathological Mr Hyde .... "As long as it has been an active force in history," this author emphasizes (1993:150), "it has always contained the potential for promoting both genuine liberal and its grotesque travesty, one which upholds the rights of on segment of humankind at the expense of others." 4. Mazzini was the first to argue for a need to distinguish a good and a bad nationalism (Hertz, 1944:34), and Balibar (1991:47) points out that all the ques• tions concerning the definition of nationalism revolve around the dilemma: a good nationalism or a bad nationalism. "There is one," writes this author, "which tends to construct a state or a community and the one which tends to subjugate, to destroy; the one which refers to right and the one which refers to might; the one which tolerates other nationalisms and may even argue in their defense and include them a single historical perspective ... and the one which radically excludes them in an imperialist and racist perspective. In short, the internal split within nationalism seems as essential-and as difficult to pin down-as the step that leads from 'dying for one's fatherland' to 'killing for one's country.'" NOTES 201

Various authors use different terms to refer to mainly identical phenom• ena-a good and a bad nationalism: original nationalism and derived national• ism (Hayes, 1928); political nationalism and (Kohn, 1944); people-oriented nationalism and power-oriented nationalism (Bay, Gullvag, Ofstad, and Tonnessen, 1950); a belligerent, megalomaniac, superiority-delu• sional nationalism and a relatively peaceful, self-conceited, isolationist form (van der Dennen, 1987); an ordinary nationalism and a destructive nationalism (Berke, 1989); political nationalism and ethnic nationalism (Nodia, 1994); and soon. 5. The authors of a report on nationalism, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (1939), in a introductory note point to this twofold meaning of nationalism. "Its [of nationalism] effect is not necessarily taken as being confined to the individual's own nation, although admittedly this is very often the case, nor is the nationalist necessarily conceived of as making the interest of his own nation supremely important. In short, the term is used in such a sense that Mazzini, Gladstone, and Woodrow Wilson can be described as exponents of nationalism, as well as Herr Hitler." 6. By applying Meinecke's principle of distinction between the political and cul• tural nation (see Chapter I), Kohn (1944:455-576) has contrasted the western European, and the central and eastern European concepts of nation. Like the different concepts of nation, there are different understandings of nationalism in these regions. Germanophilism and Slavophilism provide examples of cen• tral-eastern European nationalism, in which the emphaSis is on Eigenart (or samobytnost). Arendt (1951:226-7) calls the westernEuropean type of nationalism chauvin• ism, and the central and easternEuropean, tribal nationalism. " now usually thought of in connection with the nationalism integral of Maurras and Bares ... even in its most wildly fantastic manifestations did not hold that men of French origin, born and raised in another country; without any knowledge of would be 'born Frenchmen' thanks to some mysterious quali• ties of body and soul .... In psychological terms, the chief difference between even the most violent chauvinism and this tribal nationalism is that one is extroverted, concerned with visible, spiritual and material achievements of the nation, whereas the other, even in the mildest forms. .. is introverted, concen• trates on the individual's own soul which is considered as the embodiment of the general national qualities." See also Pejovic (1993), who states that "the ethos in has a strong bias towards communalism. The prevailing concept of the community in the region is not the classical-liberal one of a voluntary association of indi• viduals who, in the pursuit of their private ends, join and leave the community by free choice. Instead, the community is seen as an organic whole to which individuals are expected to suboordinate their private their private ends and in which all cooperate to pursue their common ." Along the same lines Hutchinson (1994:17) makes the distinction between the two conceptions of the nation. "The first is civic, focusing on the achievement of an autonomous state of equal citizens, a concept which emerged first in 202 NOTES

Western Europe, and the second is ethnic, associated with Central and Eastern Europe, where the nation was initially conceived of as a historical and cultural individuality which must be preserved or revived." 7. About the transition from liberal nationalism to imperialist nationalism see Arendt, "," In part II The Origins ofTotalitarianism. 8. Griffin (1993:148-9) rightly noticed that the demarcation line between the two nationalisms-nationalism that is "indispensable to the cohesion of democratic institutions and values", and nationalism as "chauvinism, , hyper- or ultra-nationalism" -is rarely as straightforward as it might seem. 9. "What we call style was in the climax of a 'new politics' upon the emerging eighteenth century idea of popular . A common substance of citizenship was said to exist, of which all could partake. No longer would royal or princely dynasties take the place of popular self-expression. The concept was given precision by the 'general will,' as J.J. Rousseau has expressed it, by the belief that only when men are acting together as an assembled people does man's nature as a citizen come into active existence. The general will became a secular , the people worshipping themselves, and the new politics to guide and formalize this . The unity of the people was not merely cemented by the idea of common citizenship; rather a newly awakened national consciousness performed this function" (Mosse, 1975:1). 10. Mead (1968:222) emphasizers that depends upon of unequivocal and mutually exclusive identities and , today represented by national boundaries. In this sense, in considering the alternatives to war, Mead, among negative requirements, points out "the reduction of the strength of all mutually exclusive loyalties, whether of nation, race, class, religion or , and constructing some different form of organizations in which the memory of these loyalties and the organizational residues of these former exclusive loyalties cannot threaten the total structure"; and among positive requirements she emphasizes "the establishment of the conditions for a variety of mutually overlapping and non-exclusive identifications with larger groups of many kinds, without any single or overriding loyalty." This last requirement comes down to a depatriotizing. Morris (1969:153-4), in his book "The Naked Ape," posits that "defeat is what an animal wants, not murder; domination is the goal of aggression, not destruction," and basically humans" do not seem to differ from other species in this respect." However, the original goal has become blurred for the individuals involved in the fighting due to "the vicious combination of attack remoteness and group coopera• tivness." The result is that humans" attack now more to support their comrades than to dominate their enemies." Morris warns that "this unfortunate develop• ment may yet prove to be our undoing and lead to the rapid extinction of the species," and proposes three possible solutions: massive mutual disarmament, to depatriotize the members of the different social groups and to provide and promote harmless symbolic subistitutes for war. The question arises how feasi• ble are these solutions. As far as the depatriotizing is concerned, the author is very skceptical. "This would be working against a fundamental biological feature of our species. As fast as alliances could be forged in one direction, they NOTES 203

would be broken in another. The natural tendency to form social in-groups could never be eradicated without a major genetical change in our make-up, and one which would automatically cause our complex social structure to desintegrate." However questionable is Morris's opinion that such a thing as group mentality is naturally, biologically, genetically conditioned, he is near the mark when he states that there is no way to change humans' tendency to form social ingroups and to prevent all the ramifications and consequences of such a proclivity or disposition. Scheff (1994:2) also excessive committment to only one for one of the most devastating plights humans may experience. "Destructive require not only isolation between nations but also engulfment within: blind loyalty that overrides and ." According to this author (1994:58), nationalism constitutes a bimodal alienation: engulfment within the group, isolation outside of it. 11. Connor (1987:213) states that the question of accommodating ethnonational heterogeneity within a single state revolves about two loyalties-loyalty to the national and loyalty to the state, and gives his opinion about the most likely outcome of this conflict of loyalties. "The great number of bloody separatist movements that have occurred in the past two decades within the first, second, and third worlds bear ample testimony that when the two loyalties are seen as being in irreconcilable conflict, loyalty to the state loses out." 12. Except in periods of crisis, "when international tensions and national fears become dominant," certain circumstances, according to (Grodzins, 1956:51-68), make it comparatively easy for individuals to reconcile nonnational and na• tionalloyalties. The ambiguity of the meaning of the nation. "It is by no means clear in a democratic state what the 'nation' is to which loyalty is required. Is it the in power? Is it the system of government? Is it the moral creed or the historic ideas on which government rests. Is it the duly elected leaders? Is it the enduring cultural complex? .. Individuals and groups define for themselves to which of these 'nations' they owe their allegiance. . .. It is thus possible for all manner of activities to be defined as loyal by all manner of men." In addition to that, loyalty is defined in only negatively. "No constitutional provision or statute attempts to forth what loyalty is. The legal documents define disloyalty: treason, espionage, , and related crimes." Legitimization. The practice of "making other loyalties right and justified by equating them with national loyalty" is quite widespread. "Private and special interests are given the prestige of the national interest. Some persons and organizations argue that their own goals are-or should be-the nation's goals; others take up national programs as their own." The segmentation of life and multiplicity of roles. "The very segmentation of life makes it typically easy for individuals to reconcile the different kinds of action demanded of them by their various group loyalties. . .. A citizen can be exclusively concerned with private affairs and he can still assume that his fulfils his role as citizen. . .. The center of his life and the center of his interests are rarely the nation. The nation's demands can thus be put into a pigeonhole 204 NOTES

alongside other pigeonholes. The segmentation of life makes possible the seg• mentation of loyalties. Expressions of loyalty to the nation seldom conflict with the expression of other loyalties." 13. According to Hertz (1944:21), national aspirations are composed of four ele• ments: the striving for national unity, the striving for national freedom, the striving for separateness, distinctiveness, individuality, originality, or peculiar• ity, and the striving for distinction among nations. Hertz considers the striving for distinction among nations to be the strongest of all four aspirations and to underlie them all. And what seems to be even more important, "the striving for distinction among nations, for honour, dignity, prestige and influence easily becomes a striving for domination." 14. See the paper "Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: an Extension of the Competition Model," in which Nagel and Olzak (1982) account for the resur• gence of ethnic mobilization in the modem world by urbanization, the increased scale of social organization, the expansion of the secondary and tertiary eco• nomic sectors, the expansion of the political sector, and the supranational organizations. 15. Distinction is to be made between crimes inspired by a supraindividual entity and committed in its name and crimes, the perpetrator of which, tries to justify by referring to the dictates and interests of a supraindividual entity. 16. There are a number of psychological studies in which group members are shown to prefer ingroups to outgroups (e.g., Doise, 1972; Kahn and Ryen, 1972; Turner, 1978; Brewer and Silver, 1978; Locksley, Ortiz, and Hepburn, 1980). 17. Connor (1994:46) rightly observes: "Ethnic strife is too often superificially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, customs, economic inequity, or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is that divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the 'us-them' syndrome." 18. "Only when our sense of justice is offended do we react with rage, and this reaction by no means necessarily reflects personal injury" (Arendt, 1970:63). 19. See Smith's (1983) criticism of the van den Berghe's sociobiological position. 20. "Even if it is true that more nationalistic or ethnocentric groups are more likely to survive in time of danger, more nationalistic or ethnocentiic groups may decrease the chances for continued existence by increasing the number of dangerous situations in which they get involved, by decreasing the amount of constructive criticism offered by group members in the face of threats to sur• vival" (Rosenblatt, 1964). Braunthal (1946:5), in a more open and direct form, expresses the same opinion about the perilousness of nationalist views. "Nationalist emotion was the strongest creative force during the last hundred and fifty years. In the age of modem warfare and world-wide economic interdependence it became, how• ever, the most destructive force. Hitherto, nationalist emotion sought its political satisfaction in the sovereignty and grandeur of the national State. In the atomic age, however, national egotism conflicts with the conditions for national self• preservation, because national self-preservation requires the subordination of national sovereignty to an international sovereignty and the subordination of NOTES 205

national economic interests to those of the whole world. The true nationalist must therefore become a true internationalist in to avoid the peril of the impoverishment and destruction of his nation." 21. Wertham's reasoning (1966:88) about the psychological preparation needed for -driven mass killing may also be applied to -inspired taking of other people's lives. This author points out that the dehumanization of people of other races is a part of the rationalization process designed to provide acceptable reason for killing, especially mass killing. Rationalization actually encompasses two steps. The first step is deindividualization: people of another ethnonational background (and another race, too) are not looked upon as individuals but rather as a type or a . The stereotypical view of other people supersedes the individualized approach aimed at respecting the individual specificities of every human being. In the second step the victim is "consigned to nonhuman and is no longer entitled even to mercy"; in other words, he or she is dehumanized. Sanford (1972:40) argues that "since in most there are strong prohi• bitions against killing people ... this process of defining them as outside the human race makes the killing or enslavement possible." Schwartz and Struch (1989:153) share the same opinion: "It is when people dehumanize others, viewing them as lacking the moral sensibilities that distinguish humankind, that they can ignore the internalized and social norms that enjoin compassion and oppose cruelty to others." And Bernard, Ottenberg, and Redl (1971:102) observe that dehumanization as a kind of misperceiving of others ranges from viewing them en bloc as "subhuman" or "bad human" (a long-familiar component of group ) to viewing them as "nonhuman." There are two kindred but distinct forms of dehumanization (Rieber and Kelly, 1991:16). Self-directed dehumanization "relates to intrapsychic events where the self protects itself by immunizing itself against stress-laden situations that threaten to be traumatizing." On the other side, object-dehumanization aims at depersonalizing the other; it strips other people of their human traits. Rieber and Kelly (1991:16) state that enmification, a derivative of enemy (see Chapter 4, "Nationalism and Aggressiveness"), takes the process of object dehumanization "one step further and reduces the other to a 'thing' that is potentially dangereous." The sequence of events might also be reversed so that enmification precedes object dehumanization. Yet Fein (1990:36) questioned the concept itself of dehumanization, because " it presumes an universalistic norm barring collective violence." However, the existence of such a norm, according to this author, cannot be taken for granted. That is why Fein prefers the notion of "the exclusion of the victim from the universe of mutual obligations" to the concept of dehumanization. Fein rightly stresses that the exclusion of the victim from the universe of obligations is necessary but not sufficient condition for genocide, which is always precipitated by purposeful" state action, by instrumental rationality of its perpetrators, given their ends." 206 NOTES

Dehumanization is, according to Bar-Tal (1990:93), one of the most com• monly used contents of delegitimization. This author defines delegitimization (or beliefs of delegitimization) as those "beliefs that downgrade another group with extreme negative social categories for the purpose of excluding it from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values." Delegitimization is a wider notion than dehumaniza• tion, as it includes, among others, the use of extremely negative and unique contents, the rejection of the delegitimized group, and so on. 22. McCall et al. (1974:28) see the social relationship as a form of social organization. Although they considers a relationship between two individuals to be the basic form of social relationship and thereby of social organization, the authors assert that a dyadic relationship is in many regards comparable to relations existing in groups and . 23. Eriksen (1993:62) calls children from "mixed" couples ethnic anomalies. He says that their identity problems "may be similar to those of the children or grand• children of immigrants". Children from ethnically "mixed" couples, according to this author (1993:62), can be considered "as 'neither-nor' or 'both-and,' depending on the situation and/or the wider context." It is interesting, this author adds, that in some places, for example in Mauritius, "mixed" people may be considered a particular . 24. Allport (1954:13-4) points out that attitude and belief are at one and the same time related and different, particularly ethnocentric attitudes and beliefs (e.g., I cannot abide Negroes, is an attitude, and Negroes are smelly, is a belief). "The belief system has a way of stitchering around to justify the more permanent attitude. The process is one of rationalization-of the accommodation of beliefs to attitudes." If effort were made to suppress, to correct an ethnocentric attitude, it, as a rule, would hide, slip into respective belief, and as soon as corrective pressure eased up the attitude would resurface. According to van Dijk (1987:195), ethnic prejudice has five basic properties. " A first property of prejudice is that it is a 'group attitude'-it is shared by the members of a social group (the 'in-group')." In other words, flit is not a set of personal opinions." "Second, the objects of attitude are one or more other groups ('out-groups') that are assumed to be different on any social dimension." In ethnic prejudice, "this difference is attributed to the ethnic characteristic of the out-group." Third, "the overall (macro)evaluation dominating the group atti• tude is negative." Fourth, "the negative opinions of the ethnic attitude are generalizations based on lacking, insufficient, or biased models." Fifth, "the ethnic attitude is acquired, used, and transformed in social contexts and func• tions as the cognitive program for intergroup perceptions and interactions that are structurally favorable for the in-group and its members." 25. Bay et al. (1950:19-20) also state that one cannot talk about distinct and descrete entities-nationalists and nonnationalists. Both can be presented on a dimen• sion. On one pole of this dimension are persons showing a high power orienta• tion, low people orientation, and strong hostility toward outgroups; on the other pole are persons showing low power orientation, high people orientation, and no or very little hostility to outgroups. According to the authors, people-oriented NOTES 207

identification means identifications with people as individual human beings, independently of their social status or power, and power-oriented identification means an identification with symbols of power and authority, that is, with events, institutions, persons, or any other objects in so far as they are perceived as representing power and authority. 26. It was Sumner (1906:13) who first coined the term ethnocentrism and defined it as "this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it .... Each group nourishes its own and vanity, boasts superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these exite its scorn." Originally, ethnocentrism involved a tendency to apply the values and criteria of one's own ethnic group "to other cultural contexts where different values are operative" (Le Vine and Campbell, 1972:1). Ethnocentrism in a broader sense implies people's strong attachment to their national group, whereas "symbols of other groups or their values become objects of contempt and hatred." In this broader sense, the idea of ethnocentrism is close to that of nationalism. In fact, "nationalism and ethnocentrism are similar in the sense that they both usually involve positive attitudes toward an ingroup and negative atti• tudes toward some or all outgroups. They do not overlap completely. National• ism, more often than ethnocentrism, involves loyalty to a politically distinct entity, membership in an elaborately organized and relatively populous social grouping, adherence to a formalized ideology, and performance of relatively stereotyped allegiance-expressing behavior" (Rosenblatt, 1964). Stack (1981:4) also considers nationalism as "only the most visible and politicized manifestation of the phenomenon we call ethnicity." 27. If a partner to an, in ethnonational terms, mixed marriage happens to have ethnonationalist beliefs and, in addition, by his or her psychological make-up, is a assertive person, the other partner, in order to establish and sustain peaceful marital relations (lithe peaceful life under the same roof"), may use the defensive mechanism called identification with the aggressor; and by so doing become the preacher of the same nationalist attitudes as his/her spouse. However, once the partner, who in this context may be considered an authentic ("genuine") nation• alist, has died or the partners, for whatever reason, have split up, the partner who resorted to nationalism for (in the above sense) defensive purposes, quite often, and almost overnight, becomes a fierce enemy of the ethnonational group of his or her former (or late) spouse. I have witnessed many a time this kind of switching from one nationalism to another during the most recent clashes among the ethnonational groups in the Balkans. 28. "Nationalism proved most successful in creating the new politics in part because it was based on emotion. But this emotion did not produce 'a crowd in ecstasy' simply because reason and logic were missing. Rather, the careful efforts of nationalist movements were directed towards disciplining and directing the 208 NOTES

masses in order to avoid that chaos which defeats the creation of a meaningful movement" (Mosse, 1975:16). 29. About the mythopoeic dimension of nationalism see Smith (1976:5). 30. "The past is an essential element, perhaps the essential element in these ideolo• gies (nationalistic). If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented .... The past legitimizes. The past gives a more glorious background to a present that does not have much to show for itself" (Hobsbawm, 1993b) Smith (1995:63) calls the same nationalist invention and glOrification of the past calls 'ethno-history' or ethnic mythistoire. "I mean," says this author, "not an objective historian's dispassionate enquiry into the past but the subjective view of later of a given cultural unit of population of the experience of their real or presumed forebears. That view is inseparable from what the historian and social scientist would term 'myth'." 31. Many scholars consider nationalism to be one of the forms of historicist culture (d. Breuilly, 1982:336; Smith, 1991:97, and others). 32. Two other paradoxes of nationalism, according to Anderson (1987:14), are "(1) the formal universality of nationality as a sociocultural concept-in the modem world one-versus the irremediable particularity of its concrete, so that, by definition, 'Greek' nationality is sui generis, and (2) the political power of nationalism versus its philosophical poverty and even incoherence." 33. In comparing the of the nationalist and Marxist explications of human suffering, Moore (1978:485-6) points to the general advantage of nation• alism. "In the first place, it is simple, which certainly is not. National• ism puts the for whatever is painful in one's own society squarely on an easily identified group: the outsiders, the foreign enemy. There is no need for nuances and complicated causal links. Class consciousness, on the other hand, runs counter to many obvious facts from daily experience. It is hard to put domestic power-holders in the same emotional and category as foreign ones, when every day's news brings evidence of conflict between"our" leaders and those of other states. It is also not so easy to make a steelworker believe that he has a great deal in common with a brewery worker if the price of beer goes up .... The foreign enemy is also a relatively safe target for day-to-day symbolic aggression. Retaliation is far less likely than in the case of an attack on local power-holders. For that reason too the attack is much more likely to attract diverse social support." 34. There are many aspects of the relationship between religion and nationalism. We will mention but a few of them. 1. Nationalism is a substitute for religion. The binding force of nationalism plays the role which religious beliefs used to perform. "The insecurities arising from changes in the material environment have been augmented," asserts Lasswell (1935:50-51), "by the stresses arising from the decline in potency of the older religious symbols and practices. Nationalism and proletarianism are secularized alternatives to the surviving religious patterns, answering to the need of personalities to restabilize themselves in a mobile world." Llobera (1994:144) observes that modem national identity appeared in West• ern Europe at a time "when all the intermediary bonds were collapsing, and NOTES 209

religion itself was losing its grip on the masses." This author attributes the success of nationalism in largely to "the sacred character that the nation has inherited from religion. In its essence the nation is the secularized god of our times" (Llobera, 1994:211). Nationalism can substitute for religion because they have many common features, most clearly articulated by Hayes (1980:164-5) in his book "National• ism: A Religion." "Nationalism, like any religion, calls into play not only the will, but the intellect, the imagination and the emotions. The intellect constructs a speculative theology or mythology of nationalism. The imagination build an unseen world around the eternal past and the everlasting future of one's nationality. The emotions arouse a joy and an ecstasy in the contemplation of the who is all-god and all-protecting, a longing for his favors, a thankfulness for his benefits, a fear of offending him, and feelings of awe and reverence at the immensity of his power and wisdom; they express themselves naturally in worship, both private and public. For nationalism, again like any other religion, is social, and its chief rites are public rites performed in the name and for the salvation of a whole community." 2. Religion is a political extension of traditional . (Smith, 1976:19). The notion of political religion in the sense in which Apter (1963:77-89) uses this term in some way exemplifies this aspect of the relationship between religion and nationalism. Reconciliation systems (a government of and not of humans) are undergo• ing, according to this author, a crisis intensified by the secularization of the religious sphere. "The logic of this argument would be a return to religious belief as the way out of our difficulty." However, this course of action seems to be "highly unlikely," and therefore new solutions are needed. "The resulting internal danger is that reconciliation systems might turn to political religions to reinforce their own position or in an illusory effort to eradicate enemies both within and without. This was the Nazi solution in , and the Fascist solution in Italy." States in which political religion dominates, which arose in the West as a response to the loss of faith, have something in common with theocratic states. "States created through nationalism have taken a form not dissimilar to theoc• racies in that they attempt to create new systems of transcendental values that have the twin effects of establishing for the state and the moral underpinnings necessary to political objectives. In this respect political religion is at least partly employed for nomeligious objectives." 3. The secular and . It was Jurgensmeyer (1993:13-24) who made this distinction. According to this author, "the secular-nationalist loyalties are based in the idea that the legitimacy of the state was rooted in the will of the people, divorced from any religious sanction." Yet the religious nationalism "dismisses secular nationalism as bereft of moral and spiritual values," and its advocates reproach secular nationalism for having failed to , economic prosperity, and social justice. "The vision of relig• ious nationalists is appealing in part because it promises a future that cannot easily fail: its moral and spiritual goals are transcendent and not so easy to gauge as are the more materialistic promises of secular nationalists." 210 NOTES

4. The holy of religion is in many ways entwined with the unholy of nationalism. Nationalism-inspired and driven seek the blessings of their respective gods. "However cynical the leaders might ever have been, their followers generally believed they had these blessings and killed and died because they held certain creeds to be true, practiced certain rites, or-perhaps most commonly-lacking faith or piety or both, simply wore the badges of belonging or not belonging to this or that religious " (Isaacs, 1975:154). The same point is made by Jurgensmeyer (1993:15). He says that religion and nationalism provide an overarching framework of moral order, a framework that commands ultimate loyalty from those who subscribe to it. "Nowhere is this common form of loyalty more evident than in the ability of nationalism and religion, alone among all forms of allegiance, to give moral sanction to martyr• dom and violence." 35. Griffin (1991:26) defines generic in the following way: "Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of a populist ultra-nationalism." 36. Weber (1948:177) writes that "the earliest and most energetic manifestations of the idea (of the nation), in some form, even though it may have been veiled, have contained the legend of a providential 'mission.' Those to whom the representatives of the idea zealously turned were expected to shoulder this mission." 37. "National unity requires both a sense of cohesion or 'fraternity' and a compact, secure, recognized territory or ''; all nationalisms, therefore, strive for such fraternity and homelands. But, since neither are born overnight or ex nihil, both presuppose a long history of collective experience. So 'history' becomes the focal point of nationalism and nation-formation. The 'rediscovery' or 'inven• tion' of history is no longer a scholarly pastime; it is a matter of national honour and collective endeavour" (Smith, 1986:148). In the same sense, the progress in historical studies (not "rediscovery" or "invention" of history) may constitute, according to Rennan (1990:11) a danger for (the principle) of nationality. "Historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity if always effected by means of violence .... " 38. Fukuyama (1991:182) writes that there is no reason to believe that "all people will evaluate themselves as the equals of other people." Rather, they may seek to be recognized as superior to other people," possibly on the basis of true inner worth, but more likely out of an inflated and vain estimate of themselves." Fukuyama dubs as megalothymia (" a new word with ancient Greek roots") this desire to be recognized as superior to other people, and, later (1991:201) adds that "nationalism represents a transmutation of the megalothymia of earlier ages into a more modern and democratic form." 39. Connor (1987:204) points at two main effects or consequences of the fact that the sense of common permeates the ethnonational bond. "First, it qualitatively distinguishes national consciousness from non-kinship identities (such as those based on religion or class) ... and secondly, an intuitive sense of kindredness or NOTES 211

extended family would explain why nations are endowed with a very special psychological dimension-an emotional dimension-not enjoyed by essentially functional or juridicial groupings, such as socia-economic classes or states." 40. Weber (1948:179) stresses that, in the eyes of the nationals, "the significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the group." The politicization of the native culture, Smith (1995:68) observes, often goes hand in hand with the purification of the community. This means, "first of all, jettisoning all '' cultural traits-words, customs, dress, food, artistic styles-and reappropriating vernacular traits for a renewed indigenous culture. But it also means purifying the people themselves, forging the 'new man' and the 'new woman,' in the image of a pristine ideal found only in a idealized past of heroic splendour." 41. Smith (1976: 18) shares the same view. "Every secession movement is fundamen• tally a linguistic movement." Fishman (1985:71-2) calls the language loyalty movement this nationalists' insistence on only "our" culture. The main goal of such a movement is "to activate and use unconscious language-and-ethnicity linkages in order to attain or reallocate econotechnical, political and culturaIl educational power .... Lan• guage loyalty movements utilize language as a medium for reaching the largest possible target population and as a symbol of the purported 'authenticity', 'unity' and 'mission' of that population." The main objective of national linguistic purism is to draw a linguistic boundary between our language and the language of our enemy. "The same enemies that are opposed in the struggle for national identity and are also opposed in the quest for linguistic identity and autonomy" (Fishman, 1973:409). And Hobsbawm (1990:9-11) observes that "problems of power, status, poli• tics and ideology and not of communication or even culture, lie at the heart of the nationalism of language" and adds that that "there is an evident analogy between the insistence of racists on the importance of racial purity and the horrors of miscegenation, and the insistence of so many-one is tempted to say of most-forms of linguistic nationalism on the need to purify the from foreign elements."

3. Social Circumstances and Factors That Incite the Upsurge of Nationalism

1. The analysis of the genesis of nationalism is confounded by the fact that nationalism is at once the effect and cause of some occurrences. "The subtlety of nationalism is such that cause-and-effect relationships are extremely difficult to determine; nationalism itself is amorphous and has a causal influence on other social phenomena as well as being their effect" (Coakley, 1992:214). 2. The reaction of an ethnic minority toward the politics of the center may be similarly motivated. "Ethnic nationalism is the kind of locality or local-level 212 NOTES

response to government intrusion in a political system where government controls the major power sources and where policies are legislated and imple• mented by the center with great consequences for the local level" (Reiter, 1972). 3. See also Lijphart's analysis (1977) of erroneous predictions of the declining relevancy of the ethnic principle in the modem world. 4. Warwick and Cohen (1985:162-201) point out that it is possible to identify three distinct strategies that were developed and implemented by the Communist regime in in order to control or eliminate the centrifugal tendencies of the system that owe their origin to profound interethnic hostilities, These strategies may be termed " fusion" (1945-1950), "evolutionary merging" (1950-1962), and "pluralistic " (1962-1969). See also Bridge, 1977, Some Causes of Political Change in Modern Yugoslavia, pp. 343-368, and Malcolm, Bosnia. A Short History, especially the chapter Bosnia in TItoist Yugoslavia, pp. 193-213. 5. According to the report of a commission for the investigation of lynching, the economic conditions in twenty-one provinces (southern ), where lynching was reported in 1930, rated below the broader regional average (Cantril, 1941:84). 6. Rotschild (1981, cited according to Stavenhagen, 1990:27) talks about politicized ethnicity and ethnopolicy. In this author's view, politcized ethnicity is not the expression of some sort of primordial binding but rather the instrument of the struggle for power. Thus, in some societies, "politicized ethnicity has become the crucial principle of political legitimization and delegitimization of systems, states, regimes and ." 7. Hechter (1986:19-20) states thatethnicity and nationalism have often been more important than class as a basis for group formation and mobilization and provides some explanations of why ethnicity can be expected to overshadow class. Compared with class ties, ethnic ones are "inherently more potent, and qualitatively distinct"; they are also more affective rather than merely instru• mental. Furthermore, "the composition of ethnic groups is more stable from to generation than the composition of classes." Subsequently, "eth• nicity will predominate to the extent that the rate of interclass mobility exceeds the rate of inter ethnic change for the society as a whole." Why? Because groups that are historically more persistent" develop richer and more complex cultures than those having rapid turnover." Being richer in and stability, ethnic groups are able to command greater loyalty; in other words, "ethnic is easier to achieve than class solidarity." 8. "The tribal gods must have had a good laugh in their caves as they watched the socialist hope for a better future based on international working-class solidarity founder precisely on the rocks of 'national' and 'ethnic' differences," writes Isaacs (1975:216). And Moore (1978:116) observes that nationalist and separatist movements have enjoyed many successes in the past fifty-odd years, and that the number and fervor of their supporters is probably much larger than that behind any movement based on revolutionary working-class consciousness. 9. Nationalism is a kind of plebiscitary democracy, which essentially delegitimizes existing political institutions. The social situation that provokes and facilitates NOTES 213

the imposition and buildup of plebiscitary democracy constitutes a latent charismatic situation, characterized "by a break with ordinary behavior, by the development of new modes and criteria for social relations." As a rule, "claimants for charismatic leadership address ultimate values like survival, honor, self-respect, and justice, and not technical problems and their implementation .... If the perception of reality is directly oriented toward ultimate values, the chances grow for an acceptance of the claim to ultimate authority" (Lepsius, 1986:58). 10. In the same sense McNeill (1986:4,6,25,84) considers barbarous any strivings to achieve ethnically uniform national units. 11. Hutchinson and Smith (1994:69) note that nationalists are driven to seek "any cultural marks which can differentiate their population from others and give it lustre. As a result many nationalists have turned to the religious heritages of their societies, transforming them from universalistic belief-systems into em• blems of national . As they do so, the meaning of the religious is secularized and particularized."

4. Causes and Mechanisms of the Spread of Nationalism

1. There are a comparatively small number of authors who point out this, as we dubbed it, the polyvalency of nationalism in functional terms, or, as Hutchinson and Smith (1994:8) call it, "chameleon-like character of nationalism." Thus Andersson (1988:19) states that nationalisms "exhibit great flexibility in being used by very different social groups and classes for different and often conflict• ing purposes," and Mosse (1987:4) emphasizes that everywhere nationalism has many faces, "appropriating the hopes of men and women .... " Toch (1971:17), reasoning along the same lines, writes that social movements in search of mass following frequently follow a saturation method and "try to present a'cafeteria' of appeals, catering to a diversity of needs." Breuilly (1982:350-51), for his part, states that appeal of nationalism is that it enables the nationalist "to take a wide variety of practices and sentiments prevailing among the population of a particular territory and to tum them into political justifications. Be seeming to abolish the distinctions between culture and politics, society and state, private and public, the nationalist has access to a whole range of sentiments, idioms and practices which would hitherto have been regarded as irrelevant to politics but now turned into the values underlying political action." 2. As a rule, ethnonationalist allegiances are evoked from above. Someone or a group of people must be interested in inciting such feelings. "The enormous violence of this century-the world wars, , and so on-was all violence from above, rather than violence from below" (Drucker, 1994). 3. "Nationalism has become structurally embodied, in all parts of the world, as the basis of the modem state. The implication is not that the nation-state is an eternal category or that some less deadly basis of political organization and interna- 214 NOTES

tional solidarity may eventually emerge. It is that there is little sensible that we can say about these possibilities: on this issue, if no other, we lack a reliable gUide to the future. The nation-state (or the would-be nation state) remains the basic political unit. It continues to define the primary space in which political argu• ment takes place. The competing ideas, of a world market dominated by multi-national corporations to whom we owe loyalty, or international proletar• ian solidarity, are equally implausible. In relation to other states and peoples the nation-state also defines the context in which real, as opposed to fantastical, moral choices must be faced" (Mayall, 1990:152). Brown (1989) states that ethnicity is particularly attractive as a basis for political affiliation because it fulfills the following criteria: "(i) it replicates, in the public and adult world, the functions performed in the private and child• hood environment by the family; (ii) the ethnic group is perceived as by its members as a pseudo-kinship group, which promises to provide the all-embrac• ing emotional security offered by the family to the child; (iii) it offers practical support, in the form of nepotism, such as the family gives to its members when they interact with others; and (iv) since the ethnic group is based on the ubiquitous family and kinship ties, it is widely and easily available for utiliza• tion in politics." 4. "Rather than a primordial allegiance that springs up into an organized political movements, we believe that ethnic nationalisms are better explained as political movements that simply utilize a presumed shared ethnicity-as other political movements assume common economic class status-as their basis for recruit• ment" (Fox, Aull, Cimino, 1978:115). 5. Nationality is, according to Deutsch (1953:96), the ability to communicate effectively and over a wider range of subjects. Mutual influence of people of the same national group is, according to Lasswell (1935:37), performed through their mutual identification. "Of great political relevance is mutual identification, whose distinguishing mark is the inclusion of persons within the field of reference of the symbol who are beyond the face-to-face experience of anyone person. The term'American' includes persons who are dead and gone and those who are geographically remote, and thus beyond the primary experience of those identified with the word. Interloping identifications among persons in relation to this symbol make such mutual identifications possible." 6. After reviewing many definitions of the nation Alter (1989:17) concludes that "a nation should be understood as a social group," indicating by that notion "a people or a section of a people." And Connor (1993) points out that the nation is the "largest group that can command a person's loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is from this perspective, the fully extended family." 7. Brown (1985:140) also states that the nation could be regarded as a group. "The concept of group may encompass anything from small face-to-face groups to large groups as a nation." According to this author, "psychologically speaking, a group exists when people think of themselves as members and are affected in their experience or behavior by their membership." The nationals largely meet such a criterion. NOTES 215

8. Some authors argue that nationalism has nothing to do with the specific tenden• cies of humans. Thus, for example, Fukuyama (1991:266--75) considers nation• alism as a historical occurrence that has nothing to do with the human psyche, with anthropological properties. In the same way that " vanquished religion in Europe," it will, according to Fukuyama, make nationalism (more) tolerant, transform it into a person's private matter. However, nationalism ought not be only connected, associated with the nation, and be accounted for only by the nation (viewed as a historical phenome• non). Nationalism is deeply rooted in people's mentality, in the group, which is a more general phenomenon than the nation as a historical group. 9. Can we solve the puzzle of the masses? asks Moscovici (1985:45-6). This puzzle is to be found, according to this author, "in the spiritual affinity of people when united, and an affinity which transforms them and makes them accept without thinking the opinions of their friends, neighbors, or party. More seriously, the people who constitute a crowd are capable-once the crowd has swallowed them up and immersed them in a shared emotion-of excesses of joy and panic, enthusiasm or cruelty. Deeds are done which the conscious mind condemns and which run counter to personal interests. Everything happens as if a collective soul had subjugated the individual soul by wholly transfOrming Man and making a different being of him." 10. In fact self- is in question. The person is losing the characteristics of an individual. The opposite is the deindividuation of the other person. The other person is being treated as a type rather than as a creature endowed with particular traits and features. Due to the fact that a person belongs to a group that is the object of , every and each member of that group is treated in a stereotypical way, that is according to the dictates of the existing stereotype. Campbell and Heginbotham (1991:6) rightly assert that irrespective of the actual loss suffered in particular cases, discrimination is wrong because it manifests an insulating and degrading failure to treat its victims as individuals. 11. Discussing the mirror image magnified, the mechanism which contributes substantially to producing and maintaining serious distortions in the reciprocal images of the nations (the and the United States), Bronfenbrenner (1986:77) points out that the Asch phenomenon operates even more foefully outside the laboratory, where the game of social perceptions being played for keepers. 12. As a matter of fact the personality traits do not have a high predictive validity as far as the kind of reaction ( or nonconformity) to group pressure is concerned. In other words, the role of other situational factors in shaping the individuals' response to group pressure is to be taken into consideration. Thus Blumer (1957:148) points out that social movements (and nationalism is, among other things, a social movement) rarely gain sympathizer!> or members through a mere combination of a preestablished appeal and a preestablished individual psychological bent on which it is brought to bear. "Instead, the prospective sympathizer or member has to be aroused, nurtured, and directed, and the so-called appeal has to be developed and adapted. This takes place through a process in which attention has to be gained, interests awakened, grievances 216 NOTES

exploited, ideas implanted, doubts dispelled, feelings aroused, new objects created, and new perspectives developed." 13. Greenstein's (1975:113) opinion that dispositions toward conformity reduce the impact of the individual's other psychological characteristics on his behavior only partly matches the reality. The fact is that the individual's intense needs to take cues from others is determined by a great number (and not just one or two) of, mainly dynamically related, personal characteristics (traits and tendencies) and thus is not to be seen as reducing the impact of the individual's many other psychological characteristics on his or her behavior. 14. Hoffer (1951:93) describes the consequences of the loss of personal responsibility through the renouncement of the self and becoming the part of a compact whole as follows: "There is not telling to what extremes of cruelty, and ruthlessness a man will go when he is freed from the fears, hesitations, doubts, and the vague stirrings of decency that go with individual judgment. When we lose our individual independence in the corporateness of a mass movement, we find a new freedom-freedom to hate, bully, lie, torture, murder and betray without shame or remorse. Herein undoubtedly lies part of the attractiveness of a mass movement." 15. Braunthal (1946:42) observes that "war and bad faith are the inescapable conse• quences of nationalism." And that what Wertham (1966:85) says for race dis• crimination ("not only may race discrimination lead to violence; it is in itself latent violence") may be applied to ethnonational discrimination, too. Howard (1991:39), for his part, states that "from the very beginning the principle of nationalism was almost indissolubly linked, both in theory and practice, with the idea of war," and Brown (1993:9) maintains that "the emergence of ethnic nationalism makes some form of inevitable." Shafer (1984) made the same point. Does nationalism lead to war? asks this author, and answers: "Not always or all the time, though in any case too often .... Almost everyone must agree that integral nationalism nearly always does sooner or later." 16. Williams (1947) distinguishes instrumental aggression, which is intended to help one party achieve the end for which the struggle is being waged, from expressive aggression, which serves the aggressor to relieve the internal appre• hension. And Buss (1961) speaks about impulsive aggression, behavior in which the aggressor seeks satisfaction in the suffering of the victim, and instrumental aggression, behavior in which the aggressor seeks some other satisfaction, for which the suffering of the victim is only a means. Nationalists' aggression has all these characteristics. 17. There are a great number of studies and collections dealing with aggressiveness and aggression, for example, Scott 1957, Aggression; Buss 1968, Psychology of Aggression; earthy and, Ebling, 1964, Natural History of Aggression; Montagu, 1968, Man and Aggression; Torch, 1980, Violent Men; Siann, 1985, Accounting for Aggression; Klama, 1989, Aggression; Archer and Browne, 1989, Human Aggres• sion; Berkowitz, 1993, Aggression: its Causes, Consequences and Control, and others. 18. In writing about human aggressiveness, Frank (1967:51) points out that the human power to symbolize may be a more important abolisher of inhibitions NOTES 217

against killing our own kind than our relatively ineffective native attack equip• ment and the consequent lack of in-built inhibitions against massacring each other. This "uniquely human power to symbolize, which enables us to regard each other almost at will as conspecifics, prey or predator, and behave accord• ingly, with those whom we regard as like ourselves, we indulge only in ritual• ized non-lethal fighting as games and lawsuits; but like rats, once we define someone as an enemy, no holds are barred .... " The mostly arbitrary definition of the enemy is at the core of nationalism. Thus the uniquely human capabilities, such as prediction ability and power to symbolize, are profusely used in protecting and promoting nationalist cause. 19. Voegelin (1940) uses the term Gegenidee to describe in Germany. The idea of the Jew was built up from all the attributes that uncon• sciously disliked in themselves. In attributing those features to Jews (the Jew as a Gegenidee) Germans articulated the idea (Idee) of themselves as superior beings (Ubermensch). 20. Noteworthy in this context is the distinction made by Holmes (1978) between the projection of undesirable traits onto desirable and undesirable persons. In the first case, "when persons realize that they have an undesirable trait and it is in conflict with their self-concept, they will project the trait onto desirable persons, allegedly so that they can reevaluate the trait as being less undesirable and thus reduce their concern over the possession of the trait." In the second case, "seeing one's own undesirable trait in undesirable persons would appear to reaffirm the trait's undesirability and thus maintain and enhance the threat to self-esteem posed by possession of the trait." 21. It is of note that the Nazi leaders, tried at Nuremberg, were tested by Rorschach inkblot patterns. No mental disorder was evident. The investigating psychiatrist at Nuremberg, D. Kelley, reported: "From our findings, we must conclude not only that such personalities are not unique or insane, but also that they could be duplicated in any country of the world today" (Borofsky and Brand, 1980:362). 22. In an earlier published text (1971:138-9) Sanford states that those who are predisposed will take the lead in any collective destructiveness. "People less disposed will join in later as excitement mounts and the stimulus of what the others are doing becomes intense .... The greater the disposition to collective destructiveness the less the stimuli necessary to evoke destructive action." 23. Platt (1980:82), the author of this metaphor (sense-making crisis), defines it in the following way: "The loss of familiar social orders and one's place in them is potentially chaotic. People who cannot sustain a biographically achieved sense of personal identity, continuity, feelings of worthiness, self-esteem, membership in a community, and so on, are easily overwhelmed by affective experiences. When these conditions are widespread the society is undergoing a sense-making crisis." 24. By the notion of organized insecurity Mannheim (1980:135) means those societal situations wherein, once the unorganized insecurity is more or less over, chan• nels for economic and administrative activities have been established, govern• ment and industry are planned, and so on, but "the psychic disturbances and 218 NOTES

the general breakdown are deliberately guided for the benefit of those who still maintain their rational calculation and, because they stand more or less outside the focal points of the general collapse, are able to remain sober." According to Neumann (1957:291), the institutionalization of anxiety is meant to perform the same goal. The institutionalization of anxiety through , terror, and commonly committed crimes is a means of preventing the extinction of the people's need for protection through submitting to, and identifying with a supraindividual entity, such as , ethnic group, mass, nation, and so on. 25. Poole (1992) seems to be right when, in response to a J. Ree's (1992) paper on internationality, he suggests that "the concept of identity plays a crucial role in our understanding of nationalism." Halliday (1994:231) made the same point: "Most of work done on national• ism in recent years has been on its historical and sociological aspects; yet what has attracted much less attention are the normative claims underlying it. These are that we belong to a nation, that the nation, embodied in its leaders, has a claim over us, that it gives us an identity" (Italic by D.K.). 26. (1983:351-2) considers "unhealed mental wounds" (social and emotional insecurity) to be at the core of nationalism. According to this author, "the destruction of the traditional and orders of social life, in which men's loyalties were deeply involved, by the centralisation and bureaucratic 'ration• alisation' which industrial progress required and generated, deprived great numbers of men of social and emotional security, produced the notorious phenomena of alienation, spiritual homelessness and growing , and needed the creation, by deliberate social policy, of psycholOgical equivalents for the lost cultural, political, religious values on which the older order rested .... For the majority the vacuum was filled neither by professional associations, nor political parties, nor the revolutionary myths ... but by the old, traditional bonds, language, the soil, historical memories real and imaginary, and by institutions of leaders which functioned as incarnations of men's con• ceptions of themselves as a community, a Gemeinschaft-symbols and agencies which are far more powerful than either socialists or enlightened liberals wished to believe." 27. "In times where the traditional distinctions between the normal and the abnor• mal, the permitted and the forbidden have been threatened to the point to be wiped out-nationalism promised to restore order and the respect for immuta• ble values, and maintain clear distinctions between the accepted and the unac• ceptable-guidelines upon which men and women could model their life to escape confusion" (Mosse, 1987:1). 28. The truth is, as was stated in section "Nationalism and Conformity," that in societies where ethnocentric run high, adherence to ethnonational prejudices may be conceived of as kind of social adaptation. 29. The extent to which personal interests are involved in nationalist undertaking, and the attainment of territorial sovereignty is one of the major topics of any , cannot be overestimated. Hechter (1987) comments on the role played by people's personal interests in nationalist strivings for the NOTES 219

attainment of sovereignty in the following way. "Because it is a public good, the attainment of territorial sovereignty is only the ostensible goal of most of the members of nationalist parties. The bulk of any party's members are motivated by the desire to consume private goods. This explains why most nationalist parties fail well before the attainment of territorial sovereignty" (italic by M.H.).

5. Nationalism: Beyond the Normal and the Pathological

1. This bias in social perception has been described by social psychologists as the fundamental attribution error. In interpreting events and the actions of others people overestimate the importance of some intrinsic properties or dispositions of persons, playing down the external or circumstantial causes. 2. There are a great number of authors who regard nationalism and even the national identity as pathological phenomenona. Thus Berke (1989:258) writes that nationalism is "the expression of a perverted or pathological self-absorption and pride," and TIpton (1995) concludes that "the national identity, in short, is a psychiatric delusional syndrome, at once grandiose and persecutory.". The same point is made by Partridge (1928:92): "It may be assumed that within any group there is a tendency towards or possibility of the production of motives, adjustments, and behavior, which are relatively pathological: a striking and perhaps sufficient illustration is the behavior of the national consciousness, particularly in its motivations in war." 3. Sanford and Comstock (1971:3) remind us of a cabaret joke popular in the early 1930s in Germany: "Show me one Nazi." "What do you mean? Here is a whole room full of Nazis." "Yes, but show me one Nazi." The account of this joke does not mean that we identify ethnonationalism and . Although they have many points in common (the idea of the Yolk, the appeal to collective will and brutal drives, and so on), they differ in many aspects. 4. Nairn (1981:348-9) accounts for the irrationality of nationalism by pointing to the fact that it is "through nationalism that societies try to themselves forward to certain kinds of goals . . . by a sort of regression-by looking in• wards, drawing more deeply upon their indigenous resources, resurrecting past folk heroes and myth about themselves and so on." Nairn resorts to a personal• ized metaphor in order to suggest the origin of irrationality of nationalism. "In mobilizing its past in order to leap forward across the threshold, a society is like a man who has to call on all his inherited and (up to this point) largely unconscious powers to confront some inescapable challenge. He summons up such latent energies assuming that, once the challenge is met, they will subside again into a tolerable and settled pattern of personal existence. But the assumption may be wrong. In the social trauma as in the individual one, once these well-springs have been tapped there is no real guarantee that the great forces released will be 'controllable' (in the sense of doing only what they are supposed to do, and no more). The powers of the id are far greater than was realized before Freud exposed them to theoretical view. In the same view, 220 NOTES

the energies contained in customary social structures were far greater than was understood, before the advent of nationalist mobilization stirred up and re• leased them from the old mould." Not only nationalism, but ethnicity and nationality as well are partly nonra• tional, even irrational phenomena. "The non-rational, even irrational dimen• sions of ethnicity are an undeniable aspect of contemporary ethnic mobilizations throughout the world" (Stack, 1986:2). And Connor (1993) points out, "Convic• tion concerning the singular origin and evolution of one's nation, belong to the realm of the sub-conscious and the non-rational (note: not irrational, but non• rational)." One could largely endorse the conclusion made by Eller and Coughlan (1993): "All sociologists and anthropologists would agree that emotion is a crowning feature of ethnic identity." This basic affective quality of ethnic attach• ments renders them nonrational. Nodia (1994:6) made the same point as far as nationalism is concerned: "Nationalism is a nonrational phenomenon." 5. In that sense Atkin (1971) is right when he says that the characterization of war as a social psychosis is superficial and scientifically unsound. 6. Hoffmann (1986) rightly warns: "Even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the 'cure' can only be provided by politics." 7. What are psychiatrists to do with their observations; keep them for themselves or report them publicly? It is hard to be prescriptive, to give psychiatrists any advice, or recommendation. However, one thing is certain: The social effects of their publicly presented observations, or more precisely their warnings, depend primarily on the strength of the social forces that support and incite the spread of nationalism, openly or covertly. 8. As said earlier, projection is one of the most favored defensive mechanisms that nationalists resort to. Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (1975:246) point out that whenever the mechanism of projection is resorted to, we are confronted with a threefold failure: "(i) insufficient reality-testing (which may be described as harmless credulity or, more correctly, as an incorrigible proclivity to prejudice), (ii) insufficient drive control (manifested in an antisocial release of aggres• sion-aggressive and libidinal tensions are discharged onto victims whose weakness makes them a national prey, perhaps because they happen to be a minority), (iii) insufficient integration of the ego (plainly shown in our accep• tance of the alien ego and its judgments, and the access we allow it to the control of our behavior." Money-Kyrle (1951) also states that, as a consequence of projection, reality testing becomes inoperative. 9. The same holds for the various more or less institutionalized tendencies to close, to strictly separate one's own region, territory, group, and so on-tendencies that are almost unavoidably accompanied by the overvaluation of "ours" and the disparagement of "theirs." NOTES 221

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Acton, J.E.E.D., 92 Balibar, E., 200 Agentic state, 129-130 Bad national , 11 Adaptive potential, 39 Ballachey, E.L., 27, 110, 115 Adelson, J., 156 Bar-Tal, D., 206 Adorno, 46, 53, 151, 152, 173, 175 Barbu, Z., 132 Aggressiveness, 131-135 Basic group identity, 28, 36 nationalism and, 137-150 Bass, M., 120 Allen, V.L., 29, 119 Bauman, Z., 53, 170 Allport, G., 51, 110, 148, 175,206 Bay, Ch., 18,67, 201, 206 Alterantive gratification, 152 Bell, D., 84 Altruistic genes, 39-40 Benign aggressiveness, 143 Altemeyer, B., 157 Berger, P.L., 114 Alter, P., 21, 68, 101, 103,214 Berke, J.H., 18,201,219 American Psychiatric Association, 155 Berkowitz, L., 142, 144,216 Anderson, B., 57, 58, 208 Berlin, 1., 54, 76, 218 Anderson, E.L., 77 Bernard, v.w., 205 Andersson, J., 213 Billig, M., 29, 30 Andric, 1., 149 Black-white schematism, 51 Anomie, 161 Blood and soil, 188 Anti-, 55 Blood kinship, 75 Anti-Semitism, 151, 217 Bloom, W., 10, 11, 88, 138 Apter, D.E., 209 Blumer, H., 215 Apter, M.J., 168 Bochner,S., 161 Archer, J., 216 Boehm,H.,24 Arendt, H., 60,149,201,202,204 Bogardus, E.S., 47 Argyle, W.J., 70, 221 Borofsky, G.L., 217 Aronson, R., 187 Brand, D.J., 217 AS (Anti-Semite Feeling) Scale, 151 Braun, J.A., 119 Asch, S.E., 111, 113 Braunthal, J., 90, 95, 145, 204, 216 Ascribed relationships, 44-45 Breakwell, G.M., 32 Atkin,S., 220 Breuilly, J., 69, 89, 93, 103, 122, 208, 213 Attribution theory, 181 Brewer, M.B., 29, 204 Auli, Ch., 214 Bridge,S., 212 Authoritarian character, 150 Brinton, c., 12 Authoritarian personality, 150 Bronfenbrenner, U., 215 Nationalism and, 151-152 Brotherhood within-warlikeness without Autokinetic effect, 11-12 pattern, 34-42 Brown, D., 214 Bagley, c., 174, 177 Brown, D.E., 38 Baker, J.M., 155 Brown, E.M., 216 237 238 INDEX

Brown, H., 159,214 Dawkins, R., 39 Brown, R, 38 Deci, E., 116-117 Browne, K., 216 Declaration of the Rights of Man, 18 Built-in inhibitions, 140 Dedifferentiating tendency, 84 Buss, A.H., 47, 216 Dehumanization, 41,56,74,205-206 object directed, 205 Calhoun, c., 54, 167 self-directed, 205 Campbell, D.T., 207 Deindividuation, 106,215 Campbell, E., 156 Demarcations, 52 Campbell, T., 36, 183, 215 Depatriotizing tendency, 202 Canetti, E., 106, 107 Dethematization, 192 Canning, RR, 155 Deutsch, K.w., 113, 214 Cantril, H., 212 Deutsch, M., 113 Carthy, J.D., 216 Dichotomization, 51 Cartwright, D., 35 Displacement, 49,145 Cimino, L., 214 Dogan, M., 21 Chamy, I.w., 42, 74, 125, 165, 187 Dogmatism, 176 Chauvinism, 201-202 Doise, W., 204 Children from "mixed" couples, 206 Dollard, J., 141 Chipman, J., 123 Doob, L.W., 2, 4, 52, 67-70, 72, 110 Chirot, D., 25, 42 Double loyalty, 85 Chosen people, 69 Double nationals, 45 Christie, R, 154 Drucker, P., 213 Civil sentiments, 197 Dual attachment, 9, 14 Coakley, J., 211 Duck,S., 52 Cobban, A., 199 Duckitt, J., 49, 138, 177 Cochrane, R., 63 Durando, D., 85 Cohen, L.J., 212 Djilas, A., 171 Collective behavior, 101-104 tentatively pathological, 189 Ebling, EJ., 216 Collective identity, 21 Ehrlich, H.J., 45-46, 172, 174-175, 177 Collective selfhood, 187 Elms, A., 131, 155 Collective social facts, 187 Eller, J.D., 220 Collective will, 20, 201 Emerson, R., 21 Collectivistic ideologies, 20 Enmification, 147, 205 Collins, B.E., 35 Eriksen, T.H., 206 Communalism, 199,221 Erikson, E.H., 10,41,171, 187 Comstock, c., 219 Eros, 133 Conformity, 110-115 Ethnic cleansing, 76 personality and, 115-120 Ethnic group, 31 Connor, w., 14, 77, 85, 187,203,204,210, Ethnic mentality, 26, 31-32 214,220 Ethnic mobilization, 87,100-103 Cooper, J., 102, 116, 119 Ethnic principle, 9, 32, 198 Coughlan, RH., 220 Ethnic superiority, 65-66 Counterantropomorphization, 129 Ethnocentrism, 36, 38, 207 Craving for immortality, 59 nationalism and, 207 Crocker, J., 174 , 208 Crutchfield, RA., 27, 110, 115 Ethnonational heterogeneity, 203 CSCE (the Conference for Security and Co• Ethnonational prejudices, 45-48, 206 operation in Europe), 91 Ethnonational prejudices in children, Culture shock, 161 172-174,206 INDEX 239

Ethnonationally "mixed" marriages, 45, 206 Greenfeld, L., 7, 20-21, 25, 42 Ethnopolity, 212 Greenstein, EI., 216 E (Ethnocentrism) Scale, 151 Griffin, R., 18, 34, 62, 160, 200, 202, 210 Evans, R.I., 110 Grodzins, M., 157, 197, 203 Existential human needs, 143 Group, 26-32 Expedient conformity, 119-120 cohesion of, 35-37 External sources of motivation, 116 mentality of, 26-36 Extraspecific aggression, 42-74 nation as, 100-103, 214-215 Group mind, 21 Fanatical, 183, 186 Guetzkow, H., 23 the nationalist and, 186-187 Fascism, , viii, 210 Haas, E.B., Fear of responsibility, 169-170 Habermas,J.,10 Feelings of desertation, and isolation, Halliday, E, 218 165-166 Halo effect, 48 Feelings of infirmity, 168-169 Hamilton, W.D., 39 Fein, H., 205 Hayes, C, 15, 18-21,27,199,201, 209 Festinger, L., 35,106 Hechter, M., 212, 219 Fishman, J.A., 211 Heginbotham, Co, 36, 183, 215 Fleiner-Gerster, T., 91 Heller, A., 132 Folk society, 56' Hepburn, C, 204 Foucault, M., 182 Herrenvolk , 65 Foon, Ch.5., 198 Hertz, E, 4, 6, 199-200,204 Fox, R.G., 214 Hewstone, M., 146 Francis, E.K., 198 High self-monitors, 117-118 Frank, J.D., 28, 217 Hill, P., 76 Frenkel-Brunswik, E., 45,53, 151, 152 Hobsbawm, E., 39, 208, 211 Freud,S., 10,35, 105, 133 Hockenos, P., 83 F (Fascism) Scale, 151 Hoffer, E., 10, 216 Fromm, E., 33, 140, 143-144, 150-151, 156 Hoffman, M.L., 172 Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, Hoffmann,S., 220 141-143 Holmes, D.5., 217 Fukuyama, E, 210, 215 Holon,34 Furnham, A., 156, 161 Horkheimer, E., 150 Horowitz, D.L., 31, 197 Garvin, M., 199 Hovland, CI., 87 Geertz, Cl., 59, 87, 187, 199,221 Howard, M., 216 Gellner, E., 199 Hughes, A., 156 Gemeinschaft, 218 Huizinga, J., 4 Genealogical principle, 198 Human universals, 38 General will, 202 Hutchinson, J" 198,201,213 Generalized other, 10-11 Hyman, RH., 154 Genetic selfishness, 39 Hyslop, B., 199 Gerard, H., 113 Germanophilism, 201 International Classification of Diseases, "Givens," 87, 187 10th Edition (lCD-10), 155 Glass, J.M., 188-189 Identity diffusion, 167-168 Glenny, M., 167 Identity-securing interpretive system, 10-11 Globalization, 84 Ignatieff, M., 69, 170 Goldstein, J., 52 Image hypothesis, 50 Green, M., 162-163 Informative , 119-120 240 INDEX

In-group(s), viii, 204-206 Locus of control, 116 Ingroup preference, 38 Low self-monitors, 117-118 Ingerman, C, 174 Loyalty, 8, 9, 23-24, 203-204 Innate predispositions, 107-108 contradictory, 22 Integrative cravings, 28 double, 85 Integrative tendencies, 33-34 , 76 Intergroup conflicts, 38-39 Le Bon, G., 104, 107, 109 Interethnic marriages, 52, 206 Lepsius, M.R, 213 Insufficient reality testing, 192 Le Vine, R, 172-173,207 Internal sources of motivation, 116 Levinston, D.]., 45, 53, 151, 152 Intolerance of ambiguities and rigidity, Lijphart, A., 212 175 Linguistic purism, 76, 211 Intraspecific aggression, 41 Linton, R., 75 Isaacs, H.R, 28, 36, 86, 165, 210, 212 Lippa, R.A., 110 Isaacs, S., 36 Llobera, J.R, 209 Locksley, A, 204 Jahoda, M., 154, 186 Lorenz, K, 135-136, 139 James, W., 118 Janis, 1.1., 105-106 MacIver, RM., 28 Janus, 17 Malcolm, N., 212 Jarvis, R, 50 Mallick, K, 174 Johnston, 1., 146 Malouf, D., 2 Jurgensmeyer, M., 209-210 Mannheim, K, 164,217 Malignant aggressiveness, 144 Kahn, AS., 204 Mann, 1., 125 Kaldor, M., 65 Mantrell, D., 125 Kamenka, E., 17 Maslow, A., 4, 143, 150 Katz, Ph.D., 171 Mass behavior, 102-108 Kecmanovic, D., 161, 185 Mass killing, 205 Kedourie, E., 199 Mass media, 95 Kellas, J.G., 18, 137, 197 Maxwell, M., 41 Kelly, R]., 147, 205 Mayall, J., 70,170,214 Kemilainen, A., 199 McCall, G.]., 42-44, 206 Kiesler, Ch.A., 110, 119 McCandless, 156 Kiesler, S.8., 110, 119 McGraw, KM., 174 Kilham, w., 125 McNeill, W.H., 213 Killian, 10M., 110 Mead, H.H., 10 Kin altruism, 40 Mead, M., 202 Klama, J., 216 Megalothymia, 210 Klineberg, 0., 47 Meinecke, E, 7 Koestler, A, 34 Mental contagion, 108-109 Kohn, H., 16--18,21,55,69,201 Michels, R, 3, 57 Krech, D., 27, 110, 115 Milgram, S., 103, 123, 125, 126-131, 155 Kristeva, J., 35,62 Militant enthusiasm, 135-138 Kuhn, M.H., 10 Mill, J.5., 25 Kupchan, CA, 18 Miller, N.E., 141 Kutner, 8., 176 Millner, D., 47 Kwan, KM., 77 Minogue, KR, 58 (s), 82 Lasswell, H.D., 208, 214 Misanthropy, 156 Latent tendencies, 107-108 Mitscherlich, A, 220 INDEX 241

Mitscherlich, M., 220 Nationalism (cant.) Moore, B., 36,208,212 civic,18 Money-Kyrle, R, 220 closed,18 Monson, T.e., 117 collectivistic, 20-21 Montagu, M.F.A., 216 cultural, 18, 201 Moralism, 55-56 culture and, 76 Morgenthau, H.J., 22 definition of, 15-22, 212 Morris, H., 202-203 democratic, 18 Moscovici, S., 215 demotic, 18, 198 Mosse, G.L., 107, 202, 208, 213, 218 derived, 18, 201 Mowrer, O. H., 141 destructive, 18 Moynihan, D.P., 146 endemic, 182, 190 Multiple nationalities, 8-9 epidemic, 182, 190 ethnic exclusive, 18, 65, 197,212 Nagel, J., 87, 204 ethnocentirsm and, 207 Nairn, T., 200, 219 fraud, robbery and, 178-178 Nation, 6-10 horizontal, 65 cultural, 7-8 humanitarian, 18 political, 7-8 hyper, 202 National botany, 4 illiberal, 18 National character, 65 individualistic, 18, 20-21 National conscience, 131 integral, 19-20, 202 National consciousness, 211 irrationality of, 219-220 National dynamics, 35 jingoistic, 20 National egotism, 204 liberal, 19-20 National feeling, 1-13 megalomanic, 201 basic group identity and, 28 mythopoetic dimension of, 208 culture and, 3,4 mystic-nostalgic, 57 mythology of, 4 open, 18 national identity and, 10-12 original, 18, 201 patriotic feeling and, 1-6, 8 peaceful, 201 perverted, 42 people oriented, 201 people and, 3 political rational, 18, 201 physical environment and, 2-3 power oriented, 201 National group, 6-10, 19-20,23 racism and, 75 instrumentalization of, 100-101 religion and, 68, 208-210 National identity, 7-8, 16 religious, 208-210 social identity and, 100 revenge and, 77 National independence, 17 secular, 209 National symbols, 11 self-conceited, 201 National zoology, 4 social, 197 Nationalism social inclusive, 18 as bimodal alienation, 203 spread of, 97-100, 102 as indifference to reality, 185 superiority-delusional, 201 as mass behavior, 102-107 territorial, 18 as resentment, 64, 66 totalitarian-aggressive, 18 as self-preservation, 204-205 tribal,201 as unhealthy life-style, 192-193 two concepts of, 18 authoritarian, 20-21 ultra, 202 belligerent, 201 vertical, 65 ethnocentrism and, 207 war and, 60, 90, 216 242 INDEX

Nationalist catastrophic predictions, Prejudices, 45-48, 186 64 ethnic, 29-30, 172-174,206 Nationalist ideology, 48-67 negative, 47 thematic characteristics of. 61-67 positive, 47 Nationalist sentiment, 22 Primordial attachment, 9, 87 Nationalists (hard and soft), 47,57 Primordial sentiment, 197 (im)morality of, 56 Primordial time, 57 Nazism, viii, 219 Promised land, 69 Nazis, 219 Pseudospaciation,41 Negative generalization, 53 Psychology of intergroup relations, 37 Normalized psychopathy, 163 Psychopaths. See Personality disorders} Normative social influence, 119-120 Neumann, F., 145, 164,218 Quinton, A, 183 Newcomb, T.M., 23, 106, 116 Nodia, G., 18, 201, 220 Racial consciousness, 171 Radden, J., 184 Raven, B., 35 Obedience, 123-127 Ray, J.J., 156 nationalism and, 127-131 Rayner,J.,52 Olzak, 5., 87, 204 Reactive formation, 152 Organized insecurity, 217-218 Redl, F., 205 Orientational other, 10-11 Ree, J., 218 Ortiz, 204 v., Rehnson, S.A., 4 Orwell,S, 185 Reich, w., 150 Ottenberg, P., 205 Reiter, R R, 2122 Out-group(s), viii, 204, 206 Rennan, E., 210 Overgeneralization, 192 Reproductive fitness, 40 Oversimplification, 50-51 Retribalization, 86 Revenge,77 , 19 Rieber, RW., 147, 162-163, 205 Palingenesis, 62 Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), Parochialism, 199 157 Parsons, T., 84 Rokeach, M., 154,176 Partridge, G., 219 Rose, 5., 47 Patriotic feeling, 1-13 Rosenbaum, M., 125 national feeling and, 12-14 Rosenberg., 174 , Patriotic myths, 57 Rosenblatt, P.c., 204, 207 Patriotism, 4,5, 199 Rotschild, J., 212 PEC (Political Economic Conservativism) Rotter, J.B., 116 Scale, 151 Royal Institute of International Affairs, 16, Pejovic, 5., 201 201 Pepitone, A, 106 Royce, A.P., 18 Personal disorders, 148-149 Ruch, F.R, 126 Personal identity, 32, 37 Russen, B., 36-37 Pfaff, W., 199 Ryen, AH., 204 Plamenatz, J., 16 Platt, G.M., 160, 217 Sampson, RV., 35 Political parties and movements, 94-95 Sanctioned communication, 192 Poole, R, 218 Sanford, N., 45, 53, 151-152, 155, 158,205, , 54-55 217,219 Positive self-image, 37-38 Scapegoat, 144-145 INDEX 243

Schafner, P.E., 157 Stone, W.E, 157 Scheff, Th.J., 21, 203 Struch, N., 205 Schonbach,~, 175, 177 Sullivan, P., 156 Schwartz, S.H., 205 Sumner, w.G., 36, 207 Scotomization, 192 Superrealism, 153 Scott, J., 216 Sutherland, St. 47-48 Sears, G.H., 141 Symmons-Symonolewicz, K., 20, 103, Sears, S. S., 141 162 Sears, R, 87 Seeman, M., 161 Tajfel, H., 29,178 Self-assertive tendencies, 34 Tarde, G., 109 Self-deindividualization, 215 TAT (Test of Thematic Apereception), Self determinism, 17 151 Self-image, 37-38 Tehranian, M., 18 Selective perception and memory, 192 Tendency to unjustified generalizations, Sense-making cirsis, 160 175 Selznick, G.J., 154 Terhune, K.w., 156 Shafer, B.C., 12, 16, 199,216 Territorial principle, 9, 31, 198 Shanab, M.E., 125 Thanatos, 133 Sherif, M., 111-113 Thompson, L.L., 174 Shibutani, T., 39, 56, 77 Tipton, B., 219 Siann, G., 216 Toch, H., 213 Sidanius, J., 175 Torch, H., 103,216 Siegman, A.w., 156 , 56-57 Silver, M., 204 Tribalism, 199,221 Simpson, G.E., 47 Trotter, w., 107 Slavophilism, 201 True conformity, 120-121 Smith, A.D., 7-9, 14, 16, 18, 23, 31, 59, Turner, J.c., 29, 37, 204 60, 76, 138, 197-198,208-211, Turner, R.H., 110 213 Smith, M.B., Smith, M.G., 204 Uniformity, 53-54 Snyder, L.L., 15-16 Unorganized insecurity, 164 Snyder, M., 116-118 Unreasonableness, 188-189 Sobel, M., 63 Us-them syndrome, 36-37, 39, 48, 146, Social categorization, 29 204 Social distance, 47 Social distress syndrome, 162 Van den Berghe,~, 39-41,100 Social identity theory, 30, 38-39 Van der Dennen, J.M.G., 201 Sociobiological concept, 39-41 Van Dijk, T.A., 30, 53, 74, 206 Sovereignty, 7, 17,72,219 Vaughn, U., 155 as justification for nationalsm, 72 Verma, GK, 174 Specifical memory, 138 Voegelin, E., 217 Stack, J.E, 100, 166-167, 207, 220 Volk, viii, 219 Stagner, R., 150, 198 Volkan, V.D., 146 Staub, E., 29, 34,36, 56, 149, 167 Stavenhagen, R., 212 Steinberg, S., 154 Wagner, U., 175, 177 Steiner, I.D., 116 Wallerstein, I., 61 Stereotype, 47, 186 Walzer, M., 200 244 INDEX

Warwick, P.V., 212 Xenophobia, 156, 199 Weber, M., 160,210-211 Wertham, F., 205, 216 Yahya, L. A., 125 Wheeler, L. 109 Yinger, I.M. 47 White, K., 155 Young, L., 174 White, L.A., 39 Williams, R.M., 216 Zander, A., 35 Worchel, S., 102, 116, 119 Zematto, G., 6 World Health Organization, 155 Zimbardo, P.G. 106, 126